ARTILLERY MISSIONS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES
DURING OPERATION MASHER/WHITE WING

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In addition to the artillery expended, the U.S. Navy supported the operation with 3,212 5-inch rounds, and the U.S. Air Force flew 515 tactical air sorties during which over 1,000 tons of ordnance were dropped.

Both tube and aerial artillery received a fair share of credit for enemy killed. Of particular value in this respect was information gleaned from prisoner interrogations. For example, a prisoner from the 8th Battalion, 18th North Vietnamese Army Regiment, revealed that on 3 February 1966, at the end of Operation MASHER, his unit had discovered and buried 200-400 bodies killed by artillery. All told, Operation MASHER/WHITE WING yielded 2,389 enemy casualties, of which 358 confirmed dead were credited to the field artillery.

On the whole, Operation MASHER/WHITE WING was a tremendous success in defeating the enemy and freeing the civilian populace of the Bong Son area from enemy control. The complete fire support system functioned effectively throughout this operation. Target acquisition resources, artillery survey, artillery aviation, firing batteries, and support elements all acted as a team. The cooperative effort and enthusiastic response of the South Vietnamese artillery contributed significantly to the over-all fire support coordination effort. On the U.S. side, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 19th Artillery (Airmobile), and the 1st Battalion (Airmobile), 77th Artillery, exchanged liaison personnel during the operation to permit the direct support battalion of one brigade more easily to provide support for maneuver units of another brigade. Artillery communications functioned smoothly throughout the operation, and, last but not least, despite the vast area covered by the operation, artillery survey personnel from both division artillery and the support battalions traversed in excess of 190,000 meters and established 18 survey control points during the operation. If there had been doubts as to how an entire division artillery would fare in its first large-scale operation, MASHER/WHITE WING erased them.

Another significant 1966 field artillery action occurred during Operation BIRMINGHAM. This operation is noteworthy because it involved a major movement of supporting field artillery that required detailed planning and coordination

The operation was initiated when Military Assistance Command directed a search and destroy operation into northwest Tay Ninh Province. Controlled by the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, Operation BIRMINGHAM was directed at locating and destroying Viet Cong forces and base camps in the area. The 1st Division was operating in the Phu Loi area, 50 kilometers southeast of Tay Ninh,

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when the division commander received word to displace to Tay Ninh Province within a week. The 1st Division Artillery had to plan and coordinate the displacement of elements from seven field artillery battalions. The result was the smooth displacement of 72 pieces of field artillery into Tay Ninh Province using all available means of transportation. The 1st Division Artillery Headquarters, functioning as the convoy control element, moved by road, with the 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery, and the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery, in the formation. Security for the convoy was provided by the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry ("Quarter Horse"). One battery of the 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery, moved by C-130 aircraft from Lai Khe to Tay Nih city. Air Force C-123 aircraft were used to displace a second battery of the 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery, from Binh Gia, southeast of. Saigon, to Tay Ninh. An attached battery of the 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery, was airlifted by CH-47 helicopter from Phu Loi. The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, under operational control of the 1st Division and in support of the South Vietnamese Airborne Brigade, moved separately by road; and a battery of 175­mm. guns, in general support of Operation BIRMINGHAM, moved by road to Soui Da To insure continuous and sufficient fire support for the road moves; the 1st Division Artillery Headquarters utilized its headquarters battery executive officer to coordinate fire support along the route of march.

Brigadier General (then Colonel) Marlin W. Camp, 1st Division Artillery commander, was justifiably proud of the manner in which the move was conducted. The success of the move is especially significant because friendly units had not ventured deep into northwest Tay Ninh Province in the past.

For field force artillery to provide maximum area coverage, certain of its firing units were required to occupy extremely remote positions. In such cases, movement to the positions and position preparation required detailed planning. Those weapons that provided the best area coverage by virtue of their long ranges were self-propelled weapons-8-inch howitzers and 175-mm. guns-too heavy to move by helicopter. For the most part, the "heavies" were restricted to movement by road.

Some of the roads over which self-propelled weapons moved were in remote areas which had long been in enemy hands. These roads could be expected to be heavily mined with their bridges destroyed. Extensive engineer support was required to open those roads and the engineers, like the artillery that followed, were subject to ambush at any time. Infantry and armor support was required to help open the roads, provide protection, and keep the

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roads open at least until the artillery movement was completed and support withdrawn.

In a war characterized by the frequent movement of field artillery, the displacement of Battery B, 7th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, in September 1967 is particularly impressive. The movement of Battery B was unusual because it was accomplished by Air Force tactical airlift. The battery, under the command of Captain Edward G. Walker, was moved from Bien Hoa air base to a landing strip at Song Be in heavily contested Phuc Long Province. To make the move, the weight of the weapons had to be reduced to the lift capacity of the aircraft. This was done by removing the weapons' spades and tubes and transporting them by C-130 aircraft. The carriages could then be lifted by C-124's. B Battery was positioned at the end of the Song Be airstrip from where its weapons could easily reach to the Cambodian border. The men of B Battery worked on their new position for a month and then turned it over to B Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery. Both batteries swapped their weapons to avoid the problem of having again to move weapons to and from a remote area. The artillery position at Song Be was occupied until June 1971. The weapons could not be withdrawn by air in the same manner in which they had been moved to Song Be, since the landing strip was able to accommodate aircraft landing at peak capacity loads but was insufficient to allow them to take off with these same loads. The weapons were, therefore, withdrawn over a road that had been opened and improved during the four years that the Song Be position was occupied.

As noted earlier, the first combat firing of the Beehive round occurred in November 1966. But it was the battle at Landing Zone BIRD in December that really woke up field artillerymen and infantrymen to the effectiveness of this new round.

BIRD was a fire base located in the Kim Son Valley some 50 kilometers north of Qui Nhon. (Map 6) No strangers to the valley, the 1st Cavalry Division had operated throughout the area since Operation MASHER/WHITE WING early in 1966. The landing zone had only one half-strength infantry company (Company C, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry) for security in addition to twelve howitzers (six 105-mm. and six 155-mm.). The surrounding terrain afforded good cover for an enemy force that might decide to attack the base. On the night of 26 December 1966, two companies of the 22d North Vietnamese Army Regiment decided to test the light defenses and silently moved to within feet of the outer perimeter of BIRD.

