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Foreign Relations of the United States
1945-1950
Emergence of the Intelligence EstablishmentDepartment of State
Washington, DC
Vandenberg's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence
155. Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board
Washington, June 10, 1946, 2:30 p.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Confidential. The meeting was held at the War Department.
PARTICIPANTS
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, in the Chair
Members Present
Mr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, WDGS (Designate)
Commodore Charles J. Rend (representing Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence)
Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
Mr. D. M. Ladd (representing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)
Also Present
Dr. Kingman Douglass, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel Carter W. Clarke, G-2
Captain R.K. Davis, USN, O.N.I.
Captain J.J. Rochefort, USN, O.N.I.
Colonel E.P. Mussett, A-2
Lt. Colonel F.K. Newcomer, G-2
Colonel L.J. Fortier, Central Intelligence Group
Captain W.B. Goggins, USN, Central Intelligence Group
Mr. L.L. Montague, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel H.F. Cunningham, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel C.P. Nicholas, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel W.A. Perry, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel T.J. Sands, Central Intelligence Group
Secretariat
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National Intelligence Authority
Mr. J.K. Tibby, Assistant Secretary
1. Provision of Monitoring of Press and Propaganda Broadcasts of Foreign Powers (C.I.G. 1/1, C.I.G. 1/2, and C.I.G. 1/3)/1/
/1/None printed. (Dated respectively, April 26, May 8, and June 4; ibid., HS/HC-276) See the Supplement for all.
Admiral Souers recalled that the proposals raised in C.I.G. 1/1 and 1/2 had been considered provisionally in the previous meeting. In view of General Vandenberg's suggestion that the operation of FBIS be assumed by State, that department had been asked to make a study of its capabilities. The State Department replied (in C.I.G. 1/3) that while they were keenly interested in having the monitoring service continue it would be impossible for the Department to assume administrative responsibility for FBIS during the next fiscal year. Admiral Souers felt that these developments justified the Members in approving C.I.G. 1/1, which in substance called for War Department operation of FBIS under directives from the Director of Central Intelligence as to collecting and distributing missions.
Dr. Langer underscored the reasons leading to State's conclusions. These were chiefly technical and budgetary. For example, State estimated that the administrative costs of FBIS would mean a 50 per cent increase in the entire amount budgeted for State's intelligence service--at a time when even the presently budgeted amounts had not been finally approved by Congress. There were also questions of the establishment of new stations in military zones, the transfer of some facilities now under British auspices, the procurement of new equipment, and the like--all of which he felt could be more effectively handled by the War Department at present.
General Vandenberg observed that an eventual alternative to State or War Department administration would be direct control by Central Intelligence, if C.I.G. were to obtain an operating appropriation of its own. But such considerations could not apply in the solution of the immediate problem.
In the course of the general discussion which followed it was brought out by Admiral Souers that the Central Intelligence Group at present could not accept a transfer of funds from War for direct administration of FBIS, since C.I.G. was not an authorized disbursing agency. It was therefore the consensus of the Members that the best immediate solution was operation by the Director of Central Intelligence with the administrative assistance of the War Department.
After concluding discussion,
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
Approved C.I.G. 1/1 subject to textual clarification to insure that the recommendation to the National Intelligence Authority provided for operation of the monitoring function by the Director of Central Intelligence with the administrative assistance of the War Department. (Report to N.I.A. to be circulated as N.I.A. 5.)/2/
/2/Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-243) NIA 5 was a slightly revised version of CIG 1/1. See footnote 1 above.
2. C.I.G. Weekly Summary
Admiral Souers invited discussion and criticism of the trial issue of the C.I.G. Weekly Summary circulated on 7 June./3/ The discussion which followed centered on two issues developed by Dr. Langer: first, whether interpretive articles such as the Weekly contained could be prepared more effectively in C.I.G. Specifically, he asked Dr. Langer to arrange a means whereby political intelligence texts could be promptly checked when necessary with a State Department specialist. He transmitted further specific comments and suggestions from G-2 regarding the trial issue to Mr. Montague.
/3/Not found.
The Members of I.A.B. were in agreement with General Vandenberg's proposal.
Commodore Rend commented that it was essential to commence regular publication of the Weekly, despite shortcoming that might be inevitable in early issues; and General McDonald and Mr. Ladd thought that, in view of all the circumstances, the reports staff should be congratulated on a good beginning.
3. Provisions for Coordinating the Acquisition of Foreign Publications (C.I.G. 9)/4/
/4/Dated May 31. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) In its final form the paper was issued as NIA Directive No. 6, July 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132) Both are in the Supplement.
Admiral Souers noted that replies had not yet been received from all Members regarding C.I.G. 9, which had been circulated for informal consideration. After brief discussion, during which it was agreed to reduce the classification of the paper to "Restricted",
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
Approved C.I.G. 9. (Enclosures to be submitted to N.I.A. as N.I.A. 4.)
4. Remarks by Admiral Souers
Admiral Souers said he wanted to take occasion, on being relieved as Director of Central Intelligence, to express to all Members of the Intelligence Advisory Board his appreciation for the unstinted cooperation he had received from each one. He took great satisfaction in turning over his duties to General Vandenberg.
General Vandenberg, in an acknowledgment in behalf of all those present, expressed the hope that the work of Central Intelligence should be maintained at the standard set by Admiral Souers.
156. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg) to the Intelligence Advisory Board
CIG 10
Washington, June 20, 1946.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276. Top Secret; Limited Distribution.
FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
REFERENCES
a. Minutes, I.A.B. 2nd Meeting, Item 4/1/
b. Minutes, I.A.B. 3rd Meeting, Item 1/2
c. C.I.G. 1/1/3/
d. Minutes, I.A.B. 5th Meeting, Item 1/4//1/Document 144.
/2/Document 146.
/3/Dated April 26; see footnote 1, Document 155.
/4/Document 155.
1. The former and the present Directors of Central Intelligence are in agreement that the initial organizing and planning stages of the Central Intelligence Group have been completed, and that the time has arrived to request that the National Intelligence Authority authorize the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake certain operations and functions of vital importance to the national intelligence mission. The enclosed report to the National Intelligence Authority is designed to obtain that authority.
2. Attention is invited to the fact that the provisions of paragraph 2 of Appendix "A" hereto have been previously discussed in reference b. The provisions of paragraph 4 a of Appendix "A" hereto were briefly discussed in reference a. Paragraph 4 b is intended to serve in lieu of the revision of C.I.G. 1/1 agreed in reference d. Paragraph 3 of Appendix "A" hereto has not been previously discussed by the Intelligence Advisory Board, although its concept has been incorporated in approved papers on specific problems involving the coordination of intelligence activities.
