Chapter XIV: A New Assessment

The lightning war between the Arabs and Israelis in 1973, when the Egyptian and Syrian armies lost more tanks than the United States had in Europe at the time, caused the Army to rethink its doctrine and the structure of its divisions and brigades. An examination of the seventeen-day conflict led to new ideas about how to prepare for war and how to fight. Known as the "Active Defense," the new doctrine stressed defense as the principal mode of combat. Other factors embedded in the new approach were the speed with which decisive actions would take place and an awareness of the increased lethality of modern weapons on the battlefield. Both considerations put added pressure on the Army to improve the combat capabilities of forward-deployed active forces and the speed with which effective reserve components units could be delivered to overseas battlegrounds.2

Since the Army was on the threshold of adopting new equipment and weapons that increased mobility, firepower, and maneuver, the Army's schools, commands, and agencies examined such issues as military intelligence organizations; signal and aviation requirements; and chemical, biological, and nuclear defense, seeking better ways to maximize the new technology and not just providing "tag alongs" in existing organizations. Fire support teams for artillery;

bifunctional staffs (the unit commander serving as a chief of staff with two deputies, one for operations and military intelligence and the other for personnel and logistics); rearmament, refueling, and maintenance in the forward area of the battlefield; and consolidation of administration at the battalion level also came under scrutiny.3

In March 1975 Chief of Staff General Fred C. Weyand suggested to Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans Lt. Gen. Donald H. Cowles that the structure of divisions should be reexamined. Weyand was concerned that new technology had resulted in only "add ons" to divisions, increasing their weight and complexity and decreasing their overall flexibility. Cowles turned to General William E. DePuy, commander of the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), established in 1973 specifically to address training and doctrine issues, for his views. DePuy assembled a group of officers from his command and the Army's schools and centers to conduct a division restructuring analysis focused on finding the optimum antiarmor capability for divisions. Among the areas considered were the employment of the new armored vehicles coming into service and the problems associated with exploiting new artillery and target acquisition systems whose range had been greatly increased. 4

The major product of the Division Restructuring Study (DRS) was the "heavy division" (Chart 44), an organization designed to replace both mechanized infantry and armored divisions. Headed by Col. (later General) John Foss, from the Training and Doctrine Command, the planning group believed that the principles underlying the new organization could be applied to all divisions.

The heavy division included three brigades, each consisting of a permanent combat team of two mechanized infantry and three tank battalions. Infantry battalions consisted of one combat support, one TOW, and three small rifle companies; tank battalions, similar in structure to the mechanized infantry units, fielded three tank companies and maintenance, TOW, and combat support companies. A tank company had three tank platoons with each platoon having only three tanks. The precise location of the TOW antitank missile launchers posed the old problem of centralized versus decentralized control for the planners, much as had the introduction of other new weapons and equipment, such as the machine gun, tank, antitank gun, airplane, and helicopter. For now they remained under control of the battalion.5

With smaller divisional infantry and armor battalions, planners envisioned integrating the combat arms at the battalion rather than at the company level. Under the ROAD concept a company team had been the principal combat formation. For example, a mechanized infantry company was normally reinforced with engineers, forward artillery observers, and possibly tanks, antitank weapons, and helicopters. But the company commander who integrated these forces had no staff and probably lacked the experience to achieve the most effective use of all these resources. A change of focus therefore appeared necessary.7

Combat support within the new division also underwent radical changes. A combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) battalion was organized from military intelligence and Army Security Agency resources. Consisting of an electronic warfare company and a ground surveillance company, along with a headquarters and operations company, the battalion greatly expanded the division's intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. As noted, the reconnaissance squadron's aviation troop was moved to a new divisional aviation battalion, which consolidated the attack helicopter company and the division's command and control aviation resources in one unit. All mess resources were grouped at battalion level, and a personnel service company merged finance and personnel services into one company, which was included in the support command. That command also fielded a supply and transport battalion, a maintenance battalion, and a support operations center. A chemical company provided the division with smoke generating resources and the ability to assist in defense against biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons. In the past no chemical unit had existed in a division, and all units had been expected to defend against those weapons as a primary responsibility. Finally, the study moved the divisional medical battalion and the bridge company from the engineer battalion to the corps level.8

A field test of the new structure at Fort Hood by a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division in 1979 produced mixed results. Lt. Gen. Marvin D. Fuller, the III Corps commander, who oversaw the test, found the division overmanned and overequipped in many areas, giving commanders resources to cover every possible deficiency or contingency. He thought the additional costs in personnel and equipment would price the division out of reach. He also found that radios had