Shortly after midnight the enemy launched a coordinated mortar and ground attack against the position. The attack penetrated

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Map 6

the base from both the northeast and southeast. Driven slowly back, the defenders found themselves cornered in the south end of the base in the vicinity of gun number 2 of the 105-mm. battery position. Almost in desperation, Captain Leonard L. Schlenker, the battery commander, ordered the firing of Beehive and First Lieutenant John T. Piper, the battery executive officer, loaded the round, yelled a warning, and fired the round to the northeast in the direction of the enemy main attack. One hundred enemy soldiers were at the northeast corner of the fire base, in and around the

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number 1 gun position of the 155-mm. battery. Piper fired one additional round and the attack was halted as suddenly as it had begun.

The United States lost 30 men killed in action at BIRD while claiming 266 known enemy dead. For doggedly beating back a determined and numerically superior enemy, the three units at BIRD (Battery B, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery; Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery; and Company C, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry) were all presented the Presidential Unit Citation. Sergeant Delbert O. Jennings, weapons platoon sergeant, was awarded the Medal of Honor for his bravery, and Lieutenant Piper and Staff Sergeant Carrol V. Crain, Battery B chief of firing battery, both received the Distinguished Service Cross for their action.

The most important benefit derived from the action at BIRD was recognition that the Beehive round was a tremendously valuable asset to the over-all fire base defense program. It had gained the confidence and respect of both artillerymen and infantrymen and would continue to play a vital role in position defense throughout the remainder of the war.

The Buildup and Major Combat Operations During 1967

The year 1967 saw a continued growth in the number of field artillery units in the Republic of Vietnam. During that year, eleven nondivisional field artillery battalions arrived in Vietnam and began supporting operations in various parts of the country. They were joined by three additional division artilleries. In January, the 9th Division Artillery set up its headquarters in Bearcat, and in late 1967, the remainder of the Screaming Eagles of the 101st Airborne Division joined their 1st Brigade. In a ceremony held at Chu Lai in September 1967, Task Force OREGON was redesignated the 23d (Americal) Division and thus was also born the Americal Division Artillery. The task force had been in existence since mid-1967 and was composed of three separate infantry brigades.

In contrast to the previous year, 1967 was highlighted by large­scale, multidivisional operations. The year was only a week old when Operation CEDAR FALLS began. Controlled by II Field Force, CEDAR FALLS involved the 1st and 25th Divisions, the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and separate battalions of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. The operation was directed against the enemy Military Region IV headquarters and strongholds in the Iron Triangle region of III Corps. The success of the operation (389 enemy killed, 471 defectors) attested

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to the ability of the Free World forces to work together, fight side by side, and produce a well coordinated, multidivision offensive.

While CEDAR FALLS was in full swing in the Iron Triangle, II Field Force planners were putting the final wraps on plans for subsequent operations. The largest offensive planned to date, Operation JUNCTION CITY had been on the drawing boards for months. It was aimed at Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army strongholds in War Zone C, in northern Tay Ninh Province, which had long been a major Viet Cong stronghold and the location of the headquarters for the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN). COSVN, the controlling headquarters for all Viet Cong activities in South Vietnam, had always been an elusive target and continued to be throughout the war.

Committed to JUNCTION CITY were two U.S. divisions (1st and 25th), five brigades (173d Airborne; 196th Light Infantry; 199th Light Infantry; 3d Brigade, 4th Division; and 1st Brigade, 9th Division), and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. II Field Force, Vietnam, under the command of Lieutenant General Jonathan O. Seaman, was the controlling headquarters for the operation. II Field Force Artillery, commanded by Brigadier General Willis D. Crittenberger, Jr., provided six field artillery battalions and four batteries of Dusters and quad.-50 machine guns from the 5th Battalion (AWSP), 2d Artillery. II Field Force assets were divided equally between the 1st and 25th Divisions, the two major subordinate elements. An additional eleven artillery battalions were committed to the operation in various support roles. A list of the participating field artillery units is shown below:

II Field Force Artillery Units

7-9 Arty (105 T) attached 1st Div
2-13 Arty (105 T), attached 1st Div
2-11 Arty (155 T)
6-27 Arty (8/175)
2-32 Arty (8 / 175)
2-35 Arty (155 SP)
5-2 Arty (AWSP)

25th Infantry Division Artillery

1-8 Arty (105 T)
7-11 Arty (105 T)
2-77 (Arty 105 T)
3-13 Arty (105 T)
3-82 Arty (105 T) OPCON, DS 196th Bde
Btry A, B, C, 11th ACR, OPCON, Supporting 11 th ACR 1st Infantry Division Artillery
1-5 Arty (105 T)

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1-7 Arty (105 T)
2-33 Arty (105 T)
8-6 Arty (1558)
3-319 Arty (Abn) (105 T), OPCON, DS 173d Abn Bde

JUNCTION CITY was initially a two-phase operation; Phase I (22 February-17 March 1967) called for a coordinated assault into western War Zone C and search and destroy operations against the Central Office and enemy forces and installations in the area. Phase II (18 March-15 April 1967) called for a shift of emphasis to eastern War Zone C and continuation of search and destroy operations throughout the remainder of the war zone. The success of these first two phases resulted in a third (16 April-14 May), which called for a continuation of search and destroy operations to the southern edge of the war zone and the provision of security for the city of Tay Ninh and the town of Soui Da (Map 7) For Phase III, II Field Force passed control of the operation to the 25th Infantry Division.

The objectives of Operation JUNCTION CITY were accomplished to varying degrees. The Viet Cong lost 2,728 soldiers. A number of his base camps and supply caches were destroyed, forcing him to move. Although the operation did not destroy the enemy's capability to wage war, JUNCTION CITY can be said to have put him significantly off balance and to have eliminated War Zone C as a haven for enemy units. During the operation, U.S. forces constructed in War Zone C three C-130 airfields and two civilian irregular defense group camps, giving Free World forces readily accessible points from which to launch future operations in the area should the need arise.

