- Chapter VII:
Facilities Engineering
Facilities engineering, as distinct from new construction, refers
to the series of operations carried out after basic structures are
complete. It involves the services necessary to keep any large
physical plant functioning efficiently: maintenance and repair of
buildings, surfaced areas and grounds, service to refrigeration and
air conditioning, minor ancillary construction, fire prevention,
removal of trash and sewage, rodent and insect control, water
purification, custodial services, management of property, engineer
planning, supply of maintenance materials, and maintenance of
equipment used in the upkeep of a base.
For these operations the Army relied heavily on civilian
contractors working under an arrangement in which the contractor
provided labor, organization, and management, while the Army
provided tools, repair parts, supply, mess facilities, and quarters
for the work force.
A number of factors influenced how facilities engineering support
would be provided. Contingency planning for operations in Vietnam
had not, in any of the joint service plans, developed a requirement
for facilities engineering forces. While operations in Vietnam were
substantially different from those assumed in developing contingency
plans, the fact remained that plans were not developed to support
facilities once erected during previous sessions of contingency
planning. The inability to produce the manpower for a military
facilities engineer force severely limited other military engineer
capabilities from the outset. Most of the engineer utilities
detachments intended for facilities engineering were in Reserve
status, and the decision not to mobilize the Reserve meant that
these forces would be unavailable. The strict limitations on
personnel strength in Vietnam and the desire to keep the ratio of
support troops as low as possible forced consideration of a
predominantly civilian work force. However, low ceilings were
imposed on direct hiring, a complex and slow procedure; this left a
civilian contract force as the only feasible alternative.
Consequently, with the buildup the Army called upon Pacific
Architects and Engineers to expand its organization as the pace of
facilities construction in-
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creased. The contractor's response was commendable, although not
without problems. His strength grew from 274 men located at six
adviser sites in 1963 to a peak strength of over 24,000 in 1968 at
more than 120 locations.
The piecemeal nature of the buildup made it almost impossible to
predict future requirements or even the eventual location of
incoming troop units. The system which evolved was to tailor the
contractor's organization to meet the needs of each installation as
it was established and expanded. The PA&E work force was made up
of a combination of U.S. civilians, Vietnamese, and other
nationalities. The force mix was about 5 percent American, 15
percent other country, and 80 percent Vietnamese. The contract with
PA&E grew to approximately $100 million per year, not including
government-furnished supplies amounting to approximately $20
million.
While the Army relied heavily on Pacific Architects and Engineers,
it knew that the contractor could not do all the work. His civilian
workmen could not enter certain areas of the combat zone and would
go off the job when curfews and strikes were ordered. There were,
however, approximately 1,450 engineer troops mobilized and deployed
in Vietnam as utilities detachments and firefighting and water
purification teams. (See Chart 5.) Military power plant
operation and water supply companies ranged in size from four to
forty men. While some of these units operated at the same locations
as the contractor's forces, they were stationed primarily in
outlying areas where for security reasons civilians were barred.
In addition to the PA&E work force and the engineer utility
detachments, there were a number of smaller contracts let for
specific kinds of facilities engineering support. But, except for
contracts with the Navy and Philco-Ford in I Corps and with Vinnell
for electric power generation, these contracts will not be discussed
individually.
In sharp contrast to the Army, the Air Force facilities
engineering forces were predominantly military. During peacetime,
the Air Force had maintained a significant number of military
personnel as facility maintenance engineers in its stateside
installations. This gave the Air Force a good base upon which to
draw when the conflict in Vietnam developed. A base civil engineer
force is an integral part of an Air Force wing, and when wings were
deployed to Vietnam, their base maintenance forces went with them.
These forces were augmented by Red Horse squadrons (heavy
maintenance and repair units numbering about 400 men) and Prime BEEF
teams (small detachments sent for six-month tours to augment the
base civil engineer forces for specific projects). The Air Force
made con-
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siderable use of contracts, but these were usually for special
tasks, such as power generation and refuse collection.
