Chapter VIII: An Interlude of Peace

An Interlude of Peace

It seems certain that atomic, and other new weapons, which we may expect a major ruthless opponent to use in the foreseeable future, will not alter the nature of warfare to such an extent that the immediate ground combat need for versatile, mobile, and hard-hitting divisions will be diminished or altered.

General Jacob L. Devers 1

By the summer of 1946 the peacetime Army fielded sixteen active divisions, to be backed by an additional fifty-two in the reserve components. For the first time in its history the United States kept more than a token army in the aftermath of victory. This radical departure from tradition resulted from the international instability that characterized the postwar years and spawned the Cold War, an era of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. To counter the threat of Soviet expansion, successive administrations made extensive political and military commitments around the world that matured into a foreign policy known as "containment." Associated with containment were several collective defense treaties, most notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which required a significant degree of peacetime readiness on land and sea and in the air.

Shortly after establishing the postwar force, the Army leadership reorganized divisions based upon the lessons from World War II. Despite the Soviet military threat, various obstacles hindered the Army's effort to maintain readiness-the totality of the recent victory, an apathetic public, and an economy-minded Congress. One of the most critical, but widely ignored, issues facing the nation was the possible use of atomic weapons in future wars. That nuclear war did not receive extensive attention during the early postwar years was a consequence of the nation's short-lived monopoly of atomic weapons and the complexity of military decision making in a dangerous international environment.

In late 1945 the Army began to retool for new missions, which included occupying former enemy territories and establishing a General Reserve, while demobilizing the bulk of the World War II forces. The point system developed earlier, which served as an interim demobilization measure until the defeat of

41st Infantry Division departs the Philippine Islands, July 1945.

Japan, provided the basic methodology for execution but did not control the pace of the reduction. As after World War I, the Army failed to prepare a general demobilization plan. Demobilization thus proceeded rapidly, driven largely by public pressure and reduced resources, without the benefit of sound estimates about the size and location of the occupation forces that the Army would need or the length of time that they would have to serve overseas. The divisions that returned to the United States in 1945 and 1946 were generally administrative holding organizations without any combat capability. They were paper organizations "to bring the boys home.."2

Within a year after the end of the war in Europe, the number of divisions on active duty dropped from 89 to 16 (Table 17); of these, 12 were engaged in occupation duty: 3 in Germany, 1 in Austria, 1 in Italy, 1 in the Philippine Islands, 4 in Japan, and 2 in Korea. The remaining 4 were in the United States. By the end of January 1947 three more infantry divisions overseas were inactivated: the 42d in Austria; the 9th in Germany; and the 86th in the Philippine Islands. In addition, the 3d Infantry Division was withdrawn from Germany and sent to Camp (later Fort) Campbell, Kentucky, where it replaced the 5th Division. When demobilization ended in 1947, the number of active divisions stood at twelve.3

Status of Divisions, 1 June 1946

Division	Status	Remarks
1st Armored	Inactive	Inactivated 25 April 1946
1st Cavalry	Active	Japan
1st Infantry	Active	Germany
2d Armored	Active	Fort Hood, Texas
2d Infantry	Active	Fort Lewis, Washington
3d Armored	Inactive	Inactivated 10 November 1945
3d Infantry	Active	Germany
4th Armored	Active	Reorganized as Constabulary
4th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 12 March 1946
5th Armored	Inactive	Inactivated 11 October 1945
5th Infantry	Active	Camp Campbell, Kentucky
6th Armored	Inactive	Inactivated 18 September 1945
6th Infantry	Active	Korea
7th Armored	Inactive	Inactivated 9 October 1945
7th Infantry	Active	Korea
8th Armored	Inactive	Inactivated 13 November 1945
8th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 20 November 1945
9th Armored	Inactive	Inactivated 13 October 1945
9th Infantry	Active	Germany
10th Armored	Inactive	Inactivated 13 October 1945
10th Mountain	Inactive	Inactivated 30 November 1945
11th Airborne	Active	Japan
11th Armored	Disbanded	Disbanded 31 August 1945
12th Armored	Inactive	Inactivated 3 December 1945
13th Airborne	Inactive	Inactivated 25 February 1946
13th Armored	Inactive	Inactivated 15 November 1945
14th Armored	Inactive	Inactivated 16 September 1945
16th Armored	Inactive	Inactivated 15 October 1945
17th Airborne	Inactive	Inactivated 14 September 1945
20th Armored	Inactive	Inactivated 2 April 1946
24th Infantry	Active	Japan
25th Infantry	Active	Japan
26th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 29 December 1945
27th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 31 December 1945
28th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 13 December 1945
29th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 17 January 1946
30th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 25 November 1945
31st Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 21 December 1945
32d Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 28 February 1946
33d Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 5 February 1946
34th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 3 November 1945
35th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 7 December 1945
36th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 15 December 1945
37th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 18 December 1945
38th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 9 November 1945

