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**The American Impact on Western Europe:  
Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective**

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*Der Monat*, the Congress for Cultural Freedom,  
and the Process of Westernization in Germany

THE INTELLECTUAL AS PROPAGANDIST: *Der Monat*, THE CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM,  
AND THE PROCESS OF WESTERNIZATION IN GERMANY

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Time and again at least two questionable, even mistaken assumptions about role and function of *Der Monat* in post-war German intellectual life and society are made. The first one suggests that the well known, and perhaps the most influential, monthly in postwar Germany was from the beginning subsidized by the CIA.<sup>1</sup> Thus, a further subassumption attempts to denounce the editors and contributors of *Der Monat* and other magazines, for example *Encounter*, as willful servants of American grand strategy at the cultural front of the Cold War. These ardent Cold Warriors were thought to be fellow-travelers of American hegemony who without the slightest scruples advocated militantly and irresponsibly anti-Communist propaganda.<sup>2</sup> Consistently following this line of argumentation a second assumption holds that *Der Monat* was not only an instrument of anti-Communist highbrow propaganda but moreover guilty of actively promoting restaurative tendencies in West Germany. Anti-Communism, concludes the argument, overwhelmed the previous attempts to reform the sickened, antimodern German society and led to the integration of militarist, capitalist, and nonreformist elements into the evolving society of the Adenauer era. Therefore, true democracy became definitely impossible until the late 1960s.<sup>3</sup>

It seems relatively simple to modify at least the first assumption by just pointing to the very fact that *Der Monat* before 1958 always had been overtly an instrument of the OMGUS/HICOG authorities in West Germany and later of the Ford Foundation (1954-1958), which made it unnecessary to support it covertly with the help of CIA funds<sup>4</sup>. The second assumption needs closer scrutiny. Even if we put aside the radical revisionist premises of the argument, it nevertheless could provide us with a reasonable and serious question about the true function of *Der Monat* in the intellectual life of West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s. In this paper I will, therefore, argue that *Der Monat* and the better part of its affiliate network, namely the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF)<sup>5</sup>, were predominantly instruments of anti-Communist propaganda, but that they did successfully fulfill certain other functions which can be subsumed under the label of *westernization* or intercultural transfer<sup>6</sup>. In a quite subtle and complex manner did the magazines of the CCF contribute to the formation of a coherent liberal democratic ideology as an alternative to the rival ideologies of the 1950s, for example Communism, conservatism, nationalism, monetarism, or Thomism. Certainly and without any question, this liberal ideology, which may be described as *consensus liberalism*<sup>7</sup>, served the hegemonical interests of the United States in Western Europe after World War II. But on the other hand, it did as well allow the left-wing liberals and their right-wing social-democratic partners to form an anti-Communist alliance on the basis of reformist notions and concepts. Consensus liberalism, a key element in the editorial praxis of *Der Monat* and the other CCF magazines, changed not only the perceptive framework of European, especially German, intellectuals and politicians but also - by using

Hamiltonian means for Jeffersonian ends - that of the Americans. Insofar it was a decisive tool within the permanent process of westernization after World War II.

In the following chapters, I will present my argument in two ways: I will start by examining the process of founding the magazine. Afterwards in a more structural approach, I shall focus on the ideology of *Der Monat* and the personal and organizational networks which supported the magazine, especially the CCF. This will cover the period between 1948 and 1964. In a last chapter I will return to the genetic approach in order to show that the decline of *Der Monat* was the result of an increasing lack of intellectual and ideological coherence caused by the final triumph of westernization in the early 1960s. In all the chapters, it will be inevitable to mingle international and German developments. But because of the transnational structure of the Cold War, there is some logic in this approach. Germany, at any rate, will be the central focus of analyses.

## I.

Beginning with summer 1947, perhaps a bit earlier, when the first discussions inside the OMGUS machinery about a new perspective for American propaganda in Germany reached their peak there were thoughts developed about a freshly conceived magazine based on a two-track strategy. These considerations were the outcome of preceding struggles about the structure of American aims and methods in Germany under the conditions of the evolving Cold War. They were connected with the political developments in the United States after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt<sup>8</sup>. On the one hand, the Americans came to accept the failure of

the older and more punitive reeducation strategy. This specific attempt to reconstruct the whole German society and somehow cleanse it from the relics of nazism was more or less an offspring of the situation directly after World War II. The protagonists of reeducation believed in radical reform and in cooperation with the former war ally, the Soviet Union.<sup>9</sup> With the death of Roosevelt they started to lose influence first in the United States, later on in their German strongholds. It did not seem possible to continue cooperation with the Soviet Union, nor did the Germans show any desire for radical reform. In 1947/48 the left-wing New Dealers, who were the leading representatives of reeducation, became a *quantité négligeable*<sup>10</sup>. Their successors, supporters of a moderate reformist faction of right-wing New Dealers, who were ardently anti-Communist liberals connected with the *Americans for Democratic Action* (ADA)<sup>11</sup>, believed that it was inevitable to modify the American attempts to correct the German political and social attitudes. The new reorientation strategy stressed consistently the distinction between the former nazi leadership and the common people in Germany. This distinction included the theory that while the leaders were incorrigible, the common Germans had just to be influenced by modern liberal ideas in order to regain the ability to rule themselves in a democratic way. It likewise became an indispensable instrument of moderate reorientation propaganda and was utterly helpful in the establishment of *Der Monat*. On the other hand, the members of OMGUS and - since 1949 - HICOG were deeply impressed by the evident successes of Communist propaganda all over Europe<sup>12</sup>. Germany as the central battlefield of the Cold War seemed to be in acute danger. More than for example the British analysts did the Americans, following their own tradition of ideologizing foreign

politics, understand that the Cold War was not only a traditional conflict between national states in terms of balance of power notions. It was a transnationalized relentless and irreconcilable struggle between societies and ideologies, with propaganda as a main instrument of combat. On the basis of this assumption, culture and ideology became eminently important. Up to a certain degree, these concepts were then and still are today serviceable for understanding Cold War conflicts. According to the views of the American officials, the Soviets had the obvious advantage of an impressive propaganda apparatus. They were successful in putting specific issues on the transnational agenda, such as the World Peace Movement, the campaign against petty bourgeois formal democracy and individualism, the campaign for social equality or - dealing with German issues - the positive handling of nationalism and reunification or national neutralism. With the founding of the *Kominform* and the conception of the Shdanov theory in autumn 1947<sup>13</sup> the Soviets were able to combine all these efforts in a unified theoretical and practical approach. These developments gave the Americans the distinct impression that they were naturally to be defeated in the cultural and ideological propaganda battles of the Cold War. Therefore, the Americans in Washington, D.C. as well as in West Germany became ever more thoughtful during summer 1947. They searched for a powerful propaganda means which would be able to combine anti-Communism and reorientation.

The pivotal event that put together all these separate, but intertwined strings was the *Erste gesamtdeutsche Schriftstellerkongreß* (October 4th to October 8th, 1947)<sup>14</sup>. Whether or not the famous speech of Melvin J. Lasky, then reporter of the American social democratic

magazine *New Leader*, was inspired by the OMGUS authorities is not relevant here. It is more important to keep in mind that the subsequent collapse of national solidarity among the German intellectuals in East and West Germany was not preeminently owed to such an American initiative. It was also caused by the previous tensions between the non-Communist *Innere Emigration* and the Communist emigrants. Lasky's speech gave the German anti-Communist intellectuals (such as Günther Birkenfeld, Eugen Kogon, Rudolf Hagelstange, Theodor Plievier, Dolf Sternberger, etc.) the signal for a significant reexamination of their own position. Thus, the Americans saw a chance for further cooperation with German anti-totalitarian intellectuals. This, furthermore, gave the Germans the chance to join again the growing transnational discussion forums of western liberals. This could in fact become the basis for effective counterpropaganda and a voluntary German intellectual commitment to the western value system, which had been impossible under the auspices of reeducation.

