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The American Impact on Western Europe:

Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective

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As far as the labor movement is concerned, there is a marked difference between ‘Americanization’ and ‘Westernization’. Both notions describe a specific process of change, and both of them have actually taken place in West Germany during the 1950s. If you look at the West German labor movement and its history between 1945 and 1965, the particular meaning of Westernization — not as opposed to, but rather as different from Americanization — becomes palpable. This paper is meant to serve a twofold purpose. First, to tell the story of how the West German labor movement got ‘westernized’, i.e. how it came to change longstanding belief systems rooted in traditional German socialist thought by integrating elements of liberal, Anglo-Saxon political ideas into their own world view. Secondly, to offer some reflection on the notion of Westernization, and thus to suggest a differentiation of the two concepts in the field.[1]

Any labor movement, as long as it is a social force and not controlled by the state, claims to turn ideas and political ideals into political practice and social reality. Labor movements, especially trade unions which are situated at the borderline between economy and society, are therefore a motor as well as an indicator for social and political change. The self-perception and political practice of a labor organization very much depends on its underlying ideas and basic assumptions. These fundamental ideas, however, can be altered. They respond, for instance, to external influences like experiences made in a foreign country, or made by contact with foreign persons and organizations.

Labor movements are not constrained to the frame of the national state. Their outlook is, at least in theory, internationalist, and they maintain transnational and international contacts which can and, in fact, do alter their fundamental believes, and influence their political practice.

During the 1950s, a transformation of the West German labor movement took place that indicated an approximation to Western political thought. This process of change, which became manifest in the new programs of the Social Democratic Party and the German Trade Union Federation, in 1959 and 1963 respectively, was strongly supported by the politics of a transnational network consisting of German labor reformers, US-American labor unionists, and members of the international trade union movement. This labor network was spanning the Northern Atlantic, comprising the United States, all of Western Europe and parts of the rest of Europe, and was even active in most other continents. It existed between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s. The aim, and also the result, of the policies of this network was to bring about a Western community of political thought, of which, especially in the eyes of American labor, the labor movement was to be a major supporting force. Although the labor movement of the United States was a major actor in this process, it is suggested here that the notion of 'Westernization' is more adequate to this special phenomenon than that of 'Americanization'.

What happened to the (West) German labor movement during the 1940s and 1950s can best be described as a process of cultural transfer. This implies understanding it as a transmission of ideas, goods, people, and institutions from one specific system of social patterns of behaviour or interpretation to another.[2] But cultural transfer does not mean the implantation of an original copy of foreign ideas or institutions into a society or a country, but rather a process of productive appropriation. It is closely related to the (anthropologically informed) notion of acculturation, which

describes the encounter of two different national cultures and their mutual relations and mutual exchanges, and looks at the process of adoption, adaptation or rejection. The term 'intercultural transfer' would be even more appropriate to what we are looking at, as it is not a question of taking on aspects of high, or low, culture, but rather an interaction between different cultures as entities.[3] It was the culture of an Anglo-American West which was appropriated by the West German labor movement. To say it was a transfer from the United States of America to West Germany though would be an oversimplification. For it was more complex than just a bilateral, oneway, and comprehensive takeover of specific American cultural features. For one thing, the emanating Western community of thought was not based on a true copy of specific US-American concepts, but rather on a wider framework which also involved West European, for instance British, ideas, and which had the traditions of Western political thought as common denominator. Thus, even though the United States — government and trade unions alike — acted as a powerful advocate of their own conceptual framework, they did not procure American conditions in the labor movements of Western Europe. But they did achieve a convergence of the social, political, and economical circumstances in the West, and also of the underlying belief systems. Furthermore, as far as the West German labor movement is concerned, the United States was only one, albeit an influential one, of at least two contributors to a transformation that fundamentally altered the political thought, self-perception and politics of trade unions and social democratic party alike. For before the American labor movement became an active force in Germany, there had already been a strong influx of British ideas and concepts of society, by dint of the experiences of labor politicians in their exile years in London. For the process of learning which they underwent in the 1940s was not Americanization, but rather 'Britainization'. Still this was a crucial factor in shaping the conceptual framework of this movement

in the 1950s and 1960s. The result of this intercultural transfer, of this amalgamation of values and conceptual frameworks experienced by contact with other societies, were not specifically American conditions, but rather, on a very fundamental level, common-Western ones. And finally, the transfer did not only go in one direction. Rather, there also was certain amount of mutual influence that came with longstanding contacts, and so American labor as well underwent a process of „learning and unlearning," became to a certain degree 'Europeanized'.

Therefore this paper suggests taking both terms literally and using 'Americanization' in cases of cultural transfer where specifically US-American features are transmitted to another society, and where they remain recognizably 'American'; where this transfer is bilateral in the sense of including two societies only, at least as for the analyzed topic; and where finally this transfer is going in a oneway direction, with a 'source' and a 'receiver' culture. Phenomena of mass culture in the 1950s could serve as examples, or, for the German labor movement, the 'Americanization' of the electoral campaigns of the SPD from 1960 onward, where specific American techniques were taken over more or less unchanged, and simply replaced former techniques. 'Westernization' on the other hand would belong to a different type of cultural — or here indeed rather intercultural — transfer, where several societies mutually influence their respective culture, where, by a process of approximation and mutual appropriation of the originally differing elements, a kind of synthesis results in cultural features that are, at least on a basic level, common to all societies involved, but not recognizably stemming from one single source alone. The constitution of a Western community of values or of political thought with its common conceptual frameworks and socio-economic order, was such a process. It took the better part of two centuries, from the age of enlightenment until today, and included several different branches of Western thought. The ideas of the French as well as of the

American revolution contributed to the Western world of ideas. But in the twentieth century there emerged some basic features common to all branches of the 'West', that is, parliamentary democracy and the rule of law in the political sphere; the idea of pluralism as the basis of society; an economic order founded on the principle of private property, a free market and the equality of chances; and the individual at the center of society and culture.[4] In the 1940s and 1960s, under the pressure of the Cold War, the cultures of the 'West' with their formerly more diverse features of Western traditions were more strongly amalgamated. West Germany now was also integrated into a 'West' of which German political thought since the 1870s had not regarded itself as a part. Although there were also numerous phenomena of 'Americanization', some parts of the development of the West German society in the 1950s were of a different character, and are more appropriately described as 'Westernization', like, for instance, the process of transformation that could be observed in the West German labor movement.

