CHAPTER II

The Advisory Effort, 1950-1965

Background- Military Assistance
Advisory Group, Vietnam, Organized

The U.S. military advisory effort in Vietnam had a modest beginning in September 1950, when the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam, was established in Saigon. Its mission was to supervise the issuance and employment of $10 million of military equipment to support French legionnaires in their effort to combat Viet Minh forces. By 1953 the amount of U.S. military aid had jumped to over $350 million and was used to replace the badly worn World War II vintage equipment that France, still suffering economically from the devastation of that war, was still using.

From the outset, French forces were happy to receive the new material but refused American advice on how to employ it. The U.S. desire was that all Vietnamese units be organized and trained to provide internal defense of their own country and that aid be used to equip those units. Such a desire was at odds with existing French policy. The French Army was employed not only to counter enemy forces but also to assert France as a colonial power. A purely Vietnamese army would not be dependable in this latter role. Accordingly, major units were filled totally by French officers and noncommissioned officers with the ranks made up of Vietnamese. Senior French commanders were so loath to accept advice that would weaken their traditional colonial role that they effectively hampered various attempts by MAAG personnel to observe where the equipment was being sent and how it was being used.

Slowly, however, the French were forced to change their policies. As they steadily lost their grip on the country, they saw that their days as a colonial power were numbered and that, if the country was to be saved from a Communist takeover, a strong, effective Vietnamese force would have to be provided. In 1954 the commanding general of French forces in Indochina, General Navarre, permitted the United States to send liaison officers to Vietnamese forces. But it was too late, as evidenced by daily worldwide news accounts of the siege and fall of Dien Bien Phu in the spring of

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that year. Under the Geneva Accords, France was forced to surrender the northern half of Vietnam and to withdraw from South Vietnam by April of 1956. On 12 February 1955 at a conference in Washington, D.C., between officials of the U.S. State Department and the French Minister of Overseas Affairs, it was agreed that all U.S. aid would be funneled directly to South Vietnam and that all major military responsibilities would be transferred from the French to the Military Assistance Advisory Group mission under the command of Lieutenant General John O'Daniel. Because there were only 342 U.S. military personnel assigned to the group, not enough to accomplish the advisory mission, it was decided to make the training effort a joint U.S. and French mission under the title of Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM). The mission was short lived, since the French Expeditionary Force formally departed South Vietnam in April of 1956 as directed by the Accords and upon the insistence of President Diem. To fill the void, the MAAG mission was increased to 740 men by the end of June.

During this reorganization period, General O'Daniel had stated a need for assigning military advisers down to the battalion level rather than concentrating them at the higher headquarters levels, but Military Assistance Advisory Group at that time did not have enough personnel. Further, President Diem was reluctant to allow advisers with tactical units. He was fearful that the United States would gain control or influence over his forces if Americans permeated the ranks of the army. It might be surmised that Diem wanted to maintain complete control of his armed forces, which constituted a major political tool to keep his opponents at bay. By 1961, however, conditions had changed. Communist guerrillas were becoming stronger and more active, and enemy contacts increased in size and intensity throughout South Vietnam.

It was evident that the Hanoi government had little intention of abiding by the Geneva agreements to honor the south's territorial integrity. President John F. Kennedy, during late spring of 1961, further increased the U.S. military commitment in both equipment and men. Aid had been averaging $50 million per year for the past several years but was sharply increased to $144 million for 1961. At the same time President Diem agreed to the assignment of advisers to battalion level. Accordingly, the adviser strength jumped from 850 in 1959 to over 2,000 in 1961. By 1964 the advisory force numbered 23,000 officers and men.

