NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
1961-1963 Volume V Soviet Union |
1. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 11-4-60
Washington, December 1, 1960.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-60, USSR. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Joint Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, and National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate, which was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the USIB, except the Assistant Director of the FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1960-1965
The Problem
To review significant developments affecting the USSR's internal political situation, economic, scientific, and military programs, relations with other Bloc states, and foreign policy, and to estimate probable Soviet policies and actions over about the next five years.
Summary of the Estimate
1. The attempt to forecast developments within the USSR and in Soviet power and policy for five years ahead is subject to some very severe limitations. Our estimative reach in many of the detailed matters discussed in the body of this Estimate is frankly acknowledged to fall well short of such a period. In respect of matters where we have actually made five-year estimates the degree of certainty falls off markedly for the later years. In the summary paragraphs which follow we are dealing with the broader trends which will determine the nature and magnitude of the challenge which the USSR will present to US security in the years ahead. These we believe are predictable in the main, although their particular manifestations clearly depend upon unknown and imponderable factors, or even upon purely fortuitous developments.
The Present Soviet Outlook
2. One of the principal factors which will shape future developments is the outlook of the Soviet leaders themselves. There are two essential aspects of this. One is the Soviet leaders' belief, derived from the Marxist-Leninist ideology which continues to dominate their thinking, that their society and the non-Communist world are locked in an irreconcilable struggle which must continue until their system comes to dominate the world. There is no evidence at present to indicate that the Soviets will come to accept a world system which assumes the genuine coexistence of states and ideologies. For so brief a period as five years, Soviet behavior and policy will surely be marked by fundamental hostility toward the West, and especially toward the US as the principal obstacle to the fulfillment of Soviet aims.
3. A second essential feature of the Soviet outlook in the current period is its high confidence in the growth of the USSR's power and influence. Looking back to the weak and perilous position in which the new Communist regime found itself in 1917, remembering all the internal and external trials it has survived, and considering its growth in relative economic and military power over the last 20 years, the Soviet leaders are encouraged in their doctrinaire expectations about communism's inevitable triumph. That it was a Communist rocket which first ventured into space symbolizes for them that they are marching in the vanguard of history. They think they see a response to their doctrines and influence in the revolutionary turmoils of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They expect to associate the peoples emerging from colonialism and backwardness with their own cause, mobilizing them against an ever more constricted world position of the Western states. The relative internal stability of the latter at present they see as only a transient phase.
4. While hostility toward the West and confidence in the eventual outcome of the world struggle will inspire Soviet behavior in the period ahead, we do not believe that the result will be policies of recklessness. The Soviet leaders recognize that Western resources remain great, and that the struggle for Communist power in the uncommitted world will be prolonged. They are particularly conscious of the hazards of nuclear war. Moreover, they have numerous problems of their own within the Communist Bloc which may move them to caution. Their policies will be marked by a persistent activism and opportunism, but also by what they consider to be a due measure of caution. More important, however, than the Soviet outlook and aims, especially since these offer little hope for accommodation and genuine peace, are the strengths and resources which the Soviets will be able to bring to the pursuit of their aims.
The Soviet Power Base
Economic Aspect
5. Perhaps the most firmly based of our estimates are those which relate to the growth of Soviet economic power. The Soviet economy has the resources and plant as well as the planning and directing mechanisms to insure steady fulfillment of most of the goals in industrial expansion which the leadership sets. The industrial targets of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965), providing for 8.6 percent annual increase in industrial output, will almost certainly be met ahead of schedule. We estimate that by 1965 total investment will reach about one-third of gross national product (GNP), as compared with the present US rate of about one-fifth of GNP. Only in agriculture, which is burdened by a heritage of errors and neglect, will the regime fall well short of its goals, but even here we estimate that output will increase by about 3 to 4 percent per year. The GNP of the USSR in 1959 was somewhat less than half that of the US; it is growing about twice as fast and by 1965 will probably be somewhat more than half of US GNP.
6. GNP is a rough measurement, however. More important in terms of world power competition are the uses to which economic resources are put. The USSR maintains a defense effort judged to be of about the same magnitude as that of the US. The dollar value of Soviet investment in industry in 1959 exceeded the highest US figure, achieved in 1957. For purposes related to national power--defense, science, foreign economic and political operations--the Soviets are increasingly in a position to assign resources freely and without agonizing self-denials. That they are able to provide the resources for national power on a scale equivalent to the US is due to the virtually absolute command which the leadership has over the disposal of resources. It will continue to give the highest priority to purposes related to national power in order to "overtake and surpass" the US. The Soviet regime has bought economic growth and military strength at the expense of the living standards of the Soviet people. But its resources are now great enough so that it feels able to provide for improved living standards also. The consumption level remains low but we estimate that per capita increases will occur over the next five years at the respectable rate of four percent annually. The Soviet challenge in the economic field will be increasingly formidable, not because the USSR has any chance of overtaking the US standard or style of living, but because Soviet resources for the competition in power are already great and will continue to grow rapidly.
Military Aspect
7. As indicated, military power has one of the first claims upon Soviet resources. Our estimates on the development of Soviet military power until 1965 are far less certain than those on the Soviet economy. This is partly due to unpredictable developments during a period of rapid change in military technology. It is due more to gaps in certain kinds of critical information about Soviet military programs. Although in recent years the Soviets have released fuller economic data than previously, on essential matters in the military field they continue to maintain a policy of extreme secrecy, which they evidently view as a major military asset in itself.
8. The most significant development in the military field during the period of this estimate will be the USSR's emergence from strategic inequality, primarily through the build-up of an ICBM force, and also through development of its defense systems against nuclear attack. The overcoming of an inferiority under which the Soviets have operated throughout the postwar period is already having a profound effect on Soviet attitudes and policy. It inspires the confidence remarked upon above, has emboldened the Soviets to challenge the West on a vital issue like Berlin, and has led them to engage the West in other areas around the world formerly conceded to be beyond the reach of Soviet power.
9. The Soviet leaders will not be content with the gains in military power they have made. They will seek, by intensive research and development through the years ahead, as well as by equipping their forces with advanced weapons as these become available, to acquire an advantage over the West. If they succeed, they will press their advantage ruthlessly, though still within what they would consider to be the limits of tolerable risk to their own rule and system. It seems quite clear that in their present view both sides are deterred from the deliberate initiation of general war as a rational course of action. Moreover, with the weapons systems now on hand or likely to be available during the next few years, the Soviets probably do not count on acquiring an advantage so decisive as to permit them to launch general war under conditions which would not gravely menace their regime. Nevertheless, they are building their nuclear striking power with vigor, and we believe that they will build a substantial missile force. What we can learn of Soviet ideas suggests that their long-range striking capability is thought of primarily in terms of deterrence, and of employment for a heavy blow should the Soviets finally conclude that deterrence had failed, rather than in terms of the deliberate initiation of general war./2/ The Soviet missile force will also constitute an important means of political pressure, even though it is never used in actual combat.
