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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Souers' Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence

                           

137. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Souers) to the National Intelligence Authority

Washington, February 2, 1946.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776, History of the National Intelligence Structure. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Proposed Tentative Organization of the Central Intelligence Group

1. The President's letter of January 22, 1946,/1/ requires the assignment of accessory personnel and facilities from the Departments of State, War and the Navy in order to form a Central Intelligence Group.

/1/Document 71.

2. An initial personal authorization and an outline of organization should now be approved so that the Group may be activated and proceed with the pressing problems now confronting the National Intelligence Authority. The problems requiring earliest attention are:

a. The production of daily and weekly summaries of the most significant intelligence and operational information related to national security and foreign policy for the use of the President, the members of the National Intelligence Authority, and certain additional limited distribution.

b. Conducting a survey of existing facilities for collecting foreign intelligence information, with a view to determining how these facilities may be better coordinated and improved.

3. The proposed organization is set forth in the enclosed directive/2/ which has been prepared for your approval. It provides the necessary tentative charter and sufficient personnel to activate the organization and begin operating.

/2/Not printed; see the Supplement. The enclosure was a draft of NIA Directive No. 2. For text of the directive as issued, see Document 141.

4. It is recommended that the members of the National Intelligence Authority approve and sign the enclosed directive.

Sidney W. Souers/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

138. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board

Washington, February 4, 1946, 3:30 p.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Confidential. The meeting was held in the New War Department Building.

PARTICIPANTS

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

Members Present

Mr. Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in Charge of Research and Intelligence

Brig. Gen. John Weckerling (representing Lt. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS)

Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence

Brig. Gen. John A. Samford, Acting Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

Also Present

Capt. Thomas F. Cullen, USNR
Capt. W. B. Goggins, USN
Mr. L. L. Montague, Department of State
Col. E. P. Mussett, USA
Col. C. P. Nicholas, USA
Col. W. A. Perry, USA

Secretary
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Department of State

1. Proposed Policies and Procedures Governing the Central Intelligence Group

The paper/1/ was discussed paragraph by paragraph.

/1/A draft of NIA Directive No. 1, not found.

Admiral Inglis questioned whether paragraph 3, on the composition of the Intelligence Advisory Board, permitted other officials of the State, War and Navy Departments, such as the Director of Naval Communications, to participate in meetings of that Board. After discussion and amendment

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

a. Concurred in the paper as amended at the meeting. (Subsequently circulated as N.I.A. 1.)/2/

/2/Appended to a February 4 covering memorandum from Souers to the NIA. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776) See the Supplement.

b. Agreed that the wording of paragraph 3 does not preclude membership by heads of other intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments, but that each case will be decided on its merits by agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

2. Proposed Tentative Organization of the Central Intelligence Group

The paper was discussed and amended.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Concurred in the paper as amended, subject to a revision of Appendix "A" so that the totals would be approximately 40 each for State and Navy, and 80 for War. (Subsequently circulated as N.I.A. 2.)/3/

/3/The paper discussed was the enclosure to Souers' February 2 memorandum to the NIA. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776) See the Supplement. A version circulated as NIA 2, dated February 5, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers. See the Supplement. Appendix "A" dealt with personnel assignments.

139. Minutes of the 184th Meeting of the Secretary of State's Staff Committee

Washington, February 5, 1946, 9:35 a.m.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees-- State Department, Lot File No. 122, Records of the Secretary's Staff Committee 1944-47. Secret. Drafted by E.A. Jamison. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

PARTICIPANTS

Present:

The Secretary (presiding)
The Under Secretary
Mr. Benton
Mr. Braden
Mr. Clayton
Mr. McCormack
Mr. Russell
Mr. Henderson (for Mr. Dunn)
Mr. Matthews (for Mr. Dunn)
Mr. Vincent (for Mr. Dunn)
Mr. Culbertson (WE)
Mr. Jamison
Mr. Lewis

Absent:

The Counselor
Mr. Hackworth
Mr. Pasvolsky

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to intelligence.]

