Chapter VII:
From HUSKY to AVALANCHE: May - Mid-August 1943
Although TRIDENT did not settle the role the Mediterranean was to play in
long-range European strategy, the need for deciding the size, timing, and
direction of immediate operations in the Mediterranean became urgent. One
effect of TRIDENT Was to speed preparations for the invasion of Sicily. By
the close of the conference, operational planning for HUSKY was taking
final shape. The Germans had at last been defeated in Tunisia, and the
Allied headquarters in Algiers could turn its full attention to Sicily.
Pantelleria had been accepted as an intermediate objective, an ad hoc, or
modified, HUSKY had been rejected, and a full-scale operation had been
projected in accord with a plan developed by General Eisenhower's staff.
The final outline plan for Sicily, approved by the CCS on 13 May during
the TRIDENT meetings, provided for British and American assaults against
southern and southeastern areas of the island. On 22 May, while the CCS
were still at the conference, General Eisenhower confirmed 10 July 1943
as D Day.1
Launching HUSKY
Early in its planning for HUSKY, General Eisenhower's combined planning
staff had concluded that the most important need was to capture suitable
airfields and ports to maintain the armies after the landings. By early
May General Eisenhower and his deputy, General Alexander, had decided to
concentrate the assault against the southeastern group of airfields and to
seize Catania, Palermo, and other important ports later on. As usual, the
landing craft bottleneck presented a problem. The outline plan called for
eight seaborne assaults on approximately a hundred miles of coast line
extending from just below Syracuse around the southeast tip of the island
to the west as far as Licata. British troops were to assault the southeast
coast, U.S. troops to land farther west in the vicinity of Gela and
Licata. General Eisenhower chose 10 July, which occurred in the second
quarter of the moon, as the target date offering sufficient light during
the early period of the night for parachutists' landings and complete
darkness after midnight for the naval force operations.2 With the
objectives and timing
[146]
definite, the tempo of preparations for launching the campaign was stepped
up both in Washington and abroad.
As a part of the advance planning for HUSKY, the British arranged
for a body, made to appear to be that of a British courier, to be washed
ashore on the Spanish coast. In the corpse's pouch were plans for an
attack upon Greece under the code name HUSKY and for a second attack in
the western Mediterranean. According to the planted information, only a
feint would be made against Sicily. The Germans in due course received
word of the body and the plans and reinforced the Peloponnesus and
Sardinia.3
The close of the Tunisia Campaign led to a radical change in the situation
in Italy. The defeat in North Africa convinced many Italian leaders that
Italy should get out of the war, but Hitler remained adamant in his
determination to fight both the Russians and the Anglo-Americans. With
their hopes for a political settlement quashed, the Italians were placed
in a precarious position. Their military weakness made them acutely aware
of the dangers of attempting to break their alliance with Germany, for
swift retaliation might follow. On the other hand, they wanted to stop
fighting. As they wavered between Scilla and Charybdis, they aroused the
suspicion of Hitler. On 20 May he decided to take no chances and directed
the German staff to prepare a plan for German control of northern Italy in
the event of Italy's defection.
By mid-June, the German commanders in Italy concluded that Italian
morale was hopeless and that little could be expected in the way of
resistance unless German forces were brought in. The Italian military
staff conceded the truth of the German position by permitting and
requesting German aid. As German troops entered Italy in increasing
numbers during June and the early days of July, the Italians' freedom of
action decreased.
Thus, on the eve of HUSKY, German forces controlled the northern
approaches to Italy and were firmly ensconced around Rome. If the
Italians defected, the German commanders would be in a position to
evacuate their forces from the south to a defensive line along the
northern Apennines. Were the Italians to continue the fight, the Germans
contemplated defending all of Italy. All signs pointed to an Allied
attack upon Sicily, but the Germans were forced to be prepared for a
number of eventualities. The next move depended upon the Allies-and the
Italians.4
The uncertainty in the relations between the two European Axis
partners was not unwelcome to the Allies, but the German reinforcement
of Italy and Sicily was hardly encouraging. To the Allies, HUSKY
represented months of preparation. It developed as a unique combined
undertaking, involving mounting, assembling, and supplying assault
forces from tour widely separated areas -the United States, the United
Kingdom, the Middle East, and North Africa. It required the organization
and dispatch of one task force from the United States, the assembly in
the theater of a gigantic
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Allied armada, and the launching of an ambitious amphibious operation.
