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Ulrich M. Bausch

Good-bye, Swabian Authorities!

Culture and the Public in Württemberg-Baden during
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Dr. Ulrich M. Bausch

This heading – a farewell to the authoritarian state – may surprise some people. Has there indeed been a break of tradition in many important areas of political culture? Who said good-bye to whom? Who were the prominent figures in this? These questions lead to the old controversy about democratic beginnings in the South West of Germany after 1945 on the one hand and the restoration theory on the other. The idea of a completely new democratic start dominated the interpretation of post-war history in Württemberg-Baden for a long time. ¹

In fact, the first minister-president of Baden-Württemberg, Reinhold Maier, to a large extent contributed to this view. ² He wrote - with a slight nostalgic tinge – the following quote from an account of the first meeting of senior state officials (Landräte) in the city of Murrhardt:

"The men in charge met with a natural air to them. As if there had never been a totalitarian state, the old forms of democratic discussions and exchange of views on the subject at hand had returned. We decided very simply to settle community problems as a community. The captain who was watching the proceedings was amazed? He said: "You are just as democratic as the people at home in Connecticut". ³

This implies that the old traditional forms had been resumed and the Americans were not really necessary in the development of a new democracy. This thought is still popular in the South-West of Germany and journalists like to make use of it.

One of them is the former director of the Südwest-Funk television, Klaus Simon. He used Maier's Connecticut quote in a documentary in the series "The South-Western Country". At the beginning of the documentary film there was a long shot with the camera zooming in on Murrhardt, the city in which the "first democratic meeting" took place according to the commentator in this scene who then quotes Maier. In the book accompanying the series, Simon wrote with regard to the quote.

"This is a wonderful, almost unbelievable example that makes you blink: A fairy tale or reality? Just about four weeks after the capitulation, 15 senior officials from North Württemberg met in an inn in Murrhardt near Backnang under American supervision and exchanged their thoughts for the first time. (...) The participants spoke freely, the officials still had a historic feeling for the democratic and liberal tradition in this country and demonstrated real, simple and direct democracy."

I'm afraid this is closer to the fairy story. Especially since the Maier quote doesn't hold in the light of a thorough investigation. Reinhold Maier himself noted November 22nd, 1945 after the fourth – not the first – meeting of the senior state official that a certain Major Bingham said to him: "Now your meetings are just as democratic as ours in Connecticut." ⁴ It is likely that Bingham saw the

¹ Compare Sauer 1978 ore. Konstanzer 1969.

² See at: Matz 1989, 199.

³ Maier 1965, VII.

⁴ Maier 1948, 388.

first three meetings in a completely different light, because only that explains the word "now". It is quite unreasonable to think that an officer of an occupational army sent to "democratize" had nothing better to do than declare himself superfluous, especially during a time when shattering disclosures about the Nazi crimes were made every day.

The headline "Good-bye, Swabian Authorities" will naturally also be objected to by those who think of the continuing features that survived from the Nazi reign into the new post-war republic. The keyword restoration played an important role in the scientific journals during the 70s, especially since the findings are clear.

The capitalist economic order with its old property situation was reconstructed, though with some modifications such as the workers' right of participation in the coal and steel industries. A first step in this was the currency reform in favor of the property owners.⁵ The dream of a non-capitalist beginning that was dreamt by many, even in the CDU (Ahlener party program) in the group around Eugen Kogon, Walter Dirks, Jakob Kaiser, Ernst Lemmer and Karl Arnold was over.⁶

Apart from the controversial discussion of the economic order that the new state should have, the "re-militarisation" and the takeover of former sponsors into the administration and the legal system were the main reasons for the allegations against the Adenauer government that their politics were restorative. A de-nazification never took place within the legal system. Dr. Hans Globke, a man who had been honored by the president of the Volksgerichtshof, Dr. Roland Freisler, was highly regarded because of his commentary to the Nuremberg race laws and now became the director of the Chancellery, a very influential position in West Germany. The government member Franz Josef Strauss declared on March 14th, 1954: "The German soldiers of the future must continue the traditions of the German soldiers in WW 2."⁷

Continuations and restorative tendencies therefore cannot be denied. However, a restoration in the sense of a close approach or a match with the status quo ante cannot be spoken of seriously either.