National Intelligence Authority

Mr. McCormack reviewed for the Committee the drafts of two directives which it was proposed that the newly created National Intelligence Authority would issue to the Director of Central Intelligence./1/ He explained that these were prepared by Admiral Souers who had been appointed Director of Central Intelligence under the plan issued by the President. Mr. McCormack said that the final order for the National Intelligence Authority differed in two respects from that proposed by the Department of State/2/ because of amendments which had been suggested by Admiral Leahy at a meeting in which the State Department was not represented. These changes had involved taking the coordinating authority away from the Department of State, placing it in the hands of a Director appointed by the President, and adding Admiral Leahy as the Personal Representative of the President on the Authority.

/1/Drafts of NIA 1, attached to Souers' February 4 memorandum to the NIA (ibid., RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776), and NIA 2, February 5 (ibid., RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 130), are in the Supplement. NIA 1 and NIA 2 are printed as Documents 141 and 142.

/2/See document SC-172. Mr. McCormack mentioned, however, that the three Secretaries did not send to the President the plan proposed by the Department but a compromise plan prepared by the Navy Department. [Footnote in the source text; SC-172 is printed as Document 46.]

Mr. McCormack outlined the two draft directives, indicating that they prescribed the functions of the National Intelligence Authority, specified certain details of the dissemination and distribution of intelligence, and outlined personnel requirements. He said that the directives would require each of the three Departments to provide for the Director of Central Intelligence with competent people for a survey of materials which might be available. He referred particularly to Section 7 of the first directive, under which the Director would be authorized to obtain all necessary facilities, intelligence and information in the possession of the respective Departments, including necessary information as to policies, plans, actions, capabilities and intentions of the United States with reference to foreign countries. He said that this provision would open to inspection all available material in the Department. Mr. McCormack pointed out that the second directive described the two main missions of the Intelligence Authority as (1) the preparation of a daily and weekly summary of all important intelligence, to be made available to the President, to members of the Authority and to certain others, and (2) to conduct a survey of existing facilities for collecting foreign intelligence information with a view to making recommendations as to how they may be better coordinated and improved. The second directive also outlined a table of organization to be established by June 30, 1946, including a statement of the facilities to be contributed by each of the Departments. Under this the State Department would be called upon to furnish, by the end of the year or before, 43 people to the Central Intelligence Group. Mr. McCormack explained that this would necessarily be contingent upon obtaining the people and the necessary appropriation.

The Secretary asked Mr. McCormack for details on that section of the directives outlining materials to be made available, and Mr. McCormack repeated Section 7 of the first Directive as given above. The Secretary pointed out that the determination of what was "necessary" under that section carried with it much responsibility. He said that a great deal would depend upon the individual who performed this function.

Mr. Russell inquired whether the danger of misinterpretation of the Department's position might not arise as a result of the coordination of intelligence by the Director. Mr. McCormack remarked that the term "intelligence" apparently would be interpreted quite broadly so that it would include steps taken in the adoption of policies and in their implementation. The Secretary expressed the view that the practical question concerned the method by which the reporting would be done. Mr. Russell stated his view that there would be considerable danger in reports on State Department policy being presented to the President from sources other than the Department, since these would be no less binding upon the Department. It was his view that statements of policy in any form should be made by the person responsible for their formulation and implementation. Mr. McCormack emphasized the important influence which might be exerted if there were any inclination to short circuit the Department on matters of policy. Mr. Acheson said that danger was inherent in the decision which had been made to take the primary responsibility for coordination out of the Department of State.

Mr. Henderson asked whether it would not still be possible for the Department of State to approach the President directly with its own report of intelligence. Mr. Russell said that this would probably be ex post facto, and the Secretary agreed that that would be the likely result. The Secretary said that, since the information for the President would come from the Intelligence Authority and not from the Department of State, someone else would do the reporting. There would be coordination without full explanation and the way would be left open for misinterpretation. The Secretary again expressed the view that much would depend upon the person doing the job.

