Sir Henry Clinton was much discouraged by the progress of events during the year 1779 and on August 20 wrote Lord Germain that his spirits were "worn out by struggling against the consequences of many adverse incidents, which, without appearing publicly to account for my situation, have effectually oppressed me." His disappointment was great that urgency of government affairs in different quarters caused the withdrawal from his command of the extensive support which its mission required. He proffered his resignation, feeling that Lord Cornwallis, who had recently returned from England, was entirely competent to assume the official designation, "General and commander in chief of His Majesty's forces in the several Provinces in America on the Atlantic, from Nova Scotia to West Florida, inclusive. Of Cornwallis he wrote to Germain:

Germain's reply to this letter was to the effect that His Majesty was too well satisfied with Clinton's conduct to wish to see the command of his forces in any other hands. Before the communication was received Clinton had effected all preparations to attempt the long-projected reduction of the southern provinces. By carrying an expeditionary force of great strength to South Carolina, the main army would be active during the winter months. The purpose of the campaign was to subjugate the two Carolinas, thus giving to England control of an immense domain on the Atlantic,

which would include Georgia and the Floridas and be as large as the 10 remaining colonies. The general plan contemplated sending a smaller force into Virginia to break up the foreign trade in tobacco, which was an important factor in the resources of the State and confederation. The departure of the French from the coast after the repulse of the allied armies at Savannah left Clinton at liberty to put these plans into effect.

An amphibious force was organized toward the end of 1779, the fleet being commanded by Vice Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot, and on the 26th day of December the expedition sailed from New York. The army consisted of about 8,500 men, well supplied with artillery, military stores, and provisions. The command of the troops left in the North devolved upon the Hessian Lieut. Gen. Baron von Knyphausen, whose force was sufficient to act on the defensive against any detachment or army which might attack him during the winter months.

There never was a stage of the war in which dissatisfaction in the American Army was so general or alarming as it was at this time. Congress became more ineffectual from day to day, losing its strength to the voracious demands of the States. Much of the Army was starved, unclothed, and unpaid; these matters now being provided for, in theory at least, by the several States. Little less than the dissolution of the Army would have long since occurred had it not been for a spirit of patriotic virtue, seconded by the unremitting pains taken to compose and reconcile both officers and men to their situation. There was one hope that enabled Washington to preserve a semblance of equanimity during these days of gloom—that soon Lafayette would return from France with ships, men, and money in sufficient quantity to turn the tide of events in favor of the Revolutionary cause. Such was the condition of affairs in the sadly harassed country when Washington heard from General Lincoln that his army was besieged in Charleston, and that both it and the city were doomed.

Upon receipt of this intelligence the Commander in Chief determined to aid the South with such Continental troops as might be

spared, despite the fact that every man under arms was needed in the North, owing to the facility with which the enemy, by the help of the fleet, could unite their forces at any point where they found the Americans weak. Washington realized that reenforcements would probably arrive too late to be of any service in raising the siege of Charleston; nevertheless they might "assist to arrest the progress of the enemy and save the Carolinas." There was every reason to believe that should the British succeed in capturing Charleston the Southern States would become the principal theater of war.

On the 2d of April Washington informed the President of Congress that the Maryland line and the Delaware regiment, which acted with the Maryland line, would be put under marching orders immediately, if Congress acquiesced in his views as to the propriety of taking such action. The expedition would be led by Major General Baron de Kalb, who commanded the Maryland division. The project was approved by Congress, and on the 16th of April the troops, to the number of 1,400, broke camp at Morristown and after a march of several days reached Philadelphia. From there the artillery, ammunition, and baggage continued south by land; and the infantry marched to the head of Elk River, where it embarked on the 3d of May. The command rendezvoused at Petersburg and was there enlarged by the addition of a Virginia regiment of 12 pieces of artillery. Considerable time was lost in assembling wagon transportation, and it was not until the 1st of June that De Kalb was able to dispatch the first of the three brigades into which his command was divided. The second brigade was started the 6th of the month, on which day an express arrived from Georgetown, S. C., with the information that Charleston had capitulated on the 12th of the preceding month.

