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Foreign Relations of the United States
1945-1950
Emergence of the Intelligence EstablishmentDepartment of State
Washington, DC
Vandenberg's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence
165. Letter From the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover) to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)
Washington, August 23, 1946.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132. Personal and Confidential.
Dear Admiral Leahy: I am sure you will recall your recent conversation with Mr. Tamm of my office, on August 12th,/1/ last, concerning the Central Intelligence Group. With further reference to the matters discussed at that time I thought I should call to your attention the proposed CIG Directive No. 15/2/ which recently has been referred to me for approval and/or comment./3/
/1/See Document 124.
/2/The number 12 has been crossed out, and 15 has been inserted by hand.
/3/Hoover presumably was referring to a paper designated as CIG 12/1, "Exploitation of American Business Concerns, Non-Governmental Groups and Individuals with Connections Abroad as Sources of Foreign Intelligence Information," which was circulated to the IAB on August 21. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement. It replaced an earlier paper on the same subject that carried the designator CIG 12. For the paper as finally approved, see CIG Directive No. 15, Document 171. There is an account of the debate over this paper in Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, pp. 122-127.
Some of the provisions incorporated in this Directive have caused me considerable concern. Briefly, they provide for CIG operations within the United States and its Territories in a fashion which I regard to be an invasion of domestic intelligence coverage which, according to our laws, is the sole responsibility of this Bureau. I am attaching a copy of my letter of reply to General Vandenberg, in which I outlined my objections in detail. This letter should be self-explanatory.
We are sure you will agree that it is imperative that the present arrangement for domestic intelligence coverage should not be tampered with at this critical period. If the proposed Directive should be placed into effect, it is our feeling that it definitely would create considerable difficulty and would inevitably lead to confusion, duplication of effort and intolerable conditions to the detriment of the national well-being.
Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover
Attachment/4/
/4/Strictly Confidential; By Special Messenger.
Letter From the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg)
Washington, August 23, 1946.
Dear General Vandenberg: I refer to your memorandum of August 21, 1946, concerning the exploitation of American business concerns, non-governmental groups, and individuals with connections abroad as sources of foreign intelligence information./5/ I must advise that the proposed directive which was attached does not incorporate the changes suggested in my letter of August 6, 1946,/6/ and I, therefore, cannot approve it. This new directive also includes provisions and statements in which I cannot concur and, in fact, must oppose.
/5/See footnote 3 above.
/6/Not found.
In the discussion attached to this new proposed directive it is stated: "Foreign intelligence information related to the national security, although it may be collected from sources whose headquarters are within the limits of the United States and its possessions, is definitely part of the national intelligence mission, the coordination of which is specifically a function of the National Intelligence Authority under the provisions of the President's letter of 22 January, 1946." This statement is not in agreement with Section 9 of the President's letter of January 22 which states: "Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions except as provided by law and Presidential Directives."
I note that in the proposed directive it is stated that field agents of the Central Intelligence Group will establish and maintain liaison with the intelligence officers of local Army and Navy headquarters and Air Force headquarters. If this means that the CIG will establish offices in the United States or will operate field agents within the United States or its possessions, I am of the opinion that this is not within the provisions of the President's original directive. I did not understand that the President's original directive contemplated the Central Intelligence Group engaging in any such activities within the United States and its possessions.
In connection with the proposed directive, as previously advised, I will approve a directive providing for the Director of Central Intelligence establishing uniform procedures for securing the cooperation of American business concerns in supplying foreign intelligence information required for the national security. As set forth in my letter of August 6 concerning the original proposed directive, the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be exempt from provisions requiring clearance from the Central Contact Register inasmuch as it is necessary for us to contact such various firms on a daily basis in matters involving the discharge of our domestic responsibilities. I desire also to reiterate my suggestion that the Central Contact Register advise the FBI with reference to each American business firm with which arrangements are made to secure foreign intelligence in order to prevent duplication of effort and possible embarrassment to both the FBI and the CIG.