I will show the fact that neither the beginnings of a natural, basically democratic beginning nor the restoration theory adequately represent the historic reality after 1945 by taking a look at the media and culture politics of the US-American Information Control Division. This division of the occupational army controlled musical and theater performances, rebuilt the library system and was responsible for the structural changes in the areas of cinema and films, radio and the printed media.

The Information Control Division was the successor of the "Sikeboys", as the employees of the Psychological Warfare Division came to be called. During the war, their main work consisted of encouraging German units to surrender, demoralizing the „Volkssturm“ and informing the inhabitants in the occupied territories of the new commanders' intentions. They drafted leaflets which showed the Germans the true front lines, persuaded German units via loudspeakers to surrender and offered medical care and food. Already in the summer of 1944 - behind the army

⁵ Comp.. Huster 1976; Hartwich 1970.

⁶ Huster 1976, 424. ore: Berg-Schlosser 1979, 111.

⁷ In: Welt am Sonntag vom 14. 3. 1954. From: Siepmann u.a. 1981, 84.

lines - the PWD invited the locals to cooperate and started to add to the famous „white lists“. After the fighting ceased, the PWD was transformed into the Information Control Division (ICD) and organized centrally under General McClure's command (OMGUS-Berlin).

A new start in the field of music and theater

The *Directive Concerning Psychological Warfare and Control of German Information Agencies* dated April 16th, 1945 authorized the ICD to supervise performances of operas, plays, orchestra music and "other performances". The exact executive orders were received by the culture officers on September 1st, 1945 only. These orders specified that each mayor should be aided by a contact officer in the preparation of communal culture programs for the locals and could possibly open up closed community accounts for this purpose. The approval of cultural performances of any kind was to be granted by the ICD central office only. They were ordered to ensure that there was at least one theater, cinema or comparable institution for the public in every city.

In the city of Stuttgart, the first American officer in charge of musical and theater performances was William Sailer, born in Stuttgart himself and an expert on classical music and the German "high culture". Actors, musicians and film directors had to apply to him and present their plans for the future. Even though Stuttgart was still occupied by French troops, it was him who viewed the program planning for morning performances at the "Grosses Haus" (with texts by Lessing, Hoelderlin, Schiller, Euripides, Droste-Huelshoff and Klabund) and watched the rehearsals for Beethoven's *Eroica*. Even hurdy-gurdy players asked him for a license to play. After they promised to remove the *march "Wir fahren gegen England"* (We're charging against England) by the Nazi poet Herms Hiel from the instrument, they received this license.⁸

The ICD was quite generous with approvals in the beginning, since they were interested in staging a large number of cultural events for the local public. For most officers, literature, theater and music personified the other, the good Germany that ought to be rebuilt. This was not surprising if you consider the fact that these culture officers were usually exiles who had grown up in a German speaking country and had studied literature or music here or, alternatively, that they had studied in Germany during the 30s. These men returned to Germany as culture officers with this qualification.

For example, Newell Jenkins had studied music with Carl Orff in Freiburg and engaged himself in creating liberal culture sponsoring politics already at a very early stage.

Until the beginning of 1946, the military government approved almost all the applicants who wanted to work in the cultural sector. However, all of these approvals were only valid until revoked, since a systematic survey of the applicants was not yet possible during the fall of 1945 due to a lack of personnel. The new freedom in the cultural sector prompted the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* to raise a warning voice in one of its commentaries. It ran:

"Barely half a year had passed since the cease fire, and already we have the danger of an art inflation. What was greeted and cheered after months and years of cultural starvation now threatens to become evil. One look on the advertising columns and in the newspapers shows you a confusing number of cultural events, which provokes the question: How does this fit into

⁸ William Sailer interviewed by the author 20th August 1990.

the desolation of our time? Is this the expression of a true need? And if so, is this need still appropriate and healthy?"

Starting in January 1946, the ICD started to be much stricter with approvals in the cultural sector. This was not due to the opinion that this "eager/enthusiastic approach to art" might be "unhealthy", but simply because the lack of rooms clashed with an enormous offer of actors, artists and musicians. A certain selection had to be made, and the mayors were reminded that they had to adhere to the license regulations of the ICD. On February 13th, 1946, the Secretary of the Interior sent instructions to all the senior county officials and mayors in Württemberg-Baden which included the following paragraph:

"not all the theater, musical and varié performances can be authorized by the local military rule nor by the mayors or senior county officials. The American department in charge of this kind of public events for your area is the ICD in Stuttgart, Tagblatt Tower, 5th floor."⁹

The ICD still wanted to approve as many performances as possible, but they regularly were stopped by the local mayors. The yearly report of the ICD for 1947 contains these sentences:

"It is sad to see that local and county politics play such a great role in the cultural life of this country. The politicians tend to use theater and music as their plaything, (...). Even well-meaning and far-sighted people like, e.g. Lord Mayer Klett are hindered by selfish party politics and are even threatened in their political career. It is noteworthy that there is not one specialist or expert with a background in the theater or in music in the culture committee of the state parliament."