HUSKY also represented the first large-scale Allied venture in airborne
operations. To maintain equal status between U.S. and British forces,
special arrangements for command and administration were required. In
the process, HUSKY ushered in an experiment in military government for
occupied enemy territory. All of these experiences were to furnish
valuable precedents for the management and conduct of subsequent combined
operations.
The preparation and execution of this whirlwind campaign, which lasted
only thirty-nine days (10 July-17 August 1943), pointed up the fact that
much operational planning hitherto performed in Washington was shifting
to large theater headquarters. The development of the replacement system
and of the standing operating procedure for convoy loading and
dispatching troops to the field made much of the work of operations
officers in Washington routine and automatic. At the same time the
tendency for an increasing number of General Marshall's plans and
operations assistants to go overseas to serve on the theater headquarters
staff as observers, liaison officers, planners, and active participants
in the operation became even more marked.5 The chief Army planner,
General Wedemeyer, during a tour of extended temporary duty in the North
African theater, joined General Patton's staff and at the latter's request
analyzed the entire operational plan for HUSKY. Wedemeyer went so far as
to ask for and receive command of a regiment and participated in the initial fighting in Sicily.6 This leaven of
practical experience with amphibious operations, needless to say, was to
serve the Washington Army headquarters in good stead in subsequent
planning for the highly operational phase of the war.
While some of its representatives were busily engaged in theater
planning, the Washington Army headquarters completed arrangements for
dispatching the 45th Infantry Division and the 82d Airborne Division.7 The combat-loaded 45th Division was a task force in miniature, for whose
preparation the Washington headquarters had already had intensive
experience in mounting and moving the Western Task Force for TORCH. The
82d Airborne arrived in the North African theater in May, followed a
month later by the 45th Division. General Marshall's operations staff
examined General Eisenhower's troop lists in terms not only of available
units, ships, and escorts but also of the effect on other prospective
operations, particularly on the build-up in the European theater for
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the projected cross-Channel operation.8
The contrast in the totals of
American strength divided between North Africa and the United Kingdom in
the summer of 1943 drove home the need to hold the line so far as possible
and to use troops already in the Mediterranean for HUSKY. By 1 July 1943,
just ten days before HUSKY was launched, the strength of U.S. forces in
the North African theater was estimated by the Washington planners at
over 528,000, while U.S. strength in the United Kingdom was only about
160,000.9 Meanwhile, replacements had to be sent to the active theater,
and the War Department took steps to correct deficiencies in the
replacement training program in the zone of interior. It opened
replacement depots on both coasts, increased capacities for training
infantry and field artillery replacements, augmented training periods, and
made provision for more small unit training.10
To match British arrangements, the War Department also took a significant
step in organizing U.S. forces for HUSKY. Learning of the apparent British
intention to designate General Montgomery's Eastern Task Force for HUSKY
as an army, General Hull, then Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD,
suggested on 13
May to Marshall the advisability of designating General Patton's Western
Task Force-then set up as a corps-also as an army. General Hull was
concerned lest world opinion conclude that American contribution to HUSKY
was much less than that of the British-a conclusion contrary to the facts
in the case. General Marshall thereupon conferred with Field Marshall
Dill, who confirmed the British intention. At the same time, the War
Department operations staff learned of General Eisenhower's favorable
disposition to Hull's proposal. As a result, on 17 May the Chief of Staff
cabled General Eisenhower that the designation of General Patton's force
for HUSKY was to be the U.S. Seventh Army.11 General Montgomery's Eighth
Army comprised seven divisions, while General Patton's Seventh Army was
given six divisions-the 1st, 3d, 9th, and 45th Infantry Divisions, the