The Navy also experienced a shortage of trained military
personnel, although it was somewhat better off than the Army in this
regard. In I Corps, Seebees were assigned to the Public Works
Department, Naval Support Activity, at Da Nang. The Seabees managed
the work force augmented by hired foreign nationals and by local
nationals provided under a service contract with Philco-Ford. The
work force was made up of about one-third Seabees, one-third foreign
nationals, and one-third Vietnamese. In contrast to the Army's
contract with Pacific Architects and Engineers, the Philco-Ford
contract served primarily to provide skilled local labor. Except at
a few industrial facilities, the contractor was not responsible for
over-all management. In addition to the forces assigned to the
Public Works Department in Da Nang, the Navy activated two
construction battalion maintenance units and sent them to Vietnam.
As previously noted, Pacific Architects and Engineers had to
organize and staff its forces along the lines of standard Army
organizations. To control this force, PA&E established a
Contract Management Office in Saigon and three district offices at
Saigon, Qui Nhon, and Cam Rahn Bay from which PA&E forces and
operations at each Army installation were controlled. A highly
effective communications net was operated independently of the
unreliable Vietnamese telephone system and of the military
communications system, which was needed for high-priority
operational traffic.
SEABEES responsible for bridge construction in I Corps
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Administration of contracts and the technical direction and
control of the contractor's activities were, until mid-1968, the
responsibility of the 1st Logistical Command. Within the 1st
Logistical Command, responsibility for contract management was
vested in the U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USAPAV). The
rapid growth of contract work between 1965 and 1967 made it evident
that better control than the procurement agency and the 1st
Logistical Command engineering staffs could provide was needed.
Therefore, the Contract Operations Branch, located at PA&E's
Contract Management Office in Saigon, was established as a part of
the Office of the Engineer, 1st Logistical Command. In addition, the
staff engineers of the Saigon, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay Support
Commands, subordinate commands of the 1st Logistical Command, and
the staff engineers of the installations within the support command
areas were delegated appropriate contracting officer's
representative authority. The Contract Operations Branch consisted
of an operations branch, a technical inspection branch, and a
performance and analysis branch. It had the mission of directing the
contractor's activities and analyzing contract operations and
expenditures. This new organization facilitated the identification
and resolution of many problems which resulted in increased
efficiency and responsiveness in the contractor's work.
Increasing construction, real estate, and facilities engineering
costs resulted in a decision to integrate all Army engineer
activities in the U.S. Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam (USAECAV),
in 1968. In July 1968, USAECAV also assumed the facilities
engineering responsibilities formerly assigned to the 1st Logistical
Command except for a direct-hire force supporting the Saigon area
under the direction of the U.S. Army Headquarters Area Command. This
activity was also later transferred to USAECAV in 1969.
Under the Construction Agency organization, district engineer
offices were established at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Qui Nhon. The
district engineers, in turn, supervised the installation engineers.
This provided a vertical command channel from USAECAV through the
district engineers to the installation engineers independent of
other command relationships. This vertical channel, together with a
substantial increase in the number of military personnel directly
concerned with supervision of the contractor's operations (212 under
the Construction Agency as compared to 73 under the 1st Logistical
Command), substantially improved operations management.
Under the new setup, 1st Logistical Command's procurement agency
retained contracting officer authority, and the contracting
officers, who exercised technical supervision over the contractor,
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reported to two separate headquarters. To overcome the inherent
disadvantages in this arrangement, it was proposed to provide the
Commanding General, USAECAV, with contracting officer authority for
the facilities engineering contract. This, however, was disapproved
by the Department of the Army in order to avoid fragmenting
procurement authority in Vietnam. While this decision did not result
in the optimum organizational relationships from the viewpoint of
managing the facilities engineering effort, relations between the
procurement agency and the construction agency under a memorandum of
understanding were excellent. Through mutual effort, the
difficulties inherent in the organizational relationship were
minimized.
The form of the contract with PA&E underwent several changes.
Originally negotiated as a cost plus a fixed fee in 1963, the
contract remained in effect until 1970. To increase the contractor's
incentive in performance of the contract, the Procurement Agency
assisted by the Construction Agency negotiated a cost-plus-award-fee
contract in 1969. Under this contract the company was evaluated on
its performance, and the fee depended upon this evaluation. The new
agreement appears to have resulted in increased effectiveness and
efficiency.