The Field Artillery Adviser

The U.S. advisory buildup during the early 1960's included the assignment of field artillery advisory teams down to battalion level

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as quickly as they could be trained and sent. Each team included an artillery officer, usually a captain, and a senior noncommissioned officer. In most cases both had attended the six-week Military Assistance Training Agency (MATA) course taught at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The course was established to prepare students for future duties as advisers in Vietnam- to teach them both what to expect and what was expected of them. The curriculum included, among other subjects, a profile of the country, its people, government, history, and geography; the organization and employment of its military and paramilitary forces; and basic language instruction. The "Redleg" (an artilleryman) advisers were given additional instruction concerning Vietnamese artillery and methods of employing field artillery effectively in Vietnam. In addition to the MATA course, artillerymen attending resident courses at Fort Sill after fiscal year 1962 were to receive orientations on counterinsurgency operations. Officers attending the field artillery career course participated in practical exercises in the employment of artillery in support of jungle operations.

Field artillery advisory teams were assigned to battalions of both divisional and corps artillery. Each Vietnamese division in 1961 had a division artillery consisting of one 4.2-inch mortar battalion and one 105-mm. howitzer battalion. Each battalion had three subordinate firing batteries. In 1961 the mortar batteries had nine weapons and the cannon batteries had four weapons each. In 1963 mortar battery weapons were reduced to six and cannon battery weapons increased to six. From late 1964 to early 1965, 4.2-inch mortar batteries were replaced by 105-mm. batteries; 105-mm. weapons, with their longer ranges, had proved to be more valuable in accomplishing the mission of area coverage. Each of the four Vietnamese army corps also had its own artillery, usually two or three battalions, depending on the need. Corps artillery consisted of 105- and 155-mm. howitzer battalions. The 155-mm. howitzer was the heaviest artillery in Vietnam during this period. Like division artillery, the battalions of corps artillery each had three batteries. Each battery initially had four weapons, increased to six by early 1965.

The artillery advisory team was assigned to assist the Vietnamese unit commander and his staff in such areas as administrative procedures, personnel management, logistics, operations, training, maintenance, and communications, with particular emphasis on the tactical employment of artillery. The officer of the team, whose title was artillery officer adviser, proffered advice on all matters concerned with enhancing unit effectiveness. His noncommissioned

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assistant, the firing battery adviser, concentrated on assisting the battalion S-3 and operations sergeant in planning, organizing, and supervising training of the firing batteries and individual gun sections. In addition to the battalion advisory teams, an artillery officer, normally a major, was assigned to each corps and division to advise the senior Vietnamese artillery commanders at those levels. This adviser had the additional task of coordinating the efforts of the advisory teams with the subordinate battalions.

The young officers and noncommissioned officers who served as battalion advisers were of the highest caliber. They were at once professional, knowledgeable, and aggressive. Yet they were soon to learn that as advisers they could not "get things done" as they had in the American units in which they had served. Now they could only advise, not lead. Their advice could be accepted or rejected as the Vietnamese commander saw fit. Though often frustrating, this exclusively advisory status was necessary if the Vietnamese were to learn without the United States being accused of attempting to grab control of the military with intentions of making Vietnam a puppet state. Accordingly, advisers in the field were specifically directed to avoid any action that might be construed as leading a Vietnamese military organization in combat against the enemy.

To add to their frustrations, advisers were often fearful that their effectiveness would be judged by their superiors in relation to the effectiveness of the unit they advised. Unhappily, in some cases their fears were justified. An outstanding officer might be assigned to advise a mediocre unit which he was powerless to improve if the unit commander was indifferent to his suggestions. Though expressed humorously in this first verse of a rather lengthy poem, the dilemma was a very real one:

I can't pull the throttle,
I can't ring the bell,
But if this goddamn train should stop,
I'm the one that catches hell.

(an adviser's lament-anonymous)

The Adviser's Challenge

Even when an adviser's suggestion was accepted by his counterpart, it often seemed that the suggestion was executed in a painstakingly slow and inefficient manner. There were several reasons for this.