TABLE 17-Continued

Division	Status	Remarks
40th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 7 April 1946
41st Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 31 December 1945
42d Infantry	Active	Austria
43d Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 1 November 1945
44th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 30 November 1945
45th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 7 December 1945
63d Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 27 September 1945
65th Infantry	Disbanded	Disbanded 31 August 1945
66th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 8 November 1945
69th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 18 September 1945
70th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 11 October 1945
71stlnfantry	Inactive	Inactivated 11 March 1946
75th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 14 November 1945
76th Infantry	Disbanded	Disbanded 31 August 1945
77th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 15 March 1946
78th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 22 May 1946
79th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 11 December 1945
80th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 4 January 1946
81st Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 20 January 1946
82d Airborne	Active	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
83d Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 27 March 1946
84th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 21 January 1946
85th Infantry	Disbanded	Disbanded 25 August 1945
86th Infantry	Active	Philippine Islands
87th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 21 September 1945
88th Infantry	Active	Italy
89th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 17 December 1945
90th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 27 December 1945
91st Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 1 December 1945
92d Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 15 October 1945
93d Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 3 February 1946
94th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 7 February 1946
95th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 15 October 1945
96th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 3 February 1946
97th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 31 March 1946
98th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 16 February 1946
99th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 27 September 1945
100th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 10 January 1946
10 1st Airborne	Inactive	Inactivated 30 November 1945
102d Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 12 March 1946
103d Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 20 September 1945
104th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 20 December 1945
106th Infantry	Inactive	Inactivated 2 October 1945
Americal	Inactive	Inactivated 12 December 1945

7th Infantry Division Band on the capital grounds of Seoul, Korea, 1945

Although the US. Army saw no action in Korea during World War II, the 6th, 7th, and 40th Infantry Divisions arrived there in September and October 1945 to occupy the southern portion of the country and assist in the demobilization of the Japanese Army. An agreement with the Soviet Union had divided the former Japanese colony at the 38th Parallel. The Korean contingent for a short time remained at three divisions but soon dropped to two, the 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions. Following establishment of an independent South Korean government in 1948, the Far East Command inactivated the 6th and moved the 7th to Japan, leaving only a military advisory group in Korea.5

Demobilization and the ensuing personnel turbulence played havoc with the active divisions. During a twelve-month period the 88th Infantry Division in Italy received 29,500 officers and enlisted men and shipped out 18,500. The 1st Cavalry Division in Japan operated at one-fourth of its authorized strength during

the first year on occupation duty, and most replacements were teenaged recruits. Divisions in the United States fared no better. The 3d Infantry Division was authorized approximately 65 percent of its wartime strength but fell well below that figure. Demobilization, far from being orderly, became what General George C. Marshall described as a "tidal wave" that completely disrupted the internal cohesion of the Army.6

As the nation demobilized, Congress approved, with the consent of the Philippine government, the maintenance of 50,000 Philippine Scouts (PS) as occupation forces for Japan. On 6 April 1946 Maj. Gen. Louis E. Hibbs, who had commanded the 63d Infantry Division during the war, reorganized the Philippine Division, which had surrendered on Bataan in 1942, as the 12th Infantry Division (PS). Unlike its predecessor, the 12th's enlisted personnel were exclusively Philippine Scouts.7

The War Department proposed to organize a second Philippine Scout division, the 14th, but never did so. After a short period President Harry S. Truman decided to disband all Philippine Scout units, determining that they were not needed for duty in Japan. The United States could not afford them, and he felt the Republic of the Philippines, a sovereign nation, should not furnish mercenaries for the United States. Therefore, the Far East Command inactivated the 12th Infantry Division (PS) in 1947 and eventually inactivated or disbanded all Philippine Scout units.8

Besides the requirement for occupation forces, an urgent need existed for some combat-ready divisions in the United States, where none had been maintained since February 1945. The War Department scaled back its earlier estimate for "strategic" forces and decided to maintain one airborne, one armored, and three infantry divisions, all at 80 percent strength. Initially the department designated the force as the Strategic Striking Force but soon renamed it the General Reserve, to reflect its mission more adequately. But the General Reserve quickly felt the effects of demobilization, and it was soon reduced to four divisions the 82d Airborne, the 2d Armored, and the 2d and 3d Infantry Divisions.9

Departing from its post World War I policy, the War Department kept divisional units in the United States concentrated on large posts to foster training and unit cohesion. However, shortages in personnel, obsolete equipment, and insufficient maintenance and training funds prevented the divisions from being combat effective. By the winter of 1947-48 the General Reserve consisted of the airborne division at Fort Bragg at near war strength, two half-strength infantry divisions, one at Fort Campbell and the other at Fort Lewis, and the armored division at Fort Hood with fewer than 2,500 men.10