When the southern army under Lincoln surrendered, Clinton considered that the major effort in the subjugation of the province had been accomplished, and that with this showing of the power of the Crown many of the inhabitants would join the loyal cause.

It would be necessary, of course, to occupy the country with a considerable force and thereby give protection to the loyalists; but it was thought that the British regulars would be largely augmented by tory militia, who would aid in keeping the revolutionists suppressed.

Cornwallis commanded in the field and on May 17th had a force of regulars amounting to 2,542 rank and file, which was believed by Clinton and himself to be sufficient, when augmented by militia, to subjugate South Carolina and continue the campaign into North Carolina. At the same time he was advised that, in view of the importance of his mission, troops were not to be stinted, and Clinton offered to supplement his force in the field by any that he might desire from the garrisons of the several forts which had been established. His army was to be temporarily increased by the light infantry and the Forty-second Regiment for the commencement of the campaign; but these troops were to be returned as soon as they could be spared, as the operations which Clinton contemplated conducting to the northward would be handicapped without them. Cornwallis was of the belief that he had sufficient regular forces to eventually control all the territory from the Floridas to Virginia, and on the 18th of May wrote Clinton that he would regret to see any part of the troops left behind, which were destined for use elsewhere; and unless considerable reenforcements of Continentals should come from the northward to join the revolutionists, he would not need more assistance.

On May 20th the light infantry and the Forty-second Regiment marched to Moncks Corner and joined the command in the field. At this time both Clinton and Cornwallis were hopeful that South Carolina would offer but little resistance to complete subjugation, although there was in Clinton's mind a measure of doubt, for he knew that the entire success of the campaign would depend upon whether or not "the temper of our friends in those districts is such as it has always been represented to us."

The time now arrived when Clinton and Arbuthnot could no longer delay their departure for New York. Intelligence had

reached Clinton of Lafayette's return to America, bringing the promise of his government that a French fleet and army would follow in a short time. Cornwallis was informed that after finishing the campaign of subjugation he was to leave in the South such forces as might be necessary to dominate the territory and proceed with the remainder to the Chesapeake to assist in the operations which were to be undertaken there as soon as Clinton no longer feared a superior fleet, and the season was far enough advanced to permit of campaigning in that climate. Cornwallis was to command the troops which would be concentrated in Virginia, and it was supposed that the move to the Chesapeake could be undertaken in the early part of October. Clinton and Arbuthnot sailed from Charleston on the 5th day of June, and arrived in New York Harbor on the 17th of the month.

Cornwallis now established his headquarters at Camden and conducted an extensive correspondence with the loyalists in North Carolina. It was not desired that partisans of the King should be unduly active in that province, for fear the rebels would likewise become embodied and produce a situation inimical to the success of the army when it approached the border of North Carolina. However, if the loyalists considered themselves a match for the whigs and were determined to rise without further delay, Cornwallis promised to supply them with ammunition and to send incursions of fight infantry against their enemies. Meanwhile he was kept fully occupied in establishing posts from the Peedee to the Savannah Rivers for the purpose of awing the disaffected, and in raising provincial corps and militia both for the defense as well as for the internal government of South Carolina.

Having made the above arrangements and everything along the frontier appearing tranquil, Cornwallis set out on the 21st of June for Charleston, leaving the command of the troops to Lord Rawdon. On the last day of the month he wrote to Clinton that with the capitulation of Ninety Six, the most populous and powerful district in the province, and the dispersion of a party of rebels who had assembled at an ironwork on the northwest border of the

province, there was an end to all resistance in South Carolina. He commented on the distant approach of De Kalb's command and the nearness of several other small detachments, but believed that it would be impossible for any considerable body of men to march across North Carolina before the harvest.