Again and again the reports of the theater and music department mention the local authorities as a hindrance to the cultural life. The behavior of the mayor of Schorndorf and former Secretary of De-Nazification, Gottlob Kamm is characteristic of many other cases as well. He refused to let Horst Hallen, a theater manager from Bad Mergentheim, perform in Schorndorf together with his troupe, the "Bauerntheater". The reasons he stated were as follows:

"As the mayor I am responsible for the citizens and therefore for a sound cultural development of the theatrical life in my city. I would be laughed at if I let this kind of theater performance take place here."

Kamm was informed by the ICD that his position was clearly contradictory to the constitution of Württemberg-Baden, as he as a former Secretary ought to know.¹⁰ In the town of Gaildorf, the mayor declared in the spring of 1946 that he disapproved of all theater performances as a rule, since the town had to be rebuilt first. The same general refusal came from the mayor of Schnait, who reasoned that "the people should work during the week and go to church on Sundays". In the town of Korb, the mayor explained that it was only possible to allow one event per month. In June 1946, the vice-mayor of Waiblingen rejected a performance by the *Gastspielleitung Ewald Huth* by declaring that there were too many events already. After the intervention of the local contact officer of the military government, the performance took place, since the officer held that in fact there were not enough cultural events in Waiblingen at the time.¹¹

⁹ Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg, FL 20/19 Bü 1195.

¹⁰ Quarterly History Theater & Music Control Branch, First Quarter 1948. S. 37. Wie Anm. Nr. 149.

¹¹ Memo by Ewald Huth to Military Gov. Theater und Musikkontrolle vom 17.6.1946, NARA RG 260. OMGWB, Records of the Theater and Music Section. 12/89-3/8.

Such cases were reported to the ICD from all the licensees, which led the theater department to appeal to the Secretary of Education and the Arts. In a meeting that was also attended by representatives from the Secretary of the Interior, it was decided that the Secretary of the Interior was to send an order to all the mayors and senior county officials stating that all kind of censure and control of cultural events was prohibited.¹²

However, the theater control members felt that in fact the Secretary of Education and the Arts was the real obstacle in the creation of a theater and music life in Württemberg-Baden. Newell Jenkins reported his experiences to General McClure. The relationship with the Secretary himself, Theodor Heuss, was quite pleasant, but Heuss had declared several times that he was not qualified to judge theater and musical performances, since he was a newspaper man himself. Jenkins: "Dr. Kauffmann was the thorn in the side of theater and music". In addition to this, according to Jenkins, the CDU party had just won the elections and suggested Mr. Simpfendörfer as the new Secretary of Education and the Arts. Simpfendörfer was a "Pietist" (member of a religious group that is rather strong in the South-West of Germany) and toleration of the theater was the most one could expect from him. He was said to be against contemporary theater and modern music and it was rumored that Kauffmann was to remain in his position under Simpfendörfer. Kauffmann, according to Jenkins, was instrumental in the refusal to give contracts to first-rate conductors and musicians. On the other hand, he accepted dubious artists who had been rejected by the military government. For example, the theater control department refused to register a pianist who had been an active member in several Nazi organizations. Kauffmann accepted this pianist at once. In addition, Kauffmann awarded him the title of professor. The charges against Kauffmann included that he was unable to make decisions and in fact managed to make every negotiation so complicated that most applicants lost heart and left Stuttgart. Jenkins mentions a number of cases when famous conductors and musicians were basically driven away to Munich. He also complains about Kauffmann's tendency to grant licenses for performance to several men's choirs and city marching bands in defiance of previous arrangements with him. In the towns of Aalen and Heidenheim, Jenkins continues, these groups were even identical with the former SA marching bands and the "Kreismusikzug", which in fact still used letter paper from the Reichsmusikkammer for its correspondence. When faced with these charges, Kauffmann explained that he had not known this, but that these musicians were simply needed for weddings ceremonies and funerals.¹³