JUNCTION CITY required most of the U.S. ground forces available in the III Corps area, and a commensurate amount of field artillery supported the operation. The massive coordination effort dictated by the employment of the equivalent of seventeen field artillery battalions was effected with surprising ease. The completeness with which the operation was planned is, in large part, the explanation for its success. To facilitate command and control of the operation, II Field Force for the first time displaced a tactical headquarters to the field. Collocated with the tactical command post was the II Field Force Artillery command post. In addition, II Field Force Artillery tapped the resources of its 54th Artillery Group to provide a controlling headquarters for the separate howitzer batteries of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The technique proved to be a success in aiding the coordination between firing units. For the remainder of the field artillery battalions, existing liaison sections proved sufficient in strength to provide

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liaison between units. Unit boundaries were used as fire coordination lines throughout the operations, and the II Field Force fire support plan authorized direct coordination between divisions and supporting artillery groups. Field artillery fire planning was accomplished by division and separate brigades.

The most significant combat action during Operation JUNCTION CITY took place around Fire Support Base GOLD, seventeen miles northwest of Tay Ninh. The fire base was occupied jointly by the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, of the 3d Brigade, 4th Division, and the headquarters and all firing batteries of the 2d Battalion, 77th Field Artillery. At 0640 on 21 March infantry patrols sweeping the area around GOLD made contact with elements of a Viet Cong force apparently preparing to attack the base. The contact prematurely triggered the enemy attack which began with heavy fire from recoilless rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and 60-mm. and 82-mm. mortars. At 0715 the Viet Cong launched a coordinated ground assault from the east, southeast, and north with elements of five battalions under the control of the 272d Viet Cong Regiment. So violent was the assault that the enemy carried portions of the perimeter, but actions by the field artillery turned the tide. All batteries of the 2d Battalion, 77th Field Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John W. Vessey, engaged the enemy with over 1,000 rounds in direct fire including 30 rounds of Beehive, the largest number of these rounds fired in a single engagement to date. At the same time three batteries within range added their fire. The batteries included Battery C, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery (105-mm., towed), to the south which delivered more than 1,000 rounds; Battery B, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery (155-mm., self­propelled), which delivered almost 400 rounds; and a composite 8-inch and 175-mm. battery from II Field Force Artillery to the south which provided additional support. Further fire support was provided by Air Force tactical air. During the attack two maneuver battalions of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, were rushed to the scene, catching the enemy forces as they were attempting to withdraw and inflicting further casualties. The action in and around GOLD resulted in 635 Viet Cong killed (confirmed by body count) and 7 captured together with 65 crew served weapons and 94 individual weapons. U.S. losses were 31 killed and 109 wounded. The action was given the name Battle of Soui Tre after the fact.

Field artillery units involved in Operation JUNCTION CITY gained invaluable experience in employment, tactics, and techniques in a large-scale, multidivision offensive operation. To help preserve the element of surprise, field artillery units usually fired preparations of short duration; the fires of large numbers of units

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Map 7

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were massed to insure the effectiveness of preparations yet to maintain brevity. A problem was the lack of a large number of suitable field artillery positions. Thus, several artillery units were often consolidated at one location. Landing Zone BLACKHORSE at one point in the operation housed 52 field artillery tubes-five 105-mm. batteries, three 155-mm. batteries, and an 8-inch battery. The disadvantages of crowding artillery into one location and presenting a lucrative target were far outweighed by being able to mass accurately the fires of a large number of weapons from a few locations.

Since the element of surprise was essential, extensive position area surveys were impractical; the field artillery instead employed a relatively new technique called photogrammetic survey. Basically, the technique utilized air reconnaissance photos, the prominent terrain features in the photos serving as registration points and survey control points for position area survey. Although limited, the method proved far superior to that of obtaining coordinates by map inspection and served as a valuable expedient during the operation.

Several other artillery-related techniques used successfully during JUNCTION CITY deserve mention:

1. Artillery warning control centers (AWCC's) played a vital role in the operation. The tremendous number of aircraft in the area coupled with the large amount of constant artillery firing necessitated timely and accurate artillery advisories for aircraft. The 1st and 25th Divisions operated centers for their respective areas of operation during Phase I of the operation. During Phase II, such responsibility was delegated to the direct support artillery battalion in each brigade area of operation. The advantage of this system was that data were always current and did not have to be consolidated at a central location. One center in an area as large as that encompassed by JUNCTION CITY would necessitate an unacceptably heavy volume of radio traffic.

2. High-angle fire was proved to be more effective in penetrating the thick jungle foliage than low-angle fire, principally because the projectile descended steeply, paralleling the tree trunks, so that the chance of its hitting a tree and detonating prematurely was reduced. High-angle fire in the jungle also assured added safety for supported ground troops. If high-angle fires detonated prematurely, they did so almost directly over their target. On the other hand, if low-angle fires detonated prematurely they did so some distance laterally from the target, possibly directly over the heads of friendly troops.

3. During the operation, the effectiveness of the AN / MPQ-4A radar was proven. Careful planning prior to the operation resulted

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in the placement of radars to provide mutual and overlapping coverage of the various units and fire support bases. Each radar had a primary direction of coverage as well as alternate directions. If a fire base came under attack, usually a radar at another fire base would pick up the enemy rounds before the radar on the fire base under attack would. This flexibility greatly enhanced the ability of U.S. Forces to deliver rapid counterbattery fire.

4. On D-day, 22 February 1967, the artillerymen of Battery A, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, under operational control of the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne, participated in the only U.S. parachute assault conducted in the war. Led by the battery commander, Captain Charles C. Anderson, the entire battery parachuted into the area around Katum. The howitzers were dropped into the landing zone by C-130's. From a position established in the vicinity of the landing zone, Battery A provided direct artillery support for search and destroy operations conducted by maneuver elements in the vicinity of Katum.

In spite of the magnitude of the operation and the amount of artillery involved in JUNCTION CITY, there were surprisingly few problem areas of major significance. The most significant was in fire support. During the operation, field artillery fires were frequently lifted to accommodate tactical air support, which is a bad practice. If supporting fires are properly coordinated, the need to check fire field artillery should rarely occur. When it does occur maneuver forces are slighted because only when all available supporting fires, regardless of type, are able to function simultaneously will they provide the best possible support.

On the whole, JUNCTION CITY was a successful operation. In the years of combat that followed, U.S. and allied forces maintained the capability of reentering War Zone C at will. All artillerymen participating in the operation could take great pride in having contributed so effectively to the accomplishment of the mission.