„The Finest Labor Network in Europe"

> „There is not a single country in Europe where we don't have contacts whether in the majority or minority; whether legal or illegal. We have the basis for the finest labor network in Europe from both an organizational and information standpoint."[5]

This statement made in August 1947 by the European Representative of the American Federation of Labor, Irving Brown (1911-1989), was not at all exaggerated. After 1945, both American trade union federations, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) were conducting a major 'foreign policy' program, trying to influence the labor movements in all parts of the Western World. The main center of their activities was Western Europe: Great

Britain, France, Italy and West Germany, but also Greece and Turkey in the South, and even Finland and Iceland were involved in their policies. But their contacts stretched also to Eastern Europe: East Germany, Hungary, and Poland; and to the rest of the world: to Latin America, South East Asia and China, Africa and the Near East.[6] In the postwar years, both trade union federations had begun to set up international departments or committees, were running virtual embassies in Western Europe, and were actively engaged in the projects, and the battles, of the international trade union movement. They were also cooperating with US government agencies, for example with the State Department and the Department of Labor, and were participating in committees which connected labor and government in their politics toward Europe.[7]

In 1943 the AFL founded an 'International Labor Relations Committee' which in 1947 was turned into a 'Department of International Relations'. From now on, international labor relations, even some sort of foreign policy, was one of the principal concerns of the federation, and one for which it was willing to spend a lot of money, energy and personnel. The most important foreign policy institution in the AFL though was already in being from 1944 on. The 'Free Trade Union Committee' (FTUC) was originally meant to collect money from the trade unions affiliated to the AFL, „[to] assure prompt practical assistance to the workers of the liberated countries in Europe and Asia as well as to the workers of South and Central America in their efforts to organize free democratic trade unions."[8] One million dollar was the target, and this relief program was meant to be a contribution to the United States' national security policy by helping to reconstruct free and democratic labor unions in the formerly occupied, or Nazi-, countries, and to strengthen them against Communist assault. The FTUC quickly gained scope and independence, and was soon the main actor in the AFL's international policies. It was the federation's foreign policy think tank, and kept

it informed on the situation in international relations as well as on the politics of foreign labor movements. This was the ideological center of the AFL, advertising its world view and belief system all over the western half of the world. Its executive secretary, who conducted its politics nearly single-handed, was Jay Lovestone (1898-1990), the former general secretary of the Communist Party of America, afterwards the leading Bucharinist in the United States and from the early 1940s on a fierce anticommunist.[9] The other American trade union federation, the CIO, was created during the New Deal years as a response to the growing percentage of industrial workers and the refusal of the older AFL, with its traditions of craft unionism, to adapt to the needs of a rapidly changing economy, and to organize industrial unions. The new federation was more 'left-wing', more 'social democratic' and 'liberal' in an American sense than the AFL tended to be, and stood in sharp competition to its twin.[10] Thus, in 1945 the CIO also set up a 'Department of International Affairs' and made Michael Ross (1898-1963) its director, an Englishman who had immigrated to the United States only in his mid thirties.[11]

But the US labor federations were not only running international departments in Washington and New York City, they were also entertaining bureaus in Europe, a kind of embassy of the US labor movement to the West European ones.[12] Never before in History had a labor movement installed offices of representation in another country. This was, indeed, the step to 'transnational foreign politics.' The AFL established in 1946 a European representative at first in Brussels, then in Paris, endowed with a bureau and a small budget to spend on his administratory expenses, and a bigger one to see to the needs of free trade unions in Europe, and there also was a second AFL-representative in West Germany. The CIO followed the AFL's model and established in 1951 a European bureau, and

one in Bonn-Bad Godesberg. The task of these institutions was, as the AFL presented it to the press:

> „1.- To supervise, maintain and extend A.F.L. postwar Labor relief programs in many war-torn European countries; 2.- To handle growing international responsibilities by servicing any A.F.L. delegates to international conferences; 3.- To maintain contacts and relations with independent European trade union movements. 4.- To advise and encourage newborn trade union movements in Germany and Austria and to be one of the most important contributors in the eventual democratization and denazification of these countries.“[13]

But in fact it was much more than that. These representatives formed the image the American labor organizations had of the situation in Europe, and shaped their international policies in a decisive way. They not only conducted the official contacts to the European labor organizations, but also built up a network based on personal, not organizational, relations, including politicians, trade unionists, publishers and journalists in many countries and in the international labor movement. Its center lay in Western Europe, and there it formed the main basis for a development that helped to transform at least the West German labor movement profoundly. This European network was built up between 1945 and 1950, and it was falling apart by the mid-1960s. In the meantime, it played a crucial role in establishing a Western community of thought, by building it from within the societies themselves rather than relying on governmental policies only. This community of thought was founded on a liberal consensus which again was rooted in the Anglo-American traditions of Western political thought. And it was a product of the Cold War, for only under its external pressure and the resultant internal demand for conformity was there any chance of an integration of the belief systems and the conceptual frameworks of the Western societies. Antitotalitarianism, soon simply

anticommunism, was the one side of the coin, and a liberal consensus on the basic values determining the political system and the social and economic order, was the other.

„The Common Loyalty to Democracy“: West Germany

West Germany was one of the centers of the activities of AFL and CIO, which was strongly emphasized by the additional representative in Germany. Still, it is important to note in advance that the American labor federations did not pursue a German policy, but rather a European one, of which Germany formed an essential, but always integral, part. As the situation of West German labor was to some extent different from that of other countries, a certain prominence was given to its affairs. First, being the main stage of the early Cold War, the fight for the people’s minds, the clash of belief systems, was particularly intense in the occupied and soon divided Germany, at least in the immediate postwar years. In the eyes of American labor the emerging West German republic was, by its double negation of National Socialism and Stalinist Communism, the epitome of the concept of anti-Totalitarianism. And secondly, in West Germany there were many labor politicians and trade unionists, who had returned from years of exile in Great Britain or the United States, and were not only fluent in English, but were also well familiar with Anglo-Saxon ways of life and political traditions.

The representatives of AFL and CIO in West Germany conducted their policy at two different levels. They entertained official relations with the newly emerging West German trade union movement and with the Social Democratic Party (SPD). At the same time, they wove a network of personal contacts to individual members of German labor, who shared their basic interests and were ready to cooperate in the pursuit of common aims. This network between individual members of

West German unions and the SPD and representatives of AFL and CIO was part of the larger, European and international labor network, and was also connected to an inner-West German network of labor reformers that dated back to its members' years in exile or resistance.[14]

The history of this German cluster in the transnational network can be divided into several phases: a time of building up, a time of operation, and a time of disintegration. The network in Germany was knit between 1945 and 1952. In this phase AFL and CIO each put a very clear emphasis on the organizational or structural perspective, even though they differed in their choice of options. Both tried to influence the shape of the emerging West German trade union movement by influencing the politics of the Military government. The result was the concept of 'tree trade unionism' which eventually shaped the structure of the West German trade unions.[15] It was, and this is important to note, not a copy of US labor relations or industrial relations, but rather a reformed organizational structure catering for West German conditions, which was created to implement new political ideas into a basically conventional outfit of trade union politics.

When by early 1946 the question of the form of West German labor was settled, AFL and CIO turned to matters of occupational policies, and helped the West German unions, for instance in their struggle against the dismanteling of industry. From 1947 onward, the European Recovery Program became a major issue. Especially the AFL was working hard to persuade the West European labor movements into accepting the Marshall Plan, not least the SPD and the DGB's predecessors. Because although they clearly acknowledged the need for American help, they also saw the deeper lying socio-economic implications of the ERP, which would more or less end all hopes for a socialist German economy. Still, West German labor agreed to cooperate with the Marshall Plan authorities and to contribute to the success of the program, because, as the AFL argued, the ERP would greatly

enhance its chance of reintegration into the international labor movement. As a result, the West German labor movement was back on the international stage as a sovereign actor much earlier than the country itself, and labor was preceding Adenauer in his policy of West European integration by several years.[16] This did not imply though that labor already shared a 'Western' framework of ideas. This kind of integration was playing on the level of organization and structure, rather than in the realm of ideas. Here, as in matters of personnel, the old socialist traditions still prevailed.