Mr. Braden pointed out that the situation which had existed during the war period, with the War and Navy Departments doing considerable reporting on political affairs, had been confusing, however necessary, in the emergency. The Secretary agreed that War and Navy were continuing to do political reporting. He indicated that the only method under the new plan by which the Department could be sure that its policies and actions might not be misinterpreted would be to submit a report of its own directly to the President before the coordinated report from the Director of Central Intelligence had been sent in.

In answer to a question by Mr. Vincent as to whether the Department of State would have the authority to see the coordinated reports of the Director of Central Intelligence before they were presented to the President, Mr. McCormack said that under the proposed directives a copy would be sent to the Department after presentation to the President. Mr. Braden emphasized the importance of State Department controlling the reporting of its activities and policies but Mr. McCormack again indicated that struggle had been lost in the order establishing the National Intelligence Authority.

(The Under Secretary left the meeting at this point.)

Mr. Braden inquired as to what would be done about the FBI program in this hemisphere since ARA had found this to be highly valuable if not essential. Mr. McCormack said that Admiral Souers was apparently seeking to avoid placing large numbers of OSS personnel in the Departments of War and State, and did not wish to replace such useful functions as those of the FBI in the other American republics. The Secretary said that he had come to have a much higher regard than formerly for the work of the FBI in such activities, and he added that there was additional practical value in the fact that the FBI was highly successful in obtaining appropriations from Congress.

Mr. Henderson, referring to the 43 people who would be assigned from State Department to the National Intelligence Authority, asked whether they would continue to be responsible to the Department. Mr. McCormack said that they would be entirely under control of the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Henderson said that in his view the Department should maintain control over them.

Mr. Clayton stated that it was his view that the only department or agency of the Government competent to express foreign policy was the Department of State through its responsible officers. Plan as outlined in these directives, he felt, would only bring continued and interminable trouble. The Secretary said that this meant that the Department must coordinate its reports and present them to the President each day, that this must be done in the most attractive and impressive manner by competent officers.

In stating again his view that the Secretary should proceed very cautiously on the program as set forth, Mr. Russell indicated that an alternative method might be for the Department of State to prepare a report for the President within the Department, a copy of which would be sent to the Director of Central Intelligence for the purpose of coordinating it with intelligence from other sources. Mr. McCormack suggested that another possible solution was to confine the daily report to intelligence, under a narrow definition, from the War, Navy and State Departments, but the Secretary expressed his fear that this would not prove practicable. The consensus was that in his meeting with the other members of the National Intelligence Authority the Secretary should present fully the Department's position on the coordination and reporting of policies to the President.

The meeting adjourned at 10:00 a.m.

Annex I/3/

/3/Secret-- Not for Circulation to Anyone Without Express Approval of Executive Secretary. This addendum is designated as "Annex I" although it is the only annex found with this set of minutes.

There was considerable discussion of the degree to which Admiral Leahy was maintaining control of the intelligence function. The Secretary said that although the President felt that by closing the Map Room in the White House Admiral Leahy's influence would be reduced, actually under this setup his control would be very much greater. He said that the Admiral would now be able to spend all of his time with the National Intelligence Authority. Mr. Russell said that the President would be put in a position of seeing only that material which had been screened through Admiral Leahy and that reporting on policies or actions would be done without State Department approval. Mr. McCormack reported that Admiral Leahy had apparently facetiously noted in his comments on the proposed directives that the requirement that the State Department furnish reports on its policies should be left out, since the State Department had no policies. Mr. Russell said that however facetiously suggested this proposal should be seized upon, and that the requirement in the directives that statements on policies be submitted should be taken out.

140. Minutes of the First Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority

Washington, February 5, 1946, 11:30 a.m.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 811.002/1-2446. Confidential. The meeting was held at the Department of State.