Astonishingly enough, Lasky had turned the original intention of the Communist organizer of the Congress, Johannes R. Becher, the president of the fellow traveling *Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands*, who wanted to unify the German intellectuals under the banner of nationalism, into its very opposite. Gradually, the West German intellectuals started to prefer individual freedom to national reunification.

However, the Congress of 1947 did not only cause a great many German intellectuals to accept a democratic anti-Communist and pro-American standpoint. More circumstantially, the *Schriftstellerkongreß* provided the American officials with a personality able to handle the combination of subtle reorientation and firm highbrow anti-Communist propaganda. Melvin J.

Lasky<sup>15</sup>, a dedicated consensus liberal and supporter of the New York Jewish Intellectuals, former Trotskyite turned anti-Communist, apparently seemed to be the ideal man for any new propaganda project. The "Levitas boy"<sup>16</sup> was competent, thought to be brilliant, and had intense connections with the ADA, the New York Intellectuals and lots of European liberal intellectuals and socialist reformist politicians. The members of these groups served as contributors to *Der Monat*. Basically, the magazines of the New York Intellectuals (*Partisan Review*, *Politics*, and *New Leader*)<sup>17</sup> even influenced the style and the lay out of the new monthly magazine. Lasky wanted to transfer the sophisticated culture of discussion and the attitude of brilliance from New York to Berlin. Together with his German coeditor Hellmuth Jaesrich Lasky shaped the character of *Der Monat* until 1958, when he became editor of the CCF transatlantic monthly *Encounter*. His personal attitudes toward liberalism, pragmatism, cosmopolitanism and antitotalitarianism were crucial for the special appeal and the early successes of his magazine.

It was the Truman administration's operation "Talk Back" which finally provided the institutional framework for the development of *Der Monat*<sup>18</sup>. Since the spring of 1948<sup>19</sup> officials of the "Public Information Branch" (PIB/OMGUS) started discussing the creation of a new and highly sophisticated magazine. Up to this day it is still not clear whether General Lucius D. Clay or Melvin J. Lasky himself developed the initial idea<sup>20</sup>. But this is of no great importance because *Der Monat* could only survive as long as these two persons worked together. This was especially true in view of the internal conditions within PIB and the New York Field Office (NYFO). The latter was responsible for the shaping and the lay out of the



American press in Germany. Ruben S. Nathan and Paul Kecskemeti from NYFO still tried to enforce an aggressive reorientation strategy as distinct from defensive anti-Communism<sup>21</sup>. They were not convinced that the Germans could already be trusted allies in the struggle against Stalin. In their thoughts, Germany still was considered a sort of laboratory for anti-Nazi nation building; mere anti-Communism seemed to be of minor importance. This was evidently incompatible with Lasky's optimistic viewpoints. However, the American administrators in Germany, headed by General Lucius D. Clay, backed Melvin J. Lasky. He sharply criticized the ongoing determination of the NYFO which advocated aggressive reorientation<sup>22</sup>. This reminded him too much of the failed punitive reeducation. Lasky, Clay, and their allies had quite a different analysis. Fascism and Communism were only slightly different aspects of the broader concept of totalitarianism, and totalitarianism was based on party rule and the arbitrariness of a ruling elite. Fascist totalitarianism was as dead as a horse, but Communist totalitarianism seemed to be very much alive and expanding<sup>23</sup>. This clear and present danger of Stalinist aggression made anti-Communism obviously an absolute necessity. Such an argumentation did not imply that reorientation was meaningless. But his optimistic general anthropology and his specific knowledge of Germany and the Germans<sup>24</sup> had given Lasky the impression that a more subtle form of reorientation would be most helpful to reform the German mind and society. Particularly, the brave prodemocratic behaviour of the inhabitants of Berlin during the blockade of the city impressed Lasky and strengthened his believe in the capabilities of the Germans to reform themselves with some moderate help from the United States. Admittedly, Lasky was never naive in his judgements about the Germans.

He could become rather harsh, if they tried to escape the consequences of their past. One time, when Werner Krauss, the famous actor in the nazi anti-Semitic propaganda movie *Jud Süß*, made an appearance in Berlin, he even quarreled with his close friend Ernst Reuter. Besides, Lasky did fiercely fight every attempt of the director of *Jud Süß*, Veit Harlan, to succeed in the German intellectual and public scene.<sup>25</sup>

## II.

From the beginning, *Der Monat* was dedicated to a double strategy: Anti-Communism<sup>26</sup> was always combined with liberal democratic reorientation purposes<sup>27</sup>. Based on anti-totalitarianism and an optimistic anthropology, Lasky and his editorial staff tried to establish a universalist liberal value system with specific regards to the German situation. They understood their magazine to be a broad and sophisticated forum for intellectual discussions<sup>28</sup>. This allowed them to establish western, predominantly liberal ideas<sup>29</sup> not in form of plain propaganda but as part of an ongoing worldwide liberal debate, something very fascinating for the Germans after twelve years of isolation. However, Lasky did normally prefer contributors without a clear party preference. The only exception were reformist members of democratic socialist parties from the West European labor movement, as for example Willy Brandt, Ernst Reuter, R.H.S. Crossman, and Anthony Crosland<sup>30</sup>. Following a definite pattern<sup>31</sup>, most of the regular contributors were affiliated with the New York Jewish Intellectuals or their European liberal "family branches", like the circles of Nicola Chiaromonte, Ignazio Silone, Richard Lowenthal, and so on. Contributors with a totalitarian

background were self-evidently excluded, but even authors with a conservative or Roman Catholic perspective were of minor importance. Whenever they were published, their articles would be surrounded by well known consensus liberals correcting the other opinions. This tactic allowed *Der Monat* to present itself as a medium of vast ranging discussions without losing a strictly and overwhelming consensus liberal direction. Besides, the readers would find lively discussions and opposing viewpoints within the range of the overall aims of Lasky and Jaesrich. Moreover, Lasky never became just a subordinate of the American official institutions that financed *Der Monat*. His personality guaranteed the independence of the magazine on behalf of OMGUS, HICOG, and the Ford Foundation.

The basis of the magazines' reorientation program was twofold. On the one hand, it pictured the United States as the most important power fighting the evil of totalitarianism in the name of civil liberty as well as individual and cultural freedom<sup>32</sup>. The positive depiction of the United States did serve anti-Communism as well as reorientation or westernization aspects, because it provided the German reader with western, liberal democratic examples. However, Lasky did not believe in the USIS/USIA-style sterile hyperpatriotism, which denied any negative aspect of life in the United States. He wanted the Germans to take part in the reformist discussions of American consensus liberal circles. Thus, he served as a mediator who presented a positive, but subtly differentiated general picture of the United States, including aspects like the Negro issue, the elitist critique of mass consumerism, conformity, and McCarthyism<sup>33</sup>. Nevertheless, the central focus of his pro-American attitude was individual liberty. With some pathos did *Der Monat* always defend the American way of

defining individualism against more egalitarian or traditional communitarian approaches in the shaping of societies. Again, this was not only a matter of anti-Communism. The principle of individual and cultural freedom served as a vehicle to deconstruct conservative German positions, for example the primacy of the (*Volks-*) *Gemeinschaft* over the individual. The German intellectuals were forced to learn that freedom was to be the outmost and unconditional basis of a new Germany.

