Chapter XIII: The Total Army

The Nixon doctrine and smaller budgets drove Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird to set an Army goal of 21 divisions, 13 in the Regular Army and 8 in the National Guard, by 1973. Structured and equipped primarily to defend Western Europe, the divisions were designed for conventional warfare against the Soviet Union's heavy armor forces. To complement the divisions, the Army maintained 21 separate combined arms brigades, 18 in the Army National Guard and 3 in the Army Reserve. In addition, the Regular Army continued to employ special mission brigades as theater defense forces.2

In their final form the new AIM tables neither altered the overall ROAD doctrine nor radically modified divisional structures but addressed ways to counter various types of Soviet threats. To defend against low-altitude hostile aircraft and surface targets, the tables provided each division with an air defense artillery battalion equipped with Chaparral missiles and Vulcan guns, weapons that had been under development since 1964. The new battalion gave divisions the first dedicated antiaircraft artillery unit since pentomic reorganization. Aviation companies reappeared in mechanized infantry and armored divisions to enhance air support. In the divisional support command, adjutant general and finance companies replaced the administration company to improve personnel services, and automatic data processing equipment was added to provide centralized control of personnel and logistics. Eventually automatic data processing led to the introduction of a materiel (supply and maintenance) management center in each division.4

In infantry, mechanized infantry, and armor battalions, the tables concentrated combat support (scouts, mortars, air defense and antitank weapons, ground surveillance equipment, and maintenance resources) into a combat support company. Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided missiles (TOWS) replaced ENTACs and 106-mm. recoilless rifles as antitank weapons in the infantry and mechanized infantry battalions. Since the TOW was only just emerging from its developmental stage, the tables approved the retention of the 106-mm. recoilless rifle as a temporary measures.5

Modernization of armored, infantry, and mechanized infantry divisions became an ongoing process primarily to due to shortages of equipment. Because of the need for antiaircraft weapons in the divisional area, the Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Bliss, Texas, inaugurated a program in the spring of 1969 to activate and train Chaparral-Vulcan battalions, which were assigned to divisions upon completion of training. After the new divisional tables were published in

The standard maneuver element mix of the mechanized infantry division was also adjusted for the European battlefield. An additional armor battalion was added to the model division, making the mix five armor and six mechanized infantry battalions. Subsequently the Army activated additional armor battalions for the 3d and 8th Infantry Divisions stationed in Germany in 1972. That same year the Continental Army Command replaced a mechanized infantry battalion with an armor battalion in the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, and in 1973 made a similar change, giving the division a maneuver element mix of four armor and six infantry battalions. In the armored division the maneuver mix remained at five mechanized infantry and six armor battalions. Infantry divisions fielded one armor, one mechanized infantry, and eight "foot" infantry battalions.7

To have thirteen Regular Army divisions, the Army Staff directed the 25th Infantry Division, which fielded only one brigade after leaving Vietnam, to be reorganized at Schofield Barracks in the spring of 1972. Because of environmental issues surrounding the use of Schofield Barracks at that time, the division had only two brigades (six infantry battalions), with the Hawaii Army National Guard agreeing to "round out" the 25th with the 29th Infantry Brigade. Since the brigade included the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry, from the Army Reserve, the division was truly representative of the "Total Army."8

For the thirteenth Regular Army division in the force, the Continental Army Command reactivated the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis on 21 April 1972. Over the next few months the division organized one armor, one mechanized infantry, and seven infantry battalions, which was one less infantry unit than the standard for an infantry division. The division base had all its authorized elements except for the Honest John battalion, then under consideration for elimination in all divisions. Two years later the Army Staff directed the 9th to establish one brigade as an armored unit to support contingency plans, and when it became evident that the active Army was unable to field an additional tank battalion, the Washington Army National Guard agreed to furnish a tank battalion as a round-out unit.9

