- Chapter II:
Organizing the Assistance Effort
Since the inception of the United States Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam, on 8 February 1962, its policies, organization, and objectives
were guided by staff contingency planning for the entire Southeast Asia
area. The chain of command from Military Assistance Command headquarters
in Saigon to Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii was established
primarily at the insistence of Admiral Harry .D. Felt, Commander in Chief,
Pacific, who strongly believed that only Pacific Command with its joint
Army, Navy, and Air Force staff could effectively and dispassionately deal
with the entire Southeast Asia area. For this reason the staff and
planning capabilities at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), were
limited. Contingency and long-term operational planning for Southeast Asia
were to be conducted from the headquarters having cognizance of the entire
Pacific theater. Furthermore, the disrupted political and military
situation had not been accurately appraised. It was thought that the
insurgency problem could be brought under control in short order and that
a temporary MACV headquarters incorporating the old Military Assistance
Advisory Group (MAAG) as an operating headquarters would prove adequate
for handling operations until the emergency passed and the Military
Assistance Advisory Group could resume its normal functioning. (Chart 1)
General Paul D. Harkins, as the first Commander, U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), was responsible for performing
the functions of the chief of the old military advisory group and in that
capacity acted as senior adviser to the Republic of Vietnam's armed forces
while also commanding the Army component of the combined services'
Military Assistance Command. The commanding general of the U.S. Army
Support Group, Vietnam, which had been formed in 1961 to provide
administrative and logistic support for Army forces in Vietnam, became the
deputy Army component commander. General Harkins therefore exercised
operational control of Army forces, while the commanding general of
Support Group, Vietnam, was responsible for administrative and logistic
support.
[13]
The Military Assistance Advisory Group was finally absorbed intact by
the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in 1964. The air and naval
advisory activities and their personnel were subordinated to the
corresponding component commands of the Military Assistance Command.
General Harkins as COMUSMACV was succeeded on 20 June 1964 by General
William C. Westmoreland, who continued to direct actively only Army
component activities while providing general guidance to the other
participating services. Shortly after General. Westmoreland assumed
command, the U.S. force buildup completely outpaced the existing support
system, and in April 1965 the 1st Logistical Command was deployed and sub-
[14]
sequently assigned to the U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam. (Chart 2)
When President Lyndon B. Johnson was given the mandate of Congress to
commit U.S. troops in August of 1964, and the decision was made to do so
on a large scale, it became apparent that a review of the command and
control structures would be necessary. The major issues concerned MACV's
status as a subordinate unified command under orders from Pacific Command
headquarters, MACV's working relations with the Vietnamese military and
arriving allies, and MACV's U.S. troop command authority.
The same argument Admiral Felt voiced in 1962 was raised
[15]
again in 1965, this time by the new Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral
U. S. Grant Sharp. The military threat in the Pacific was not limited to
Vietnam and action there could not, therefore, be conducted without regard
for operations and plans for Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Laos,
Thailand, or any other Pacific area. Military Assistance Command would
remain subordinate to Pacific Command (PACOM) headquarters, and General
Westmoreland could direct his attention to Vietnam exclusively.
The second issue under consideration, MACV's relationship with the
Vietnamese armed forces, was still more sensitive. A single joint command
under an American commander hinted too strongly of American colonialism;
therefore command would devolve into co-operation and co-ordination
between U.S. and Vietnamese forces. The question of the operational
control of _U.S. Army forces involved both military and political
considerations.
To provide administrative control of and support for the combat forces,
the U.S. Army Support Command was transformed into the U.S. Army, Vietnam
(USARV), on 20 July to carry out "all the functions of a field army
save those an Army commander would perform at a forward command
post." Military Assistance Command would carry out the tactical
functions. The establishment of USARV made a headquarters available with
the personnel and other resources required to control all Army activities.