/2/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the evidence of offensive missile and bomber production and deployment shows a definite intent by the Soviet rulers to achieve a clear military superiority at the earliest practicable date. He feels we are entering a very critical twenty-four month period in which the USSR may well sense it has the advantage. The Soviet leaders may press that advantage and offer the US the choice of war or of backing down on an issue heretofore considered vital to our national interests. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. In order to deal more effectively with the continuing bomber threat the Soviets are incorporating a large number of surface-to-air missiles into their air defense. They are now also doing large-scale research and development on antimissile systems in the hope of obtaining an advantage in this critical aspect of the future weapons balance. By the period 1963-1966 they will probably begin to deploy such a system, though its effectiveness is uncertain. Soviet research and development effort will probably also focus on the new threat presented by Polaris.
11. Partly as a result of the increased security the Soviets feel they have gained from their development of a variety of offensive and defensive missiles, they have announced a major personnel reduction in their forces, from about 3.6 to about 2.5 million men by the end of 1961. Barring a serious deterioration in the international situation, we believe the cut will be substantially carried out. We believe that tactical aviation has already been cut by one-half and naval aviation by two-thirds, the latter primarily through elimination of the fighter arm. However, the main weight of the cut will fall on the very large ground forces. Even with the reduction, the Soviets will still have substantial field ground forces: we estimate nearly 1.5 million men organized in 65 divisions averaging two-thirds strength and some 60 cadre divisions at about one-fourth strength. The submarine force will become even more than it is today the primary component of the Soviet Navy, and will include nuclear and missile-carrying types suitable for strategic attack.
12. In sum, the USSR will continue to develop formidable military strength despite the personnel reduction. The Soviet military posture is designed primarily, we believe, to deter general war but also to fight such a war if necessary./3/ Equally, it is intended to bolster the USSR's power position and thereby to promote its general policies. Soviet capabilities for limited war in areas close to Bloc borders are obviously great, but for conflict in more distant areas they are comparatively slight. We do not believe that the USSR intends as a matter of policy to conduct limited war at remote ranges. However, we do not exclude that, with their current tendency to political involvement in remoter areas, the Soviets may seek to develop a greater capacity for intervening militarily, even if only to establish a military presence, in such areas. A really effective ability to do this would presumably depend heavily upon acquisition of base rights and facilities under friendly political arrangements.
/3/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes the Soviets seek a clear military superiority. See his footnote to paragraph 9. [Footnote in the source text.]
Scientific Aspect
13. The Soviets obviously understand that science has become one of the key fronts in the world struggle, not only because of its relations to military capability but also because it is a major element in great power prestige. The scale of their effort, thanks to the heavy investment they made in training scientists in past years, is probably now roughly on a par with that of the US, at least in some fields of the basic sciences and in critical areas related to weapons technology. Presumably the scope of Soviet scientific activity will broaden as needs in these first priority areas are met. The quality of Soviet scientific work in many fields is now such that achievements conferring great prestige are as likely to occur in the USSR as in any other country.
Political Aspects
14. It is in estimating the political aspect of future developments within the Soviet Bloc that the greatest imponderables intrude. The political system within the USSR itself is stable, and it will almost certainly retain its totalitarian features. The regime will not be openly challenged by the Soviet people, who, even though many of them view it with apathy and ideological disillusionment, are in general hopeful for improvement in the conditions of their life and patriotically moved by the USSR's achievements and its position of world power. If there is change in the Soviet political system it will come from the higher levels of the party and government. In the relatively small group which constitutes the real governing class there are some signs of a desire for more regular participation in policy making, and for more reliance in policy execution on professional expertise instead of party agitational methods. While Khrushchev has avoided or been obliged to avoid the arbitrariness of Stalin, among those who surround him there are probably some who would like to move still further away from the domination of one man in the system. Given Khrushchev's age and state of health he may not survive as the dominating leader throughout the next five years. His successor at the head of the Soviet Government and party may be more restricted in the personal power he wields, but in any totalitarian system political developments are likely to depend heavily on the qualities and style which individual personalities bring to the exercise of great and arbitrary power.
15. In the area of political developments within the Communist Bloc it is the evolution of relations among the Bloc states which raises the greatest uncertainties at present. In general, the states of Eastern Europe have gained in economic strength and political stability in recent years, despite the continuing alienation and resentment of large parts of their populations. There seems little doubt that, with the more flexible and indirect methods of control the USSR has been employing since 1956-1957, it will be able to maintain a generally effective hegemony. However, China has raised a fundamental challenge to Soviet leadership of the Bloc. Even if some way is found to resolve the issues posed by China's desire to pursue a more militant policy toward the West, it raises the serious question as to whether the long-term unity of the Bloc under Soviet leadership can be maintained. We believe that there is a trend away from monolithic unity, and that in the long run, if China is to remain within the Bloc, a looser relationship is bound to develop. The future course of Sino-Soviet relations will obviously have profound consequences for the nature of the challenge which communism poses for the Free World. The West may be faced either with new dangers or new opportunities, or both./4/
/4/The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, believe that, in spite of Sino-Soviet frictions, the USSR and Communist China will continue to be firmly allied against the West and will render one another mutual support whenever an important interest of one or the other is threatened by the non-Communist world. [Footnote in the source text.]
Soviet Policies Toward the Non-Communist World
16. The general Soviet strategy for carrying on the world struggle in the present phase rests on two propositions. The first is that general nuclear war must be avoided because the costs in physical damage and social disintegration would be intolerable. The second is that the world position and power of the "imperialist" states can be undermined by a persistent and aggressive campaign waged by methods short of war--political struggle, economic and scientific competition, subversion. Political struggle takes the form of a constant agitation designed to capture and organize in broad mass movements the sentiments which focus on the great issues of the current period--peace, disarmament, anticolonialism, social justice, economic development. By manipulating these issues and by dramatizing the growth of Soviet power, the Soviets are also trying to align the governments of the under-developed and uncommitted states with the Bloc, and against the West. The Soviet leaders hope that the result will be a progressive isolation and loss of influence for the Western powers, divisions among them, and a decline in their ability to deal effectively with threats to their interests. This is what the Soviets mean by "peaceful coexistence"--a strategy to defeat the West without war.
17. This is not a strategy which aims immediately at the revolutionary seizure of power by Communist parties and the setting up of Communist regimes. The Soviets know that there are few countries where the Communists are strong enough to undertake such action, and where they themselves could count upon being able to deter intervention by non-Communist forces. The "peaceful coexistence" strategy is aimed mainly at gradually eliminating Western and building up Soviet influence around the world. The Soviets naturally expect that conditions will thereby be created which are favorable to the growth of Communist movements and which will sooner or later permit the latter to acquire state power peacefully, or by revolutionary action if necessary. Even though overt seizure of power is not now the main aim of the Soviet strategy, over a five-year period situations might arise where the gains from such action would seem important enough to the Soviets so that they would be willing to depart from their present general line.