All this was taking place on the level of official, interorganizational relations. At the same time though, the American trade union federations were busy building up a net of contacts to individual members of German labor. This was the task of the European, and German, representatives, who first had to gather information as to the political and social situation, and to get some basic orientation, for instance on political camps within the German labor movement, and on its specific traditions and sensitivities. Soon, they were gathering people who shared their essential interests and who occupied the positions that made them actually able to move something. American labor could offer them organizational, financial and ideological support, and could thus add weight to their own specific aims, which we shall look at closely in a minute. So, after an initial time of orientation, AFL- and CIO-personnel started weaving a network of contacts that included party and trade unions alike. The AFL representatives tried to get into „closer teamwork with Schumacher, the ostburo, the SPD fraction in Bonn, the DGB second line officers and [to exert] constant pressure on the American Gov[ernmen]t representatives."[17]

And soon the SPD Executive Committee, that is Kurt Schumacher and his immediate surroundings, were in close contact with the AFL, just as was the parliamentary party; also the ostbureau, the party's intelligence service on East Germany; and finally the German Trade Union Federation

(DGB), where members at different levels — federal, regional and the trade union press — were contacted, as well as the free trade union movement of Berlin (UGO). But it was individuals within these organizations they worked with, not the organizations as such. The simultaneous official, interorganizational contacts with DGB and SPD were, in a way, the diplomatic background, useful for implementing and 'legalizing' the results of the proper political interaction that was taking place at the informal, personal level. But even on this personal level, the American trade unionists were, in this first phase of interaction, quite happy to try and influence just the structure of West German labor, and to leave its ideology, or its political thought, alone. The acknowledged policy of the AFL and also of the CIO, which only after the settling of internal struggles between a Communist and an anti-Communist wing, and subsequent 'purges' of communists in 1948-9, had become an influential force in European labor politics, was to support a very broad range of political and ideological views, provided they were anti-Communist and not opposed to the basic principles of parliamentary democracy. To be eligible as a partner to the American labor network, therefore, abjuring traditional socialist ideas was not at all necessary — at least during this first phase of cooperation. The AFL representatives actually believed that the choice in Europe would have to be between Stalinist communism and a British version of socialism, and opted for the latter:

> „America must also proclaim that this is not a struggle between capitalism and socialism. American policy in Europe is not to fight for 'free enterprise' but for a free society, for free labor — for the right of the Europeans themselves to determine democratically what form of economic and social controls they shall or shall not have. In the words of General Clay: 'although the American people believe in free enterprise, they believe even more firmly in democracy.' In this common loyalty to Democracy, the new capitalism of the U.S.A. and the

> democratic socialism of British and Western European labor are beginning to approach each other and become eventually joined together in a mutual international economy.“[18]

But when between 1949 and 1952 the outer framework of West German labor politics was definitely settled, things began to change and questions of values and political thought came to the foreground. The political system and socio-economic order of the Federal Republic of Germany had been determined, the country was on its way to integration into a political and economical Western bloc, and the organizations of the labor movement were set up and at work. By 1952, the second phase of cooperation began as the transnational labor network was well established and able to operate efficiently within party and unions. At that time there was also a distinct shift in the official role of the West Germans within the wider European network: they turned from objects into subjects of its policies, and became partners of the Americans in the task of establishing a Western labor movement based on the same basic ideas. West Germany and its labor movement were not considered any more to be in immediate danger of Communist subversion, and were also deemed sufficiently democratic to be relied upon as an ally.[19] Now questions of program and values began to play a more prominent role in the dealings of the American labor representatives and their German partners. After an initial phase of ‘external’, or ‘structural’, assimilation to Western standards and of integration into Western coalitions, there were now manifest attempts to bring about an ‘internal’ Westernization. For this aim, the cooperation of German functionaries was essential. A very open and straightforward discussion of the mutual belief systems set on, focusing on the role of a labor movement in a liberal society and on questions of selfperception and political performance.[20] The compatibility of socialist concepts with the reality of the West German political economy was now openly questioned by the AFL representatives. But this was not the view of the American trade

union federations alone. A notable fraction of their German network partners shared, for their own reasons, very much the same position. Thus in 1953-4, the affiliation of the AFL with the SPD leadership around Ollenhauer weakened, mostly over the issue of West German rearmament, and instead they started to knit closer connections with the party's right wing reformers and their counterparts in the DGB who tried to bring about a profound reformation of the organizations' programs, and by that to finally modify the values at the root of all their policies. Hence, this second phase saw a concentration on value issues, and as a consequence a shift in allegiance on the side of American labor. Thus strengthened, the German labor reformers could more effectively go about their own task of 'westernizing' their organizations' conceptual framework.[21]

The coalition of American and German 'Westernizers' finally dried out in the third and final phase between the end of the 1950s and the mid-1960s, when the German reformers in SPD and DGB had accomplished their aims. The SPD in 1959 adopted the Godesberger Programm, and in 1963 the DGB voted for its Düsseldorfer Programm. Both included most of the crucial issues the reformers had been fighting for. But the American labor movement drew back in disappointment over the outcome and especially in dismay over the SPD's emerging policy of rapprochement toward the East. For the personnel of AFL and CIO, or rather AFL-CIO by now as the federations had been unified in 1955 and the new organization was named after its contributors, was not really happy with the result. Of course, the taking on of Western values was what they had wanted, but strangely enough, in a way they were not really interested in the new programs, rather found it all „a waste of time and energy."[22] It had, in fact, simply come too late. The former partners were drifting apart, and the network was hardly in action any more by the early 1960s. Only Jay Lovestone was still keeping up contacts on a regular, although transatlantic basis, and he declared himself disappointed

at the giving up on Marxism by the SPD. He feared it would cost them their political acumen and make them smooth in the hands of industry and government. His regret was not least the result of long grown familiarity with the foundations of German labor, and the respect for and understanding of its ways. In the mid-1950s, Lovestone had observed that „[...]the A.F. of L. has in recent years been doing much unlearning and learning.“[23] It had, in fact, been a mutual process of leaning, with by far the greater changes on the German side. Still, the American side had gotten familiar with European ways, and was not prepared to see it all modified. But by 1963, Lovestone had pulled out, so the network was at its end, and even the official contacts between the labor organizations were quickly cooling down. A major reason for this was the new policy of the SPD toward East Germany and Eastern Europe in general, the so called Ostpolitik, which instigated not only contacts, but proposed even formal acceptance of the communist regimes, and made talks with the Kremlin necessary. This was overstretching the AFL-CIO's capacity of adaptation, which so far had been rather remarkable. Everything they had been working for in Europe now seemed endangered. Even the formal acceptance of a market economy by the DGB could not make up for it. The cooperation came to an end. Still, there had undoubtedly been a profound shift in the political thought of West German labor, and the American trade union federations had helped to bring it about.

