Before General Washington set out from Head of Elk on the 8th of September, 1781, to join the troops of Lafayette and St. Simon at Williamsburg, he received letters from the Count de Grasse and General Duportail dated the 2d of the month, giving full information of conditions in the Chesapeake. Washington replied to the admiral's letter on the 6th of the month, and after felicitating him upon "the happy arrival of so formidable a Fleet of His Most Christian Majesty," said that a force of about 2,000 men constituting the van of the French and American Armies, would embark in about two days and "fall Down the Chesapeake." The limited shipping available to carry the troops was a great misfortune. It became necessary to employ most of the vessels to transport the heavy ordnance and necessary stores, and the greater part of both armies had to suffer the delay of marching to Baltimore and Annapolis to embark.

From Head of Elk to Washington's "own Seat at Mount Vernon" was a distance of about 120 miles but, in his impatience to be home after an absence of more than six years, Washington made the trip in two days. Here the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Chastellux joined him on the 10th of September and accepted the hospitality of their friend and commander. About this time Washington received word of the sailing of the French Fleet from the capes of Virginia on the 5th of September; and being apprehensive of the security of the transports, he ordered the troops who had embarked at Head of Elk to discontinue their passage until further intelligence was had as to naval conditions in the lower part of the bay.

Washington and his guests set out from Mount Vernon on the morning of the 12th and spent the night at Fredericksburg. They stopped at New Castle the following night, and on the evening of the 14th effected a joyful reunion with Lafayette at Williamsburg. Here Washington learned that the French Fleet was again in possession of the Chesapeake, whereupon he dispatched the Count de Fersen up the bay with orders to General Lincoln to press forward "with every despatch possible." In his letter to Lincoln, Washington said:

On the night of September 7th Lafayette had moved his corps to a position near Williamsburg. The next day he was joined by St. Simon's command, consisting of 3,100 men made up from leading regiments of the French Infantry, and eight field pieces served by a detachment of the French Royal Artillery Corps. The position selected by Lafayette for the allied troops was just weft of Williamsburg. Its right flank was covered by a small mill pond along the road to Jamestown, its left by Queens Creek and some rivulets and marshes, and its front by the substantial buildings of the town.

The great anxiety felt by Washington to expedite the arrival of the armies from the North prompted him to write De Grasse on the 15th and ask that transports be sent up the bay to take the troops aboard. The admiral had anticipated this need by dispatching to Baltimore, under convoy of the Romulus, all the transports brought by De Barras, together with some frigates seized since the arrival of the fleet. These transports and frigates were able to carry more than 4,000 men, as De Grasse had removed part of the crew for this operation.

On the 17th of September General Washington, the Count de Rochambeau, the Chevalier de Chastellux, and Generals Knox and Duportail went aboard the French flagship, Ville de Paris, to pay

their respects to the admiral of the fleet, and to confer upon the joint operations to be undertaken as soon as the armies were assembled on the Peninsula. During the interview Washington presented to De Grasse a questionnaire, the preamble of which contained the following comments on general policy:

The discussion of the questions which followed brought about an agreement on all essential matters. De Grasse was willing to deviate from the instructions fixing the time of his departure from America for October 15th, and remain until the end of the month. The matter of forcing a passage between Yorktown and Gloucester with some of the ships was to be determined after the admiral had an opportunity to reconnoiter the York River. In answer to Washington's request for a strong force to be placed on each side of the York above the British posts, De Grasse offered to land from 1,800 to 2,000 men if they would be employed only in a coup de main.

All matters of discussion having been settled satisfactorily, except that there was no assurance ships would be sent above York, town and that the fleet would not remain longer than November, Washington and his party boarded the Queen Charlotte on the 18th of September to return to Williamsburg. Owing to contrary

winds a landing could not be made until four days later. Upon Washington's arrival in camp at Williamsburg on the 22d he learned that most of the troops which had embarked at Head of Elk had arrived and landed in the upper part of College Creek; and that those under M. de Choisy, brought by the squadron of De Barras from Newport, had also reached camp.

