On the 8th day of July, 1778, a fleet of 12 ships of the line and 4 frigates belonging to His Most Christian Majesty, Louis XVI, under the command of Admiral Count d'Estaing, reached the mouth of the Delaware. Had not the passage been attended with unfavorable winds, the fleet would have arrived at a time when many British ships were in the river, covering the evacuation of Philadelphia, which had been completed about three weeks previous. Detaching a frigate to land a distinguished visitor at Philadelphia (Monsieur Gerard, the French minister plenipotentiary to the United States), D'Estaing sailed for Sandy Hook, where he arrived on the 11th of July, just a few days after the British had established themselves on Long Island, Staten Island, and York Island.

The mission of the French Fleet in America was twofold—one of immediate service to their ally along the Atlantic coast; another of indirect service by making the English ports in the West Indies untenable. D'Estaing was imbued with the same ideas of liberalism which inspired the mind of Lafayette. Just before reaching the capes of Delaware he wrote Washington that his talents and great actions "have insured him, in the eyes of all Europe, the title, truly sublime, of Deliverer of America." Before this letter was received, Washington had intelligence of the fleet's arrival from the President of Congress, and the following day, July 14, he dispatched Colonel Laurens with information for the count as to his position, which was within 20 miles of the North River, and of his intention to cross 50 miles above New York, "'to facilitate such enterprises, as you may form, and are pleased to Communicate to me." At Haverstraw Bay, on the night of the day of Laurens's departure,

D'ESTAING

the Commander in Chief received a letter written by D'Estaing of Sandy Hook the day before. Colonel Hamilton was sent off on the 17th with a reply, accompanied by four captains of vessels, and two pilots, "'in whose skill, expertness, fidelity," Washington wrote, '"'I believe you may place great dependence."

The question of entering the Hook with the larger ships of the line was found to be a most serious one. Circumstances required that the admiral reconnoiter the coast himself, and in a small boat he discovered the communication of Shrewsbury River. The English colors were seen waving "on the other side of a simple barrier of sand, upon so great a crowd of masts." His own investigations, and the knowledge of the pilots, "destroyed all illusion." These experienced persons unanimously declared that it was impossible to carry the fleet into the harbor. D'Estaing offered in vain a reward of 50,000 crowns to any one who would promise success. All refused, and the particular soundings which the admiral caused to be taken too well demonstrated that the pilots were right. North of the Hook there was a wide channel leading into the harbor, but just outside it was blocked by two parallel sandbars that gave only three and a half fathoms of water. Previous to his dispatching Colonel Hamilton on his mission to the admiral, General Washington had made inquiries respecting the navigation at the Hook, and was led to suspect, "however interesting and desirable the destruction or capture of the British fleet might be, that it was not sufficient to introduce the Count's ships." On the 18th Laurens returned to Army headquarters, bringing information that it was not safe for the fleet to enter New York Harbor, and that the admiral was inclined to make an attempt against Rhode Island, as soon as the frigate which carried M. Gerard into the Delaware should rejoin him.

The alternative plan of campaign which Washington provided for by halting his army at White Plains was now put into effect. Glover's and Varnum's brigades and the detachment of Colonel Henry Jackson were placed under Lafayette's command, and he

was ordered to march with celerity to Providence, reporting on his arrival to General Sullivan, who would conduct an expedition against the British post at Newport. Several days later Washing, ton decided that Greene, who was acquainted in Rhode Island, would be able to render valuable service there, and on the 27th of July wrote Lafayette to that effect. At the same time Sullivan was ordered "to throw all the American troops, both Continental, State, and Militia, into two divisions, making an equal distribution of each," to be under the immediate command of Greene and Lafayette in the descent from Providence to Newport. Lafayette accepted this order with the same gracious spirit of loyalty and affection as was shown by him at Monmouth.