3. It is recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the submittal of the Enclosure for consideration by the National Intelligence Authority.
Hoyt S. Vandenberg/5/
Lieutenant General, USA/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Enclosure
Draft Report by the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg)/6/
/6/As indicated in Vandenberg's covering memorandum, the report was submitted to the National Intelligence Authority.
FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
REFERENCES
a. President's letter of 22 January 1946/7/
b. N.I.A. Directive No. 1/8/
c. N.I.A. Directive No. 2/9//7/Document 71.
/8/Document 141.
/9/Document 142.
Report by the Director of Central Intelligence, with the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board
1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, directing the establishment of the National Intelligence Authority, contained, in paragraph 3 thereof, a general description of the functions envisaged for the Director of Central Intelligence. N.I.A. Directive No. 1, containing the basic policies and procedures governing the Central Intelligence Group, further clarified the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence, particularly as regards his relationship with the National Intelligence Authority and the Intelligence Advisory Board. N.I.A. Directive No. 2 contained an initial personnel authorization for the Central Intelligence Group, providing only the minimum necessary for the tasks of organizing, surveying pressing problems, and meeting initial requirements. N.I.A. Directive No. 2 also instructed the Director of Central Intelligence to submit his recommendations for augmentation of the Central Intelligence Group as soon as practicable. Pursuant to those instructions, this report proposes a redefinition of the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence which will give him the necessary authority to augment the Central Intelligence Group so that he may effectively perform his assigned missions.
2. A draft N.I.A. directive, redefining the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence, is contained in Enclosure "A" (Appendix "A" hereto). Discussion of the provisions of this draft directive is contained in Enclosure "B" (Appendix "B" hereto).
3. The former Director of Central Intelligence, Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, has concurred in the recommendations contained herein. This report also has the unanimous concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board, which included the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this case.
4. It is recommended that the National Intelligence Authority approve the draft directive in Enclosure "A" (Appendix "A" hereto).
Appendix A
Draft National Intelligence Authority Directive
FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Pursuant to the President's letter of 22 January 1946 designating this Authority as responsible for planning, developing and coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security, the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence are hereby redefined as follows:/10/
/10/In a June 26 memorandum Vandenberg submitted a "corrected" form of the draft NIA Directive "based upon informal discussions of C.I.G. 10." At this point the following phrase was added; "subject to the provisions of the said letter." (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
1. Paragraph 3 of the President's letter of 22 January 1946 defined the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence as follows:
"3. Subject to the existing law, and the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:
"a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your departments.
"b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the Intelligence agencies of your Departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.
"c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
"d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct."
2. In performing the functions specified in paragraph 3 a of the President's letter, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby author-ized to undertake such basic research and analysis of intelligence and counter-intelligence information as may in his opinion/11/ be required to produce the necessary strategic and national policy intelligence. This will include the centralization of research and analysis activities of common intelligence interest to more than one agency when, in the opinion of the Director of Central Intelligence, such activities can be more efficiently performed centrally. Under such procedure, existing organizations of the State, War and Navy Departments, including their funds, personnel and facilities, performing those functions, will be integrated into the Central Intelligence Group as a central service to all intelligence agencies subject to N.I.A. coordination./12/
/11/In Vandenberg's correction of June 26 the rest of this sentence reads: "and that of the appropriate member of the Intelligence Advisory Board, be required to supplement the research and analysis performed by the State, War and Navy Departments in the fields of primary interest to each of those Departments."
/12/The last sentence of paragraph 2 was eliminated in the June 26 draft.
3. In addition to the functions specified in paragraph 3 b of the President's letter, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to act as the executive/13/ agent of this Authority in coordinating and supervising all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security in accordance with the over-all policies and objectives established by this Authority.
/13/In the June 26 draft "executive" was omitted.
4. Pursuant to paragraph 3 c of the President's letter, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to perform the following services of common concern which this Authority has determined can be more efficiently accomplished centrally:
a. Conduct of all Federal espionage and counter-espionage operations for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security.
b. Conduct of all Federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers required for the collection of intelligence information related to the national security.
5. To the extent of available appropriations and within the limits of their capabilities,/14/ the State, War and Navy Departments will make available to the Director of Central Intelligence, upon his request, the necessary funds, personnel, facilities and other assistance required for the performance of the functions authorized herein. At the earliest practicable date, the Director of Central Intelligence will submit for approval by this Authority any supplemental budget required to perform the functions authorized herein, in addition to the appropriations available for this purpose in the State, War and Navy Departments.
/14/In the June 26 draft the phrase "as determined by the respective Departments," was added at this point.
6. Where the performance of functions authorized herein requires the liquidation, transfer or integration of funds, personnel or facilities for existing activities of the State, War and Navy Departments, the liquidation, transfer or integration will be accomplished at the earliest practicable date by mutual agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the official now responsible/15/ for such activities so as to involve a minimum of interruption in the performance of these functions.
/15/The phrase "by mutual agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the official now responsible" became in the June 26 draft "as agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence and the official responsible".
Appendix B
Discussion of the Draft National Intelligence Authority Directive
Discussion by paragraphs of the provisions of the draft directive in Enclosure "A" (Appendix "A" hereto) follows:
Paragraph 2: Paragraph 3-a of the President's letter makes the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination of strategic and national policy intelligence relating to the national security, making full use of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments. This means that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for the accuracy, adequacy and timeliness of intelligence required for the national security. To discharge his vital responsibilities, the Director of Central Intelligence should not be required to rely solely upon evaluated intelligence from the various Departments. He should also have the authority, when he deems it necessary in the interests of national security, to undertake within the Central Intelligence Group basic research and analysis of original and unevaluated intelligence and counter-intelligence information from all available sources. This authority is especially necessary to ensure adequate coverage, from a national viewpoint, of those fields which are of common intelligence interest to more than one agency, such as economics, science, biography, geography, sociology, etc. In many of those fields the national security requires that basic research and analysis activities be centralized so as to serve the intelligence agencies subject to N.I.A. coordination.
Paragraph 3: Paragraph 3-b of the President's letter charges the Director of Central Intelligence with planning for the coordination of intelligence activities related to the national security and recommending over-all policies and objectives to the National Intelligence Authority. No provision is made in the President's letter for an executive agent of the National Intelligence Authority who will be responsible for coordinating and supervising intelligence activities related to the national security so as to ensure that policies are properly implemented and objectives are successfully accomplished. Such coordination and supervision is considered a necessary step in the effective execution of the national intelligence program. It is therefore recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence be specifically charged with this responsibility.