2d Armored, and the 82d Airborne. The 9th and part of the 82d Airborne
were to be held in reserve in North Africa; the rest were to, be used in
the first assault.12
The Seventh Army became "the first United States field army to operate
as a unit in the war."13
[149]
To provide fighter cover, a major problem in the operation, General
Eisenhower had decided to subject the island of Pantelleria, almost
equidistant from Tunisia and Sicily, to a heavy Allied bombardment well in
advance of the assault on Sicily. Before an amphibious assault, the
severe air attacks were supplemented by naval bombardment. The island
surrendered after a few rounds of small arms fire were exchanged with the
landing forces on 11 June. Next day Lampedusa, a smaller island some
distance to the south, also fell. These attacks marked the first
successful Allied effort to conquer enemy territory principally by air
action.14
A month later, on 10 July, the Allied ground forces went ashore in
Sicily. U.S. troops participated in the assault on the south coast of
Sicily as the Western Task Force (Seventh Army), the attacks coinciding
with those launched by the Eastern Task Force (Eighth Army) on the
southeast end of Sicily with British forces from the Middle East,
Tunisia, and the United Kingdom. Making the assaults for the Americans
were three reinforced infantry divisions-the 1st, 3d, and 45th-and the
2d Armored Division. The 1st and 3d Infantry and the 2d Armored
Divisions were mounted from North African bases. The 45th, trained
amphibiously in the United States, had spent five weeks . at sea and
required a brief conditioning in North Africa before its participation
in the initial assault. Airborne operations were carried out by the 82d
Airborne Division before and after these landings-not without some
unfortunate mishaps.15
Though the Seventh Army encountered bad weather conditions, the landings
on the whole came off without serious opposition. The remarkable
performance of the celebrated DUKW-a product of American ingenuity-in
unloading over the beaches solved the problem of large-scale supply
until suitable ports were captured.16
Soon the ports of Licata, Syracuse, and Augusta were seized. On 22 July,
elements of the U.S. 2d Armored and 3d Divisions, moving with great
speed, met at the outskirts of Palermo, and Palermo surrendered without
resistance. Early in the morning of 17 August, patrols of the U.S. 3d
Division entered Messina not far in advance of patrols from the British
Eighth Army. The campaign was over. In the closing days of the operation
the strength of the U.S. and. British Army forces in Sicily was almost
evenly balanced-168,427 American and 168,268 British.17
[150]
At Casablanca, seven months before, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had set
as the objectives of the Sicily Campaign: to make the Allied lines of
communication in the Mediterranean more secure; to divert as much German
strength as possible from the Soviet front during the critical summer
period; and to intensify pressure on Italy. General Eisenhower's
conclusion was, "The operation achieved all these and much more."18 The
invasion of Sicily, accompanied by heavy bombing on the Italian
mainland-especially of the marshaling yards in the Rome area on 19
July-dealt crushing blows to Italian morale and led directly to the
overthrow of the Fascist regime.19 On 25 July King Victor Emmanuel
announced the resignation of Mussolini and charged Marshal Pietro
Badoglio with the task of forming a new government. Italy had taken the
first step toward withdrawing from the war against the Allies.20
Aside from their effect on Italy, air attacks from Mediterranean
bases served as a prelude and warm-up for the five groups of B-24's that
were withdrawn from HUSKY on 20 July, the day after the attack on Rome,
in order to prepare for a raid on the Ploesti oil refineries in Rumania
on 1 August 1943. Ploesti, with its rich resources of natural oil of
great importance to the German war machine, had long been a favorite
target in U.S. military planning. Its special attraction was the
prospect of slowing up German operations on the Eastern Front and
thereby offering immediate help to the USSR. Shortly after Pearl Harbor,
American planners had studied the possibility of bombing Ploesti, and in
the late spring of 1942 an ineffective attempt -by a special air group
under Col. Harry A. Halverson-had been made by AAF planes from the
Middle East.21
In the spring of 1943 a new plan had been developed by the Air Staff in
Washington-a project for a low-level mass attack based on Bengasi.