During the evaluation of the division restructuring concept, the Army Staff approved selective improvements in existing divisions based on lessons learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. A target acquisition battery was placed in the division artillery to identify targets up to 50 kilometers in front of the forward edge of the battle area. Chemical companies were added to divisions to provide nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance and decontamination support. Because of the need to acquire and evaluate information about the enemy, divisional military intelligence battalions of the CEWI type were organized beginning in 1979. In the armored and mechanized infantry divisions, aviation resources were again pooled to form aviation battalions. The airborne division was assigned three antitank TOW companies, one for each brigade, while the infantry division in Korea was assigned only a company. When the aerial field artillery battalion was inactivated in the air assault division, antitank resources were concentrated in an aviation battalion.10

Along with upgrading existing divisions, the Department of Defense directed the Army to increase its mechanized forces. In September 1979 the 24th Infantry Division converted from infantry to mechanized infantry, and the following year elements were assigned to the previously unmanned 149th Armored Brigade in the Kentucky Army National Guard, raising the number of brigades in the total force to twenty-five. By 1980 the Texas Guard had eliminated its unfilled 36th Airborne Brigade, using its personnel to organize a corps-level combat engineer battalion. Planners also considered reorganizing all infantry divisions, except the airborne and the airmobile forces, as mechanized units.11

Before the 1st Cavalry Division completed its evaluation of the heavy division in 1979, the new commander of the Training and Doctrine Command, General Donn A. Starry, began to develop another divisional concept that built upon the Division Restructuring Study. From his experience as the V Corps commander in Europe, Starry believed that Foss' Division Restructuring Study group had worked too quickly. Units had conducted tests without proper training, and the opposing forces lacked adequate knowledge of Soviet tactics. Therefore, he judged that the test results could not be totally ascribed to deficiencies in tactics, leadership, or organization. 12

and ground, would come together over a wide area to produce a decisive action. He believed that analysis of those elements in the battle area, including the range of weapons and their rates of fire, the size of the opposing forces, the terrain over which they would advance, and the speed of that advance, would permit development of more effective operational concepts. In addition, he thought consideration had to be given to "force generation," the task of concentrating the combat power of the division for the central battle. These ideas evolved into the "AirLand Battle" doctrine, which was published in 1982 in the revised Field Manual, 100-5, Operations. 13

Analysis of combat within the framework of the AirLand Battle concept led to the development of "Division-86," so named because 1986 was as far out as General Meyer and his advisers could project the threat. Because of the importance of Europe to national security, Division-86, like the Division Restructuring Study, emphasized a standardized heavy division, which combined both armored and mechanized infantry divisions, and focused on maximizing the new equipment entering the inventory. In October 1979, four months after General Edward C. Meyer became Chief of Staff, Starry presented his Division-86 proposal, which Meyer approved in principle on the 18th of that month. His final decision about fielding such a division depended upon studies to be conducted for light divisions (infantry, airborne, and airmobile), corps, and echelons above the corps level.14

Division-86, as presented to General Meyer, retained the flexible ROAD structure. The new heavy division consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company; three brigade headquarters; a military police company; signal, air defense artillery, engineer, and military intelligence battalions; a reconnaissance squadron; division artillery; an air cavalry attack brigade; a division support command; and a number of maneuver elements to be determined, possibly four or five mechanized infantry battalions and five or six armor battalions. The division would total approximately 20,000 officers and enlisted men (Chart 45).15

logistical requirements, the study called for a radical reorganization of the division support command, primarily to address the forward area of the battlefield. The command included a materiel management center, adjutant general and finance companies, a supply and transport battalion, a maintenance battalion, and three support battalions, one for each divisional brigade. Support battalions, which were to "arm, fuel, fix, and feed forward," included headquarters and headquarters, supply, maintenance, and medical companies. A small medical battalion supported the rest of the division. Planners had difficulty deciding whether to place a chemical company at corps, division, or division support command level, but gave it to the supply and transport battalion in the support command.16

Evidence of fundamental change existed within the combat arms. Each tank battalion consisted of a headquarters element and four tank companies, and each tank company fielded three platoons of four tanks each. Mechanized infantry battalions contained a headquarters element along with one TOW and four rifle companies, with the riflemen to be mounted on new Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. To counter the Soviet Union's high density of artillery and improved weapons, the Division-86 study, like its predecessor, significantly increased the division artillery. It fielded three battalions of 155-mm. self-propelled howitzers organized into three batteries, each having eight pieces; one battalion of sixteen 8-inch howitzers and nine multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) mounted on vehicles; and a target acquisition battalion. 17

The reconnaissance squadron called for three troops, each having two platoons equipped with cavalry fighting vehicles similar to the Bradley fighting vehicle-and a platoon of motorcycles. A new organization, an air cavalry attack brigade (later designated as an aviation brigade), which resulted from the pioneer work of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 6th Cavalry Brigade at Fort Hood and others, appeared in the division to provide helicopters for an antitank role. Two attack battalions, each consisting of four companies with six helicopters each, and a combat support aviation battalion, which provided resources for command aviation, aircraft maintenance, and the military intelligence battalion, made up the brigade. The brigade fielded 134 aircraft.18

