Chapter VI:
The TRIDENT Conference-New Patterns: May 1943
On 12 May the President and the Prime Minister, with their chief military
advisers, met at the White House for the first session of the TRIDENT
Conference. Churchill and his party of approximately a hundred crossed on
the Queen Mary to attend the largest assembly of high-level Anglo-American
officialdom in the war thus far.1 Met on his arrival off Staten Island by
Harry Hopkins, the Prime Minister had come directly to Washington by
train. President Roosevelt, who had brushed aside the suggestion that
Churchill stay at the British Embassy during the conference, was on hand
to greet him and took him to the White House.
This time the United States was represented by a much fuller complement
of staff officers than at Casablanca and also enjoyed the advantage of
drawing on the planning staffs in the nation's capital. The conference
opened with even greater optimism for the future than had been shown at
Casablanca four months earlier. Allied transition to the strategic
initiative, which had begun in late 1942, was virtually complete. Initial
campaigns
for seizing the offensive had been successful. On the day after the
conferees assembled, news came of the end of organized resistance in
North Africa. In the Pacific, U.S. forces had completed the Guadalcanal
and Papua Campaigns and were engaged in seizing Attu. On the Eastern Front
the Soviet forces, having withstood the siege of Stalingrad, were
continuing their counteroffensives. The Battle of the Atlantic was turning
in favor of the Allies. Preparations were going forward for HUSKY. Again
the question was, "What next?" Against the British predilection for
deferring long-range over-all plans, the U.S. staff was ready to press the
importance of long-term versus short-term planning.
Cross-Channel and Mediterranean Operations
For fourteen days, 12-25 May, the two delegations debated strategic
issues. The President and the Prime Minister met six times with the CCS
at the White House, and the CCS held additional sessions almost every
day in the Board of Governors room in the stately Federal Reserve
Building on Constitution Avenue not too far away.
The single most pressing question was
[126]
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C., where the Combined Chiefs
of Staff held sessions in the Board of Governors room during the TRIDENT
Conference.
again the problem of cross-Channel and Mediterranean operations. From the
very beginning of the conference, it became apparent that the President
had drawn closer to the position of his military staff and that the Prime
Minister and his advisers had to face a more united and aggressive
American team. As the lines drew more taut on each side, it became easier
to define the areas of agreement and disagreement between the British and
American cases. But to get any action at all, it was also apparent, each
side would have to yield what the other regarded as extreme views, and
move closer to a middle ground on which both could stand.
At the opening meeting with the Prime Minister and the CCS, the President
declared that the question for immediate
decision was how most profitably to employ in 1943 the large Allied
forces then in the Mediterranean. Beyond any doubt it would be desirable
to knock Italy out of the war-after HUSKY-but, he added, he had "always
shrunk from the thought of putting large armies into Italy." Allied
forces might thereby suffer attrition, German troops might be released
from Italy, and no pressure would be taken off the USSR. He wondered
whether the same results might not be achieved at less cost by air
offensives from Sicily or from the heel and toe of Italy.
The President's position on Mediterranean operations had clearly
become more cautious. At the same time he came out unequivocally in
favor of a cross-Channel operation for the spring
[127]
of 1944. Such an operation would, he maintained, be the most effective
method of forcing Germany to fight and thereby relieving German pressure
on the USSR. Regardless of operations undertaken in the Mediterranean,
there would be a surplus of British and U.S. manpower that should be used
for the build-up in the United Kingdom. The President felt that all were
agreed that no SLEDGEHAMMER or ROUNDUP was possible in 1943 but that if
one operation or the other were to be mounted in the spring of 1944
preparations would have to begin at once. An affirmative and firm
decision should be reached at the conference to undertake either
SLEDGEHAMMER or ROUNDUP in the spring of 1944.2
The Prime Minister replied that the "first objective" and the "great
prize" in the European-Mediterranean area, after HUSKY, was the
elimination of Italy from the war. He saw no other way of relieving Axis
pressure on the Soviet front in 1943 on so large a scale. The collapse
of Italy might mark the "beginning of the doom" of the German people.
German forces would have to be diverted from the Eastern Front to
replace Italian troops withdrawn from the Balkans or Germany would have
to yield the Balkans, the Italian Fleet would be eliminated, and Turkey
would be favorably disposed to join the Allies. The Prime Minister did
not feel that an occupation of Italy by the Allies would be necessary.
On the other hand, in the event of an Italian collapse, ports and air
bases necessary for launching operations against the Balkans and
southern Europe should be seized. The problem was to decide on the
course of action to be followed between the expected completion of HUSKY
(end of August 1943) and the spring of 1944, when cross-Channel
operations might first lie mounted. All these objectives, he emphasized,
"led up to BOLERO, SLEDGEHAMMER, and ROUNDUP." His Majesty's Government
earnestly favored undertaking a full-scale invasion of the Continent
from the United Kingdom "as soon as possible," provided a plan offering
"reasonable prospects of success could be made." On antisubmarine
warfare and on the air bombardment of Germany, he indicated, the United
States and Great Britain were in substantial agreement. The President
and Prime Minister agreed that Anglo-American forces should not be idle
between the end of the Sicily Campaign and the spring of 1944.3
With the stage thus set by the political heads of state, the British and
U.S. Chiefs of Staff proceeded to marshal their arguments. The British
stressed continuing the Mediterranean ground operations after HUSKY as a
necessary prelude to an ultimate cross-Channel operation. The Americans
emphasized the necessity of "firming up" the cross-Channel undertaking,
warning that large-scale ground operations in the Mediterranean would
jeopardize the cross-Channel effort.