he wrote—

The French Fleet appeared off Newport on the 29th of July. The same day General Sullivan boarded the admiral's ship, and the situation was discussed by the two commanders. Due to the unavoidable delay of some of the troops intended for the operations, the movement of the American Army from Providence to Rhode Island could not be made at once. To this unfortunate but necessary delay can be attributed the ultimate failure of the amphibian campaign in the effort to secure possession of the harbor. The plan adopted in the ensuing days was for a part of the fleet, on the 8th of August, to force a passage between Rhode Island and Conanicut Island, and on the 10th land a detachment of 4,000 French troops, who would join Lafayette's command. The north end of Rhode Island was then to be occupied by the entire allied forces, and in the advance on the outer works of Newport the British were to be attacked wherever encountered. The fleet meanwhile was to engage the land defenses covering the harbor. The joy of Lafayette in anticipating the rôle assigned to him was un-

bounded. The standards of France and America were to be united under his command. He wrote to Washington on the 6th:

The uncertainty of war was again demonstrated by the untoward events which soon occurred. D'Estaing passed the channel between the two islands on the 8th of August, and the British detachments on the north end of Rhode Island retired within their fines at Newport. The following day Admiral Howe's fleet appeared off Point Judith. Its presence was a complete surprise. No intelligence had been received that the ships were about to leave New York. In a letter to Congress written on the 26th of the month D'Estaing said that—

A large number of the sailors, who were suffering with the scurvy, had just been landed on Conanicut Island, and the admiral himself had gone on shore to meet General Sullivan, leaving orders for the troops to follow. "The King's ships," he wrote, "were about to be left disarmed." With the dissipation of a fog which had been covering their movements came the discovery of Lord Howe's fleet approaching the entrance of the port. Fourteen ships with two tiers of guns, many frigates, fire ships, bomb ketches, in all about 36 sail, were in sight. Two of the French ships were out at sea; two others at the north end of the west channel; the three frigates at a distance in the eastern channel; and eight ships which had forced the middle channel were between Rhode Island, thick set with English batteries, and the island of Conanicut.

In the opinion of the admiral it was necessary to go to sea, where there would be an opportunity to engage the foe on even terms. The wind being favorable the next day, D'Estaing set sail. A

terrible storm arose on the night of the 11th, causing great damage to several of the ships and dispersing the two fleets, thus preventing a general action. The American troops, who had crossed over to Rhode Island, were much chagrined at the unexpected departure of their allies. Entertaining the hope that the fleet would soon return, Sullivan took post on the 15th within 2 miles of the British lines covering Newport, and prepared a position of defense. Admiral D'Estaing returned to the coast on the 20th of the month. Generals Greene and Lafayette went aboard the flagship to persuade the count to engage in further operations. The request met with a positive refusal. D'Estaing considered that he would be culpable for his disservice to America should he "for a moment think of not preserving a squadron destined for her defence." He informed his visitors that he had positive orders from his government that in case of any disaster, or of being pursued by a superior force, his squadron should rendezvous in the harbor of Boston. In the storm of the 11th his own ship had lost all her masts, and the rudder was unshipped. His coming back to the shores of Rhode Island was to fulfill a promise made to General Sullivan that no matter what happened, he would return, ""dead or alive." Sullivan interpreted this promise as indicating an intent to renew the joint operations against Newport, hence it was with regret, bordering upon resentment, that he and his command learned of the departure of the fleet for Boston on the night of the 21st.

Immediately resentment flamed into unreasoning criminations. Anger took control of the senses, and on the morning after D'Estaing's departure a tactless protest, signed by all the general officers except Lafayette, was dispatched to the fleet. Colonel Laurens carried the protest in a fast-sailing privateer but was unable to overtake D'Estaing's ship, and the paper was eventually delivered through other channels. The offensiveness of the protest may be judged from the following extract:

Washington transmitted to Congress a copy of all the correspondence on this matter, and that body, by resolution dated August 28, placed the ban of secrecy upon his letter and the accompanying papers. The selection of Laurens as the bearer of the protest was made because of his sympathetic regard for the allies. In reporting the incident to General Washington by letter dated the 2d of September, Laurens refers to the absurd prejudices against the French "which we inherited from the British Nation." He says the count's sensibility was much wounded and that in a letter written by D'Estaing to Sullivan, he declared that "this paper imposed on the Commander of the King's squadron the painful but necessary law of profound silence."

