INSTITUTE OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudhölter

Working-Paper No. 292

February 1998

Abstract

The positive prekernel, a solution of cooperative transferable utility games, is introduced. It is shown that this solution inherits many properties of the prekernel and of the core, which both are subsolutions. We prove that the positive prekernel on the set of games with players belonging to a universe of at least three possible members can be axiomatized by nonemptiness, anonymity, reasonableness, the weak reduced game property, the converse reduced game property, and a weak version of unanimity for two-person games. Additionally, we show that anonymity and reasonableness can be replaced by covariance and the strong nullplayer property, if at least four potential players are present.

Keywords: TU-game, core, kernel

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