On the other hand, individualism served as an intellectual principle that was closely combined with the social and political aspect. The editors of *Der Monat* aimed at ending the German tradition of the nonpolitical intellectual. The quest for the political intellectual was related to another important item on Lasky's agenda. He and his American consensus liberals believed in a special variety of the so-called *Sonderweg* theory as conceived in 1915 by John Dewey, Georges Santayana, and Thorstein Veblen.<sup>34</sup> Differing from later, more advanced forms of this theory, which were sociologically based, the early approaches more or less concerned themselves with the history of ideas and with intellectual problems. According to this World War I analysis the Germans had left the common and rational way of western enlightenment at the very least with the philosophies of Kant and Hegel. The American thinkers believed that the formal duties of Kantian ethics and the non-individualist Hegelian teaching about freedom as inwardness and acceptance of necessity were erroneous and dangerous. They were simply not compatible with the realities of modern mass societies. *Der Monat* applied the *Sonderweg* theory to the theory of totalitarianism and made it responsible for the National Socialist dictatorship and the antiliberal perversion of Marxist doctrines<sup>35</sup>. By

introducing liberal individualistic and internationalist values into the German intellectual discussions, the monthly wanted to redefine the framing of these discussions fundamentally and not only by violence or superficially<sup>36</sup>. Somehow, *Der Monat* still struggled for the "ideas of 1789," respectively for the "spirit of 1776," against the "ideas of 1914." In this way, one could remain being a Hegelian, Kantian, existentialist, or Thomist, but the very basis of one's intellectual approach should become liberal. Older traditions were reinterpreted and thereby made safe. In a further conclusion, the non-political intellectual, part of this specific German *Sonderweg* would vanish because of the superior concept of the liberal and political intellectual *Der Monat* propagated.

The magazine's editors and contributors were absolutely convinced that their specific interpretation was not only the most modern one but also the only one to cover every aspect of modernity. Whatever modernization crisis a society would be confronted with, liberalism and individualism as core elements of modernity would help the leading experts and intellectuals to find proper solutions. Progressivism, the New Deal, and the British New Liberalism were historical examples for this claim. Neither Hegelianism and its offsprings, nor existentialism and Kantianism had this pragmatic-modernist approach.

Besides, these modern principles provided the newly construed political intellectual with an adequate set of reformist, antiradical meanings. By further elucidating consensus liberalism the tradition of non-politicism became anachronistic and in the end dishonest. This could be furthermore achieved by another of John Dewey's assumptions: The reinterpretation of the German narrow concept of culture. *Der Monat* advocated the broad Anglosaxon concept of

culture which normally included politics and economics as well as mass consumerism or the highbrow culture to which the German concept was restricted. As a result of this reinterpretation it became possible to accept politics as an integral part of intellectual and cultural activity, at least step by step.

However, this approach was combined with grave restrictions. The most important was its dependence on preeminently pragmatist assumptions which were never really appealing to the continental European and the German minds. Even those who generally excepted liberal ideas thought of pragmatism as a second rate philosophy with far-reaching gaps in epistemology and noetics. Although *Der Monat* for over a decade featured pragmatism, many undoubtedly westernized German intellectuals, as for example Siegfried Lenz, still favored existentialism<sup>37</sup>, notwithstanding the well known neutralism of Jean-Paul Sartre. In so far, the reception of *Der Monat's* ideology became particularly eclectic<sup>38</sup>.

Secondly, the pragmatist or progressivist *Sonderweg* theory was rather obviously the result of World War I propaganda. All three authors (Dewey, Santayana, and Veblen) had written in 1915, and the very perspective of their writing was all too clear. Therefore, these philosophers and sociologists were not able to correctly interpret the status of Hegelian notions, because they did not acknowledge the fact, that Hegelianism had been declining since 1831. They moreover had never discussed contradicting opinions and authorities which accepted the Hegelian and Kantian notions of duty and freedom as compatible with individual liberty and liberalism<sup>39</sup>. They also overlooked the American Civil War tradition which held that the Germans were thought to be especially concerned with matters of freedom<sup>40</sup>. As a

result, the early *Sonderweg* discussions had to be interpreted as part of the progressive movement towards intellectual independence from Europe, in particular from Anglosaxon Hegelianism<sup>41</sup>, comparable to Turner's frontier thesis or Protestant fundamentalism. The progressive-pragmatist criticism was predominantly concerned with the Anglosaxon idealist movement, not with any German reality. As *Der Monat* was not able to change this impact of the *Sonderweg*, its reception in Germany was a problem. Only when in the 1960s the whole theory was based on economic, political, and social assumptions independent from the history of ideas, it would become an acceptable concept for a new generation of German historians influenced by the American revisionist historiography.

Thirdly and perhaps of special importance, *Der Monat* did never critically rethink its own analysis. Without reference to other traditions in Germany, for example the socialist, liberal, or Roman Catholic ones, Lasky and his men just adopted the argumentation of the ruling classes in Germany after 1871 and turned the formerly positive notions to the negative.

German was still understood in the terms of the "ideas of 1914." Opposing viewpoints were interpreted as morally good, but "un-German." Lasky mistook the Prussian-Protestant notions as mirrors of historical reality. Therefore, one has to admit that a fundamental notion of *Der Monat's* reorientation and westernization efforts was oversimplified.

Nevertheless, the overall pragmatist assumptions and approaches of *Der Monat*<sup>42</sup> concerning fresh notions of freedom, culture, and intellectual responsibility altogether successfully provided a firm basis for further attacks against the antiwestern traditions of German intellectuals. It is, however, striking that the journal normally did not seek an intensive debate

about the immediate German past. In fact, *Der Monat* published a number of articles covering the Nazi time, especially World War II and - not astonishingly - the German resistance against Hitler. One may suppose that this was caused by fears about negative German reactions, but this misses the reality of the 1950s, when the resistance was not yet part of the West German identity. On the contrary, the majority of the West Germans still believed the opposition against Hitler have been traitorous. Moreover, these few articles were part of a farther reaching pedagogic attempt which aimed at not only criticizing, but establishing positive ideas about the German future. Anew, Lasky's optimistic anthropology (and his anti-Communist goals) became fruitful.

The principle forward-looking concept of *Der Monat* was cosmopolitanism<sup>43</sup>, a result of Melvin Lasky's New York City College education. It was certainly a vague idea. Hitherto, cosmopolitanism had been predominantly used as a specific concept of the New York Jewish Intellectuals who wanted to describe their modern, humane, and urban attitudes without referring to Marxist internationalism. In itself, cosmopolitanism was opposing any variety of nationalist emotion. Lasky modified the idea and made it the central focus of his magazine in order to structure henceforth nearly every article on whatsoever a theme. Specifically, the discussions between intellectuals of different countries served as proof for the cosmopolitan structure of *Der Monat*. With the help of this concept, Lasky had the possibility to introduce international debates and standards of intellectual discussions to the German public by simultaneously overcoming nationalist attitudes. Obviously, this attempt was quite compatible with parallel American political efforts to promote the idea of European unity. In



was not by chance that many of the *Monat's* European contributors were members of the European liberal integrationist movement. The same was true for the CCF.

The mixture of progressive liberal pragmatism and cosmopolitanism moreover allowed *Der Monat* to present itself as dedicated to the European and American enlightened liberal democracy, without closer examination of the differences between, say, the French or continental European version of enlightenment and the Anglosaxon tradition. Lasky always stressed the common agendas of European, British, and American matters of concern. Insofar he was a model westernizer. This helped him furtheron to signal his readers that *Der Monat* was not just another standard instrument of American propaganda, but a unique catalyst for the reawakening of common westernity in Germany.