I shall, of course, be most anxious to promptly transmit to the Central Intelligence Group any information gathered through our domestic operations involving foreign intelligence information relating to the national security.
With best wishes and kind regards,
Sincerely yours,/7/
/7/Printed from an unsigned copy.
166. Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board
Washington, August 26, 1946, 2:30 p.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Secret; Limited Distribution. The meeting was held at the New War Department Building.
PARTICIPANTS
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
Members Present
Colonel William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2
Mr. C. H. Carson (representing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)
Also Present
Brig. General John A. Samford, U.S.A.
Dr. Kingman Douglass, Central Intelligence Group
Mr. A. S. Buford, State Department
Captain Ransom K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel Charles E. Taylor, U.S.A.
Colonel Robert Taylor III, U.S.A.
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Lt. Colonel E. G. Edwards, U.S.A.
Commander George McManus, Central Intelligence Group
Secretariat
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National Intelligence Authority
1. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] (C.I.G. 12/1)/1/
/1/[text not declassified] (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
General Vandenberg explained that the need for coordination in this field is to assure that all agencies' views and requirements are given the same weight. It is also necessary to avoid the experiences during the war when as many as twelve agencies called on a single firm for the same information. It is considered that only C.I.G. could properly perform this coordinating function. In addition, C.I.G. will be able to place more people on the job than any other single agency. General Vandenberg then requested comments on the paper.
General Samford stated that A-2 had no objection. They would like to see the paper approved as it stands if it is considered to be strong enough.
Admiral Inglis said that his comments were primarily to clear up the wording. He questioned whether this paper referred to exploitation only in the United States and suggested that this point be cleared up.
General Vandenberg confirmed the fact that the exploitation would occur only in the United States, and an amendment to that effect was agreed upon.
Commander McManus also noted that the briefing would be done only with individuals who were going abroad on short trips, and an amendment to that effect was agreed upon.
Mr. Carson stated that the F.B.I. felt the directive was too broad since it might or could conflict with F.B.I.'s operations in the United States. Specifically the F.B.I. objected to including in this directive the exploitation of "non-government groups and individuals with connections abroad." He suggested that such groups and individuals be specifically defined or that this directive be confined to American business concerns.
General Vandenberg stated that it was impossible to define specifically the groups and individuals which C.I.G. wished to exploit since they included any groups or individuals who might be sources of foreign intelligence information related to the national security. He thought that, in view of the President's directive, it might be necessary to put this paper before the N.I.A. if the F.B.I. objected to it. General Vandenberg noted that the term "investigations," which C.I.G. was precluded from making by paragraph 9 of the President's directive establishing the N.I.A., was an entirely different matter from the type of activities to be covered by C.I.G. 12/1. Under this proposed directive the C.I.G. would not be making investigations in the United States for internal security, criminal or counter intelligence purposes as the F.B.I. uses this term, but rather would be collecting foreign positive intelligence required for the national security.
Mr. Carson pointed out that the information in many cases would nevertheless include what the F.B.I. is seeking.
General Vandenberg stated that whenever that was the case the information would be turned over to the F.B.I.
Mr. Carson noted that his concern was to avoid conflict in this borderline region between C.I.G. and F.B.I.
General Vandenberg questioned how there could be a conflict if the F.B.I. received any information of interest to it.
Mr. Carson thought that C.I.G. activities might conflict with similar F.B.I. activities and contacts.
General Vandenberg quoted the following paragraphs from a letter from the Director of the F.B.I./2/ concerning C.I.G. 12/1:
/2/See the attachment to Document 165.
"In the discussion attached to this new proposed directive it is stated: 'Foreign intelligence information related to the national security, although it may be collected from sources whose headquarters are within the limits of the United States and its possessions, is definitely part of the national intelligence mission, the coordination of which is specifically a function of the National Intelligence Authority under the provisions of the President's letter of 22 January, 1946.' This statement is not in agreement with Section 9 of the President's letter of January 22 which states: 'Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions except as provided by law and Presidential Directives.'