Paragraph 4-a: It is considered that the conduct of all Federal espionage and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security can be more efficiently accomplished centrally by the Director of Central Intelligence for the following reasons:
A. Conduct of this type of operation by the executive departments would almost certainly embarrass these departments in the conduct of their official overt activities.
B. Such operations must be centrally controlled to ensure that they serve the national interest rather than the interests of any single department or agency, and that they do not conflict with overt intelligence activities.
C. Since such operations require maximum security they should be performed by a single closely controlled central agency.
D. The danger of competition and confusion between agents of different agencies necessitates the use of a single agency. Moreover, the interdependency and interrelationship between geographical areas and foreign countries makes it imperative that there be one agency with world coverage. This does not, of course, preclude the use of specialized departmental personnel under rigid central control.
E. The difficult and specialized administrative problems involved in such operations make a single central agency more efficient and economical.
Paragraph 4-b: It is recommended that the conduct of all Federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers required for the collection of intelligence information related to the national security be centrally operated under the Director of Central Intelligence for the following reasons:
A. The present organization carrying on this function under War Department direction should be liquidated because its reports are circulated too generally and its personnel have not been adequately screened for security.
B. This function is of value to the State, War, Navy and other Government departments. It should therefore be centrally directed to serve the needs of all these departments.
C. The Department of State appears to have the greatest interest, but the War Department is the only agency which has included funds for this function in its 1947 budget. The Department of State, however, has stated that it is not practicable for that Department to assume responsibility for this operation. The War Department considers that under no circumstances should it engage on a continuing basis in this predominantly nonmilitary intelligence function. The same viewpoint applies to the Navy Department. It therefore appears that this function is a service of common concern which can be accomplished more efficiently centrally.
Paragraph 5: The primary source of funds, personnel and facilities required by the Director of Central Intelligence to discharge the functions proposed in this report, should be those which can be made available by the State, War and Navy Departments. Since, however, some of these functions have not been performed by any department, or have not been performed on the adequate scale now contemplated, the Director of Central Intelligence should be authorized to submit for N.I.A. approval any supplemental budget required pursuant to this directive.
Paragraph 6: This paragraph is intended to ensure that the transition of any activities from departmental to central direction or operations be accomplished with a minimum of interruption in the performance of those functions.
157. Memorandum From C. H. Carson of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Ladd)
Washington, June 21, 1946.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Troy Papers, FBI Documents. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
Central Intelligence Group
World-Wide CoverageThere is attached a memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Intelligence Advisory Board submitting a proposed memorandum to the National Intelligence Authority and a proposed directive to be issued by the National Intelligence Authority extending the powers and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence./1/ In the proposed memorandum to the National Intelligence Authority it is stated that the attached draft of an NIA Directive redefining the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence has the unanimous concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board, including the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
/1/See Document 156.
Proposed NIA Directive
The Directive which it is proposed that the NIA issue provides in essence the following additional functions and powers for the Director of Central Intelligence:
(1) The Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to undertake such basic research and analysis of intelligence and counterintelligence as may in his opinion be required.
(2) The Director of Central Intelligence is "to act as the executive agent of this authority (NIA) in coordinating and in supervising all federal foreign intelligence activities."
(3) The Director of Central Intelligence is directed to perform the following services of common concern:
A. Conduct all federal espionage and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign intelligence.
B. Conduct all federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers for the collection of intelligence information.
Finances
The Directive provides that to the extent of available appropriations and within the limits of their capabilities, State, War and Navy Departments will make available the necessary funds, personnel, and facilities required for the performance of the new functions authorized. The Director of Central Intelligence is to submit for the approval of the NIA any supplemental budget required to perform these functions in addition to the appropriations available from State, War, and Navy.
Discussion
There is attached to the Directive an Appendix labeled "Discussion."/2/ According to this Appendix, the purpose in giving the Director of Central Intelligence authority for research and analysis was to prevent his being required to rely solely upon the evaluated information from the various departments and to provide means by which he could do basic research and analysis of original and unevaluated intelligence and counterintelligence. With reference to the provision for giving the Director of Central Intelligence power to coordinate and supervise all federal intelligence, it is pointed out that there was no provision in the original Directive for an executive agent of the National Intelligence Authority to be responsible for these duties in order "to insure that the policies are properly implemented and objectives successfully accomplished."
/2/See Appendix B to Document 156.
With reference to the provision that the Central Intelligence Authority shall conduct all federal espionage and counterespionage for the collection of foreign intelligence, it is pointed out that the conduct of this type of operation by executive departments would embarrass them in their regular work; central control would insure that these operations are not conducted solely in the interests of a single department or agency; performance by a single, closely-controlled central agency would secure maximum security; the specialized and difficult administrative problems can better be handled by a central agency; and the use of a single agency is necessary because interdependency and inter-relationship between geographical areas and foreign countries makes it imperative that one agency handle world coverage. It is stated, however, this would not preclude the use of specialized departmental personnel under rigid central control.
The discussion seems to indicate that the supplemental budget is to be presented to Congress after approval by the NIA as it is stated that some of the functions provided for in the Directive have not previously been performed by any department or have not been performed on the adequate scale now contemplated and, therefore, a supplemental budg-et is required.
Comment
This proposed Directive, of course, is the same super-colossus originally proposed by General Donovan. It is not the original plan as proposed by the President or which was envisioned by the discussions occurring prior to the time the President issued his Directive. The original plans insofar as the Bureau was advised, contemplated the setting up of solely a coordinating agency which was given the power, of course, to perform certain functions which it would determine could more adequately and economically be performed centrally for the benefit of all government agencies. This Directive, however, blankets the field of intelligence operations and puts it under one strong central control with practically no control by the departments which are interested in the problems, which is the same as the old Donovan proposal. It is noted in particular that this Directive omits the stipulation set forth in the Presidential Directive of January 22, 1946, placed therein at the insistence of the Attorney General on the advice of the Bureau, which stipulation provided, "Within the scope of existing law and Presidential Directives, other departments and agencies of the executive branch of the federal government shall furnish such intelligence information relative to the national security as is in their possession and as the Director of Central Intelligence may from time to time request pursuant to regulations of the National Intelligence Authority."