Recognizing this general framework of Lasky's and *Der Monat's* ideology, we may now better understand the function of anti-Communist propaganda within the magazine's reorientation and westernization efforts. It may be possible to analyze the anti-Communist approach of *Der Monat* in itself, respecting the circumstances of the Cold War. But this would only reveal part of the truth. Anti-Communism was likewise part of the reorientation, at least in the eyes of dedicated consensus liberals. Not only did antitotalitarianism teach this, but it also was a result of pragmatist and cosmopolitan reflection. Hegelianism seemed to be the theoretical foundation of all totalitarian systems, but the lack of cosmopolitanism was a significant aspect of fascism and Communism. The campaign against Jewish cosmopolitanism during Stalin's rule was a clear proof of this thesis. Besides, anti-Communism as a part of antitotalitarianism had the positive sideeffect that the majority of the Germans - living in a

postwar society searching for integrative moments - was strictly anti-Communist. By adapting the antitotalitarian version of anti-Communism it was possible to introduce the underlying liberal assumptions without risking too radical a defense reaction. Finally, these reflections necessarily led to a critique of national neutralism and the readiness especially of national-conservative Protestant circles to favor reunification in comparison with westernization and liberal democracy<sup>44</sup>. Just as well, the same argumentation afterwards allowed to combine westernization and *Wiederbewaffnung* (rearmament). National neutralism and the primacy of reunification and disarmament became anachronistic, and antimodern ideologies were hence unable to compete with liberal ideas about modern industrial societies, at least in the minds of consensus liberals.

The latter two points became even more evident when *Der Monat* in the late 1950s and early 1960s adapted the end of ideology hypothesis<sup>45</sup>. The specific debate resulting from this new idea was part of a campaign started by the CCF in 1955. Its pivotal aim was to give consensus liberalism a new "vital center" after radical anti-Communism had lost its impact with the death of Stalin. Raymond Aron, Edward Shils, Daniel Bell, and Seymour Martin Lipset supposed that modern industrial and mass consumerist societies would gradually and with some necessity overcome ideological standpoints. In general, they deduced from liberal premises a future noncontingent development that would destroy ideology as a misperception of reality. Liberalism, however, would survive, because it was a perfectly adequate apperception of reality and in the avantgarde of progress, affluence, democracy, and peace. It is hard to miss the nearly Marxist approach of historical and social prognosis in this theory.

Therefore, there were many aspects that could be criticized. One may start with the fact that Shils, Bell, and the others were always reflecting different developments in differing terms from different viewpoints and that their concept of ideology, which resulted from the Marxian-Mannheimian tradition, was superficial. The New Left critics thus argued with some persuasiveness against the impacts of the end of ideology. Nevertheless, it was this technocratic vision that gave in the later 1950s new life to formerly pathetic struggle against totalitarianism. The passion of the early 1950s became outmoded. By more and more using the modern, technocratic language and the skills of social and political sciences, *Der Monat* and the CCF were able to transform their remaining ideological setting into the language of a new age. Thus, both could survive for some more years and even boast that they were still shaping the international intellectual and academic debates. In the end, it was just the language that changed while the ideology remained intact, but it started to outlive itself. However, this development confirms the thesis that the fundamental ideas of *Der Monat* (and the CCF) always included much more than pure and simple anti-Communism, and that the anti-Communist paradigm was rather versatile.

### III.

As the last few passages about the ideological foundations and developments of *Der Monat* have shown, the journal did never act in a political, intellectual, or organizational vacuum. On the contrary! Again, it was Lasky who masterfully handled the practice of networking. He had started it already in the years previous to the founding of *Der Monat*, and afterwards he

was able to fall back upon the different circles he knew. As mentioned above, the New York Jewish Intellectuals and the ADA played a decisive role in Lasky's plan. With the help of these organizations, he was able to establish an ideologically coherent and well motivated pool of contributors for his magazine. The motivation of the ADA members and even more so of the New York Intellectuals was quite simple. They wanted to export their right-wing New Deal liberalism which had been so successful in overcoming the sectarian struggles of the 1930s<sup>46</sup>. In particular, they wanted to fight any possible form of philo-Sovietic progressivism and neutralism by offering an anti-Communist, reformist perspective, including free market democracy and social reform. Thus, they thought of themselves as moderate reformers with a left-wing liberal, anti-Communist agenda. Some conservatives and the "House Un-American Affairs Committee" HUAC tended from time to time to misjudge them as Communists, Trotskyites, or Bucharinites<sup>47</sup>. As the majority of Lasky's contributors from the American intellectual scene were Jews, their antitotalitarian commitment rooted deeply in their personal experiences with Stalinist and fascist repression. These early anti-Communist consensus liberals were never just opportunistic ad hoc antitotalitarianists, they really believed in what they were doing. In their eyes, Communism was morally discredited after the great purges, the assassinations during the Spanish Civil War, and the Hitler-Stalin pact. Moreover, they accepted the moderate New Deal and consensus liberalism as an altogether superior solution for modernizational crises, guaranteeing both individual freedom and a combination of progressive social engineering and Keynesian economics.

After 1946, the ADA and the New York Intellectuals adapted Wilsonian internationalism practically and searched together with the anti-Communist forces of the A.F. of L. and the CIO for transnational cooperation. They even anticipated the Truman administration's activities in Western Europe. This coincided with parallel efforts of non- and ex-Communist intellectuals in Europe who were involved in a bitter conflict with rivaling forces of fellow travelers, neutralists, and Communists<sup>48</sup>. Among those who struggled most effectively was Arthur Koestler, assisted by his friend of from former days in the Münzenberg apparatus of the KOMINTERN agitprop department, Manès Sperber<sup>49</sup>, as well as Ignazio Silone, George Orwell and others<sup>50</sup>. Lasky, then already editor of *Der Monat*, was the right person to coordinate the transatlantic developments. This became ever more urgent, when in April 1949 the first American cooperation with European intellectual anti-Communists in Paris had failed<sup>51</sup>. Sidney Hook, one of the veterans of John Dewey's silently expired "Committee for Cultural Freedom" (1939-1942), had tried to repeat the success of the "Americans for Intellectual Freedom" (AIF) against the fellow traveling World Peace Movement during the Waldorf-Astoria conference in March 1949. Together with James T. Farrell from the ADA and rank and file members of the New York Intellectuals, the AIF had wanted to beat the Sartrean neutralists on their own field, which proved to be impossible. But from April 1949 on Koestler and Lasky joined the common efforts. Since then, plans about a major anti-totalitarian congress of famous intellectuals from all over the free world were under discussion. At the same time, a highly significant person made arrangements from the background. The CIA field agent Michael Josselson<sup>52</sup>, who would from 1951 on dominate the

CCF as executive secretary until 1967, managed to work together with the rather inefficient intellectuals from the United States and Europe. His and Lasky's breadth of intellectual scope made the broadening of *Der Monat's* outlook possible. Together with Jay Lovestone and Irving Brown from the A.F. of L., the CIA was willing to support the Congress project. Since August 1949 Lasky discussed the plan with Hook, Franz Borkenau, and the former leader of the German Communist Party Ruth Fischer<sup>53</sup>. It was he who involved German social democratic politicians like Ernst Reuter and Otto Suhr as sponsors. Furthermore, he in December 1949 launched the Congress idea with the help of the French socialist David Rousset at a cultural conference of the European integrationist movement in Lausanne. This made the Europeans believe that the whole idea was a spontaneous European plan without any inspiration from the United States<sup>54</sup>. Lasky afterwards organized the enormously successful congress with its 121 participants at Berlin just at the time when Communist troops were invading South Korea<sup>55</sup>. The very success of the conference in summer 1950 was perpetuated by an organisation based in Paris. This CCF was led in a rather restraint, but direct manner by CIA agent Michael Josselson.