An Army component headquarters, exercising operational control over land
combat forces, would have been in keeping with existing doctrine and, in
the opinion of some observers, would have provided a more efficient means
of conducting land combat operations. In the context of events in 1965,
however, adoption of this approach was not so clearly indicated. In
particular, it would have required General Westmoreland to interpose a
new, untested, and inexperienced headquarters between himself and his
newly arrived American combat troops. Of equal concern was the fact that
the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) was also the Army of
Vietnam headquarters. Coordination of land combat operations was being
conducted between MACV and the JGS; if operational control of U.S. Army
forces had rested in USARV, the absence of a counterpart headquarters in
the Vietnamese Army would have made co-ordination much more difficult. For
these reasons, the responsibilities of USARV were limited to
administrative and logistical matters.
Before mid-1965, when the first U.S. engineer units arrived, the only
American construction capability in Vietnam resided in a small civilian
force under contract to the Navy. For a number of years the Department of
Defense had followed the practice of assigning to the construction arms of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force areas of
[16]
responsibility around the world where bases were planned, under way, or
already built. The Army Corps of Engineers was given jurisdiction over
military construction contracts in Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, Korea, the
Mediterranean, and the Near East. Air Force Civil Engineers were assigned
the United Kingdom, and the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks (which was
later redesignated Naval Facilities Engineering Command) was committed to
Spain, the South Pacific islands, Guantinamo Bay, Antarctica, and
Southeast Asia. As Department of Defense contract construction agent, the
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) had an Officer in Charge of
Construction (OICC) for Southeast Asia headquartered in Bangkok, Thailand,
with a branch office in Saigon. In July 1965 the Navy divided the area by
creating the position Officer in Charge of Construction, Republic of
Vietnam.
As the military buildup gained momentum, engineer and construction
forces received higher priorities for mobilization and deployment. With
the arrival of contingents of Army engineers, Navy Seabees, Marine Corps
engineers, Air Force Prime BEEF and Red Horse units, and civilian
contractors, U.S. construction strength in Vietnam mounted rapidly.
Because the buildup was so rapid, construction had to be accomplished on a
crash basis, but before that could be done there were numerous logistical
obstacles to overcome. Changing requirements for facilities from which to
conduct or support combat operations and deployments interfered with the
establishment of construction priorities, which in turn depended upon the
availability of labor, equipment, materials, and sites, for which there
was intense competition among the services.
During a visit to Vietnam in July 1965, the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Properties and Installations discussed the situation with
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics (J-4), MACV, and the commander
of Military Assistance Command. He strongly urged that "there be one
focal point in MACV for direction of construction matters, a central
office with which the Department of Defense, CINCPAC, and other service
agencies can coordinate"; and he recommended a construction czar
other than the MACV J-4.
General Westmoreland had assigned staff supervision of base development
to his Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics. Up to the time of the
buildup, the J-4 had been concerned primarily with the Military Assistance
Program (MAP). Among other duties the J-4 also chaired the U.S.
Construction Staff Committee which consisted of representatives pf
agencies involved in civil and military construction. Within the J-4
office was a Base Development Branch of four officers headed by a Navy
commander and overly. occupied for the most part with routine staff
matters. About twenty-five Engi-
[17]
neer officers were also in the Engineer Branch of the Directorate of the
Army MAP Logistics-a separate staff agency and remnant of the old MAAG.
Headed by Colonel Kenneth W. Kennedy, Corps of Engineers, this branch had
the mission of advising the Vietnamese Armed Forces Chief of Engineers. On
7 April 1965, J-4 merged the Engineer Branch, Directorate of Army MAP
Logistics, with its small Base Development Branch to form the Engineer
Division, J-4, under Colonel Kennedy; but, as the scope of engineer
activities (especially base development) expanded, the post of the
Engineer was upgraded to Deputy J-4 for Engineering in November 1965.
During this same month Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara visited
General Westmoreland's headquarters in Saigon, where he was advised that
the then-envisaged construction program would cost about $1 billion within
a two-year period. Upon his return to Washington, Secretary McNamara
directed the establishment of a construction base for Vietnam. On I 1
February 1966 the position of Director of Construction (MACDC) was
established. As a special staff officer, he would report directly to
General Westmoreland independently of J-4 channels. Brigadier General
Carroll H. Dunn, who had been selected for promotion to major general, was
the first director and served in this post until 1966 when he was
succeeded by his deputy, Brigadier General Daniel A. Raymond. General
Dunn's initial staff consisted of 135 people, half Army, one-quarter Navy,
and one-quarter Air Force. The mission assigned to General Dunn was to
"direct, manage, and supervise the combined and coordinated
construction program to meet MACV requirements and coordinate all
Department of Defense construction efforts and resources assigned to MACV
or in the Republic of Vietnam."