The Regular Army also maintained three other brigades with special missions in the early 1970s. The 172d and 193d Infantry Brigades served in Alaska and the Canal Zone, respectively, as theater defense units. At Fort Knox, Kentucky, the 194th Armored Brigade was a brigade in name only. It had been reduced to a headquarters, and its infantry, armor, and field artillery units had been assigned directly to the Armor School. The 194th, however, remained at Fort Knox as a command and control organization for various units ranging in size from a finance section to a supply and service battalion.11

In late 1972 the Army approved the reorganization of the 101st Airborne Division using new airmobile divisional tables. Since returning from Vietnam, the 101st had comprised two airmobile brigades and one airborne brigade, with the airborne brigade separately deployable. Defense planners had insisted that the division serve as a quick reaction force until the thirteen-division force was combat ready. The existing division employed a conglomeration of old, new, and test tables of organization and equipment, which created organizational problems in the division's combat and support units, particularly in signal resources and medium-range field artillery. After extensive study Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams approved the reorganization of the division under new tables, which continued to provide two airmobile brigades and one airborne brigade, with its supporting elements parachute qualified. Signal, engineer, maintenance, and aviation resources were increased; and an air defense artillery battalion, adjutant general and finance companies, and a materiel management center added. A 155-mm. howitzer battalion, which had been used in Vietnam by the division, was made an organic element in the tables, but in fielding the new structure, Abrams directed that the 155-mm. towed howitzer battalion be temporarily eliminated as a way to reduce personnel requirements.12

By early 1974 the thirteen-division Regular Army force was deemed combat ready, and contingency plans no longer required an airborne brigade in the 101st. United States Army Forces Command, which in part replaced the United States Continental Army Command in 1973, reorganized the division as a completely airmobile organization. The reorganization also eliminated internal rivalries between the higher paid paratroopers (soldiers on "jump status") and the regular airmobile soldiers. To compensate for its loss of airborne status in recruiting, Maj. Gen. Sidney B. Berry, the commander of the 101st, decided to capitalize on the division's air assault training, requesting that the division's parenthetical designation be changed from "airmobile" to "air assault" and that the personnel who completed air assault training be authorized to wear a special badge. The Army Staff approved the change in designation and eventually authorized the air assault badge.13

The airborne division was the last type of division to be modernized. As in other divisions, the new tables provided an air defense artillery battalion, adjutant general and finance companies, and a materiel management center. The structure also continued to include a much debated light armor battalion, equipped with reconnaissance airborne assault vehicles, which had been assigned to the division in 1969. The most significant change, however, was the replacement of the supply company with a supply and service battalion, which provided the division with over 500 additional service personnel. The one remaining active airborne division, the 82d, with nine airborne infantry battalions and an armor battalion, adopted the new structure by the fall of 1974.14

After returning from Vietnam the 1st Cavalry Division had been given two primary missions: evaluate the interaction of armor, mechanized infantry, airmobile infantry, and air cavalry (armed helicopters); and fill the role of an armored division in the strategic reserve force. To cover the second mission, the division continued to use National Guard round-out units, which had originally been designated for the 1st Armored Division-the unit that the 1st Cavalry Division replaced at Fort Hood in 1971. To evaluate the interaction of armor, air cavalry, and mechanized and airmobile infantry, the "First Team" was organized under new tables (Chart 42) that included resources for an air cavalry combat brigade (ACCB). This was not to be the type of brigade the Howze Board had suggested in 1962, which was to be a completely air-fighting unit, but one that troops in Vietnam and Europe had been testing under limited conditions as a combined arms assault unit. With the division combining armor, infantry, and air cavalry in one organization, Westmoreland coined the term "TRICAP" (triple capability) to describe it.15

During the evaluation of TRICAP two views emerged about the structure of an air cavalry combat brigade. Some planners saw it primarily as a separate antiarmor brigade with infantry and air cavalry integrated into attack helicopter squadrons without organic support. Others desired the brigade to be a strong, well-balanced, versatile organization with attack helicopter, infantry, reconnaissance, artillery, and combat support units that could perform a variety of missions, including an antitank role. During the summer of 1972 Vice Chief of Staff

