

EUI WORKING PAPERS

RSCAS No. 2004/24



Three Rifts, Two Reconciliations:
Franco-American Relations During the Fifth
Republic

Georges-Henri Soutou



EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Transatlantic Programme Series

EUI Working Paper RSCAS No. 2004/24

Georges-Henri Soutou, *Three Rifts, Two Reconciliations: Franco-American Relations During the Fifth Republic*

The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies carries out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of European integration and public policy in Europe. It hosts the annual European Forum. Details of this and the other research of the centre can be found on:

<http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/>.

Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:

<http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Publications/>.

The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES

*Three Rifts, Two Reconciliations:
Franco-American Relations During the Fifth Republic*

GEORGES-HENRI SOUTOU

EUI Working Paper **RSCAS** No. 2004/24
BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO DI FIESOLE (FI)

All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed or utilised
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without
the prior permission in writing from the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

Download and print of the electronic edition for teaching or research non commercial use is permitted
on fair use grounds—one readable copy per machine and one printed copy per page. Each copy should
include the notice of copyright.

Permission for quotation should be addressed directly to the author(s). See contact details at end of text.
Source should be acknowledged.

ISSN 1028-3625

© 2004 Georges-Henri Soutou

Printed in Italy in November 2004
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I – 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy

<http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/publications/>

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Transatlantic Programme

The Transatlantic Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies conducts policy-oriented and basic research on the subjects of transatlantic relations and transatlantic governance. Our activities aim at improving public and scholarly understanding of transatlantic partnership, and the role of the transatlantic partners in issues of global governance. The Transatlantic Programme was established in Autumn 2000, thanks to a generous grant from BP.

For further information:

Transatlantic Programme
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Via delle Fontanelle, 19
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy

Fax: + 39 055 4685 770

E-mail: atlantic@iue.it

<http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/transatlantic/Index.shtml>

Abstract

There is a widespread view that Franco-American relations have been consistently difficult at least since the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, but not so difficult as to prevent the two countries from joining together in times of crisis. However, after having simmered for years, the current Franco-American rift, as opposed to the recurrent tensions of the Cold War period, is most probably a lasting reality with no real reconciliation in view. This new lasting rift has occurred for four reasons. The first is that the French have recently experienced a sea change in their view of international relations: they no longer see their interest lying in close bilateral Franco-American cooperation, even on terms favourable to France. The second and third relate to French geopolitical interests and ideology, while the last involves the institutional evolution of French political life. There is as of now no possible domestic political arrangement, either on the left or on the right, for a real re-founding of Franco-American and Franco-Atlantic relations. In short, changes in France's international position, in the French self-conception, and in domestic political arrangements all tend to undermine deeper transatlantic cooperation and necessitate a reformulation of the balance between Europe and America.

Keywords: transatlantic relations, NATO, French foreign policy

Introduction

There is a widespread view that Franco-American relations have been consistently difficult at least since the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, but not so difficult as to prevent the two countries from joining together in times of crisis. The reality is more complex: the state of relations between France and the United States has not been a stable quantity but has instead oscillated over time, with a series of rifts and reconciliations. But the current crisis is more severe and goes deeper than previous ones, and is therefore likely to last longer—or even to become permanent.

To understand this, it is essential to realize that the French have recently experienced a sea change in their world view: they no longer see close bilateral Franco-American cooperation, even on terms favourable to France, as a central interest. The reasons for this change of heart are manifold, including the transformation of geopolitics, ideological shifts within French society, and changes in the structure and conduct of French domestic politics. But the inescapable result of these various changes is that maintaining positive relations with the United States is no longer a priority for a large portion of the French political class. Thus while maintaining Franco-American relations on an even keel has never been an easy task, repairing the breach in bilateral relations occasioned by the Third Gulf War will therefore be even more difficult than in times past.

To make this point, I begin this chapter with an overview of the efforts of Georges Pompidou and Valéry Giscard-d'Estaing to broker reconciliations with the Americans following bilateral crises during their respective presidencies. The success of their efforts, I will argue, was due in large measure to the substantially convergent interests of Paris and Washington during the Cold War. Absent that convergence, the efforts of Jacques Chirac during the mid-1990s to upgrade Franco-American relations did not succeed; underlying motivations were now too divergent on both sides. I then turn to the characteristics of the current situation that militate against successful reconciliation following the recent war in Iraq, or at least reconciliation along the lines of past efforts. I conclude with some observations about the conditions under which a genuine improvement in relations between France and the United States might be possible.

Franco-American Relations during the Cold War

The legacy of de Gaulle for the French political system was immense, especially with respect to foreign affairs. After 1962 Franco-American relations entered a state of perpetual crisis, climaxing with the French withdrawal from the NATO integrated command structures in 1966. But during 1969-1970 President Georges Pompidou largely succeeded in restoring positive relations, and managed to do so without renouncing the basic tenet of Gaullist foreign policy: national independence. Later, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing similarly managed to repair breaches in the bilateral relationship that had developed during the Nixon-Kissinger years. To understand these developments it is necessary to consider the strategic orientation of these two French presidents as well as the domestic political constraints under which they operated.

Pompidou and the First Franco-American Reconciliation

Unlike de Gaulle, Pompidou's world view and foreign policy agenda did not collide directly with those of the Americans. He believed that the American guarantee to Europe against the Soviet menace was essential. He therefore wanted American troops to remain in Europe, and stated so publicly; he believed that Franco-American cooperation was necessary to prevent German *Ostpolitik* from going astray. He understood the need for American help in developing the French *Force de Frappe*. Whereas de Gaulle had tried to capitalize on American difficulties in Vietnam, Pompidou was discreetly helpful, convinced as he was that opposition to the Vietnam war on the internal French scene had been

seminal for the outburst of 1968.¹ As for the Middle East, he believed that France should not try to insist on a special role which might undercut American peace efforts.