PARTICIPANTS

Members Present

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal Representative of the President
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director of Central Intelligence

Also Present

Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Department of State
Mr. Davidson Sommers, War Department
Mr. Edward Hidalgo, Navy Department

Secretariat

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Central Intelligence Group

1. Proposed Policies and Procedures Governing the Central Intelligence Group (N.I.A. 1)/1/

/1/See footnote 1, Document 139.

Secretary Patterson suggested deleting the word "prior" on the 8th line of page 3, in order to make it clear that approval by the Authority was not required.

Admiral Souers suggested that this might also be accomplished by substitution of the words "action by" for "prior reference to". He also recommended that a period be placed after "departments" on line 4, paragraph 7, page 4, and that the remainder of the sentence be deleted.

The National Intelligence Authority:

Agreed to the following amendments in N.I.A. 1:

a. Substitute "action by" for "prior reference to" in line 8 of page 3.

b. Place a period after the word "departments" in line 4, paragraph 7 of page 4 and delete the remainder of that sentence.

2. Proposed Tentative Organization of the Central Intelligence Group (N.I.A. 2)/2/

/2/See footnote 3, Document 138.

Secretary Byrnes asked what paragraph 2-a on page 1 contemplated as to foreign policy. He pointed out that he is responsible for reporting to the President on matters of foreign policy.

Admiral Souers explained his understanding was that the President wanted him only to go through the dispatch traffic and make a digest of significant developments. Admiral Souers emphasized that there was no intention that he should interpret these dispatches or advise the President on any matters of foreign policy. His report was intended to be purely factual as regards the activities of the United States in the field of foreign affairs.

Secretary Byrnes stressed the fact that it was his function to furnish the President with information on which to base conclusions.

Admiral Leahy expressed his understanding that the President wanted the information from all three departments (State, War and Navy) summarized in order to keep him currently informed. Admiral Leahy pointed out that Secretary Byrnes presents the viewpoint of the Department of State while the President would like to receive significant information available in all three departments in a single summary.

Secretary Byrnes pointed out that Admiral Souers would not be presenting the viewpoint of any single department. Although the Central Intelligence Group would be composed of personnel from all three departments, Secretary Byrnes believes that any man assigned to that Group must be responsible solely to Admiral Souers.

Admiral Souers suggested that, in order to clarify the meaning of paragraph 4 on page 3, it might be reworded as follows: "Production of daily and weekly summaries of the significant developments in the field of intelligence and operations related to the national security and to foreign events for the use of the President, the members of this Authority, and additional distribution shown in Appendix 'C'."

After further discussion,

The National Intelligence Authority:

Agreed to defer final action on N.I.A. 1 and N.I.A. 2, pending further study by Secretary Byrnes.

141. National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 1

Washington, February 8, 1946.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132. Confidential. Also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 35-37.

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Pursuant to the attached letter from the President, dated 22 January 1946, designating the undersigned as the National Intelligence Authority, you are hereby directed to perform your mission, as Director of Central Intelligence, in accordance with the following policies and procedures:

1. The Central Intelligence Group shall be considered, organized and operated as a cooperative interdepartmental activity, with adequate and equitable participation by the State, War and Navy Departments and, as recommended by you and approved by us, other Federal departments and agencies. The Army Air Forces will be represented on a basis similar to that of the Army and the Navy.

2. The Central Intelligence Group will furnish strategic and national policy intelligence to the President and the State, War and Navy Departments, and, as appropriate, to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other governmental departments and agencies having strategic and policy functions related to the national security.

3. The composition of the Intelligence Advisory Board will be flexible and will depend, in each instance, upon the subject matter under consideration. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of Research and Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, WDGS, the Chief of Naval Intelligence and the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence (or their representatives) will be permanent members. You will invite the head (or his representative) of any other intelligence agency having functions related to the national security to sit as a member on all matters within the province of his agency.