As many divisions were eliminated from the active rolls, various divisional commanders jockeyed to have their units retained in the active force. By what some thought was chicanery, the 3d Infantry and 82d Airborne Divisions had replaced the 5th Infantry and the 101st Airborne Divisions on the active rolls. These changes caused considerable resentment within the ranks, and unit desig-

nations became a contentious issue with many active duty personnel as well as veterans. Thus, the adjutant general solicited recommendations from the commanders of Army Ground Forces and the overseas theaters for divisional numbers to be represented in the Regular Army. In the ensuing study, the adjutant general recommended the numbers 1 through 10 and 24 and 25 for infantry divisions (the 10th Mountain Division to be redesignated as the 10th Infantry Division); the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 for armored divisions (when elements of the 4th Armored Division serving in the Constabulary were inactivated, they were to revert to divisional units); and 82 and 101 for airborne divisions. The recommendations also included the priority for the retention of divisions on the active rolls.11

No change in the number of divisions on active duty resulted from the study; it simply provided the nomenclature for the Regular Army's divisional forces. Eventually the 1st Cavalry Division, the 10th Mountain Division, and the Constabulary units conformed to these decisions. Also, the 101st Airborne Division and the 10th and 25th Infantry Divisions (Army of the United States units) and the 82d Airborne Division (an Organized Reserve organization) were allotted to the Regular Army. 13

With the nation victorious in war and alone armed with the most awesome weapon known to man, the atomic bomb, a lasting peace appeared at hand. Some military planners believed, however, that the need for ground combat units remained unchanged. Planning for a postwar conventional force had begun in 1943, and over the next three years those plans, which included reserves, were debated in Congress and by the War Department and state officials. 14

When Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh, president of the National Guard Association, learned the staff was studying a postwar reserve structure, he pressed for consideration of reserve officers' views, petitioning Congress to ensure that the War Department establish reserve affairs committees in agreement with the provisions of the National Defense Act. In August 1944 Deputy Chief of Staff McNarney appointed a six-member committee of Regular Army and National Guard officers to prepare policies and regulations for the Guard. Then, in October, he authorized a

similar committee for the Organized Reserves. He also arranged for joint meetings of the two groups where they discussed matters common to both.15

On 13 October 1945 the War Department published a postwar policy statement for the entire Army. It called for a ground military establishment consisting of the Regular Army, the National Guard of the United States, and the Organized Reserve Corps, 16 which were to form a balanced force for peace and war. The Regular Army was to retain only those units required for peacetime missions, which were the same as those identified after World War I. The dual-mission Guard was to furnish units needed immediately for war and to provide the states with military resources to protect life and property and to preserve peace, order, and the public safety. The Organized Reserve Corps was to supplement the Regular Army and National Guard contributions sufficiently to meet any projected mobilization requirements. 17

After the policy statement was published, the Army Staff prepared a postwar National Guard troop basis, which included twenty-four divisions. It derived that number by counting the prewar eighteen National Guard infantry and four National Guard cavalry divisions, the Americal Division (which had been largely composed of Guard units), and the 42d Infantry Division. Most soldiers considered the 42d, initially organized with state troops in 1917, as a Guard unit. The fact that the new plan allowed each of the forty-eight states to have at least one general officer also helped earn its acceptance. In the end it was necessary to approve a 27-division structure with 25 infantry divisions and 2 armored divisions to accommodate the desires of all the states. During this process New York, for example, successfully petitioned the War Department for the 42d Infantry Division. When the allotment was completed, the Guard contained the 26th through 48th and the 51st and 52d Infantry Divisions and the 49th and 50th Armored Divisions. The number 39 was used for the first time since 1923. Although a 44th Infantry Division had existed during the interwar years, the postwar 44th in Illinois was a new unit, as were the 46th, 47th, 48th, 51st, and 52d Infantry Divisions and 49th Armored Division. The 50th Armored Division replaced the 44th Infantry Division in New Jersey. 18

While the states and the War Department settled troop basis issues, the National Guard Bureau changed the procedures for organizing the units. In the past states had raised companies, forming regimental headquarters only when sufficient companies existed to make a regiment. Under the new regulations, divisional and regimental headquarters were to be organized first, and they were to assist the division commander in raising the smaller units. 19

During the spring of 1946 the National Guard Bureau surfaced the complex problem of how to preserve historical continuity in the Guard units. In 1942 the divisions had been reorganized from square to triangular units, which left them only vaguely resembling the formations inducted into federal service in 1940 and 1941. Furthermore, the expanded troop basis of 1946 compounded the problem by adding units that had never before existed. To keep from losing the historical

link with the prewar units, some dating as far back as 1636, the bureau and the Historical Section, Army War College, reaffirmed an earlier policy validated between World Wars I and II. Units were to perpetuate organizations that had been raised in the same geographic areas, regardless of type or designation. For example, New Jersey, which had supported part of the 44th Division before the war, now supported the 50th Armored Division. Therefore most of its elements "inherited" the history of the organic units of the old 44th, and elements of the new 44th perpetuated the history and traditions of former units in Illinois.20