Perhaps it is only fitting that 1967, the "year of the big battles," should end as it had begun. Operation JUNCTION CITY began the year; the battle for Dak To ended it. Although much of the heavy fighting in 1967 took place in the south (for example, CEDAR FALLS, JUNCTION CITY, and the battle at Loc Ninh), Dak To was to the north in the Central Highlands of Kontum Province. The battle for Dak To was part of MACARTHUR, an operation that extended into early 1969.

Reacting to intelligence reports that indicated a large buildup of enemy troops in Kontum Province, the 4th Infantry Division deployed its 1st Brigade to the Dak To airfield in late October

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1967. On 2 November, a North Vietnamese Army reconnaissance sergeant defected and revealed that four infantry regiments and an artillery regiment were preparing to launch a large-scale attack against the Dak To-Tanh Canh area. This would have been the largest enemy offensive in the Central Highlands area to that time.

The 1st Brigade initially made heavy contact with the enemy to the south and southwest of Dak To throughout the first week in November. Augmented by the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 1st Brigade maintained heavy contact throughout the Ben Het-Dak To area. Additional assistance came from the 42d South Vietnamese Army Regiment, operating to the east of Dak To, and from the 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, which blocked enemy withdrawal routes to the south of Ben Het-Dak To. As the fighting intensified, the enemy was forced to commit his reserves to cover his withdrawal toward the southwest. The bitter fighting that followed ranks with the fiercest of the war. The turning point of the action was the fight for Hill 875, which was finally taken by elements of both the 4th Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade but not before the hill "received the heaviest concentration of Tac Air and all calibers of artillery bombardment of any single terrain feature in the II Corps area."

After the operation, Major General William R. Peers, commander of the 4th Division, acknowledged the role played by the artillery in the battle: "The large number of enemy in the area and the fact that many of the contacts were against elaborately constructed enemy fortifications required that Tac Air and artillery be used at the maximum rates possible. The responsiveness of both air and artillery and the cooperation between them contributed greatly to the victory and was a real tribute to integrated direct support under difficult circumstances."

The artillery committed in the battle of Dak To consisted of 15 batteries of all calibers, with a total of 77 artillery pieces available for support. These figures do not include the battery of aerial rocket artillery that became available when the 1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division joined the operation on 11 November. Battery A (ARA), 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery, assumed a general support­reinforcing role. The U.S. aerial rocket artillery, coupled with the enemy's use of rockets, led to the unfamiliar sight of rockets being employed against rockets.

Artillery expenditures for the 37-day period exceeded 150,000 rounds of all calibers. Artillery units completed 48 tactical displacements to meet the constantly changing demands of the battle. To eliminate fire support coordination problems, the 4th Infantry Division Artillery sent a tactical command post to Dak To on 9

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Map 8

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November and U.S. artillery batteries provided liaison personnel to the fire direction centers of the three supporting Vietnamese artillery batteries. The effectiveness of the fire support coordination effort is evidenced by the successful integration of 2,096 tactical air sorties and 45 B-52 strikes during the operation. The battle of Dak To cost the enemy 1,644 lives and rendered three North Vietnamese Army infantry regiments ineffective, totally disrupting enemy plans for a major victory in the Central Highlands.

The holiday truce ended abruptly on New Year's Day 1968 for the defenders of Fire Support Base BURT, a 25th Infantry Division base located ten kilometers south of the Cambodian border. (Map 8) Beginning with sporadic mortar attacks in the late afternoon, the enemy sent four Viet Cong battalions against the base. Among the defenders were two batteries of 105-mm. and one battery of 155-mm. howitzers. The enemy ground attack commenced minutes before midnight, the official end of the truce. After a diversionary attack on the west side of the perimeter, defended by elements of the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mechanized), the enemy launched his main attack from the southeast, a sector defended by Company C, 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, and Battery C, 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery. As the enemy slowly worked his way toward the bunker line, the artillery shifted from countermortar to direct fire in answer to a call from the infantry command post. Battery C began firing a heavy volume of direct fire with both high explosive and Beehive ammunition. The enemy attack slowed in the face of the artillery but picked up to the south of the fire support base, a sector manned by Company C, 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, and Battery A, 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery. Battery A commenced direct fire, and flare ships and armed helicopters were used extensively throughout the south side of the base. Fire Support Base BEAUREGARD, located twelve kilometers to the west, provided supporting fire west of BURT in an attempt to prevent the enemy from reinforcing or withdrawing in that direction. The 155-mm. (self-propelled) howitzers of Battery C, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery, located on the north side of the fire base, supplied continuous direct fire to the north, northeast, and northwest. In addition to the direct fire, indirect fire from both BURT and BEAUREGARD was shifted out to the road running south from BURT. Although they were not discovered until daylight, two enemy battalions were assembled on that road as a reserve force to exploit weaknesses in the perimeter, If weaknesses existed, the two battalions never found them. By 0300, tactical air had arrived and was pounding the area to the south. The fires of the artillery gunships and tactical air broke up the Viet Cong attack: by 0600 contact was broken and 400 enemy lay dead in and around the base.

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Diagram 7

The artillerymen of the 25th Division played a vital role in the success of the operation. In addition to maintaining a constant stream of both direct and indirect fire, artillery personnel cut out hasty landing zones for resupply aircraft and broke out and distributed over 1,500 rounds of artillery and mortar ammunition and 200,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, all during the hours of darkness and in the heat of battle. In addition, they established an improvised air station in the fire direction center of Battery C, 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery, and assisted in the treatment and evacuation of the wounded.

Despite the heroic actions of the 25th Division personnel, the battle cost 23 lives and 153 wounded. The successful integration of infantry, artillery, and air power had saved Fire Support Base BURT. The battle of Soui Cut is a typical example of many such actions that occurred during the war in Vietnam. It is representative of well coordinated position defense and fire support.

A second example of a determined defense by field artillerymen occupying a fire base occurred during the early morning hours of 14 October 1967. Battery A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery (105-mm.), and Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155­mm.), were occupying an unnamed fire base on a ridge line in support of elements of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, during Operation WHEELER. The fire base, which had been occupied for almost a month, was located halfway between Tam Ky and Thien Phuoc in the I Corps region.

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To assist in the defense of the base, a force of 75 civilian irregular defense group (CIDG) personnel manned the perimeter bunkers. For further security, Battery A nightly posted guards at each howitzer, the fire direction center, and the ammunition section. Because of the difficulty in distinguishing them from the enemy at night, the irregulars had been instructed to remain within their bunkers during the hours of darkness.