The ultimate mission of the MACV Director of Construction was to provide
military engineering advice and assistance to the Commander, U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam. In executing this mission the Construction
Directorate supervised the construction program; co-ordinated all
Department of Defense construction efforts and resources assigned to
Military Assistance Command or other agencies in Vietnam; established
joint service policy; and monitored all military construction programs.
The Construction Directorate also supervised the execution of interservice
facility management matters and obtained and allocated real estate for use
by U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Forces. The Construction
Directorate was later given the responsibility for advising and assisting
the Ministry of Public Works, Communications, and Transportation relative
to the government of Vietnam's highway
[18]
and road system. The directorate also assisted the component services,
the Agency for International Development, and the Vietnamese National
Railway System in the development of waterways and railways.
The establishment of the Director of Construction clarified several
matters: the Commander, Military Assistance Command, would exercise direct
control of the construction effort in Vietnam, including direction of the
Navy's Officer in Charge of Construction in areas of project assignments,
priorities of effort, and standards of construction. He would control the
use and allocation of all construction resources in Vietnam. What up to
now had been several programs of separate agencies responsible to
different bosses both in and out of Vietnam became a unified program under
centralized control and direction.
Throughout 1965 there had been an increased commitment of U.S. military
personnel. On 8 March 1965, 3,500 marines landed in the I Corps area to
take up defensive positions around the U.S. air base at Da Nang. On 5 May
1965, U.S. Air Force C-130 aircraft began landing at Bien Hoa Air Base,
north of Saigon, with the main body of the 173d. Airborne Brigade,
previously stationed on Okinawa. On 16 June 1965, the Secretary of Defense
announced the deployment of an additional 21,000 U.S. troops to South
Vietnam, which brought the total commitment to 75,000.
On 12 July, the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, landed at Vung Tau
and immediately moved inland to Bien Hoa. To the north, the 2d Brigade's
remaining battalion came ashore at Cam Ranh Bay and relieved the 1st
Logistical Command forces of the bulk of the peninsula security mission. A
little over two weeks later, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division,
landed at Cam Ranh Bay and relieved a battalion of the 2d Brigade, 1st
Division, of its security mission. These two brigades were the first U.S.
Army combat forces to be deployed from the United States to South Vietnam.
On 28 July 1965, in a television address to the nation the President
announced: "I have today ordered to Vietnam . . . forces which will
raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately.
Additional forces will be needed later and they will be sent as
requested." In the next five months, the strength of U.S. forces rose
not to 125,000 but to nearly 200,000. By Christmas 1965, the 1st Cavalry
Division (Airmobile) and the 1st Infantry Division (-) had arrived in
South Vietnam, where they were joined by the Korean 1st (Capital-Tiger)
Infantry Division. To control the U.S. combat forces in II Corps, Task
Force Alpha, a corps head-
[19]
ELEMENTS of 1st CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) arrive at Qui
Nhon September 1965.
quarters, was deployed in August from Fort Hood, Texas, to Nha Trang.
The troop buildup continued into the new year. On 29 December 1965 the
3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, began a two-week movement from
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to Pleiku. By 8 January 1966 a second corps
headquarters, designated II Field Force, was deployed to manage U.S.
combat forces in the III and IV Corps areas.
The first Army engineer unit to arrive in Vietnam was the 173d Engineer
Company, which landed at Bien Hoa on 5 May 1965 as part of the 173d
Airborne Brigade. This company, like other brigade and divisional engineer
units, worked to establish base camps and provide combat support to the
larger organization of which it was a part.