Elaborating on the views of the Prime Minister, the British Chiefs
intimated that operations against the mainland of Italy should be backed
up by operations in other parts of the Mediterranean. Only through
Mediterranean operations could the British and Americans capitalize on
the benefits of victories in Africa and Sicily and profitably employ British-American forces and the resources assembled in the area.
Acknowledging
Ibid.
[128]
that provision of shipping for another amphibious operation in the
Mediterranean in 1943 would affect the buildup in the United Kingdom,
they asserted that successful Mediterranean operations, especially the
elimination of Italy, would "ease the task" confronting a British-American
force landing in northwest Europe from the United Kingdom. With the
collapse of Italy and the elimination of the Italian Fleet, the United
States and United Kingdom should be able "to mount a threat" through
Sardinia and Corsica against southern France in the spring of 1944.
Moreover, considerable Allied naval strength could then be transferred
from the Mediterranean to the Pacific or the Indian Ocean .4
The British Chiefs concluded that the Mediterranean offered
opportunities for action in the autumn and winter of 1943 that might be
decisive and, in the final analysis, might contribute more toward paving
the way for a successful cross-Channel operation in 1944 than the
transference to the United Kingdom of any of the Anglo-American forces
then in the Mediterranean-as the Americans were suggesting. The balance
of forces on the Continent, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal argued,
would change more quickly in Allied favor if Mediterranean operations
were undertaken before launching ROUNDUP. Summing up, Field Marshal Sir
Alan Brooke maintained that Mediterranean operations would shorten the
war. It was the "firm intention" of the British Chiefs to execute
ROUNDUP as soon as favorable conditions were created. It was their "firm
belief" that such conditions would arise in 1944. Since the necessary
conditions could, in the final analysis, be created only by the Soviet
Army, British-American action must consist of intensifying the
bombardment of Germany and of drawing off from the Soviet front as many
German forces as possible. Unless Mediterranean operations were first
carried out, "at best only a SLEDGEHAMMER Could be undertaken" and the
Anglo-American forces would be pinned down to a bridgehead in France.
Such was the strategic context within which the British put forward their
case for the Mediterranean.5
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff sought to bring the discussion around to a
broader consideration of world strategy and long-range implications of
further Mediterranean amphibious operations in 1943, recapitulating the
arguments and views on which they had agreed before the meetings. The
over-all objective of the United States and Great Britain, in conjunction
with the USSR, was to force the unconditional surrender of the European
Axis and then bring the full weight of Anglo-American strength to bear in
compelling the unconditional surrender of Japan. For Europe, a full-scale
assault should be launched against the Continent in the spring of 1944 (a ROUNDUP operation), for which the way should be paved for an intensified
air offensive. Forces must be built up for the ground and air, assaults
and the two countries must be prepared to launch a contingent cross-Channel
operation to take advantage of German disintegration at any time
[129]
thenceforth with whatever forces might be available.
Insofar as post-HUSKY Mediterranean operations were concerned, the
JCS indicated that at most they would be interested only in limited
offensive action. Such Mediterranean operations would be designed to
destroy the Italian war potential by air attacks from Mediterranean
bases, furnish support to the USSR by diverting Axis strength, force a
dispersal of Axis strength in order to promote a cross-Channel
undertaking, and safeguard Allied positions and communications in the
Mediterranean. The JCS emphasized that the strength of the forces to be
employed in the Mediterranean must be so limited as not to endanger the
success of a cross-Channel operation in 1944 and that in any event U.S.
ground and naval forces were not to be employed in the Mediterranean
east of Sicily.6
General Marshall was again the forceful spokesman and negotiator for
the U.S. staff on European strategy.7
He relied heavily on air arguments that had
been winning increasing support in the U.S. staff since Casablanca. Air
capabilities, he argued, must be carefully considered in determining
subsequent Allied strategy. Advantage should be taken of Allied air
strength, especially in the Mediterranean where it should be possible to
utilize airpower rather than pour in additional ground strength for
subsequent operations. He expressed concern lest the landing of ground
forces in Italy create a vacuum, precluding the assembly of sufficient
forces in the United Kingdom for the cross-Channel effort. To undertake
further Mediterranean ground operations would be to commit the United
States and Great Britain, except for air attacks on Germany, to a
Mediterranean policy in 1943 and practically all of 1944. Such a policy
would prolong the war in Europe and delay the ultimate defeat of Japan, a
course not acceptable to the United States.
General Marshall called for consideration of hastening the collapse of
Italy by air action alone-a position similar to that advanced by the
President. The Chief of Staff maintained that continual air operations
in the Mediterranean would contain German troops in the area, just as the
concurrent build-up of forces in Great Britain would serve to pin down
German forces on the rest of the Continent. He also endorsed a plan,
presented to the conference by General McNarney, to bomb the oil fields of Ploesti
in Rumania from Mediterranean bases in order to dry up the German supply
of oil.
8
In supporting a cross-Channel operation for 1944, General Marshall
stressed the great faith put by U.S. leaders in the Combined Bomber
Offensive. Indeed,
[130]
he confessed to his colleagues in the JCS during the conference
that, except for the factor of air bombardment in the coming year,
"ROUNDUP would be a visionary matter."