In short, Pompidou's preferred policies did not differ as sharply from those of Washington as had been the case with de Gaulle. On top of that, President Pompidou had to rely on a governing majority which included the two Atlanticist parties, the *Républicains Indépendants* and the Centrists. Repairing Franco-American relations was part of the mandate which got him elected in 1969, even while he had to take into account still another (and the most important) component of his majority, the Gaullists, and therefore to strike a fine balance among the three.²

But while electoral considerations reinforced Pompidou's Atlanticism, it was not the source thereof. De Gaulle had believed that the great ideologies were on the decline, that nationalism was reasserting itself in Eastern Europe and Russia, and hence that communism was in long-term decline. But Pompidou was much less sanguine. The Soviet system was certainly evolving, but it would be a long process; meanwhile, the West should do nothing which might hamper its collective resistance to communism. Whereas De Gaulle believed in a new European order, based on Franco-Soviet cooperation and with the United States pushed back to the periphery as a sort of guarantor of last resort, Pompidou would have none of it. He neither believed in nor favoured such a new order, especially because in his view it would rely on cooperation between Germany and the USSR rather than Franco-Soviet cooperation. He resisted all attempts by the Soviets (and by parts of his own government) to establish a contractual Franco-Soviet relationship akin to the Franco-German Elysée Treaty of 1963.³ For all those reasons, and with ready cooperation from Nixon and Kissinger, Pompidou oversaw the restoration of positive Franco-American relations in the three years following his assumption of office in 1969; on several important issues the two countries cooperated quite closely.⁴ A new balance was struck: France would not return to the integrated command structures of NATO, but on all substantive issues the two countries would collaborate or at least consult constantly and in depth.

New Tensions and a Second Reconciliation

The Franco-American relationship turned sour once again in 1973-1974. Both the Yom Kippur war and efforts to develop a united western reaction to the subsequent oil shock played substantial roles in this period of crisis, exacerbated by Henry Kissinger's attempt to force the European Community to consult with Washington on all external issues before reaching decisions (the U.S. Secretary of State's so-called 'year of Europe'). But there was another, underlying cause to the rift: the Soviet-American SALT negotiations and especially the Nixon-Brezhnev Agreement on June 22, 1973 for 'the prevention of a nuclear war.' This agreement was understood in Paris as tantamount to a Soviet-American condominium over Europe. This was, by the way, a rather un-Gaullist concern: France was not opposing a western bloc, but was regretting that the West was not enough of a bloc!

Despite these deep differences, Pompidou managed to keep the new rift within manageable limits (against the more aggressive views of some of his ministers). Most significantly, he instructed Foreign Minister Michel Jobert to negotiate the Ottawa Declaration, subsequently passed by the Atlantic Council on June 19, 1974, some weeks after Pompidou's untimely death. That Declaration substantially resolved the outstanding issues, including the relationship between the EEC and the US, and officially acknowledged the value to the Alliance of the French and the British deterrents. Under the trying circumstances, the successful negotiation of the Ottawa Declaration was a substantial accomplishment; indeed, it remained the basis of relations between France and NATO until the end of the Cold War.⁵ Still, the Franco-American relationship remained tense. After 1972, Pompidou increasingly feared both Soviet-American *détente* and the acceleration of German *Ostpolitik*, believing that western Europe might become the victim of either an American-Soviet condominium or of a German-Soviet one. In his view, the only possible answer for Paris to those mounting dangers was the further development of the European Community, including establishing it with a strong identity that extended to foreign policy and defence, while at the same time retaining the absolute independence of

the French deterrent and refusing to rejoin the integrated structure of NATO. Indeed, at the very end of his term, Pompidou reverted to an increasingly orthodox version of Gaullism. As a result, relations between Paris and Washington remained frosty; it was not until after the election of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing that a closer and more cordial relationship was restored.

Elected in May 1974, Giscard was the head of the *Républicains Indépendants*, and thus the leader of the pro-American part of the French *bourgeoisie*. He met with President Ford on the island of Martinique on 14-16 December 1974, where the two men agreed to overcome previous differences about energy policies and also decided to continue secret Franco-American relations concerning nuclear cooperation.⁶ Of course Giscard had no desire to break with the Gaullist mantra of 'national independence,' nor could he have done so had he wished to since the Gaullist party represented an essential part of his parliamentary support. Indeed the lack of a parliamentary majority that genuinely supported his foreign policy was Giscard's bane throughout his time in office. On the other side of the aisle the Socialist party, reconstituted after 1970, had itself become much less Atlanticist than previously, even allying itself with the Communists in 1972. Hence there was no longer a majority on the left or the right, or even a potential majority of the centre, that actively favoured accommodation with America; the domestic political situation was in this sense even more constraining than it had been during the presidency of de Gaulle. But despite this evolution of domestic affairs during Giscard's presidency, bilateral cooperation with the US once again became quite close. In Africa, for example, in the Kolwezi operation of 1978, Washington and Paris worked together to stem Soviet advances.⁷

During this period Paris upgraded cooperation with NATO, as an expression of Giscard's new strategic doctrine—a doctrine that was much less opposed than previously to the American concept of graduated deterrence. Thus Giscard implicitly admitted that the security of France was linked to that of its neighbours, and did not exclude the possibility of French participation in NATO's forward defence. He even conceded the possible eventual use of French tactical nuclear weapons within in the framework of NATO strategy and not exclusively in defence of French territory, as part of a purely national deterrence strategy. At his instruction conversations were held between General Méry, the French military chief of staff, and SACEUR (General Alexander Haig), and procedures were established for an eventual nuclear planning cooperation. Another positive contribution to the Atlantic Alliance took place at the Guadeloupe summit of January 1979, when Giscard helped negotiate the 'double-track' decision about intermediate range missiles in answer to the Soviet SS-20s (that is, the decision to simultaneously pursue negotiations with Moscow and preparations for the installation of American Pershing-II missiles and cruise missiles in Europe should those negotiations fail).⁸

In short, Giscard succeeded in both restoring and expanding the Franco-American reconciliation first engineered by Pompidou. France still did not return to the integrated command of NATO, but the consequences of the 1966 rift were largely overcome. And this was accomplished despite strong opposition from Gaullist quarters. Still, beginning from the very start of President Jimmy Carter's term in 1977, French relations with Washington once again soured. Fortuitous external circumstances managed to check the consequences of this breakdown in relations, but the breach was never fully repaired.