By the end of 1972 the course of the TRICAP/ACCB studies appeared set. The Combat Developments Command recommended reorganizing the 1st Cavalry Division to consist of two armored brigades (with two mechanized infantry and four armor battalions divided between them) and one air cavalry combat brigade. The latter, to be employed as a part of the division or independently, was to consist of an airmobile infantry battalion and two attack helicopter squadrons. The brigade was to have no organic support battalion. Round-out battalions continued to be assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division so that it could deploy as a full armored division along with the air cavalry combat brigade. 17

Before the ink dried on the new instructions, Abrams decided to reorganize the air cavalry combat brigade as a separate unit for employment at corps level and to make the division exclusively an armored unit. With one organic brigade organized as air cavalry, the 1st Cavalry Division with only two mechanized infantry and four armor battalions lacked the necessary ground-gaining and holding ability of a normal armored division. On 21 February 1975 the Army thus organized the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat) at Fort Hood, Texas. The first of its type, the brigade consisted of a headquarters and headquarters troop, an air cavalry squadron (without the armored cavalry troop), two attack helicopter battalions, a support battalion, and a signal company. Strictly an air unit, the brigade's mission was to locate, disrupt, and destroy enemy armored and mechanized units by aerial combat power. In the summer of that year the 1st Cavalry Division was reorganized wholly as an armored division with four armor and four mechanized infantry battalions in the Regular Army. One mechanized infantry and two armor battalions in the National Guard continued to round out the division.18

Although the 21-division, 21-brigade force did not alter the number of reserve divisions and brigades, the reserve components underwent numerous changes after the Army withdrew from Vietnam. Like the Regular Army, the Guard began increasing its heavy forces in 1971 with the 32d (Wisconsin) and 81st (Washington) Infantry Brigades being converted to mechanized infantry. In 1972 the states began modernizing their divisions and brigades using the recently published tables, but they lacked the materiel to complete the process.

Shortly after the National Guard reorganized its divisions, a controversy arose over the command of the 30th Armored Division, a multistate unit supported by Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama. Tennessee was about to appoint a new divisional commander, and the governors of Mississippi and Alabama threatened to withdraw their units from the division unless their officers had the opportunity to be the divisional commander. Governor Winfield Dunn of Tennessee objected to rotation of the commander's position, and Secretary of the Army Robert F. Froehlke supported him. Abrams therefore directed Maj. Gen. Francis S. Greenlief, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to review such command arrangements in all Guard divisions.20

Before Greenlief could propose a solution, other events made the question moot. The Department of Defense directed the Army to convert six reserve brigades from infantry to armored or mechanized infantry as reinforcements for Europe. In the meantime, Mississippi Governor William L. Waller decided to withdraw his units from the 30th Armored Division. Given the requirement to convert some brigades, the Army Staff decided to have Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama each organize an armored brigade and to move the allotment of the armored division to Texas, which could support the necessary units itself. After much negotiating, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi agreed to organize the 30th, 31st, and 155th Armored Brigades, and Texas took on the 49th Armored Division in 1973. For the other three brigades, the Army replaced the 30th Infantry Division, another tri-state division, with the 30th (North Carolina), 48th (Georgia), and 218th (Louisiana) Infantry Brigades and reorganized the 40th Infantry Division in California. All were mechanized infantry. The reorganization did not change the total number of reserve divisions or brigades, and the National Guard continued to field 8 divisions (1 mechanized infantry, 2 armored, and 5 standard infantry) and 18 brigades (3 armored, 6 mechanized infantry, and 9 standard infantry), while the Army Reserve supported 3 brigades (I mechanized infantry and 2 infantry).21

By 30 June 1974, the Army had attained the 21-division, 21-brigade force (Tables 32 and 33). The 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, with two brigades, and the 197th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning were regarded as equivalent to one division in the Regular Army. Some Regular Army divisions in the continental United States, however, had round-out battalions from the reserves to meet mobilization missions. More serious was the fact that reserve divisions and brigades continued to experience readiness problems. Recruitment lagged because of the end of the draft, and equipment shortages continued due to the lack of money. The "total force" thus exhibited significant weaknesses.22

