Abstract
Since the Age of Enlightenment the Western World believes in man's potential to emancipate himself and act according to normative reason. But how can it be that after decades of liberal conditions Western democracies are still not able to realize their full emancipatory potential? If it is true that an open society?s normative capacities lead to a commonly shared understanding of universal norms, then why is it that the Western democratic public so often is dominated by particular lobbies or pressure groups? It can be frequently observed that legitimate claims are hindered by powerful minorities and that society prevents itself from dealing with social pathologies sucessfully. What could be the reasons for such malfunctioning of democratic reason? The hypotheses presented here takes its course from the assumption that it is the performative aspect of public discourse which is responsible for the described disbalance. Starting with a reconstruction of Michel Foucault?s historic ontology the public is conceptualized to reveal its inherent structural prefigurations which acompany all processes of understanding on a performative level. In a second part the theory of communicative action by Jürgen Habermas is introduced in order to develop a normative notion of an ideal setting for mutual understanding. The link between the two thinkers is made by Axel Honneth and his concept of recognition. On the basis of Honneth?s post-traditional model of morality a critical concept of the public sphere is outlined which is able to analyse normative as well as structural features of public discourse. This concept is, in a third part, briefly tested. It is shown how neo-liberal tendencies of the present are prone to destroy the autonomy of the public sphere. This finding is the core of the aspired critique of the public sphere in Western societies. |