New Failure, but no New Reconciliation

There were several reasons for the new breakdown in relations. To begin with, there was a strong Gaullist reaction against the closer links to NATO, complicating Giscard's domestic situation. In addition, however, the French president had evident misgivings about the ability of Carter to withstand the pressures of the 'new Cold War.' Finally, Giscard desired, in close agreement with German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, to save *détente* and to cushion Western Europe from the consequences of both the Afghan crisis and mounting tensions in Eastern Europe.⁹ Of these many and somewhat contradictory impulses, Giscard retrospectively stressed—in his memoirs, *Le pouvoir et la vie*—the doubts he had about Carter's ability to withstand Soviet pressure. But at the time he expressed much more forcefully his disagreement with the American president's wish to inject some basic moral and

liberal values into the East-West relationship, and to pressure Moscow on those points. As he told *Newsweek* on July 25th, 1977:

What seems clear in Mr. Carter's foreign policy is that he has introduced a fresh ideological dimension. This undoubtedly met certain needs—such as nonproliferation, arms limitations and human rights—just as it met some of my own preoccupations, but it has compromised the process of *détente*. The question now arises whether or how new ideological themes can be applied without provoking negative reactions.

What Paris did not realize at the time was that Carter, despite his often hesitating stance, was beginning to change the rules of the Cold War. With his insistence upon human rights and genuine disarmament, while at the same time modernizing the American armed forces, his policies laid the foundation for a rejection of the *détente* of the Nixon-Kissinger era and movement towards a new policy framework that ultimately proved much more threatening to the stability of the Soviet system. But Giscard's attitude towards Carter has a deeper explanation, valid by the way for most French leaders during the Cold War, as I explain in the next section.

In any event, with the election of François Mitterrand in May 1981 Giscard lost whatever opportunity he may have had to mend fences with the Americans. Mitterrand's agenda did not include any closer links to NATO, and French foreign and strategic policy regarding the US and the Atlantic Alliance returned to a kind of Gaullist orthodoxy tinged with leftist ideology. With the Cold War's end, Mitterrand likely believed that NATO would soon be disbanded; thus he vigorously pursued the aim of a European foreign policy and defence identity outside NATO. But he was no more able than de Gaulle had been to overcome the opposition of Germany, and for that matter of most of France's European partners, to such an approach. Thus Franco-American relations remained in a state of more or less cordial deadlock from around the end of Giscard's term until Chirac's gambit in 1995, with Washington unable to bring France back into the fold but France likewise unable to united Europe behind her to redress the transatlantic imbalance.¹⁰

The French Cold War Agenda: Reality versus Rhetoric

These oscillations between periods of Franco-American tension and episodes of cooperation are probably best explained by the real agenda, as opposed to public rhetoric, of France during the Cold War. This secret agenda precluded a wholehearted and permanent cooperation with Washington, but at the same time French ulterior motives during this period were not entirely incompatible with American policies and did not prevent a cautious cooperation on topics of common interests. These motives, which could never be frankly acknowledged, had to do with fears about Germany and desire for a closer and more prestigious bilateral relationship with the United States.

The first of these ulterior motives is best encapsulated by the notion of 'double security.' This meant in the first place security against Germany (or at least a counterweight against the growing German influence) through the division of the country, which was a central fact of the French international environment until the end of the Cold War. But Paris also relied upon West Germany, firmly embedded in the European Community and NATO, as a useful pillar for French security against the second big perceived security problem since 1947-1948: the Soviet Union and the expansion of Soviet communism.¹¹

A second ulterior motive of French policy was the wish to retain a tacit reinsurance against Germany in Moscow: to ensure that the Soviet Union could be counted upon to prevent German reunification and to resist or at least balance German-American relationship that became too close, a permanent fear in Paris since 1950. After all, the Soviets had signed the Potsdam agreements, which the French were now defending with tooth and nail against the more relaxed attitude of the Anglo-Saxons, because they formed the basis of French superiority over Germany. In addition, until the very end of the Cold War the Soviets regularly let Paris know that Moscow was amenable to such tacit cooperation, and even tried to bring France at least indirectly into their orbit. And many in Paris expressed interest in upgrading the Soviet relationship, especially in the period immediately after the

death of Stalin, under de Gaulle, during the 1970s, and once again at the end of the Cold War. The trick for successive French governments, and more generally for French diplomacy, was to nibble at the Russian bait in order to encourage the Soviets' continued resistance to German reunification and to help Paris escape the embrace of the German-American couple, without actually getting hooked.¹²

The third part of the unspoken agenda was to maintain as far as possible a strong bilateral (as opposed to a NATO-related) relationship with Washington. This was deemed necessary for practical reasons, including nuclear cooperation with the US and more general bilateral cooperation in new technologies, but most importantly to demonstrate France's continued significance in world politics. Paris resented the American-British special relationship and strove to achieve the same status for itself in Washington. Even de Gaulle desired this, and until late 1962 tried to upgrade the Franco-American relationship in the framework of a trilateral directorate (with London and Washington) of the Atlantic alliance. And Pompidou and Giscard realized perfectly the importance of Franco-American cooperation for the defence of French interests in the fields of international trade and finance.¹³

The consequence was that there was sufficient overlap between French and American interests that relations were tolerably good as long as Washington agreed to maintain a bilateral dialogue with Paris, did not try to privilege the German-American dialogue, and followed a prudent policy with Moscow—that is to say, a policy that was firm but that also promoted *détente* without trying to achieve a Soviet-American superpower condominium above the heads of the Europeans. This explains both the good understanding (at least initially) between Pompidou, Nixon and Kissinger, since all three were disquieted by German *Ostpolitik*, and also the difficulties between Giscard d'Estaing and Carter, who was accused of being both too lax and too ideological in his relations with Moscow as well as too ready to further German ambitions. Much the same could be said about the relationship between Mitterrand and Reagan, although Mitterrand, like de Gaulle, was something of an exception to this stylized account of French foreign policy proclivities. But the main point is that there was frequently sufficient tacit convergence between the positions of Paris and Washington to keep recurrent bilateral tensions in check.