First, advisers were faced with helping an army whose soldiers came from a culture with a set of values and philosophy far different from their own. The American believed that anything could

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be accomplished with hard work, and he considered the year he would be in Vietnam ample time to get the job done. The Vietnamese, on the other hand, believed that one must work hard to live but that progress came about slowly. He had fought an enemy all his life and could not comprehend why Americans felt that they could end the fighting overnight. Many other values held by Americans and Vietnamese clashed. Suffice it to say that it was often difficult for an adviser and his counterpart to understand one another. What was viewed as a reasonable approach to a problem by one was often viewed as inane by the other. Other than making a sincere effort to understand one another's views, little could be done to close this cultural gap.

Another reason for apparent ineffectiveness of Vietnamese units was a void of trained and experienced leaders. Correcting this weakness was somewhat easier than overcoming cultural differences but was still a prodigious task. The French had purposely denied a majority of the leadership positions within their army to Vietnamese. There was evidence, however, of token acceptance of Vietnamese leaders as early as 1948. At that time, the French established an artillery training center forty kilometers northwest of Saigon to train noncommissioned officers as well as enlisted cannoneers for the French Expeditionary Force. In 1951 the school accepted Vietnamese officers for attendance in the basic courses and in 1953 presented the first battery commander's course. After the reorganization of the Vietnamese Army the artillery school was relocated, first at the engineer school near Thu Dan Mot and then on 25 July 1961 at Duc My, approximately fifty kilometers northwest of Nha Trang. At each location activities were expanded to train artillery officers and noncommissioned officers as well as artillerymen with specialized duties. Among other artillery-related courses, the first battery commander's course was offered in 1961 and the first advanced course in 1965. Vietnamese artillerymen could take some pride in their branch being the first in the Vietnamese military to offer an advanced course.

At unit level, advisers pressed their counterparts to provide training of junior officers. Some battalions developed aggressive training programs which brought officers in from the field to present classes and practical training on various aspects of the employment of field artillery.

Many of the most promising young Vietnamese artillery officers and noncommissioned officers received further training at the U.S. Army Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where they were exposed to the latest thinking on field artillery employment and

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ARVN OUTPOST. Large French-style outpost with a platoon of howitzers.

developments. From fiscal year 1953 to fiscal year 1973; 663 Vietnamese artillery officers alone were sent to Fort Sill. Peak attendance was during the early years of the expanded advisory effort, 1960 to 1964, when yearly attendance exceeded 60 officers.

Vietnamese field artillery leaders could not be effective if they were not knowledgeable in all aspects of the employment of their weapons. Formal training served that purpose. But an even more important factor in developing leaders was encouraging the Vietnamese to take command themselves. American advisers could not command Vietnamese units, and although the Vietnamese might make mistakes and perform awkwardly initially, they would be challenged to perform and to develop into outstanding leaders. Thus, any frustrations that an adviser might feel in not being given a firmer hand to control the situation were well worth the end result of effective Vietnamese leadership.

A third reason for ineffectiveness was poor operational practices, some inherited from the French and others developed by the Vietnamese over a period of years. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these practices was the use of the field artillery primarily as a defensive weapon. The French had unavoidably set a poor example for the Vietnamese. They had been forced to use their artillery defensively in the face of too few soldiers, poor communications,

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limited road networks, and insufficient equipment. Since the road network was so vital to their operations and the Viet Minh tactics centered on cutting this network, the French developed a series of small outposts along the roads, each with one or two guns and mutually supporting wherever possible. For this purpose they used approximately 400 weapons of mixed calibers, including U.S. 105­mm. and 155-mm. howitzers and UK 3.7-inch and 25-pound guns. These weapons were manned by crews of seven to eight men and usually were located in an outpost occupied by one or two infantry platoons. From these positions, artillery supported squad-size outposts positioned along roads and canals. As a result of this type of employment, the war was often known as the war of the "firing lieutenant." Each platoon of two guns was commanded by a French lieutenant who, because of his isolated location, actually conducted his own little war. Artillery employed in this static role was not organized into batteries or battalions. Thirty to forty guns were grouped under a small headquarters staff responsible for their administrative and logistical support.