The Training and Doctrine Command published tables of organization and equipment for this second try at the heavy division concept on 1 October 1982 (Chart 46). One set of tables covered both the mechanized infantry division and the armored division, but with five variations. Five or six armor and four or five mechanized infantry battalions were to be assigned to an armored division, and a mechanized infantry division was to have five armor and five mechanized infantry battalions. Variations in the tables also covered different equipment, M60 tanks and M 113 armored personnel carriers or the new M 1 Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. Given the variations, the strength of heavy divisions ranged between 19,000 and 20,500 officers and enlisted men.20

The published tables differed somewhat from the proposed heavy division that Meyer had approved three years earlier. Cavalry fighting vehicles replaced tanks in the reconnaissance squadron, and the squadron, consisting of two ground and two air troops, had no motorcycles. Rather than being a divisional unit, it was a part of the aviation brigade. The finance unit moved to the corps level, and the reorganized military intelligence battalion fielded electronic warfare, surveillance, and service companies. In the support command, the medical battalion reappeared, but the chemical company was returned to divisional level, and the target acquisition element was reduced to a battery.21

The Army faced complex problems in fielding Division-86. Over forty major weapons or new pieces of equipment needed to be procured, and some were still in developmental stages. Doctrinal literature and training programs required revision, and budgetary limitations had to be considered. The solution approved by the Army Staff, as in the past, was to adopt the heavy division concept but with interim organizations using obsolete equipment until new weapons and equipment were available. Delivery of many new items was expected to begin in 1983. Therefore, organizational and equipment modernization was to begin in January of that year. The number of maneuver elements for a heavy armored division was set at six armor and four mechanized infantry battalions, while that for a heavy mechanized infantry division was placed at five armor and five mechanized infantry battalions.22

ernizing the forces in Germany, the 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, was inactivated in Europe in 1984 along with other units throughout the Army. Shortly thereafter the modernization plan went awry. Because of various problems involved in funding and procuring equipment, the Army leadership slipped the completion date for modernizing heavy divisions to the mid-1990s.23

Early in the planning process for modernizing divisional forces, Meyer also decided to adopt a new regimental system. It was to address one aspect of the "hollow Army" (the problem of having sufficient personnel and equipment to support and sustain the forward-deployed Army), unit cohesion.24 Patterned after the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS), the new United States Army Regimental System assigned each armor, air defense artillery, cavalry, field artillery, and infantry regiment -later aviation regiments and special forces 25 were added-a home base from which regimental elements would rotate between continental and overseas assignments. A soldier could affiliate with a regiment and expect to serve in it for most of his or her career. By necessity the new system broke traditional regimental associations with divisions since fewer regiments could be accommodated in the system because of the linking of elements between overseas and continental stations. Meyer believed that the benefits of unit cohesion outweighed the loss of divisional affiliation. He tied implementation of the new regimental system to modernization of the force. By 1985 implementation of the regimental system was separated from force modernization because of production delays, and unit rotation was abandoned because of personnel turbulence and its adverse effect on readiness. Nevertheless, designating regiments as part of the system continued, paced by the number of flags that the US. Army Support Activity, Philadelphia, could manufacture each month. The flags were needed when the battalion designations were changed.26

In 1979, when Meyer had approved the heavy division, he also had directed Starry to standardize infantry, airborne, and airmobile divisions-now called "light divisions." Meyer, who opposed the total heavy force envisioned by Department of Defense planners, wanted the Training and Doctrine Command to focus on the infantry division; airborne and airmobile divisions were to be considered later. He particularly wanted to know if the infantry division could be designed to move and fight in contingency areas, such as the Asiatic rim, and still have sufficient resources to delay and fight Soviet forces in Central Europe. This question posed the dilemma that had plagued the airborne division community since World War 11-how to give a unit strategic mobility and still have it possess the firepower and the resources to sustain itself in combat. Meyer thought the answer to the problem lay in the use of new technology, which included advanced radar, intelligence, and satellite resources; containerized food and equipment; lightweight, high power communications; new lightweight vehicles; highly accu-

An effective structure for the "non-heavy" infantry division, however, proved elusive. Initially Starry set restrictions on the division. Its size was not to exceed 14,000 soldiers, it was to be without organic tank or mechanized infantry units, and it was to be deployable in Air Force C-141 aircraft. After four tries and a relaxation of the strength requirement, Starry recommended a division of 17,773 officers and enlisted men, which Meyer approved for further development and testing on 18 September 1980.28

