INSTITUTE OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

Jos Potters Peter Sudhölter

Working-Paper No. 246

October 1995

Abstract

A class of single valued solution rules for airport problems is considered. The common properties of these solution rules are Pareto optimality, reasonableness and a weak form of consistency. These solutions are automatically members of the core for the associated airport game. Every weighted Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the modified nucleolus turn out to belong to this class of solution rules. As a side result we prove that, for airport games, the modified nucleolus and the prenucleolus of the dual game coincide. The t-value, however, does not to belong to this class of solution rules. Furthermore, we investigate monotonicity properties of the solution rules and axiomatize the Shapley value, nucleolus, and modified nucleolus on the class of airport games.

Keywords: Airport problem, airport game, weighted Shapley value, nucleolus, modified nucleolus