This Directive, of course, as is revealed in the discussion, appears directly aimed at getting the Bureau out of Latin America. In view of the Bureau's present policy, we should not, of course, oppose this Directive inasmuch as the Bureau desires to operate the Special Intelligence Service only until July, 1947, or until some other agency is ready to take over these duties. It should be noted, however, that undoubtedly if this Directive is approved and the Central Intelligence Group is successful in setting up complete foreign coverage, the Bureau would undoubtedly be pushed into a "second-rate" position insofar as purely intelligence functions are concerned in the domestic field. Our law enforcement functions, of course, could not be touched by the Central Intelligence Group. It is inevitable that the Central Intelligence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of foreign intelligence existing in that field. Also, it is impossible to separate entirely foreign intelligence and the domestic functions performed by the Bureau. In other words, whether we prosecute a spy in a given case would be intimately bound up in the question of what would be best from the standpoint of foreign intelligence. We might find ourselves prosecuting, investigating, and using every means to disband subversive foreign nationality organizations in the United States, but the policy with respect to foreign intelligence would be to encourage, collaborate with, and assist these same groups. The sheer size of the foreign intelligence set up and its intimate relationship with powerful departments of the United States Government would probably mean that the Central Intelligence Group would be in a position to win out in any controversy as to action to be taken touching on intelligence in the foreign field. In the past, the State Department, the Army, and the Navy have incessantly disagreed with respect to intelligence, which has certainly facilitated the Bureau's position and our domination of the intelligence picture. The concentration, however, of all these intelligence functions, including the research and analysis formerly performed by various agencies, into one strong, central group would place the Bureau at a great disadvantage and would probably mean that we would be overshadowed in this field and that we would be forced to accede to the desires of the Central Intelligence Group in domestic intelligence problems, if not to give the field entirely to them.
Suggested Changes
In view of present Bureau policy of not accepting responsibility for foreign intelligence in the Western Hemisphere beyond July, 1947, we are not, of course, in a position to oppose the issuance of this proposed Directive. Our main concern naturally would be to insure as much protection for domestic jurisdiction as is possible. In line with this, the following suggestions are made:
(1) In Paragraph 3 of the Directive it states, "The Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to act as the executive agent of this Authority in coordinating and in supervising all federal foreign intelligence activities . . .". This could mean, of course, that the Director of CIG would supervise federal foreign intelligence even though performed in the United States, although I believe the sense is intended that he will supervise foreign intelligence performed outside of the United States. It is suggested that this be clarified by making the sentence read: "The Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to act as executive agent of this Authority in coordinating and supervising of federal intelligence activities performed outside the United States and its possessions . . . ."
(2) In Paragraph 4, Section A it is provided that the Director of Central Intelligence is to perform services of common concern as follows: "Conduct all federal espionage and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security." For the reason set forth above, it is suggested this read: "Conduct all federal espionage and counterespionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security."
Although I do not believe that we can eventually oppose the Central Intelligence Group entering into the domestic picture on the basis that it is essential to foreign operations, the above suggested changes would insure some grounds on which the Bureau could frame a protest.
Recommendation:
There is attached a letter to General Vandenberg advising him that the proposed directive is approved with the above suggested changes./3/ In this letter the statement in the "Discussion" set forth under Appendix "B" of the proposed Directive to the effect that personnel of other agencies can be used subject to rigid control is apparently an erroneous interpretation of the original Presidential Directive. This action is recommended, of course, in light of the Bureau's decision to withdraw from all foreign intelligence operations by July, 1947, or as soon as another agency is ready to take over these functions.
/3/Not attached and not found.
Addendum/4/
Mr. Tolson and Mr. Tamm do not concur with the conclusion expressed in this memorandum that "It is inevitable that the Central Intelligence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of foreign intelligence existing in that field." They feel that a coordinated program for the exchange of information between the Central Intelligence Authority and the FBI, permitting a free and comprehensive exchange of information in matters of mutual interest, will enable the Bureau to work in the domestic field without interference from the Central Intelligence Authority in the same manner that the Bureau works, for example, with local police departments or other governmental agencies within defined jurisdictional lines. We believe that the attached letter to General Vandenberg is satisfactory.
/4/Assistants to the FBI Director Tolson and Tamm added the following addendum to this memorandum.
Hoover added the following handwritten comment: "I am not as optimistic as are Tolson & Tamm. I think it is inevitable that there will be a collision with C.I.G. over our domestic jurisdiction or rather their expansion into our intelligence matters. It ought not occur but this new memo of C.I.G. shows how greedy it is. It is the Donovan plan almost in toto & is being slyly put over. It means we must zealously guard our domestic jurisdiction & not yield an inch & be ever alert to resist any encroachment. H."
Edw
C.A. Tolson/5//5/Tolson's typed signature appears on the source text; apparently Edward Tamm signed for them both.
158. Memorandum for the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Langer)
Washington, June 28, 1946.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/6-2846. Top Secret. Drafted by W. Park Armstrong of Langer's staff. Attached to this document was a 7-page chronology dated January 1946 and entitled "History of the National Intelligence Authority." See the Supplement.
AIDE-MEMOIRE TO SA-L:/1/ CIG 10/2/
/1/The designator or routing symbol for the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence.
/2/Document 156.
1. General. a. The Department has been a consistent and enthusiastic supporter of the concept of centralized intelligence. It is anxious to contribute in every way possible to the successful and efficient operation of CIG. It believes, however, that a great deal of constructive accomplishment remains to be undertaken within the framework of the present functions and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
b. The Department believes that the President's letter of January 22, 1946 expressed the mutually agreed upon conception of centralized intelligence and that the basic theory there established is that the NIA, the DCI and CIG should be at the managerial, not the operational, level, except with respect to "services of common concern" performed "for the benefit of said intelligence agencies" [i.e., State, War and Navy]./3/ The provisions of CIG 10 would radically affect the original concept.
/3/Brackets in the source text.