Division	Component	Location of Headquarters	Maneuver Battalions
Division	Component	Location of Headquarters	Inf	Mech	Ar	Abn	AAST
1st Armored	RA	Ansbach, Germany		5	6
1st Cavalry 1&3	RA	Fort Hood, Tex		2	4
1st Infantry2	RA	Fort Riley, Kans.		5	5
2d Armored3	RA	Fort Hood, Tex.		4	4
2d Infantry	RA	Camp Casey, Korea	4	2	2
3d Armored	RA	Frankfurt, Germany		5	6
3d Infantry	RA	Wuerzburg, Germany		6	5
4th Infantry	RA	Fort Carson, Colo.		6	4
8th Infantry	RA	Bad Kreuznach, Germany		6	5
9th Infantry	RA	Fort Lewis, Wash.	7	1	1
25th Infantry3	RA	Schofield Barracks, Hawaii	6
26th Infantry	NG	Boston, Mass.	8	1	1
28th Infantry	NG	Harrisburg, Pa.	8	1	1
38th Infantry	NG	Indianapolis, Ind.	8	1	1
40th Infantry	NG	California		6	4
42d Infantry	NG	New York, N.Y.	8	1	1
47th Infantry	NG	St. Paul, Mich.	8	1	1
49th Armored	NG	Austin, Tex.		5	6
50th Armored	NG	East Orange, N.J.			5	6
82d Airborne	RA	Fort Bragg, N.C.			1	9
101st Airborne	RA	Fort Campbell, Ky.					9

Brigade	Location of Component	Headquarters	Maneuver Battalions
Brigade	Location of Component	Headquarters	1nf	Mech	Ar	Lt Inf
29th Infantry	NG and AR	Honolulu, Hawaii		2
30th Armored	NG	Jackson, Tenn.		1	2
30th Infantry (M)1	NG	Clinton, N.C.		2	1
31st Armored	NG	Tuscaloosa, Ala.		2	1
32d Infantry (M)1	NG	Milwaukee, Wisc.		2	1
33d Infantry	NG	Chicago, Ill.	3
39th Infantry	NG	Little Rock, Ark.	3
41st Infantry	NG	Portland, Oreg.	3
45th Infantry	NG	Edmond, Okla.	3
48th Infantry (M)1	NG	Macon, Ga.		2	1
53d Infantry	NG	Tampa, Fla.	3
67th Infantry (M)1	NG	Lincoln, Neb.		2	1
69th Infantry	NG	Topeka, Kans.	3
81st Infantry (M)1	NG	Seattle, Wash.		2	1
92d Infantry	NG	San Juan, Puerto Rico	3
155th Armored	NG	Tupelo, Miss.		1	2
157th Infantry (M)1	AR	Horsham, Pa.		2	1
172d Infantry2	RA	Fort Richardson, Alaska				3
187th Infantry	AR	Wollaston, Mass.	3
193d Infantry2	RA	Fort Kobbe, Canal Zone	2	1
194th Armored	RA	Fort Knox, Ky.	No assigned battalions
197th Infantry3	RA	Fort Benning, Ga.	1	1	1
205th Infantry	AR	Fort Snelling, Minn.	3
218th Infantry (M)1	NG	Newberry, S.C.		2	1
256th Infantry	NG	Lafayette, La.	3

As the Army struggled to meet the 21-division, 21-brigade force, General Abrams turned his attention to the nation's ability to execute its military strategy without resorting to nuclear weapons and to the task of providing the resources needed to deal with a variety of world situations. In testimony before congressional committees in 1974, he characterized the Regular Army's portion of the 21-division force as a high-risk, "no room for error" force.23 He further testified that through more efficient management, cuts in nonessential support activities, and reorganization of various headquarters throughout the Army, a 785,000-man Regular Army could support sixteen divisions. Congress gave no opposition, and the Department of Defense lent its support. Therefore, Abrams directed his staff to plan for three additional Regular Army divisions by 1980.24