But there were indeed exceptions to the French agenda as I have outlined it. De Gaulle and to a lesser extent Mitterrand had in mind a different system of European security, which would have relied on a special Franco-Soviet relationship in order to control the German problem with the US pushed to the periphery of the system. Within that framework there was no overlap between French and American interests, and hence no buffer on bilateral tensions. De Gaulle's insistence on such an approach to France's international relations largely explains Franco-American difficulties between 1963 and 1969. As for Mitterrand, only the speedy demise of Soviet communism prevented a real clash with Washington.¹⁴

But even for Pompidou and Giscard, the circumstances of the Cold War were essential for the practicality of this underlying French agenda, and thus for the possibility of a tolerably good Franco-American relationship. After all, the Cold War arrangements promoted by the United States within the NATO framework were highly beneficial for France: the partition of Germany helped resolve one set of concerns, while the American security guarantee at last achieved with the Atlantic Alliance in 1949 had been sought by Paris since 1919. Whether the French foreign policy agenda described above was advisable or judicious in the long term is a question I do not address in this essay. But it is evident that the end of the Cold War quickly changed the assumptions underlying such an approach.

The Cold War ended, as I have suggested, with Franco-American relations in poor shape, having been in a state of low-level crisis since the latter portion of Giscard's presidency and throughout Mitterrand's two presidential terms. But shortly after assuming office, President Jacques Chirac suggested a solution which would have put Franco-American and transatlantic relations on a much better institutional footing. Since the 1960s the French had repeatedly tried to form an European security identity alongside and outside of NATO, and Chirac realized that this was not acceptable to France's partners (especially Germany). He decided to break the deadlock by having France first rejoin NATO, and then working inside NATO to promote a European defence identity inside rather than outside the Atlantic alliance. Chirac's proposal, put forward in 1995 and 1996, would have fully

returned France to NATO's integrated command structure, which France left in 1966; NATO in turn would recognize the existence of a European identity inside the Alliance and set up a special European chain of command inside the different NATO staffs, allowing the Europeans to use NATO assets in operations in which the Americans chose not to participate. That compromise was accepted and promulgated by the Atlantic Council in Berlin in June 1996;¹⁵ but it was ultimately to fail, because of a major disagreement between Paris and Washington about the commanding officer for NATO's Mediterranean forces, headquartered in Naples. The Americans wanted to retain the position (the American admiral in Naples is also the commander of the Sixth Fleet), while the French felt it should go to an European admiral.

Beyond that surface difference the real reason of this new Franco-American difference lay in diverging ulterior motives on both sides. Almost certainly France wished to retain, through an agreement with NATO promoting a European defence set-up, a greater weight in Washington than the now reunified Germany, and to continue to distinguish itself from its eastern neighbour by its enduring world role at the highest level of the Alliance, on a par with Washington and London.¹⁶ On the other side Washington was convinced it should keep a tight grip on NATO as an instrument of regional and global security against the new threats arising after the end of the Cold War, consistent with the 'New Concept for NATO' adopted in Washington on April 25, 1999. It bears noting that this New Concept explicitly opened the possibility of out-of-area action for NATO forces acting without an UN mandate, a feature of the new strategy that the French tried hard to tone down.

In any event, the tentative Franco-American agreement of 1996 ultimately failed.¹⁷ Of course that failure did not prevent close Franco-American cooperation in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999. But the lack of a real solution to deep-seated Franco-American differences, including coming to grips with the relationship between NATO and a European foreign policy and defence identity, greatly contributed to the transatlantic break over Iraq in 2002-03.

Thus from 1963 to the present, the Franco-American relationship has been characterized by three deep rifts or ruptures but only two genuine reconciliations. Pompidou succeeded in mending fences with the Americans following de Gaulle's tempestuous presidency, but by 1973-74 relations between Paris and Washington were once again in crisis. Giscard built upon the legacy of the Ottawa Declaration, authorized by Pompidou shortly before his death, to achieve a second reconciliation with the Americans, culminating with the double-track decision of 1979. But Giscard's relations with Carter were never good, and by the end of his presidency the bilateral relationship was again in peril. It remained so until the election of Jacques Chirac, who sought to return France to NATO on the basis of a new understanding within the Alliance regarding the role of a European defence identity. But Chirac's proposal did not succeed, and the Franco-American relationship remained mired in a low-level crisis until tensions erupted in the run-up to the war in Iraq.

The Current Crisis: From Tacit Convergence to Differing World Views

Is the current crisis a conjunctural accident, due simply to a major difference of views about the way to handle the Iraq question? Official commentary and many private specialists favour this interpretation, together with an emphasis on the inherent differences between American 'unilateralism' and the multilateralism extolled by France. And indeed there is no question that in the Iraq crisis the US showed small regard for the three major international organizations it set up or contributed to setting up after 1945, the United Nations (UN), NATO and the European Union, by acting outside the framework of the first two institutions and playing upon the divisions within the third. And current American foreign policy is indeed the object of serious scientific debate in France,¹⁸ as well as of heated controversies.¹⁹ But things go much deeper than the quite real differences about the problem of a UN mandate for Iraq and so-called American unilateralism, which itself is not a new development but a permanent tendency.

Of course, the present transatlantic crisis is not the first. And the earlier crises were sooner or later resolved, usually tolerably quickly. The same thing might occur this time, but there are good reasons to doubt it, because both the international environment and French policy have changed deeply in recent years. After

having simmered for years the current Franco-American rift, as opposed to the recurrent tensions of the Cold War period, is most probably a lasting reality, with no real reconciliation in view, for four reasons.

Foreign Policy Theory

The first reason is that the French have recently experienced a sea change in their view of international relations: they no longer see their interest lying in close bilateral Franco-American cooperation, even on terms favourable to France. This represents an important shift from what all French leaders, including de Gaulle, have tried to achieve since 1945 (or even since 1919). Present French foreign policy is in this respect of course a development of the Gaullist policy of national independence, but it goes much further. For de Gaulle himself, there was still some sort of useful relationship with the United States, despite all the differences between Paris and Washington, if only as guarantor of last resort; this was true of his foreign policy even after the crisis of 1963. But present French foreign policy is in this respect different even from the course outlined by Jacques Chirac in 1995-1996.

The term 'multipolarity' goes to the heart of the matter. A quick perusal of the website of the Quai d'Orsay, where all official pronouncements and foreign policy speeches by the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs since 1990 are listed, should be sufficient to make the point.²⁰ Once there, one can search for particular words or expressions. Such an exercise reveals that the word 'multipolaire' had appeared in 152 speeches or declarations by Jacques Chirac between his assumption of office in 1995 and the end of July 2003.