9
He questioned the British arguments that operations in the Mediterranean
would not appreciably slow the build-up in the United Kingdom and that
they were necessary to create favorable conditions for a ROUNDOUP.10
On the contrary, he was concerned lest such operations prohibit the
Allies from carrying out any cross-Channel attack. Marshall admitted
that landing twenty-five divisions in 1942 in an emergency cross-Channel
attack (SLEDGEHAMMER) might have been "suicidal," but the situation had
changed radically since then. There was now the prospect of
co-ordinating Anglo-American air superiority in direct support of ground
forces at any bridgehead established in France and thereby turning the
balance in favor of the Allies. Twice before, he observed, the forces
the CCS had thought would be available for cross-Channel operations had
dwindled to relatively small numbers as a result of increasing
requirements for TORCH and HUSKY. Unless the build-up in the United
Kingdom (BOLERO) were given priority over Mediterranean operations, he
feared a similar result. The British, in their proposals for the
Mediterranean, were in his opinion too optimistic in estimates of forces
required, on the likely Axis reaction, and on logistical feasibility;
they were too pessimistic on the effects of the Allied Combined Bomber
Offensive in reducing Germany's strength and paving the way for
cross-Channel operations. He summed up for the JCS the basic differences
in the attitudes of the two staffs toward Mediterranean operations in
this way:
our [JCS] attitude is to the effect that Mediterranean operations
are highly speculative as far as ending the war is concerned. On the
other hand, the British feel that Mediterranean operations will result
in a demoralization and break-up of the Axis.11
As the conference progressed and the points of difference in the
British and American cases for European strategy for 1943-44 became
clearer, he advised the U.S. Chiefs to aim at "something more than
SLEDGEHAMMER and less than ROUNDUP."
12
Whatever line of action was adopted against Germany, it was clear to
all the leaders-British as well as American-that current successes in
the Battle of the Atlantic must be maintained. General Marshall felt
that the needs of antisubmarine warfare made it particularly imperative
for the Allies to gain the Azores as soon as possible. He agreed with
both the President and the Prime Minister in favoring occupation of the
islands, preferably through diplomacy but, if necessary, through
diplomacy coupled with threats of force.13
The debate on whether Mediterranean operations could be conducted
after HUSKY without jeopardizing a ROUNDUP in the spring of 1944
inevitably narrowed down to the question of availability of strength and
resources-problems essentially in the planners' realm.
[131]
Aside from the need to husband trained U.S. manpower for a major
cross-Channel effort-a problem of particular concern to General
Marshall-there was, as always, the limiting and troublesome factor of
landing craft. That factor, with which British and U.S. planners wrestled
during the conference, was complicated by the fact that there could be no
certainty as to future production rates or precise requirements for a
projected cross-Channel operation a year thence. The first estimate of
requirements that the British submitted to the conference called for 8,500
landing ships and craft to lift simultaneously ten divisions for the
assault. The U.S. planners felt these calculations to be so far out of
line with predictable production rates as to be completely unrealistic.
General Marshall termed ROUNDUP on the basis of a ten-division assault
for the spring of 1944 a "logistical impossibility."14
General Wedemeyer and Admiral Cooke, senior U.S. planners, also
expressed the belief, shortly after the conference began, that if
further amphibious operations were conducted in the Mediterranean after
HUSKY, the United States could not meet the landing craft requirements
for a full-scale ROUNDUP in 1944.15
In the final analysis, the whole debate on European strategy at the
conference turned on the issue of landing craft. Studying the problem
further, the U.S. planners concluded that, on the assumption of
continued Mediterranean action after Sicily, enough landing craft could
be provided in the United Kingdom by the spring of 1944 to lift five
divisions simultaneously, three in the assault and two in the immediate
follow-up. In the
second follow-up two more could be moved. From twenty-six to thirty
Anglo-American divisions could be made available in the United Kingdom by
the same date. In the end these American planning estimates were accepted
by the conferees for the guidance of Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan (COSSAC).
The number of available landing ships and craft agreed upon for planning
purposes was about half (4,504) the original British estimate. Morgan,
however, was also to plan on using two airborne divisions in the
assault. To convince the British of the logistical feasibility of a
cross-Channel operation in the spring of 1944, the U.S. planners pegged
the operation to the more certain 1943 production rates, thereby scaling
down the size of the assault considerably. So far were the Americans now
willing to go in order to win firm British agreement to a definite
cross-Channel operation with a definite target date.16
The outcome of the debate at TRIDENT on cross-Channel and
Mediterranean operations was another compromise of British and American
views. The disagreements were not so great that they could not be
reconciled or at least straddled. They could be treated as a
disagreement over method. Both sides agreed that the final blow against
Ger-
[132]
many could only be struck across the Channel-not from the Mediterranean
-but the British argued that to capitalize on immediate opportunities in
the Mediterranean would be the best way to prepare for the final blow. The
U.S. staff was no longer resisting Mediterranean operations per se but
only insofar as they might postpone the cross-Channel invasion.
Tied in with these different approaches to European strategy were the
divergent attitudes of the British and Americans toward the Combined
Bomber Offensive, although even here there was a large measure of basic
agreement. At Casablanca both sides had already approved the concept of a
Combined Bomber Offensive and its inseparability from a major
cross-Channel effort, but now the Americans were pressing for a firm
commitment to a four-phased Combined Bomber Offensive culminating on 1
April 1944 and paving the way for a definite cross-Channel operation with
a definite target date in the spring of 1944. Still hoping for
preliminary operations in the Mediterranean, the British were reluctant
to make a firm commitment to such a Combined Bomber Offensive plan lest
their other, more immediate, plans be jeopardized.17
In the end both sides had to give ground. The British accepted as a
"first charge" the principle, for which General Marshall and his staff
had been arguing for more than a year, of concentrating maximum
resources in a "selected area" as early as practicable in order to
execute "a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel."18
They agreed to
mount a cross-Channel operation with a target date 1 May 1944, on the
basis of twenty-nine divisions present in the United Kingdom by that date
(Operation ROUNDHAMMER, soon to be called OVERLORD).19 Its object was to
secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations
could be conducted. The CCS agreed that an immediate expansion of
logistical facilities should take place in the United Kingdom and that,
after the assault, ports were to be built up on the Continent to
accommodate follow-up shipments at the rate of three to five divisions
per month.