During the greater part of the 1950s, the whole network was on about values, about different ideas of democracy and of society. But the result was not just a takeover of US-American concepts, replacing German traditions entirely. It was a process of integrating Western values into the selfperception and worldview of West German labor, but not at all a copying of the structures of American labor organizations. This becomes more obvious if one looks at the different sets of ideas in questions. What, then, were the basic ideas that formed the politics of the American labor

movement, what were the motives that made it enlist on such a scale of international engagement? What concepts and values did they hope to advertise by it, and what made them think it worth the effort? On the other hand, what were the aims and interests of their German coalitionaries in the network, what traditions did they intend to change, and why? What concepts did they turn to instead, and what had actually made them become reformers?

Consensus Capitalism: The American Labor Movement

The American labor movement „is a labor movement upholding capitalism, not only in practice, but in principle as well.“[24] It was therefore distinctly different from its European counterparts. Although this specific feature has induced especially German scholars now and then to put ‘American labor movement’ in quotation marks,[25] and has made especially American scholars lament its refusal to opt for socialist concepts,[26] the argument contended here is founded on the assumption that the American trade unions were, in fact, very much a labor movement, even though working from a different viewpoint than the one held by their European, and even their British, colleagues. The set of ideas that determined the outlook of the American unions, and formed the core of their belief system, was firmly rooted in Western political thought, and was very close indeed to the specific form of Western liberalism that came to be at the foundations of the Western community of ideas which emerged between the 1940s and the 1960s. The ‘exceptional’ political thought of the American labor movement as well as its organizational framework was the result of political experiences from the end of the nineteenth century up to the Second World War.

The American labor movement consists mainly of a trade union movement. There is no socialist or workers’ party of any real political significance. By the end of the nineteenth century the trade

unions took over as the main representative of the American workers' interests. The American Federation of Labor, set up in 1886 as the federation of a great number of powerful crafts unions, soon developed into the leading actor of the American labor movement. Its political ideas were determined by the craftsmen's republicanism of its founders and their understanding of the worker as citizen. The first AFL president, Samuel Gompers, who dominated the federation until 1924, declared it to be

> „our duty to live out our lives as workers in the society in which we live and not work for the downfall or the destruction or the overthrow of that society, but for its fuller development and evolution."[27]

Raised in London and initially sympathizing with European socialism, he still gave up any notion of class struggle shortly after 1900 and denounced socialism as economically harmful, socially wrong and in fact unfeasible in an industrial society.[28] Instead, the AFL developed the approach of 'pure and simple unionism': the task of trade unions was to stick to unionism, to try and achieve, in their very own field, the best possible result at the time being. They should not fix a specific aim, which would make all further exertions unnecessary, but rather keep trying to better the conditions of the working population on a day by day basis. This continuous progress in itself was the goal. This program reflected the core of American exceptionalism, the confidence in the possibilities of the American society.[29] Another crucial feature of American trade unionism that developed in the time around the First World War was the so-called voluntarism. This meant a refusal of any interference by the state in labor relations, even if to the advantage of labor. As Gompers put it in 1914: „Any surrendering of a right [...] to the state means certain control by the state and no one can tell how far reaching that may be."[30] This anti-etatism was rooted in the anti-mercantilistic traditions of English

Labor, according to which the government had to keep clear of the conflicts of social interest groups and instead to guarantee the framework for free competition only. There was no advantage to be expected by governmental interference. To the AFL, labor relations belonged to the sphere of civil, not public law. This need for independence even went so far as to make them steer clear of any definite allegiance to a political party. Instead, labor was to have a firm political standpoint which was derived from a consideration of its own interests. Whichever party — or even whichever single deputy — in Congress served this interest best, was to receive support. This principle of 'reward your friend, punish your enemies' was a rule the AFL adhered to even though for a time it became a regular supporter of the Democratic Party. Political strength combined with political independence was, in the eyes of the AFL, the best way to serve labor's interests. And this was also one of the main principles it tried to implement into the West German labor movement, especially with respect to the DGB' over-cautious policies toward the Adenauer government and its pro-industry stance: to American labor it was „obvious, that the trade union movement must have freedom of action with respect to a government which very definitely fosters anti-democratic and anti-labor forces."[31]

The New Deal and the Second World War finally shaped American labor and the conceptual framework it then tried to export to Western Europe. What emerged was 'Consensus Capitalism' in industrial relations, a concept which was closely corresponding to 'Consensus Liberalism', the social and political consensus that lay at the basis of US postwar political thought.[32]

The New Deal brought about a profound change in the relationship between state, society, and labor movement. The implementation of Keynesian concepts provided the trade unions with a crucial part in enhancing purchasing power by wage demands, and it guaranteed acceptance of the labor organizations and their role in the political economy. The Second World War finally with its massive

production effort restored the faith in economic growth which the Great Depression had shattered, and made social Keynesianism the basis for a 'Fair Deal' between the different sections of society, for not only had it helped the United States out of fierce internal divisions, but at the same time had made it the most powerful economic and political force in the world. Thus, in the 1950s there was a widespread belief in the society of the United States that there was no more need for class struggle or similar fundamental conflicts of interests. The solution for this kind of social discord seemed to be found: social justice was to be gained by productivity and economic growth, and by efficiency. Once there was enough for all, there was no reason to quarrel about the distribution of wealth, and about the right social order. Thus even political strife would lose its sharpness. Unions and industry were to deal with each other on the basis of mutual recognition and of a consensus on the main features of the political economy. Productivity and efficiency required privately owned plants, whereas a just distribution of the fruits of economic growth required strong and independent trade unions, and the governmental task was to provide stable conditions and a fiscal framework that would guarantee continued growth. This concept of 'Consensus Capitalism' had its supplement in the liberal consensus that lay at the foundations of American social relations and political practice in the 1950s and 1960s, or even, as some argue, up to the 1980s,[33] and which also provided the blueprint of US policies throughout the world.

The main features of this American liberal consensus were Keynesianism with its reformism and 'social engineering', Anglo-Saxon liberalism with its strong emphasis of the market as panacea, American Pragmatism, a philosophy that insists on measuring theory by the result it will effect in practice, and a liberal internationalism, which resulted in the idea of an 'American mission'.[34] For even though this set of ideas was in fact deeply rooted in liberal values and in the Anglo-Saxon

enlightenment it was deemed to be non-ideological, but rather derived from scientific, and reasonable, dealings with a given problem. Therefore, all the world would in the end come around to applying such an obvious answer to the all pervading class, ethnic, or political struggles, once they had it explained to them.

Another important feature of Consensus Liberalism was anticommunism. It served more as a catalyst than as an additional element of this specific set of ideas. It enforced the pressure of conformity, within the USA as well as within the Western bloc, and helped to join together rather different political groups within the liberal consensus by defining the mutual adversary as the smallest common denominator.[35]

This 'Consensus Liberalism' was indeed a model for the specific form of Western liberalism that came to be at the foundations of the Western community of ideas which was promoted and kept together by United States hegemony between the 1940s and the 1960s. United States hegemony in these years, made possible by the Cold War, covered not only the diplomatic and military, as well as the economic spheres, but also the realm of ideas.[36] The United States from the early Cold War years on endeavored to swear in Western Europe on a consensus over basic values. But this third level of hegemony, basic as it was also to the other two, could not have been established without the consent and cooperation of the West European societies that were involved. This also excluded the transformation of the European societies into true copies of America, for a community based on voluntariness has to combine elements from all its members in order to be stable.

