Epilogue
Completing the Strategic
Patterns
Although the fighting went on for almost another year, the main story of
military strategy in World War II, except for the important and still
unanswered question of how to defeat Japan, comes to an end in the fall of
1944. Once the Allied forces had become firmly lodged on the European
continent and taken up the pursuit of the German foe, the war became, for
General Marshall and his staff, essentially a matter of logistics and
tactics-the Supreme Allied Commander assuming the responsibility for
making decisions as military exigencies in the field dictated. But to
Churchill, warily watching the swift Soviet advance into Poland and the
Balkans, the war had become more than ever a contest for great political
stakes, and he wished Western Allied strength diverted to fill the vacuum
left by the retreating Germans in southeastern Europe, thereby
forestalling the Soviet surge.1 In the last year of the European conflict
the two approaches therefore boiled down to a question of military
tactics versus political maneuvers.
Had the President joined with the Prime Minister, as he often had in the
past, the U.S. staff's concentration on bringing the war against Germany
to a swift military conclusion might still have been tempered and the war
steered into more direct political channels. But the
President would not, and the Prime Minister by himself could not. Perhaps
the President, as usual when his political objectives came into conflict
with the possibility of a quick and decisive military ending of the war,
once more yielded to the latter. Perhaps, growing ever more weary under
the great burden he was carrying, he was anxious to get the military phase
over and apply his remaining energies to the tasks of peace. As we now
know, the President's health had begun to weaken after SEXTANT, and his
absences from Washington high councils had become more frequent. In any
case, by 1944-45 the Commander in Chief was caught on the horns of a
political dilemma confronting a U.S. President involved in a coalition
war abroad. There is reason to believe that the President was not
insensitive or unconcerned about the unilateral efforts of the Soviet
Union to put its impress upon the shape of postwar Europe-as witness the
dispute over the reconstruction of the Polish Government. But from the
point of view of domestic political considerations, he had to fight a
quick and decisive war-one that would justify U.S. entry and the dispatch
of U.S. troops abroad. He had educated the American public to the need for
active participation, but whether he could have led them to a prolonged
war, or to a prolonged occupation by U.S. troops-such as might have
resulted from the more active American role in southeastern Europe desired
by the Prime Minister-was more doubtful. The American tradition of holding
aloof
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from European affairs, the strong spirit of isolationism only
temporarily stilled in wartime, and the typical aversion of democracy to
extended war efforts would in any case have made him less likely in
1944-45 to risk
new military or political embroilments on the Continent in the process of
ending the current conflict. The experience of World War I and domestic Realpolitik seemed to dictate that a U.S. President who led his country in
international war must stay in it only long enough to administer a sound
thrashing to the bullies who had dared to start it, hurry out of it with
the least disarrangement of the American way of life and standard of
living, "get the boys home," and then resume the traditional policy of
remaining uninvolved in European affairs.
In Roosevelt's faith, the path of peace for Europe seemed to lead toward
the long-range development of a healthy environment in which new moral,
political, and economic factors might come into play rather than toward
the traditional reliance on balance of military and political power. In
fact certain measures, other than the thrusting of U.S. military weight
into the path of the Soviet Union's advance, had from time to time
suggested themselves to him as feasible ways of keeping the peace in
Europe with friends and foes alike. It is a moot point whether these in
time would have amounted to a well worked-out policy, or would have
remained what they seemed to be in the summer of 1944-a number of inchoate
threads, a composite of idealism and practicality, of optimism and
reality. Roosevelt appeared to have put his faith in offering the USSR the
hand of friendship; in his personal handling of Stalin and in Stalin's
reasonableness; in a joint occupation of Europe with a million-man U.S. force to
remain in certain selected areas of Germany for one or two years; in
raising the economic standards of relatively backward areas and thereby
preventing trouble spots from developing, as in the case of Iran; in a new
international organization, the United Nations Organization; and in a
system of United Nations trusteeships over key bases, as in North Africa.2 Whatever the explanation may be whether through deliberate choice or
drift, or a combination of the two-the fact remains that American national
policy in the final year of the war placed no obstacles in the way of a
decisive military ending of the European conflict.