The Americans had finally won British acceptance of a cross-Channel
operation with a definite size and target date. At the same time, the
British also approved the Eaker plan, advanced by the JCS, for carrying
out the four-phase Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom, to
be completed by April 1944. The plan provided for destroying and
disrupting the German "military, industrial and economic system" and
critically undermining the morale of the German people. German fighter
strength was to be whittled down, and increasing penetration into enemy
territory was to be made in the successive stages. The conferees also
agreed to continue to prepare for an emergency cross-Channel operation (a
SLEDGE-
[133]
HAMMER in accord with the directive previously issued to General Morgan.
It should be noted that while the basic U.S. aim of winning the British to
a firm commitment to cross-Channel objectives appeared to have been
gained, the projected ROUNDHAMMER operation was far smaller in scale and
a full year later in time than that envisaged in the War Department's
original BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan.
In return, the Americans made concessions to British arguments on
Mediterranean operations. As has been suggested, the U.S. staff came to
the conference in a frame of mind receptive to acceptance of some type
of limited Mediterranean operations, if their major strategic aims might
thereby be won. They gave their assent to the planning of further
operations in the Mediterranean with the object of eliminating Italy
from the war. At the same time, they extracted certain provisos. No
precise method of eliminating Italy was adopted. General Eisenhower,
commander in chief in North Africa, was to plan such operations, but the
final decision was to be reserved to the CCS. The Americans also sought
to restrict the forces to be used to those already in the Mediterranean.
Indeed, they went even further and won British agreement to the
preparation for transfer, from November onward, of four U.S. and three
British divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom to
participate in the cross-Channel operation. A definite ceiling was at
last projected for the strength to be devoted to subsequent
Mediterranean advances. The conferees decided that General Eisenhower
was to plan on the basis of the availability of twenty-seven divisions,
in all, for operations and garrisons in the Mediterranean after HUSKY. So high had the
costs of diversion from concentrating on the cross-Channel effort mounted!
Other specific decisions of significance to the war in Europe proved less
difficult. The CCS agreed that the U.S. Army Air Forces should send
representatives to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater of
Operations, to present their plan for bombing the oil fields at Ploesti
from bases in North Africa. The British Chiefs of Staff were given the
responsibility for preparing a plan to capture the Azores. The islands'
land, sea, and air facilities would be made available, in the event of
their occupation, to all the Allies.20 The war on the U-boats must be
continued with every available means. That the war effort of the USSR
should be aided, Turkey armed, and the French forces reequipped were
again accepted as desirable objectives.
The specific undertakings agreed upon for the
Atlantic-European-Mediterranean area for 1943-44 represented a reweaving
of British and American strategic conceptions into a new design. The
bare outlines of the new pattern of European strategy were beginning to
take shape. Whether the steps taken by the U.S. staff toward fixing
European strategy in terms of a major cross-Channel effort would be
enough to turn the Allies from the Mediterranean and to-
[134]
ward northwest Europe by 1944 remained to be seen.
The Pacific and Far East
Although the question of European and Mediterranean operations was the
principal issue before the TRIDENT Conference, the war against Japan
received considerable attention from both the British and the Americans.
The British were fearful that the United States might devote too large a
portion of its resources to the defeat of Japan before Germany could be
beaten, and the Americans were anxious to elicit a greater response from
the British in the prosecution of operations in Burma and to be able to
keep the enemy under unremitting pressure in the Pacific. The use by the
U.S. staff of the "Pacific Alternative" argument as a lever to restrict
Mediterranean activities and to gain British support for a major
cross-Channel attack was tempered by British counter-pressures to ensure
that the war against Japan would remain secondary and hinged upon the
favorable outcome of the war against Germany. To a degree, both sides
were successful. It soon became evident that a definite over-all plan
for the defeat of Japan, for which the U.S. staff was pressing, could
not be formulated and adopted until a similar plan, blueprinting the war
against Germany, had been accepted and made firm. The time factors for
operations, in the meantime, could be estimated only very roughly, and
plans would have to remain largely fluid and opportunistic.
Forward in the Pacific
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff came to TRIDENT armed with a general concept of
long-range strategy for the Pacific war -a product of the intensive study
and search for an over-all plan for the defeat of Japan in which the
joint Planning Staff had engaged in early 1943.21
At the first plenary session of the conference when Churchill, perhaps
forewarned, took the initiative and suggested that the U.S. Chiefs
assume the lead in preparing long-range plans to encompass the fall of
Japan, the JCS were ready to comply almost at once. The Prime Minister
believed that the war against Germany would be over in 1944 and that the
"great" campaign against Japan might well begin in 1945. He personally
favored the entrance of the USSR into the conflict in the Far East, and
the President agreed, predicting that the Soviet Union would join them
within forty-eight hours after Germany surrendered.22
Some of the old differences of opinion between the British and the
Americans
[135]
again cropped up. It was the familiar story of the relative
importance of the war against Germany versus the war against Japan and
the United States' implied threat of a "Pacific Alternative" to
counteract British pressure in behalf of the Mediterranean. Marshall
reiterated the American position in an early meeting of the Combined
Chiefs-the United States did not want to become committed to a
Mediterranean war that would prolong the European phase and delay the
prosecution of the Pacific war. The American people would not tolerate
any such postponement, and the U.S. Chiefs could not accept any such
proposals.23
The Joint Chiefs felt that unremitting pressure on Japan should be
maintained and extended in the Pacific and the Far East while the
European war was in progress.24
The American stand was rebutted by the usual British counterargument -
Pacific operations must be coordinated with those in Europe; they must
not prejudice the defeat of Germany, or the war would drag on
interminably.25
At a meeting of the U.S. JCS during the conference, Marshall went so
far as to suggest that if, as a result of the adoption of a
Mediterranean strategy, there were to be only a cross-Channel attack of
the SLEDGEHAMMER variety, a readjustment of landing craft and troop
shipping should be made in favor of the Pacific.26
In line with this feeling, the proposals of the U.S. Joint Chiefs for
the defeat of Japan contained the thought: "If, however, conditions
develop which
indicate that the war as a whole can be brought more quickly to a
successful conclusion by the earlier mounting of a major offensive against
Japan, the strategical concept set forth herein [beating Germany first]
may be reversed."