Though the French employed their artillery primarily in a static role, they also had regular artillery battalions organized as division artillery. In early 1951, as Viet Minh operations approached conventional proportions, the French emphasized employment of these battalions in a conventional manner. But this offensive application of artillery was too little and too late to have any effect on the outcome of the war.

The defensive posture that the French adopted for their guns was readily copied by the South Vietnamese. Weapons were placed in static positions throughout the countryside, where they often remained for years at a time, and seldom were used to support offensive operations. A purely defensive role was disheartening; one could never win on the defensive but could only hold off an attack or lose. A defensive attitude came to permeate the ranks at all levels and resulted in operating procedures that would seem ridiculous to anyone who seriously intended to win. Mortars were withheld from outposts where they might do some good because of the illogical reasoning that the outposts might be overrun and the weapons seized. Certain types of special ammunition and mines were withheld for the same reasons. It could only be unsettling to the morale of the defenders that they were denied weapons that might save their lives.

This is not to deny that a system of scattered artillery outposts to provide area coverage was valid in itself. Hamlets, government compounds, and lines of communication required continuous ar-

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ARVN GUN SECTION. Typical 105-mm. position within a hamlet in Kontum Province, September 1963.

tillery protection. Still, after years of occupying static positions, methods of effectively employing artillery offensively were all but forgotten. Artillery not placed in static outposts was often held in unit motor pools when it should have been used to support ongoing operations or to relieve other artillery that could be so used. Artillery advisers relentlessly pushed their counterparts to move their howitzers out of the motor pools and their mortars out of arms rooms and, wherever possible, to move their guns out of the static outposts to support ground operations. From 1961 to 1965 there were some changes toward a more offensive spirit on the part of the Vietnamese artillery. Major General Charles J. Timmes, Chief MAAG, Vietnam, noted in June 1964 that there was less hoarding of weapons in motor pools and more of a tendency toward employing all available weapons in the field. He gave much of the credit for the improvement to field artillery advisers. In addition, a U.S. Army contact team noted in a report written in early 1965 that artillery weapons were being

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used frequently to support South Vietnamese Army operations and that there was little hesitation to move weapons in support of those operations. However, the same report noted that most often only two guns were used to support a battalion-size operation. The report was also critical of the fact that once a platoon of two guns was moved and emplaced to support an operation, it was seldom moved again throughout the duration of the operation.

Another poor operational practice was overcontrol of the artillery commander by the supported maneuver commander. The Vietnamese followed the strictest interpretation of the French artillery commander's relationship to the ground commanders. At regimental level, the infantry commander actually commanded artillery assigned to his support. This alone was not necessarily a bad practice. U.S. artillery doctrine permits it, particularly, as was often the case in Vietnam, when both maneuver and supporting forces are some distance from their parent units on semi­independent operations. Given the command of his supporting artillery, however, the Vietnamese ground commander had a tendency to over-involve himself in the details of its employment. He often selected weapon positions and required that the artillery obtain permission from him before firing. As a result, corps and division artillery commanders were powerless to influence the action through their subordinate artillery headquarters, which were controlled by the supported commanders. They could only make recommendations on the employment of their weapons to their respective corps or division commanders. If the recommendations were accepted, they were passed on as orders through ground command channels. Subordinate maneuver commanders were then responsible for the execution of the orders. Artillery battalion commanders had no more power than their superiors to influence the action of their batteries other than to make recommendations to their supported ground commanders. A more efficient use of the system would have been for the infantry commander to give only general guidance to his artillery on how best to support his maneuver plan. The artillery commander, the more knowledgeable of the two on fire support matters, then would have the freedom and flexibility necessary to deliver the most responsive support. Unfortunately, Vietnamese infantry commanders were leary of giving their subordinates such leeway.

Artillery advisers were justifiably critical of Vietnamese firing procedures. Again, Vietnamese ideas reflected past exposure to French techniques. The French forward observer computed firing data mentally and sent them directly to the guns. The data were not accurate but the system was speedy. The U.S. observer sent

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