By the summer of 1944 the signs of things to come were already apparent.
Once on the Continent, new problems arose, and old problems, hitherto
quiescent, became immediate-problems calling for policy decisions
relating to Allied, liberated, and neutral countries. General Eisenhower
was given more and more responsibility for political decisions or fell
heir to them by default. In the absence of clear and consistent political
guidance and direction from Washington, decisions were made by the
commander in the field on the basis of military considerations. He fell
back on the U.S. staff concept of bringing the enemy to bay and ending the
war quickly and decisively with the least casualties. This trend, already
apparent in 1944, became
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even more marked in 1945 in the commander's decision to stop at the
Elbe and not take Berlin or Prague ahead of the Russians.3
As usual, General Marshall and the U.S. staff backed the decisions of the
commander in the field. Typical of Marshall's approach were two
statements prepared in April 1945-the one in response to the British
proposal to capture Berlin, the other concerning the liberation of Prague
and western Czechoslovakia. With reference to Berlin, Marshall joined
with his colleagues in the JCS in emphasizing to the British Chiefs of
Staff "that the destruction of the German armed forces is more important
than any political or psychological advantages which might be derived
from possible capture of the German capital ahead of the Russians . . . .
Only Eisenhower is in a position to make a decision concerning his battle
and the best way to exploit successes to the full."
4 With respect to
Prague and the rest of Czechoslovakia, Marshall commented, on a draft
communication to Eisenhower, in his own hand: "Personally and aside from
all logistic, tactical or strategical implications, I would be loath to
hazard American lives for purely political purposes. Czechoslovakia will
have to be cleared of German troops and we may have to cooperate with the
Russians in
so doing."5 Such views of the Army Chief of Staff took on added
significance, for during the hiatus of Roosevelt's final days and his
successor's early days in office the burden of dealing with important
issues fell heavily on the senior military advisers in the Washington high
command. Marshall's stand on these issues was entirely in accord with
earlier Army strategic planning. Whatever the ultimate political
implications, from the point of view of a decisive military ending of the
war against Germany it made little difference whether the forces of the
United States or those of the Soviet Union took Berlin and Prague.
The Prime Minister's inability to reverse the trend in the last year of
the war bore testimony to the changed relationships between U.S. and
British national military weight and to the shifting bases of the "Grand
Alliance." Though the military power Marshall had managed to conserve for
the invasion of the Continent gave the United States a powerful weapon,
the United States did not choose to use it to political purpose. The Prime
Minister had the purpose but not the power. By the end of 1943 British
mobilization was practically complete. In the first half of 1944, with its
manpower mobilized to the hilt, strains and stresses began to appear in
its economy. After the middle of 1944 its production became increasingly
unbalanced, and the British were to fight the remainder of the war with a
contracting economy.6
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The Americans, who had entered the war later, enjoyed the advantages of
greater industrial capacity as well as greater manpower resources. They
did not hit the peak of their military manpower mobilization until May
1945-the month Germany surrendered. Reaching their war production peak at
the end of 1943, they were able to sustain it at a high level, keep it in
balance with nonwar production, taper off slightly in 1944 and still more
in 1945 to V-E Day.7
The greater capacity of the American economy and population to support a
sustained, large-scale Allied offensive effort showed up clearly in the
last year of the European war. In the initial stages Of OVERLORD the U.S.
and British divisions were nearly equal in numbers, but once entrenched
on the Continent the preponderance in favor of the Americans became
greater and greater. Through the huge stockpiles of American production
already built up, and through his control of the increasing U.S. military
manpower on the European continent, the SHAEF commander could put the
imprint of U.S. staff views on winning the war. The British had to
recognize
this.8
Whatever political orientation Churchill hoped to give the Western Allied
military effort, lie had to yield.9
Meanwhile, as the war with Germany drew to a close, the Allies still had
to face the momentous problem of how to defeat Japan.10 Here, too, as the
noose was drawn tighter around Japan in the last year of the conflict,
questions of political versus military objectives came to the fore. In
shaping the final strategy against Japan, it became more difficult to
separate war from postwar concerns and the desires of partners in the
coalition from purely American wishes. These factors intruded on the
continuing debate over the need for a Pacific OVERLORD.