As planners developed various ideas for a light division, the Army Staff selected the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, to serve as a "test bed," or a field laboratory, for equipment, organization, and operations. One objective was to shorten the equipment developmental cycle typically from five to seven years-which had frustrated Meyer and others. Although Meyer obviously wanted the division to experiment with new equipment, difficulties in funding hobbled the effort from the start. Some of these problems were overcome through the direct intervention of the Army Staff, but others were never surmounted. In 1982 Meyer thus changed the emphasis of the 9th Division's mission from testing highly technical equipment to developing innovative organizational and operational concepts. The result was the design of a motorized division of 13,000 men and capable of being airlifted anywhere in the world. Before the 9th Infantry Division completed its new assignment, however, the Army set off in a new direction for the light division.29

By 1983 planners had reassessed the nature and direction of world events and the types of conflicts that could be expected. As Meyer saw a need for a balance between heavy and light divisions, so did his replacement, Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham. The successful operations of the British in the Falkland Islands, the Israelis in Lebanon, and the United States in Grenada all drove home the point that credible forces did not have to be heavy forces. To have light divisions within the Army's limited resources, Wickham ordered the replacement of the 16,000-man standard infantry division with a new light infantry unit of about 10,000 men and the adaptation of light concepts to airborne and airmobile divisions. He also wanted the design applied to the motorized division under development at Fort Lewis. Furthermore, Wickham desired light divisions to have an improved "tooth-to-tail" (i.e., combat strength to logistics) ratio and to be deployable three times faster than existing infantry divisions. With these changes he anticipated that the corps would be strengthened and made the focus of the AirLand Battle doctrine.30

Under Wickham's guidance the Army specified that corps were to plan and conduct major operations, while divisions were to concentrate on the tactical battlefield. The revised Field Manual 100-5, Operations, of 1986 defined the corps as the Army's largest tactical unit. Tailored for a particular theater and mission, the corps was to contain all combat, combat support, and combat service support required for sustained operations. In addition to various types of divisions, the corps was to have available an armored cavalry regiment; field artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, signal, aviation, and military intelligence brigades; and a military police group. Infantry and armored brigades and psychological operations, special operations forces, and civil affairs units could be attached as needed. When organized for a particular theater and mission, the corps was thus to be a relatively fixed organization with area as well as combat responsibilities. The newly defined corps was really a throwback to the beginning of the century when Field Service Regulations described a prototype corps.31

Wickham's guidance resulted in the development of units for the "Army of Excellence." 32 Within that rubric, the tables of organization and equipment called for a 10,220-man light infantry division, which comprised a headquarters and headquarters company; a military police company; signal, air defense artillery, and engineer battalions; three brigade headquarters; nine infantry battalions; division artillery; an aviation brigade; a support command; and a band. Shortly thereafter a military intelligence battalion was added and additional personnel autho-

The light division greatly improved the ratio of combat troops to support personnel. Infantry battalions fielded three rifle companies and a headquarters company, a total of 559 officers and enlisted men. The battalion headquarters company included a "footmobile" reconnaissance platoon (no vehicles in it), an antiarmor platoon (four TOW launchers), and a heavy mortar platoon (four 4.2-inch mortars). The only vehicles in the battalions were the new "high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles" (HMMWVs, or "Hummers") and motorcycles. Brigades provided mess and maintenance for battalions. The division artillery consisted of three towed 105-mm. howitzer battalions, three batteries with six howitzers each and one battery of 155-mm. howitzers fielding eight pieces. A command aviation company, an attack helicopter battalion, and the reconnaissance squadron comprised the aviation brigade. The air defense artillery battalion fielded 20-mm. multibarrel, electrically driven Vulcan guns and the Stinger missiles fired from a shoulder position, and the engineer battalion had no bridging equipment. Support elements followed the functional ideas of ROAD, with the division having a maintenance battalion, a supply and transport battalion, a medical battalion, and a transportation aircraft maintenance company, along with the command headquarters and materiel management center. Support troops totaled about 1,300 men.34

The light division met several needs of the Army. It cost less and was simpler to maintain and support than the heavy infantry division. It was well suited for rear area operations if provided with air and ground transport and could easily adapt to urban operations, heavily forested or rugged areas, and adverse weather conditions-all circumstances found in Western Europe. Easily deployed, the division enhanced the Army's strategic response options. The division's weaknesses included lack of organic ground and air transport and an inability to face heavy forces in open terrain because it lacked armor. Also, the division was vulnerable to heavy artillery, nuclear, and chemical attacks and had only minimal