What was especially annoying for Newell Jenkins was the refusal of the Hungarian conductor and former band master of the Budapest State Opera House, Georg Solti. Jenkins received a phone call from Berlin asking him to go to Basel and accompany the Hungarian conductor and his family back to Stuttgart. The position of General Music Director in the "Grosses Haus" was not vacant at the time, but its holder was in hospital, presumably for a longer period of time. The "Grosses Haus" in Stuttgart belonged to only a few comparable institutions that had survived the war without any damage. However, the Secretary (of Education and the Arts) did not want to accept his resignation and employ a new director. Jenkins unsuccessfully tried to push Solti's application with Kauffmann. Solti was not German and, in addition, of Jewish descent. When asked by Jenkins what exactly was wrong with that, since actually a war had been fought because of this and Solti was the best musician available at the time, Kauffmann (himself of

¹² Ebd. but, Second Quarter 1948, S. 26.

¹³ Newell Jenkins an Mc Clure vom 28.9.46. Subjekt: Dilemma of ICD. NARA RG 260. ISD Wü-Ba. 12/96-2/20.

Jewish descent) answered and was cited by Jenkins in his report to McClure: "We don't need a Hungarian here in Württemberg." Georg Solti instead went on to become General Music Director at the state opera house in Munich and later on took over first the Frankfurt opera house and then the Royal Opera House in London.

The difficulties encountered by all those who tried to develop the music and theater life without state interference were basically the same that appeared in the reorganization of the Württemberg-Badische cinema world.

Hollywood falls through

The film department of the ICD had orders to use the German cinemas and in fact films as a medium for the presentation of documentaries and selected reports to promote the reorientation program. ICD members were active in producing, marketing and evaluating the so-called atrocity pictures, i.e. documentaries about the Nazi extermination camps.

- they produced and sold current news and documentaries which were intended to inform the Germans about the rest of the world.

- the ICD had the noteworthy order to open the German market for the American movie industry.

I cannot elaborate on this here but would like to point out that the ICD had similar difficulties as in the music and theater sector when it tried to re-open as many movie theaters/cinemas as possible for this purpose. For example, in the village of Neudorf (in Baden) the local minister/pastor/priest, who dominated the village together with the mayor denied a Jewish citizen the right to open up a cinema. His reason for this as reported by the film department was that he felt he could not allow this Jew to bring immoral movies into the town. The department then asked the local inhabitants with the result that 70% voted for the cinema. The minister reacted with a survey of his own and declared that everyone who was against the cinema did not have to house fugitives. The mayor of Neudorf shared this view. And this is just one story of many. John Scott, the head of the film department, even knows stories about teachers who threatened to beat their students if they went to see movies. And another man of the church recommended that the district council should allow only one movie per month. In another case, the students' lessons of religious studies were scheduled exactly at the time a movie for children and teenagers was shown as well. Several mayors confiscated the cinemas for presumably important meetings and the local police censored movies, in short: everything was done to prevent the showing of films.

Even in those places where the movie theaters in fact were open and in use there were difficulties, because other mayors tried to fill the community accounts with the money from the showings. According to Scott's studies, attempts were even made to give the management of the cinemas to old friends from the Nazi party – "politically unacceptable individuals" and those who were dependent on the mayors. In his book he mentions the examples Heilbronn, Schorndorf, Kornwestheim, Hockenheim, Bruchsal and Stuttgart. Scott also noted a plan in Stuttgart designed to build up a state-controlled movie industry together with the Secretary of Education and the Arts. When asked about this plan, the representative of the Secretary said: "The thought that these films might be produced in Bavaria is unbearable, because they are bound to contain Catholic propaganda. We want to supervise the production of these films here and ensure that they are good cultural films." In addition, John Scott cites the (oral) request of the Secretary, which kind of organization could be suggested by the military government to give the Secretary control of the cinemas. They were asked in return whether they thought such a

control was necessary and answered that someone should control them. Scott draws the following conclusion in his report: "The experience with German officials in the past indicates that they will try ever more openly to use means of suppression and direct control".¹⁴

Wanted by the locals: state control of radio broadcasting and the press

The fact that an independent, not officially controlled sphere in the public life was practically unimaginable for the local politicians becomes apparent when one looks at the procedures during the reorganization of the broadcasting and press system.