18. The general line of Soviet policy estimated in the two preceding paragraphs falls within a range which excludes, on the one hand, the deliberate assumption of serious risks of general war, and on the other, abandonment of active struggle against the West. Within these limits we believe that the Soviet leaders will display both militancy and conciliation, at various times and in various proportions as seems to them most profitable. However, the Chinese challenge to Soviet authority involves basic questions of foreign policy, and brings severe pressure to bear on Soviet policy decisions. In trying to adjust to Chinese pressures, the Soviets may go farther in the direction of militancy and risk-taking than they otherwise would. On the other hand, if the Soviets should conclude that the Chinese were pushing them towards unacceptable dangers, they might move as a matter of temporary expediency toward a greater degree of stabilization in their relations with the West than they would otherwise consider, though without altering their long-term aim of establishing Communism throughout the world./5/
/5/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, agrees that the Chinese challenge to Soviet authority will, undoubtedly, have its effect on Soviet policy toward the non-Communist world; however, he believes that the relationship of Soviet military power vis-à-vis the US is the essential determinant. Further, as expressed in his footnote to paragraph 9, he believes that should the Soviets feel that they have achieved a clear military superiority, they are likely to adopt policies involving serious risks of general war. [Footnote in the source text.]
19. As a general rule, we believe that the Soviets would consider that the initiation of limited war with Soviet or even Bloc forces entailed unacceptably high risks and political liabilities. However, it cannot be excluded that situations will appear in which they would conclude that some prize was great enough, and the military and political risks acceptable enough, to justify resort to such action. The Soviets are aware, however, that any limited war carries a danger of expanding into general war. We believe, therefore, that their attitude toward the involvement of Soviet or Bloc forces in local and limited war will be a very cautious one, and will be governed by their estimate of the risks and advantages, both political and military, in each situation. Even so, there is always a possibility that they may miscalculate risks.
20. Negotiations with the Western Powers over outstanding issues are conceived by the Soviets as one of the modes of waging the struggle of "peaceful coexistence." They hope that the pressures which they attempt to build up against the West will result in concessions at the negotiating table. Intervals of more accommodating behavior and appeals for relaxed tensions are intended to encourage the making of such concessions. We expect this alternation of pressure and accommodation to be the regular pattern of Soviet behavior with respect to negotiation in the years ahead. Since the U-2 incident in May 1960 the Soviets have adopted a hostile and aggressive attitude which has made effective negotiation impossible. We believe that within the next six months or so the Soviets are likely to moderate this attitude and to attempt to get negotiations started again. It is also possible, however, that on the Berlin issue, where negotiation has so far failed to get them results, they will resort to intensified pressure and threats in an attempt to force the West into high-level negotiations under more unfavorable conditions.
21. We do not believe that the Soviets have a five-year plan for foreign policy in the sense that they set themselves particular goals to accomplish within a set time. Their policy is marked rather by an extraordinary opportunism, and in recent years by rapidity of response and vigor in execution. Over the next five years they probably look for new developments favorable to their interests to occur in a number of areas, but more especially in Africa, Latin America, Japan, Indonesia, and Iran. They probably intend to give particular attention to establishing a diplomatic and economic presence in Africa, to stimulating and exploiting movements on the Castro model in Latin America, and to encouraging the growth of a radical anti-American mass movement in Japan. Above all, however, they intend to build up their base of power within the Bloc itself, in the belief that during the next several years they can considerably improve their relative power position vis-à-vis the West. They believe that if they do so, more opportunities for Communist expansion, and more readily exploitable ones, will open up for them.
[Here follows the body of the 92-page Estimate.]
2. David K.E. Bruce Diary Entry/1/
Washington, January 5, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret.
[Here follows unrelated material.]
Before Senator Kennedy's inauguration, he told Rusk to make me coordinator of the conversations that Soviet Ambassador Menshikov was attempting to hold with various private American individuals. This was quite an assignment. "Smiling Mike" had embarked on a campaign of trying to talk to everybody whom he thought might ultimately have some close association with Kennedy.
I went to the Ambassador's residence on January 5, 1961 and after much drinking and eating, I left and made this report to Dean Rusk:
"At Ambassador Menshikov's invitation, I lunched with him today. He said he welcomed the opportunity to talk unofficially with an American private citizen, and assumed the gist of his remarks would be conveyed to Mr. Rusk. His official contacts were, of course, with Secretary Herter. He recognized the impediments to conversation with Mr. Rusk before the latter was inducted into office. He had seen Mr. Bowles, and would appreciate word being passed to him that he, Menshikov, after reflecting upon their interviews, was now ready to express his reaction to certain points discussed by them. (N.B. Would you please pass this on to Chet Bowles?).
"At another time, the Ambassador referred to conversations that had taken place with Adlai Stevenson and Robert Kennedy. He expects to see Mr. Kennedy again shortly. (He did not mention to me his request for a visit to Senator Kennedy.)
"Menshikov observed that he was an intimate acquaintance--indeed friend--of Messrs. Khrushchev and Mikoyan and, to a lesser degree, of Kozlov. He had commenced his career in trade and commercial matters, becoming later a diplomat. He thought that expansion of trade between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. was of great importance, but did not propose to deal with that subject at this time.
"His principals--especially Khrushchev--believed the coming into power of a new American administration presented an opportunity to resolve existing and dangerous differences between our countries. The atmosphere had changed. Psychologically, it would be easier for the U.S.S.R. to deal with the new Administration than with the old one. He realized nothing could be negotiated until the Presidency changed hands, but, as soon as possible thereafter, serious inter-changes should begin. Meanwhile, he hoped to continue informally to set forth Soviet views as he was now doing.
"Khrushchev felt that, with due regard to the susceptibilities of smaller nations on each side, no real relaxation of tensions could be achieved until the only two great powers agreed upon a program for peaceful coexistence. There are two outstanding problems: first, in order of importance, is disarmament; second, the German question, including West Berlin. This is not to minimize the necessity of dealing with other sources of contention, which should also be considered as urgent. (He made no allusion to China.)
"What Menshikov later said was so nearly a repetition of his statements in the memoranda on his conversations with Messrs. Harriman, Robert Kennedy, Stevenson and Salisbury/2/ that I do not think it useful to set down his remarks except as they deviated from the foregoing.
/2/Menshikov had talked with Harriman on November 21 and December 14, 1960 (memoranda of conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers); with Robert Kennedy on December 12 (Robert Kennedy memorandum to Rusk; Kennedy Library, Robert Kennedy Papers); with Stevenson on November 16 (memorandum of conversation; Princeton University, Stevenson Papers, Box 832, Menshikov); and with Harrison Salisbury on December 15 (memorandum of conversation; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, USSR). These conversations are also summarized in Beschloss, The Crisis Years, pp. 40-42, and in Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, pp. 439-440.