*Der Monat* and the CCF were closely connected. The contributors to *Der Monat* founded the CCF, and after 1950 it was the members of the CCF who published in *Der Monat* and the other CCF magazines all over the free world. Even before 1958, when *Der Monat* became directly part of the CCF's press empire, its editors joined the organization's editorial board<sup>56</sup>. Twice a year, Lasky, Jaesrich, Josselson and others like Irving Kristol from *Encounter* or Francois Bondy from *Preuves*, met and discussed issues regarding the content and the form of

the magazines. Thereby the CCF became a central clearing office for the spreading of consensus liberalism as an ideological foundation for a common western thought and a basis of anti-Communist antitotalitarianism. The organization was never totally dominated by the Americans<sup>57</sup>, that is by the United States government. Such domination was not necessary because its members were devoutly dedicated to the topics of consensus liberalism. What they did, voluntarily they did and out of clear conviction, not because they were mercenaries of anti-Communism. Most of the CCF's members did not even know of the CIA funding. Moreover, the congresses and seminars of the CCF created a personal liberal and transatlantic network that closely linked different intellectual communities in the United States, Western Europe, India, Australia, and Scandinavia. This was more than one could expect from a magazine, its contributors and readership. This personal linkage helped to transport subject matters obviously underrepresented in the magazines dedicated to questions of literature, theater, and politics. The CCF could push economic and political agendas much more directly. Thus the CCF used its seminars, especially after 1955, to bring together Keynesian and semi-Keynesian economists and politicians from the Democratic Party with reformists from the European socialist and labor movements<sup>58</sup>. Again, the ADA had a key function in this network. The Europeans were offered a flexible and general framework of reformist ideas like consensus liberalism, consensus capitalism, social engineering, individualist notions of liberty and human rights that always included a democratic and overall reformist capitalist perspective. These concepts differed as much from European etatist traditions as from the classical republicanism of the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian tradition. In the end, the aim was to

create the intellectual preconditions for a broader European-American consensus including social democrats, right-wing socialists, liberals, and Christian democrats, perhaps even some sort of "bipartizanship." This could provide a foundation for United States hegemony and European integration.

However, the CCF was not only a supplementary organization of *Der Monat* on a transnational and personal level. The German branch of the CCF could also be helpful in integrating German intellectuals and politicians into the networks of transatlantic liberalism and cultural debate. Over the years, many well-known German writers, academics, and foremost, journalists and other opinion leaders became members of the German CCF (Carlo Schmid, Max Brauer, Willy Brandt, Karl Schiller, and Otto Suhr from the SPD; the journalists Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, Theo Sommer, Franz-Joseph Schöningh, Peter Coulmas, Marcel Reich-Ranicki; the writers and editors Heinrich Böll, Siegfried Lenz, Stefan Andres, Rudolf Hagelstange, Rudolf Pechel, and Joseph C. Witsch; and the academic Bruno Snell; also several influential members of German TV and radio broadcasting corporations). But in the end, this attempt failed because the fragmented intellectual life in Germany was not comparable to that in intellectual centers like New York, London, Rome, and Paris, which served as pattern for the CCF<sup>59</sup>. Nevertheless, the German branch of the CCF is still of some interest as it shared the principles of *Der Monat* much more purely than the early CCF which was dedicated to radical anti-Communism. The Germans were hardly concerned with the dangers of Communism. They acted against reactionary fraternities, neofascism, anti-Semitism, neutralist activities, and Roman Catholic integralism<sup>60</sup>. Meanwhile, the international CCF, though not



dogmatically opposing the German peculiarities, was dedicated to an international perspective, including the definite primacy of anti-Communist struggle<sup>61</sup>. Only after 1953-55, when the CCF became a more pragmatic and technocratic organization, did the liberal agenda become dominant. Then, the international CCFs, the German CCFs, and *Der Monat's* line fell together again. Hence, the international CCF backed the activities in Germany organizationally and financially. The most impressive example was the fight against the right-wing extremist minister for education in Lower Saxony, Leonard Schlüter (FDP), who was brought down by a coalition of students, professors, and the international press, coordinated - sometimes even directed - by the international CCF and its academic suborganization, the "Committee for Science and Freedom" (CSF)<sup>62</sup>. Besides, the CCF and the CSF supported liberal attempts toward university reform with the help of the *Hofgeismarer Kreis*<sup>63</sup> and human rights activities by assisting the founding of the German chapter of "amnesty international."<sup>64</sup> The most important issue, nevertheless, was the support of the Willy Brandt faction in the SPD.

It was certainly not by chance, that after 1953-55 the CCF lost its predominant affection for radical anti-Communism. With the death of Stalin and the decline of the danger of Communist expansion, priorities changed. Westernization became more attractive and showed that there was life beyond radical anti-Communism. Since the late 1950s, *Der Monat* and the CCF were able to support the first theoretical approaches of George F. Kennan and, lateron, of Egon Bahr and Willy Brandt toward détente<sup>65</sup>. The moderate and technocratic antitotalitarianism of the end of ideology was combined with a strengthening of liberal reform and transatlantic

cultural transfer. This was not at all self-evident. After Lasky had overcome the opposition of the NYFO, the radical reorientationists had lost their influence. But since 1949-50 opposition had come from within the anti-Communist faction, as many radicals did not share Lasky's moderate anti-Communism. For a short time (1950-52) Lasky was in a minority position, while the radical anti-Communists like Arthur Koestler and Franz Borkenau, James Burnham and Sidney Hook dominated the CCF and therewith *Der Monat*. It was the high tide of the Cold War, and the CIA subsidized a whole apparatus of organizations<sup>66</sup>, including the *Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit (KgU)*<sup>67</sup>, *Untersuchungsausschuß freiheitlicher Juristen (UfJ)*<sup>68</sup>, the *Ostbüros* of the German democratic parties<sup>69</sup>, the *Bund deutscher Jugend (BdJ)*, RIAS, Radio Free Europe (RFE), and Radio Liberty (RL)<sup>70</sup> that was totally dedicated to anti-Communism as the reason of its existence. As the CCF and *Der Monat* were part of this apparatus, it was hard to withstand the temptations of radical anti-Communism and to subjugate one's liberal ideas to conservatism. But primarily Lasky and Josselson led their groups in another direction. Josselson, for his part, backed CCF's General Secretary Nicolas Nabokov in his struggle with the American CCF, the center of anti-Communist hardliners. Furthermore, he himself attacked the editor of the Austrian CCF magazine *Forum*, Friedrich Torberg, whom he believed to be especially stupid in his stubborn anti-Communist attitude<sup>71</sup>. Lasky battled with the HUAC because he was neither willing to fight productions of the Communist author Berthold Brecht nor denounce his former left-wing New Deal rivals within HICOG, Theodore Kaghan or Hans Wallenberg<sup>72</sup>.

By strengthening the liberal westernization topics, Josselson and Lasky secured the survival of both, the CCF and *Der Monat*. Only the European integrationist movement and the radio stations (RFE, RIAS, and RL) were comparably successful. All the other organizations that constituted the apparatus of the Cold War were eliminated after 1953 or ceased to be of any importance at all. The CCF existed until its relationship with the CIA was revealed in 1966/67 *Der Monat* ceased publication in 1971. The very fact that they had never been merely anti-Communist had allowed the prolongation of their activities. However, the 1960s finally saw the decline of *Der Monat* and the CCF.

#### IV.

The decline of *Der Monat* paralleled that of its brother organization. From the the early 1960s on, both apparently were not longer able to shape western public opinion in an adequate manner. Some of the reasons for this development were shared by both institutions, others were more specific.

The similarities could already turn up in the question of how to finance one's activities.