"I note that in the proposed directive it is stated that field agents of the Central Intelligence Group will establish and maintain liaison with the intelligence officers of local Army and Navy headquarters and Air Force headquarters. If this means that the CIG will establish offices in the United States or will operate field agents within the United States or its possessions, I am of the opinion that this is not within the provisions of the President's original directive. I did not understand that the President's original directive contemplated the Central Intelligence Group engaging in any such activities within the United States and its possessions."
Admiral Inglis said that he gathered from this letter that the F.B.I. feels that it has the exclusive right to collect any information within the continental limits of the United States. He pointed out that the Navy Department, and he understood the War Department, has always collected foreign intelligence information within the United States.
General Vandenberg stated that he failed to see how the C.I.G. could contact business firms without establishing field offices for this purpose.
General Chamberlin asked whether it was planned to assign specific groups to be contacted by the various agencies. He thought it might be possible to specify which groups would be contacted by F.B.I. and which by other agencies.
General Vandenberg explained that it is difficult to draw a line in that manner since, for example, shipping firms normally contacted by the Navy might have information of direct interest to the Army.
General Samford said that he understood the purpose of this directive was primarily to coordinate recognized activities.
General Chamberlin suggested that the paper be amended to require consultation with the F.B.I. on the advisability of contacts of other than American business concerns. With that change he suggested that the meeting consider any further amendments and then submit the paper as amended to the N.I.A.
Mr. Lay quoted paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 as follows:
"Any recommendation which you and the Intelligence Advisory Board approve unanimously and have the existing authority to execute may be put into effect without action by this Authority."
He pointed out that, if this directive were confined to activities of the State, War and Navy Departments and C.I.G., and the I.A.B. members representing those Departments concurred, the directive could be issued forthwith.
Admiral Inglis recommended, and General Chamberlin concurred, that the F.B.I. be given an opportunity to study the amended version of C.I.G. 12/1.
General Vandenberg suggested that Mr. Carson consult with the Director of F.B.I. as to whether the amended paper would be acceptable. If the F.B.I. concurred, the directive could be issued forthwith. If the F.B.I. did not concur, a split paper should then be submitted to the N.I.A.
The Board concurred with General Vandenberg's suggestions, subject to the understanding that if the F.B.I. did not concur, the Board would have another meeting prior to submitting the paper to the N.I.A.
Admiral Inglis suggested a footnote on page 6 defining the terms "central register" and "contact register." He also suggested an amendment of paragraph 3 g of the directive since, for example, Naval Reserve officers would prefer briefing by O.N.I., which therefore would obtain more information from them.
After further discussion of this paragraph an amendment was agreed upon.
Admiral Inglis stated that he wished the minutes to show an agreed interpretation of the meaning of paragraph 3 of the directive. For example, if O.N.I. makes a contact, the contact should be told that his name will be placed in the contact register. If the contact does not agree, Admiral Inglis wondered whether that meant that O.N.I. could not use this contact.
General Vandenberg thought that the contact would be willing to agree if he knew that it would save him from interrogation by another agency for the same purpose.
General Samford questioned why the contact needed to know that his name would be placed in the register.
Admiral Inglis felt that this was necessary in order to play fair and square.
General Vandenberg suggested that the contact be asked as diplomatically as possible whether he objected to having his name in the contact register. If the contact would object, then ask him if he would mind having a representative of C.I.G. participate in the briefing and debriefing. If the contact still objected, the briefing agency should check with the C.I.G. as to what information other agencies might want.
General Samford questioned whether the existence of the contact register should not be kept highly secret.
General Vandenberg agreed that if possible the contact register should not be mentioned.