During the fall of 1944 the Washington planners explored the choices in
the war against Japan and shaped plans for the encirclement and invasion
of the home islands. As it turned out, much of the planning was altered
materially or overtaken by events.
Thus,. after the Luzon decision was made, the Washington planners believed
that following the Okinawa operation, scheduled for March 1945, the choice
would be between operations against other Ryukyu Islands, Hokkaido, and
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along the China coast. The Army planners felt that Hokkaido would require
too many forces and that weather conditions around the island were very
poor. Although difficult terrain and inadequate sites for airfields
discouraged operations in the China coast area, plans were prepared. To
the planners, future development of airfields in the Ryukyus also merited
consideration since pressure against Japan could then be intensified by
air bombardment.
In the spring of 1945, the joint planners prepared detailed plans for the
assault on Kyushu (coded OLYMPIC), scheduled for 1 November 1945, and for
the final descent upon Honshu, set for 1 March 1946. In May 1945 the JCS
issued a directive charging MacArthur with conduct of the campaign
against Kyushu and Nimitz with the responsibility for the naval and
amphibious phases of the operation. No final directive was ever issued for
the invasion of Honshu.
The whole problem of the need for invasion was subjected to further debate
and discussion during the first six months of 1945. The followers of the
bombardment, blockade, and encirclement school held fast to their belief
that invasion would not be necessary, and in mid-June the new President,
Harry S. Truman, requested that a study on the cost in money and lives be
prepared to help clarify the situation. Since the unknown factors and
quantities in such an invasion were difficult to estimate, the study was
never completed. The Army's argument that plans and preparations should be
made for the invasion was accepted as the safe course to follow.
This, briefly put, was the general planning situation when the atom bomb
attacks of August 6th and 9th on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, were launched. The dramatic dropping of
the atom bomb came as a complete surprise to the American public and to
the Army strategic planners, with the exception of three top officers in
tile Operations Division, who were in on the secret.11 If the disclosures
of the postwar atomic spy trials can be accredited, the Russians were far
better informed on U.S. progress on the bomb than the rank and file Army
strategic planners.12 Under the circumstances it is not to be wondered
that the Army planners were still engaged in more or less conventional
planning for a war that came to an unconventional and sudden end. In a
sense the supersession of strategic plans by the revolutionary development
in weapons was a fitting climax to a war that had defied Army plans from
the beginning and shown throughout a strong tendency to go its own way.
Henceforth, strategic planners had to take into account the existence of
the most destructive weapon yet known to man.
It is significant that the Pacific "OVERLORD" never did come off, and
that there was no "big blow" against the Japanese homeland. In contrast
to the "soften them up by air, then attack by land" approach in Europe,
the Pacific advance showed the ground forces winning air bases to permit
Japan's "Inner Zone" to be bombarded. The predominance of the Army and the
Air Forces in Europe was supplanted by the Navy and the Air
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Forces in the Pacific, where the Army ground and service forces played
highly important but less dramatic roles. Had the atom bomb failed and an
invasion proven necessary, however, the Army planners would have been
remiss if they had not had the plans and preparations well under way. It
should also be noted that regardless of which type of war was fought in
World War II-concentration and invasion in Europe, or blockade,
bombardment, and island hopping in the Pacific-each had required a
tremendous outlay of American military strength and resources. What it
meant to fight a secondary and limited war in the far Pacific at the end
of a long line of communications-even without launching a Pacific
OVERLORD-had been driven home to the Army planners more and more before
the war with Japan ended.