Michael Josselson and Melvin Lasky (and his successors after 1958 when he was coopted as editor of *Encounter*) for years spent their time searching for new sponsors<sup>73</sup>. They wanted to get rid of the CIA. Though both were trying hard, it was nearly impossible to find potent sponsors willing to prolong the independence of the magazine and the CCF. This was not only an organizational problem. At a higher level, it was a signal. The social, political, and intellectual background had changed. The Fifties were over, a new epoch and a new generation

had arisen. Westernization as a specific effort seemed to be as antiquated as radical anti-Communism. The appearance of a New Left not only in Britain and the United States, but in France, Germany, Italy, and other countries was a clear signal for the successes and failures of the process of westernization. Besides, the rise of neoconservatism as a reaction to the New Left discredited the consensus liberalism of the previous era. The western intellectual and political debates became more and more fragmented and lost the clarity and coherence of the 1940s and 1950s. While in the political system the democratic parties partly lost their ideological and social integrity, in the cultural sphere intellectual and ideological milieus crushed. The point of departure for institutions with a clearcut international approach became less stable. Even from inside, many of the CCF leaders felt the urgent need for change. The celebrated end of ideology turned out to be problematic. This led to a certain lack of self-assurance. Only *Encounter* managed to overcome the structural crisis with Lasky's help by opening itself to the new discussions while sticking firmly to the principles of the consensus liberal elite. However, *Der Monat* tried to escape the problems by emphasizing German themes and its German character. Increasingly, German authors dominated the journal's issues. In the beginning, in 1960/62, this strategy was strongly approved by the CCF, but in the end it proved to be a disaster<sup>74</sup>. Whatever had constituted the appeal of *Der Monat* after 1948, the German readers had wanted to be part of a cosmopolitan intellectual community. With the new strategy *Der Monat* lost its older readers and did not win the younger ones. This lack of conceptual coherence could not be filled by simple anti-New Leftism<sup>75</sup>. Overall, it was absolutely impossible to just identify the heterodox New Left with old

fashioned orthodox Communism under the auspices of antitotalitarianism. The individualism of the New Left was clearly different from Stalinism. The inability to acknowledge that made *Der Monat* and the CCF anachronistic. Moreover, the very existence of the New Left was a catastrophe for the end of ideology and the CCF's capability of interpreting the developments of modern industrial mass societies. The consensus liberal intellectuals lost their self confidence. Some even turned neoconservative.

Finally, those who in Germany had started as westernizers had to accept that the German youth was more or less westernized. Their habits, their political opinions did not any more differ significantly from the American, French, or British youth, at least concerning the specific traditions of German intellectual life<sup>76</sup>. Westernization had created an impulse that had changed the intellectual life in Germany and made itself partly spare<sup>77</sup>. Predominantly, the political intellectual had become a reality, however, not quite in the sense the consensus liberals had expected it. Siegfried Lenz, Günther Grass, Klaus Harpprecht were members of Willy Brandt's kitchen cabinet. They, matter-of-factly, represented the successes of the CCF, as did Willy Brandt represent the dreams of the whole branch. Others, as for example Peter Rühmkorf, Peter Handke, Hans-Magnus Enzensberger became radicals. But they were also opposing the old notion of the nonpolitical intellectual as much as their moderate rivals.

Up to a certain degree, the difference between the intellectual life in Germany in 1955 and that in 1965 and the waning influence of the CCF and *Der Monat* can be measured when one compares the Schlüter affair and the *Spiegel* crisis. In 1955 the CCF, the CSF and the diverse magazines of the consensus liberals played a decisive role in the victory of the Göttingen

academic community. In 1962, however, the CCF and *Der Monat* did not play any significant role during the *Spiegel* crisis.

On the other hand, there were impressive differences between the reasons for CCF's decline and those of the German magazine. The CCF was definitely nearly dead when it imploded in 1966/67 as a result of the revelations in *Ramparts* and the *New York Times*. This followed from its structural diseases. The CCF's membership was exclusively male, rather old, and ever more incapable of recruiting younger intellectuals. The organization's leaders stuck to an ideology formed in the 1930s and 1940s, and they did never really understand the problems of the Sixties' revolt in the face of hitherto unknown affluence and liberality. They could only see it as an Marxist effort to reideologize western democratic societies. This structural problem was intensified by the snobbish attitude of the CCF. By accepting the recruiting principles of the New York Intellectuals, as for example brilliance, wit, and outstanding intellectual achievement (as they defined it), nobody was thought to be competent enough to become a member of the organization. They celebrated themselves and lost contact with reality. Thus, they were incapable of positioning new members in socially, or politically, or intellectually relevant positions. The New Left activists in effect had more success in positioning themselves.

Contrarily, *Der Monat* was much more successful. As far as we can judge today, the magazine reached those people it wanted to reach<sup>78</sup>. Opinion leaders, journalists, intellectuals, teachers, students, politicians, they all read *Der Monat* and were influenced by its habits until the mid-

1960s. Afterwards, they did not necessarily change their attitudes, but the journal was no longer able to fulfill their high expectations.

#### CONCLUSION

*Der Monat* started as an ambitious intellectual project. The magazine wanted to combine anti-Communist propaganda and westernization, respectively reorientation efforts, within a broader structure of westernizing and Cold War institutions. Both aspects were of unrefutable importance for the journal. Anti-Communism was never an end in itself, although it was a result of the hard personal life experience of most of *Der Monat's* contributors and of many members of the surrounding networks. On the other hand, anti-Communism and antitotalitarianism were necessary conditions for integrating the majority of the Germans into the process of westernization. Against the will of this majority every attempt of reorientation had to fail, as the failure of punitive reeducation proves. The efforts of *Der Monat* were thus always embedded in a wider field of organizational and personal transatlantic networks. They were effectively run by Michael Josselson and Melvin J. Lasky. Both were flexible enough to hold together a snobbish bunch of individualist intellectuals through different phases of anti-Communist and westernizing priorities. In the phase between 1948 and 1950 and about 1953-55, these networks were globally dominated by radical anti-Communism, which influenced the German magazine, but did not overwhelm its deeper aspirations. Later on, up to about 1964, this consensus liberal network was able to dominate western liberal intellectual discussions as a means of westernization after overcoming radical anti-Communism.

According to the situation in Germany, this was the phase of successful integrating German intellectuals and social democratic politicians into the reformist community of consensus liberalism. Afterwards, the CCF and *Der Monat* rapidly disintegrated and lost their intellectual significance. Somehow, their mission seemed to have come definitely to an end. Nevertheless, basically *Der Monat* and up to a certain degree the CCF were not just reducible to the Cold War circumstances, although it was during the Cold War that they had been at their peak. They have to be placed in the broader developments of the twentieth century, the quest for cultural hegemony of liberalism and the United States commitment toward spreading the fundamental principles of democratic, free market societies with a moderate reformist impulse<sup>79</sup>. Here is the adequate point to reintegrate the revisionist quest for United States hegemony. The whole cultural was commitment certainly part of a major hegemonic strategy, that was obviously accompanied by *Der Monat* and its network. But this hegemony was not at all as simple as critics have construed it. Its aims were broader and more sophisticated than one would suspect. Within this development, at least on the German level, but with some respect to the ideological preconditions of American foreign policy also worldwide, Cold War anti-Communism was a catalyst, not a monolithic cause.

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1. Marko Martin, *Orwell, Koestler und all die anderen: Melvin J. Lasky und Der Monat* (Asendorf, 1998), Wolfgang Kraushaar, "Sich aufs Eis wagen: Plädoyer für eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Totalitarismustheorie," in Eckard Jesse, ed., *Totalitarismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Eine Bilanz der internationalen Forschung* (Bonn 1996), 462. Cf. *Die Welt*, 17.10.1998.

2. Christopher Lasch, *The Agony of the American Left* (New York, 1969), 61-114. More conciliatory Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II* (New York, 1997), 66-75.



