Chapter XV: Conclusion

In 1912 Maj. (later Brig. Gen.) Nathaniel F. McClure, a future instructor in military art at the Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, listed terrain, theater of war, and the enemy as issues that planners should consider in developing military organizations. These ideas had particular application to divisions and separate combined arms brigades, and over the last eighty-odd years have been expressed in various ways. Yet other factors have also had significant impact on military organizations. The rapid evolution of military technology is perhaps the most obvious. Others include the manner in which the nation has raised its military manpower-a combination of active, reserve, and expansion components; the aptitude of that manpower to harness the new technology; and the political and economic constraints that create the environmental parameters within which military structures must operate. This study has attempted to show the influence of these broad and interrelated factors on the changing organization of the Army's large, combined arms tactical units.

Prior to the twentieth century the Army did not use one specific command level at which to organize infantry, artillery, and cavalry units into combined arms teams. Brigades and divisions often comprised a single arm, while the army corps was the combined arms unit, with its size varying greatly according to the mission and the forces available. Reflecting the Army of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, little specialization existed within the Army's corps, divisions, and brigades beyond the traditional combat arms. Field units for signal, medical, transportation, military police, ordnance, and other supporting branches simply did not exist. Often civilians were hired to undertake those duties, soldiers were detailed from the combat regiments to perform them, or entire regiments were reorganized for new missions, such as infantry units' service as engineers during the Civil War.

From the turn of the century until American intervention in World War I, the Army defended the nation and its modest insular possessions with what was basically a constabulary force. To some limited extent the Army tested the infantry division as a basic combined arms unit in field exercises or maneuvers. The cavalry division, although not totally neglected, remained more or less a theoretical organization. In 1916 and 1917, when the Army pursued bandits along the Mexican border, a provisional division was organized. Heavy in cavalry and light in infantry, it was tailored to meet an elusive, mobile enemy.

Mobilization for the crisis on the border and observation of trends in foreign armies during the initial campaigns of World War I caused national leaders to become increasingly concerned about the need to create permanent tactical divisions. Congress approved their organization in 1916, but the Army entered World War I before any such units had been organized, and the ensuing mobilization and battlefield experiences witnessed constant changes in both their theoretical (i.e., authorized) and their actual composition.

The Army created the square infantry division during World War I in response to the German use of entrenched positions that blocked flanking movements. The division was designed to punch through the enemy's position using overwhelming manpower and tremendous firepower. Strong in staying power, the division lacked the mobility and flexibility to conduct highly mobile operations. But the nature of the war also put a premium on coordination between the combat arms and combat support organizations within the infantry division. Not infantry and not artillery but coordination of all the branches held the key to success. Infantry could not move forward without engineers and artillery; artillery could not provide adequate fire support without a constant supply of ammunition; quartermaster troops supplied food and clothing; signalmen served as the link between the arms and support units; and medical personnel cared for casualties of all types. This complex combined arms interaction, or synergy, became both necessary and possible because of advances in weapons, communications, and transportation.

World War I posed problems that military planners would face for the remainder of the century. They had to balance military requirements against those of the home front, which provided the materiel for war. Mobilization for total war theoretically demanded the maximum amount of the nation's best manpower for its military forces, but without the civilian manpower to provide the logistical

base for that force, it would soon collapse of its own weight. A related question concerned the size and readiness of the peacetime active and reserve forces, which influenced the preparation for a swift industrial and manpower mobilization without bankrupting the nation. Military planners in the United States also had to confront the problem in the twentieth century of how best to deploy their military forces abroad in the face of limited means, because the number of ships available for what was termed "strategic mobility" would always constrain the speed with which the Army could bring its major combat organizations to bear on far-away battlefields.

Although memories of the Army's helter-skelter mobilization during World War I cast a long shadow over the interwar period, 1919-39, isolationist sentiment caused a certain malaise in organizational development. Nevertheless, Army leaders recognized that infantry and cavalry divisions, rather than regiments or smaller units, had become the pillars that supported a future mobilization. Officers examined the structure of various types of divisions, and the Army adopted in the post-World War I era a modified but powerful square infantry division designed for a straightforward frontal attack, and a smaller cavalry division for reconnaissance. Although the lessons of World War I influenced the structure of these divisions, the traditional nineteenth century criterion of distance or road space still dominated their design.