2. Paragraph 2 of CIG 10. The powers and duties conferred upon the DCI by this paragraph extend his functions and responsibilities into operational intelligence activities. The language of paragraph 2 permits a number of differing interpretations of its intent and the phraseology lacks clarity with respect to the functions and the powers granted the DCI. Numerous questions arise, some of which are:
a. The DCI is authorized to undertake "basic research and analysis" supplemental to that of the State, War and Navy Departments when "in his opinion and that of the appropriate member of the IAB it is required by the national security." Should it devolve upon the DCI in the first instance to determine "the appropriate member" of the IAB and the "fields of primary interest" for each of the Departments?
b. What are "fields of primary interest"? Is "political" intelligence the only field of primary interest for State? Can political intelligence be separated from economic, geographic, biographic or sociological intelligence, or, for that matter, from order-of-battle or maritime intelligence at certain times and under certain circumstances?
c. The DCI is authorized to perform research and analysis activities in the fields of "common but secondary interest to more than one of those Departments," provided centralization increases efficiency or effectiveness. What is a "secondary interest" to the State Department? Here again the DCI is charged with determining which of the members of the IAB are "the appropriate members" with respect to the activities of common but secondary interest.
d. It has been rumored that the DCI may take over some of the branches of MIS, such as the Pol-Ec Branch, the Who's Who Branch and the Scientific Branch. How, specifically, would the provisions of paragraph 2 cover the determination by the DCI of his right or duty to conduct the activities now performed by those branches of MIS?
e. It is possible that the exercise of the duties and functions of the DCI under paragraph 2 may come into direct conflict with certain provisions of the President's letter (to which the redefinitions are subject) and thus prove abortive. For example, paragraph 6 of the President's letter makes it obligatory for State, War and Navy to continue "to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence." Do not questions arise as to what constitutes "departmental intelligence" and whether the departments can turn over even secondary activities if they are "departmental"?
f. Is not the effect of paragraph 2 to diminish the authority and function of the IAB to a marked degree?
3. Legality. a. Entirely apart from the substantive questions involved in the redefinition of the functions of the DCI, there is some doubt whether the NIA, under the provisions of the President's letter of January 22, has the authority to redefine the functions of the DCI so as to empower him to undertake activities not specifically delineated in the President's letter. Paragraph 3-d of the President's letter directs the DCI to perform "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct." It is not clear from the language whether the requirement is imposed that both the President and the NIA are to direct the DCI to perform other functions, but the more logical, and possibly the legal, interpretation would be that such a requirement was established. In that case, the NIA would have no authority to direct the DCI to perform functions other than those enumerated in the President's letter unless and until the President so directs.
b. The foregoing does not, apparently, apply to the assumption by the DCI of the duties specified in paragraph 4 of CIG 10, for it would seem likely that those activities fall within the provisions of paragraph 3-c of the President's letter which directs the DCI to "perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently performed centrally."
159. Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board
Washington, June 28, 1946, 2:30 p.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. The meeting was held at the War Department building.
PARTICIPANTS
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, former Director of Central Intelligence
Members Present
Dr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Commodore Charles J. Rend, USN (Representing Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence)
Colonel E. P. Mussett (Representing Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2)
Also Present
Mr. Park Armstrong, Department of State
Captain R. K. Davis, USN, ONI
Colonel Joseph A. Michela, G-2
Secretariat
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National Intelligence Authority
1. Functions of the Director of Central Intelligence (C.I.G. 10)/1/
/1/Document 156.
General Vandenberg expressed regret that the original version had caused such turmoil. He explained that his primary purpose was to get the people necessary to do the job of assisting the three departments. He wants these people to try to find out where, because of lack of people or money, the departments have to stop their intelligence activities short of national requirements. General Vandenberg explained that he was not trying to unsurp any departmental prerogatives. He realized that C.I.G. cannot do its job unless there is an intelligence system within State, War and Navy which is as strong as possible. He wants to find out where the departments have to stop and thus where there are deficiencies or holes in our intelligence organization. General Vandenberg stated that he had talked with the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and with Fleet Admiral Leahy, and they were all in agreement with his concept. He would, however, welcome any comments or criticism on the subject paper.
Dr. Langer explained that he was very interested in making C.I.G. a real going concern, including provision of the necessary money and people. His chief objection to the paper was that it was rather loose in places and would subsequently give rise to suspicions. The State Department had no objection to a large part of the paper. It did object, however, to paragraph 2 of Appendix "A". Dr. Langer felt that this paragraph went beyond the provisions in the President's letter. He doubted that it was necessary for C.I.G. to undertake extensive research and analysis. He felt that if the departments showed themselves unable to do the job for C.I.G., specific authorization for C.I.G. to perform such functions could be given at that time. Dr. Langer also felt that it would be extremely difficult to define what fields were of primary or secondary interest to the departments.
General Vandenberg felt that point would be covered, since he was required to obtain the concurrence of appropriate members of the Board in any given case.
Dr. Langer noted that the decision as to which member was appropriate in any case was left to the discretion of the Director. He felt that setting up the proposition of negotiating with individual members would cause the Board to pass into eclipse. He would be very sorry to see that happen, since solidarity of the Board gave necessary moral support to the Director. Dr. Langer explained that it was only because of the interest of State in C.I.G. that he would like to avoid unnecessary debate, acrimony, or any suggestion that would break down the solidarity of the Board. He thought that paragraph 2 should be more specific, and therefore circulated an alternative paragraph 2.
General Vandenberg thought the alternative paragraph would tie his hands unnecessarily. If he is to produce national intelligence he must fill the holes as rapidly as possible. If he has to obtain approval by the entire Board in each case, it will become a debating society and no action will be taken.
Dr. Langer pointed out that the departments have definite functions and responsibilities which must be recognized. He noted that the Secretary of State has the responsibility of informing the President regarding the foreign situation and advising him of what should be done in that field.
General Vandenberg stated that one of the main purposes of this paper was to enable C.I.G. to define precisely the fields of primary interest to the departments.
General Chamberlin expressed his regret that he had to leave the meeting at this point, but stated that Colonel Michela could vote for him unless there were particularly controversial issues involved. General Chamberlin then left the meeting.
General Vandenberg said that he must prepare a supplementary budget within the next few days or C.I.G. would be without necessary funds during the fiscal year 1947. He was therefore anxious to obtain N.I.A. approval of the concept of this paper to enable him to secure the necessary funds. He felt that C.I.G. would be unable to find the gaps in the intelligence situation unless it was able to perform the research and analysis operation.
Dr. Langer expressed the understanding that the Central Planning Staff was designed to find the gaps.
General Vandenberg thought, and Admiral Souers agreed, that this was a problem for research and not for planning. Unless C.I.G. actually performed research functions, it would not know where the gaps were.
Dr. Langer asked whether C.I.G. intended to have so large a staff that it would be able to take care of any conceivable emergency.
General Vandenberg explained that he wanted only enough experts to find the holes. It would then be necessary to determine whether those holes could be filled by one of the departments or whether, in each particular field, the research and analysis should be centralized in C.I.G. In other words, he did not want to do the work now being done in the departments, but rather to find out what the departments cannot do.
Dr. Langer agreed with this concept, but felt that a revision of the wording of paragraph 2 was necessary.