The command arrangement within the multistate divisions presented another quandary. The War Department did not rule on the question, but some states that shared a division developed and signed formal command arrangement documents. For example, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, states that contributed to the 48th and 51st Infantry Divisions, contracted to rotate command of the units every five years.21

After the state governors formally notified the National Guard Bureau that they accepted the new troop allotments (Table 18), the bureau authorized reorganization of the units with 100 percent of their officers and 80 percent of their enlisted personnel. The first division granted federal recognition after World War II was the 45th Infantry Division from Oklahoma on 5 September 1946. Within one year all Guard division headquarters had received federal recognition.22

On Veterans Day 1946, at Arlington National Cemetery, President Truman announced the return of the National Guard colors and flags of those units that had served during the war. In concurrent ceremonies in state capitals, forty-five governors received those colors and flags. The other three states obtained their standards in separate ceremonies. These actions did much to express the tie of the postwar National Guard forces to prewar units.23

The rebuilding of the Organized Reserve Corps divisions posed some similar problems and others that were unique to it. A tentative troop basis, prepared in March 1946 (after the National Guard organizational structure had been presented to the states), outlined 25 divisions-3 armored, 5 airborne, and 17 infantry. These divisions and all other Organized Reserve Corps units were to be maintained in one of three strength categories, labeled Class A, B, and C. Class A units were divided into two groups, one for combat and one for service, and units were to be at required table of organization strength; Class B units were to have their full complement of officers and enlisted cadre strength; and Class C were to have officers only. The troop basis listed nine divisions as Class A, nine as Class B, and seven as Class C.24

Maj. Gen. Milton A. Reckord, the adjutant general of Maryland, and General Walsh of the National Guard Association protested the provision for Class A divisions, whose cost, they believed, would detract greatly from funds available to the Guard. They argued that if Class A units were needed, they should be allotted to the Regular Army or the National Guard, not to the Organized Reserve Corps, because these units were augmentations to rather than essential components of

Location of National Guard Divisions

Division	States
26th Infantry	Massachusetts
27th Infantry	New York
28th Infantry	Pennsylvania
29th Infantry	Maryland and Virginia
30th Infantry	Tennessee and North Carolina
31st Infantry	Alabama and Mississippi
32d Infantry	Wisconsin
33d Infantry	Illinois
34th Infantry	Iowa and Nebraska
35th Infantry	Kansas and Missouri
36th Infantry	Texas
37th Infantry	Ohio
38th Infantry	Indiana
39th Infantry	Arkansas and Louisiana
40th Infantry	California
41st Infantry	Washington and Oregon
42d Infantry	New York
43d Infantry	Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont
44th Infantry	Illinois
45th Infantry	Oklahoma
46th Infantry	Michigan
47th Infantry	Minnesota and North Dakota
48th Infantry	Georgia
49th Armored	Texas
49th Infantry*	California
50th Armored	New Jersey
51st Infantry	Florida and South Carolina
52d Infantry	California

the immediate mobilization force. Maj. Gen. Ray E. Porter, director of the Special Plans Division, supported the Guard's view regarding funds and noted that facilities were not available for use by Class A divisions. Furthermore, he believed the Organized Reserve Corps divisions would compete with Guard formations for available personnel. Porter therefore proposed reclassification of all Class A divisions as Class B units. Eventually the War Department agreed and made the appropriate changes.25

Although the dispute over Class A units lasted several months, the War Department proceeded with the reorganization of the Organized Reserve Corps

divisions during the summer of 1946. That all divisions were to begin as Class C (officers only) units, progressing to the other categories as men and equipment became available, undoubtedly influenced the decision. Also, the War Department wanted to take advantage of the pool of trained reserve officers and enlisted men from World War II. By that time Army Ground Forces had been reorganized as an army group headquarters that commanded six geographic armies (Map 3). The armies replaced the nine corps areas of the prewar era, and the army commanders were tasked to organize and train both Regular Army and Organized Reserve Corps units. The plan the army commanders received called for twenty-five Organized Reserve Corps divisions the 19th, 21st, and 22d Armored Divisions; the 15th, 84th, 98th, 99th, and 100th Airborne Divisions; and the 76th, 77th, 79th, 81st, 83d, 85th, 87th, 89th, 90th, 91st, 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th, 1024, 103d, and 104th Infantry Divisions. Demography served as the basic tool for locating the units within the army areas, as after World War I.26