All recommendations, prior to submission to this Authority, will be referred to the Board for concurrence or comment. Any recommendation which you and the Intelligence Advisory Board approve unanimously and have the existing authority to execute may be put into effect without action by this Authority. If any member of the Board does not concur, you will submit to this Authority the basis for his non-concurrence at the same time that you submit your recommendation.

4. Recommendations approved by this Authority will, where applicable, govern the intelligence activities of the separate departments represented herein. The members of the Intelligence Advisory Board will each be responsible for ensuring that approved recommendations are executed within their respective departments.

5. You will submit to this Authority as soon as practicable a proposal for the organization of the Central Intelligence Group and an estimate of the personnel and funds required from each department by this Group for the balance of this fiscal year and for the next fiscal year. Each year thereafter prior to the preparation of departmental budgets, you will submit a similar estimate for the following fiscal year. As approved by this Authority and within the limits of available appropriations the necessary funds and personnel will be made available to you by arrangement between you and the appropriate department through its member on the Intelligence Advisory Board. You may determine the qualifications of personnel and the adequacy of individual candidates. Personnel assigned to you will be under your operational and administrative control, subject only to necessary personnel procedures in each department.

6. The Central Intelligence Group will utilize all available intelligence in producing strategic and national policy intelligence. All intelligence reports prepared by the Central Intelligence Group will note any substantial dissent by a participating intelligence agency.

7. As required in the performance of your authorized mission, there will be made available to you or your authorized representatives all necessary facilities, intelligence and information in the possession of our respective departments. Arrangements to carry this out will be made with members of the Intelligence Advisory Board. Conversely, all facilities of the Central Intelligence Group and all intelligence prepared by it will be made available to us and, through arrangements agreed between you and the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, subject to any authorized restrictions, to our respective departments.

8. The operations of the intelligence agencies of our departments will be open to inspection by you or your authorized representatives in connection with your planning functions, under arrangements agreed to between you and the respective members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

9. You are authorized to request of other Federal departments and agencies any information or assistance required by you in the perform-ance of your authorized mission.

10. You will be responsible for furnishing, from the personnel of the Central Intelligence Group, a Secretariat for this Authority, with the functions of preparing agenda, reviewing and circulating papers for consideration, attending all meetings, keeping and publishing minutes, initiating and reviewing the implementation of decision, and performing other necessary secretarial services.

Secretary of State/1/
Secretary of War
Secretary of the Navy
Personal Representative of the President

/1/No signatures or any annotation indicating the directive was signed appears on the source text.

142. National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 2

Washington, February 8, 1946.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-244. Confidential. This "tentative" version was approved at the February 8 NIA meeting. Appendices A-C are in the Supplement under cover of a February 11 memorandum from Souers. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/2-1146)

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP(Tentative)

REFERENCES

A. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, establishing the National Intelligence Authority

B. N.I.A. Directive Number 1/1/

/1/Document 141.

1. Pursuant to the President's letter of 22 January 1946, designating the undersigned as the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Group is hereby constituted and will be activated this date by the Director of Central Intelligence. In accordance with personnel authorizations approved by this Authority, the Departments of State, War, and the Navy will assign personnel to the Central Intelligence Group, and make reliefs and replacements, upon the Director's requisition. The approved initial personnel authorization is enclosed (Appendix "A").

2. The initial authorization provides the minimum personnel necessary for the tasks of organizing, surveying pressing problems, and meeting initial requirements. As soon as practicable the Director will submit his recommendations for augmentation of the Group.