What is the French understanding of multipolarity? In the bipolar world of the Cold War, there were two 'blocs.' France refused to belong definitively to either of the two, but was instead aligned with the West, recognizing that the US was essential to maintaining peace and the bipolar balance. Indeed, French leaders quite happily nurtured the national interest within that framework, with the American security guarantee enabling the policy of 'double security' towards Germany and the USSR, and a kind of tacit reinsurance in Moscow to balance discreetly both the US and Germany. But today the bipolar world order no longer exists, and therefore these considerations no longer obtain. Instead, in the French view the role played by the United States has changed: it has become unilateralist if not outright imperialistic, and is no longer interested in, and has even turned against, the three major institutions it promoted after 1945: the UN, NATO and a unified Europe. (The irony of the fact that Paris at times was no strong supporter of at least the first two of those institutions does not escape some commentators.)²¹

Current American foreign policy is therefore seen as dangerous, because it leads to a 'clash of civilizations' and to instability. This policy therefore has to be resisted in the framework of a 'multipolar world,' that is to say a world where there will be several major actors besides the United States, and major alliances that will not include the United States. Among these global players and partnerships will be a European Union with a strong foreign policy identity under the guidance of the Franco-German partnership (which, by the way, has been strongly revived since the autumn of 2002); a Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis; China; India; and enhanced links between France (and therefore Europe) and Africa. It should be stressed that despite some superficial convergence, this vision is fundamentally different from the world system recently advocated by Henry Kissinger, a system of interlocking regional balances where the US would play a cooperative but central role in all regions.²² For the French, 'multipolarity' is not meant to enhance or even to modify the global role of the United States, but to reduce it, because American power and policy are currently regarded as excessive and unbalanced.²³

And American reactions to these French views certainly have been excessive. For example, at the end of June 2003 the Bush administration's National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, condemned multipolarity as an outmoded remnant of the past, 'a necessary evil that sustained the absence of war but did not promote the triumph of peace'; she added that something different, under American leadership, must take its place.²⁴ But such a response doesn't do justice to the thinking in Paris, where the government is articulating a much more sophisticated and intellectually valid vision than Ms. Rice's comments suggest. As President Chirac explained in Brussels on April 29, 2003:

[...] When we watch the evolution of the world, we see that in a quite natural way a multipolar world is taking shape, whether we wish it or not; it is an unavoidable development. Not only the US and Europe, but also China, India, and South America will form new groupings in the near future, that is to say in the next fifty or hundred years. Links between those groupings will have to be strong if clashes are to be avoided, especially between groupings with the same culture—that is, mainly between Europe and the US. But, for the sake of balance, it will be necessary that a strong Europe and a strong US be linked together by a strong pact, that is a pact resting on their common culture.

That is what we defend, and that means of course that relations between Europe and the US will be complementary, amounting to a partnership—of course between equal partners, or there is no partnership and it is another kind of world. It is not the world that France recognizes and wishes.²⁵

But while the dispute with the United States is certainly the focus of current attention, the French position about multipolarity is better understood in the framework of debates within France about the possible evolution of the global political system. For French realists, states will retain their international role; for idealists, transnational forces and phenomena will supersede the former international system of relations among nations-states and ensure final peace. But for the realist school only political hegemony, not benevolent social forces, could usher in world peace, and hegemony has to be absolutely resisted—with the United States being the aspiring hegemon at present (the ‘hyperpower’ of Hubert Védrine, Foreign Minister de Villepin’s predecessor at the Quai d’Orsay). But most French analysts do not believe that the world system would long tolerate a hegemon, even a benevolent one. Hence multipolarity is both a lasting fact of international life and a desirable objective.²⁶

On top of that, the tradition of French diplomacy since before 1945 has been to call for a multilateral approach to problems, to support the United Nations and the Security Council, and to take into account regional situations as well as economic and social imbalances as major factors of world tensions. According to that tradition, the aim of policy should be to go to the roots of problems; hence international life is not a series a crisis to be solved one by one, but a complex mix of long-term structural problems that need to be addressed with continuity and persistence. Of course the articulation of these views has often been self-serving, French policy has not always been a model of consistency, and France has frequently failed to convince her partners with these arguments—at least until recently. But such inconsistencies are typical of foreign policy, and not only in France. The point is that Paris generally frames its policy actions within a consistent and coherent world view that has significant cross-party appeal to the French.²⁷

Geopolitical Interests

The second important factor underlying increasing Franco-American tensions goes beyond diverging theories of international relations, and has to do instead with very real geopolitical factors. French geopolitical interests and aims have remained basically the same since de Gaulle: to take the leadership of Europe through a strong Franco-German link and thus by proxy to retain world influence, an influence that is political but also economic and cultural. But the end of the Cold War, German reunification, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the continued evolution of Germany and of Russia, and the perceived change in American foreign policy have modified the French game, or at least, if not the goal of the game, its rules. In particular, the US is no longer considered to be a useful ally or at least a sort of reinsurance of last resort, but instead to be the main obstacle to the achievement of French goals.

The first of these goals is the achievement of a European defence and foreign policy identity, an aim going back to de Gaulle and reaffirmed by Mitterrand with the Maastricht Treaty.²⁸ This aim was re-launched on November 22, 2002, with a new Franco-German proposal to the European Union suggesting the adoption of a clause of mutual assistance between members of the EU and the building of a core group of countries willing to collaborate more closely in matters of security and defence; the joint proposal also suggested an increase in armaments cooperation.²⁹ This led to a summit meeting in Brussels between the leaders of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg at the end of April 2003, endorsing those proposals and suggesting the set-up of a European military staff independent of NATO.