Locals and occupational army officials discussed the new press law for almost five years. Now time was running out. The time for the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany, planned to take place in the fall of 1948, had drawn near and with it the end of press control by the occupational government. Since December 1945, the military government had tried to enforce a press law that was acceptable to them, but had failed to do so again and again due to the deficient suggestions by the local officials. The occupational officers from the USA would have preferred not to have a information law at all, since no such law existed in their own country. However, the old press law dated 1874 was still valid and could only be abolished by a new one. This is one instance where two completely different legal systems met. The American officers imagined the US model, in which the constitution guarantees freedom of speech and information and makes any other law superfluous. The Anglo-Saxon legal tradition regards every inhibition of this right with distrust, in accordance with the idea that a limitation of this freedom is equal to the loss of it.

On the other hand, the information law of 1974 had its origin more in the "need" of the state to protect itself from the press than in the protection of the press from the state. Especially one aspect of it turned out to have a strong negative effect on the press, namely that the "Reichspressegesetz" allowed the police to confiscate newspapers even without a court decision if they suspected an offence against state laws. This paragraph, together with the "protection of the honor of persons in public life" plus the laws pertaining to slander and insult was a powerful instrument in the hand of the state and could be used to harass the press. Therefore the fact that this law was still and might continue to be valid was unacceptable to the occupational government. Most local politicians orientated themselves according to the values from the Weimar Republic, which included special protection laws for persons in public life, a feature that was alien to the Americans. Proof for this can be found in a bill handed in by the SPD, or in the lively controversy "Maier vs. Maier/Simpfendorfer" in Württemberg-Baden. According to a bill by the SPD, anyone making false or exaggerated (sic) allegations against persons in the public life should be sentenced to at least 6 months of prison.¹⁵ Franz Karl Maier, a lawyer and co-publisher of the "Stuttgarter Zeitung" reproached Minister President Reinhold Maier and the Secretary of Education and the Arts Wilhelm Simpfendorfer for their vote in 1933. Both had voted for the so-called "Ermächtigungsgesetz" (law of empowerment). In addition to this, Karl Maier accused Secretary Simpfendorfer to have promoted Hitler and went on to print an article written by Simpfendorfer in 1933. This article mentioned that Hitler had "removed the rotten system of 1918 with revolutionary zeal and now (had) gained everybody's confidence as the

¹⁴ John Scott to ICD, OMGWB: Requirements for Free German Information Services. 27. Nov. 1946. NARA RG 260. 12/-2/20.

¹⁵ Hurwitz 1972, 174.

Fuehrer." In another article, Simpfendörfer allegedly wrote that each vote for Adolf Hitler was a confession to true community of the people, the Volk and its fate. Simpfendörfer had to resign, but Reinhold Maier managed to keep his position. The state parliament (Landtag) now saw a controversial debate. The member of parliament, Theiss from the CDU called the events an "attack on all fronts" against democracy, since the "leading men of the state" were attacked. Theiss went on to say:

"while on the one hand those leading the attack against our current form of parliamentary state have almost all the means to do so, especially because they control a large part of the press, the representatives of the state (...) are not able to meet these attacks. (...) We all have to ask ourselves the question whether we want this young democracy to be slaughtered again as has happened before."

Theiss wanted a daily press, owned by the parties, in order to confront the licensed papers. The criticism from the Stuttgarter Zeitung, which in fact was based on undisputed facts, was seen by him as an attempt to "slaughter democracy", since it attacked the "representatives of the state."¹⁶

At the beginning of September, 1948, the military government asked the state parliament to draft a law to guarantee freedom of the press. On September 10th, the Landtag discussed the draft. Less than half the members of parliament had appeared and the speeches about the subject seemed rather superficial to the press officers. The draft contained 39 paragraphs, 33 of which were rejected by the military government. The press committee of the Landtag then wondered whether it made any sense to continue working and asked the senate of Bremen for help. The press law presented by the senate had been accepted by the Americans (even though it had come into force after the württemberg-badische law).¹⁷ The chairman of the press committee in the Landtag in Stuttgart complained about the rules enforced by the occupational powers in further meetings. The main point of criticism was that if the military government had left the parliament in peace, the draft would have looked differently. In addition, the American concept did not offer any protection from the "pornographic articles" of the scandal papers (yellow press?) that ought to be fought.¹⁸

The following negotiations proved to become a mental war between Landtag and military government.