The next few days failed to restore the poise of Sullivan's command, and on the 24th a general order was published to the troops in which it was said that—

Lafayette was torn by conflicting emotions—his deep affection for his comrades in arms, and the feeling that the honor of his country was being assailed. His protest to General Sullivan resulted in the publication of another general order on the 26th to the effect that the commanding general had not meant to insinuate "that the departure of the French fleet was owing to a fixed determination not to assist in the present enterprise," as he did not wish to give the least color to ungenerous and illiberal minds to make such an unfair interpretation.

This disagreement between the army commanded by General Sullivan and the French Fleet came to Washington's attention on the 16t day of September and gave him singular uneasiness.

he wrote Sullivan on that day

The same day the Commander in Chief appealed to his loyal friend Greene and said that he depended upon his "temper and influence to conciliate that animosity" which Washington plainly perceived, in a letter from Lafayette, "subsists between the American officers and the French in our service." The marquis will "take any advice coming from you in a friendly light"; and if he can be pacified, "the other French gentlemen will of course be satisfied, as they look up to him as their head."

It was, however, in a letter written at the same time to Lafayette that Washington reaches a superb height of dignity and vision. He sympathizes with Lafayette; he feels for the allies and D'Estaing; "and lastly I feel for my country." Even the love of a father for a son must not prevail to insinuate itself between the love of that father for his country. He asks Lafayette to help heal the wound:

This appeal to his devotion Lafayette met with a response in words and deeds that did not end even at Yorktown.

A board of general officers thought that one more attempt should be made to solicit the aid of D'Estaing before the army was with, drawn from Rhode Island, and Lafayette was asked to carry a letter to Boston on the 28th of August conveying the request. He traveled with remarkable speed, covering the more than 60 miles in 7 hours, and taking half an hour less time for the return trip. During his absence Sullivan withdrew the army to the north end

of Rhode Island, and Lafayette came upon the field at 11 o'clock on the night of the 30th, in time "to bring of the pickets and other parties which covered the retreat of the army." Greatly perturbed because he was absent from the main battle on the 29th, Lafayette wrote to Washington:

His disinterestedness in sacrificing his personal feelings by engaging in a mission which removed him from the field of battle was favorably commented on by Congress on the 9th of September as follows:

In thanking the President of Congress for the honor conferred upon him in this resolution, Lafayette wrote:

The designs of the British and their future movements were for a long time entirely unknown to the Americans. A squadron under Admiral Byron arrived in New York Harbor, and a large part of Clinton's command was known to have been embarked upon ships, but in Washington's mind the expectation of their leaving the continent was daily decreasing. The hurricane season seemed opposed to their going to the West Indies, and the passage to Europe would in a little time become more and more dangerous. As a matter of fact, Clinton had received instructions dated the 21st of March to

send 5,000 men to the West Indies for the purpose of attacking St. Lucia, but was delayed in carrying out the order by the appearance of the French Fleet. The situation was not cleared up in October, when on the 3d Washington addressed the President of Congress regarding a report that the British were sending a detachment southward.

The approach of winter presaged a cessation of hostilities. Even the abortive plans having in contemplation a winter campaign into Canada soon collapsed, and Washington advised Lafayette to avail himself of the eagerly awaited opportunity "of paying a visit to your court, to your lady, and to your friends this winter," and suggested that he signify his desires to Congress on the subject of his voyage and absence. Washington himself addressed a letter to Congress relative to a furlough for Lafayette, expressing "a reluctance to part with an officer, who unites to all the military fire of youth an uncommon maturity of judgment."

About this time there occurred an interesting incident but little known, which adds to the sum of knowledge pertaining to both Washington and Lafayette. Lord Carlisle, head of a British commission in America, sent an address to Congress in which the commission expressed themselves in terms derogatory to France. The French officers believed the honor of their country was concerned, and Lafayette challenged his lordship. The challenge was refused, Carlisle declaring he was responsible only to his country and King for his public remarks. In reply to a letter from the marquis on the subject, Washington wrote on October 4:

page created 20 March 2000

Return to Table of Contents

Return to CMH Online