The convoy which had been sent up the bay by De Grasse to embark the remainder of the troops, arrived in the lower part of the Chesapeake on the 22d of September. De Grasse wrote to Washington in great elation:

An alarming situation arose at this time which caused much anxiety in the minds of the French and American commanders. Washington and De Grasse learned that Admiral Digby was nearing New York Harbor at the head of a British squadron reported to consist of six sail of the line. "The enemy are beginning to be almost equal to us," De Grasse wrote to Washington on the 23d of September, "and it would be imprudent of me to put myself in a position where I could not engage them in battle should they attempt to come here with succours." The letter continued with the alarming information that De Grasse would leave two ships of the line, and several frigates and corvettes to blockade the York and James Rivers, and with all the others would hoist sail and go to sea, "so that if the fleet come to force the entrance, I can engage them in a less disadvantageous position," Reference was made in his letter to the possibility of the French Fleet being driven to sea in the course of battle and not being able to return in time to regain the harbor. In case this unhappy event occurred, De Grasse said he would try to reach New York, "where, perhaps, I could do more for the common cause, than by remaining here, an idle spectator."

The receipt of this letter caused Washington " painful anxiety." All the brilliant prospects for success were about to be frustrated—

In his reply to De Grasse, written on the 25th of September, Washington said:

Fortunately De Grasse saved the situation by convening "a council of general officers" of his army on the same day that Washington's letter was written. The council, after considering all phases of the situation, decided that the "major part of the naval army", should proceed without delay to an anchorage in the York River, and De Grasse hastened to inform Washington that he would immediately carry this recommendation into execution. In thanking De Grasse for making this decision, Washington said it "proves that a great Mind knows how to make personal Sacrifices to secure an important general Good."

The navigation charts of the time showed that safe anchorage for 20 or 30 ships could be found at the mouth of the York, but upon occupying the position on the 26th of September the admiral found "it bad and unsuited to be of any service" to the Army. The next day he was back at the anchorage inside Cape Henry, which gave "the naval Army greater facility for subsistence, and procuring the necessary water, wood and refreshments. It affords an opportunity likewise of fighting as circumstances may require either at anchor or under sail."

By the 27th of September all of the allied troops had arrived in College Creek and established a camp west of Williamsburg. Orders were prepared for their march to Yorktown. The Order of Battle for the Army is given in Washington's Orderly Book under of the 27th of September. The Americans were to be the right wing under command of the senior Continental officer, General Lincoln. Upon reaching the vicinity of Yorktown they were to form in two lines, in the right wing of the position of investment. Muhlenberg's and Hazen's brigades of Continentals would constitute the division on the right of the front line, under the command of the Marquis de Lafayette. The Continentals from Pennsylvania under Wayne, and those from Maryland and Delaware under Gist, would form the center division of the front line under Baron von Steuben. Dayton's and Clinton's brigades of Continentals would be on the left of the front line under Lincoln's immediate orders. Stevens's and Lawson's brigades of militia were to form the second line. The Park of Artillery, the Corps of Sappers and Miners, and the Virginia State Regiment were to be posted between the two lines in the order mentioned, commencing from the right. Count de Rochambeau was to command the left wing of the allied armies and make his own dispositions.

The troops began the march to Yorktown at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 28th of September. The Continentals, followed by the French troops, formed one column on the left, and the militia a column on the right. The left column marched by way of the main road to Yorktown to a point "half a mile beyond the half way H[ous]e," where the two armies separated, the Americans filing off to the right in the direction of Munford's bridge, and the French continuing on the direct road "by the Brick House" to Yorktown. The militia took the road from Williamsburg to Harwoods mill, and at Munford's bridge fell in behind the Continentals after they had passed that point. About noon the heads of both columns encountered the enemy's pickets and drove them back to the main British position outside of Yorktown. By nightfall the allied armies

had reached their several positions and "the line being formed, all the Troops, Officers and Men, lay upon their arms during the Night."