The twenty-five reserve divisions activated between September 1946 and November 1947 (Table 19) differed somewhat from the original troop basis. The First Army declined to support an airborne division, and the 98th Infantry Division replaced the 98th Airborne Division. A note on the troop list nevertheless indicated that the unit was to be reorganized and redesignated as an airborne unit upon mobilization and was to train as such. After the change, the Organized Reserve Corps had four airborne, three armored, and eighteen infantry divisions. The Second Army insisted upon the number 80 for its airborne unit because the division was to be raised in the prewar 80th Division's area, not that of the 99th. Finally, the 103d Infantry Division, organized in 1921 in New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona, was moved to Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, and North Dakota in the Fifth Army area. The Seventh Army (later replaced by Third Army), allotted the 15th Airborne Division, refused the designation, and the adjutant general replaced it by constituting the 108th Airborne Division, which fell within that component's list of infantry and airborne divisional numbers.27

A major problem in forming divisions and other units in the Organized Reserve Corps was adequate housing. While many National Guard units owned their own armories, some dating back to the nineteenth century, the Organized Reserve Corps had no facilities for storing equipment and for training. Although the War Department requested funds for needed facilities, Congress moved slowly in response.28

Given a smaller Organized Reserve Corps troop basis that called for infantry, armored, and airborne divisions, six prewar infantry divisions in that component were not reactivated in the reserves. The War Department deleted the 86th, 97th, and 99th Infantry Divisions when other divisions took over their recruiting areas, and the Regular Army, as noted, retained the 82d and 101st Divisions, which had been reorganized as airborne during the war. The future of the 88th Infantry Division, still on occupation duty in Italy, remained unsettled. Within the

Location of Organized Reserve Corps Divisions

Division	Army Area	States
13th Armored*	Sixth	California, Oregon, and Arizona
21st Armored	Fifth	Michigan and Illinois
22d Armored	Fourth	Texas and Oklahoma
76th Infantry	First	Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont
77th Infantry	First	New York
78th Infantry	First	New Jersey and Delaware
79th Infantry	Second	Pennsylvania
80th Airborne	Second	Maryland, Virginia, and District of Columbia
81st Infantry	Third	Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina
83d Infantry	Second	Ohio
84th Airborne	Fifth	Indiana
85th Infantry	Fifth	Illinois, Minnesota, South Dakota, and North Dakota
87th Infantry	Third	Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Florida
89th Infantry	Fifth	Kansas, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Colorado
90th Infantry	Fourth	Texas
91st Infantry	Sixth	California, Oregon, and Washington
94th Infantry	First	Massachusetts
95th Infantry	Fourth	Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana
96th Infantry	Sixth	Montana, Washington, Idaho, Nevada, and Utah
98th Infantry	First	New York
100th Airborne	Second	Kentucky and West Virginia
102d Infantry	Fifth	Missouri and Illinois
103d Infantry	Fifth	Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, and North Dakota
104th Infantry	Sixth	Washington and Oregon
108th Airborne	Third	Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, and Alabama

Organized Reserve Corps' block of numbers fell the 92d and 93d Infantry Divisions, but they were not classified as a part of that component. The War Department, however, decided not to maintain all-black divisions or use their traditional numbers in the postwar reorganization.29

Two changes took place shortly after the reorganization of the reserve divisions. In 1947 the 13th Armored Division replaced the 19th in the Organized Reserve Corps, and the 52d Infantry Division became the 49th in the National

350th Infantry, 88th Infantry Division, parades in Gorizia, Italy, 1945

Guard. Redesignation of the 52d coincided with California's centennial celebration. The division's home area covered the region where gold had been discovered in 1849, and the state requested the name change to honor the "Forty-Niners" of that era. The 13th replaced the 19th Armored Division, also at California's bidding, because of the former unit's association with the state; the 13th had served there during and after World War II.30

The War Department tentatively planned to organize the 106th Infantry Division in Puerto Rico using units from all three components. The Regular Army and the National Guard were to furnish the regimental combat teams and the Organized Reserve Corps the combat support units. By early 1948 the combat elements had been organized, and the formation of most other units had been authorized, including the headquarters company of the division. The War Department determined, however, that the 106th Infantry Division was not needed and never added it to the reserve troop list. The division headquarters company was inactivated in 1950, but most other units remained active as nondivisional organizations. 31

Manning reserve units proved to be a difficult task. Initially the Army planned that the rank and file of the units would be men who had undergone universal military training in centers operated by Regular Army divisions. With public sentiment opposed to universal military training, Congress declined to