Admiral Inglis pointed out that individuals frequently volunteer their assistance. These contacts may state that their financial security, continued employment and possibly life itself depends on the assurance that the discussion will not go beyond the immediate participants. In such cases Admiral Inglis considered that it is not fair to give their names to the contact register without permission.
General Vandenberg suggested that contacts be told that, to prevent their being approached by other agencies, a highly secure central point has been established where all contacts are cleared.
General Samford felt, and it was agreed, that the names of contacts should be given to the contact register unless they insisted upon secrecy.
Colonel Eddy suggested, and it was agreed upon, that certain changes be made in paragraphs 3 g and 5 of the proposed directive and that paragraph 4 thereof be deleted since the terms of that paragraph were already covered by previous directives.
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
a. Concurred in Appendix "A" to C.I.G. 12/1 as amended at the meeting, except for the representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who undertook to present the amended directive to the Director of F.B.I. for further consideration (amended directive subsequently circulated as the Enclosure to C.I.G. 12/2)./3/
/3/[text not declassified] (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
b. Agreed with the Director of Central Intelligence that:
(1) If the Director of the F.B.I. concurred in the Enclosure, it would be issued forthwith as a directive.
(2) If the Director of the F.B.I. did not concur in the Enclosure, the Intelligence Advisory Board would meet again to discuss submitting this matter to the National Intelligence Authority for decision.
c. Noted the interpretation of the procedures to be followed under the proposed directive as developed in discussion at the meeting.
167. Letter From the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover)
Washington, September 4, 1946.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Troy Papers, FBI Documents. No classification marking.
Dear Mr. Hoover: Because of an absence from Washington I have been unable to make an earlier reply to your letter of 23 August in regard to Instructions No. 12 proposed by the Director of Central Intelligence for issue to his Central Intelligence Group./1/
/1/See Document 165 and footnote 3 thereto.
A careful reading of the proposed Instructions No. 12 fails to find wherein it invades the domestic intelligence coverage that is the responsibility of your Bureau.
It occurs to me that if you should send to my office an officer of your Bureau who is qualified to explain your objections, it would be of great assistance to me in an endeavor to correctly inform members of the National Intelligence Authority when they meet to pass upon the proposal of the Director to instruct his Central Intelligence Group in the matter covered by his Directive No. 12.
I shall be very pleased to talk with one of your officers at any time that an appointment is made by telephone.
Most sincerely,
William D. Leahy
168. Letter From the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover) to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)
Washington, September 6, 1946.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Troy Papers, FBI Documents. Personal and Confidential.
Dear Admiral Leahy: Reference is made to your letter of September 4, 1946, which was in reply to my letter of August 23/1/ concerning the proposed CIG Directive No. 12,/2/ covering the exploitation of American business concerns, non-governmental groups and individuals with connections abroad as sources of foreign intelligence information. Since my letter of August 23, a meeting has been held of the Intelligence Advisory Board,/3/ CIG, and a number of minor changes have been made in the proposed directive which has been reissued as proposed CIG Directive No. 12/2./4/ In answer to the objections which had been previously made by me, the changed directive provides, "The Director of Central Intelligence will establish standards for security clearance of contacts by participating agencies, which shall include consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the advisability of contacts of other than American business concerns."
/1/Documents 164 and 165.
/2/CIG No. 12 is not printed; the revised version, CIG 12/1, August 21, is in the Supplement. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276)
/3/See Document 166.
/4/Circulated August 27 (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
I thought you would be interested in my observations concerning the last version of the proposed CIG Directive No. 12/2, which are incorporated in a letter to General Vandenberg dated September 5, 1946,/5/ a copy of which is attached.
/5/Not found.