Plans to introduce light divisions sent reverberations throughout all Regular Army divisions since there was to be no increase in strength. Wickham directed reductions in the size of heavy divisions to about 17,000 officers and enlisted men, with armored divisions maintaining six armor and four mechanized battalions while mechanized divisions continued to field five armor and five mechanized infantry battalions. Cuts were therefore made in the combat support and service support elements. As noted, the motorized division was limited to 13,000 men. He ordered the reorganization of the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord and of the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks as light divisions without round-out brigades and the activation of the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York, and of the 6th Infantry Division at Fort Richardson, Alaska. The 10th was to have a Guard round-out brigade, and the 6th was to draw its round-out units from both the National Guard and the Army Reserve.36

With the plans to reorganize two standard infantry divisions as untested light divisions, the Defense Department decided to add another mechanized infantry division to the National Guard force. In August 1984 the Guard's 35th Infantry Division, organized from three existing brigades, returned to the active rolls under the new tables as a mechanized division. Five states-Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and Nebraska-contributed units to the division, including a mechanized infantry brigade each from Kansas and Nebraska and an armored brigade from the Kentucky National Guard. The headquarters of the new mechanized infantry division was at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. To preclude the command and control problems that some multistate divisions experienced after their reorganizations in 1967 and 1968, the five states supporting the division agreed that a division council (the adjutant generals from the five states) was to select the division commander and key personnel, who would serve a maximum of three years.37

The 7th Infantry Division began to transition to light division structure in 1984, and it was followed by the conversion of the 25th Infantry Division and the activation of the 10th Mountain and 6th Infantry Divisions. Because Fort Drum lacked facilities to house even a small division, one Regular Army brigade of the 10th was stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, for three years. A new brigade, the 27th Infantry Brigade from the New York Army National Guard, completed the 10th. The 172d Infantry Brigade in Alaska was inactivated, and its personnel provided the nucleus for the 6th Infantry Division. To retain an airborne capability in Alaska, one company in each of the initial three infantry battalions assigned to the 6th remained airborne qualified. Eventually all airborne assets were concentrated in one divisional battalion. Although the chief of Army Reserve agreed to have the 205th Infantry Brigade round out the 6th Infantry Division, the Regular Army still lacked all the resources to complete the division. Therefore, additional round-out units from the Alaska Army National Guard and the Army Reserve were assigned. The 6th Division, howev-

In addition to the Regular Army divisions, the Department of Defense authorized the National Guard to organize one light division, raising the total number of such divisions to five. The 29th Infantry Division returned to the active force in the Maryland and Virginia Army National Guard as a light division in 1985. Resources from the 58th and 116th Infantry Brigades provided the nucleus for the new division, which was headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. With the activation of light infantry divisions, the number of divisions in the force rose to 28 (18 Regular Army and 10 National Guard) and the number of brigades fell to 23 (16 in the National Guard, 4 in the Regular Army, and 3 in the Army Reserve).39

As part of the Army of Excellence program, Wickham's directive included cutting and standardizing airborne, airmobile, and motorized divisions. As a result, the Training and Doctrine Command published tables for a smaller airborne division, with its strength plummeting from over 16,000 officers and enlisted men to approximately 13,000 (Chart 48). The new division was built on the light division base with three brigade headquarters and nine infantry battalions as its major components. However, it was stripped of both its armor battalion and its separate TOW equipped infantry companies. Each infantry battalion consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, three rifle companies, and an antitank company fielding five platoons, each equipped with four TOWs. The one divisional addition, an aviation brigade, contained the reconnaissance squadron, an attack helicopter battalion, and two combat aviation companies. The target acquisition battery was eliminated from the division artillery, and its three 105-mm. howitzer battalions were organized similarly to those in the light division. No 155-mm. howitzers were assigned.40

The greatest personnel economy in the airborne division took place in the support command. It embodied a headquarters and headquarters company; a materiel management center; medical, supply and transport, and maintenance battalions; and an aviation maintenance company, a total of about 1,750 soldiers rather than 2,500. Military police and chemical companies and signal, military intelligence, air defense artillery, and engineer battalions completed the airborne division. As in the light infantry division, it had to be reinforced from corps level when engaged in sustained operations. The 82d Airborne Division began adopting the new structure during fiscal year 1986 and completed it the following year when the quartermaster airdrop equipment company, which had been a nondivisional unit at Fort Bragg since 1952, was added to the supply and transport battalion, almost doubling its size.41

Along with the airborne division, the Training and Doctrine Command standardized the air assault division, which was decreased by about 25 percent (Chart 49). It also was similar to its old organization, but with a light division base. The division consisted of three brigades, nine airmobile infantry battalions, division artillery, a support command, and divisional troops. The one exception was the