"Regarding disarmament, Khrushchev believed there were no fundamental differences between us, as both nations realized the utter and criminal folly of a nuclear war. Perhaps the quarrel over inspection and control preceding an agreement on general and complete disarmament was due to a misunderstanding, or was a matter of semantics. At any rate, if Khrushchev could have a private conversation with President Kennedy they could reach a compromise on a system of inspection and control synchronized with stages of disarmament.
"Regarding Germany, Menshikov confined his remarks to Berlin, and repeated in essence what he had said to Adlai Stevenson. I told him previous suggestions by his Government did not seem to promise a solution satisfactory to us. He answered that Khrushchev was flexible on the subject, and believed he could work out something mutually satisfactory in private talks with President Kennedy.
"He came back and back to the desirability and urgency of the two Chiefs of State meeting, and hoped this could happen before President Kennedy saw Adenauer and Macmillan, the first of whom had been announced as a visitor to Washington in February, and the second in March. I said the report about Adenauer was incorrect, since his proposed trip had been cancelled. I had no information about Macmillan's plans, but was not aware of a definite time having been set for him to come to Washington.
"Menshikov agreed that we would have to await the formal taking over by the new Administration before consideration could be given to the possibility of a meeting between the two statesmen. I reminded him of the sentiment prevalent here, of the necessity of preliminary agreements broad enough to warrant a later conference between two or more Chiefs of State. Menshikov replied that Khrushchev thought preliminary understandings could be reached but did not specify how. He said he was sure Khrushchev would be glad to receive a representative of President Kennedy in Moscow to engage in preparatory discussions. I asked if this could be done through normal diplomatic channels. He answered that such a procedure had not been followed in the past, and thought letters between the two Chiefs, and perhaps a special emissary from President Kennedy, might be better. However, he was careful to add this was an entirely personal opinion. He felt himself capable of handling the Washington end, since he had always been kept informed by Khrushchev of the contents of all private communications between Khrushchev and President Eisenhower. He asked whether Ambassador Thompson would remain in Moscow. I answered that I did not know.
"He referred to the difficulties, of which he was aware, on the Western side especially, of bilateral conversations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Heads of State, but thought, by the exercise of tact, they could be overcome, as would also be the case with disarmament discussions, which would have to receive the eventual approval of a United Nations Committee.
"Menshikov started to talk about U.S. mistakes in Laos and Cuba but, after some jocularity over Castro, I told him I thought we better disregard those areas.
"He asked if I would renew this talk on a weekly basis. I said I would see Mr. Rusk Saturday and give him an answer Monday, since it might or might not be preferable to make some other arrangement.
"He then handed me the enclosed paper,/3/ asked me to read it and, if I wished, to pass it on. It was his personal production and entirely unofficial. I read it hurriedly, and said I would not comment on it today, though, off-hand, I did not personally find his comments on the German question constructive."
/3/Not found.
Menshikov sent me a hamper of vodka and caviar and invited me to lunch again. I went a second time, but found his conversation a repetition of what he had said before. During the remainder of my stay in Washington, he suggested I meet him again, but I replied that, since the Secretary of State had taken office I thought I should drop out of any future discussions on the matters with which he was concerned.
[Here follows unrelated material.]
3. Current Intelligence Weekly Review/1/
Washington, January 12, 1961.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Secret; Noforn. The source text comprises pp. 7-8 of Part I of the issue. The Current Intelligence Weekly Review was prepared by CIA's Office of Current Intelligence, whose staff also produced the President's Intelligence Checklist and the Current Intelligence Bulletin, both daily intelligence summaries. Based on the daily summaries, the Current Intelligence Weekly Review provided a weekly wrap-up of the key events as well as special articles. Like the Current Intelligence Bulletin, it was disseminated widely to U.S. Government officials. Excerpts from the Current Intelligence Weekly Review have been included in this volume to provide examples of the kind of incremental intelligence information that U.S. policymakers depended on day in and day out to illuminate developments in the Soviet Union.
East-West Relations
At the Cuban National Day reception on 2 January, Khrushchev said the delay in establishing contact with the new US administration was largely responsible for the Soviet party's decision to postpone its 22nd congress until October, according to the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow. At the same reception First Deputy Premier Mikoyan remarked that Khrushchev did not expect to meet with President-elect Kennedy until "perhaps July."
This link between the timing of the party congress and top-level East-West talks suggests that Khrushchev hopes to achieve some tangible diplomatic success which could be used to demonstrate the validity and effectiveness of his foreign policy before committing the Soviet party to the kind of authoritative and long-range programs that are enunciated by party congresses. The Soviet leaders may also feel that the Chinese Communist challenge makes it imperative that the party congress take unequivocal positions on doctrinal as well as foreign policy questions, and that this will be impossible until the Soviet leaders have an opportunity to assess the character and likely moves of the new US administration.
The new date for the party congress--17 October--and Mikoyan's reported reference to a meeting with the new US President in July suggest that the Soviet leaders are aware that the process of arranging a summit conference will require considerably more time than Khrushchev indicated in earlier private remarks. In talks with Prime Minister Macmillan last fall, Khrushchev mentioned February and March as possible dates for a summit; later he indicated to the West German ambassador that April would be the deadline for talks on Germany.
Khrushchev's latest private remarks along this line suggest, however, that he will initially press for early negotiations. He used a talk with the Icelandic ambassador on 4 January to emphasize his public statement that the Berlin problem must be solved in 1961. Unless the new US administration gave an early indication of willingness to negotiate, Khrushchev told the ambassador, the USSR would proceed with a separate peace treaty with the East Germans.
As is often the case when discussing the Berlin question with Western diplomats other than the three Allied powers, Khrushchev tried to cast doubt on the firmness of Western reaction to a separate treaty. He said he was convinced that the Western powers, with the possible exception of Bonn, were not prepared to fight over West Berlin and claimed that even De Gaulle had told him it was natural that Berlin should be under Soviet influence. Admitting that a separate peace treaty could precipitate a crisis, Khrushchev added that tensions would ease after a time and the new situation would gradually be accepted.
[3-1/2 lines of 2-column source text not declassified] As a result of Ulbricht's talks with Khrushchev, the East Germans feel that a summit is not likely until this summer and that the USSR will sign a separate peace treaty if Khrushchev fails to achieve his objectives on Berlin through direct negotiations. Khrushchev reportedly assured Ulbricht that the Berlin question would be solved in 1961.
Moscow's relative restraint on Berlin which was evident in the Communist position during the negotiations renewing the Soviet and East German trade pacts with Bonn was again reflected in Moscow's reply to the US note of 26 October protesting East German statements and actions concerning Berlin. The Soviet note of 7 January was brief, devoid of polemic, and merely confirmed the Soviet position as presented in the 26 September note./2/ In response to an earlier US protest, the USSR declared at that time that East Germany exercised full power on the territory lying under its sovereignty, "including in its capital."