During the early Cold War, US foreign policy, governmental or non-governmental alike, was based on two closely interdependent concepts: 'national security' and 'politics of productivity'.[37] The concept of national security had not only a military, or bloc political, side like for instance in the

Truman Doctrine or atomic armament, but also a political and social one. The basic values and the socio-economic order of the United States could, as this concept saw it, only be defended by creating conditions in which „our free democratic system can live and prosper“.[38] This meant creating a Western Alliance not only in military, but also in political terms. American culture and American political economy were to serve as the model after which the whole Western alliance was to be reshaped. This demanded an active and strategic export of values, the creation of an all-Western ideology. Its twin concept was the concept of the ‘politics of productivity’. It emphasized the close interdependence of the economic and the political system and therefore aimed at establishing a homogenous economic sphere geared into American economic notions and needs. But again, the governmental level, as for instance in the agreements of Bretton Woods and GATT, was not deemed sufficient. The Western societies were to be intertwined in the economic and cultural spheres as well. A well distributed national wealth, a consumerist culture and continuous growth were to stifle social conflict and thus to guarantee stable liberal democratic political systems in the Western world, which again would serve the concept of US national security. Basically the ‘politics of productivity’ was the transfer of Consensus Capitalism to the international realm, whereas, in a sense, ‘national security’ as a concept was the transfer of consensus liberalism to the outer world. By setting up a liberal or neo-corporatist framework similar to the one in the United States in other societies, these were integrated into the new consensus liberal community. This liberal corporatist order means

> „an American political economy founded on self-governing economic groups, integrated by institutional coordinators and normal market mechanisms, led by cooperating public and

> private elites, nourished by limited but positive government power, and geared to an economic growth in which all could share.“[39]

The Marshall Plan was a crucial instrument of implementing these concepts, which incorporated the Keynesian ideas of the later New Deal, abroad.[40] The labor movements in the Marshall Plan countries would have to play a role very similar to the one played by American labor in the New Deal and the Second World War, and in the Consensus Capitalism of the 1950s. AFL and CIO shared the conceptual framework of the American government, and were ready to promote it in the world, since they were convinced that in an adversary world order the socio-economic order at home would not survive, and that labor had much to loose in that case.

The two basic foreign policy aims of AFL and CIO were to defy Communism in the battle for the workers' allegiance all over the world, and at the same time to promote consensus liberalism and its consensus capitalist economy. Each of these aims was depending on the other, they could not be separated in the political strategies of the American trade unions. Communism would tear the world into another war, just like its twin, national socialism, had done before.[41] Economic recovery and stable growth were needed to strengthen democracy against another onslaught of totalitarianism. And it was labor's task to contribute to the stabilization of the free societies in the West.

> „It is this section of European society [i.e. the European labor movement, J.A.] which holds the key to whether or not Europe will remain free or be submerged by Soviet totalitarianism. It is this movement whether one likes it or not that will determine in the last analysis, whether or not the reconstruction of Western Europe can succeed; whether or not America's vast economic aid will achieve its goals. For whoever gains the soul of European labor can gain all other objectives.“[42]

Here, American labor had a special role to play, for the US government was obviously unable to pursue this policy on its own:

> „According to the historical tradition and foundations which underlie American democracy and which also underlie American trade unionism, private property has been considered as an essential element in the defense of the individual and in the guarantee of his freedom against other individuals or groups, and even, in modern times, against the great power which governments begin to possess. Therefore, according to the historical principles of this country, private property is essential to the defense of the individual and his freedom. [...] [The US] government cannot explain private property in American democracy and the capitalist system to the workers of Europe, because [the] government would be suspected of propaganda [...]. Also they cannot be explained by the manufacturers because they would be suspected of defending their vested interests. Therefore the only people who can explain them in a way that will carry conviction and weight with the European workers are the American trade unions. Certainly they cannot be suspected of defending vested interests in private property, or capitalism.“[43]

But there was, in the selfperception of AFL and CIO, not only an economic side to labor’s role. The American labor representatives were convinced that the strength of the Western model of society lay not least in its pluralist diversity as opposed to the monolithic rigidity of Soviet rule, as long as there was an underlying consensus over basic values which would unite the West. As Irving Brown put it in 1953:

> „The defense of the true revolutionary spirit as against the Soviet degeneration of the original ideals of the Russian Revolution. That is, the West carries the fulfillment of the original ideals

> of our Founding Fathers, of the English and French revolutionaries while the Stalinist regime has not only destroyed its revolutionary ideals but physically liquidated or exiled most of their founding fathers. This means especially in communist influenced areas we must not talk only in terms of Stalinism as a continuation of Marxism, but as contradictory and in conflict with Marxism. [.] We and our allies are the defenders of common ideals of our civilization and culture and not the propagandists for a country or for a particular tradition or way of life."[44]

The Western community of ideas was to be more than just a copy of American thought and political practice. Hence the support for other, if only anticommunist, models of democracy, as long as there was an agreement on some basic conditions. Labor movements had to be anticommunist, to sustain parliamentary democracy, and be politically active, so they could exert influence on their respective political economy and become a dynamic force in consensus capitalism.

In their foreign policy, the American labor federations were not always in agreement with the US government. There were frequent tensions, and in many cases of conflict AFL and CIO took side with their European fellow movements against their government. The concord was more on the part of conceptual frameworks and basic ideas, even covering essential policy decisions, but it was not stretching as far as to cover day by day policies. The model of political practice which AFL and CIO tried to advertise was founded on political culture, on values and selfperception: a labor movement could, in fact, be critical toward the government, but at the same time have a firm standing within the borders of the prevailing social order and even exert significant political influence.[45] But the hopes and wishes of the West German labor movement around 1950 were, in fact, rather different from those of its American counterpart.

German Social Democracy and the West

The German labor movement is the world's oldest organized labor movement. Between 1890 and 1914 it was the most influential member of the Second International, acting as a role model for many others. From its early days it consisted of two organizational wings, a political party and a trade union movement, which more or less cooperated in their struggle for a common end. The trade union movement before 1933 was structured along party lines, so that only the, albeit biggest, part of it which was socialist or social democratic in outlook actually went along with the politics of the workers party. The ascent of the National Socialists to power in 1933 destroyed not only the first German Republic, but also the one party which had throughout been its main supporter. The merciless prosecution of the whole German labor movement that followed was a crucial break in its history.