Divisions Designated as Training Centers, 1947-50

Division	Location	Dates
3d Armored	Fort Knox, Ky.	July 1947-Active
4th Infantry	Fort Ord, Calif	July 1947-Active
5th Armored	Camp Chaffee, Ark.	July 1948-February 1950
5th Infantry	Fort Jackson, S.C.	July 1947-April 1950
9th Infantry	Fort Dix, N.J.	July 1947-Active
10th Infantry	Fort Riley, Kans.	July 1948-Active
17th Airborne	Camp Pickett, Va.	July 1948-June 1949
101st Airborne	Camp Breckinridge, Ky.	July 1948-May 1949

approve it. The reserves therefore relied upon volunteers who had prior service, the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and personnel who had to complete a commitment after serving on active duty in conjunction with the draft, which was reenacted in 1948. That year to stimulate interest in the Organized Reserve Corps, Congress authorized pay for inactive duty training. With a small portion of the postwar Army dependent upon the draft, it generated few reservists for the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps, and those units fell considerably below full strength.32

Although the War Department did not use divisions as a part of a universal military training program, it decided to use divisional designations for replacement training centers in the summer of 1947. The 3d Armored Division and the 4th, 5th, and 9th Infantry Divisions were activated and their elements reorganized for that purpose. The cadres who trained the recruits responded favorably to the use of divisions as a means of building esprit since they wore the divisional shoulder sleeve insignia, and the recruits were inspired by the accomplishments of historic units. The Army authorized more training centers divisional designations in the summer of 1948 (Table 20). As the training load fluctuated, so did the number of "divisional" training centers, which stood at four two years later.33

In reorganizing the postwar divisions, the Army used World War II tables of organization and equipment, but studies of combat experience that were under way portended revisions. The U.S. European Theater of Operations established the General Board, consisting of many committees, to analyze the strategy, tactics, and administration of theater forces. A committee headed by Brig. Gen. A. Franklin Kibler, formerly the G-3, 12th Army Group, examined the requirements for various types of divisions. After weighing divisional strengths and weaknesses and considering new combinations of arms and services, the committee recom-

mended the retention of infantry, armored, and airborne divisions. The committee concluded that a standard infantry division could accomplish missions that might require either light or mountain troops, and that therefore such special divisions were unnecessary. However, it also recommended that the Army maintain at least one horse cavalry division to guarantee that a few officers and enlisted men would continue to be trained as mounted troops. No other postwar study urged the retention of the cavalry division, and, as noted, the War Department rejected any large horse units for the future.34

Other General Board committees examined the requirements for each type of division. The committee for the infantry division surfaced many of the same requirements identified previously in the spring of 1945 and recommended a unit of 20,578 men. Additional men were needed in the infantry regiment to provide communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and administration, and improved weapons were required for cannon and antitank companies. The committee proposed the development of a low silhouette 105-mm. self-propelled howitzer, but until its adoption the cannon company was to use a 105-mm. howitzer mounted on a medium tank. To arm the antitank company, the planners proposed either a self-propelled antitank gun or a medium tank, with most favoring the latter. Some committee members advocated removing the antitank company from the infantry regiment and adding a three-battalion tank regiment to the division. Because of the size and complexity of the infantry regiment, the committee urged that its commander be a brigadier general.35

Cavalry and field artillery arms were also expanded within the infantry division. To ensure adequate intelligence and counterreconnaissance (i.e., security), a divisional cavalry squadron replaced the troop. Because the division often lacked sufficient field artillery, the committee recommended adding a towed 155-mm. howitzer battalion for a total of two 155-mm. howitzer battalions and three self-propelled 105-mm. howitzer battalions. All fifteen artillery batteries were to have six pieces each.36

Divisional combat and combat service support also grew. An antiaircraft artillery battalion was added for air defense, an engineer regiment replaced the battalion, and a military police company supplanted the platoon. Given the increases in the arms and combat support elements, the division needed greater maintenance and quartermaster resources, and the committee urged expansion of these units to battalions. Finally, a new reinforcement battalion was suggested to process and forward replacements. In sum, the General Board committee preserved the division's three regimental combat teams used during the war, but added or enlarged units that had been organic or habitually attached and organizations to service them.37

The committee analyzing the airborne division concluded it should have the same organization and equipment as the infantry division, along with augmentations needed to perform its airborne missions. Two sets of equipment were thus recommended for the division, a lightweight set for airborne assaults and a

heavy set for sustained ground combat. All divisional elements were to be trained in parachute, glider, and air transport techniques, making all divisional elements airborne units.38

The General Board's third committee on divisional organization reviewed the armored division. Examination of both the early heavy armored division and the lighter variant introduced in 1943 revealed defects that had been corrected by attaching units. Using the 1943 division as a base, the committee added a fourth 105-mm. howitzer battalion, an antiaircraft artillery battalion, and a tank destroyer battalion. During combat operations these units had been added to the division, as was an infantry battalion or regiment, when available. The committee viewed the combat command as a major weakness because it did not have assigned units, a violation of unity of command. Furthermore, both types of armored divisions had only two authorized combat commands, but in combat they normally had operated with three. To provide the third command in the heavy division, the headquarters and headquarters company of the armored infantry regiment had been organized provisionally as a combat command headquarters, and in the light division a headquarters and headquarters company of an armored group augmented the reserve command. The committee recommended that the combat commands be replaced with three regiments, each made up of one tank and two armored rifle battalions, and that brigadier generals command the regiments. Upon reflection, the committee omitted one unit previously attached to the division, the tank destroyer battalion, because of the wartime trend toward arming American tanks with high-velocity weapons capable of destroying enemy armor, an evolution that made the lightly armored tank destroyer redundant. The strength of the projected armored division rose to 19,377 officers and enlisted men, nearly double the size of light armored divisions of 1943.39