/2/For text of the Soviet note of September 26 and the U.S. note of October 26, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 720-723. The January 7 Soviet note was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1570 from Moscow, January 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-961)
The brevity of the latest Soviet note also appears intended to close out the exchange over East German restrictions on West German travel into East Berlin.
4. Record of Telephone Conversation Between President-elect Kennedy and Adlai E. Stevenson/1/
Washington, January 13, 1961.
/1/Source: Princeton University, Stevenson Papers, Box 832, John F. Kennedy. No classification marking.
[Here follows discussion of other matters.]
S: I talked to Rusk and Chester/2/ several weeks ago urging them to suggest to you or discuss with you sometime what seems to me the most important first thing that this administration has to do--and that is to discover what is in K's mind, if possible. There's only one way I know of and this would be by direct talks in Moscow without formality by somebody who is not the diplomatic agent but someone who corresponds to Khrushchev's concept of power. That is, a political figure rather than a diplomatic one; someone who would go there after the inauguration as your emissary to review the situation and exploit what opportunities there may be. I think it is important to find out what his troubles are--as well as to explore with him ours. I am told one trouble of his may be his health--which we don't know anything about.----extremists in the Presidium and China--and what he has to deal with. I think we will not find anyone easier to deal with than K is. I think it is important to find out whether he wants to expand the cold war----if we make proposals on general and complete disarmament--how are we going to proceed--does he want an effective U.N., or is he determined to destroy it?----I know how he reveals himself in conversation--and it could be this could determine quite a good deal, especially if he wants to do business.----What we want to do is discover some means of creating a favorable world order and we must explore the kind of thing we could do--for example, if they would make a gesture of releasing the B-47 pilots/3/ we could with grace make a gesture in their direction. It would be helpful if Zorin at the U.N. got some new instructions and we could have a more profitable meeting in the Spring than we had in the Fall. I think they have been taking the initiative too long now. This would recapture the world's imagination which is one of the first jobs to be done--and I don't think we can do it by being too cautious. I think this is one of the things that you should talk over--I haven't been able to get Dean.
/2/Chester B. Bowles.
/3/A reference to the two surviving crew members of an RB-47 that was shot down by the Soviet Union on July 1, 1960.
K: We should talk about the desirability of bringing Thompson home right away to report, then we can talk to him and see what best way we can proceed from there.
K: Who would be best one to talk to K?
S: I think the unhappy thing is the best one is me. But I haven't wanted to suggest this and it would come at an awkward time--but I would do this if it were deemed wise and helpful--and I would put other things aside. The alternative would be Harriman--he has disadvantages in view of the fact he always insists on talking--and has difficulty in hearing.
I think it would be best to send someone K knows and with whom he has had dealings before--someone he would be quite sure would represent you--someone influential--not just a personal diplomat.
K: Good. We will have a chance to talk before we come to a final judgment on this?
[Here follows discussion of other matters.]
5. Editorial Note
A Department of Defense study, "Evaluation of Possible Military Courses of Action in Cuba," January 16, 1961, reported that as many as 100 Cuban pilots were undergoing flight training in Czechoslovakia and that the USSR had delivered to Cuba in the past 5 months at least 20,000 tons of arms and equipment. So far the U.S. had "no evidence of the Soviets providing Cuba with sophisticated weapons such as missiles or nuclear devices, or MIG jet fighter aircraft." For text of the study, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume X, pages 36-40.
6. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 1-61
Washington, January 17, 1961.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Registry: Job 79-R01012A. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Joint Staff participated in the preparation of the estimate, which was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the USIB, except the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION
[Here follow sections entitled "I. Introduction," "II. The Communist World: A. Soviet Progress and Policy," and "II. The Communist World: B. Chinese Communist Growth and Aspirations."]
C. Sino-Soviet Relations and the Future of Communism
25. The character of Sino-Soviet relations in the years ahead will have a profound effect upon the future of communism and thereby on the world situation. The quarrel with Peiping has put the Soviet leaders in a difficult situation. They cannot condone Chinese contumacy without losing control of the Communist movement. They cannot permit an open break without losing what influence they still possess over the Chinese and without gravely weakening the international Communist movement as a whole. The Soviet leaders would consider an open break calamitous, but we do not believe that they would go so far in trying to avoid it as to surrender to the Chinese position; both the USSR's determination to preserve its supremacy in the Communist movement and Soviet national interest in avoiding serious risk of general war would preclude such a course. We also do not believe that the Chinese would submit fully to the Soviet position; their pride, self righteousness, and national aspirations are too heavily committed to permit it.
26. The issues between the partners are basic, and will probably not be resolved in any clear-cut fashion. The meetings in Moscow in November, 1960, clearly did not produce a complete agreement, or one which is likely to be lasting. The estrangement seems likely to continue, with ups and downs as new issues arise and temporary solutions are developed, and possibly moving toward a looser connection. If the Sino-Soviet relationship does in fact develop in this way, there will probably be a tendency for recurrent stresses and strains to weaken the Communist world posture and to diminish the effectiveness of world communism outside the bloc. In particular, factionalism would be stimulated in the Communist movement, with parties or factions in various countries tending to identify either with the USSR or with Communist China. The two countries would compete with each other for influence in a variety of arenas, from revolutionary movements to world organizations. A further widening of the Sino-Soviet split, if it should occur, would dim the image of the bloc as a great and growing power center and thus reduce the pressure upon peripheral countries to accommodate to the Communists.
27. The cohesive forces between the USSR and China are strong, and we believe that the two states will not abandon their alliance against the West. The Soviet leaders would be confronted with a most serious dilemma, however, if the Chinese pursued independently such a militant policy as to become engaged in a major war. Caught between a desire to avoid Soviet involvement, with its attendant dangers, and desire to preserve a Communist state, with its attendant opportunity to re-establish Soviet influence in China, the Soviet leaders might tend toward the latter course. Thus a wider Sino-Soviet divergency would not necessarily lead to a less dangerous world.
28. It is impossible to predict with confidence the course of Communist policy in the decade ahead, particularly in the light of the uncertain future course in Sino-Soviet relations. We believe that the USSR will stick to its present policy of seeking to win victories without incurring serious risks, and of alternating or combining shows of anger and bellicosity with poses of reasonableness and compromise. We say this largely because we believe that the relationship of power between the US and USSR will cause the Soviet leaders to desire to avoid general war, and that within the limits which this desire places on their action there will be constantly shifting ideas of the potential risks and gains involved in the various situations which will arise. A danger exists, of course, that in assessing the risks involved in particular situations or proposed courses of action, the Soviet leaders might overestimate their position while underestimating that of the West. In particular, they might misjudge Western will and determination in the face of Soviet threats or encroachments. Such a political miscalculation could lead to the incurring of serious risks without the intention to do so; it could even lead to general war.