On 9 June 1965 Headquarters, 35th Engineer Group, together with the
864th Engineer Battalion and D Comp4ny, 84th Engineers, had debarked on
the Cam Ranh Peninsula. These were the first major units to arrive at Cam
Ranh Bay. On 16 July the 159th Engineer Group (Construction) at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina,
[20]
received orders to activate Headquarters, 18th Engineer Brigade, from
its resources. On 30 July the newly formed brigade received movement
orders, and one month later it departed for South Vietnam and assignment
to U.S. Army, Vietnam. This brigade was commanded by Brigadier General
Robert R. Ploger. The brigade's advance party arrived in Vietnam on 3
September and immediately scrambled to find space in the Saigon area for
its headquarters and to establish a communications net with its
subordinate units. On 16 September the headquarters (less the main body,
which did not arrive until 21 September) became operational and assumed
command of all nondivisional Army engineer units from the 1st Logistical
Command. In northern II Corps, meanwhile, the engineer situation was
significantly changed by the arrival at Qui Nhon of Headquarters, 937th
Engineer Group (Combat), and the 70th Engineer Battalion (Combat) on 23
August. These units came to South-east Asia as time-tested organizations,
since both had been in operation before deploying. By 1 October 1965 the
engineer force was composed of two group headquarters, six battalions, and
nine separate companies. One week later USARV assigned the following
missions to the brigade:
a. Provide operational planning and supervision of USARV construction
and related tasks in the Republic of Vietnam and for other missions as may
be directed by this headquarters.
b. Exercise command and operational control of engineer units assigned
to United States Army, Vietnam.
c. Provide for physical security of personnel, equipment, facilities,
and construction of all units assigned or attached to your command.
On 1 January 1966 the 20th and 39th Engineer Battalions, along with the
572d Light Equipment Company, landed at Cam Ranh Bay. From 2 January until
mid-May, only two companies were added to the strength of the 18th
Brigade. The 20th and 39th Battalions were the last products of the
initial herculean push by the United States Continental Army Command to
deploy a maximum number of engineer units to Southeast Asia. It would be
summer before the steady flow of engineers across the Pacific would
resume.
The command situation for base development was by now formally
established. The Director of Construction at the MACV joint staff
headquarters exercised control and guidance for all service construction.
Air Force, Navy, and Army construction efforts would
[21]
be co-ordinated through this office. To ensure effective operation, the
Construction Directorate was organized along functional lines. The
directorate originally consisted of five main divisions: Plans and
Operations, Engineering and Base Development, Construction Management,
Real Estate, and Program Management. On 1 January 1968 a major revision of
the organization occurred with the creation of the Lines of Communications
(LOC) Division. (Chart 3) The LOC Division assumed the responsibility for
managing a 4,100kilometer road restoration program and for advising the
Vietnamese Director General of Highways. Before this reorganization, LOC
responsibility had been delegated to the Construction Management
[22]
Division, which was dissolved. Its functions were assumed by the Base
Development Division.
The Base Development Division served as the focal point for base
development planning, for monitoring the component service base
construction projects, and for interservice facility management matters.
Engineer staff activities pertaining to military operation, determination
of engineer requirements and plans for employment of engineer forces, and
technical supervision of engineer activities were the responsibility of
the Plans and Operation Division.
The Lines of Communications Division, once established, directed,
supervised, and managed the development and restoration of designated
roads to support military operations, pacification programs, and national
economic growth. The division co-ordinated the planning and execution of
LOC programs for the component services, the Agency for International
Development, and the Vietnamese government. Assistance and advisory
support were also provided to the Ministry of Public Works,
Communications, and Transportation; to the Directorate General of
Highways; and to the five regional engineers and the province engineers.
The Lines of Communications Division also assisted all interested agencies
in the development of waterways and railways. The Program Management
Branch, meanwhile, was responsible for funding matters including fund
status, piaster impact, and statistical analysis of the Vietnamese
military construction program, while the Real Estate Division served as
the MACV agent in obtaining and allocating real estate for U.S. use.
The commander of Army units in Vietnam remained the Commanding General,
U.S. Army, Vietnam. As senior Army component commander, he was responsible
for base development at ports, beaches, depots, and major installations in
II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones, except for those bases specifically
assigned to other services through the office of the MACV Director of
Construction. Since the Commanding General, U.S. Army, Vietnam, was also
the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, this apparent
division of command may be seen as a simple differentiation of staff
functions made necessary by the diversity of responsibilities inherent in
the planning staff, which was MACV, and the execution staff, which was
USARV.