3. Initial principal offices and sub-divisions shall be as shown on the chart (Appendix "B"), with functions as follows:

a. Director of Central Intelligence--Responsible for all operations of the Central Intelligence Group in accordance with the President's letter of 22 January 1946 and Directives of the National Intelligence Authority. He will make the assignments of all personnel in the Group. At the appropriate time, he will select an Assistant Director from each of the four personnel contingents (State, Army, Navy, Air), one of whom he may designate as his Deputy.

b. Administrative Section--This Section will perform all necessary administrative and security functions of the Group, and will provide the Secretariat for the National Intelligence Authority.

c. Central Reports Staff--This Staff will assist the Director in accomplishing the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and in accomplishing appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence.

d. Central Planning Staff--This Staff will assist the Director in planning for the coordination of intelligence activities related to the national security, and in preparing recommendations regarding the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

e. Central Intelligence Services--The Central Intelligence Services shall be such operating agencies as may hereafter be established upon approval of this Authority under the provisions of paragraph 3c of the President's Directive of 22 January.

4. Initial Tasks. The Director of Central Intelligence will give first priority to the following tasks:

a. Production of daily summaries containing factual statements of the significant developments in the field of intelligence and operations related to the national security and to foreign events for the use of the President, the members of this Authority, and additional distribution shown in Appendix "C".

b. Conducting a survey of existing facilities for collection of foreign intelligence information, and submission of appropriate recommendations.

Secretary of State/2/
Secretary of War
Secretary of the Navy
Personal Representative of the President

/2/No signatures or any annotation indicating the directive was signed appears on the source text.

143. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Souers) to the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (McCormack)

Washington, February 14, 1946.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/2-1446. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Arrangements to make certain State Department intelligence and information available to the Current Section, C.I.G.

1. In accordance with paragraph 7, N.I.A. Directive No. 1,/1/ I request that you make appropriate arrangements within the Department of State to make the following intelligence and information available to the Current Section, C.I.G., in the performance of the priority task indicated in paragraph 4 a, N.I.A. Directive No. 2:/2/

/1/Document 141.

/2/Document 142.

a. Information copies of the selected dispatches now delivered to Mr. Reams in the Office of the Secretary.

b. A copy of Mr. Reams' daily one-page summary of the most important of such dispatches, normally completed at 0930.

c. Advanced copy prepared by Mr. Edgar for the Staff Officers' Top Secret daily summary, normally available between 1030 and 1130.

d. The several daily and weekly Top Secret and Secret summaries prepared in the Department.

2. Access to this material will be limited to members of the Current Section, all of whom have been cleared for access to intelligence and information of the highest security classification.

3. I request also that you obtain any necessary authorization in the Department of State for the installation of properly secure teletype communications between Mr. Edgar's office (Room 108) and the location of the Current Section in the Pentagon, and for the transmission thereon of the material indicated under 1 b and 1 c. This provision is essential to ensure its timely availability to the Current Section. Messrs. Reams and Edgar have been consulted by Messrs. Montague and Ruddock in this regard, and have indicated their informal concurrence. In view of the urgency of the matter, I am concurrently requesting of General Vandenberg that he arrange for the installation of such communications and for the indoctrination and technical training of operators to be furnished by me.

Sidney W. Souers

144. Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board

Washington, March 26, 1946, 3:30 p.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Top Secret. Limited Distribution. The meeting was held at the New War Department Building.

PARTICIPANTS

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

Members Present

Mr. Ludwell L. Montague (representing Mr. Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in Charge of Research and Intelligence)

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS

Commodore Charles J. Rend (Representing Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence)

Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Also Present

Mr. Kingman Douglass, Central Intelligence Group

Colonel Louis J. Fortier, USA, Central Intelligence Group

Captain Thomas F. Cullen, USNR, Central Intelligence Group

Colonel Charles P. Nicholas, USA, Central Intelligence Group

Colonel Harry F. Cunningham, USA, Central Intelligence Group

Colonel Willis A. Perry, USA, Central Intelligence Group

Secretariat

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National Intelligence Authority

Mr. J.K. Tibby, Assistant Secretary

1. Policy on Liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit

The directives proposed for submittal to the National Intelligence Authority were read and minor amendments agreed upon.