General Arnold and his planners heartily supported the plan, which was
presented at TRIDENT and approved by General Eisenhower and the CCS
early in June.22 In order not to deprive HUSKY of bomber support, it was
agreed by all that the North African air force should provide only two
groups of B-24's for the operation (known successively as STATESMAN,
SOAPSUDS, and TIDALWAVE) and that the remainder should be obtained by
transferring two groups of B-24's (the 93d and 44th) from the Eighth Air
Force and temporarily diverting one group (the
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389th) scheduled to move to the United Kingdom.23 Arriving in the
Mediterranean at the end of June and beginning of July 1943, these groups
joined the 376th and 98th groups.
The raid on Ploesti of 1 August was not a complete success. The loss of
men and planes was heavy-532 (dead, prisoners, missing, or interned) of
the 1,726 airmen and 54 of 177 planes, 41 of them in action. Much damage
was inflicted on Ploesti's refining and cracking installations, reducing
the production of lubricating oils, but the Germans soon repaired the
damage. AAF historians, analyzing the results after the close of
hostilities, have concluded that "though the over-all damage was heavy it
was not decisive."
24
Planning Post-HUSKY Operations
The progress of HUSKY inevitably raised anew the question that had
been left in suspense at TRIDENT-what was to be the next strategic move?
Should large-scale activity in the Mediterranean be closed down, and
resources and strength be husbanded for the major operations in
northwest Europe? The conferees had agreed to eliminate Italy, but how,
where, and when had been left undecided. Should the Allies cross the
Strait of Messina and seize the toe of
Italy? Should they capture the heel at Taranto, or possibly land higher up
the west coast? Or should they limit themselves to occupying Sardinia, as
the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had favored? Churchill, who had come to TRIDENT
with his heart set on an invasion of the Italian mainland, was
disappointed in the vagueness of the agreement on Italy.25 As he confided
somewhat later to General Jan Christian Smuts:
Not being satisfied with this, I requested the President [at the
close of TRIDENT to send General Marshall with me to North Africa and
there upon the spot to convince Eisenhower and others that nothing less
than Rome could satisfy the requirements of this year's campaign.26
Before he left Washington, Churchill explained to Roosevelt that he would
feel awkward in discussing post-HUSKY policy with the Allied staff in the
theater without the presence of a high-ranking American representative,
lest he be charged with having exercised "undue influence." Obviously, if
he could persuade Marshall-the strongest and most influential American
military protagonist of an early cross-Channel operation as well as the
theater commanders to back an invasion of Italy after Sicily, the Prime
Minister would have gone a long way toward realizing his immediate goal
in the Mediterranean. At the President's request, General Marshall
agreed to defer a trip to the Southwest Pacific in order to accompany
the Prime Minister and his staff.27 The transaction between the
President and the Prime Minister prompted Marshall's rueful remark,.
[152]
that "he [Marshall] seemed to be merely a piece of baggage useful as
a trading point."28
Algiers Conference, 29 May
, June 1943
A series of meetings with General Eisenhower and other high-ranking Allied
military leaders in the Mediterranean followed at Algiers in the week of
29 May-3 June 1943. Among those present were Generals Sir Harold
Alexander, Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, and Sir Alan Brooke, Air Chief
Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Maj. Gen. Walter B. Smith, Brig. Gen Lowell W.
Rooks, and General Sir Hastings L. Ismay. Toward the close of the week
General Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, who had been on a tour of
the overseas theaters, arrived at Algiers to join the Chief of Staff at
the meetings.
Churchill and Marshall acquainted Eisenhower with the TRIDENT
decisions, explored with him the progress of the HUSKY preparations and
the implications of the projected cross-Channel operation (ROUNDHAMMER)
for Mediterranean operations after HUSKY, and exchanged views with him
on the merits of various possible post-HUSKY operations. At the outset
General Eisenhower expressed the view that if the Allies were going to
knock out Italy, they should do so immediately after HUSKY with all
available means. If HUSKY proved to be an easy undertaking, the Allies
should go directly into Italy rather than to any of the Mediterranean
islands.29
The Prime Minister drew on all his eloquence to reaffirm the
position he had supported at TRIDENT. He insisted that he had no desire
to interfere with a cross-Channel attack projected for 1944, but he
wanted to take full and immediate advantage of all opportunities offered
by the capture of Sicily. His "sincere wish and hope" was that the
United States and Great Britain could go directly from HUSKY into Italy.