After further discussion, a revision of paragraph 2 was accepted by the Board.
Commodore Rend was concerned about the wording of paragraph 3 of Appendix "A", since it seemed to infringe upon the responsibility of each Board member to execute approved N.I.A. recommendations within his department.
The Board agreed to a re-wording of paragraph 3.
Commodore Rend suggested that paragraph 4-a make it clear that C.I.G. would conduct such operations only outside the limits of the continental United States.
General Vandenberg noted that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had suggested a similar revision of paragraph 4-a, and this revision was accepted by the Board.
Colonel Michela suggested re-wording the last two lines of paragraph 5 of Appendix "A", and a revision was subsequently agreed upon by the Board.
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
Concurred in C.I.G. 10 subject to the following amendments to Appendix "A" thereto and appropriate changes in Appendix "B":
a. Revise paragraph 2 to read:
"2. In performing the functions specified in paragraph 3-a of the President's letter, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby author-ized to undertake such research and analysis as may be necessary to determine what functions in the fields of national security intelligence are not being presently performed or are not being adequately performed. Based upon these determinations, the Director of Central Intelligence may centralize such research and analysis activities as may, in his opinion and that of the appropriate member or members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, be more efficiently or effectively accomplished centrally."
b. Revise paragraph 3 to read:
"3. In addition to the functions specified in paragraph 3-b of the President's letter and in accordance with paragraph 4 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to act as the agent of this Authority in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security to ensure that the over-all policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed."
c. Revise paragraph 4-a to read:
"a. Conduct of all organized Federal espionage and counter-espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security."
d. Revise the last two lines of paragraph 5 to read:
"herein, in addition to the appropriations which can be made available for this purpose by the State, War and Navy Departments."
(Enclosure to C.I.G. 10 as amended subsequently submitted for N.I.A. consideration as N.I.A. 4.)/2/
/2/The NIA apparently did not meet as a body to discuss the draft directive. On July 8 the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy approved Enclosure A to NIA 4 without change. Admiral Leahy, however, objected to the use of the word "agent" in paragraph 3 of Enclosure A because it might imply unwarranted freedom of the Director of Central Intelligence to act for the NIA. Vandenberg agreed that the language was subject to such an interpretation and stated that he had only intended that the Director of Central Intelligence would implement NIA policies. (NIA 4/1, Memorandum from Lay to NIA, July 8; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132) The paragraph as revised is printed as paragraph 3 of NIA Directive No. 5, Document 160.
160. National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 5
Washington, July 8, 1946.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132. Top Secret; Limited Distribution.
FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
REFERENCES
a. President's letter of 22 January 1946
b. N.I.A. Directive No. 1Pursuant to the President's letter of 22 January 1946 designating this Authority as responsible for planning, developing and coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to ensure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security, the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence are hereby redefined as follows, subject to the provisions of said letter:
1. Paragraph 3 of the President's letter of 22 January 1946 defined the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence as follows:
"3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:
"a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your departments.
"b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the Intelligence agencies of your departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.
"c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
"d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct."
2. In performing the functions specified in paragraph 3-a of the President's letter, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized to undertake such research and analysis as may be necessary to determine what functions in the fields of national security intelligence are not being presently performed or are not being adequately performed. Based upon these determinations, the Director of Central Intelligence may centralize such research and analysis activities as may, in his opinion and that of the appropriate member or members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, be more efficiently or effectively accomplished centrally.
3. In addition to the functions specified in paragraph 3-b of the President's letter and in accordance with paragraph 4 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized and directed to act for this Authority in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security to ensure that the over-all policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed.
4. Pursuant to paragraph 3-c of the President's letter, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to perform the following services of common concern which this Authority has determined can be more efficiently accomplished centrally:
a. Conduct of all organized Federal espionage and counter-espionage operations outside of United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security.
b. Conduct of all Federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers required for the collection of intelligence information related to the national security.
5. To the extent of available appropriations and within the limits of their capabilities, as determined by the respective Departments, the State, War and Navy Departments will make available to the Director of Central Intelligence, upon his request, the funds, personnel, facilities and other assistance required for the performance of the functions authorized herein. At the earliest practicable date, the Director of Central Intelligence will submit for approval by this Authority any supplemental budget required to perform the functions authorized herein, in addition to the appropriations which can be made available for this purpose by the State, War and Navy Departments.
6. Where the performance of functions authorized herein requires the liquidation, transfer or integration of funds, personnel or facilities for existing activities of the State, War and Navy Departments, the liquidation, transfer or integration will be accomplished at the earliest practicable date as agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence and the official responsible for such activities so as to involve a minimum of interruption in the performance of these functions.
161. Central Intelligence Group Directive No. 14
Washington, July 19, 1946.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-275. Confidential.
REORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
REFERENCE
N.I.A. Directive No. 5/1//1/Document 160.
Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
1. In order to perform the functions assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence by N.I.A. Directive No. 5, the Central Intelligence Group is hereby reorganized as shown in the attached chart, effective 20 July 1946./2/ Budgetary requirements for the attached organization will be submitted to the National Intelligence Authority for approval pursuant to paragraph 5 of N.I.A. Directive No. 5. All previous directives and orders regarding the organization of the Central Intelligence Group are hereby rescinded.
/2/See the Supplement.
2. The detailed organization and activation of the various elements of the Central Intelligence Group will be announced by subsequent C.I.G. Administrative Orders, while personnel will be assigned by C.I.G. Personnel Orders.
Hoyt S. Vandenberg/3/
Lieutenant General, USA/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
162. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg) to the National Intelligence Authority
NIA 6
Washington, August 13, 1946.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/8-1546. Top Secret. The source text is covered by an August 15 note from Acting Secretary of State Acheson to his Special Assistant, Herbert S. Marks, which reads as follows:"
The President feels strongly that this action should not be taken. He approves of my stalling and using the authority he has given me in any way to prevent it from happening."
He is concerned about paragraph 2 saying that General Groves has already transferred his people and thinks I should tell somebody that the transfer should not take place."
Some of the Department of War background is in memoranda for the record by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Wright, dated August 1 and August 5. (Both in Central Intelligence Agency Records, Wright Office Diaries, Job 80-01731R, Box 32, Folder 1)
COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS ANDPOTENTIALITIES
Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence With the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board
Foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities constitute a paramount field of intelligence related to the national security. As such, the National Intelligence Authority is responsible for planning, developing, and coordinating Federal foreign intelligence activities in this field.