Along with the question of invasion went the more intricate political
problem of Soviet intentions in the Far East. It was the general belief
among U.S. military leaders that, if an invasion were necessary, it would
be desirable to have the Soviet forces pin down the Japanese in northern
China, Manchuria, and Korea. The Army staff and General Marshall worked on
this premise and, viewing it in the military light, especially in terms of
possible savings in American lives, the Army was eager to have the USSR
enter the war against -Japan. But the precise time and terms of Soviet
entry were still unresolved at the time Of OCTAGON.13 At the Moscow Conference in October 1944, the United States agreed to build up stocks in the
Far East (coded MILEPOST) in preparation for Russian entry. Stalin again
told Harriman that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan two
or three months after Germany was defeated and Soviet forces in the Far
East were reinforced. At Yalta, Stalin and Roosevelt agreed upon the
terms for Soviet intervention: the USSR would get Sakhalin and the Kuril
Islands; Port Arthur would be leased to the USSR, and Dairen would become
a free port; the Soviet lease on the Manchurian railroads would be
revived; and Outer Mongolia would remain autonomous. The Soviet Union
announced its readiness to conclude "a pact of friendship and alliance"
with the "National Government of China" in order to support China in the
war against Japan. Roosevelt assumed the responsibility for informing
Chiang Kai-shek of the terms and for securing Chiang's approval.14 As
Leahy has since remarked, there appeared to be little discussion between
the political leaders on the matter.15 Perhaps if the Russians had been
in the Pacific war longer, the later outcry against these concessions
might not have been so great. But since there was no invasion and Japanese
surrender on 14 August came so quickly after Soviet entry into the war (8
August), the belief that the Russians had duped the Anglo-Americans was to
gain widespread credence in the West as the rift with the
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Soviet Union broadened in the postwar years.16
The Challenges of Victory
and Peace
Differences of opinion within the coalition that were later regarded as
having stemmed from the Yalta Conference were foreshadowed during 1944.
Strangely enough, the first cracks in the Allied armor appeared between
the United States and Great Britain. The apparent British intention to
foster the conservative elements in liberated nations such as Belgium,
Italy, and Greece did not meet with enthusiasm in the United States, which
looked to the Atlantic Charter as the guide to be used in determining
such future governments. The British place in the war with Japan and the
restoration of colonial territories in the Far East was another area of
disagreement that had already arisen in 1944. The need for continued lend-lease to bolster British economy loomed as an added bone of
contention, especially after the end of the war against Germany.
Furthermore, besides the Russians' designs in the Far East, their
attitude toward Poland, Iran, and the Balkans caused both the British and
the Americans uneasiness.17 The seeds of altercation and dispute were
growing as the common bond of danger weakened and the need for
co-operation lessened. Eisenhower warned Marshall just before OCTAGON,
"As signs of victory appear in the air, I note little instances that
seem to indicate that Allies cannot hang together so effectively in
prosperity as they can in adversity. "18
The curtain began to lift on the divergent national objectives and war
aims of the Allies-objectives hitherto obscured by the peril the partners
had shared, the unconditional surrender slogan, and the political
declarations to which they had subscribed. The unconditional surrender
concept, first announced at Casablanca, had been consistently advanced
at the midway conferences through OCTAGON as the agreed aim of the Allies
in the war. But the passing of the common danger increasingly exposed the
unconditional surrender formula, whatever its merits as a rallying cry
for the Allies in midway, to the harsh realities of conflicting postwar
national political objectives. Unfortunately the doctrine, born in war
and directed to the enemies' surrender, would offer no common peace aim or
basis for the peace settlement.
Willy-nilly, the coalition war was becoming more and more political, and
the stresses and strains that had already appeared to the Axis partners
with the approach of defeat loomed before the Allied coalition as victory
came into sight. The shift in the balance of military power between the
United States and Great Britain, and in the relations of the Western
Allies with the USSR-roughly marked by OCTAGON-heralded the uneasy day
when the West would polarize around the United States and the East around
the USSR. In the last year of the shooting war, in the field and
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across international conference tables the representatives of the United
States and of the USSR would meet face to face as the advance guard of the
two nations emerging from the conflict as the most powerful in the world
but whose relations-so important for future peace or war-were still in
flux.