The perimeter bunkers were on the edge of a steep dropoff along the narrow ridge line. Because of the steepness of the slope, it was impossible to observe activity directly below the bunkers. It was up these steep slopes that a platoon of sappers crept during the early morning hours and pre-positioned themselves for an attack on the 105-mm. battery. Their objective was to capture the weapons and turn them on the 155-mm. battery and infantry battalion headquarters, which were located on either side of the 105-mm. battery position.

At 0320, in extreme darkness, mortars, rockets, and recoilless rifles unleashed a devastating barrage on the area in conjunction with the sapper attack. Every position within the battery area was known to the enemy before the attack. The radios in the fire direction center were destroyed immediately. A sapper tossed a grenade into the center and then reached in and placed a satchel charge directly on top of the two VRC-46 radios. The enemy so effectively infiltrated the battery area that the artillerymen had no chance to repulse the initial attack; instead, the fighting began within the parapets. That the crewmen of the weapons were able to return fire with their howitzers testified to their discipline and courage. Although the enemy seemed to be everywhere in the battery area, the battery commander, executive officer, and first sergeant, though wounded, moved from weapon to weapon, helping the more seriously wounded and assisting in the delivery of fire.

Each weapon parapet had its own private war going by this time. All the men of number 1 section had been wounded by the initial mortar attack; nevertheless, the section chief, Staff Sergeant Webster Anderson, and his men moved into the parapet and directed fire upon the enemy. Grenades fell all around them, but neither Anderson nor his men faltered. Two mortar rounds landed at Anderson's feet and severely mangled his lower legs. Although in great pain, he managed to move around in the protective parapet and continued to inspire his men. When a grenade landed next to one of his wounded cannoneers, Anderson grabbed the grenade and threw it from the parapet. In the process, his hand was blown off. The executive officer came upon number 1 weapon at this time and, seeing Sergeant Anderson's condition, moved him to medical aid.

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BATTERY A, 2D BATTALION, 320TH FIELD ARTILLERY, IN POSITION ON OPERATION WHEELER. An example of a small, crowded ridgeline position.

For his actions, Sergeant Anderson later received the Medal of Honor.

By now the battery commander had retrieved the sole remaining radio and had directed defensive fires upon the enemy weapon positions. These fires, in conjunction with direct fires from the 105-mm. howitzers, silenced the enemy. The Viet Cong were finally driven from the battery perimeter after more than two hours of close combat. The infantry battalion headquarters and the 155-mm. battery had not received a single enemy round during the battle. Because of the unknown nature and size of the enemy force, these two units were forced to man their own defenses and were initially unable to assist Battery A. Because of extremely bad weather, the only aircraft flying that night were medical evacuation helicopters, and even they had to be directed into the fire base by the battalion Q-4 radar, which was collocated with the 155-mm. battery. A total of three medevac aircraft evacuated the wounded and dead from the battery area under the worst possible flying conditions.

Morning found Battery A with 6 killed and 29 wounded out of

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an initial strength of 49. Twenty-two of the wounded required evacuation. The civilian irregulars lost 6 killed and 5 wounded. Fifty-six craters from 82-mm. mortar rounds were counted in the battery position. At least five mortar rounds had landed in each section parapet. Rocket and recoilless rifle flashes had been observed and fired upon by the 105-mm. and 155-mm. batteries. Although the 105-mm. battery was hurt badly during the attack, the objective of the enemy force was not realized. The field artillerymen stood by their weapons in the face of overwhelming odds and repulsed the enemy from the battery area without losing a single howitzer.

Still another example of determined defense of a fire support base occurred on 18 November 1967 at the opposite end of the country from Operation WHEELER, at Fire Support Base CUDGEL. It was one of three bases established in support of 9th Infantry Division units participating in Operation KEN GIANG in western Dinh Thong Province.

The operation began at dawn on 15 November from a staging area at Dong Tam, the 9th Division command post. In order to locate an area of dry ground large enough to accommodate four guns of his 105-mm. howitzer battery, the commander of Battery C, 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery, Captain Dennis J. Schaible, accompanied the first flight of infantry. For security reasons, reconnaissance of the area had been limited to one brief flyover three days before the operation. Forty-five minutes after the insertion, the battery commander had located an area suitable for the four howitzers. This area was later named Fire Support Base CUDGEL. Fifteen minutes after the crews had lowered the first howitzer to the mushy ground, Battery C commenced preparation fires in support of positions previously selected for the other two fire bases. Later in the morning after the insertion of two infantry battalions into the area of operations, three howitzers of Battery D, 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery, joined Battery C at CUDGEL. Battery D was the first battery employed in Vietnam with the airmobile firing, platform, and this was its first operation. The four guns of Battery C were positioned near the northern perimeter and the three guns of Battery D flanked the southern portion of the perimeter. With the addition of elements (battalion headquarters, Company C, and the reconnaissance platoon) from the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, which would join the two artillery batteries at CUDGEL on the 17th, the cast of players was set for the battle of Fire Support Base CUDGEL.

The base was bordered on the west by a canal approximately 33 feet wide and 10 feet deep. On the north was a canal with similar dimensions and running east to west. To the south were scrub woods and thick undergrowth, and to the east were open rice paddies. The

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reconnaissance platoon was deployed on the western portion of the perimeter across the north-south canal, since the canal offered a good line of protection against enemy advance and was a good terrain feature on which to fix the two flanks of the company defensive position. The right flank of the reconnaissance platoon, on the west side of the canal, was linked with the left flank of the 2d Platoon, Company C, which was on the east side of the canal. The 2d Platoon stretched to the east and linked up with the 4th Platoon, which extended south. The right flank of the 4th Platoon linked with the 3d Platoon, which deployed south and west to tie in with the 1st Platoon on the south. The right flank of the 1st Platoon, on the east side of the north-south canal, joined with the left flank of the reconnaissance platoon, along the west side of the canal. In addition to the perimeter established by the infantry company and reconnaissance platoon, Battery C had prepared automatic weapons positions on the east side of the north-south canal as a backup defensive position. A hot line between the battery fire direction center and the infantry battalion command post provided vital communications for the integrated defense.

Intelligence had disclosed a heavy concentration of Viet Cong forces in the area. Battery C cannoneers prepared sandbagged positions as a precaution before dark on their first night at the fire support base. They improved their positions at every opportunity during the occupation of CUDGEL. Preparations were extremely difficult because the water level was less than one foot below the ground. All the foxholes filled with water and most of the protection had to be constructed above the soggy surface of the base.