He declared that "his heart lay in an invasion of Southern Italy." To
Churchill, the choice of southern Italy over Sardinia represented the
difference between "a glorious campaign and a mere convenience."
30
In reply, General Marshall emphasized that he was not arguing
against the broad commitment made at TRIDENT to aim at the fall of Italy
but, he stated, the Allies would have to select the particular operation
in the Mediterranean to follow HUSKY with great care in order to ensure
that it be based on-a close calculation of requirements and of actual
conditions to be faced. The "ball" and "toe" of Italy were only a small
part of the mainland, and operations on the mainland might, in the final
analysis, result in great drains on Allied shipping and other resources.
Before a decision could be reached on post-HUSKY operations, it would be
necessary to estimate German reaction to HUSKY in order to determine
[153]
GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER AND GENERAL MARSHALL during the Algiers
Conference, 3 June 1943.
Whether there would be real resistance to an Allied landing in
southern Italy, Whether the Germans would withdraw to the Po, whether
the Germans could organize and handle the Italians effectively, and what
readjustments they Would make on the Soviet front. The information could
be secured, in General Marshall's opinion, after the initial phases of
HUSKY were completed.
31
General Marshall thus continued to show the cautious attitude of the U.S.
military staff toward large-scale ground operations in the Mediterranean.
Pending the outcome of HUSKY, he recommended that the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, prepare for various
Mediterranean operations. The logical approach, lie suggested, was to
set up two forces, each with its own staff-one to train for an operation
against Sardinia and Corsica, the other for an operation against the
mainland of Italy. When the HUSKY situation became sufficiently clear to
make a decision on the next step, the necessary air strength and vital
resources could be assigned to the force carrying out the plan adopted. As
a result of General Marshall's recommendations, General Eisenhower
modified the view lie lead first offered. He would designate
[154]
two separate headquarters, each with its own staff, to plan
post-HUSKY operations. One would plan for operations against Sardinia
and Corsica; the other for operations against the mainland of Italy,
particularly the toe and the ball. If Sicily collapsed quickly, he would
cross the Strait of Messina and seize a bridgehead on the mainland.32
The conference ended, as it had begun, without a clear-cut decision on post-HUSKY operations. The conferees simply concluded that General
Eisenhower should send his recommendations to the CCS during the early
phases of HUSKY. In effect, as the Prime Minister summed it up at the
close of the meetings, "post-HUSKY would be in General Eisenhower's
hands." The Prime Minister had to take what comfort he could from his
impression that all were agreed that Italy be eliminated from the war as
soon as possible, and if differences arose over the particular course of
action recommended by General Eisenhower, they would be settled between
the two governments. General Marshall had won his way on postponing a
final decision.33
Decision To Undertake
AVALANCHE
Meanwhile, in Washington General Marshall's planning assistants kept
one eye on the progress of HUSKY, the other on post-HUSKY planning. In
examining recommendations for Mediterranean operations after Sicily, they took the same cautious stand Marshall had
taken against Allied embroilment in large-scale ground action in Italy.
Their yardstick was the likely effect of any Mediterranean operation on
the main effort in northwestern Europe. One recommendation to which they
objected was that advanced on 3 July by General Arnold for invading Italy
in the fall of 1943 in order to occupy the Ravenna-Ancona area.