An effort was made to introduce competition by splitting off the
Qui Nhon area in 1968 and advertising for new bids. Because PA&E
was already working in Vietnam and was familiar with facilities
engineering operations there, the firm had a distinct advantage over
any competitors. Consequently, the new contract also went to Pacific
Architects and Engineers. The attempt to introduce competition not
only proved unsuccessful, but the new contract meant PA&E would
operate under two distinct contracts. Any thoughts of a second try
at competition were quietly laid aside, and-the following year the
Army returned to a single contract.
In 1967 PA&E's activities were extended into I Corps following
deployment of substantial numbers of Army units into the area, which
had been primarily a Marine Corps and Navy zone of operations.
Although the Navy was providing logistical support for I Corps, it
was not in a position to support all Army installations.
In 1970, following major shifts in U.S. operations, logistical
responsibility for I Corps was transferred from the Navy to the
Army. Consideration was given to extending the PA&E contract to
cover all of the area, but the decision was made to negotiate a
contract with Philco-Ford to continue in the areas where they had
been working under contract to the Navy. This arrangement
facilitated continuity of operations but had the disadvantage of
resulting in two different contracts and contractors to supervise.
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Experience in Vietnam highlighted many administrative, regulatory,
and other constraints, which indicated areas where improvement was
required. Vietnam was the first conflict in which peacetime Army
budget regulations had been stringently applied in a combat zone.
Many of the peacetime regulations applicable to facilities
engineering were necessarily prohibitive in nature and cumbersome in
application. Designed to minimize the diversion of utilities
engineering resources and to avoid certain statutory violations, the
application of these regulations in a combat zone greatly inhibited
the effectiveness of facilities engineering support by both the
contractor and the utilities detachments. Further examination of
these regulations as well as the Department of Defense directives
and the laws on which they were based is required to achieve greater
flexibility and responsiveness under future combat conditions.
The contractor, PA&E, frequently drew criticism for
overstaffing. Much of his staffing requirements, however, resulted
directly from the requirement that he organize, staff, and manage
his efforts strictly in accordance with Army regulations. (Chart
6)
This resulted in much of the contractor's effort going into work
management and production control. While the principles of work
management are an inherent part of effective operations under any
conditions, the amount of effort expended in the preparation of
detailed schedules and work plans was of questionable value under
the turbulent conditions which prevailed. There was a distinct
advantage in having the contractor follow Army regulations in
organizing and managing his force in that this facilitated the
control and monitoring by the contract officers, but here too
consideration should be given to adopting simplified procedures for
combat conditions.
A major problem that persisted throughout the conflict, largely
because of the rapid turnover of military personnel, was the general
lack of facilities engineering experience. The one-year tour of duty
was necessary from a morale standpoint, but it had an adverse effect
on the operations of the engineer detachments and on contractor
supervision. Most officers assigned to facilities engineering duty
in Vietnam lacked former experience, and it normally took much of
their one-year tour to become knowledgeable in facilities
engineering regulations and requirements. The Vietnam experience has
highlighted the need for a broader base of both officers and
enlisted men with facilities engineering training and experience.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in the contractor's operations
stemmed from the problems he had in obtaining the necessary
government-furnished supplies and equipment-problems which were not
resolved until late in the conflict.
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Despite these difficulties, the facilities engineering support of
combat forces in Vietnam was an undertaking successfully carried out
on a scale never before seen in a combat zone. The rest of this
chapter will discuss a few of the special problem areas.
While primarily contracted for facility operation, maintenance,
and repair, PA&E was used extensively to accomplish construction
of minor facilities during the major period of the troop buildup
from mid-1965 to mid-1968. Before the buildup, the small PA&E
force was primarily engaged in maintenance and repair of leased
facilities. As more and more troop units arrived in Vietnam, the
most urgent requirements were to construct defenses followed by
troop and support facilities. Urgent requirements existed for
cantonments, airfields, depots, repair shops, and the utilities
systems needed to service them. Because of its construction
capability, Pacific Architects and Engineers was called upon to
provide help in small operations and maintenance funded (under
$25,000) projects. Paradoxically, although much of its effort went
into construction, the terms of the PA&E contract did not permit
the contractor's employment on new construction funded work. This
meant that he could not construct many of the facilities needed for
his own use, which would have increased his over-all effectiveness.