Soon after the occupation of the perimeter by the reconnaissance platoon, one member of the platoon saw what he thought to be someone wearing a helmet and crouching next to a stand of palm trees directly west of the position. The soldier was unarmed at the time; when he returned with his weapon to investigate, he could find nothing and did not report the incident.

At 2130 the men of one of the listening posts set out by the reconnaissance platoon intercepted a Viet Cong scout and killed him with a burst from an M60 machine gun. Around 0150 the south side of the fire support base perimeter came under heavy fire. The 1st Platoon of Company C was in danger of being overrun. Within minutes, an intense mortar barrage fell on the positions occupied by the reconnaissance platoon and Battery C. This seemed to be a signal for enemy forces on the southwest of the perimeter to attack the reconnaissance platoon positions. It was later estimated that one company assaulted the reconnaissance platoon on the south and west to provide a base of fire with mortars and

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Map 9

recoilless rifles while two companies maneuvered against Company C on the south.

When the mortar barrage began in the Battery C area, most of the men cried "incoming" and dived for protection. The battery commander and the fire direction officer (FDO) were in the fire direction center. Within seconds after the first mortar rounds burst in the battery area, the officer was on the radio requesting that supporting artillery prepare to fire the defensive concentrations to the south and west of the battery position. At the same time the battery commander was on the hot line to the infantry battalion command post and informed the infantry battalion commander that the fire direction center was in contact with the mutually supporting artillery and requested permission from the battalion commander to call for defensive concentrations. Though permission was quickly granted, it was ten to fifteen minutes before the first artillery support from a sister battery was received. The enemy had also mortared Fire Support Base MACE, a few kilometers away, just before the ground and mortar attack on CUDGEL. (Map 9)

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The battery supporting CUDGEL was also supporting MACE and was already engaged in a fire mission when the call from the Battery C fire direction center was received.

In the battle that raged for the next 1 1/2 hours, the Viet Cong forces made a desperate attempt to penetrate the southwest portion of the perimeter by overrunning the reconnaissance platoon left flank and Company C right flank. They came perilously close to achieving their goal.

The reconnaissance platoon and the 1st and 3d Platoons of Company C were the most heavily engaged infantry forces during the battle. The fighting in their sector was so fierce and at such close range that each position seemed to be isolated by intense enemy fire in a struggle for individual survival. The battle had been going on for approximately 30 minutes when the reconnaissance platoon leader gave the order to pull back across the canal to the positions occupied by Battery C. As the platoon evacuated its position, the enemy rushed forward and set up recoilless rifle and automatic weapons positions aimed point blank into the Battery C position across the canal.

As soon as the reconnaissance platoon began to withdraw across the canal, Battery C was subjected to intensive automatic rifle, rifle grenade, and recoilless rifle fire. The battery commander requested and received permission from the infantry battalion commander to engage the advancing Viet Cong units with direct artillery fire. Permission to fire Beehive rounds was withheld, however, until the reconnaissance platoon had crossed the canal. Three of the four howitzers had been firing an illumination mission when the attack began and were pointed away from the direction of the enemy advance. Within a few minutes, the crews had turned the pieces around and taken the onrushing enemy under fire. The battery commander and the chiefs of sections adjusted the high-explosive direct fire while the fire direction officer was on the radio adjusting the indirect supporting fire.

The Viet Cong countered with recoilless rifle and heavy machine gun fire. The first round from the recoilless rifle missed the guns and its flash provided a target for howitzer number 2. The cannoneers of number 2 fired at the recoilless rifle, but their first round was low. It struck the canal just below the target, exploded on contact with the bank, and sent mud and fragments back into the battery position. As the crew was about to fire a second round, a recoilless rifle scored a direct hit on the front carriage of the howitzer. The blast wounded the entire section. The tires and sling-load cushioning on the howitzer burst into flame. One of the cannoneers, Private First Class Sammy L. Davis, struggled to his

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feet and returned to the now furiously burning howitzer. Disregarding a hail of small-arms fire directed against the position, he aimed and fired the howitzer. The damaged weapon recoiled violently and slammed Davis to the ground. Undaunted, he returned to the piece, but a mortar round exploded within 20 meters of his position and compounded his wounds. Private Davis loaded the howitzer, aimed it, and fired; this time he destroyed the recoilless rifle. Again the recoil of the howitzer knocked him to the ground, sent the howitzer skidding into a hole, and rendered it inoperable.

By this time, most of the reconnaissance platoon had reached the friendly side of the canal. The artillerymen of Battery C dragged many of the infantrymen from the canal. Three men from one of the platoon listening posts were not so fortunate; the Viet Cong attack had cut them off. As the battle progressed, a round from another battery landed immediately in front of them. They decided that they must abandon their position or be annihilated by their own artillery. As they started back, another artillery round landed behind them and wounded two of the three men. They continued to low crawl back toward the canal. As they reached the bank of the canal, they saw the recoilless rifle that Davis had knocked out. Not knowing that the round that had knocked out the recoilless rifle had also put the howitzer out of action, they yelled across to the artillery to cease firing. Hearing their cries for help, Davis and another member of number 2 gun section, Private First Class William H. Murray, went to help the wounded men. Despite his painful wounds and his inability to swim, Davis picked up an air mattress and he and Murray struck out across the deep canal to rescue three men. Upon reaching the men, all of whom had by this time sustained wounds, Davis took up a position on the canal bank and fired on the Viet Cong, who were swarming the western bank, while Murray ferried the most seriously wounded infantryman across the canal. After emptying five magazines into the charging enemy, Davis and Murray floated the remaining two wounded infantrymen across the canal. Though still suffering from neglected wounds, Davis refused medical attention, joined another howitzer crew, and assisted in firing until the attack was broken later in the morning. For his action, Private Davis received the Medal of Honor, which was presented to him by President Johnson at the White House exactly one year from the date of the battle.