Although some officers on Abrams' staff were thunderstruck at the directive, since a 785,000-man force had not been sufficient in the past to maintain 16 Regular Army divisions, the Army Staff eventually developed plans involving both regulars and reserves to raise a 24-division force. A mechanized infantry division and two infantry divisions were to be phased into the force over the next few years. The first increment was to include activating three new divisional brigades, reorganizing the 1st Cavalry Division as an armored division (as decided earlier), and adjusting the number of maneuver elements in other divisions in the United States. Phase two was to provide the base and an additional brigade for each of the three new divisions. Phase three was vague, but the divisions were to be completed using reserve round-out units.25

During the summer of 1974 Forces Command began to implement the 24-division force. To provide some of the resources, various headquarters throughout the Army were reorganized, cuts were made in nonessential support activities, and the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions each saw one of their Regular Army maneuver battalions inactivated and replaced by a National Guard round-out unit. On 21 October the command activated the 7th Infantry Division headquarters and the 1st Brigades of the 5th, 7th, and 24th Infantry Divisions at Forts Polk, Ord, and Stewart, respectively. The 7th and 24th were standard, or "foot," infantry divisions, and the 5th was mechanized infantry. Because Fort Polk, in Louisiana, lacked adequate housing facilities, the brigade of the 5th fielded only two maneuver battalions. The larger facilities at Fort Ord, California, allowed the 7th to support four maneuver battalions, and the brigade of the 24th at Fort Stewart, Georgia, fielded three. As noted above, Forces Command organized the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat) as a separate corps-level aviation unit and reorganized the 1st Cavalry Division as an armored division consisting of four armor and four mechanized infantry battalions in the Regular Army and three round-out battalions from the National Guard.26

Division	Unit	Component
1st Cavalry	2d Battalion, 120th Infantry	N.C. NG
	2d Battalion, 252d Armor	N.C. NG
	1st Battalion, 263d Armor	S.C. NG
1st Infantry	2d Battalion, 136th Infantry	Minn. NG
2d Armored	3d Battalion, 149th Infantry	Ky. NG
	1st Battalion, 123d Armor	Ky. NG
	2d Battalion, 123d Armor	Ky. NG
4th Infantry	1st Battalion, 1 17th Infantry	Tenn. NG
5th Infantry	256th Infantry Brigade	La. NG
7th Infantry	41st Infantry Brigade	Wash. NG
	8th Battalion, 40th Armor	Army Reserve
9th Infantry	1st Battalion, 803d Armor	Wash. NG
24th Infantry	48th Infantry Brigade	Ga. NG
25th Infantry	29th Infantry Brigade	Hawaii NG and Army Reserve

Forces Command began activating phase two units in the fall of 1975, organizing all required Regular Army units within two years. While the Regular Army units were being activated, Louisiana, Washington, and Georgia agreed that the 256th, 41st, and 48th Infantry Brigades would be assigned to round out the 5th, 7th, and 24th Infantry Divisions, respectively. Because the 7th needed an armor battalion, the 8th Battalion, 40th Armor, an Army Reserve unit, was assigned to it. Hence, in order to raise the 24-division force, the round-out concept was extended to all divisions except those forward deployed in Germany and Korea and the airborne and airmobile units (Table 34). 28

Although Forces Command did not use the 194th Armored and 197th Infantry Brigades to organize the new divisions, both brigades were assigned strategic missions after 21 October 1975. Responding to General Abrams' congressional testimony to provide a better balance of combat to support units, the Army Staff converted 4,000 general support spaces to combat positions in the continental United States, and the command used some of them to reorganize the 194th as a strategic reserve unit. The brigade eventually included one mechanized infantry battalion and two tank battalions. In addition, it continued to support the Armor School at Fort Knox. 29