Arguing purely from the Air point of view, the Air Forces chief
dwelt on the advantages of gaining a base area in northern Italy from
which the German controlled industrial centers of southern Europe could
be bombed, thus supplementing the Combined Bomber Offensive from the
United Kingdom and paving the way for an invasion of the Continent., On
the other hand, alternative operations-against Sardinia, Corsica, or the
Iberian Peninsula-promised only limited results for air operations.34
The Army planners objected that should the enemy offer strong resistance
after HUSKY, a sufficient number of Allied divisions and adequate means
would not be available to occupy the northern portion of the Italian
boot. It was their hope, however, that the measures finally adopted to
eliminate Italy would yield a base area for broadening air operations
against German-controlled Europe
35
In fact, so important did they consider this aim that they were opposed
to allocating U.S. heavy bombers to Turkey-then
[155]
suggested by the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington-on the
ground that the airplanes could be more effectively used in operations
based on Italy.36
The Army planners also raised objections to a concomitant
recommendation of the British Chiefs of Staff that the Allies occupy the
toe and ball of Italy. In presenting their proposal, the British
declared that "all means at our disposal" should be used to eliminate
Italy from the war, and thereby contain as large a German force as
possible in the Mediterranean.37
Col. George A. Lincoln of the War Department's operations staff argued
that the toe and ball had little military value in themselves. If the
Axis Powers chose to resist, a commitment of limited Allied forces
available against Italy would not necessarily afford the best method of
containing German forces in the Mediterranean or of bringing about the
collapse of Italy. On the other hand, air operations from Sicily,
Sardinia, and Corsica might pave the way for the later disintegration of
Italy. In any event, the seven divisions scheduled for transfer from the
Mediterranean to the United Kingdom must be sent. A major operation in
Italy must be avoided so long as there was a "reasonable" chance of
executing OVERLORD. A realistic decision by the CCS on post-HUSKY plans,
Colonel Lincoln concluded, must be based on General Eisenhower's
appraisal of Axis reaction to HUSKY and of probable Axis reaction to a
post-HUSKY operation, on a reliable estimate of resources remaining
after HUSKY, and, above all, on over-all strategic considerations.38
Pending the response to HUSKY and the final decision on post-HUSKY
operations, the Army planners heartily approved the flexible concept of
operations embodied in General Eisenhower's unfolding plans against
Sardinia, Corsica, southern Italy, and various combinations thereof. In
this theater planning, the seizure of the toe or ball of Italy was to be
followed by an overland advance to occupy the heel and thence northward to
capture Naples. To ensure that post-HUSKY Mediterranean actions would not
become extended, the Army planners sought to keep the wherewithal limited
to that already allocated to the area, exclusive of planned withdrawals
for other operations. On the other hand, the British were anxious to
increase the means and strength available to General Eisenhower for an
invasion of the Italian mainland in force.
Success of the initial assaults on Sicily soon began to bring the
interrelated questions of objectives, resources, and timing to a head.
At first the vital resource in immediate question was combat loaders. At
the close of June General Eisenhower had asked for the retention of nine
combat loaders that TRIDENT had not definitely allocated to other
theaters. Within a week after the initial landings the British urged
that General Eisenhower to be given a free hand in respect to
shipping-especially combat
[156]
loaders-the resulting loss to be absorbed by BOLERO or the Pacific. The
Army planners resisted. They called for General Eisenhower to adjust his
projected requirements for combat loaders for post-HUSKY operations to
those remaining in the Mediterranean after the withdrawals for BOLERO,
BULLFROG (operation against Arakan coast, Burma), and the Pacific were
met-as originally planned. In a meeting of the CCS on 16 July General
Marshall forcefully backed his planners' point of view on the
distribution of resources, observing that losses of combat loaders in
the initial HUSKY operations had been slight.39
Up to this point General Marshall's attitude toward an invasion of Italy
had been a cautious "wait and see." He now proposed that a bold amphibious
attack on Naples be seriously considered. Presumably his stand was
influenced-in part at least-by a 15 July report from his intelligence
staff on the exploitation of HUSKY. G-2 indicated that Italian combat
power had deteriorated to the point where the Allies could assume
calculated risks in dealing with Italy. To exploit their advantage, the
Allies would be justified in taking prompt action against the Italian
mainland. G-2 recommended the Naples area as the most promising target
for an Allied invasion and called for studies to be made of an operation
to capture Naples and then move on to Rome.40 Reasoning along the same
lines, the Chief of Staff suggested on 16 July that the CCS consider launching an amphibious attack on
Naples after HUSKY on the ground that if the HUSKY outlook continued
favorable the Allies would be justified in taking a bolder move and "some
reasonable risk in this direction."41
Sir John Dill took up Marshall's suggestion at once, and on the same day