While Davis was fighting his private battle with the recoilless rifle, the other howitzer sections were also heavily engaged. By 0245 the 3d Platoon, manning the southern perimeter, had fallen back to the battery position. The platoon leader had been seriously wounded and the platoon sergeant killed. With a second side of the

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perimeter now open, gun number 4 once again shifted trails to level direct fire south into the vacant perimeter area. Throughout the raging battle, the battery commander continually requested permission to fire Beehive in hopes of breaking up the attack. Finally permission came, and Battery C fired a total of 21 Beehive rounds. Just after the first of these was fired, number 3 gun received a direct hit from a recoilless rifle. Although the recoil mechanism was leaking oil, the crew continued to fire the Beehive rounds until the piece would no longer return to battery. As the last of the Beehive rounds was fired, and almost as quickly as the firing had begun, that attack withered. By this time helicopter gunships and a C-47 Spooky had arrived on station to add their fire power against the retreating enemy forces.

When the battle was over, 22 of the 44 artillerymen of Battery C had been wounded. Two of the 4 howitzers had been destroyed and over 600 direct fire rounds, including the 21 Beehive rounds, had been fired at the enemy. The infantry suffered 6 killed and 76 wounded. The official number of enemy killed in the operation was placed at 83, but estimates of the actual enemy losses were more than twice that number. The efforts of Private Davis and the other field artillerymen in Battery C turned what could have been a Viet Cong victory into a clear defeat.

Overview: 1965 to Pre-Tet 1968

As 1967 drew to an end, the enemy was busy formulating plans for an offensive to be launched throughout Vietnam in celebration of Tet 1968. The eve of Tet is a good vantage point from which to look back on the U.S. Field artillery's first 2 1/2 years of combat in Vietnam.

Beginning on 5 May 1965, with the commitment of the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 319th Artillery, the U.S. Army involvement had increased until 54 artillery battalions were in various supporting roles throughout Vietnam. In nearly 1,000 days of combat, artillery progress and accomplishments contributed significantly to the success of the U.S. tactical mission. Artillerymen adapted to the unique situation posed in Vietnam. The length of time between the Korean War and the start of combat operations in Vietnam had deprived the Army of a high level of combat experienced personnel. Combat experience was the exception rather than the rule at company and battalion levels in all branches. Further, the nature of the Vietnam war negated much of the conventional war experience possessed by those who had previously been in combat. To overcome this inexperience and unfamiliarity with counterguerrilla opera-

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tions, the field artilleryman needed to be more creative, innovative, and flexible than ever before. Artillerymen fulfilled this need with the utmost professionalism.

From the first few informal reports from the field in 1965 through the volumes of operational reports and lessons learned that became formalized by 1967, the message was clear: the basic doctrine, tactics, and techniques that had been followed for years by artillerymen were still valid, but some modifications of the manner in which they were applied were necessary. These modifications initially resulted in problems, which were listed and discussed to determine expeditiously the best and most feasible solutions. Experiences were shared with artillerymen worldwide to insure against repetition of the same mistakes and to better provide adequate fire support.

Probably no artilleryman of any grade or position proved more flexible in the face of adversity than the forward observer. Every maneuver company was assigned a field artillery forward observer who traveled with the company and called for and adjusted supporting fires. The "eyes and ears of the artillery," as he is often called, the forward observer in Vietnam faced many disadvantages in the early months of the war. A lieutenant by table of organization and equipment, the observer was often a young noncommissioned officer or enlisted soldier, in his first combat tour, and trained in the principles of conventional war. In Vietnam he encountered thick forest and jungle and, more often than not, lack of visibility of the target area. This often necessitated the adjustment of artillery by sound, something he was not trained to do. The nature of operations in Vietnam often resulted in infantry platoons and squads operating semi-independently, away from the company command post. Control of the platoons and squads kept company commanders so busy that the forward observer's responsibilities often included maintaining accurate and current locations of the company and subordinate elements. This was a significant problem, compounded by the fact that vegetation often obscured prominent terrain features and visible reference points. The 1st Cavalry Division reported in 1965 that their forward observers, hampered by dense jungle, had improvised a rope and sling device with which to climb trees in order to observe artillery fire. Common methods of resolving map reading problems were the "pace and count" method of land navigation and the firing of a spotting round of smoke or white phosphorus, which was detonated in the air above a location that had been predetermined by the fire direction center and passed to the forward observer. In a series of taped interviews with company commanders who had served in Vietnam, the general consensus was

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AERIAL FIELD ARTILLERY COBRA IN FLIGHT

that map reading and responsibilities for maintaining unit locations were best left in the hands of the artillery forward observer.

Another problem area for the observer was the employment of aerial rocket artillery, which was relatively new. The forward observer had received little if any training in aerial rocket artillery adjustment. He had to gain confidence in the system, but once that was accomplished, aerial rocket artillery inevitably became his "trump card."

Artillery commanders in Vietnam were quick to recognize the need for well-trained, able observers. In 1965, a large proportion of "combat notes" and reports from the field emphasized the importance of the forward observer section to the successful accomplishment of the fire support mission. Initial reports from the 173d Airborne Brigade stressed the need for cross-training of personnel in these sections. The reconnaissance sergeant and the radiotelephone operator often had to assume fire-support responsibilities

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AERIAL FIELD ARTILLERY COBRA AND LIGHT OBSERVATION HELICOPTER form hunter-killer team.

and some were not qualified to do so. In addition, it was believed that forward observers were not being properly utilized as a source of intelligence. It was concluded that more emphasis should be given to correcting these shortcomings during training in the continental United States.

Firing batteries throughout Vietnam experienced several common problems. Tables of organization and equipment prescribed personnel levels and authorizations that made 24-hour operation a severe strain on personnel. Modification of tables was necessary to permit round-the-clock operations, particularly in the fire direction center. Large areas of operation and great distances between battalions and their batteries put the emphasis on the battery center as the primary source of firing data. Often the battalion fire direction control mission became more a matter of control than direction. Too, mountainous terrain often hampered communications and thus the battery center had to check its own firing data. The frequent splitting of batteries meant that a battery had constantly to maintain the personnel and equipment to establish and maintain several fire direction centers. Another challenge for the field artilleryman was his new-found mobility resulting from the extensive

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use of the helicopter. Few individual replacements had much if any training in airmobility, yet all towed artillery units had to be ready to move on a moment's notice. The versatility of the artilleryman offset his lack of experience. Units that had never displaced by air learned, and learned quickly. Occasionally peacetime habits, both good and bad, cropped up in Vietnam. One such habit, a negative one but easily correctable, was cited by the 23d Artillery Group. Delays in firing often occurred in firing sections with new section chiefs. The explanation was that these chiefs, with considerable peacetime experience, were in the habit of waiting for the safety officer to check firing data. A further problem was that firing batteries equipped with the M107-mm. gun were hampered by the weapon's extremely short tube life. After firing 300 full charge rounds, it was necessary to replace the tube, a six-hour procedure. The artillery lived with this problem until a new tube with four times the tube life was developed. Stateside production of the tubes caught up with Vietnam demands in early 1968. In addition, the field time required to change tubes was reduced to two hours, principally the result of the efforts of an enterprising artilleryman who fabricated an adapter which prevented the nitrogen in the weapon's equilibrators from escaping. Previously, equilibrators were permitted to empty during tube change and additional time was required to replenish the lost nitrogen.