Initially the Army engineer construction effort was the responsibility
of the Engineer Section of the 1st Logistical Command. In September 1965
the headquarters of the 18th Engineer Brigade arrived and assumed
responsibility of engineer staff planning from the 1st Logistical Command;
the Commanding General, 18th Engineer Brigade, acted as both the Engineer
Troop Commander and
[23]
the Army Engineer until December 1966 when the U.S. Army Engineer
Command was formed. The 18th Engineer Brigade was then delegated the
responsibility for engineer support in I and II Corps Tactical Zones. The
Engineer Command took over responsibility for over-all supervision of the
Army construction program and direct supervision of two engineer groups
operating in II and IV Corps Tactical Zones. When the 20th Engineer
Brigade arrived in Vietnam and was delegated the responsibility of
engineer support in III and IV Corps Tactical Zones, the Engineer Command
functioned as the over-all planning staff for Army construction
subordinate to the Engineer, USARV. In March 1968 the Engineer Command was
reorganized with the U.S. Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam (USAECAV),
and was charged with responsibility for managing and administering real
estate, property maintenance, and execution of the Military Construction,
Army (MCA), construction programs. At the same time the Office of the
Engineer, USARV, served as the component staff engineer.
The Engineer's staff at USARV headquarters consisted of five main
divisions: Construction, Facilities Engineering, Mapping and Intelligence,
Military Operations, and Supply and Maintenance. (Chart 4) Although the
organizational structure of the Construction Agency provided for
operational independence, policies and proce-
[24]
dures were prescribed by U.S. Army in Vietnam. The Construction Agency
at Army headquarters was composed of three main divisions: Engineering,
Real Estate, and Real Property Management. The USAECAV organization also
utilized the area concept and had district offices in four major
geographical locations.
Like the Construction Agency, the engineer brigades were subordinate to
the U.S. Army in Vietnam and their organization and mission evolved in an
area concept. The brigades each operated in two tactical zones. Since the
brigades divided their areas into group and battalion areas of operations,
the battalions were responsible for all engineer support within assigned
areas of operation.
Naval construction planning at the beginning of the buildup was
delegated to the III Marine Amphibious Force. In October 1965, III Marine
Amphibious Force was provided a small support activity which was an
extension of Services Forces, Pacific, and the Director of the Pacific
Division of Bureau of Yards and Docks. This activity assumed the
responsibility for facility planning until April 1966 when the Commander,
Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV), assumed the duties of co-ordinator and
planner for base, port, beach, depot, air base, road, and installation
construction for all Navy, Marine, and allied forces operating in I Corps
and for other distinct naval operations in II, III, and IV Corps areas.
The Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam, as the Navy component commander,
was placed under operational control of the Commander, Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam, but remained under the operational command of the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, the operating naval force of the
Commander in Chief, Pacific.
The Department of Defense contract construction agent in Vietnam, the
Navy's Officer in Charge of Construction, had been providing construction
resources. This office and its organization had been modified frequently
since 1962 when the Navy negotiated a $16.5 million cost-plus-a-fixed-fee
contract with a joint contractor, Raymond International and
Morrison-Knudsen (RMK), for construction of airfields and port facilities
in Vietnam to support the country's armed forces. The buildup of American
forces increased the scope of contract construction. In August 1965 RMK
brought two additional contractors-Brown & Root and J. A. Jones--into
the partnership (henceforth referred to as RMK-BRJ) to bolster personnel
strength and management capability. Lyman D. Wilbur, vice president of
Morrison-Knudsen, was in charge of work from May 1965 until February 1966,
when he was succeeded by Bert Perkins, also a vice president of the same
corporation.
The Navy's OICC in supervising the RMK-BRJ contract assigned a Naval
Civil Engineering Corps officer as resident officer
[25]
in charge at each major construction site. The OICC since 1965 had been
a Navy flag officer of the Civil Engineer Corps.