I am advising General Vandenberg that the suggestions I had previously made were put forward solely for the purpose of preventing duplication or confusion in contacts with representatives of foreign language groups and non-governmental groups and individuals in whom the Federal Bureau of Investigation is primarily interested because of its responsibility in covering Communist activities within the United States. I informed General Vandenberg that I do not believe it necessary for representatives of CIG to check with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with contacts made with American business concerns doing business abroad, as normally this Bureau would have no interest in such contacts made by them. In order to avoid duplication and confusion, as well as conflict which may arise in connection with the CIG and the Federal Bureau of Investigation maintaining coverage of foreign language groups or other groups and individuals, I proposed that this Directive be confined at this time to contacts with American business concerns doing business abroad. I suggested that further study be given to an alternate directive of delimitation agreement which would codify a procedure mutually acceptable in contacts with foreign language groups and other persons presently included within the phrase "other non-governmental groups and individuals with connections abroad".
I feel that under terms of the current directive, the CIG would be authorized to contact and to "exploit" foreign language groups and other individuals with similar connections or background, which "exploitation" would be in addition to the similar utilization of these channels by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and I fear that there would be inevitable duplication, confusion, misunderstanding and perhaps conflict which would operate to the disadvantage of both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Group.
If, after examining my comments to General Vandenberg concerning proposed CIG Directive 12/2, you desire further clarification, I shall be most happy to have one of my assistants contact you in the matter.
With best wishes and kind regards,
Sincerely,
J. Edgar Hoover
169. Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority
Washington, September 25, 1946, 11:15 a.m.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132. Secret; Limited Distribution. The meeting was held at the Department of State.
PARTICIPANTS
Members Present
Acting Secretary of State William L. Clayton, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal Representative of the President
Lieut. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central IntelligenceAlso Present
Under Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Department of State
Captain Robert L. Dennison, USNSecretariat
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
1. Report by the Director of Central Intelligence
General Vandenberg, using a series of charts, presented a report on the activities of the Central Intelligence Group.
General Vandenberg first noted the objectives of the C.I.G. as expressed in the President's letter of 22 January 1946 and N.I.A. Directives Nos. 1 and 5./1/ He then presented a definition of "intelligence related to the national security" as interpreted by the C.I.G. He enumerated the following steps as essential to the production of such intelligence:
/1/Documents 71, 141, and 142.
a. Anticipating needs.
b. Determining most effective means.
c. Ensuring collection.
4[d]. Receiving all available intelligence information.
e. Checking each item against all others.
f. Correlating political, military, economic and other implications.
g. Reporting in useful form to appropriate officials.
General Vandenberg showed the initial organization of the C.I.G. which was designed primarily for planning, except for a small staff preparing the daily factual summary of incoming cables and dispatches. He noted that the question of central intelligence services was left for subsequent decision.
General Vandenberg submitted a list of 31 projects which had been referred to C.I.G for study by one or more intelligence agencies. In the light of the study of these projects and the experience gained up to that time, C.I.G. was reorganized on 22 July along lines explained by General Vandenberg. He noted that the need for such a reorganization was noted in Admiral Souers' final report/2/ to the National Intelligence Authority. General Vandenberg analyzed the personnel allocations for this organization at the present time and as estimated for 31 December 1946.
/2/Document 154.
General Vandenberg then listed over 20 accomplishments of the C.I.G. to date, stressing the fact that while many of these were incomplete and continuing projects, an agreement as to the proper line of action in each case had already been reached.
Secretary Forrestal stated that he was dubious about the destruction of the F.B.I. operation in Latin America. He considered these peripheral areas, such as Mexico, Cuba, etc., to be extremely important to our national security, and thought that the F.B.I. had conducted a very effective intelligence activity there. He asked General Vandenberg whether he was satisfied with the present arrangement.
General Vandenberg agreed that the F.B.I. had conducted a very effective intelligence operation. He explained, however, that the F.B.I. had agreed to turn over to C.I.G. the contacts it had developed in Latin America. This turnover, of course, would take time to accomplish, but if it is carried out as agreed at present, there should not be any serious interruption in the operation.