the CCS cabled General Eisenhower their acceptance of his current
strategic concept for post-HUSKY planning purposes and their interest in
the possibilities of an amphibious operation against Naples in lieu of
an attack on Sardinia.42
In London Churchill received the report of General Marshall's 16 July
proposal to the CCS with "evident. delight." Secretary of War Stimson,
then on a visit to the United Kingdom, was greatly disturbed to find, in
the course of conversations with the Prime Minister on 17 July, that
Churchill interpreted Marshall's support of a bold move against Naples as
an endorsement of his whole Italian policy. Stimson hastened to point out
that Marshall had probably proposed the Naples operation only as a short
cut designed to hasten "the completion of the Italian adventure" so that
there would be no danger of interference with preparations for the
cross-Channel operation. On 19 July the Secretary, talking with Marshall
via transatlantic telephone, asked for a clarification of views. He
reported his impression that the Prime Minister, subject to his "very
strong desire" for a march on Rome, was sincere in his promise to
support OVERLORD. Stimson informed Marshall of the
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assumption he had made regarding Marshall's position-that Marshall
had suggested the move against Naples in order to hasten the drive on
Rome, permit more time for the cross-Channel operation, and preclude the
danger of a long, slow march "up the leg" that might eliminate the
cross-Channel operation altogether. The Chief of Staff reassured the
Secretary of War: "You are absolutely correct. This is exactly what we
are after."
43
On 22 July Stimson told Churchill of his talk with Marshall and
confirmed his interpretation of Marshall's support of AVALANCHE (code
name for attack on the Naples area). He made clear that Marshall and his
staff were as firmly in favor of the cross-Channel operation as ever.44
Thus it appears that General Marshall's proposal of 16 July signified no
sudden new interest on his part in extended, large-scale ground action
on the Italian mainland. Far from supporting a departure from the
fundamental strategy hitherto espoused by the Army staff, he was seizing
on the possibility of the Naples attack as a device to gain all the
advantages of a position in Italy-as far north as Rome-as quickly and as
cheaply as possible, thereby ensuring rather than impeding the success
Of OVERLORD. Whatever Marshall's reasons, the possibility of bolder
action in the Mediterranean found British staff circles no less
enthusiastic than the Prime Minister.45
In Washington and in the theater, planning for post-HUSKY operations
henceforth took AVALANCHE seriously into account.46
On 18 July General Eisenhower requested the approval of the CCS to carry
the war to the Italian mainland immediately after the capture of Sicily.
In the light of the current state of Italian morale this appeared to him
to be the best course to achieve the twin objectives of forcing Italy
out of the war and of containing the maximum German forces. His
planners, he pointed out, were re-examining the proposition of an
assault on Naples.47
[158]
On 20 July, on the basis of a message drafted in the War Department,
the CCS cabled their approval.48
Once more the British raised the question of augmenting General Eisenhower's resources-this time to ensure
completely the success of AVALANCHE. On 19 July-and more definitely on
the 21st -they proposed that nothing be moved out of the Mediterranean
until Eisenhower had stated his requirements for the proposed invasion
of the mainland. Acknowledging that a stand-fast policy might delay
scheduled operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, they felt that
the elimination of Italy from the war would be worth the price. To some
extent the British proposal affected combat loaders. Since those slated
for the Pacific and BOLERO-SICKLE had already left, Burma operations in
all likelihood would suffer the most. The main items in immediate
question now appeared to be aircraft-bombers and troop carriers and
possibly also destroyers. To the British, the situation called for
immediate and even unilateral action. They proceeded to issue a
"stand-fast" order on movements of their own troops, shipping, and other
resources from the Mediterranean, urging the Americans to do the same.49
Once more the Army planners raised objections-this time on the ground that
JCS support of AVALANCHE was not intended to imply any increase in the
means available for post-HUSKY operations. Col. Frank N. Roberts reasoned
that General Eisenhower's forces for post-HUSKY had already been augmented
at the price of some disarrangement of BOLERO.50 A further increase of
means might postpone or cancel operations projected for other theaters-an
unacceptable departure from TRIDENT strategy. The JPS went so far as to
contend that unless the British went through with the planned withdrawals
of combat loaders for BULLFROG, the American LST's (landing ship, tank)
for that operation should be sent to the Pacific.51
General Marshall took the same position as his staff in arguing before
the CCS on 23 July-that General Eisenhower had the means with which to
capture Naples and that "reasonable hazards" could then be accepted in
the Mediterranean. If additional shipping and other resources were
furnished, OVERLORD as well as Far East and Pacific operations would be
jeopardized.52
To General Marshall and
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the JCS, AVALANCHE would have to be a calculated risk.