To execute the Nunn amendment US. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army agreed to a plan for organizing a mechanized infantry brigade and an armored brigade for Europe, which were known as Brigade-75 and Brigade-76. Under the plan the headquarters and a support battalion for each brigade were to be stationed in Germany while the infantry, armor, and field artillery battalions, engineer companies, and cavalry troops from the United States were to rotate every six months. No provisions were made for dependents to accompany the soldiers since they were to be away from home on temporary duty for only 179 days. The short duration of the assignment was to be a cost-saving measure, which indirectly also attacked the balance of payment problem between the United States and its allies, and a morale booster. To support the rotation of Brigade-75, the first unit in the program, the Army selected the 2d Armored Division, at Fort Hood, Texas. Between March and June 1975 the 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division, deployed to Germany, with its headquarters at Grafenwoehr and its elements scattered at various training areas. A few weeks before each unit departed Fort Hood, Forces Command activated a similar unit, including Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Brigade, 2d Armored Division, to maintain the three-brigade structure of the division in the continental United States. During the deployment the Army Staff approved a request from Forces Command to use a battalion from the 1st Cavalry Division, rather than have all elements from the 2d Armored Division, in order to reduce personnel turbulence in the 2d. Because of the shortage of tank crews, the Army changed Brigade-75 from an armored to a mechanized infantry unit. Another factor in the decision to deploy a mechanized brigade was the shortage of tanks resulting from U.S. replacement of tanks the Israelis had lost in their 1973 war against the Arabs. In September 1975 the first rotation of brigade elements between Germany and Fort Hood began.31

Forces Command selected the 4th Infantry Division to support Brigade-76 and in December 1975 activated the 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, at Fort Carson, Colorado. The following year the brigade moved to Germany. To lighten the burden of the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, a mechanized infantry battalion from the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley was included in the rotation scheme. Following the procedure used to send Brigade-75 to Europe, new organizations were activated in the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions to maintain their divisional integrity.32

Readiness became the watchword for the seventies. Although some Army leaders believed that the first battle of any future war might be the last and final ground battle, a high state of readiness served as a deterrent against aggression. Improving readiness in the Army's 24-division force thus became the primary objective of Army Chief of Staff Fred C. Weyand, who was appointed after Abrams died in office in September 1974. Weyand requested the National Guard Bureau to explore the consolidation of the 50th Armored and the 26th, 28th, 38th, 42d, and 47th Infantry Divisions into single or bi-state configurations and to consider the possibility of forming five more brigades. The latter were to be organized only with the secretary of defense's approval. In 1975 and 1976 the 50th Armored Division was reorganized in New Jersey and Vermont, the 28th Infantry Division in Pennsylvania, and the 42d Infantry Division in New York. Former elements of the 28th from Maryland and Virginia supported the new 58th and 116th Infantry Brigades, respectively. In 1977 Ohio dropped out of the 38th Infantry Division, leaving Indiana and Michigan to maintain it. Ohio organized the 73d Infantry Brigade. The only divisional element not concentrated within each division's new recruiting area was the air defense artillery battalions. With these changes, the Army reached the 24-division, 24-brigade force (Tables 35 and 36). Also, the 36th Airborne Brigade and 149th Armored Brigade headquarters were organized and federally recognized in the National Guard, but they were headquarters only, without assigned elements.34