27 The application of the "Pacific Alternative" argument
undoubtedly added another spur to the persuasive factors already
suggested for placing a major cross-Channel operation on the planning
books at TRIDENT.
The final objective envisaged in the American strategic concept was
the unconditional surrender of Japan. This objective, the U.S. staff
concluded, might require an invasion of the Japanese home islands-though
there was no certainty on that point. In any event, such an invasion
would not be practicable until the Japanese will to resist had been
greatly reduced, probably only after "a sustained, systematic, and
large-scale air offensive against Japan itself." The Joint Chiefs of
Staff felt that an air offensive of such magnitude could be mounted only
from bases in China, and for this reason the Chinese would have to be
sustained in the war. Adequate supply routes would have to be
established to maintain the Chinese and support Allied operations in and
from China. The immediate reopening of the Burma Road and the seizure
later of a port on the China coast would be necessary. Hong Kong, which
was felt to be the most suitable port for initial seizure, could be
captured by forces operating from the interior of China supplemented by
amphibious forces operating in the South China Sea. Two lines of advance
to this penultimate ob-
[136]
jective were set forth: one by the British through the Strait of Malacca;
the other by the United States, crossing the Pacific to the Celebes Sea by
way of the central and southwest Pacific routes. Bases would have to be
secured in the Formosa-Luzon sea area as intermediate objectives. Allied
success or failure in compelling the enemy to expose his fleet would be
the deciding factor in determining which objective in particular to
select for attack. If the United States could gain control of the western
Pacific waters, Japan might surrender before being invaded.
The Japanese war was divided into six phases, with no time limits imposed
and with reliance placed upon the co-operation of British, Chinese, and
U.S. forces. During the first period, while the Chinese sought to improve
their position in China and the Americans tried to open a line of
communications into the Celebes Sea, the British, assisted by Chinese and
U.S. forces, would attempt to recapture Burma. The United States would
take over the major role in the second phase, retaking the Philippines
while Great Britain carried out operations in and around the Strait of
Malacca and China made ready to attack Hong Kong. During the campaign
against Hong Kong-the third phase the Chinese would be assisted by U.S.
forces, which would enter the northern reaches of the South China Sea,
and by further diversionary action around the Strait of Malacca by the
British. As the fourth step, the three nations would prepare an
overwhelming air offensive against Japan from bases in China and in the
fifth period would mount the air attack. The final stage would find the
United States providing the main forces for the invasion of Japan, the
other two powers assisting.28
With little debate, the CCS accepted these long-range proposals as a
basis for more detailed study by the Combined Staff Planners.
29
Turning from the general to the specific, Admiral King presented the
outline of operations the United States hoped to carry out in 1943-44 in
the Pacific. In his opinion, all such operations should be directed
toward severing the Japanese lines of communications and toward
recapturing the Philippines. King considered decisive action against the
Japanese Fleet and seizure of the Mariana Islands prime requirements for
victory in the Pacific. Because of their location on the enemy line of
communications, the Marianas were the key to the approach to the
Philippines regardless of whether the northern, southern, or central
route were taken. Pointing out that the ultimate defeat of Japan would
come about through blockade, bombing, and assault, he proposed that
attrition of Japanese war potential be intensified in the meantime and
that favorable positions be secured for the final attack. There was no
way of knowing, he cautioned, where Japan would strike next, although it
had the ability to invade Siberia or complete the conquest of China.
King listed six possible courses of action against Japan for 1943 and
1944 that would damage the Japanese
[137]
lines of communications or would gain for the Allies positions of
readiness for the final assault on Japan: (1) air operations from and in
China; (2) operations in Burma to augment the flow of supplies to China;
(3) operations to drive the Japanese from the Aleutians; (4) seizure of
the Marshall and Caroline Islands; (5) seizure of the Solomons-Bismarck
Archipelago and the rest of Japanese-held New Guinea; and (6) operations
against Japanese lines of communications.30
The JCS informed the British Chiefs of Staff in detail of the status of
current Pacific operations and of the forces required for future
undertakings. No firm dates could be given for any but the most immediate
operations, since the reaction of the enemy was impossible to forecast and
topographical difficulties might tend to slow down projected moves. The
JCS March 1943 directive to the Pacific commanders covering the current
American objectives was described for the benefit of the British.31 Examination of the availability of means for later operations revealed
that seven additional Army divisions would be needed to capture the Marshalls, the Carolines,
and New Guinea. There would be some shortages in aircraft, but
sufficient naval forces would be on hand.32
Except for the rather touchy problem of land operations in Burma, the
British Chiefs of Staff accepted the U.S. estimate of Pacific strategy and
approved the operations recommended.33 Not only did the United States
secure British assent to its Pacific projects, it also sought to call a halt to the
practice of reinforcing the Mediterranean at the expense of the Pacific.