29. We believe that China will persist in pressing the USSR for a more militant bloc policy. It will continue its hostility to the US, and as it becomes stronger--especially after it acquires a nuclear capability--it might press its objectives much more aggressively than at present. On the other hand, the Chinese have in recent years assessed risks carefully, and despite their bellicose talk they have refrained from actions which involved serious risk of large-scale military operations. Thus, their militancy has been tempered by some degree of prudence, and this tendency toward prudence might in time become somewhat stronger as they become more familiar with the dangers of nuclear war and as they come to recognize the vulnerability of their developing industrial capacity. On the whole, however, we do not expect a general shift in the Chinese domestic or world outlook for some time to come, and Chinese militancy will continue to create a serious danger of local or general hostilities in the Far East, and even of general war.
30. Over the next decade at least, there appears to be a greater likelihood of flexibility in Soviet than in Chinese policy. The Soviet leadership's desire to prevent a general war, the wider range of Soviet contacts with the outside world, the continuing pressure at home for liberalization, and the growing capacity of the USSR to provide its citizens with a more comfortable life--these factors taken together may tend toward moderation in foreign policy and toward a recognition of some areas of common interest with the West. It is even possible that the Soviet leaders will come to feel that the USSR has little in common with China except an ideology which the Chinese interpret in their own way, and that by 1970 Communist China, with nuclear weapons and a population of almost 900 million, will be a dangerous neighbor and associate.
III. The Emerging Areas
A. The Political and Social Milieu
31. It is one of the key points in the Soviet estimate of the world situation that conditions are favorable for Communist gains in the colonial and ex-colonial areas of the world; there is much to support this Soviet view. The nationalist revolutions in such areas as Africa and the Arab states have been directed largely toward revamping political and social systems in order to modernize societies and to achieve a place in the sun. The Communist revolutions in Russia and China arose from broadly comparable aspirations. Indeed, the system in these countries is widely admired in the newer nations of the world because it has been demonstrably effective in achieving rapid modernization, while the West is associated in their minds with the colonialism which they blame for most of their problems and miseries, both real and fancied.
32. Many of these countries in emerging areas--especially in Africa and the Middle East--are in the charge of revolutionary-minded leaders; in others of them such leaders are making a bid for power. These leaders are members of an intelligentsia who have frequently had an education along Western lines, some of it in military schools, and who have become aware through travel and education--or through observation of the mode of life of Westerners in their midst--of the backwardness of their countries and the poverty of their people. Out of a sense of obligation, frustration, and impatience, they have adopted a revolutionary attitude or taken revolutionary action against the old order--whether it was colonial or indigenous. Despite the Western nature of their youthful training, they tend to be resentful of Western influence and critical of Western methods. They therefore are tempted by communism insofar as it is anti-Western and an effective method of bringing about rapid change.
33. Nevertheless, the revolutionary intelligentsia are generally chary of embracing communism. Some of them have accepted Communist advisers, economic aid, and diplomatic support, and some have even sided with the Communists against the West. But, for the most part they do not wish to accept all that now goes with the Communist ideology--the goal of a classless society, wholesale social reorganization, Soviet interference in or dictation of domestic policy, complete identification with the Soviet Bloc in international politics, and exclusion from Western economic aid and technical assistance. Moreover, many of them have become aware of their own nation's history--in some cases a distinguished history--and they see themselves as national figures capable of resurrecting some features of that past and binding them into the new fabric being created. Thus, they see themselves, not as capitalists, Communists, or exponents of any other borrowed ideology, but as nationalists carving out their own destinies and selecting from the past and from other societies the elements with which to fashion new states and new societies of their own.
34. There are, of course, wide variations within the emerging world, not only as among major areas--Latin America is quite different from Africa--but even within major areas. There are wide diversities of all kinds in social structure, degree of advancement, extent of revolutionary feeling, degree of pressure upon available resources, extent of implantation of Western institutions, and cultural backgrounds. Whereas Latin America is Christian, is predominantly Western in language and culture, and has a long history of independence, Africa is a melange of languages, religions, and cultures, and is only now emerging from foreign domination. Even within a continent such as Latin America, there are societies which have passed through a major social revolution and others which still possess small social elites and a large mass of illiterate and poverty-stricken peasants and tribes.
35. There is, however, a large common denominator in the underdeveloped world. This is the political and social instability which is either manifest or dormant and which arises from the rapidity with which knowledge is growing and from the revolutionary manner in which large numbers of people are reacting to the changes in the world around them. Nearly all the nations of the underdeveloped world--whether in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America--are beset by problems springing from population growth, lack of development capital, rising popular expectations, internal political strife and competing ideological pressures, lack of political prowess and administrative and technical competence, and an inadequate sense of national identity. While some states, especially those barely emerging from tribalism, as in Africa, suffer more intensely than others from these assorted ills, even states such as India and the more advanced Latin American countries confront several of them to a most serious degree. Many states have adopted strongly socialist methods; some have held to constitutional methods of government with only the greatest difficulty; some have thrown out bloody dictators only to acquire equally distasteful successors; some have taken halting and others more dramatic steps toward the establishment of democratic governments.
36. In states confronted by these enormous problems, the tendency toward some blend of authoritarianism and socialism seems likely to continue. Revolutionary leaders attempting to deal with backwardness, tribalism, feudalism, corruption, economic pressures, and ineptitude often have no alternative but to stifle political opposition. Western states which set store by economic individualism and political freedom will probably be increasingly shocked by methods which will be adopted, but in the eyes of local leaders Western standards of political and economic conduct are likely to be irrelevant to the problem. Revolutionary leaders are likely to expect the West to judge them more by what they are trying to do than by the manner in which they are doing it. If the West does not understand and help them, they will tend to rely more and more heavily upon the Communists, until a point is reached when they can no longer extricate themselves from the Communist embrace.
37. Of all the problems confronting these nations that of the relation between population and economic growth may be the most difficult. Indeed, population growth is a grave world problem, with present rates making for a doubling of the world's population every 35-50 years. In 1930 the world population was two billion; today it is three billion; in twenty years it will probably be four billion; in forty years it may be six or seven billion. Growth is most rapid in the underdeveloped areas, where nearly everywhere it exceeds two percent a year. Ten years ago almost no nation had a population growth rate of three percent; now such rates are not uncommon and there is no reasonable prospect that they can be significantly reduced in the next decade, whatever means might be tried. These increases impede capital formation in the areas where it is needed most, since increases in production simply go to keep alive the larger numbers of unproductive old people and children. In some cases total GNP grows while per capita GNP falls. Standards of living are declining in some countries at precisely the time when the revolutionary leaders now in charge must begin to meet the expectations which have arisen in their own and in their fellow countrymen's minds.
38. The problem of maintaining standards of living and even that of satisfying to a degree rising economic expectations probably can be met with substantial infusions of outside aid and with the execution of national development programs. However, even if these countries received outside aid in massive quantities, they would still confront the grave political and social problems of backward and uprooted societies. Indeed, these problems will inhibit both the receipt and proper use of needed economic assistance. The present revolutionary leaders must surmount this great complex of problems if they are to sustain the nationalist character of their revolutions; if they fail, they may be replaced by Communist leaders ready to use Draconian methods and determined to impose permanent totalitarian institutions.