In 1986 Forces Command began to phase the new structure into the 101st Airborne Division; by 1990, however, the Training and Doctrine Command changed the aviation brigade. The reconnaissance squadron, which had been a divisional element, moved to the brigade, which fielded one command, one medium, two assault, three attack battalions, along with the reconnaissance unit. A fourth attack battalion was planned for the brigade, but not active.43

The one type of division that failed to win a place in the Army of Excellence was the motorized infantry division (also referred to as the middleweight rather than light division). Motorized experiments conducted by the 9th Infantry Division had produced unsatisfactory results because of funding problems created by going outside normal combat development channels. The kinetic energy assault gun, the division's primary weapons system, and the fast attack vehicle never got beyond the experimental stage. In 1988 a reduction in the size of the Army forced the inactivation of the 9th Division's 2d Brigade. To maintain the integrity of the division, the 81st Infantry Brigade, from the Washington Army National Guard, was assigned as a round-out unit. Also, Forces Command transferred the 1st Battalion, 33d Armor, a Regular Army unit, from I Corps to the division. Its new maneuver element mix, including round-out units, consisted of two light attack infantry, two mechanized infantry, three armor, and four combined arms (motorized) battalions. The latter included two rifle companies and an assault gun company equipped with TOWS mounted on HMMWVs.44

With the reorganization of the Army into heavy and light divisions, only the 2d Infantry Division in Korea and the 26th, 28th, 38th, 42d, and 47th Infantry Divisions in the Army National Guard remained organized under the dated standard infantry division's tables of organization and equipment. Wickham exempted the 2d Infantry Division from conversion to either the heavy or light configuration because of its mission in Korea, the absence of a corps organization there, and Korean augmentation assigned to it. Working with the Training and Doctrine Command, Eighth Army devised a unique structure for the 2d that increased its firepower, especially the artillery and the antiarmor capabilities, and provided a mix of light and heavy maneuver battalions. The division was planned to field

The reorganization of the National Guard divisions under the Army of Excellence concepts, except for the 29th Infantry Division, which returned to the active force in 1985 as a light division, proved to be a challenging endeavor. In 1985 the 49th and 50th Armored Divisions and 35th and 40th Infantry Divisions were reorganized as heavy divisions with the same maneuver element mix as the Regular Army divisions. Because of recruiting problems the areas that supported the Guard divisions were expanded, usually to adjacent states. One exception to the expansion was the 50th Armored Division, which was headquartered in New Jersey but had the allotment of one of its brigades moved to the Texas Army National Guard in 1988. Thus the future of the division in the force was uncertain.46

The Guard's five infantry divisions carried on under modified versions of the "H" series tables of organization and equipment, which were nearly twenty years old. Strengths for those divisions ranged from 14,000 to 17,000. With uncertainty about the need for more light divisions, the need for state troops, which the local authorities were unwilling to lose, and the lack of funds, which did not materialize, the reorganization of the units was held in abeyance. The National Guard divisions were, however, truly a part of the "Total Army." Because of concerns over sensitive equipment in the military intelligence battalion, the Army Reserve provided that unit for each Guard division except the 29th Infantry Division, which organized with its guardsmen.47

As the Army modernized its heavy divisions, it continued to revise their structure. In 1986 the 8-inch howitzers were transferred from the heavy division to corps level, but the multiple-launch rockets, organized as separate batteries, remained a part of the division artillery. The same year the division's support command was reorganized. Three forward support battalions (one for each brigade), a main support battalion, and an aviation maintenance company replaced the divisional medical, support and transport, and maintenance battalions in the support command. The functions and services provided by the displaced units were performed by mixed area support battalions. The divisional adjutant general company was inactivated, and its functions moved to the corps level where they were reorganized as a personnel service company, and the divisional materiel management center was absorbed by the headquarters company in the support command. The reorganization of the support command saved over 400 personnel spaces. In the National Guard heavy divisions, the air defense artillery battalions were eliminated because spare parts for antiquated M42 Dusters were not available. On mobilization the corps was to provide antiaircraft resources for these divisions.48

equipment for heavy divisions, they included variations for the types of equipment and the number of maneuver elements that the brigades fielded. Each brigade, authorized approximately 4,100 soldiers, included a headquarters and headquarters company, engineer and military intelligence companies, a cavalry reconnaissance troop, a field artillery battalion (three batteries of six self-propelled 155-mm. howitzers each), a support battalion, and a combination of armor and mechanized infantry battalions.49