Once permanent divisions were established, any reorganization of them was controversial. Because no foreign threat or opponent could be identified, divisions were initially designed to fight on the North American continent, and their organizations stressed firepower over mobility. And once that organizational structure became embedded in both the Regular Army and the reserve components, it became exceedingly difficult to alter it in any substantial way. Although many Army leaders viewed the situation with increasing misgivings, major changes ultimately depended on changes in the political climate of the nation. Before any major reorganization of its divisions could be effected, the Army needed more specific guidance from its political leaders regarding future missions and the availability of commensurate resources.

From the fall of 1937 to the summer of 1943 the Army slowly fashioned the divisional designs it used to fight World War II. Not only revised infantry and cavalry divisions, but also armored, motorized divisions and airborne divisions appeared. The concept of having three regimental combat teams within the infantry and airborne divisions also solidified. Other trends included steady increases in firepower-with mobility or maneuvering capability, always trying to catch up-and the increasing standardization of division base elements. In the entire process, the horse cavalry and motorized divisions died, while the armored division, designed initially as a two-element organization, was often committed on the battlefield as small task forces.

German foot-soldiers or tanks, Philippine or Viet Cong guerrillas, or an army equipped with chemical and nuclear weapons. Such problems inevitably brought soldiers from the theoretical realm of the schoolhouse into conflict with those living in the reality of the army in the field. Doctrine, which dictated how units should be organized, fell within the domain of the service schools, while employment of the units rested with field commanders. To both, such seemingly esoteric matters as the best span of control, the number of command echelons, the composition of the staff, the balance between infantry and artillery, the location of the reconnaissance element, the role of engineers, and the organization of the supply system were recurring subjects of exploration and argument in designing divisions and separate brigades. No final determination emerged as to whether the schools or the field commands should perform organizational studies, but one aspect of the Army's experience became clear. The Army could not solve all its organizational issues in a single study. The questions were-and still are-too enormous and complex for one group of planners to address. The reorganization study of 1936, PENTANA 1955, and MOMAR 1959 all failed because the issues they addressed were too broad and varied. After the Army came to terms with its divisional echelon, as in the triangular, ROAD flexible response, and Army of Excellence studies, the remainder of the force somehow fell into place.

Ultimately nothing influenced Army planners in their search for the right combined arms units more than the desire to ensure mobility and maneuverability on the battlefield. The disappearance of operational flexibility on the Western Front in World War I convinced many officers that the resulting stalemate had caused unacceptable losses in men and equipment for both the victors and the vanquished. The square division was adopted for the peacetime Army because Army leaders relied upon their World War I experience and believed that the unit could be adapted to maneuver and mobility.

The evolution of technology eventually brought about more mobile and flexible forces, which included various types of infantry divisions (airborne, airmobile, light, and motorized), the replacement of obsolete horse cavalry divisions with armored and mechanized units, and the introduction of separate combined arms brigades. Infantry divisions dominated World War 11, due primarily to the influence of such leaders as Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall and Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, the chief of Army Ground Forces, who believed that it was vital to standardize, at least for the moment, the size and structure of the field army to assist in both manpower and materiel mobilization planning. However, in the postwar era the regular "foot" or "leg" infantry division was slowly replaced by various types of armored, mechanized, airborne, and airmobile organizations developed to serve special needs. Tanks stopped tanks; airborne troops intimidated and threw the enemy's rear area into disarray; and helicopters inserted and extracted units with precision on the battlefield. Given the specialization of division and brigade forces, planners had to decide how many of each type the Army needed and how many it could afford. Since each specialized unit

created different requirements for equipment and training, advocates of such organizations were pitted against those who favored more universal formations that performed a variety of missions. As always, permanent solutions proved elusive, and planners continued to balance the number and type of divisions and separate brigades required to meet threats, both real and perceived. By the 1990s the trend was toward two types of divisions and brigades, light and heavy, but within those two types were variations that allowed the Army to build tailored forces for specific missions with armored, infantry, mechanized infantry, light infantry, airborne, and air assault units.