The press law came into force on April 1st, 1949. On the 1st of July 1949, the license rule in Württemberg-Baden ceased to be in effect. This meant that Württemberg-Baden was the first state in the American occupational zone where publishing did not have to be approved of any longer. General Clay writes in his memoirs:

"The German inability to really grasp the idea of democratic freedom has never showed itself so clearly in any other area (...) It seemed to be impossible to reach a legislation in which the press was not in the hands of the ruling party, for better or worse."¹⁹

¹⁶ „Verhandlungen des Württ. Bad. Landtags“. 15. Sitzung. Stuttgart, Dienstag den 1. April 1947. S. 292.

¹⁷ Hans Schmidt-Osten, former journalist counselor of „Presseausschußes“ interviewed by the author 14.4.1990.

¹⁸ Subjekt: Press Law vom 24.3.49. NARA RG 260. OMGWB. ISD 12/96-2/7.

¹⁹ Clay 1950. From Pfau 1986, 72.

Radio broadcasting as an instrument in the hand of the state chancellery

The so-called "men of the first hour" demanded state control not only for the printed press, but also for the radio.

In a debate in the Länderrat in January 1946, Reinhold Maier outlined his ideas on the reorganization of the radio system in the following way:

"I think that this should be organized along these lines: the purely technical sector of the radio system is to be dealt with by the postal service. The stations are again owned by the state, the political responsibility rests with the Secretary of State and there should be a director or manager each for the program under central supervision (...) but in all this, the development of a Ministry of Propaganda should be avoided." ²⁰

This makes it clear that Reinhold Maier's ideas were related to the old fateful structures: political control by the state via a central office of supervision. The little word "but", however, makes it also clear that he himself knew exactly what the outcome of his own ideas could be if they were brought to life.

In the fall of the same year, the US occupational government in Stuttgart interviewed many leading representatives from politics and society and many locals from "all walks of life".

This survey did not count as a representative survey. Instead, its purpose was to give the occupational army an overview over the public opinion. It is striking that the group of "ordinary citizens" who were asked "on the street, in trains etc" almost uniformly rejected the idea of state-controlled media. Only a 28-year-old student of medicine demanded a strict state control as well as more classical music and no jazz on the radio. The summary conjecture is that "the people believe that they have had enough control during the last 13 years." ²¹

The group of state representatives had completely different opinions. A clear majority welcomed state control over the media. Only 7 of 29 people questioned opted for independent management. This group included all three representatives of the media, Martin vom Bruch (program advisor for Radio Stuttgart), Consul Bernhard and his successor as the licensee of the Stuttgarter Zeitung, Dr. Schairer. All three spoke out vehemently against state control of press and radio. However, Bernhard, suggested a control panel of selected members of parliament and experts to select the licensees for the press and broadcasting stations. Schairer opted for independent media, but he also made mention of administrative organizations that were "responsible either to the German or the American military government." Dr. Bruch suggested private companies for the press and the broadcasting agencies, whose policies should be approved either by the German government or by the military government. ²²

The opponents of a state control also included the Secretary of Education and the Arts, Councilor Ströhle, the director of the city information council Dr. Arntz and the head of the Stuttgart school district Mr. Leichtele. Arntz was against any type of control but did not submit a suggestion of his own. Heuss suggested an independent control panel that was to consist of

²⁰ ebd. 71.

²¹ "Subjekt: Weekly Brief - 15-22 October 1946. Opinion on Question of Government Control of Radio and Press." S.2 . NARA RG 260. ISD Wü-Ba. 12/85-2/5.

²² ebd. 6.

representatives from the Ministries, the unions and the parties. Similar to Heuss` suggestion, Ströhle and Leichteleg planned control panels with representatives "from all walks of life".²³

In the group of community and state representatives, the votes for state control was strong. The statement of the vice state councilor Dr. Benke is characteristic for this group:

"Radio broadcasts must be controlled in order to ensure that they cannot be abused, as has happened in the past 12 years. The employees and the program should be supervised. (...) Political broadcasts must be under close control."²⁴

All the mayors who participated in the survey had arguments similar to Benke´s. The mayor from Ettlingen Mr. Kauffmann demanded the revival of the old Reichsrundfunk and his colleague from Karlsruhe, Heurich, opted for state ownership and control of the radio stations.²⁵