The Army Staff received the reports from the General Board and passed them along to the Army Ground Forces. In September 1945 that command began preparing new tables of organization for the postwar Army, but General Devers, commander of Army Ground Forces, refrained from making any decisions about divisional organization pending review of the board's findings and the recommendations of infantry and armored conferences being held in the spring of the following year. In July 1946 he finally forwarded proposals to the General Staff for new infantry and armored divisions that combined recommendations of the committees and of the conferences. The new tables for the infantry division were similar to those developed in 1945 when restrictions were lifted on their manning. The armored division retained its 1943 configuration with augmentations to correct organizational deficiencies. Devers believed these divisions would meet the Army's needs for versatile, mobile, hard-hitting units. Despite the availability of the atomic bomb, the nature of ground combat had not changed. The infantry division was capable of operating in jungle, arctic, desert, and mountain terrain or on plains; the armored division remained a highly mobile unit to break through a

line or exploit success on the battlefield. He questioned, however, the appropriate rank for commanders of the new infantry combat teams (formerly infantry regiments) in the infantry division and combat commands in the armored division-a colonel or brigadier general.40

Eisenhower sent the divisional proposals to senior officers, including his own advisory group, for comment.41 He was concerned that units were too large, possessing everything they might need under almost any condition, violating the principles of flexibility and economy of force followed during the war. He also requested the officers' views as to whether the Army should break each division into three smaller units, and if so whether the infantry regiment should be renamed an infantry combat team.42

The advisory group concurred with the Army Ground Forces proposals. It did not believe that divisions had too many people and too much equipment; they had only those units habitually attached during combat. The group did not fear a diminution of morale because the infantry regiment was to be known by another name. Moreover, it supported the rank of brigadier general for the commanders of infantry combat teams in the infantry division and combat commands in the armored division because it was commensurate with the assigned responsibilities.43

Among the other general officers who commented on the divisions, General Omar N. Bradley, head of the Veterans Administration, wanted the staff to develop a division organization that combined aspects of both infantry and armored divisions. For the time being, however, he deemed the proposed units sound. Lt. Gens. Walton H. Walker and Oscar W Griswold, the Fifth and Seventh Army commanders, also endorsed the organizational proposals but disagreed on the appropriate rank for combat command and infantry combat team leaders. Eisenhower approved the divisions on 21 November 1946, but disapproved the change in general officer positions and the new name for infantry units. The following month Army Ground Forces prepared draft tables of organization for a 17,000-man infantry division and a 15,000-man armored division.44

In 1948, when the Department of the Army 45 finally published new tables for the infantry division, it authorized 18,804 officers and enlisted men (Chat 23). The division, however, remained basically the same as approved by Eisenhower. The ratio of combat to service troops was 4 to 1, and a 50 percent increase in firepower was attained by merely authorizing each field artillery firing battery six pieces.46

Some changes made between the time Eisenhower approved the division and publication of its tables, however, are noteworthy. In the medical service, a medical company replaced the attached medical detachment in each infantry regiment, and artillery, engineer, and tank battalions fielded organic medical detachments as did the division headquarters. The medical battalion was to provide only clearing and ambulance services. The reconnaissance troop was redesignated as a reconnaissance company to eliminate the term "troop" from the Army's nomenclature except for cavalry and constabulary units. At the insistence of officers who attended an Infantry conference in 1946 that discussed the status of the arm,

Infantry Division, 7 July 1948

A controversial area that affected development of the tables for the infantry division was the postwar battlefield's greater depth and breadth, which increased the difficulty of conducting reconnaissance and intelligence collection. Ten airplanes had been assigned to the division artillery in 1943 and an additional three to the infantry regiments in 1945. In 1946 Army Ground Forces proposed assigning aircraft to the division headquarters and to tank and engineer battalions. The Army Staff endorsed the additional planes but wanted them pooled in one unit, except for those in the division artillery. Opposition to that proposal came from the Army Air Forces, which argued that all air units came under their jurisdiction.48 The Army countered that the National Security Act of 1947 authorized it to organize, train, and equip aviation resources for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.49 Nevertheless the tables provided no aviation unit, but ten planes were assigned to the division artillery and eight to the division headquarters company.50