Division	Component	Locationof Headquarters	Maneuver Battalions
Division	Component	Locationof Headquarters	Inf	Mech	Ar	Abn	AAst	Remarks
1st Armored	RA	Ansbach, Germany		5	6
1st Cavalry1	RA	Fort Hood, Tex.		4	5			See Table 34
1st Infantry2	RA	Fort Riley, Kans.		5	4			See Table 34
2d Armored3	RA	Fort Hood, Tex.		6	5			See Table 34
2d Infantry	RA	Camp Casey, Korea	4	2	2
3d Armored	RA	Frankfurt, Germany		5	6
3d Infantry	RA	Wuerzburg, Germany		6	5
4th Infantry4	RA	Fort Carson, Colo.		7	5			See Table 34
5th Infantry (-)	RA	Fort Polk, La.		3	3			See Table 34
7th Infantry (-)	RA	Fort Ord, Calif	6					See Table 34
8th Infantry	RA	Bad Kreuznach, Germany		6	5
9th Infantry (-)	RA	Fort Lewis, Wash.		7	1	l		See Table 34
24th Infantry (-)	RA	Fort Stewart, Ga.		4	2
25th Infantry (-)	RA	Schofield Barracks, Hawaii	6					See Table 34
26th Infantry	NG	Boston, Mass.	8	1	1
28th Infantry	NG	Harrisburg, Pa.	8	1	1
38th Infantry	NG	Indianapolis, Ind.	8	1	1
40th Infantry	NG	Long Beach, Calif.		6	5
42nd Infantry	NG	New York, N.Y.	8	1	1
47th Infantry	NG	St. Paul, Mich.	8	1	1
49th Armored	NG	Austin, Tex.		5	6
50th Armored	NG	Somerset, N.J.		5	6
82d Airborne	RA	Fort Bragg, N.C.			1	9
101st Airborne	RA	Fort Campbell, Ky.					9

Brigade	Component	Locationof Headquarters	Maneuver Battalions
Brigade	Component	Locationof Headquarters	Inf	Mech	Ar	Lt lnf	Remarks
29th Infantry (RO)	NG & AR	Honolulu, Hawaii	3
30th Armored	NG	Jackson, Tenn.	1	2
30th Infantry	NG	Clinton, S.C.	2	1
31st Armored	NG	Northport, Ala.	1	2
32d Infantry (M)	NG	Milwaukee, Wisc.	2	1
33d Infantry	NG	Chicago, Ill.	3
36th Airborne	NG	Houston, Tex.	No assigned battalions
39th Infantry	NG	Little Rock, Ark.	3
41st Infantry (RO)	NG	Portland, Oreg.	3
45th Infantry	NG	Edmond, Okla.	3
48th Infantry (M) (RO)	NG	Macon, Ga.		2	1
53d Infantry	NG	Tampa, Fla.	3
58th Infantry	NG	Pikesville, Md.	3
67th Infantry (M)	NG	Lincoln, Neb.		2	1
69th Infantry	NG	Topeka, Kans.		2	1
73d Infantry	NG	Columbus, Ohio	3
81st Infantry (M)	NG	Seattle, Wash.		2	1
92d Infantry	NG	San Juan, Puerto Rico	4
116th Infantry	NG	Staunton, Va.	3
149th Armored	NG	Bowling Green, Ky.	No assigned battalions
155th Armored	NG	Tupelo, Miss.	1	2
157th Infantry (M)	AR	Horsham, Pa.	2	1
172d Infantry	RA	Fort Richardson, Alaska	l	1	1		Special Mission
187th Infantry	AR	Fort Devens, Mass.	3
193d Infantry	RA	Fort Kobbe, Canal Zone		2	1		Special Mission
194th Armored	RA	Fort Knox, Ky.		1	2
197th Infantry	RA	Fort Benning, Ga.		2	1
205th Infantry	AR	Fort Snelling, Minn.				3
218th Infantry (M)	NG	Newberry, S.C.		2	1
256th Infantry (RO)	NG	Lafayette, La.		2	1

Despite these difficulties, Forces Command wished to improve the readiness of the Army Reserve brigades. At first it proposed reducing the number of units, particularly in the northeast, the First U.S. Army's area, and in February 1975 it inactivated a battalion in the 157th Infantry Brigade at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Then, early in 1976, Maj. Gen. Henry Mohr, Chief of the Army Reserve, submitted a brigade improvement plan that retained the units in their recruiting areas but eliminated other units from the areas to limit the competition for scarce personnel resources. As the Army Reserve staff developed the plan, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) Lt. Gen. Donald H. Cowles selected the 41st Infantry Brigade, the only brigade with a northern Arctic mission, as the round-out unit for the 7th Infantry Division. To replace the brigade in the contingency plans, Mohr agreed to reorganize the 205th Infantry Brigade as a light unit. The brigade assumed responsibility for the contingency mission on 4 July 1976.36