Of course it was widely noted that the Brussels summit took place without the participation of Great Britain, despite the fact that her military contribution would be essential and that Prime Minister Blair had been instrumental in restarting the idea of a European defence with the Saint-Malo Declaration of December 1998 (signed by Blair and Chirac).³⁰ Blair's absence from the Brussels summit was of course a result of the deep European rift induced by the Iraq crisis, and it is certain that a majority of European countries are not willing to follow the French lead if it means setting up a European defence system outside NATO. At the same time, American leaders are too complacent in believing that France is not making headway in this respect: it is enough to read articles I-39 and I-40 of the project for a European constitution, adopted in June 2003 by the European Convention, to realize that the idea of a common European foreign and defence policy is making real progress even if most European countries still do not wish it either to contradict or to supersede NATO. And when Tony Blair did finally meet with Chirac and Schröder in Berlin on September 20, 2003, he extended a hand—albeit prudently—towards the two other countries on the matter of European defence. While Blair plainly still resists any European set-up that might contradict NATO, it is nonetheless clear that things are moving.³¹

Another main direction of French geopolitical policy is developing a close relationship with Russia. Jacques Chirac, on January 10, 2003, mentioned 'the vitality of our [Franco-Russian] strategic partnership,' and added that 'France was striving for the establishment of an ambitious strategic partnership between Russia and the European Union, with France in the vanguard.' In July 2002 a 'council for security cooperation' was established between the two countries, with foreign and defence ministers to meet every six months. Cooperation in matters of space and aeronautics (including the project of a common advanced fighter) is thriving.³² There are also ideas for further promoting a Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis.³³ The leaders of the three countries now meet regularly and their common approach towards Iraq, despite frequent prognostications that either Germany or Russia (or both) would soon veer towards Washington, still holds.

More generally the French believe that the problems of Europe call for, in addition to the further development of the European Union, much closer cooperation between the three major countries of the continent. This prescription applies to energy, trade and European security, but also to practical and complex problems such as the Kaliningrad enclave. And anyway the French are quite comfortable with a revitalized big powers diplomacy, especially as this stands a better chance of enhancing the role of Paris than does a common European foreign policy, a goal that is still at some distance and whose substance France might have trouble controlling in the more and more complex institutional framework of the enlarged European Union.

A third strategic direction is the establishment of substantial links with North Africa, both to keep an eye on developments there and to give more weight to France at the international level. During his visit to Algeria in March 2003, President Chirac insisted on the special nature of Franco-Algerian cooperation as a leading factor in the establishment of a close relationship between the European Union and North Africa. He underlined the fact that one Frenchman out of six has a personal relationship to Algeria, either as French refugee after 1962, a descendant of French refugees, or as an Algerian immigrant. He further underscored the 'links established between the two countries by Islam, the second religion in France'³⁴—factors that, I might add, were certainly not without effect on Paris' attitude in the Iraq crisis. And on March 4, in a speech to the students of Oran University, Chirac forcefully condemned theories about 'the clash of civilizations' and extolled the role of the United Nations, as well as positing the principle of cultural diversity as a buffer against the spread of globalization. Two weeks earlier, Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin had stressed the concept of a partnership between the European Union and North Africa, and stated that France, despite the enlargement of the EU towards the east, would 'make sure that Europe's relation with the Mediterranean remains a strategic priority.'³⁵

Still another strategic direction which Paris is nurturing is relations with sub-Saharan Africa, where Chirac and de Villepin have decided to reengage France in Africa after the relative disengagement of the 1990s.³⁶ Accordingly, Paris has been instrumental in the recent engagement of the European Union

in Congo, with two aims: to promote a ‘strategic presence of Europe in Africa,’ and to set an example for European military operations outside NATO.³⁷

Ideology

The third important factor behind current differences between Paris and Washington is ideology. Neither de Gaulle, Pompidou nor Giscard d’Estaing ever felt or expressed the view that basic values differ across the Atlantic. Indeed, during all major crises (Berlin and Cuba, for example) de Gaulle stressed the basic solidarity between Europe and America, ‘her daughter.’ But this is no longer the case: the French consider themselves and Europe at large to represent a culture and a world view quite different from that of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’. And this sense of cultural separation goes beyond the well-known disputes about the death penalty, the environment, and the International Criminal Court. As Olivier Mongin, director of the well-known journal *Esprit*, wrote recently (in an article provocatively titled ‘Which values? For which Europe?’):

In order to inscribe the European Union in world history, it is necessary to promote specific values setting her apart from those values which an imperial post-Cold War strategy is forcing on the other side of the Atlantic.³⁸

It is enough to read de Villepin’s speech to representatives of the Freemasons on the 275th anniversary of Freemasonry (June 25, 2003) to understand that his conception of ‘European identity’ relies on a set of values—‘a modern and rejuvenated humanism’ resting on ‘justice, solidarity and responsibility’—that sets it apart from what is understood, at least in France, as ‘American’ or ‘Anglo-Saxon liberalism.’³⁹

All this has much to do with the perceived need to defend a French model against the disruptive forces of ‘globalization’ and ‘communitarization’ (with the latter phenomenon often linked with the heavy immigration that has taken place since the beginning of the 1970s). And this attack on the French model is seen as part of the self-serving agenda of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ powers.⁴⁰ Indeed the resentment of American (or Anglo-Saxon) influence is all the greater because the French model—republican, centralized, statist, and Jacobin—is regarded as under attack from various different quarters, some of which are routinely confused with one another. These multiple sources of attack include the forces of ultra-liberalism and globalization, putting into question the validity of the French economic and social model; the growing importance and scope of the European Union, with deep consequences for the French constitutional order; the growing tendency towards a form of regionalism that is basically opposed to the centralization of the French state; the growing impact of multiculturalism, of feminism, and of the consequences of immigration on French culture, and also on the French legal system. This latter point stems from mounting pressure in many quarters for the legal recognition of special social groups, a development that is absolutely contrary to the basic principle that the French state recognizes only individual citizens and only equal, individual rights, with no legal possibility to support affirmative action or to distinguish the legal status of any special cultural, sexual, or ethnic groups. All these factors tend to contribute to the French ascribing, whether rightly or wrongly, their current problems to the rise of the ‘global’ and ‘communitarian’ model, which many French believe to be the result not only of social evolution but also of the agenda of Great-Britain and the US.⁴¹ This belief, and the resentment that accompanies it, goes to the roots of French self-perceptions.

Domestic Politics

Finally, the institutional evolution of French political life also matters. Under Pompidou and Giscard d’Estaing there was a strong constituency for good Franco-American relations, and this constituency had representation in the spectrum of French political parties. Even if it did not constitute a majority, that constituency could exert considerable leverage. Indeed one of the reasons for de Gaulle’s failure to win the referendum of April 1969, which led to his resignation, was the opposition of important parts of French

society and political élites to his American policies. And whatever the views of Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing, both needed the support of right-of-centre Atlanticists to retain a majority in Parliament.⁴²

But this constituency no longer exists, or at best is too widely dispersed to be influential. From polls and through conversations one could guess that approximately one third of French political élites do not desire permanent tension with Washington. But on the Right, since a majority of UDF members (the former Giscardians) joined the new UMP party of Jacques Chirac, which is basically the old Gaullist party, they now have little leverage on major issues of foreign affairs: having burned their own boat, they cannot leave the one in which they now sit. As for moderate Socialists, most of whom are by no means anti-American (even if the current American administration has, generally speaking, few supporters in France), they cannot hope to regain power without allying themselves with the Communists, the Greens and the Ultra-Left, all groups opposed to America as a matter of principle.