By the end of 1967 the increased capabilities of the construction
contractors and construction troops made it possible for Pacific
Architects and Engineers to concentrate on facilities engineering.
The sharply increased demand for facilities engineering made
redirection of PA&E effort imperative as more new facilities
went into use and more troops arrived in the theater. While during
1965 and 1966 the contractor expended as much as 80 percent of his
effort on new construction, this figure dropped to 25 percent by the
middle of 1968 and to below 15 percent in subsequent years.
The varying standards of construction and the absence of a
standard for maintenance and repair proved troublesome throughout
the conflict. Although the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam
published over-all standards, wide variations existed. Standards
ranged from tent frames and Southeast Asia huts to elaborate
air-conditioned, pre-engineered facilities with high-voltage
electric distribution systems and modern water and sewage systems.
The extent of facilities engineering support received by individual
installations depended on what local commanders needed and on what
facilities they succeeded in getting built. Until very late in the
conflict, there were no countrywide standards for planning
facilities engineering support. As a result, resources were often
not equitably distributed.
Fire protection was certainly adequate at Army installations
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VIETNAMESE FIREFIGHTER ignores risk to fighting petroleum fire
at Long Binh.
throughout Vietnam. Fire companies were manned primarily by
PA&E, although there were some military firefighting
detachments. On a visit in 1969, representatives of the Office of
the Chief of Engineers pointed out that there were far too many fire
companies and fire trucks in the theater. Further analysis by the
Army Engineer Construction Agency led to a substantial reduction in
fire companies and the cancellation of all outstanding requisitions
for fire trucks. Although fire protection was possibly overstressed,
fire prevention was given inadequate attention. While temporary
structures appropriate to a combat zone were constructed with
combustible materials like plywood and low-density fiberboard, fire
hazards could have been appreciably reduced by proper building site spacing. Still, the use of combustible interior partitions and other
interior finishes and nonexpert installation, extension, and
modification of electrical systems created serious fire hazards. The
lesson is evident-more emphasis must be given to fire prevention.
Control of insects, rodents, and other pests was a particularly
challenging problem. Vietnam lacks all but the most basic health and
sanitation safeguards; malaria and the plague are endemic. Vigorous
efforts by facilities engineering entomology teams and the rigid
enforcement of health and sanitation rules turned military bases
into "islands of health in a sea of disease and
pestilence." The return of retrograde cargo from Vietnam raised
the danger of Asiatic insects and rodents being brought back.
Careful and thorough cleaning of this cargo and treatment with rat
poison and insecticide dust-as much as 112 tons per
month-effectively eliminated this danger. Losses of foodstuffs in
storage from insect infesta-
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tion amounted to millions of dollars annually. During 1970, new
control techniques for treatment of stored foodstuffs in CONUS
before shipment and in Vietnam after receipt were adopted.
Fumigation of railway cars in transit from the mills began in
September 1970. Experience in the United States to date indicates
that these procedures will reduce losses of stored foods by as much
as 98 percent.
Chief among the lessons learned from Vietnam was that the
requirements for facilities engineering support in future conflicts
must be anticipated during contingency planning, inasmuch as these
requirements represent a substantial portion of the resources
required to support such an operation-the total force dedicated to
facilities engineering (over 25,000) approached the combined
strength of the two engineer brigades deployed to Vietnam (about
30,000). The feasibility and, under similar circumstances, the
desirability of providing the major portion of this force by
contract was demonstrated in Vietnam. Our experience also clearly
demonstrated the need for the Army to maintain, in its active force
structure, an adequate number of military personnel trained in
facilities engineering to provide management and supervision of
contractor and direct-hire civilian maintenance forces and to man
sufficient numbers of military facilities engineering detachments to
ensure continuity of essential operations in emergency situations.
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page created 15 December 2001
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