As the Army National Guard and Army Reserve shouldered a more active role in the Total Army's deterrence plans, the Army Staff developed a plan in the mid-1970s to upgrade the effectiveness of brigade- and battalion-size units. Known as the Affiliation Program, the initiative had three goals: improving readiness; establishing a formal relationship between regular and reserve units; and developing a system of priorities for manpower, equipment, training, funding, and administrative resources. Within the program five categories of combined arms brigades existed: round-out units, which gave Regular Army divisions their full organizational structure; augmentation units, which increased the combat potential of standard divisions; worldwide deployable units, which needed assistance to meet deployment schedules; special mission units, which served as theater defense forces; and units to support the Army school system. Thus, each brigade in the reserves was to have a mission and train for it in a "come-as-you-are for war" mode, which was a far cry from mobilization planning that had existed before and after World War II.37

In 1970 the Army had revised the tables of organization for the administrative training division so that it could function more effectively in reserve status. The division consisted of a division base, a headquarters and headquarters company, a leadership academy, and a support battalion; a committee group; and four brigades-two brigades for basic training, one for advanced individual training, and one for combat support training (Chart 43). Basic combat training brigades

Two years later, seeking again to improve readiness of the Army Reserve units, Forces Command inactivated some training division elements. Advanced individual training brigades in the 76th, 78th, 80th, 85th, and 91st Divisions and the combat support training brigades in the 89th and 100th Divisions were inactivated and the spaces used to organize "mini" maneuver area commands. The new commands planned, prepared, conducted, and controlled company and battalion exercises for the reserves.39

As in other reserve units, recruiting difficulties caused undermanning in some training units. In 1975 Forces Command inactivated the 89th Division. The personnel formerly assigned to it were used to strengthen other Army Reserve units and to organize the 5th Brigade (Training), an armor training unit with headquarters at Lincoln, Nebraska, that consisted of one squadron and two battalions. With the saving in personnel, a nondivisional Army Reserve combat unit, the 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry, was organized at Fort Carson, Colorado, to support the 193d Infantry Brigade in the Canal Zone.40

The Army Reserve's 5th Brigade (Training) and the training divisions were reorganized once again in late 1978. To save both time and money in training, the active Army had earlier adopted the One Station Unit Training (OSUT) program, under which recruits received both basic and advanced individual training at the professional home of their arm or service. The program proved successful, and Forces Command adopted it for the Army Reserve training divisions. In addition, the revised structure allowed divisions to be tailored for specific mobilization stations. To reflect these changes, the Department of the Army published new tables of organization, which retained as the division base a leadership academy and a support battalion but broke the brigades and battalions down into cells that fitted together to meet specific training requirements. Divisional training brigades no longer conducted basic combat or advanced individual training but carried out both, the same as in the Regular Army. The former divisional committee group and the committee group from the combat support brigade evolved into a training command.41

withdrawal from Vietnam, the Nixon administration had adopted an all-volunteer force and imposed cuts in money and personnel. To make up for these losses, Army leaders drew the Regular Army and reserve components closer together, first through the round-out and then though the affiliation programs. The Army could no longer enjoy the luxury of general-purpose forces. Every division and brigade was either forward deployed or assigned a specific mission within the current contingency and mobilization plans. The Regular Army's special mission combined arms brigades included the 193d Infantry Brigade in the Canal Zone and the 172d Infantry Brigade in Alaska. The 194th Armored and 197th Infantry Brigades served both as Strategic Army Force units and as support troops for the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, in the training base. Changes in the Total Army since the withdrawal from Vietnam stressed combat units at the expense of support units. The nation did not have the resources for both.