In 1945, the German Social Democratic Party was rebuilt basically according to its prewar traditions.[46] Although its chairman Kurt Schumacher (1895-1952) attempted to open the party for sympathizers from other social strata and other ethical backgrounds than its traditional working class electorate, he and his followers still held closely onto longstanding socialist core believes. Socialization of plants in key industries, a 'third way' between communism and capitalism, and the firm connection of democracy and socialism marked the Social Democratic Party's basic outlook and served as a blueprint for its policies in the immediate postwar years.[47]

The German trade unions in 1945, which had to be rebuilt from scrap and were, in organizational regards, restructured as a cross-party movement, did also cling on to traditional socialist assets. Their membership as well as their functionaries were convinced that capitalist economy had, as a whole, collapsed, and that an entirely new economic order was now necessary.[48] Parliamentary

democracy on its own was, as the failure of the Weimar Republic had demonstrated, unable to sustain itself unless accompanied by a socialist economy. Industrial democracy was to be the twin of political democracy. In 1949, the Munich resolution of the newly founded German Trade Union Federation outlined the three basic demands that were to ensure the setup of an industrial democracy and thus to underpin parliamentary democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany: socialization of key industry plants, central planning and codetermination of industry by organized labor. Capitalism and Democracy were deemed incompatible, and the unions, like the SPD, sought for a third concept between the political economy of the communist East, which was considered alien to the German people, and that of the capitalist West, which was regarded as not democratic.[49] German labor did not believe their country and its political culture to really belong to the West in regard of political thought. For although Schumacher, as well as Hans Böckler, the first head of the DGB (1875-1951), opted for an integration of West Germany into the political West as a bloc and, with certain misgivings, also as an economic unit, they certainly did not intend to make Germany share the liberal, free market and individualistic culture of the Anglo-Saxon West, but rather to form something new by, as Schumacher recommended it, reconciling the traditions of Western civil revolutions, especially their liberal and pluralist elements, with German socialist traditions, mainly their collectivist elements and socialist economic thinking.[50] Therefore, both parts of West-German labor showed a strong continuity to the interwar years, not only in their quest for a socialist economic order. For if one looks at the underlying ideas, at the realm of political thought, their concept of democracy, their notion of what a society was to be like, and their idea of the role labor was to play toward this society and the state, then the pattern is repeated. Even Schumacher's widening of the recruiting grounds for Social Democracy did not alter the selfperception of German

labor as a force principally outside the prevailing social order. And its perceived task was to transform, even to fundamentally alter, this order for the better, in the name of the common good. Traditional German understanding of socialism, as it dates back to the Erfurt Program of 1891, and as it still prevailed in the interwar years, was rooted in a different tradition of political thought than the one which came to dominate the 'West' after 1945, and which had its roots in the English Enlightenment and the subsequent developments in the Anglo-Saxon political culture, including the United States of America. The German tradition of political thinking had had a strong influx from the French Enlightenment and the ideas of the French Revolution, in addition to inner-German contributions as, for instance, German Idealism. German socialism, not only in its more radical Marxist versions but also as far as the decidedly evolutionist Social Democracy was concerned, was hoping for the working class to become the nation's ruling force. Socialism, the socioeconomic and political order that was then to be established, would bring about equality, not in the sense of equal opportunity, but of equality of interests, and would thus mean the end of social conflict and strife. The aim was social unity, meaning homogeneity of the people among themselves, and people's sovereignty, perceived of as identity of interests between the rulers and those ruled, between government and the people. Thus, socialism would make parliamentary democracy with its continual strife between conflicting interests superfluous. Behind this you can glimpse Jean Jaques Rousseau's political thinking, his ideas of the Common Good, the Volonté Générale, which by him was assumed to exist a priory, and had only to be perceived rightly and then acted out, thus ruling out any notions of conflicting interests as a basis for politics. The idea of democracy that goes with it is direct, 'grassroots' and collectivist (as opposed to representative, parliamentary and pluralist), and it is this model of democracy which had taken firm roots in the German labor movement. For

even its evolutionary and reformist wing, which was happy to support the Weimar Republic, and was sometimes even the only major political force to do so, saw parliamentary democracy as a way, if the best, to transform the political economy and the social order of the country to socialism, hence to alter it fundamentally, even though in an evolutionary, piecemeal sort of way and by the ballot. In 1945, it was this tradition which reasserted itself very quickly in the West German labor movement, although there were, in fact, promoters of programmatic reform to be found within its ranks. The continuity to Weimar days, in spite of all the disruption during National Socialist rule, and in spite of the organizational changes in the trade union movement after 1945, seemed to be unshaken in the field of political thought and program, and also in the choice of the leadership.[51] Little more than a decade later though, things had fundamentally changed.

In 1959, the SPD decided on a new party program that drew the consequences from the party's new outlook and selfperception as it had developed during the 1950s. The Federal Republic's free market economy with its social security net was not only accepted by labor, but openly endorsed and turned into a basis for its own economical thinking, which was now running more or less along Keynesian lines.[52] Central elements of socialist 'dogma' were thrown overboard as the party made the prevailing socioeconomic order its own. Also the party's electoral basis was now seen as a pluralist, cross-class one instead of the former, mainly working-class constituency. In 1963, the DGB followed suit, also renouncing on socialist concepts of class, accepting the country's political economy as it was, and finally embarking on the type of industrial relations best described as consensus capitalism. They did not, however, take on the specific features of American labor relations, much as the AFL and the CIO had hoped they might.[53] Instead, a Western, consensus liberal conceptual framework was adopted and amalgamated into German traditions of labor politics.

The West German Labor Reformers: Experience and Political Thought

The central argument here is that this transformation of West German labor, which also had a profound impact on the whole of the West German society, was not just evolving by itself in an entirely internal process, but rather was very strongly influenced by external factors. To put it more provocatively still, it was the result of a cultural transfer from the Anglo-Saxon Western world, involving German laborites as well as American trade unionists. There were two main contributory factors to this cultural transfer: on one hand the experience of German socialists and unionists during their years in exile, especially of those who spent the war years in Great Britain or in the United States, and on the other the active role played by the American trade union federations in Western Europe between 1945 and the mid 1960s. Both sides ended up working together for a common aim, a (Western) Germany that would be firmly rooted within the Western community, also as far as political culture and the belief system at the foundations of this culture were concerned. Thus, German reformers in Social Democracy and in the trade unions cooperated with American trade unionists during the 1940s and 1950s, working for a transformation of German labor to make it a more liberal body which would actively promote the 'Westernization' of Germany, the foundation of its society on Western values and its integration into a Western world of ideas. Labor was to become a stabilizing factor in the Federal Republic's parliamentary democracy and was to play a crucial role in the workings of a Keynesian liberal economic order.

The German coalitioners in the transnational network had their own very good reasons to work for these ends: they believed in the values that lay at its foundations. But in the interwar years, most of these reformers had been ardent socialists, mostly on the far left of the political scale, or

communists.[54] But none of them had actually been a mainstream German social democrat. To make them proponents of Western liberal political thought took several steps. The main factor was, of course, the annihilation of the German labor movement by the National Socialist regime. In the years of resistance and early exile, and also during the Spanish civil war, in which some of these people took an active part, the former communists broke first with their party, then with communism as such. This was due to their disappointing experiences with the German Communist Party as well as the Communist International, but also to the experiences of working and living closely together with socialists and social democrats.[55] Similarly, some leftwing socialists also got estranged from Marxist dogma. This first step led to a bereavement of former believes and made them ready to look for other values to turn to. The second step was taken in exile during the early 1940s, when many of them lived in Great Britain, and some in the United States. The experiences there, the entirely different approach of a whole society to the problems of negotiating conflict and making political decisions, seemed to offer a useful answer to their own doubts and questions.[56] Contacts with the Fabian Society, the Labour Party and Trade Unions in Great Britain, the growing acquaintance with their values and their political thought, made them turn to liberal, Western political thought. The British Labour Party was very much different from German social democracy.[57] Labour perceived itself as an organization representing the interests of the working and middle classes in parliament and saw its task in obtaining political power by winning over a majority of the electorate and by this to influence the British political economy in the interest of their electorate — but without changing the constitutional order. The party was also a „broad church“,[58] with room for many different shades of socialism, which forced it to be pluralist in outlook. The Fabian Society rejected Marxism and its revolutionary politics[59] For them, socialism was absolutely compatible with the political system