Unlike the other services, the Air Force was able to avoid many
construction planning difficulties. The 7th Air Force Civil Engineer
Directorate possessed the planning force required for its construction
program in Vietnam before the 1965 buildup, and the 7th Air Force was
responsible only for base development at air bases and at other
installations where the Air Force was designated as having a primary
mission.
The Army's responsibility for facilities engineering support before 1965
was limited to six MACV advisory sites located outside Saigon. The Navy's
Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon, took care of all military property
within the city. But because of a lack of trained military personnel and
experience in contracting for facilities engineering in Korea, the Army
decided to contract for this support at the MACV advisory sites. Seven
firms submitted bids, and negotiations were undertaken with four of them.
On 1 May 1968, Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) received a
cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract.
This contract, except for a change in the type of fee, was the kind
awarded as the buildup continued. The contractor was to provide all
facilities engineering support for the Army in Vietnam and was to
establish an organization essentially the same as provided in Army
regulations for standard facilities engineering units. The contractor was
to furnish the labor, organization, and management; the government was to
supply equipment, repair parts, tools, and material as well as quarters
and messing facilities. The flexibility of this contract proved invaluable
in the years ahead.
While considerable attention is given in this text to the deployment of
Army engineer units, it should be recognized that these units actually
constituted less than half of the total American construction force in
Vietnam. By mid-1968, thirty-five engineer battalions, forty-two separate
companies, and numerous teams and detachments hart been deployed. At its
peak, Army engineer strength in Vietnam approximated 40,000 officers and
men, including members of combat engineer units of the seven Army
divisions and six separate brigades and regiments.
The following summary sets forth what might be termed the construction
force in Vietnam. Essentially it lists the principal agencies involved in
construction in South Vietnam, and therefore the agencies whose
construction activities were co-ordinated, integrated, and directed to
varying degrees by the MACV Director of Construction.
[26]
U.S. Army
1. Army Engineer Command (Provisional). Consisted of 2 brigades, 6
groups, 21 battalions, and various small specialized engineer units.
2. Pacific Architects and Engineers. Under contract for repairs and
utilities support of the Army (21,418 personnel).
3. DeLong Corporation. Fabricated and installed patented mobile piers.
4. Vinnell Corporation. Constructed, operated, and maintained electrical
systems including T-2 tankers used as power sources.
U.S. Air Force
1. Walter Kidde Constructors. Employed on a turnkey basis to design and
construct Tuy Hoa Air Base.
2. Red Horse Squadrons. Five light construction squadrons structured for
augmentation by local labor.
3. Base Emergency Engineering Forces (BEEF) Teams. Small detachments
which contained a high level of skills and capability of constructing
small quantities of critical facilities.
4. Base Civil Engineering Forces. Equipped to handle repairs and
utilities at established bases.
U.S. Naval Forces
1. One construction brigade, composed of the 80th Naval Construction
Regiment with nine Seabee battalions.
2. Three engineer construction battalions of the Fleet Marine Force,
USMC.
3. Naval Support Activity, Public Works Forces.
4. Philco. Under contract to provide a labor force.
5. Naval Facilities Engineering Command
a. Office in Charge of Construction (OICC), RVN. OICC supervised and
administered the contract for:
b. RMK-BRJ. This joint venture of four American contractors accomplished
the largest portion of construction projects.
Other U.S. agencies in the organization for construction were those of
the embassy's Office of Civil Operations and the MACV Revolutionary
Development Support Directorate.
Until early 1967, there was a tendency to view the reconstruction phase
of pacification as a Vietnamese effort, supported by U.S. civil agencies,
while the U.S. military command concentrated on building Vietnamese combat
capabilities. Integration and co-ordination were lacking among the several
U.S. civil agencies involved. The U.S.
[27]
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Joint United States
Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), and the Office of the Special Assistant to
the Ambassador (OSA), and the military agencies sometimes worked at
cross-purposes. To correct this defect the Civil Operations and Rural
Development Support (CORDS) structure was formed under MACV to provide
single manager control of U.S. military and civilian efforts in support of
Vietnamese pacification programs. CORDS did not include all of the
advisory efforts of OSA and JUSPAO. These organizations continued to
supply some construction material to the Vietnamese for self-help, while
military units often performed the actual reconstruction.
[28[
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