The postwar armored division (Chart 24) retained the flexible command structure of the 1943 organization with three medium tank battalions, three armored infantry battalions, and three 105-mm. howitzer battalions, along with some significant changes. Army Ground Forces made the reserve command identical to the two existing combat commands, replaced the attached tank destroyer battalion with a heavy tank battalion, and added an antiaircraft artillery battalion, and a replacement company. Paralleling the infantry division, the military police platoon was expanded to a company and the reconnaissance squadron was redesignated as a battalion. A 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer battalion was added to give the division more general support fire, and, in the division trains, the quartermaster supply battalion, eliminated in 1943, was restored to transport fuel, provide bath and laundry facilities, and assume graves registration duties. Besides the field artillery's aircraft, ten planes were placed in the division headquarters company to serve division and combat command headquarters, the engineer battalion, and the reconnaissance battalion. The number of general officers was increased from two to three, a division commander and two combat command commanders. The commanders of the reserve command and the division artillery remained colonel billets.51

Infantry and armored divisions were reorganized between the fall of 1948 and the end of 1949. Most divisions, however, never attained their table of organization strengths prior to the Korean War. Only the 1st Infantry Division in Germany was authorized at full strength. Strengths in other Regular Army divisions fell between 55 and 80 percent. In the National Guard the strength of the divisional elements varied, with some units being cut by individuals, by crews

Armored Division, 8 October 1948

The development of the postwar airborne division took almost two years longer than infantry and armored divisions. On 16 August 1946 Army Ground Forces forwarded to the General Staff an outline for an airborne division. It was an infantry division with the addition of a pathfinder platoon and a parachute maintenance company. The division had approximately 19,000 jump-qualified officers and enlisted men and two sets of equipment, one for air assault and the other for sustained combat. Eisenhower rejected the proposal because the unit could not be air-transported. He directed Army Ground Forces to prepare an organization that could be moved by existing aircraft. Eisenhower also rejected the resulting proposal, but a third idea developed by the Organizational and Training Division of the General Staff won acceptance. The staff proposed an airborne division with two categories of units, organic elements that could be airlifted and attached ground units that were to link up with them. To make the unit air-transportable, the staff eliminated heavy mortars and tanks from infantry regiments and restricted the number of howitzers in field artillery batteries to four. The attached units included two heavy tank battalions, a 155-mm. howitzer battalion, a reconnaissance company, a medium maintenance company, and a quartermaster company, which totaled 2,580 officers and enlisted men. Those units along with the division's organic elements, which numbered 16,470, made the division's size approximately the same as the Army Ground Forces proposa1.53

With the proposed airborne division attempting to meet two competing needs, strategic mobility and tactical sustainment, the General Staff decided to test it. The 82d Airborne Division (less one regimental combat team at Fort Benning) adopted the new structure on 1 January 1948. After the test, Army Field Forces (AFF), the successor of Army Ground Forces, recommended organizing the airborne division in the same manner as an infantry division. As organized for the test, the airborne division was not air-transportable. The Army Staff, nevertheless, still sought a large airborne unit for strategic mobility. Therefore, on 4 May 1949 the new Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley, directed that the attached combat elements be made organic to the division and that only 11,000 of its 17,500 men be airborne qualified. The Department of the Army published new tables (Chart 25) mirroring these decisions on 1 April 1950. Reorganization of Regular Army and Organized Reserve Corps airborne divisions followed shortly thereafter. 54

While the Army developed and reorganized its postwar divisions, it continued to maintain and redeploy its existing forces to meet changing international

Airborne Division, 1 April 1950

A final parade in Gorizia, before the 88th Division departs, 1947; below, 82d Airborne Division troops at the New York City victory parade, 1946.

Four years after the end of World War II the number of Regular Army divisions had fallen to ten. Overseas the 1st Infantry Division was scattered among installations in Germany, while the 1st Cavalry Division and the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions were stationed throughout Japan. In the United States the 2d Armored Division was split between Camp (later Fort) Hood, Texas, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The 2d Infantry Division was based at Fort Lewis, Washington; the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort Devens, Massachusetts; the 11th Airborne Division (less one inactive regimental combat team) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The twenty-five Organized Reserve Corps and twenty-seven National Guard divisions were at various levels of readiness.

Initially overwhelmed by the tidal wave of demobilization after World War II, the Army had struggled to rebuild both Regular Army and reserve divisions during the late 1940s. Its new divisional structures were based on combat experiences during the war, under the assumption that atomic weapons would not alter the nature of ground combat. Units previously attached to divisions from higher headquarters during combat were made organic to divisions, which also received additional firepower. Although the postwar divisions of the era were not fully prepared for combat because they were not properly manned and equipped, they nonetheless represented an unprecedented peacetime force in the Army of the United States, reflecting the new Soviet-American tensions.