As a result, there is as of now no possible domestic political arrangement, either on the Left or on the Right, for a real re-foundation of Franco-American and Franco-Atlantic relations. This has to do with the evolution of French politics described here, but also of the recent evolution of French society as suggested in the previous section. On the latter point, a long period of high unemployment has destroyed the brief and quite new acceptance of liberalism which was present for a few years around 1990; in addition, recent immigration has further undermined the constituency for positive relations with Washington. The outlook in France is generally much more influenced by Third World considerations nowadays, such as support to the Palestinians and hostility towards the capitalism of rich countries, than it was before. The constituency for those views stems largely from immigrants, the ultra-left, the Communists and a major part of the Socialists, with deep inroads even further to the Right or the Far-Right. The Franco-American rift has thus probably become a structural rather than a cyclical problem within French politics.

Prospects for Change

In short, changes in France's international position, in the French self-conception, and in domestic political arrangements all tend to undermine the relationship between Paris and Washington. What circumstances might conspire to change this?

For one thing, one may doubt whether France will achieve much success along the present lines of its present foreign policy, despite the fact that Prime Minister Blair has recently seemed to take much more seriously the concept of an European defence system.⁴³ But in the final analysis Germany does not share the French foreign policy agenda: while Berlin certainly wishes to redress the balance inside the Alliance, it will not be anxious to create a new imbalance for the benefit of the French. And indeed if official Paris envisions a Franco-German axis to move Europe in the direction of a greater international assertiveness, there are important segments of French public opinion that have strong doubts about Germany, believing that Berlin wants to mould the European Union along the lines of the German federal model—a policy aimed at furthering Germany's interests, but with great dangers for the unity and stability of France.⁴⁴ And in any event Russia will play her own game and will not unduly antagonize Washington.⁴⁵

It might be possible that the lack of real results will eventually induce a change of mind, although the current policy can go on for a long time without achieving many tangible results. And indeed there are many noted French experts who already dispute the wisdom of the present course and who argue for the repair of Franco-American relations and for a better understanding of American aims and motives. Dominique Moïsi, Alexandre Adler, Jean-Claude Casanova, and Thierry de Montbrial have all expressed their doubts in *Le Monde* or *Le Figaro*, the two major national newspapers.⁴⁶ Thérèse Delpech drew 'three lessons,' quite lucid, from the Iraq crisis.⁴⁷ Pascal Cuhe risked the blasphemous title 'Iraq: And if France was wrong?'⁴⁸

But it is important to note that France's present antagonism with the United States serves the useful political goal of rebuilding national unity; thus the failure of the new policy orientation to achieve its

major putative objectives may not prove fatal. Indeed, in order to transform what are at present minority views in favour of improved relations with the United States into a new mainstream approach in France, several additional conditions or circumstances will be necessary.

First and foremost, there should be a welcome change of public spirit when the present period of economic troubles, social turbulence, and difficult and much disputed reforms abates. Second, the further development of the common fight against terrorism may change public perceptions. Franco-American cooperation never ceased on this front despite all the tensions of the Iraq war, but this fact was not sufficiently appreciated. It is not widely known, for instance, that during the summer of 2003 French special forces joined their American counterparts around Kandahar, Afghanistan, and have been for all purposes integrated with them.⁴⁹ Furthermore, France itself could at any time become subject to terrorist attacks; if that happens, there might be a powerful call for more cooperation with Washington.

But the third precondition is a change in the American mindset, including a renewed capacity for official Washington to express a view of the world that is both workable and convincing for French élites. Americans should realize that if many Europeans regard the present French course as excessive, they nevertheless desire the articulation and development of a new transatlantic balance. This is certainly the case for Germany, where even leading scholars well known as long-standing Atlanticists make the point quite forcefully.⁵⁰ Washington should therefore resist the temptation to invoke the rather artificial divide between 'old' and 'new' Europes, realizing instead that the move towards further European integration—both geographic and functional—is, though slow, now probably unstoppable. Failure to recognize this fact undermines the prospects for deeper transatlantic cooperation, which will certainly have to be based on some new formulation of the balance between Europe and America.

Georges-Henri Soutou,
Directeur,
Centre d'histoire de l'Europe et des relations internationales (CHERI)
1, rue Victor Cousin
75230 Paris Cedex 05
France