Admiral Souers emphasized that the intention was not to absorb SSU as an entity within the Central Intelligence Group, but rather to assure the careful liquidation of the Unit, over a period of months, so as to utilize its services during that period and to permit the preservation and transfer to permanent departments and agencies of SSU elements found to be of continuing usefulness.

General Vandenberg asked whether under the contemplated liquidation procedure, the G-2 of U.S. Forces, in the China Theater would be protected from the liquidation of the SSU unit now in China before other arrangements could be made by G-2 to provide for those operations considered essential by G-2.

Admiral Souers said that this was an example of the departmental interests which the proposed liquidation directives were designed to protect. He recalled that General Vandenberg had recently forwarded to C.I.G. a plan for post-war intelligence in China as prepared by G-2, USFCT. In the course of planning post-war intelligence coverage in that area, it might be found desirable to charge C.I.G. itself with responsibility for filling certain gaps. However, C.I.G. could not enter such fields directly except by authorization of the National Intelligence Authority, and in the meantime it would be the task of the Director of Central Intelligence to insure that no available and necessary services were discarded, through liquidation of SSU, until services as good or better could be provided to take their place.

Commodore Rend proposed a revision of the paper designed to clarify its language, but after Admiral Souers explained the reasons for the present language of the paper, Commodore Rend expressed his agreement.

Mr. Hoover said he was glad to see that the directives provided for gradual rather than abrupt liquidation, since this would more readily permit the retention of valuable elements by the Government. He thought the objectives were very satisfactorily expressed.

After concluding discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Concurred in the draft directives as amended (subsequently submitted to the National Intelligence Authority as N.I.A. 3)./1/

/1/NIA 3 was a draft of NIA Directive No. 4, "Policy on Liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit," Document 106.

2. C.I.G. Weekly Summary

Admiral Souers reported that plans for issuance of a C.I.G. Weekly Summary were in hand. The Central Reports Staff had worked up several practice issues. However, it was clear that if the Weekly were to fulfill its real function--and be more than a rehash of preceding Daily Summaries--two or three seasoned intelligence officers with specialized experience would have to be added to the staff. He was attempting to strengthen the present staff with this in mind, by negotiations with the several departments.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Took note of the above comments.

3. J.I.C. Papers

The Director said that arrangements had been made with the Joint Intelligence Committee/2/ for C.I.G. to receive copies of appropriate J.I.C. papers. In reply the Secretary of J.I.C. had suggested that all C.I.G. papers be furnished to his office for file and for the use of the Joint Intelligence Staff. Admiral Souers was willing to send appropriate C.I.G. papers to the Secretary of J.I.C., but felt that many papers of C.I.G. would not be of benefit to J.I.S. and should therefore not be sent.

/2/A committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for preparing intelligence estimates and studies.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Concurred with Admiral Souers' proposed policy.

4. Special Agents

General Vandenberg inquired how soon the Central Intelligence Group would be in a position to interview the individuals who are now presenting themselves as prospective special agents abroad. General Vandenberg said there were a number of these candidates, and that he was using a few of them. He is anxious to turn such activities over to the Central Intelligence Group, however, as soon as possible, because of the danger that agents from different agencies may get crossed up in the field.

Admiral Souers stated that he wanted to be completely prepared to conduct such operations before interviewing or hiring any individuals. He does not want to confuse the permanent program with the existing operations of SSU. One of the biggest problems will be to find the appropriate man to head this operation, who can then utilize the services of these individuals on a professional basis. In the meantime, Admiral Souers would prefer that existing agencies conduct their operations in this field until a permanent program has been decided upon by the N.I.A. and established. He feels that one of the most urgent elements in this program is the use of ordinary business, scientific and professional men and travelers who are going abroad. This will not be a "cloak and dagger" type of operation, but will require careful organization.

General Vandenberg expressed the belief, and Admiral Souers agreed, that all such clandestine operations should be under a single directing head.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Took note of the above discussion.

Continue with Document 145