B. International Outlook
39. If, as we suggest above, the emerging countries will be preoccupied with their own problems, their attitudes toward the outside world will be determined largely by the way in which they feel the outside world impinges upon these problems. These countries and their leaders will not be concerned so much with ideological, moral, and cultural considerations as they will with manipulating outside influences in order to protect themselves or to advance their particular interests. The two great powers are likely to be viewed largely in terms of the threat or succor which they will afford.
40. Some of the emerging states have clearly aligned themselves with one or another of the two great powers. Many of these are states on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc--Iran, Pakistan Thailand, South Vietnam, and South Korea--and their leaders have aligned themselves with the US in order to obtain that military and economic assistance which they hoped would enable them to keep any domestic enemies at bay and to stand up against pressures from their powerful neighbors. Cuba alleges similar reasons for aligning itself with the USSR.
41. In general, however, those who thought they could safely do so have chosen neutralism, and indeed some of them have made quite a profitable thing of it. In their desire to achieve and maintain national independence they have sought to avoid commitment to either side, and they have recognized the value to both sides of their not falling under the domination of the other. This has permitted some of them successfully to seek economic assistance from both and some others to seek assistance from one side by suggesting that they might appeal to the other. Nevertheless, many of these countries, in the course of their colonial or semicolonial history, have been subjected to Western influences and institutions and have therefore come to feel that "neutralism" requires a pronounced reaction away from these influences and some closer relationship with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
42. This trend has been accelerated by increased Soviet willingness to compete with the West in providing economic assistance and diplomatic support. Bloc economic assistance overall is still considerably less than the US equivalent, but the USSR in particular can substantially enlarge its program. Moreover, the USSR has some advantages over the US in carrying out aid programs; it can move more quickly and without regard to a variety of politically-imposed restrictions which characterize US activities. On the other hand, as Soviet aid becomes more commonplace and taken for granted, the USSR is beginning to encounter some of the criticisms and problems which the US has faced in its foreign aid programs.
43. We believe that if the present trend toward neutralism is not reversed, it will become so strong that it will draw away from the West some of those nations now associated with it. This might come about through revolutions in some of these countries--for example Iran or South Vietnam--with seizure of power by nationalist-neutralist forces; it could occur because existing regimes might decide to seek the supposed benefits and safety of neutrality; it could come about because these nations might decide that the US was becoming inferior to the Sino-Soviet Bloc in military power and therefore would no longer be willing or able to support them.
44. The neutralist posture of these countries seems to us likely to produce in the decade ahead some most serious policy problems for the US. Aside from the probability of withdrawal from Western association and attempts to balance Western with Soviet or Chinese influence, there will be continual pressures for economic aid and political support, for denunciations of colonialism, for concessions on disarmament, and for further Western retreat from positions of predominance or influence. The US position in the UN will probably become increasingly difficult, particularly since many of these countries--including such influential members as India and the UAR--now appear to believe that the UN machinery has been used by the major Western powers and especially by the US as an instrument of national, and hence in their view "imperialist," policy. For this reason, the idea of revising the UN charter and proposals to bring in Communist China have received widespread sympathy among the emerging nations. Their numbers are now so great that when their views become more crystallized--as now seems unavoidable--the hitherto predominant Western influence in the UN will be greatly reduced.
45. It is obvious that neutralism as a principle is fundamentally incompatible with the Soviet objective of a Communist world. Nevertheless, neutralism may often provide Communists with opportunities for penetration and subversion. Particularly in the areas of the new states, the Communists will seize upon rivalries among nations and tribes, upon the need for economic and technical aid, and upon the naivete and weaknesses of inexperienced leaders. Hence the problem for neutralist states is to keep out of Communist clutches. Nevertheless, insofar as the new and underdeveloped nations can overcome their problems, they may take on a strength and stature which will enable them to maintain their neutrality against Communist pressures.
[Here follow sections entitled "IV. Problems of Western Alliances" and "V. The Military Problem." The latter is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VIII, pages 3-10.]
7. Editorial Note
At a meeting of senior foreign policy advisers on January 17, 1961, Secretary of State Christian Herter asked his Special Assistant Charles Bohlen to explain Soviet intentions in Laos in light of the USSR's airlifting of weapons and other supplies to rebels in Laos attempting to overthrow the Royal Lao Government. According to a memorandum of the conversation, Bohlen replied that the "Soviets don't want to turn the Lao situation into a large operation. He [Bohlen] agrees with Ambassador Thompson that the Soviets are not seeking a complete victory, but, at the same time, that they would not accept a complete defeat." Soviet involvement in Laos, Bohlen continued, was "also in part a function of the Soviet-ChiCom row. Following the Communist meeting in Moscow last November, the Soviets probably have to demonstrate their Bolshevik revolutionary zeal." For text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIV, pages 12-18. In subsequent days Kennedy and his advisers discussed several times how they should assess Soviet intentions and "how the United States could save Laos." See ibid., pages 26-27, 42-44, and 48-50.
8. Current Intelligence Weekly Review/1/
Washington, January 18, 1961.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; Noforn. Prepared by CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 1-3 of Part II of the issue.
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
East-West Relations
The USSR last week used propaganda charges of US harassment of Soviet merchant vessels to convey the impression that the new US administration is obligated to take unilateral measures to improve Soviet-American relations. In a press conference in Moscow on 12 January, Minister of Merchant Marine Viktor Bakayev charged that US military aircraft and ships were systematically conducting "provocative actions" against Soviet vessels.
The main purpose of the press conference and a subsequent note to the US on 14 January/2/ probably was to create an issue of a secondary nature which the Soviet leaders may use to differentiate between the two US administrations. Twice during his press conference Bakayev expressed hope that the "new government" of the US would denounce the actions and put an end to the "provocations of the American armed forces." He said such a move would make a "good contribution to the improvement of Soviet-American relations."
/2/For text of the Soviet note of January 14, see Department of State Bulletin, February 6, 1961, p. 178.
Bloc propaganda has also gone to some lengths on such other issues as Laos and Cuba to make clear that its criticism of the US was directed at the "outgoing Eisenhower administration" and to differentiate sharply between the present unsatisfactory state of Soviet-American relations and Moscow's expectations of improved relations under the new President.
The bloc has also used President Eisenhower's State of the Union message/3/ to emphasize that improvement of Soviet-American relations will depend primarily on the attitude of the new US administration. A TASS review described the message as an attempt to "whitewash reality" and convince the new President that the present "bankrupt policy" should be continued. TASS also claimed that while the speech evoked no interest, the inaugural address of the new President was being "awaited with much interest."
/3/For text of the message, January 12, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61, pp. 913-930.