georges-henri.soutou@paris4.sorbonne.fr

Notes

- 1 Raymond Marcellin, 1978. *L'importune vérité*. Paris: Plon, pp. 165 ss.
- 2 Jean-Paul Cointet, Bernard Lachaise, Gilles Le Béguec, Jean-Marie Mayeur, (eds.), 2001. *Un politique: Georges Pompidou*. Paris: PUF.
- 3 Georges-Henri Soutou, 'President Pompidou, the Ostpolitik and the strategy of Détente', forthcoming.
- 4 Georges-Henri Soutou, 2003. 'Georges Pompidou and US-European Relations', in: Marc Trachtenberg (ed.), *Between Empire and Alliance. America and Europe during the Cold War*, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 157-200
- 5 Georges-Henri Soutou, 'Georges Pompidou and US-European Relations'.
- 6 Samy Cohen et Marie-Claude Smouts, 1985. *La politique extérieure de Valéry Giscard d'Estaing*. Paris: Presses de la FNSP; and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, 1991. *Le pouvoir et la vie*, T. II, Paris: Cie 12, 1991, pp. 187 ss.
- 7 Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, 1981. *Débauche. L'échec américain en Iran*. Paris: Albin Michel.
- 8 Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, *Le pouvoir et la vie*; et Georges-Henri Soutou, 1996. *L'Alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques Franco-allemands, 1954-1996*. Paris: Fayard, pp. 351 ss.
- 9 Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, *Le pouvoir et la vie*, T. II, pp. 198-201, 404-409, 409-438, 454-457, 469.
- 10 Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'Alliance incertaine*, pp. 371 ss.
- 11 Geneviève Maelstaf, 1999. *Que faire de l'Allemagne ? Les responsables français, le statut international de l'Allemagne et le problème de l'unité allemande (1945-1955)*. Paris: Ministère des Affaires étrangères.
- 12 Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'Alliance incertaine*, and forthcoming articles about the Soviet policy of de Gaulle and Pompidou.
- 13 Georges-Henri Soutou, 'Georges Pompidou and US-European Relations'.
- 14 Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'Alliance incertaine*.
- 15 Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'Alliance incertaine*, pp. 423 ss.
- 16 Article by Lothar Rühl 1996. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 30 November-1 December.
- 17 Gilles Delafon et Thomas Sancton, 1999. *Dear Jacques, Cher Bill*. Paris: Plon.
- 18 For instance, the very good book by Pierre Hassner and Justin Vaïsse, 2003. *Washington et le monde. Dilemmes d'une superpuissance*, Paris: CERI/Autrement; or the last issues of the major journals *Commentaire*, *Politique internationale* and *Politique étrangère*; see also the special issue *Les Amériques et nous* of the journal *Outre-Terre. Revue française de géopolitique*, 5, 2003. The book by William Kristol and Lawrence F. Kaplan, 2003. *The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission* (San Francisco: Encounter Books) has been translated into French, with an introduction by François Heisbourg, *Notre route commence à Bagdad*, Paris: Saint-Simon, 2003.
- 19 See a very intelligent and forceful condemnation of American 'imperial' policy by Gabriel Robin, 'Sens et enjeu de la guerre d'Iraq', *Géopolitique*, 82, avril-juin 2003. Or a well-argued justification of the French position by André Bonnet, 2003. *Iraq. Le veto français*, Paris: Les dossiers de France Demain
- 20 <http://www.doc.diplomatie.fr>
- 21 See for instance Jean-Claude Casanova, 2003. 'De Charles de Gaulle à Jacques Chirac', *Le Monde*, 25 juillet.
- 22 Henry Kissinger, 2001. *Does America Need A Foreign Policy? Toward A Diplomacy For The 21st Century*, New York: Simon and Schuster.
- 23 See, for instance, Chirac's words during a joint press conference with Putin and Schröder in Saint-Petersbourg, on April 11, 2003, Quai d'Orsay website: <http://www.doc.diplomatie.fr>
- 24 William Pfaff, 2003. *International Herald Tribune*, July 3.
- 25 Official English translation on the Quai d'Orsay website: <http://www.doc.diplomatie.fr>
- 26 Thierry de Montbrial, 2002. *L'action et le système du monde*. Paris: PUF; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, 1982. *Tout Empire périra. Une visionn historique des relations internationales*, Paris: Armand Colin.
- 27 Daniel Vernet, 2003. 'Le vieux dilemme de la diplomatie française', *Le Monde*, September 26.
- 28 Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'Alliance incertaine*; Nicole Gnesotto, 1998. *La puissance et l'Europe*, Paris: Sciences Po.
- 29 See Henri de Bresson and Daniel Vernet, 2002. *Le Monde*, November 26,
- 30 Laurent Zecchini, 2003. *Le Monde*, May 29; and Isabelle Lasserre 2003. *Le Figaro*, July 14.

- 31 *The Economist*, 27 September 2003.
- 32 *Le Figaro*, June 21-22 and July 8, *Le Monde* July 10 and 11, 2003.
- 33 Declaration from Russia, Germany and France, on March 5, 2003, Quai d'Orsay website: <http://www.doc.diplomatie.fr>
- 34 Speech to the Algerian Parliament on March 3.
- 35 On February 17, to the 'Institut national de la Magistrature', in Algiers. Non-French readers should be aware that all these topics strike a deep chord in many French people, particularly in the youth. If they doubt me, I invite them to give a course on current affairs, as I have done for years, to an audience of about 150 second-year students and watch the reactions, keeping in mind that French universities rely on a system of mass education, which is representative of society at large.
- 36 Speech by Villepin to the Institut des Hautes Etudes de défense nationale, June 13, 2003, Quai d'Orsay website: <http://www.doc.diplomatie.fr>
- 37 Lothar Rühl 2003. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, August 9-10.
- 38 *Le Monde*, June 18, 2003.
- 39 Quai d'Orsay website: <http://www.doc.diplomatie.fr>
- 40 Georges-Henri Soutou, 2002. 'France, nations and empires from the nineteenth century to the present day: between Jacobin tradition, European balance of power and European integration', in: Henry Cavanna, (ed.), *Governance, Globalization and the European Union. Which Europe for Tomorrow?* Dublin: Four Courts Press.
- 41 Georges-Henri Soutou, 2002. 'France, nations and Empires from the nineteenth century to the present day: between Jacobin tradition, European balance of power and European integration'.
- 42 In the case of Pompidou see: Cointet, Lachaise, Le Béguet and Mayeur, (eds.) 2001. *Un politique: Georges Pompidou*. For Valéry Giscard d'Estaing see: Jean-Jacques Becker, 2002. *Crises et alternances 1974-2000*, Paris: Le Seuil.
- 43 The final version of this paper was written in October 2003, shortly after the first post-conflict meeting of Blair, Chirac, and Schroeder.
- 44 As is testified to by the success of the essay by Yvonne Bollmann, 2003. *Ce que veut l'Allemagne*, Paris: Bartillat.
- 45 Daniel Vernet in *Le Monde*, July 30, 2003.
- 46 Dominique Moisi, 2003. *Le Monde*, June 17; Alexandre Adler, 2003. *Le Figaro*, July 1; Jean-Claude Casanova, 2003. *Le Monde*, July 25; Thierry de Montbrial, 2003. *Le Monde*, August 1.
- 47 *Politique Internationale*, 100, été 2003.
- 48 *Politique Etrangère*, 2, 2003.
- 49 Patrick de Saint-Exupéry 2003. *Le Figaro*, August 13.
- 50 For instance Helga Haftendorn, 2001. *Deutsche Aussenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung*, Stuttgart: DVA, Munich p. 445; Michael Stürmer, 2002. *Die Kunst des Gleichgewichts*, Berlin: Propyläen.