The representatives of the parties voted almost unanimously for state control of the radio broadcasting system, too. The CDU secretary Schwan saw the state as supervisor and owner of the radio stations, with the most important organizations from the areas of religion, politics and culture as co-workers in the program design. The county president of the DVP, Duerr, suggested a control commission with members of all parties, to be appointed by the government. He thought that this measure practically guaranteed the artistic level of the program. The SPD secretary Dr. Grosshans demanded the revival of an uniform "Reichsrundfunksystem" which ought to be controlled by a parliamentary panel. His party friend Hermann Walter from the community council of Stuttgart was for a "strict control by a Ministry" for the radio system. His reasons for this demand were that "the public thinks that the radio is an official body, therefore the broadcasts have to be controlled."²⁶

The representatives of the KPD also voted unanimously for programs under the supervision of the state. However, the state radio control was to be limited to the "elimination of reactionary influences on the broadcasts themselves," as KPD secretary Willi Bechtle put it. The same reasons were used by his party friends Aschinger, Klausmann and Riedinger to promote the control of the radio program by the Secretary of Education and the Arts as well as the return of the stations to the postal service.²⁷

While the idea of a intervening, guiding state is strongly visible all through the interviews – after all, the representatives are legitimately and democratically authorized to represent it – it is also clear that in the question of the reorganization of the broadcasting system they all are against a private organization of broadcasting stations. The gentlemen orientated themselves mostly according to notions from the Weimar Republic. Even in the question of the reorganization of the library system, the authority-centered ideas of the locals had to be overcome.

²³ ebd. 8.

²⁴ ebd. 4.

²⁵ ebd.

²⁶ ebd. 5.

²⁷ ebd. 3.

A new freedom on the bookshelves

In November 1945, Mrs. Zaran Wang arrived in Stuttgart.²⁸ Her luggage included a selection of 200 books and a pile of newspaper clippings from her former place of work, the Office of War Information. She moved into an old 4-room apartment in Neckar Street and opened the first American library for Germans. These were the beginnings of a small library which a few months later became the first US Information Center (USIC) in Württemberg-Baden and still later was renamed "Amerikahaus".

In the first months, Zaran Wang's modest little library consisted of English newspaper clippings and army books, small cheap paperbacks which were published in a size fitting into the trouser pockets of a soldier's uniform. At first, the apartment in Neckar Street was not open to the general public, the idea was to allow only journalists, publishers and scientists access to the rest of the world which had been hidden from them for 12 years.

In March 1946, the 4-room apartment was renamed US Information Center and opened to the entire public of Stuttgart. By now, about 1000 books were available and a "representative" collection of US-American magazines. In Stuttgart, the apartment was called "American library." It consisted of an office, a study for those who needed to write and two reading rooms. Even though a large number of the inhabitants of Stuttgart viewed this institution with distrust, many succumbed to their curiosity to read things which had been banned for one "millennium," especially since Zaran Wang also introduced the system of American lending libraries to Württemberg-Baden. The books were not kept in closed rooms, as was customary in the German libraries, but instead the visitors were able to select and read whatever they wanted and had free access to the shelves. This open shelf concept, was later on forced on all libraries in Württemberg-Baden – against the protests of the administration. Now one could simply read and browse through *The Atlantic*, *Time*, *Esquire* and the most popular *Life* in libraries which on the whole were still very small.

When 1846 turned to 1947, the financial support of the centers changed. After the famous speech by the American Secretary of State, Byrnes, on September 6th, 1946 in the Grosses Haus in Stuttgart, Washington offered quite substantial financial help. Byrnes had announced the reconstruction of Germany in his speech, which was commonly understood as the announcement of a new paradigm in American occupational politics. Many reports of the ICD mention that "we switched over from the negative to the positive aspects of the occupation." This change went hand in hand with added efforts in the area of the so-called re-education. In November 1946, Washington approved of an amount of US \$350,000 to be used for the purchase of books and magazines in the USICs. Mike Weyls, Mrs. Wang's successor, received \$ 65,000 for the first 6 months of 1947. First of all, new branches were founded with this money, new reading rooms and lending libraries developed in Heilbronn, Göppingen, Heidenheim, Schwäbisch-Gmünd, Crailsheim, Tauberbischofsheim and Bad Mergentheim. Each center had an average of 175 magazine subscription and 4 Swiss daily papers in the spring of 1947. Mike Weyl remembers that the selection of books was done in a "very free and open spirit" and nobody tried to censure. "This was the pre-McCarthy era." Indeed, the magazine catalogues of the centers in Stuttgart, Heidelberg, Karlsruhe and Mannheim, each of which subscribed to 264 different magazines and weeklies in September 1947, also list those which were critical of the

²⁸ E&IC Branch, ICD, OMG W/B, The First Two Years USICs W/B, 5 Juli 47. S.59. NARA RG 260. OMGWB ICD. 12/96-2/4.

official American foreign policy and the American government, such as the politically left *Nation* or the *New Republic*.