and political culture of Britain. Their politics was entirely based on the foundation of the British constitutional order and on parliamentary democracy. Their aim — first and last — was a socialist majority in Westminster, but not in order to transform the system, but rather to implement socialist policies by dint of a socialist government in a representative system. As Sidney Webb put it 1923: „Socialism is rooted in political democracy; which necessarily compels us to recognize that every step towards our goal is dependent on gaining the assent and support of at least a numerical majority of the whole people.“[60] A significant number of German socialists who spend years in London, working with the British trade union movement, which was very similar to the Labour Party in outlook, with the Party itself and members of the Fabian Society, slowly but surely came closer to their perception of politics and society. A similar process happened to those exiled in the United States. Some even worked with, or for, the AFL and got to know the position of American labor quite well. But only those German laborites in exile who had previously lost their political faith were open to new values and ideas. On their return, they came home into a strange country.[61] Not only had the cities been turned to rubble, but their own organizations, for the reconstruction of which they had planned and schemed for years, had become alien to them. The old traditionalisms did not seem to fit the new times any more. So, they kept up their mutual contacts from the exile years, and worked in networks for a fundamental change of the programs of West German labor.[62] It was then that AFL and CIO appeared, looking for partners in their crusade for consensus liberalism. It was not at all an act of perjury when the German reformers cooperated with, and accepted help from, their American coalitioners.

When by the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s the SPD and the DGB concluded their programmatic reform, it was not least the work of the German reformers who had been in exile.

Their position within their organizations had been strengthened by the support of their American coalitioners. Together, they had spend years on personnel and power politics, strategic thinking, and ideological debate. When the German labor reformers finally succeeded, a major act of cultural transfer had been concluded. Experiences with foreign cultural practices had changed West German labor's political thought and had resulted in a different belief system, which again had lead to a new political practice.

Conclusion

The West German labor movement was 'westernized' in the 1940s and 1950s. This was the result of a process of intercultural transfer, of productive appropriation of elements of Western culture. It was instigated and supported by the network politics of the US trade union federations in West Germany and Europe, but was made possible only by the preceding acculturation of members of German labor in Western societies during their exile. The Germans themselves changed the political thought of SPD and DGB, but they used ideas, concepts and solutions to their needs which they had encountered by meeting, and dealing with, labor movements from the United States and Great Britain. This new westernized outlook fitted the trade unions and social democracy firmly into the social economy of the Federal Republic of Germany and opened the path to governmental power for the SPD. By the late 1960s, the West Germany society was profoundly altered, and even though big parts of its political left were staunchly anti-American, still they were deeply Western in their outlook.

[1] I have kept citations to a minimum, as the argument presented in this paper is dealt with in full detail in my doctoral thesis: „Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie. Zur ideellen Westorientierung der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, 1945-1965“, Diss. ms. (forthcoming).

[2] Johannes Paulmann, „Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer: Zwei Forschungsansätze zur europäischen Geschichte des 18. bis 20. Jahrhunderts“ in Historische Zeitschrift, 267 (1998): 649-685, here: 680.

[3] Paulmann, „Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer“, 673-681.

[4] For the elements of the (Anglo-American) Western thought see the contribution of Anselm Doering-Manteuffel to this conference: „Transatlantic Exchange and Interaction — The Concept of Westernization“.

[5] Irving Brown to Jay Lovestone, August 25, 1947, George Meany Memorial Archive, Silver Spring, MD, [GMMA], RG18-003, 011/7.

[6] Ronald Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy (New York 1969); Roy Godson, American Labor and European Politics: the AFL as a Transnational Force (New York 1976); Philip Taft, The A.F. of L. from the Death of Gompers to the Merger (New York 1959).

[7] Such as, for instance, the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) or the ERPTUAC, a similar setup concerned with questions concerning the role of labor in the Marshall plan.

[8] Taft, Gompers to the Merger, 342.

[9] GMMA, RG 18-003: AFL, AFL-CIO, Internat. Affairs Dept., Jay Lovestone Files, 1939-1974.

[10] Robert H. Zieger, The CIO 1935-1955 (Chapel Hill/London) 1995; see also: Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor (New York 1995).

[11] GMMA, RG 18-002: CIO, Internat. Affairs Dept., Director’s Files: Mike Ross 1945-1955.

[12] GMMA, RG 18-002, 008/23: CIO European Office, 1953; 012/1-16: Germany; 015/26: Reuther Delegation to Europe, 1950/51; 016/1-2. Victor G. Reuther.

[13] „A.F.L. Setting Up Office in Europe“, Daily Mail, January 3, 1947.

[14] See, for instance, GMMA, RG 18-003, 026/10-13: DGB; 037/12-30: Germany 1948-1965; 038/1-7: Germany; 056/12-19: Henry Rutz; 059/23-30 and 060/1-11: SPD; also Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie: Nachlaß Kuno Brandel; Nachlaß Willi Eichler; Nachlaß Werner Hansen (Willi Heidorn); Nachlaß Siegmund (Siggi) Neumann;

Nachlaß Ludwig Rosenberg; Nachlaß Eduard (Edu) Wald; Bestand Internationale Transportarbeiterföderation (ITF); Sammlung Hans Jahn; Bestand IJB/ISK.

15 Michael Fichter, Besatzungsmacht und Gewerkschaften: Zur Entwicklung und Anwendung der US-Gewerkschaftspolitik in Deutschland 1944-1948 (Opladen 1982).

16 Ernst-Dieter Köpper, Gewerkschaften und Außenpolitik: Die Stellung der westdeutschen Gewerkschaften zur wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Integration der Bundesrepublik in die Europäische Gemeinschaft und in die NATO (Frankfurt/M./New York 1982).

17 [Irving Brown] to Jay Lovestone, August 3, 1950, GMMA, RG 18-003, 011/12.

18 Speech by Irving Brown, AFL Representative in Europe, at the American Club, 17. Februar 1949, ms., GMMA, RG 18-003, 011/11, 6.

19 Victor G. Reuther to Mike Ross, Memorandum, September 10, 1953, GMMA, RG 18-002, 016/02; Irving Brown to George Meany, September 8, 1953, GMMA, RG 18-003, 011/19; Jay Lovestone to Fritz Heine, June 26, 1952, GMMA, RG 18-003, 059/25.

20 GMMA, RG 18-003, 059/23-30; 060/1-11: SPD.

21 For an example, see Wenzel Jaksch to Henry Rutz (German representative of the AFL), September 30, 1957, GMMA, RG 18-001, 003/11.