Initially, many combat experiences, creative ideas, and new tactics and techniques were peculiar to particular units or areas of Vietnam and were passed informally by word of mouth. To prevent disjointed concepts and ideas and to standardize procedures, information pertinent to artillery procedures was given wide dissemination. The best source was lessons learned reports, and information from them was distributed throughout Vietnam as well as up through channels, ultimately to be used in training by units and service schools in the United States.

To standardize procedures in Vietnam and to reinforce written standing operating procedures, training schools were established at division artillery, artillery group, and field force artillery levels to train newly assigned personnel in artillery procedures and techniques peculiar to Vietnam or to the particular area or unit to which they would be assigned. The emphasis was primarily on forward observer and fire direction center procedures and techniques. These schools ranged in duration from three days to a week and were staffed and equipped from units already in Vietnam. Typical of this training was a six-day course in fire direction conducted by I Field Force Artillery for all its newly assigned fire direction officers. The 41st Artillery Group conducted a five-day orientation course for

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newly assigned forward observers. Similar schools were conducted by II Field Force Artillery and its subordinate units.

To improve coordination and liaison between U.S. Forces and other Free World Military Assistance Forces units, many U.S. units conducted artillery orientation schools for allied personnel. The 9th Infantry Division conducted such a school in 1967 in preparation for a joint U.S. and Thai operation. To facilitate artillery coordination in the II Corps area, the 41st Artillery Group conducted fire support training for South Vietnamese Army personnel. When the language barrier was overcome, the result of such training was a marked improvement in the speed and quality of artillery support.

The ultimate in training experiences was on-the-job training (OJT) in a unit engaged in actual combat operations. As time progressed and personnel were "infused" between units to prevent large rotational humps, individual training became possible. To insure adherence to basic artillery doctrine and safety procedures and to allow for standardization of artillery techniques, artillery staffs at group. and division levels established various means of testing the proficiency of subordinate units. The most common technique was the formation of a team which visited a subordinate unit to render assistance and evaluate the artillery procedures used. The 23d Artillery Group conducted unannounced proficiency tests (UPT) of the basic artillery fundamentals and principles in their subordinate units. Requirements consisted of firing a registration mission, a time-on-target mission, and two adjust fire missions. The objective of such tests was to evaluate and assist, not to harass, and the practice proved quite successful.

As lessons learned reached the continental United States, every effort was made to ease the training burden of combat units in Vietnam and to incorporate Vietnam-related procedures and lessons learned into instruction and training.

At the Field Artillery School (then the United States Army Artillery and Missile School) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the emphasis was on instruction and training geared to meet the artillery requirements in Vietnam. The Field Artillery School dispatched liaison teams to Vietnam "to determine the actions required to improve the products of the [Artillery] Training Center and the Artillery School at Fort Sill for officers, enlisted men and deployable units." These visits included one in September of 1967 by Major General Charles P. Brown, Fort Sill commander and Artillery School commandant. Extensive interviews at all levels of artillery command were conducted during these visits and a list of matters requiring the attention of the Artillery School was made. Essentially, the ba-

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MAJOR GENERAL, THEN COLONEL, DAVID E. OTT, 25TH DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMANDER (RIGHT, DEMONSTRATES FADAC TO MAJOR GENERAL TILLSON, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION COMMANDER, July 1967.

sic message gleaned from these trips was that although the over-all state of training of artillery personnel assigned to Vietnam was excellent, increased Vietnam-oriented training was required. Specifically, it was determined that increased emphasis was necessary in 6,400-mil fire direction center procedures; counterguerrilla reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position training; and fire support coordination responsibilities at all levels, particularly those of the artillery liaison officer.

By mid-1967, the Artillery School had begun to make significant progress in implementing changes in instructional programs to satisfy Vietnam requirements. A field artillery officer's Vietnam orientation course (FAOVOC) was instituted in July 1967. Four to five weeks long, the course concentrated solely on tactics and techniques used in Vietnam. In fiscal year 1968, 239 officers completed the course; in fiscal year 1969, over 1,000. The course was offered in addition to the officer basic schooling and was designed better to prepare officers for Vietnam service. The officer basic course was increased from 9 to 12 weeks, and the Artillery Officer Candidate School enrollment increased from 3,000 in fiscal year 1966 to 9,600

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in fiscal year 1967. Increased emphasis on Vietnam training for non­commissioned and enlisted students resulted in short (2-3 week) section chief courses and a noncommissioned officer candidate course designed to emphasize skill development in artillery procedures. Fire direction center training stressed 6,400-mil fire direction procedures, including chart preparation and wind cards. On the basis of information received in Vietnam during liaison visits, additional training on the field artillery digital computer (FADAC) was implemented. The Tactics and Combined Arms Department constructed two Vietnam-type artillery fire bases for instruction in battery defense, and field exercises included a counterguerrilla phase in the scenario as students participating in training for reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position began occupying star-shaped and circular battery positions in addition to conventional linear positions. Throughout the Field Artillery School, every attempt was made to prepare the field artilleryman for combat duty in Vietnam.

The field artillery made genuine progress after its arrival in Vietnam in 1965. The quality of fire support was ever increasing as the artillery played a vital role in operations ranging from JUNCTION CITY, the largest combined operation to date, to small-unit actions such as those in the remote outposts of Landing Zone BIRD and Soui Cat. In over two and a half years of combat, the artillerymen had trained hard, fought hard, and shared experiences with personnel of other branches. As the 1968 Tet holiday season neared and the enemy made final plans for attack, seasoned artillerymen manned positions in 54 field artillery battalions scattered throughout Vietnam.

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