To date, the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the office of Major General Leslie R. Groves, the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District, has been the agency performing functions of collecting and evaluating intelligence related to foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities. This Branch has operated under the personal direction of General Groves, who is in turn responsible, by Presidential directive, to the Secretary of War.
The newly created Atomic Energy Commission will be concerned with the entire field of atomic energy in the United States, including commercial as well as military aspects. The Commission will, upon Presidential directive, take over the responsibilities of the Manhattan Engineer District. It is considered appropriate at this time that the National Intelligence Authority should authorize and direct the Director of Central Intelligence to coordinate the collection by agencies subject to N.I.A. coordination of all intelligence information related to foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities affecting the national security and to accomplish the correlation, evaluation and appropriate dis-semination within the Government of the resulting intelligence. To accomplish this function, the personnel and working files of the Foreign Intelligence Branch operated by General Groves should be transferred to the Central Intelligence Group.
The enclosed draft N.I.A. Directive/1/ is designed to carry out the conclusions contained in the above paragraph. This Directive has been unanimously concurred in by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, which in this case included the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District.
/1/Not printed. For text as adopted by the NIA, see Document 164.
It is recommended that the National Intelligence Authority approve the draft directive in the Enclosure.
Hoyt S. Vandenberg/2/
Lieutenant General, USA/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
163. Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority
Washington, August 21, 1946, 11 a.m.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132. Top Secret. This meeting was called at the request of Acting Secretary of State Acheson; see Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, p. 162 and p. 455, note 156. The meeting was held at the Department of State.
PARTICIPANTS
Members Present
Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal Representative of the President
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central IntelligenceAlso Present
Assistant Secretary of State William Benton
Colonel William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Department of State
Colonel Charles W. McCarthy, USA
Captain Robert L. Dennison, USNSecretariat
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.1. Coordination of Intelligence Activities Related to Foreign Atomic Energy Developments and Potentialities (N.I.A. 6)/1/
/1/Document 162.
Secretary Patterson stated that the present position is that, despite the President's directive establishing N.I.A. and its implementation, the Manhattan Engineer District under General Grove has a small division collecting information on foreign activities in the field of atomic energy. It seemed to Secretary Patterson senseless to have this division isolated without any connection with or relationship to C.I.G. He stated that he had talked with General Groves about this problem. Secretary Patterson believes that the N.I.A. will be carrying out the President's directive only if this division is transferred. He is not concerned particularly as to where it is transferred, although he approves the proposed transfer to C.I.G. This intelligence division has nothing to do with the Manhattan Engineer District proper and therefore has nothing to do with the Atomic Energy Commission. Even if it did, it would still come under the terms of the President's directive to N.I.A. At the present time the intelligence on this subject is lost and is not available to the agencies represented on N.I.A.
Secretary Forrestal questioned whether it is intended to deny the use of this information to the Atomic Energy Commission.
Secretary Patterson felt that the information involved has nothing to do with ideas for improving our own atomic energy program since we are already so far ahead of other nations.
Secretary Acheson said that he was troubled by this paper and had spoken about it to the President who was not familiar with it./2/ Secretary Acheson said that he had been informed that the Atomic Energy Commission would be almost entirely dependent on foreign sources of uranium ore. He understood that it was one function of General Groves' intelligence group to find out where uranium ore is and how to get it to this country or to deny it to others. The President expressed the opinion that this paper might be all right but that, if it is carried out before the Commission is established, it may take away from them an important part of their activities. The President felt that it would be wiser to let the matter rest until the Commission is established.
/2/No record of Acheson's conversation with the President has been found.
Secretary Patterson pointed out that the transfer of only a few people here and abroad is involved. Their sole job is to watch what is going on in foreign countries in the development of atomic energy. The present position is hard to defend and Secretary Patterson believed that the N.I.A. should have taken this action before this. He noted that this was an Army unit under General Groves, about which General Vandenberg knows nothing. Secretary Patterson expressed the belief that it has nothing to do with the statutory authority of the Atomic Energy Commission since it involves what he considers to be a military intelligence unit.
Admiral Leahy stated that he was favorably impressed with the paper but had not wanted to act on it in a hurry. He found no fault with it on the assumptions expressed by Secretary Patterson.
Secretary Forrestal felt that it was urgent that something be done. He stressed the fact that there was no intent to deny the information involved to the Atomic Energy Commission.
Secretary Patterson agreed on the urgency. He felt that the Commission will have a big job to do, of which this is only a small segment. He believed that the Army and Navy would be open to serious criticism if they did not act on this matter. He felt that they could not go on treating this new field of intelligence concerning atomic energy as if it didn't exist because they knew nothing about it.
General Vandenberg stated that he would hate to have anyone think that C.I.G. withheld material from any governmental agency that needed it, since the furnishing of such information is basically the mission of C.I.G. If the N.I.A. authorizes C.I.G. to furnish this information to the Atomic Energy Commission, he will certainly do it. He feels that C.I.G. can perform this function more efficiently since it can use all collecting facilities, whereas neither General Groves nor the Commission are or will be able to do this. At the present time the intelligence agencies are not cooperating with the Manhattan Engineer District because it is a one-way street. The best source of this information, according to General Groves, has been SSU, which will be replaced by C.I.G.'s Special Operations. If this nation is to know about foreign developments in this field, it must use all sources. If the N.I.A. approves this paper, the entire intelligence organization of the government will be utilized.
Secretary Patterson pointed out that if General Groves had information that the Russians were prepared to use atomic bombs, the members of N.I.A. would not know about it.
Secretary Acheson stated that he was not clear about the facts. He agreed that insofar as this involves finding out what other countries are doing, it should be under General Vandenberg. If, however, it involves finding out where uranium ore is, this is of vital interest to the Atomic Energy Commission.
Secretary Patterson stated that General Groves is performing this function in complete isolation. Mr. Patterson feels this is hostile to the spirit and probably the letter of the President's directive establishing N.I.A.
Admiral Leahy believed it was conceivable that the Commission might find it necessary to build up an intelligence organization of its own. He felt that this organization, however, should coordinate with C.I.G.
Secretary Acheson thought it would be a mistake to do anything in the week or ten days before the Commission is appointed. He also understands that this is the President's wish.
Secretary Forrestal could see no great harm that would be done by acting now and was very reluctant to delay action on this matter.
Secretary Patterson pointed out that this could not be accomplished after the Commission is appointed because then the personnel involved would be under the Commission. If he was a member of the Commission, he would ask for all that General Groves has, would take up the important problems first, and in the meantime freeze all personnel. It would, therefore, involve serious delay to ask the permission of the Commission.