The description given by Tarleton of the British lines held at this time is an excellent delineation of both the natural features of the ground and the defenses prepared by the Army. The labor bestowed on the outward position at Yorktown had improved its natural advantages and rendered it in every respect convenient for the King's troops. The right rested on a ravine and swamp which covered that flank of the town. A large redoubt was constructed beyond the swamp, close to the river road from Williamsburg, and completed with fraising and abatis. This work is generally referred to by the name "star redoubt." The Charon, Guadaloupe, and other armed vessels were moored in the York River opposite the mouth of this ravine and swamp. Batteries commanded all the roads and causeways which approached the town. Near the center of the position, at the head of the ravine which lay in front of the right of the town, two redoubts were placed, one on each side of what was then the main road from Williamsburg. The right sector was further protected by a thin wood, the front of which was cut down and the branches made to form an abatis.

There was a field work, mounted with cannon, on the left of the center to command the Hampton Road. A sharp ravine, in which flowed a stream tributary to Wormley Creek, and the creek itself covered the left. "Trees were felled, flèches were thrown up, and batteries were constructed, at the points where deemed most vulnerable." The distance from the head of the ravine and morass on the right to the head of the tributary stream which connected with Wormley Creek on the left was somewhat less than half a mile. The intervening area was referred to as the gorge. The ground in front of this particular sector was almost a level plain, open for nearly 2,000 yards, and it offered favorable opportunities for both attack and defense.

On the 2d of September General Clinton had written to Lord Cornwallis that Admirals Graves and Hood sailed from the Hook two days before with a fleet of 19 ships of the line, and he flattered himself that Cornwallis would have "little to apprehend from that of the French." He was soon to be disillusioned, however, for one of the several dispatch bearers whom Cornwallis had sent by boat to New York on August 31 and September 1 succeeded in passing the blockade and on the 6th reached New York. Clinton's action upon receipt of Cornwallis's letter was one of prompt decision. He immediately wrote Cornwallis that he would join him "as soon as possible, with all the force that can be spared from hence, which is about four thousand men." Clinton had no doubt but that Washington was moving southward with at least "six thousand French and rebel troops," and that only a small part of the British troops would be needed for the defense of New York. He said that the troops intended for Virginia were already embarked, and would proceed the instant he received word from the admiral that it was safe to venture to sea. He added the pleasing information that he had "every reason to expect Admiral Digby hourly on the coast."

Cornwallis received the above letter on the 16th of September, at which time the French Fleet was back at Lynnhaven Roads; General Washington was at Williamsburg with Lafayette and St. Simon; and the remainder of the allied armies was hastening to Yorktown. In view of the menacing situation which confronted him, and the expectation that on Digby's arrival the entire British Fleet would come to his relief, Cornwallis decided that the wisest course to adopt would be to refrain from any offensive action. He wrote Clinton of this decision on the 16th of September, within a few hours after receipt of Clinton's dispatch.

It was of course impossible for the New York troops to go to sea until the return to Sandy Hook of the English Fleet, and that did not occur until the 20th of September. Three days later Clinton received Cornwallis's letter referred to above, and on the 24th he called a meeting of the general and flag officers to determine what should be done. The council decided that as soon as necessary repairs to some of the ships could be made a fleet consisting of 23 sail of the line, augmented by Digby's 3 ships which had just arrived at the Hook, should convoy a force of about 5,000 men to the Chesapeake, and by the joint exertions of the army and navy attempt to relieve Cornwallis. Clinton transmitted this decision to Cornwallis in a letter dated the 24th and added: "There is every reason to hope we start from hence the 5th October." The next day, however, he found his hands tied by the necessities of the navy and sent another dispatch to Cornwallis, saying that his Lordship "must be sensible that unforeseen accidents may lengthen" the time of departure a "day or two longer."

