The victories won during the year 1781 by the French Fleet in September and by the allied armies in October brought about the termination of the War for Independence. These successes were made possible by the liberality of Louis XVI and the French Government in providing, during that year, more money, ships, and men. America had no more sympathetic and powerful friends at the Court of Versailles than were the King and the Count de Vergennes, whose sincere interest in the affairs of the United States never wavered. Among the Americans who had official dealings with the French court, none was held in such high esteem by the ministry as were Washington and Franklin. Indeed, it would be permissible to include Lafayette within the same category, rather than to name him with the French, for his every thought and purpose were those of a citizen of the United States.

Upon Lafayette's return to the United States in April, 1780, he had opened correspondence with friends at home, in which he presented the interests of America in as favorable a light as possible, and solicited aid of such magnitude as might insure final success in the war. Even during his activities in Virginia there was scarcely any diminution in the number of letters which he had found time to send to his friends, the Count de Maurepas, the Marquis de Castries, and the Count de Vergennes.

The burden of the negotiations with the Court of Versailles, however, rested upon Benjamin Franklin, particularly during the years 1780-81, and most devotedly did he serve his country. Congress was fortunate in the selection of Franklin as the head of the American mission in France, and later in his appointment as minister plenipotentiary to the French court. His gentle, lovable spirit

made friends for the United States and himself in all spheres of political and social fife. His age, dignity of character, and innate honesty engendered an affection for him on the part of the French people, and a confidence in his every word and act on the part of the ministry, far greater than that enjoyed by any other American in Europe.

Benjamin Franklin had "engaged in public affairs, and enjoyed public confidence, in some shape or other, during the long term of fifty years." He had now passed his seventy-fifth year, and due to the infirmities of age his health was much impaired. There was nothing wrong with his mental faculties, but he was sensible of a great decrease in physical activity and was fearful lest matters of state suffer on account of this deficiency. His task was made more difficult by the unsympathetic manner in which some of his coworkers conducted diplomatic affairs. Of this number was John Adams, who complained that America had been too free in expressing its gratitude to France, and that if more spirit were shown in the applications made to the government greater succor would be obtained. Franklin viewed this attitude as ungracious and in a letter to the President of Congress said:

Adams did not change his mental reactions, however, and a time came when Vergennes refused to enter into further discussions with him or to answer any more of his letters.

The foreign minister took great pleasure, however, in expressing to Luzerne his high regard for Franklin, knowing that his views would be conveyed to the Delegates in Congress. He wrote that Franklin's conduct was as zealous and patriotic as it was wise and circumspect—

Louis XVI, then a young man in his twenty-seventh year, was sincerely interested in the American States, and desired to see success attend their efforts in acquiring independence. In a letter to the President of Congress, Franklin said:

Franklin felt that it would be only fair to his Government, in view of his physical infirmities, to give Congress the opportunity to replace him by a younger man, but in response to this suggestion Congress replied that his services were too valuable to be dispensed with. Arrangements were made, however, to relieve him of some of his duties and at the same time to send an emissary, fresh from the fields of conflict, to aid in presenting the needs of the United States to the Court at Versailles. On the 9th of December, 1780, Alexander Hamilton, John Laurens, Alexander McDougal, and Jonathan Trumbull, jr., were nominated in Congress for the office of minister to the Court of Versailles. Two days later Lieut. Col. John Laurens was unanimously elected to fill the position. The mission on which Laurens was about to engage was to proceed to France and represent to

Previous to his departure from the United States, Laurens was directed to confer with the Commander in Chief of the American Army, the minister plenipotentiary of France, the commanders in chief of the King's Fleet and Army at Rhode Island, and the Marquis de Lafayette if he could be reached, upon the subject of his commission, and to avail himself of every bit of information which it might be possible to obtain from them.

The substance of the conversations which Washington had with Laurens was embodied in a letter prepared at New Windsor on the 15th of January, 1781, wherein the Commander in Chief expressed his views—

The analysis of affairs as set forth in this important paper is a keen, incisive presentation of conditions in the United States that adds immeasurably to Washington's reputation as a statesman. The paper was meant for the eyes of diplomats, adept in searching out hidden meanings. It was written with the assertive definiteness and honesty of statement that was so typical of Washington. It would impress the French Government in the same favorable Manner as did all the statements made by Franklin.

Washington referred to the impeding of commercial development in the United States and the inability of a nation, while occupied with war and facing a financial crisis, to produce its latent wealth. He represented that the method of supplying the army, an evil but necessary substitute due to want of money, was "by assessing a proportion of the productions of the earth." This had been found ineffectual, and the army was frequently exposed to the most calamitous distress. The patience of the troops, as the result of an almost uninterrupted series of hardships, was now nearly exhausted, and the extreme discontent of some of the organizations had only recently resulted in the mutiny of the Pennsylvania line.