The reorganization of reserve brigade forces, both separate and round-out units, also became an ongoing process. For the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), the 1st Cavalry Division, and 5th and 24th Infantry Divisions the maneuver element mix of their National Guard round-out brigades was increased from three to four battalions, two armor and two mechanized infantry. The light round-out brigades for the 6th Infantry and 10th Mountain Divisions continued to field three maneuver battalions. The 27th Infantry Brigade, rounding out the 10th Mountain Division, however, did not have all of its brigade base units. Five other heavy brigades in the National Guard were also organized under Army of Excellence tables, while the eight National Guard and the two Army Reserve infantry brigades, like the National Guard infantry divisions, employed a mishmash of old and new structures. Although eight Guard infantry brigades were not modernized, each had the same number of assigned maneuver elements, except for the 92d Infantry Brigade in Puerto Rico, which had four rather than three infantry battalions. The 157th Infantry Brigade, the only mechanized infantry brigade in the Army Reserve, fielded only three maneuver elements as did the 187th Infantry Brigade.50

The Regular Army brigades continued to lack uniformity. In 1984 Forces Command reorganized the 194th Armored and 197th Infantry Brigades under the heavy brigade configuration. The 193d Infantry Brigade, the special mission brigade in Panama, was reorganized as a light unit consisting of two infantry battalions (one being airborne qualified), a field artillery battery, and a support battalion. The 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry, from the Army Reserve was identified as a round-out unit for the brigade. An additional table of organization brigade was added to the Regular Army in 1983 when United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army organized the Berlin Brigade under a standard separate infantry brigade table, which provided resources for improved command and control of its assigned units. It had three infantry battalions, a field artillery battery (eight 155-mm. self-propelled howitzers), a tank company, and a newly activated support battalion.51

The cellular organization adopted in 1978 for the twelve training divisions and two training brigades (a new brigade, the 4024, had been organized in 1985 for field artillery training) in the Army Reserve created problems, particularly in accounting for the personnel assigned to the units. Some positions were authorized within divisional tables of organization and equipment cells and others were provided for as a part of the United States Army Reserve centers to which the divisions and brigades were assigned. Between the two documentation sources,

Forces Command found it difficult to tell which parts of the reserve centers were dedicated to support the training units. The command eventually recommended a solution, which the Army Staff approved on 11 December 1986. The training divisions and brigades were to be reduced to zero strength to keep the units active and then backfilled using tables of distribution and allowance. The change allowed Forces Command to identify specific billets for each division, brigade, and reserve center for its specific mission. The lineage, honors, and history of the divisions and brigades continued to be represented in the reserve forces. Units began adopting the system in September 1988 and completed the process September 1990.52

With its light and heavy divisions and brigades, the Army of Excellence reorganization was expensive, and ultimately the high cost forced the Army to move in a new direction during the late 1980s. All elements of the military establishment, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, competed for modernization monies, which helped drive the national debt to unacceptable levels. In 1988, as a part of its share in reducing defense costs, the Army inactivated one brigade from the 9th Infantry Division, as already noted, and replaced it with the 81st Infantry Brigade from the Washington Army National Guard. The following year the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, was inactivated, creating a gap that was closed by the 116th Cavalry Brigade from the Idaho, Oregon, and Nevada National Guard. The Guard's 116th and 163d Armored Cavalry regiments had been reorganized by 1989 as armored brigades because no requirement existed for those regiments in the force. By the end of fiscal year 1989 the Army had twenty-eight divisions and twenty-five brigades (Tables 37 and 38) in the active Army and reserve components combined.53

During the summer of 1989 the Warsaw Pact began to disintegrate. Economic and social issues fired the changes, and nations in Eastern Europe wrenched control of their affairs from the Soviet Union. By the end of the year most Soviet client states were set on a path of self-determination. Given this change, the rationale for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the basis for having United States forces forward deployed in Europe, and much of the Army doctrine for fighting the AirLand Battle came under close scrutiny.

Before any reassessment of the defense establishment in light of these events was completed, in December 1989 the Army was called upon to deploy the 7th Infantry Division and the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, to Panama as a part of Operation JUST CAUSE, an effort to restore democracy to that Latin American republic. Several months later American divisions and brigades participated in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, a multinational endeavor to halt Iraqi aggression in Southwest Asia and to restore the independence of Kuwait (Table 39 lists the divisions and brigades that deployed to Southwest Asia).