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3. Jost Hermand, *Kultur im Wiederaufbau: Die Bundesrepublik 1945-1965* (Berlin, 1989), 264-68; Franziska Meyer, "Auch die Wahrheit bedarf der Propaganda," in Berliner Kulturrat, ed., *Eine Kulturmetropole wird geteilt: Literarisches Leben in Berlin (West) 1945-1961* (Berlin, 1987), 33-42; Rolf Wiggershaus, *Die Frankfurter Schule: Geschichte-theoretische Entwicklung-politische Bedeutung* (München, <sup>2</sup>1989) 451-52; Hermann Glaser, *Kulturgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, vol. II (München, 1989), 53-56; with a less negative perspective see Frank Tichy, "Das Erbe des Londoner *Encounter*," *Medien und Zeit* 6:3 (1991), 41-47; *Die Zeit*, 17.5.1991; *Times Literary Supplement*, 1.2.1991.
  4. Michael Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongreß für kulturelle Beziehungen und die Deutschen* (München, 1998), 159-70. Only when after 1958 the CIA funded CCF directly financed the magazine, one can reckon with covert CIA money for *Der Monat*, whose deficitary financial situation was notorious.
  5. Cf. Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe* (New York, 1989), 93-95 and Pierre Grémion, *Intelligence de l'Anticommunisme: Le Congrès pour la liberté de la culture à Paris (1950-1975)* (Paris, 1995).
  6. The label westernization will be used in the sense of Anselm Doering-Manteuffel's paper: Cf. Johannes Paulmann, "Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer: Zwei Forschungsansätze zur europäischen Geschichte des 18. bis 20. Jahrhunderts," *Historische Zeitschrift* 267 (1998), 649-85.
  7. Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, "Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?" *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen* 3 (1996), 14-22.
  8. Cf. Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York, 1997).
  9. Cf. Hermann-Josef Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie: Der amerikanische Beitrag* (Opladen, 1993), 8-10; Josef Foschepoth, *Im Schatten der Vergangenheit: Die Anfänge der Gesellschaften für christlich-jüdische Zusammenarbeit* (Göttingen, 1993), 62-65.
  10. Cf. Mary Sperling McAuliffe, *Crisis on the Left: Cold War Politics and American Liberals, 1947-1954* (Amherst, 1978) Richard H. Pells, *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s* (Middletown, <sup>2</sup>1984).
  11. Stephen M. Gillon, *Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985* (New York, 1987).
  12. Melvin J. Lasky to Sidney Hook, 19.3.1949, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 2, Folder 11.

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13. Cf. Wladislaw Subok and Konstantin Pleschakow, *Der Kreml im Kalten Krieg: Von 1945 bis zur Kubakrise*, trans. Ulrich Schweizer (Hildesheim, 1997), 163-99; Manfred Hildermeier, *Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917-1991: Entstehung und Niedergang des ersten sozialistischen Staates* (München, 1998), 716-41; Magdalena Heider, *Politik-Kultur-Kulturbund: Zur Gründungs- und Frühgeschichte des Kulturbundes zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands* (Köln, 1993), 90-95; David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet Occupied Germany, 1945-1949* (Stuttgart, 1992), 531-36.

14. Ursula Reinhold and Dieter Schlenstedt, "Der Erste Schriftstellerkongreß 1947," *Neue Deutsche Literatur* 38 (1990), 9-38; Ursula Reinhold et al., eds., *Erster Deutscher Schriftstellerkongreß, 4.-8. Oktober 1947* (Berlin, 1997), 294-370; cf. the older, more Marxist interpretations of Sigrid Bock, "Zum Ersten Deutschen Schriftstellerkongreß in Berlin 1947," *Kürbiskern* 10:4 (1990), 64-74 and Waltraud Wende-Hohenberger, ed., *Der Erste Gesamtdeutsche Schriftstellerkongreß nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg im Ostsektor Berlins vom 4. bis 8. Oktober 1947* (Siegen, 1987).

15. Ketterle, "Der Monat", 38-39.

16. Sol Levitas was the editor of *New Leader*, a staunch supporter of social democracy and liberal anti-Communism.

17. Interview with Melvin J. Lasky.

18. Margit Ketterle, "Literatur und Politik im Nachkriegsdeutschland der Zeitschrift *Der Monat* 1948-1955," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of München, 1984,4; Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *Vor dem Vorhand: Das geistige Berlin 1945-1948* (München, 1995), 196.

19. Ketterle, "Der Monat", 21-24; cf. *Welt am Sonntag*, 7.1.1979.

20. *Newsweek*, 22.3.1971.

21. Nathan-Report (April 1948), *Der Monat*-Records, Box 6, Folder 5.

22. Report on *Amerikanische Rundschau* (n.d.), *Der Monat*-Records, Box 6, Folder 5.

23. Melvin J. Lasky to Noel Brailsford, 8.7.1949, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 1, Folder 7.

24. He was twice married with German women.

25. Melvin J. Lasky to Ernst Reuter, 12.12.1950, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 4, Folder 7; Annelene von Caprivi to Norbert Muhlen, *Muhlen Papers*, Box 18; cf. *Neue Zeitung*, 7.11.1950 and 8.12.1950. The rather anti-Semitic view of the Communist press reveals *National-Zeitung*, 10.12.1950.

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26. Especially the Communist terror, the rise of Titoism, and the question of Communism as a neurosis were themes of *Der Monat*.

27. Sidney Hook to Royce Moch, 12.4.1949, *Der Monat* Records, Box 2, Folder 11.

28. Cf. Wolfgang Müller, "Der Monat: Eine internationale Zeitschrift für Politik und geistiges Leben," unpublished M.A. thesis, Free University of Berlin, 1951.

29. Melvin J. Lasky to Senator William Benton (D-Conn.), 25.3.1950, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 1, Folder 14.

30. Hellmuth Jaesrich to *Ostschweiz*, 12.2.1952, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 20, Folder 3, spoke of a distinct "left of center"-perspective of *Der Monat*.

31. Cf. for example Fritz Wahl to Siegfried Kracauer, 9.4.1951, Krakauer Papers, 72.3096.

32. Elliot E. Cohen, "Der freie Bürger in Amerika," *Der Monat* 22/23 (1950), 424-29; cf. in particular vol. 50 (Nov. 1952).; Melvin J. Lasky to Shepard Stone, 5.11.1952, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 21, Folder 3. See as well Karl Jaspers, "Über Gefahren und Chancen der Freiheit," *Der Monat* 22/23 (1950), 396-406.

33. Richard Lowenthal, "Anatomie des Konformismus: Korrekturen an unserem Amerikabild," *Der Monat* 124 (1959), 62-65, Alistair Cooke, "Die Prüfung des Südens: Weiß und Schwarz in den USA," *Der Monat* 96 (1956), 13-21, and 97 (1956), 19-22; Leslie A. Fiedler, "Der streitbare Senator: Glanz und Elend Joe McCarthys," *Der Monat* 74 (1954), 129-42; Richard H. Rovere, "Die letzten Tage Joe McCarthys: Abgesang auf einen Demagogen," *Der Monat* 123 (1958), 39-42.

34. John Dewey, "German Philosophy and Politics," in John Dewey, *The Middle Works, 1899-1924*, vol. VIII: 1915, ed. by Jo A. Boydston (Carbondale, 1917, 135-204 and 421-46; Thorstein Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* (Ann Arbor, 1966); George Santayana, "Deutsche Freiheit," *Das Goldene Tor* 3 (1948), 621-26. Cf. as well Detlef Junker, *The Manichaeian Trap: American Perspectives of the German Empire, 1871-1945* (Washington, D.C., 1995), 19-27 and Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition* (Chicago, <sup>2</sup>1972).

35. Hans Kohn to Sidney Hook, 27.9.1951, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 13, Folder 4; Friedrich Meinecke, "Irrwege in unserer Geschichte," *Der Monat* 13 (1949), 3-6; Roland Nitsche, "Von Hegel bis Droysen: Wandlungen der deutschen Geschichtsauffassung," *Der Monat* 145 (1960), 59-68. Cf. furtheron Hans Kohn to Melvin J. Lasky, 23.12.1949, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 3, Folder 2; Melvin J. Lasky to Hans Barth, 15.11.1949, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 1, Folder 3.