Even though the books and magazines reached the German readers without censure and the selection was made with great tolerance, this does not mean that the Pentagon and the ICD had left the journalists and authors to their own devices. Close attention was paid to the way the USA was presented in foreign countries and against those reports which were found faulty, protests were made and authors advised to improve. For example, one instant of disapproval was the Life magazine edition in August 1947. The title story featured "Americans in Heidelberg," wearing German traditional clothing or what was seen as such by the Life editors. Inside the magazine there were pictures of young Americans who exchanged army signs with locals. Washington was horrified. But even though this and other goofs happened, the occupational officers retained their independence. In Stuttgart, the ICD tried to make more German literature available. Help came from Basel and Schaffhausen: Both cities sent several trucks full of literature published in Switzerland, Holland and Sweden as a present. Mike Weyl invented the "bookmobiles" so that even the rural areas and prisons could be supplied with books and magazines. The bookmobiles were movable lending libraries which stopped regularly on small market places or in prisons and offered a collection of the most popular material. In some cases, the idea that even prisoners might enjoy American magazines and Swiss literature was opposed by the prison administration. All in all, 20 bookmobiles were bought to serve the entire US zone. Later they were handed over to the local libraries and some of them were in service until 1956.

Double identification of the occupying forces

It can be proved explicitly for the area of responsibility of the ICD that the local representatives were strongly influenced by the idea of the state as a guardian, an intervening, guiding authority. The members of the ICD on the other hand usually adhered to the ideals of the Anglo-American democracy (which can be reduced to a formula somewhat like "freedom from the state" instead of "freedom by the state") and to the Other Germany, the Kulturation as they saw it in Jaspers, Weber, Thomas Mann and others. There were no punishing occupation concepts within the ICD, although there was a strong scepticism against indigenous people. The chief officer of ICD Stuttgart H. Boxer, used this phrase to express his strong reservations against the local inhabitants: „I start to believe that after all even Hitler wasn't a Nazi“, because noone – or so it seemed – had seen anything, nobody had participated and everyone was a victim. This basic uncertainty – who could be believed? – John H. Boxer and his colleagues sought to relieve by talking very personally to those locals who seemed trustworthy. The reason for this policy of personal contact are the protagonists' biographies. Most of them were exiles who had a kind of double identification: They were New Americans, come to declare the American mission and at the same time had remained Europeans who had grown up with the German language and therefore tried to save the Kulturation in order to save their own identity. During the transformation of fascism to young republic, this double identification became virulent. It made the slow moving and time consuming implantation of some Anglo-Saxon structural elements of democracy possible. Many ideas of old authority from the Weimar Republic were frustrated in the long run, or at least weakened. While there are personal and structural continuities to be found in many areas of society, the Information Control Division was able to enforce clear breaks in these lines and genuine new beginnings in the area of media and cultural life.

All those elements we today think of when we speak of democracy, among them elections plus a democratic control of power, a widespread responsibility, competition for instead of concentration of power, plurality of opinions and free, uncensored flow of information which are taken to guarantee a democratic development of opinions and many more we take for granted today, was not so granted and natural then, even among those locals who thought themselves democrats. One of the special achievements of the occupational forces at the time was that they were able to push through this independent media and cultural life first against, later on together with the local representatives. It is very probable that the process of detachment from the old German authoritarian state has not been completed yet. But the beginning was made in those years.

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Bio. Notes on Dr. Ulrich M. Bausch

Born in 1959. Social advocacy and drug counseling in Los Angeles from 1979 to 1981. Study of Empirical cultural science, political science and law at the University of Tuebingen. 1986-1991 Television author of documentaries at the Süddeutsche Rundfunk in Stuttgart. Dissertation on the Information Control Division in Württemberg-Baden between 45 and 49. Executive manager of Volkshochschule Reutlingen.