Division	Component	Location of Headquarters	Maneuver Battalion							Round-out Unit
Division	Component	Location of Headquarters	Inf	Mech	Ar	Abn	AAST	LI	CAB	Round-out Unit
1st Armored	RA	Ansbach, Germany		4	6
1st Cavalry	RA	Fort Hood, Tex.		2	3					155th Armored Brigade
1st Infantry	RA	Fort Riley, Kans.		4	6					2d Bn, 136th Infantry
2d Armored	RA	Fort Hood, Tex.		4	5					2d Bn, 252d Armor
2d Infantry	RA	Korea		2	2	31
3d Armored	RA	Frankfurt, Germany		4	6
3d Infantry	RA	Wuerzburg, Germany		5	5
4th Infantry	RA	Fort Carson, Colo.		4	5					2d Bn, 120th Infantry
5th Infantry	RA	Fort Polk, La.		3	3					256th Infantry Brigade
6th Infantry	RA	Fort Richardson, Alaska	3							205th Infantry Brigade
7th Infantry	RA	Fort Ord, Calif						9
8th Infantry	RA	Bad Kreuznach, Germany		5	5
9th Infantry	RA	Fort Lewis, Wash.			1			2	4	81st Infantry Brigade
10th Mountain	RA	Fort Drum, N.Y.						6		27th Infantry Brigade
24th Infantry	RA	Fort Stewart, Ga.		3	3					48th Infantry Brigade
25th Infantry	RA	Schofield Barracks, Hawaii					9
26th Infantry	NG	Buzzards Bay, Mass.	8		2
28th Infantry	NG	Harrisburg, Pa.	8	1	1
29th Infantry	NG	Fort Belvoir, Va.						9

Division	Component	Location of Headquarters	Maneuver Battalion	Round-out Unit
Inf	Mech	Ar	Abn	AAST	LI	CAB
35th Infantry	NG	Fort Leavenworth, Kans.		5	5
38th Infantry	NG	Indianapolis, Ind.	8	1	1
40th Infantry	NG	Los Alamitos, Calif		5	5
42d Infantry	NG	New York, N.Y.	6	1	3
47th Infantry	NG	St. Paul, Minn.	8	1	1
49th Armored	NG	Austin, Tex.		4	6
50th Armored	NG	Somerset, N.Y.		4	6
82d Airborne	RA	Fort Bragg, N.C.				9
101st Airborne	RA	Fort Campbell, Ky.					9

Brigade	Component	Location of Headquarters	Maneuver Battalion
Brigade	Component	Location of Headquarters	Inf	Mech	Ar	Abn	Lt Inf
27th Infantry	NG	Syracuse, N.Y.					3
29th Infantry	NG	Honolulu, Hawaii	3¹
30th Armored	NG	Jackson, Tenn.		1	2
30th Infantry	NG	Clinton, S.C.		2	1
31st Armored	NG	Northport, Ala		1	2
32d Infantry	NG	Milwaukee, Wisc.		2	1
33d Infantry	NG	Chicago, Ill.	3
39th Infantry	NG	Little Rock Ark.	3
41st Infantry	NG	Portland, Oreg.	3
45th Infantry	NG	Edmond, Okla.	3
48th Infantry	NG	Macon, Ga.		2	2
53d Infantry	NG	Tampa, Fla.	3
73d Infantry	NG	Columbus, Ohio	3
81stInfantry	NG	Seattle, Wash.		2	2
92d Infantry	NG	San Juan, Puerto Rico	4
116th Cavalry²	NG	Boise, Idaho		1	2
155th Armored	NG	Tupelo, Miss.		2	2
157th Infantry	AR	Horsham, Pa.		2	1
163d Armored	NG	Bozeman, Mont.		1	2
187th Infantry	AR	Fort Devens, Mass.	3
193d Infantry	RA	Fort Clayton, Canal Zone				1	2³
194th Armored	RA	Fort Knox, Ky.		1	2
197th Infantry	RA	Fort Benning, Ga.		2	1
205th Infantry	AR	Fort Snelling, Minn.	3
218th Infantry	NG	Newberry, S.C.		2	1
256th Infantry	NG	Lafayette, La.		2	2
Berlin	RA	Berlin, Germany	3

Unit	Home Station
1st Armored Division (less1st Brigade)	Germany
1st Cavalry Division (less 256th Infantry Brigade)	Fort Hood, Texas
1st Infantry Division (less 1st Infantry Division Forward)	Fort Riley, Kansas
1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division	Fort Hood, Texas
3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division	Germany
3d Armored Division	Germany
3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division	Germany
24th Infantry Division (less 48th Infantry Brigade)	Fort Stewart, Georgia
82d Airborne Division	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
101st Airborne Division	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
197th Infantry Brigade	Fort Benning, Georgia

The nation and the Army reached a watershed in 1990 with the disintegration of Soviet Union and the deployment of forces to Southwest Asia. Since the end of the conflict in Vietnam, national leaders had focused on the countering of the Soviet menace, and the Army's Division Restructuring Study, the Airland Battle doctrine, and the Army of Excellence heavy divisions, first and foremost, had addressed that threat. Although the need for other types of divisions and separate brigades was recognized, limited resources bridled full implementation of the Army of Excellence design. Aggression by the small Iraqi nation introduced a series of new questions about the size, type, and location of division and separate brigade forces needed. The answers to these questions are left to the future, but an ever-changing world and ongoing revolution in weapons and information technology will continue to challenge the designers of the Army force structure in years ahead.