New weapons often presented problems for planners of divisions and brigades. First, they had to decide the level at which a weapon belonged-army, corps, division, or brigade and where it fit within the chosen organization. Examples of this dilemma were the tank and machine gun in World War I, the tank destroyer in World War II, the Honest John rocket in the atomic field army and pentomic divisions, and the TOW in the Army of Excellence. This recurring problem also manifested itself in the conflict between centralization and decentralization of resources. When introduced into a division, new weapons were often put under centralized control, usually in a battalion or company-size unit, and attached to the user only when needed. Since such practices violated the principle of command and control, eventually new weapons were reassigned to the primary user. Certain divisional items, however, were better used under centralized control. Aircraft, for example, which used a common airfield and required sophisticated maintenance, still require centralized organization.

As weapons evolved, dispersion within and between units on the battlefield became more necessary, especially as more lethal weapons, including those with nuclear warheads, became available. The problem within the division was how to separate divisional elements physically yet maintain effective command and control over them. Improved communication systems and the use of airplanes and helicopters aided such dispersion, but the need for the division to operate in a widely dispersed nuclear environment fortunately has never arisen.

Perhaps it is endemic to a democracy that in peacetime its army suffers from neglect. The economic and financial wherewithal for personnel, equipment, training, research, and development are often available only when a threat to the nation's security is readily apparent. The Army's divisions, separate brigades, and other units in peacetime were seldom fully manned and trained and at times were only paper organizations. This neglect manifested the American people's ingrained disdain for standing armies, which dated from the beginning of the nation. After World War Il, although begrudgingly, the nation improved the Army's sustaining base, which lessened the time required for mobilization. Nevertheless, during the forty years of the Cold War many units, particularly those in the reserve components, were only marginally ready for combat.

demobilization, or force reduction. Following each period the Army struggled to rebuild and maintain a mobilization force of standing and reserve forces before the next crisis struck. On each occasion military planners designed a mobilization force requiring more divisions and brigades than the nation needed or was willing to support. Also, political pressure, particularly from the reserve components, often influenced the size of that force more than defense requirements. The result was what many called a "hollow army," with some units deteriorating into paper organizations, some serving as training units, and others lacking so much of their personnel and equipment that they had little ability to conduct either combat or training.

Following major conflicts the poor manning and equipping levels that characterized most Army units resulted partly from a lack of resources and partly from unreasonable expectations. Obviously, funding limited the number of soldiers, both officers and enlisted personnel, in the Regular Army and the reserve components. In the Organized Reserves, between 1921 and 1948 no system was even available to recruit untrained enlisted personnel; Congress simply expected that reserve enlisted personnel would be unpaid volunteers with prior service. Few former enlisted personnel, however, volunteered to serve in the Organized Reserve, and reserve officers came into the Army through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). Although Congress funded officers and enlisted men in both reserve components after World War Il, interest in serving as reservists lagged. Between the end of World War 11 and the early 1970s, when conscription was eliminated, the draft served as a stimulus for serving in the reserves. With the elimination of the draft, recruitment in the reserves suffered further, and their division and separate brigade forces underwent an almost continuous series of realignments.

Time and again after the disappearance of any immediate threat Congress or the administration cut the Army's funding drastically. At times money was available only to provide skeletal units in the Regular Army. These units manned garrisons, supported limited reserve training, and provided the overhead to operate the Army. Few men were available for combat units or for occupation forces overseas. Scattered throughout the nation on small posts or serving overseas, the Army often had neither the money nor the opportunity for combined arms training. Under the "come as you are, fight as you are" philosophy adopted in the 1970s, only the Regular Army divisions in Europe were maintained at full strength. Regular Army divisions in the United States were rounded out by reserve units, and the division in Korea relied upon KATUSA, or Korean Army personnel.

During periods of scant resources for the defense establishment, the largest share of the military budget went to the other services. Both the Navy and the Air Force required sophisticated, expensive equipment whose construction also provided civilian jobs and valuable investments in advanced technology. The Army, in contrast, is the most labor-intensive of the services. To gain support from the executive and legislative branches, its leaders used divisional models to justify

funding requests for the research, development, and production of new equipment and weapons. Looking at the division as a weapons system rather than merely as a personnel organization has in fact proved useful in conceptualizing what the Army needs and what it does for both Congress and the general public.

The end of the Cold War has prompted another examination of divisions and brigades as the Army adapts to new threats and new national missions. Whatever direction the changes may take, divisions and brigades will be organized for a particular mission, against a particular enemy, at a particular time, and in a particular place. The search for better combined arms units will continue unabated as new lessons and experiences are weighed, and the search to integrate new technology into existing organizational concepts will likewise present an ongoing challenge in the immediate future.