On the 26th of September Admiral Graves wrote to the admiralty that—

Preparations did consume much precious time, when every day was of vital consequence. Clinton knew on the 23d of the month that Cornwallis had assumed a defensive attitude a week before, because of the succor promised the army in Virginia. He knew, furthermore, that Cornwallis's troops had provisions to last only through the month of October.

Notwithstanding the great need for haste, the fleet was not ready to sail by the 13th of October, at which time a squall of wind seriously damaged the Shrewsbury and Alcide, parted the cables of two other ships at Staten Island, and drove several

vessels into the North River. Writing to the admiralty of these vexatious events, Admiral Graves said that

It was not until the 18th of October that a force of 7,149 officers and men boarded the men-of-war from the transports, upon which they had been held in readiness for some days. On the 19th day of October the whole fleet, consisting of 25 sail of the line, 2 fifty's, and 8 frigates, passed out of Sandy Hook and set their course for the Chesapeake. Little did anyone know that while the afternoon tide was carrying the ships in safety over the bar the vanquished army of Cornwallis was laying down its arms on the fields of Yorktown.

* * * * * * *

On the 29th of September the American troops shifted their position more to the right and "Encamped on the East side of Bever dam Creek," a tributary of the Warwick River, where they were about a "Cannon shot from the enemys line." The British made no resistance to this movement other than to fire a few shots from the work on the Hampton Road, and to conduct a desultory fire from the line of pickets in front of the Anspach battalions on the extreme left. The two armies observed each other with cautious attention, without anything important occurring in either camp until evening. Then a dispatch boat reached Yorktown with Clinton's letter of the 24th of September, in which he expressed the hope that reenforcements would leave New York on the 5th of October. After reading the dispatch Cornwallis decided to retire within the works of Yorktown. At 10 o'clock on the night of the 29th of September he wrote to Clinton:

The retirement to the immediate defenses of Yorktown was accomplished before daybreak of the 30th. The works consisted of redoubts and batteries on the right, with a line of stockade in rear which supported a high parapet of earth. The redoubts were protected with fraising and abatis. The deep, marshy ravine which covered the right of the town made the works secure from an attack in that quarter; the star redoubt gave additional security. The morass on the right extended in front of the center, which was defended by a line of stockade, and by batteries that "looked upon all the avenues to the swamp." On the left of the center was a horn work with a ditch, a row of fraise, and an abatis. Several embrasures for cannon were opened in the horn work. The left was fortified by redoubts, communications of earth, and batteries; all furnished with fraising but without stockade or abatis.

Two small redoubts were advanced before the left of the line, but these were not so well finished as was the star redoubt in front of the right. The ground in front of the left was in some places on a level with the works; in other places it was cut by ravines and offered very convenient avenues of approach to the besiegers. The space within the works was rather narrow, and not of sufficient extent for the construction of retrenchments. The entire position was exposed to enfilading fire, except in the several abrupt ravines which dropped from the heights of Yorktown to the level of the York River, and along the narrow strip of land between the foot of the bluff and the river.

Tarleton says in his history of the siege that a retreat to the fortifications of the town was a measure prematurely adopted. The outer position was strong and well adapted to the number and nature of the King's troops. He thought it highly improbable that the allied armies would attack in force until they received their heavy cannon, and that they would then advance by regular approaches. Time would be gained, did the British Army hold the outer position and contest the ground inch by inch, both to finish the works at Yorktown and to retard the operations of the

allies. No sudden danger was to be apprehended if the troops were vigilant; but by the premature relinquishment of the outer line the army would be cooped in the contracted and unfinished works of Yorktown.

There was only one man who could decide the matter—Cornwallis. He hoped "by the labour and firmness of the soldiers" to protract the defense until Clinton and the fleet arrived, and he believed this could best be done within the second line. Tarleton's critical comments were in a large measure sound, but in reaching his conclusions he adopted the too general habit of judging "the propriety of measures by after events."

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