The U.S. Chiefs turned down a British plea for sending an additional
eighty transport aircraft to the Mediterranean for HUSKY on the ground
that the transports would have to come from the South Pacific. Marshall
told the British quite bluntly that the limit for HUSKY had been
reached.34
When the British attempted to restrict the allocation of surplus
aircraft to the Pacific once the maximum that could be maintained in the
United Kingdom had been reached, Marshall again demurred and
successfully argued that the South Pacific had been operating on a
shoestring when great results might be achieved by relatively small air
increments.35
Though the results of TRIDENT for the Pacific war were not startling
in themselves, they did indicate a positive growth of the realization
that attention would henceforth have to be given to long-range planning
on the combined levels. The nebulous Pacific strategy set forth at the
Casablanca Conference had been replaced by the adoption of new
short-range objectives and an effort to analyze the future course and
requirements of the war against Japan. The Allies would move forward,
nibbling at the outer crust of the Japanese holdings and hoping to
attain favorable positions whence the center of the empire could be
subjected to attack. The policy of attrition would be intensified and
additional attempts would be made to hamstring Japanese lines of
communications. If nothing new had been added to the
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method of operation at this juncture, at least the will to maintain and
push the strategic offensive had been sustained.
ANAKIM-The Losing Battle
Although the U.S. Chiefs were successful in securing the adoption of
their Pacific program for the immediate future, they did not fare so
well in their support of Burma operations. The importance of the Far
East in Allied discussions was symbolized by the presence of Wavell,
Chennault, and Stilwell in Washington-the first time commanders from the
Far East were present at a major international wartime conference. The
reluctance of the British to themselves engage in the Burma jungles,
coupled with the need to provide China with more immediate assistance,
made the U.S. staff's position hopeless from the start. Two basic
problems were to be settled: How vital was China to the war effort? How
could China be helped most effectively? The British could not agree with
the view of the President that China should be treated as a great nation
and necessary to the war, nor were they convinced wholeheartedly that
China would be essential as a future base of operations, as the U.S.
Chiefs and Stilwell believed. But when it came to a question of the kind
of aid to be provided China, the British were fully in favor of air
rather than ground support.36
The indications that the British had
abandoned a full-scale ANAKIM and that they were increasingly opposed to
any Burma operation had become more and more clear after their setback at Akyab. Aware of the mounting British disinclination to go into Burma and
realizing also that the President's enthusiasm for ANAKIM had cooled, the
Army planners turned to the consideration of modified plans that would
provide aid to China and yet would not be so ambitious as to discourage
the British. Brig. Gen. Carl A. Russell, Deputy Chief of the Theater
Group, OPD, advocated the seizure of Myitkyina in north Burma along with
the operations against Akyab and Ramree Island and an advance to the
Chindwin River.37 Wedemeyer, on the other hand, favored the diversion of
U.S. forces and means to the Southwest Pacific if the British would not
agree to carry out ANAKIM, especially since the landing craft and shipping
involved would be of great assistance to Pacific operations. The Strategy
Section of OPD believed that ANAKIM was imperative to keep China in the
war and that the United States should insist on British participation
since the necessary troops were on hand.38
Against the divided counsels of the Americans, the British presented a
solid front. They asserted that any comprehensive land operation in Burma
would be wasteful and diversionary from the main European effort.
Churchill, their
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most persuasive advocate, emphasized the difficulties involved in fighting
in the Burmese jungles and was ably seconded by Field Marshal Wavell, who
painted a dismal picture of the administrative, logistical, command, climatological,
topographical, and medical problems that would impede any Burma
operation. The British favored augmenting the air route to China, but
were not convinced that Burma had to be recaptured for that purpose. The
Prime Minister also advanced one of his pet schemes, an operation
against the northern tip of Sumatra, as an alternate to ANAKIM, since it
would utilize the large forces then in India.39
The President, convinced that ANAKIM might be too slow to aid China in
time, agreed with the British that air support would be the quickest way
to assist the Chinese.40 In vain did Stilwell refute the British estimate
that the Burma Road would not be opened until 1945 and even then could
carry a peak load of only 20,000 tons a month. The President, already
favorably disposed toward further emphasis on the air war in China, did
not seem to care that the road might be opened to traffic in early 1944
or to have any interest in the more prosaic land operations.41
Left to their own devices, the JCS next attempted to salvage part of
ANAKIM and to prevent the wholesale withdrawal of the British from the
project. The American argument was based upon two
factors: the effect on the Chinese if there were no land operations in
Burma, and the relation of land operations to the build-up of the air
route. The British were unimpressed with the first argument and unwilling
to undertake what they regarded as foolish operations simply to allay
Chinese feelings. Nevertheless, Churchill did assent to Roosevelt's
stand for action in 1943, though he asserted that the action should be
neither at the expense of the air route nor to placate groundless Chinese
suspicions of British good faith.42 Some of the War Department
frustration seeped into Marshall's comment on the situation:
. . . in the development of ANAKIM, RAVENOUS [the advance to the Chindwin
River] had been the first approach. Field Marshal Wavell had objected to
RAVENOUS as being unsound for supply reasons, Sir Alan Brooke had
objected because of the insecurity of the south flank, and the
Generalissimo had objected because it was not coupled with naval action.
Finally, ANAKIM in its present form had been agreed upon by all. This
was now considered to be impracticable.43
While the debate on operations continued, the question of Chinese
participation in the conference arose. The United States did not wish to
present Chiang Kai-shek, the commander of the China theater, with a fait
accompli, without giving his representatives at least an opportunity
to make known Chiang's views on Far Eastern affairs. Dr. T. V. Soong was
permitted to address the CCS and informed them that the Generalissimo
wished the Hump tonnage of the next three months to be assigned to the
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air forces. The Generalissimo regarded ANAKIM as a definite U.S.-U.K.
commitment and considered naval forces an essential part of the plan.