There was danger that the people would become dissatisfied with the mode of supporting the war, and Washington apprehended that evils actually felt in the prosecution of hostilities might weaken those sentiments which began it. There was danger that a free and commercial people, "pressed by impositions of a new and odious kind," might "imagine they have only exchanged one tyranny for another."

From all these considerations Washington believed that there existed an—

It was vastly important that a decided effort be made by the allied armies in the ensuing campaign—

Next to a loan of money, "a constant naval superiority on these coasts is the object most interesting." England would be reduced to a difficult defensive, and by removing all prospects of extending her acquisitions she would lose all motives for further prosecution of the war. Furthermore, her army could not be maintained in the United States "if we had the command of the seas, to interrupt the regular transmission of supplies from Europe." Washington considered that the allies of the United States, France and Spain, could well afford "'to transfer the naval war to America." At the Hartford conference in 1780 the first principle upon which the conversations had been based was that "a constant naval superiority is essential in order to proceed in America in a decisive manner."

Supplementing money and ships, "an additional succor in troops would be extremely desirable," and Washington inclosed minutes of a conference between Count de Rochambeau, the Chevalier de Ternay, and himself, wherein was stated the desirability of an augmentation to 15,000 men for the 1781 campaign.

Washington stated in his instructions to Laurens—

Notwithstanding the difficulties under which the country labored, and the unrest prevailing among the people, there was "still a fund of inclination and resource in the country, equal to great and continued exertions," provided the country had it in its power "to stop the progress of disgust" which many felt for existing conditions. Washington declared that a large majority was "firmly attached to the independence of these States, abhor a reunion with Great Britain, and are affectionate to the alliance with France," but that this disposition could not supply the place of the succor customary and essential in war.

As a climax to the picturization of conditions, Washington asserted that no nation was more able to repay what it borrowed than was the United States.

On the 13th of February, 1781, Franklin received a packet of dispatches from the United States which included a letter to the King and a copy of the instructions given to Laurens, who had not yet arrived in Paris. Franklin immediately prepared a memorial, enforcing as strongly as he could the requests contained in the instructions to Laurens and himself, and delivered it to the minister of state. In concluding his letter to Vergennes he said:

No answer being given by the ministry to the memorial within the next week, Franklin wrote again and pressed for a decision on the subject, and on the 10th of March the foreign minister made

an appointment for a meeting. Vergennes assured Franklin of the King's good will toward the United States, but at the same time asked him to consider the great expense under which France labored in the conduct of the war, and expressed the hope that he would understand why it would be impracticable to comply with the request made by Congress for a loan of 25,000,000 livres. However, in order—

This sum was to be exclusive of the 3,000,000 livres tournois which Franklin had previously obtained to pay the drafts of Congress in the current year. The gift from the King was to be used partly in purchasing military clothing in France, and the remainder was to be held to the order of General Washington, or of any other person authorized to receive it.

During the conference another matter was discussed which, when Washington learned of it several months later, proved to be a factor of considerable moment in determining matters of strategy. Vergennes informed Franklin that the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna had offered their mediation. The King assured both their Majesties that personally he was agreeable to the proposition, "but that he could not yet accept it, because he had allies whose concurrence was necessary." His Majesty desired that Franklin inform Congress of the offer and request their answer. Franklin's letter of the 12th of march on the matter was received by Congress on the 28th day of May.

At the time of the conference between Vergennes and Franklin, France had reached a decision as to the assistance which she would give to the United States for the 1781 campaign. On the 7th of March the minister of war prepared detailed information and instructions for Rochambeau's guidance when a superior naval force should arrive in American waters, and on the 9th of the month Vergennes wrote to Luzerne regarding the action decided upon by the ministry in answer to the several requests made by the President

of Congress. Luzerne was told that it would be impossible to send 10,000 reenforcements due to the expense of pay, the cost of transporting and supplying the troops, and the lack of need for them in the United States. Vergennes commented on the fact that in all previous official demands made upon the French Government, either through Luzerne or Franklin "there has never been a reference of any kind to the sending of reinforcements of troops; we have been asked only for money and for ships."

In regard to the request made by Congress that His Majesty guarantee a loan of 25,000,000 livres, Vergennes called attention to the sums already advanced and promised. A loan of 3,000,000 tournois had been made prior to 1780, and in the year just past 4,000,000 was provided, together with an additional 1,000,000 in December.

The assistance rendered in, ships was fully as important as the grant of money. M. Le Comte de Grasse, who was about to sail to the Antilles with a large fleet, was ordered to conduct it to the coast of North America, or to detach a number of ships to sweep the coast and cooperate in any undertaking that might be projected by the French and American generals. The number of ships to be sent would—

If the Spanish admiral and general had already made preparations for some great enterprise, De Grasse would have to lend them a hand, for if a serious blow could be struck at the English Fleet wherever it might be found, the advantage would be equally great for all the allies. Vergennes wrote:

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