In the midst of these exchanges, Washington received the dramatic
news of the fall of Benito Mussolini (25 July), and on the following day
the JCS and the CCS met in special sessions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
were more eager than ever for quick action to knock Italy out of the
war. General Marshall now viewed the British proposal as "conservative
and orthodox." As he saw it, the situation in the Mediterranean had
become different from that envisaged at TRIDENT. Italian resistance was
weak. The Allies already possessed Palermo. Allied casualties in Sicily,
except for airborne troops, had been very light. As a result, he
believed that more Allied forces would be available in the Mediterranean
for offensive operations after HUSKY than had been thought possible. The
operation against Naples as then conceived was no longer a "calculated
risk." A timely operation against the mainland at Naples would greatly
strengthen the hand of the new Italian Government in freeing itself from
its German partner. In view of the developments during the previous
twenty-four hours, it appeared to Marshall that late August, then
considered the time when a "fleeting opportunity" to invade the Italian
mainland would occur, was much too late. Observing that 60,000 men over
and above the TRIDENT agreement would be available for post-HUSKY
operations, the JCS adopted the same arguments before the GCS. To the
British, the JCS voiced particular concern over the progress of
preparations for operations in Burma. Current successes in the
Mediterranean had, they asserted, by no means eliminated the need for
the Burma operations already agreed upon.53
On 26 July the CCS agreed that General Eisenhower should plan to mount
AVALANCHE as soon as possible with resources already available to him.
Some carrier-borne air support, however, would be made available to him
for that operation from British sources.54
Over and above the exceptions already made, the Americans remained
reluctant to retreat from their original decision not to send
reinforcements from the United States for AVALANCHE or any other
post-HUSKY Mediterranean operation. Nor did they want the scheduled
withdrawals from the Mediterranean for other operations interrupted. To
make up for the weaknesses in long-range fighters for the AVALANCHE
landings, the British themselves actually allotted four of their escort
carriers and a light fleet carrier and gave General Eisenhower three of
their bomber squadrons scheduled for early departure from the theater.55
On 26 July General Eisenhower, meeting with his staff in Tunis, ordered
the preparation of two alternative plans for operations against the
mainland of Italy: BUTTRESS (invasion of Calabria) and AVALANCHE. On 27
July he cabled the CCS that a decision as to which of these plans should
be put into effect should be possible in a few days-as soon as the
military significance of the recent politi-
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cal changes in Italy had become sufficiently Clear
56 On 28 July he informed the
CCS that the availability of shipping and landing craft made the
launching of a formal AVALANCHE by 9 September 1943 a definite
possibility. To exploit the situation immediately in the event of a
complete collapse of Italy, his staff was also preparing an ad hoc
AVALANCHE of about one division. He emphasized the difficulty of the air problem in AVALANCHE -the
lack of bases close enough to provide fighter cover for the initial
assault and the need to neutralize
enemy airpower and disrupt enemy lines of communication. He stressed the
need for haste in HUSKY in order to secure
the necessary airfields and a "reasonable
bridgehead" in the BUTTRESS area and thereby prevent the Germans from transferring their reserves directly to the scene of a landing in
AVALANCHE.57 On 2 August General Eisenhower confirmed the fact that a
lodgment would be required in the
BUTTRESS area before a bold stroke such as AVALANCHE Could be attempted.58
He had still to determine the exact character of the landing on the toe.
The choice now lay between two planned operations-BUTTRESS and BAYTOWN
(an operation across the Strait of Messina near Reggio) as the forerunner
of AVALANCHE. While the final decision was to be postponed until the time
of the next big Anglo-American conference, QUADRANT, the breaching of the
Continent via the "soft underbelly"
was close at hand.
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Endnotes
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