There was much public business to be attended to in Charleston, regulating the civil and commercial affairs of the town and country, organizing militia in the lower districts, and forwarding supplies to the army around Camden. Cornwallis planned to begin active operations the early part of September, at which time he expected that South Carolina could be left in security, while he moved with the main body of the troops into the back part of North Carolina, "with the greatest probability of reducing that province to its duty." This hopeful view of the situation was soon disturbed by the intelligence that a large body of militia under Colonel Sumter had advanced from the north as far as the Catawba settlement, and that De Kalb showed no intention of temporarily halting his march through North Carolina. On the 9th of August two expresses from Camden arrived in Charleston, bringing information that the American Army was approaching Lynches Creek, from which position it would threaten Camden and the supporting posts. On the evening of the next day Cornwallis and a small escort set out for Camden, making the journey of 140 miles in three days.

Upon the receipt of the news that General Lincoln was a prisoner, it became necessary for Congress to designate a new commanding general for the Southern Department. Congress did not deem it advisable to give this important and extensive command to Baron de Kalb, and on the 13th of June, without consulting the Commander in Chief, appointed General Gates to the position. Gates left Travellers Rest on the 26th of June to join the southern army, arriving at Coxe's Mill, beyond Hillsboro, on the 24th of the following month.

The first order issued by General Gates upon assuming command the day after his arrival, was to pay the baron the compliment of confirming his standing orders. Then, much to the surprise of everyone, he directed the army to hold itself in readiness to march at an hour's warning. To those who knew the precarious wants of the troops this order was a matter of great astonishment. Members of the staff presented their objections for the consideration of the new commander and suggested a more leisurely march through the higher ground of the Yadkin, thence to the town of Salisbury. Gates listened to the advice but did not alter his plan in any detail. He intended to press forward on a direct course through the desolate country that lay between Coxe's Mill and Camden with all the speed of which his troops were capable. This decision was typical of the aggressiveness of his every action during the entire march.

The armies of Gates and Cornwallis came together on the 16th day of August, 1780, just north of Sanders Creek, which crosses the highway 5½ miles north of Camden. In the action that followed the American army was completely defeated and driven in utter rout from the field. The Battle of Camden presents a picture unique in the history of our country. The mention of it calls to mind the havoc wrought by untrained troops fleeing from a battlefield, pursued by the phantoms of terror. Without firing a shot they deserted the regular forces whom they might have protected, and from whom protection would have been received. The cowardice of the militia, induced by mob fear, resulted in the Continentals being overcome by the enemy. Their gallantry could not win victory from a more numerous foe of equal military merit. To add to the distressing effect of the battle Baron de Kalb, a most gallant leader, well beloved by his adopted country, was mortally wounded. Cruel and unjustifiable contumely was heaped upon General Gates, whose only error of judgment during the entire campaign was that he put too much confidence in untrained troops.

The complete dispersion of the southern army left only one organized force of any size in South Carolina—that under Colonel

Sumter. Cornwallis determined to destroy this corps, as it might prove a foundation upon which to assemble the routed army. On the morning of the 17th he detached Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton to pursue and attack Sumter. Orders were also sent to Maj. Patrick Ferguson, on the Little River, to engage in the same mission. Tarleton was successful in surprising Sumter on the 18th at Fishing Creek, near the Catawba, where he was engaged in escorting 250 prisoners and a large quantity of stores, artillery, and ammunition. The 800 men who composed the corps were killed, captured, or dispersed, and their leader barely escaped being taken.

The two disasters of Camden and Fishing Creek brought deep despair to the revolutionists, while they caused great elation to the victors. In a letter written to Lord Germain a few days after Camden, Cornwallis declared that the rebel forces were dispersed and that internal commotions and insurrections in the province would now subside. He stated that he had given directions to inflict exemplary punishment on some of the most guilty, hoping thereby to deter others "from tampering with allegiance, with oaths, and with the lenity and generosity of the British Government."