36. Dean Acheson to HICOG, 6.1.1951, *Der Monat*-Recors, Box 6, Folder 7.

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37. Interviews with Siegfried Lenz and Melvin J. Lasky.
38. Peter Scheibert to Hellmuth Jaesrich, 19.11.1951, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 15, Folder 1; Theodor W. Adorno to Melvin J. Lasky, 26.9.1952, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 16, Folder 9.
39. Johann-Baptist Müller, *Deutschland und der Westen* (Berlin, 1989), 41-44; Arno Baruzzi, *Die Zukunft der Freiheit* (Darmstadt, 1993), 217-18. One may moreover think of the democratic Hegelianism of Arnold Ruge in the 1840s: Stephan Walter, *Demokratisches Denken zwischen Hegel und Marx: Die politische Philosophie Arnold Ruges* (Düsseldorf, 1995), 144-205. It is notable, that the anti-Hegelianism of *Der Monat* was never based on the famous assumptions of Karl Popper. Lasky was definitely no critical rationalist, as he joined the pragmatist movement.
40. Cf. William L. Burton, *Melting Pot Soldiers: The Union's Ethnic Regiments* (Ames, 1988), 52, or John Stuart Mill, *Autobiography*, ed. by John A. Robson (Harmondsworth, 1989), 190-91.
41. Cf. Lloyd D. Easton, *Hegel's First American Followers* (Athens, 1966).
42. Melvin J. Lasky to John Dewey, 13.10.1949, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 1, Folder 13; Melvin J. Lasky to John J. McCloy, 6.11.1950, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 2, Folder 11.
43. Interview with Melvin J. Lasky; *New York Times*, 7.4.1978; Hermann Broch to Nathan Glick, 10.2.1950, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 1, Folder 8; Melvin J. Lasky to Boris Shub, 12.12.1957, CCF-Records, Series II, Box 283, Folder 7; Protocol of the International Executive Committee of the CCF, 10.2.1951, CCF-Records, Series II, Box 2, Folder 10; Cf. Lewis Perry, *Intellectual Life in America: A History* (Chicago, <sup>2</sup>1989), 330-36.
44. Melvin J. Lasky to Edgar Salin, 25.6.1949, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 4, Folder 11; Melvin J. Lasky to Fritz Eberhard, 26.1.1949, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 1, Folder 14.
45. Chaim I. Waxman, *The End of Ideology Debate* (New York, 1968); Wolfram Burisch, "Ideologie und Sachzwang: Die Entideologisierungsthese in neueren Gesellschaftstheorien," Ph.D. diss., Tübingen University, 1967.
46. Cf. Judy Katsulas, *The Long War: The Intellectual's Peoples Front and Anti-Stalinism, 1930-1940* (Durham, 1995), 164-233.
47. Melvin J. Lasky to Manfred George, 17.1.1952, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 18, Folder 4; Melvin J. Lasky to Shepard Stone, 18.6.1953, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 26, Folder 3. Cf. McAuliffe, *Crisis on the Left*, 121-47; Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore, 1991), 91-92.

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48. Cf. David Cauter, *The Fellow-Travelers* (New York, 1973); Rüdiger Schlägl, *Die Kommunisten in der Friedensbewegung - erfolglos? Die Politik des Weltfriedensrates im Verhältnis zur Außenpolitik der Sowjetunion und der unabhängigen Friedensbewegungen im Westen (1950-1979)* (Frankfurt/Main, 1991).
49. Cf. Anne-Marie Corbin-Schuffels, *Manès Sperber: Un combat contre la tyrannie (1934-1960)* (Bern, 1996), 15-50 and 253-96.
50. Cf. Iain Hamilton, *Koestler: A Biography* (New York, 1982).
51. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive?*, 216-21.
52. Michael Josselson, "The Story Behind the CCF," Josselson-Papers, Box 9.
53. Ruth Fischer to Melvin J. Lasky, 24.8.1949, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 2, Folder 2.
54. Carlo Schmid, *Erinnerungen* (Bern, 1979), 420-24.
55. Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, 19-31; Grémion, *Intelligence de l'Anticommunisme*, 26-52.
56. Report on *Der Monat*, 31.10.1957, CCF-Records, Series II, Box 241, Folder 9; Michael Josselson to Dr. Paul Arnsberg, 18.12.1953, CCF-Records, Series I, Box 1, Folder 1; Melvin J. Lasky to Harry Scott Ashmore, 9.10.1957, CCF-Records, Series II, Box 1, Folder 4.
57. This was partly a result of the belligerent struggle within the ACCF about McCarthyism, cf. Sol Levitas to Melvin J. Lasky, 21.1.1952, *Der Monat*-Records, Box 19, Folder 5. The internal discussions of the American CCF prove the decisive difference between liberal and conservative anti-Communism.
58. Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, 108-115; Grémion, *Intelligence de l'Anticommunisme*, 153-226; Michael Josselson, "The Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1950-67," unpublished manuscript (n.d.), Josselson-Papers, Box 10.
59. Cf. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive?*, 298-411.
60. Protokoll der ersten Sitzung des deutschen Exekutivkomitees, 12.7.1951, 3-4, Pechel-Papers III, vol. 100.
61. Francois Bondy to Melvin J. Lasky, 15.1.1951, CCF-Records, Series II, Box 246, Folder 10.
62. Nicolas Nabokov to Helmuth Plessner, 10.6.1955 and 24.6.1955, CCF-Records, Series I, Box 5, Folder 8; Nicolas Nabokov to George Polanyi, 24.6.1955, *ibid.*

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63. Warren D. Manshel to Karl-Heinrich Regstorf, 29.4.1954, CCF-Records, Series I, Box 3, Folder 5; Bruno Snell to Karl-Heinrich Renstorf, 27.1.1958, Snell-Papers, Ana 490.
64. Sabine Rühle to John C. Hunt, 1.8.1961, CCF-Records, Series II, Box 123, Folder 1.
65. Protocol of the Meeting of the CCF's International Executive Committee, 12./13.1.1957; Fritz-René Allemann, "Ulbricht Triumphator," *Der Monat* 156 (1961), 5-14.
66. Ernst Nolte, *Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg* (München, 1974), 402-13.
67. Cf. Kai-Uwe Merz, *Kalter Krieg als antikommunistischer Widerstand: Die Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit 1948-1959* (München, 1987).
68. Cf. Frank Hagemann, *Der Untersuchungsausschuß freiheitlicher Juristen 1949-1969* (Frankfurt/Main, 1994).
69. Cf. Wolfgang Buschforth, *Das Ostbüro der SPD: Von der Gründung bis zur Berlin-Krise* (München, 1991).
70. Cf. Sig Mikelson, *America's Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (New York, 1983).
71. Michael Josselson to Friedrich Torberg, 3.4.1958, Torberg-Papers, Box 1/4.
72. Marion K. Sanders to Theodore Kaghan, 26.3.1952; Elisabeth Eagan to Theodore Kaghan, 17.6.1952; Melvin J. Lasky to Theodore Kaghan, 1.7.1952 and 23.9.1952; all in *Der Monat*-Records, Box 22, Folder 2.
73. Michael Polanyi to Siegmund Koch, 12.11.1964, Josselson-Papers, Box 6; Klaus Harpprecht to Shepard Stone, 23.12.1967, CCF-Records, Series II, Box 242, Folder 15.
74. Michael Josselson to Hellmuth Jaesrich and Fritz-René Allemann, 5.5.1961, CCF-Records, Series II, Box 187, Folder 8; Hellmuth Jaesrich to Norbert Muhlen, 28.2.1961, Muhlen-Papers, Box 20.
75. Lorenz Stucki to Norbert Muhlen, 19.7.1963, Muhlen-Papers, Box 21.
76. Cf. Klaus Schönhoven, "Aufbruch in die sozialliberale Ära: Zur Bedeutung der 60er Jahre in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 25:1 (1999), 123-45.
77. Doering-Manteuffel, "Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?," 28-38.
78. Cf. Harold Hurwitz, *Der heimliche Leser: Beiträge zur Soziologie des geistigen Widerstandes* (Köln, 1966).

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79. Cf. Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (Cambridge, 1981), Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (New York, 1994), and Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York, 1982). More skeptical about the success of American cultural hegemony: Pells, *Not Like Us*.