On the home front, the signs of unrest would also begin to appear. As
victory drew closer, elements held in abeyance during the more doubtful
days of fighting would again make themselves heard. The isolationists, now
that the danger was passing, would again clamor for the United States to
withdraw from foreign entanglements and mind its own business;
economy-minded legislators would once more begin to examine the military
budget with a critical eye and demand cutbacks and savings in production
and expenditures; and parents, wives, and other relatives would become
more vocal in their desire to bring the boys home. The comparatively free
and easy days of beating the enemy would give way to the curbs and
pressures of approaching peace.
Besides the frictions generating on the foreign and domestic fronts,
the Army still had to cope with the immense problem of what to do with the
beaten foes. The questions of administrative organization, government,
economic aid, and psychological readjustments were only a few of the
facets of the coming occupation. Surrender terms and the initiation of the
occupation of both Germany and Japan engrossed the Army planners during
most of 1945. Through the final year of the war, the responsibilities
thrust upon Marshall and his staff would become more and more political.
The issue of how many and which postwar bases the United States would seek
to maintain, an object of concern to the Army and Navy since 1943, came to
the fore. Although the President and his military advisers agreed upon the
necessity for American postwar control of the Japanese mandated islands,
the President desired that U.S. trusteeship be acquired through the United
Nations rather than by right of conquest and occupation. Bases in the
Philippines presented a different problem, since the islands were soon to
become completely independent of the United States. Negotiations with the
Filipino leaders continued during the remainder of the war, and the
military were directly concerned in the settlement of the question.19
The change-over from the military to the politico-military phase of the
war did not occur overnight. It became apparent after the Moscow
Conference, accelerated during 1944, and assumed preeminence after
OCTAGON. Henceforth, agreement among the Allies on military plans and war
strategy would become less urgent than the need to arrive at acceptable
politico-military terms on which the winning powers could continue to
collaborate. To handle these new challenges after building up a staff
mechanism geared to the predominantly military business of fighting a
global and coalition war would necessitate considerable adjustment of
Army staff processes and planning. It had taken the staff almost three
years of war to build and perfect the military machine for carrying
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through the invasion of the Continent. All their planning in midwar had
been geared to achieving the decisive blow that had been a cardinal
element in their strategic faith. Scarcely were the Western Allies
ensconced on the Continent, however, when the challenges of victory and
peace were upon the Army planners. They entered the last year of the war
with the coalition disintegrating, with the President failing in health
and no successor fully prepared, and with a smoothly functioning,
well-organized politico-military machine lacking.20 To the growing vacuums
in international collaboration would be added widening gaps in American
national policy, and the military would fall heir-by default -to problems
no longer easily divided into military and political, and for which little
or no provision had been made. U.S. strategic planners had successfully
made the shift from the period of prewar isolationism to the era of
intensive wartime coalition experience. But after
the summer of 1944 the Army, which had perfected its organization,
planning, and preparations for the invasion of the Continent, faced a new
planning environment. Strategic plans and their close partners-the
manpower balance and troop basis, budgets, bases, organization of national
defense, deployment and production plans, and relations with foreign
powers and with a new international organization-would have to be
threshed out as the Army staff sought a new basis for national security in
the postwar world.
Against a backdrop of a war drawing to an unorthodox conclusion in which
there were already glimmerings that the role of the Army in warfare might
be changing-indeed that all warfare might be changing-and that the
military and political balance in the world was in process of flux, the
Chief of Staff and his advisers would begin to prepare for what might lie
ahead. On the threshold of a new era-with the end of the shooting war in
sight-they would begin to demobilize the wartime Army and prepare to meet
the challenges of victory and peace.
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Endnotes
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