No further opposition to the advance into North Carolina now existed, and on the morning of the 17th of September Cornwallis dispatched messengers into that province with directions to his friends to take arms and assemble immediately. They were then to seize the most violent people and all the military stores and magazines belonging to the rebels and intercept all stragglers from the routed army. Realizing that a campaign in Virginia would lessen the pressure against the army in North Carolina, Cornwallis wrote to Clinton that next to the security of New York, the operations in the Chesapeake were among the most important objects of the war. Plans were made to move the first division of the army by way of Charlotte Town and Salisbury about the 6th or 7th of September. The second division would follow with the convalescents and stores 10 days later. The march of the first division was delayed until the 8th, and on the 26th of September Charlotte Town was reached.

The orders sent to Ferguson on the 17th of August were received on the 19th, and the same evening this intrepid leader put his column in motion. At that moment an express arrived with intelligence of a British detachment which had been attacked at Musgroves Mills on the Enoree River the day before, with disastrous results. Ferguson decided to hasten to their relief, and changing his direction of march he crossed the Broad at sunrise the next morning in close pursuit of the patriot leaders, whose march was impeded by the prisoners taken on the 18th. Colonel Williams, the senior officer with this partisan force, succeeded in leading the men to safety in the mountainous region of Gilbert Town. There he disbanded his command, after the several leaders had agreed to return to their respective homes and raise a band of volunteers to defeat any hostile force which might be brought to the eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge.

Ferguson made no effort to continue the pursuit farther and as Tarleton had disposed of Sumter he went to Camden to confer with Cornwallis regarding future activities. It was decided that the provincial corps under his command should be separated from the army and ad on the frontier with the militia, where its position along the base of the mountains would protect the left of the main army. Ferguson rejoined his command and put it in motion in a northerly direction. In the course of his march he arrived at Gilbert Town, where he paroled a prisoner and sent him into the mountains with a message to the leaders in that region—

The insolence of this message inflamed the mountain men to an extent that nothing else could have done. It aroused their anger and made them determined to drive this menacing force from the country.

They gathered in great numbers on the Sycamore Flats bordering the Watauga River, and on September 26th started to cross the mountains, directing their march toward Gilbert Town.

When Ferguson learned of this movement he fell back in the direction of the main army and on the 6th of October reached Kings Mountain, about 36 miles from Charlotte Town, where Cornwallis was now located. Kings Mountain offered favorable ground on which to give battle; and as the Americans were reported to be in hot pursuit, Ferguson determined to meet them in that position.

The various regiments and detachments of patriots, all under the command of Colonel Campbell, were like hunters in a chase. Their quarry was near, making a stand on top of a knifelike ridge, disdainfully awaiting the attack. Early in the morning of the 7th, after an all-night ride, the hunters came near their prey. With deliberation they formed a ring around the mountain and on a signal advanced up its steep sides to the attack. These men were not militia, ready to quit the field of battle with the first shot; they were volunteers who had embodied to rid their country of a dangerous enemy.

The attack was conducted with fierce intensity and ended only after Ferguson had been killed. Of the 1,104 men engaged under the British flag none escaped being killed, wounded, or captured. Not one of this number owed allegiance to the King, with the single exception of their leader. The command had been made up entirely of militia and provincial troops recruited in the United States.

The death of Ferguson and the destruction of his corps made it impossible for the British army to advance farther into North Carolina, or to hold its position at Charlotte Town. Cornwallis therefore withdrew a distance of 60 miles and went into camp at Wynnesborough. In this position he could protect the frontier of South Carolina and give assistance to the important posts of Camden and Ninety Six. He determined to remain on the defensive

until information was received from General Leslie concerning the progress of the campaign in Virginia.

The Battle of Kings Mountain was the outstanding victory of the Americans during the year 1780. It put an end to the possibility of an eventual peace with England under such terms as might have resulted in the retention of the southern provinces under British rule. No other battle of the revolution has its background of romance. It exemplifies, the aspirations of the patriots for self-government and the spirit which finally won victory.

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