Later on, Soong told Leahy that unless Rangoon were attacked, Chiang
would not move in Burma.44
Although Chiang's support of the air build-up coincided with the
wishes of the President and the British, his insistence upon ANAKIM
provided Marshall and Stilwell with some ammunition. They also attempted
to defend the ground operation as a means of securing the air route,
pointing out the possible danger of a strong Japanese reaction to an
increased air effort in China. If this threat should materialize,
trained ground forces would be required to defend the air bases.45
Neither Marshall nor Stilwell opposed the concept of mounting an air
attack against the enemy. Rather, it was to them a question of timing.
An air effort without adequate ground defense seemed to them to be
putting the cart before the horse.
The Presidential answer to their forebodings was to raise the target
tonnage for the Hump in July to 7,000 tons. Of this total, Chennault was
to receive the first 4,700 tons and Stilwell's ground forces the next
2,000 tons; the last 300 would go to Chennault. During May and June the
ground forces would get 500 tons and the air forces the remainder. This
arrangement supposedly would provide Chennault with the tonnage he deemed necessary to begin his air
attack and yet would not hold up the training of ground units.46 The
immediate problem would be to lift 7,000 tons a month over the Hump-3,400
tons a month had been the maximum carried up to April 1943. It is evident
that the long-term logistical difficulties of supporting both the air and
the ground forces over the Hump were not fully comprehended at the time.
Marshall reintroduced another factor into the CCS debates on
Burma-the influence on U.S. operations in the Pacific of pressure on the
Japanese flank in southeast Asia. The terrain and fighting conditions in
the Southwest Pacific jungles were not dissimilar to those in Burma, he
pointed out, and had not prevented Allied troops from advancing in New
Guinea and Guadalcanal. Lack of aggressive action in Burma would be
unfortunate for the South and Southwest Pacific and fatal to China, he
went on, and the CCS should not bank all on the attractive proposition
of doing everything by air. He was in no doubt as to the difficulties of
the operations, but equally he was in no doubt of their vital
importance.47
The British lack of eagerness was finally met by a compromise. The CCS
resolved to increase the air route to 10,000 tons per month by early fall,
and the British agreed to conduct vigorous and aggressive land and air
operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in conjunction with
a Chinese advance from Yunnan. The land opera-
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tions would serve to contain Japanese forces and to cover the air route to
China, and would be an essential step in the opening of the Burma Road. In
addition, amphibious operations would be carried out against Akyab and
Ramree Island, and Japanese sea communications to Burma would be
interrupted. It was the same old three-pronged advance-with specified
objectives deleted. In the meantime, administrative preparations were to
be continued for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about
the size of ANAKIM.48
The careful avoidance of any mention of Rangoon was intentional, and the
President was persuaded to acquiesce in the omission. It marked the final
shift away from any attempt to reopen the old Burma Road. Henceforth,
emphasis would be placed on constructing a new road across northern Burma
from Ledo in India to link up with the old one at Wanting in Yunnan, a
distance of 483 miles through swamps and jungle. Churchill was a little
disappointed that no mention of his north Sumatra operation had been
made, but was assured that it would be studied separately.49 Chiang
Kai-shek was to be informed of all the decisions, except that Akyab and
Ramree Island were not to be mentioned by name. No limits were to be
placed on the operations except those imposed by time and
circuinstances.50
As Stilwell pointed out to Churchill, the weakness of the decisions lay
in the vagueness of the wording of the resolutions and the many
loopholes that could be used by an irresolute commander. Nevertheless,
land operations in Burma were kept on the books.51
Looking backward, it is evident that ANAKIM Was doomed even before the
first meeting at TRIDENT, and the main question to be settled was whether
there was to be any major land operation in Burma, and, if so, how far it
would go. The President, trusting in the efficacy of airpower and feeling
the need to help China immediately, failed to give his Chiefs of Staff any
effective support in the ANAKIM argument, and there appeared to be no
overwhelming enthusiasm for the substitute plan that had replaced
ANAKIM.52 The one positive decision to emerge was that to augment the air
supply route to China, and this would be mainly an American task.
U.S. Combat Troops for Burma
Another by-product of the lack of enthusiasm for ANAKIM at TRIDENT was
the increasing coolness shown by the U.S. Army staff toward the related
project of sending U.S. ground combat units to the China-Burma-India
theater. The possibility of the Army's sending a limited number of ground
combat units to the CBI to strengthen Stilwell's position and to stiffen
the backbone of Chinese and Empire troops had received some encouragement
during March. Marshall sent word to Stilwell that the 1st Cavalry
Division, which was being readied for shipment to SWPA, might eventually
be
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used in Burma operations.53 Shipping plans had been drawn up by Somervell,
a consistent supporter of the build-up of the CBI, for the diversion of a
U.S. corps of two divisions from SWPA and SOPAC to the CBI on the ground
that such a move would hasten the end of the war.54
But the shortage of shipping during the early spring and the added
difficulties of logistics in the CBI kept the plan in the theoretical
stage until the time of TRIDENT, when the obvious need for extra drive
in the theater occasioned suggestions from the Army planners that U.S.
combat troops be sent to spearhead the Burma campaign.55
Although Marshall admitted the merit of giving Stilwell a force upon which
he could rely and over which he would have direct command, several other
considerations entered into the picture and led the Chief of Staff to
oppose the scheme. In an already muddled situation, the arrival of U.S.
troops would cause additional administrative, command, and supply
problems. Noting there were vast resources of manpower on hand in India
that could be tapped, Marshall said that he preferred not to place U.S.
units under British command in Burma-India. Lastly, and most important of
all, was the danger that committing U.S. combat troops to action in
Burma might create another pull, similar to that in the Mediterranean,
which would call for shipment of more and more reinforcements and
replacements to support the initial commitment.56
On Stilwell's request during TRIDENT for the provision of two divisions,
the Army planners commented frankly that while granting the request would
bolster Stilwell's position and was therefore desirable, the diversion
would have to come from SWPA and SOPAC and also would entail shipping air
and support units. The transfer of such a large body of troops could be
made only as the result of a major strategic decision and would be
worthwhile only if the United States were willing to pay the price.57 Wedemeyer bluntly opposed the request unless it could be shown absolutely
that it would not interfere with European operations, for it would mean a
strain on shipping when there were plenty of men in the area.58 Marshall's
opposition, combined with the acceptance of limited operations in Burma
during the coming year, resulted in the temporary shelving of the project.