Secretary Acheson felt that these points were the strongest reasons for not acting at this time.
Secretary Forrestal stated that it was the intent of N.I.A. to draw together all intelligence activities of this type. He felt that there should not be one unit separate and isolated. If this principle were sound, he believed the N.I.A. should approve this paper.
Secretary Patterson reiterated that this involved only military information. The whole subject involved is military and will be unless the United Nations is perfected and international controls are effected. He considered that it would be extremely derelict to frame major policies without considering what other countries are doing in this field.
Admiral Leahy believed that the Commission could get better information from C.I.G. than from any organization that might be set up for some time to come. He pointed out that the N.I.A. has the authority to direct C.I.G. to furnish this information to the Commission.
Secretary Acheson observed that naturally all N.I.A. members would do whatever the President desires. He suggested that Admiral Leahy might clear this paper with the President.
Secretary Patterson stated that he of course had no objection to taking it up with the President but questioned the need since the matter falls so clearly within the directive to N.I.A.
Admiral Leahy stated that he agreed with Secretary Patterson and Secretary Forrestal. He thought it would be possible to reverse the decision, if necessary, after the Commission is established.
Secretary Acheson was concerned about acting too hurriedly. He said that the wording sounded all right to him but that this was a very complex subject. He thought that if similar wording were used regarding a matter of finance, the N.I.A. wouldn't act because they would be familiar with the fact that the Treasury Department would be deeply concerned. He agreed that it might be necessary to coerce the Commission on this matter, but in any case he felt that they should have an opportunity to express their views.
General Vandenberg stated that C.I.G. was interested primarily in obtaining the existing organization since C.I.G. is not now getting the necessary information. He suggested that the unit might be transferred to C.I.G.; then if the Commission asks N.I.A. to reconsider, the unit will be intact for any future disposition decided upon.
Secretary Patterson noted that he had taken the view regarding other units of the Manhattan Engineer District, that they should be kept intact for the Commission. This unit, however, dealt with military intelligence and fell within the terms of the President's directive to N.I.A. He, therefore, felt that the proposed action could be taken immediately.
Admiral Leahy asked why it would not be possible for C.I.G. to go ahead and do this type of intelligence in addition to Groves' people.
General Vandenberg said that this might result in having two agents in the field on the same mission, which always results in one exposing the other.
Admiral Leahy then suggested that the N.I.A. direct C.I.G. to collect and evaluate the information, without transferring the unit at this time.
General Vandenberg noted that the individuals are a part of General Groves' personal staff and they have been brought to the point where they know generally all that General Groves knows. They are, therefore, in a position to tell other agencies to collect certain information without divulging their background knowledge on atomic energy. If, however, C.I.G. sets up a new unit it must inform additional people of the basic atomic energy secreta, which might further jeopardize their security.
Secretary Forrestal believed that N.I.A. would be doing a dangerous thing to mark time on this matter.
Secretary Patterson stated that he already has the power to send the intelligence personnel involved to G-2 right away. He can not, however, transfer them to C.I.G. without N.I.A. agreement.
Secretary Forrestal stated that he wanted the record to show that, if the Atomic Energy Commission is created, he does not want the military people who are charged with national defense to be denied this vital information regarding foreign atomic energy developments.
General Vandenberg noted that that was exactly the position to date.
Mr. Lay suggested that, since the Atomic Energy Commission was not mentioned in the directive, an additional paragraph might be added to the effect that intelligence produced as a result of this directive should be made available as required to the Commission.
General Vandenberg suggested amending this to indicate that C.I.G. would make the intelligence available "as directed by N.I.A."
Mr. Benton suggested an additional paragraph to the effect that this directive would be reviewed with the Atomic Energy Commission when established.
Admiral Leahy proposed certain editorial amendments. He then suggested that the proposed directive be rephrased either with or without the proposed amendments, and sent by telegram to the President with a notation to the effect that the N.I.A. recommends approval without prejudice to any future change that may be desired by the Atomic Energy Commission.
The National Intelligence Authority:
a. Agreed to recommend that the President approve the directive in the Enclosure to N.I.A. 6,/3/ amended as follows, with an understanding that any action taken by the N.I.A. will be without prejudice to future change that may be desired by the Atomic Energy Commission:
/3/For text of the directive as approved by the NIA, see Document 164.
(1) Page 3, paragraph 1, line 4, change "N.I.A. coordination" to read "coordinationa by N.I.A."
(2) Page 3, paragraph 1, line 5, change "affecting" to read "which may affect."
b. Noted that Admiral Leahy would transmit the above agreement to the President by telegram. (The President subsequently replied that he wished to defer taking action until he returned to Washington.)/4/
/4/See footnote 1, Document 164.
164. Telegram From the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to President Truman
Washington, August 21, 1946, 8 p.m. (Z).
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 131. Top Secret. The time of transmission is taken from Truman's reply (see footnote 1 below). Also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 79-80.
White 26. The National Intelligence Authority today approved the following quoted directive to be issued by the Authority to General Vandenberg. General Groves approves.
Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal consider it very important that the directive be issued without delay. Secretary Acheson stated that your approval should be obtained.
The members of the Authority recommend your approval with an understanding that any action taken by the Authority will be without prejudice to future change that may be desired by the Atomic Energy Committee. I recommend approval./1/
/1/According to telegram Blue #44, August 22, Truman wished to defer action on the directive until he returned to Washington. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 131) See the Supplement. The matter was not resolved until the following year with the issuance of National Intelligence Directive No. 9 on April 18, 1947 (Document 194), and the subsequent agreement that the Atomic Energy Commission would become a member of the IAB. Regarding AEC membership on the IAB, see Hillenkoetter's August 12, 1947, memorandum to Leahy and others in the Supplement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 131)
"Pursuant to the President's letter of 22 January 1946, designating this Authority as responsible for planning, developing, and coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security, the following policies and procedures relating to Federal intelligence activities in the field of foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities affecting the national security are announced:
1. The Director of Central Intelligence, subject to the direction and control of this Authority, is hereby authorized and directed to coordinate the collection by agencies subject to coordination by N.I.A. of all intelligence information related to foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities which may affect the national security, and to accomplish the correlation, evaluation, and appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence is further authorized to arrange with other intelligence agencies of the Government to utilize their collection facilities in this field.
2. To accomplish the function assigned in paragraph 1, the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District have authorized the transfer to the Central Intelligence Group of the personnel and working files of the Foreign Intelligence Branch operated by the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District, effective at the earliest practicable date."
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