22 Jay Lovestone to Fritz Heine, November 18, 1959, GMMA, RG 18-003, 060/1.

23 Jay Lovestone to Fritz Heine, November 19, 1953, GMMA, RG 18-003, 059/26.

24 Selig Perlman, „Labor and the New Deal“, in Milton Derber and Edwin Young, Labour and the New Deal, 2d ed., (New York. 1972), 367.

25 Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, Unionsparteien, Sozialdemokratie und Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika 1945-1966 (Düsseldorf 1983), 72.

26 See for example Nelson Lichtenstein, „From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining“ in Steven Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order 1930-1980 (Princeton, N.J., 1989) 122-152; Ira Katznelson, „Was the Great Society a Lost Opportunity?“ in Fraser and Gerstle, New Deal Order, 185-211, esp. S. 190-192.

27 John H. M. Laslett, „Samuel Gompers and the Rise of American Business Unionism“ in Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine, eds., Labor Leaders in America (Urbana-Chicago 1987) 62-88, here 84.

[28] Harold C. Livesay, Samuel Gompers and Organized Labor in America, 2d ed., (Prospect Height, Ill., 1993) 125.

[29] Irving Howe, Socialism and America (San Diego 1985) S. 28.

[30] David Brody „The Course of the American Labor Movement" in David Brody, In Labor's Cause: Main Themes on the History of the American Worker (New York/Oxford 1993) 43-80, here 57.

[31] Report: „The Trade Union Situation in Germany", [1950], [Henry Rutz], GMMA, RG 18-003, 037/18, 5-6.

[32] Patrick Renshaw, American Labour and Consensus Capitalism, 1935-1990 (London 1991).

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[34] Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton 1994); Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950 (Cambridge 1981); Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1898-1945 (New York 1982); Bernhard Plé, Wissenschaft und säkulare Mission: „Amerikanische Sozialwissenschaft" im politischen Sendungsbewußtsein der USA und im geistigen Aufbau der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart 1990); for Pragmatism, see: Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison 1989); Hans Joas, Pragmatismus und Gesellschaftstheorie (Frankfurt/M. 1992).

[35] Joel Kovel, Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America (London/Washington 1994).

[36] For a recent overview of this topic, see: Geir Lundestad, „Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford/New York 1998).

[37] Charles S. Maier, „Hegemony and Autonomy within the Western Alliance" in Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, eds., Origins of the Cold War: An International History (London/New York 1994) 154-174, here 156; 160. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford 1992) 13-4. Charles S. Maier, „The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II" in Charles S. Maier, In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy (Cambridge 1987) 121-152.

[38] NSC 68, in Thomas H. Etzold and John L. Gaddis, eds., Containment: Documents on American Foreign Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York 1978) 385-4.

[39] Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge 1987), 2-3.

[40] Michael J. Hogan, „Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal“ in Diplomatic History, 10, (1986): 363-372, here 370.

[41] Irving Brown, speech at the American Club, February 17, 1949, GMMA, RG 18-003, 011/11, 6.

[42] Irving Brown, speech at the American Club, February 17, 19491949, GMMA, RG 18-003, 011/11, 3.

[43] Dr. Stefan Osousky (Czech diplomat and visiting professor at Colgate University) addressing the Trade Union Advisory Committee, January 6, 1948, Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., GMMA, RG 2-006, 005/23.

[44] Report [Irving Brown] to the Free Trade Union Committee, 1953, GMMA, RG 18-003, 011/18, 5-6.

[45] Jay Lovestone to Fritz Heine, December 17, 1951, GMMA, RG 18-003, 059/23; Jay Lovestone to Fritz Heine, July 30, 1953, GMMA, RG 18-003, 056/17

[46] Kurt Klotzbach, Der Weg zur Staatspartei: Programmatik, praktische Politik und Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1945 bis 1965 (Berlin/Bonn 1982); Alfred Kaden, Einheit oder Freiheit: Die Wiedergründung der SPD 1945/46 (Hannover 1964).

[47] See, for example, Franz L. Neumann, „Zur marxistischen Staatstheorie“ in Franz L. Neumann, Wirtschaft, Staat, Demokratie (Frankfurt/M. 1978) 393-401, and Hubertus Buchstein, „Auf der gemeinsamen Suche nach einer ‘modernen Demokratietheorie’: Otto Suhr, Franz L. Neumann und Ernst Fraenkel“ in Gerhard Göhler and Bodo Zeuner, eds., Kontinuitäten und Brüche in der deutschen Politikwissenschaft (Baden-Baden 1991) 171-194.

[48] Siegfried Mielke and Peter Rütters, „Einleitung“ in Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung vol. 7, 9-92, here 36; Eberhard Schmidt, Die verhinderte Neuordnung 1945-1952: Zur Auseinandersetzung um die Demokratisierung der Wirtschaft in den westlichen Besatzungszonen und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 7th ed., (Frankfurt/M./Köln 1977) 68.

[49] Hans Böckler, addressing the Rhein-Ruhr-Club, November 1, 1949, quoted in Köpper, Gewerkschaften und Außenpolitik 44.

[50] See, for example, Kurt Schumacher, „Programmatische Erklärungen vom 5. Oktober 1945“ in: Ossip K. Flechtheim, ed., Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945, vol. 3, „Programmatik der deutschen Parteien“, part two, (Berlin 1963) 4-8, hier S. 5.

[51] Especially in the DGB many functionaries had already been in office in the interwar years, as for instance Hans Böckler and most of the members of the DGB's first executive committee.

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[53] Report by Henry Rutz, 1955, GMMA, RG 18-003, 056/19; Henry Rutz to Jay Lovestone, July 22, 1955, GMMA, RG 18-003, 056/19.

[54] Jan Foitzik, Zwischen den Fronten: Zur Politik, Organisation und Funktion linker politischer Kleinorganisationen im Widerstand 1933 bis 1939/40 (Bonn 1986).

[55] Ludwig Eiber, Die Sozialdemokratie in der Emigration: Die „Union deutscher sozialistischer Organisationen in Großbritannien" 1941-1946 und ihre Mitglieder. Protokolle, Erklärungen, Materialien (Bonn 1998).

[56] Manfred Briegel and Wolfgang Frühwald, eds., Die Erfahrung der Fremde: Kolloquium des Schwerpunktprogramms "Exilforschung" der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, Forschungsbericht (Weinheim et al. 1988).

[57] Geoffrey Foote, The Labour Party's Political Thought: A History, 3d ed., (Houndmills 1997), especially 3-16; 144-182; 184-5. See also: Ross I. McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party (Oxford 1974); Ross I. McKibbin, „Why was there no Marxism in Great Britain?" in Ross I. McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950, (Oxford/New York 1991), 1-41; Stefan Berger, The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 1900-1931 (Oxford 1994).

[58] Foote, Labour Party, 5.

[59] Foote, Labour Party, 26-33.

[60] Foote, Labour Party, 29-30.

[61] Claus-Dieter Krohn and Patrik von zur Mühlen, eds., Rückkehr und Aufbau nach 1945: Deutsche Remigranten im öffentlichen Leben Nachkriegsdeutschlands (Marburg 1997).

[62] For such a network between SPD and DGB see: Julia Angster, „Der Zehnerkreis. Remigranten in der westdeutschen Arbeiterbewegung der 1950er Jahre" in: Exil 1 (1998) 26-47.