Other Soviet broadcasts asserted that the change in administrations will mean a change in the atmosphere of Soviet-US relations, and that statements by members of the new administration already "testify to their correct understanding" of important international problems. The Hungarian news service reported a press editorial which presumed that the new US administration would end the "dead-lock" in Western policy and resume East-West negotiations, "if not on the highest level at least under conditions making possible the examination of the most important international questions."
Soviet spokesmen have privately continued to stress the need for top-level talks on disarmament, a nuclear test ban agreement, and the Berlin and German questions. The Soviet military attaché in Turkey, obviously under instructions, sought out his US counterpart and stressed the importance of an early meeting between the new President and Khrushchev and a "rapid agreement" on disarmament.
[1 paragraph (10 lines of 2-column source text) not declassified]
Bloc diplomats have also apparently inspired press reports that Khrushchev is prepared to withhold pressure for immediate East-West negotiations provided the US indicates its willingness eventually to discuss disarmament, a nuclear test ban, and the German question. A TASS correspondent in Geneva told a reliable American observer that there would be "no trouble" on Berlin "for awhile," but that eventually the question should be settled on the basis of a free city. He implied, however, that the USSR would settle for a more limited agreement involving public renunciation of support for refugee and émigré organizations, which Moscow would represent as a step toward American recognition and acceptance of the situation in Eastern Europe.
This line is similar to that taken by East German party chief Ulbricht in a speech to his central committee meeting last month in which he listed removal of "harassing centers" and renunciation of "revanchist propaganda" as two conditions which would assure a "peaceful solution." These minimum demands, however, were linked to some form of recognition of East Germany.
While a period of conciliatory gestures toward the US and restraint on Berlin seems to be developing, Khrushchev has at the same time sought to maintain a certain sense of urgency over Berlin. The re-emergence of the separate peace treaty threat in private talks coincides with reports from bloc sources that Khrushchev is committed to carry out this threat if he fails to obtain his objectives through negotiations. In his 6 January speech/4/ Khrushchev warned that the USSR was fully determined to sign a separate treaty with East Germany if the Western powers refused to recognize the "real situation" in Berlin and Germany. He gave no indication of an immediate action, but instead pledged the USSR "to continue, step by step, to bring aggressive-minded imperialists to their senses."
/4/See footnote 1, Document 13.
Ambassador Thompson believes that since the Soviet party congress--scheduled for October--follows so soon after the German elections, it is unlikely that Khrushchev will await the outcome of these elections before forcing the issue of Berlin.
Thus, while Khrushchev appears to have disregarded his earlier deadline of April--mentioned to the West German ambassador last fall--he has in effect implied a new deadline for East-West negotiations before the West German elections this September; moreover, he has made it clear that pressure on the West may be gradually applied if his campaign for negotiations appears to be lagging.
The TASS correspondent stressed that a nuclear test ban was a more critical problem than Berlin. He hinted that when negotiations resumed, the USSR would be prepared to reach a "reasonable agreement" on the issue of the number of annual on-site inspections of areas where detection equipment indicated a possible nuclear explosion. Thus far, the Soviet delegation at Geneva has refused to negotiate the issue since proposing three inspections in the USSR each year. The Soviets, however, have hinted that their proposal is subject to amendments, but only if the Western powers concede that the basis for determining the number of inspections will be an arbitrary political decision rather than a scientific estimate of the probable number of suspicious natural occurrences, such as earthquakes.
Thus far Soviet propaganda has not commented on American press reports of the special task force recommendation to the new President that nuclear test ban talks and disarmament negotiations be deferred for several months.
Press reports of the full text of Khrushchev's 6 January speech, on the results of the Moscow conference of Communist leaders, indicate that it is intended as a definitive Soviet interpretation of the doctrinal and policy questions covered in the Moscow declaration of 6 December. Publication of the full text of this speech was delayed until 17 January, in the party journal Kommunist. Publication at this time is probably intended to complement an expected Central Committee resolution on the Moscow conference.
9. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, January 21, 1961, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/1-2161. Confidential; Priority.
1706. Eyes only Secretary. Following is aide-memoire handed me by Khrushchev today. Request this be closely held pending receipt my explanatory message.
Begin text.
Soviet Government, guided by sincere desire to begin a new phase in relations between Soviet Union and US, has decided to meet wishes of American side in connection with release of two American airmen, members of crew of RB-47 reconnaissance airplane of US Air Force, F. Olmstead and D. McKone.
In considering this question Soviet Government took account above all of statements by President of US J. Kennedy during period of election campaign, which testify to fact that he did not and does not approve of reconnaissance flights of American military aircraft over (V predely) Soviet Union. We proceed from fact that new US Government, which is now led by Mr. Kennedy, will act in practice in spirit of these statements. With this there would be removed a serious obstacle to improvement of Soviet-American relations.
Soviet Government also took into account wishes for freeing of two airmen of RB-47 aircraft expressed lately to Soviet Ambassador in Washington by prominent figures of Democratic Party from closest circles of Mr. J. Kennedy who indicated that such a step of Soviet Government would be regarded by American side as a gesture of good-will and a step toward improvement of Soviet-American relations. Same opinion was expressed by US Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Thompson.
Soviet Government hopes that this act of good-will will be correctly interpreted and appraised in corresponding fashion by US Government and that in future, actions of the kind leading to sharpening of relations between our countries, which have formerly taken place, will not be permitted.
Soviet Government expects that US Government for its part will also devote efforts to improvement of Soviet-American relations, and hopes that release of American airmen will serve cause of strengthening trust between our countries.
We should like to put an end to past and open a new page in relations between our countries. With these objectives Soviet Government is prepared to go further and not to insist on discussion at second part of 15th Session of UN General Assembly on question "concerning aggressive actions of USA." The Soviet Government proceeds from view that, given correct understanding of this step by US Government, favorable conditions for improvement of Soviet-American relations will result. Let bad past not interfere with our joint work in name of good future.
Soviet Government would like to hope that US Government for its part will also do everything in order not to burden agenda of forthcoming second part of 15th Session of General Assembly with discussion of questions which will inevitably drag us to times of "cold war."
It is possible that there will still be found those desirous of going on path of further mutual reproaches in relations between USSR and USA. But we do not consider that this would be a correct and reasonable path. According to our deep conviction there are every grounds for normalizing international situation and clearing away by common efforts all rubbish and all residue (Nanosnogo) which has accumulated during years of "cold war" in Soviet-American relations.
Soviet Government hopes that its effort to find common language and mutual understanding with US Government will meet with positive response from American side and personally from President Kennedy.
Improvement of relations between our countries will doubtless meet with warm approval by peoples both of Soviet Union and US, and also by all other peoples, since cause of strengthening universal peace and international security in much depends on how relations between USSR and USA develop.
End text.
Thompson
Return to 1961-1963, Volume V index
Return
to the U.S. Department of State Home Page
This is an official U.S. Government source for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links does not imply endorsement of contents.