The Balance Sheet
The second 1943 conference of the Anglo-American high command was much
more satisfactory to the U.S. mili-
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tary planners than had been the first. The immediate reaction in the
Washington Army headquarters was that the wishful thinking of Casablanca
had been replaced by a more realistic attitude and aggressive spirit in
charting the global war.59 In the Pacific, where the joint Chiefs of Staff
were in charge and would brook no unwarranted delay, the movement was to
be forward. The mild statement of Casablanca about making the Aleutians
as secure as possible had been stiffened at TRIDENT to the ejection of the
Japanese from the islands. The indefinite proposals for the operations
against Rabaul and for projected advances against the Marshalls and the
Carolines-a Central Pacific drive-had become firm resolutions at TRIDENT.
The war in the Pacific not only was going to continue but would, in fact,
be stepped up. In addition, long-range planning in the conflict with Japan
was to be raised from the joint U.S. level to the combined
British-American planning level. Planning of the war against Japan had
been elevated to a more prominent position in Allied strategic councils.
Less encouraging were the Allied agreements for the China-Burma-India
theater. The secondary project at Casablanca of improving air
transportation to and building up the air forces in China had been pushed
to the fore at TRIDENT and now occupied the role of primary objective. On
the other hand, the brave plans and high hopes for the re-conquest of
Burma embodied in ANAKIM at Casablanca suffered a setback.
In the war against Germany, the bare outline of a new and acceptable
pattern of strategy was beginning to take shape. The provision at TRIDENT
for planning a cross-Channel operation with a target date of 1 May 1944 on
the basis of a definite allocation of forces was hailed by the Army
planners as the "first real indication" that the British had "definitely
accepted" a major operation against the Continent launched from the United
Kingdom. That decision might well be, as they believed, the "key decision
of the war." The concomitant decision on the Combined Bomber Offensive
furnished the first clear-cut indication of a British-American agreement
for definitely merging the projected cross-Channel ground effort with the
air offensive.60
Nor were the planners discouraged by the decision to go forward in the
Mediterranean after the Sicily operation in order to eliminate Italy. They
felt that the agreements on the Mediterranean were designed to contribute
to rather than detract from the cross-Channel operation. In the light of
the restriction set by the U.S. Chiefs on further increase of forces in
the Mediterranean, they were hopeful that the "periphery-pecking complex"
and the creation of a vacuum in the Mediterranean, which General Marshall
and his assistants had feared, had been stopped.
In the war on the U-boats, new confidence and a more aggressive note had
been sounded at TRIDENT than at Casablanca. The attendant agreement to
employ force, if diplomacy failed, to occupy the Azores was interpreted to
signify that shortening the war had be-
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come of greater importance even than scruples against an attack on a
neutral.
Though global strategy was still incomplete, it had, in the opinion
of the planners, been far better developed at TRIDENT than at
Casablanca. Casablanca had been pre-eminently concerned with projects
and accomplishments of 1943, but TRIDENT agreements had gone well beyond
that year. Logistics as "a key to strategy," they observed, had also
been given a more proper emphasis at TRIDENT, and strategy was being
more closely tied in with resources and manpower. The decision of the
high commands to meet again in the summer of 1943 to review the
agreements reached in the Washington meetings was a further
demonstration to them of a fresh note of realism and aggressiveness.61
Though Army planners had cause for immediate satisfaction, it is clear in
retrospect that TRIDENT was a halfway point rather than a final
destination in the development of strategy. TRIDENT represented the
definite transition in U.S. strategic planning to the offensive phase of
coalition warfare. Casablanca had given American strategists their
initiation; TRIDENT marked their growing-up stage. Gaining skill in
preparing and arguing their case, the U.S. staff was advancing in the art
of applying quid pro
quo in international strategy councils. Though TRIDENT did not provide
the final answers, it signified that the staff was at last coming to
grips with the new problems and facing up to the new realities of
coalition warfare. If wishful thinking and single-minded concentration
on a cross-Channel operation still appeared to linger, their methods of
reaching the goal were at least becoming more flexible and
sophisticated. Though the President and his military staff were still
not in complete agreement on all strategic issues, they had closed ranks
to the point of presenting a united front on the cross-Channel
operation.
The outcome of TRIDENT, as of Casablanca, for the immediate future
pointed to the continuation of the Mediterranean and Pacific offensives.
Nevertheless, barriers had been manufactured at the Washington meetings
to contain or limit the Mediterranean advance, and the defense of
Mediterranean operations had largely shifted to the grounds that the
operations would set the stage for the projected cross-Channel
operation. Some progress had also been made in weaving Pacific and
European operations into tentative long-range planning in the war
against Japan and Germany respectively. Welcome as these signs were to
the Army planners, events were soon to show that all the pieces in the
global strategic puzzle had not yet fallen into place and that the
Mediterranean issue in particular was still far from moribund.
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Endnotes
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