In answer to a question by Mr. Hickerson, Admiral Leahy stated that, at the insistence of Mr. Hoover, the C.I.G. was precluded from hiring former F.B.I. men in Latin America.
General Vandenberg said that he was recruiting personnel for this activity by personal contact. He also stated that C.I.G. was now prepared to utilize, to the extent security permits, all American business concerns with connections abroad as valuable sources of foreign intelligence.
General Vandenberg then listed 19 problems in the coordination of intelligence activities that are in process in C.I.G. for which solutions have not yet been devised.
Admiral Leahy commented that the problems enumerated were very far-reaching, and it was not hard to understand why solutions had not yet been found.
General Vandenberg explained certain general plans for C.I.G. intelligence operations overseas and for the F.B.I.S. activity.
General Vandenberg then presented some of the difficulties faced by C.I.G. of which he felt the N.I.A. should be apprised. First of all, he stressed the fact that C.I.G. could not produce national intelligence without all the intelligence information available to the Government. In this regard he felt strongly that only trained C.I.G. personnel could determine whether a given piece of information contained important intelligence implications. He noted that to the best of his knowledge the State and Navy Departments were furnishing complete coverage of their information. Some of the main sources of information to which C.I.G. did not have access were the President's messages, General Marshall's messages, and War Department OPD "eyes only" messages. He felt that the best solution was to have a trained C.I.G. officer who was acceptable to each department stationed in the message center of each department where he could review the messages and transmit to C.I.G. subject to any necessary restrictions, those messages having intelligence value.
Secretary Patterson expressed the belief that such an arrangement could be made.
General Vandenberg then noted the difficult problem of the relationship between C.I.G. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff./3/ He pointed out that the Joint Intelligence Committee duplicates the work of C.I.G. Also, J.I.C. intelligence coordination activities may conflict with similar C.I.G. activ-ities. He said that J.I.C. studies generally receive priority in the War and Navy intelligence agencies since the J.C.S. were the immediate superiors of the heads of those agencies. The possibility of combining C.I.G. and the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) had been considered, but raised difficulties since C.I.G. might then be serving two masters. He said that the solution was a difficult one, but that it was being carefully studied.
/3/Reference is to CIG 15, September 18, 1946. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
Secretary Patterson said that he did not see why the J.I.S. should not be disbanded.
Admiral Leahy agreed that this appeared to be the proper solution, and said that he had so stated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He observed that this was not an easy problem to solve, but he thought that a workable solution would be found.
General Vandenberg noted that a third difficulty which was under active consideration was the relationship of C.I.G. to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.
A fourth and most serious difficulty enumerated by General Vandenberg was the relationship of N.I.A. to the Atomic Energy Commission. He pointed out that the Atomic Energy Act created an independent agency which had the authority to engage in extremely important intelligence activities without coordination by the N.I.A. Furthermore, it was rumored that the Commission would conduct a foreign intelligence operation which would involve a grave danger of conflict with similar C.I.G. operations.
Admiral Leahy stated that he thought the President would do the best he can to turn atomic energy intelligence activities over to the N.I.A. The President, however, does not want to act until the Atomic Energy Commission is appointed. Admiral Leahy thinks that this matter will be arranged, but cannot say definitely at this time.
General Vandenberg stated that a fifth difficulty was the procurement of key Army and Naval personnel for C.I.G. He said that the present C.I.G. ceiling for Naval officers was 13, and that a request for an increase to 65 was under consideration in the Navy Department but had not been confirmed. He stated that any assistance in this matter which Secretary Forrestal might render would be extremely helpful.
Secretary Forrestal agreed to look into the present status of this request.
General Vandenberg then explained that Army and Naval officers assigned to C.I.G. were fearful that they might lose their normal opportunities for promotion. He felt that a few key promotions in C.I.G. at this time would be of the greatest value in improving morale. He therefore requested that the Secretaries of War and the Navy press for the promotion of certain C.I.G. personnel.
General Vandenberg then presented a chart showing the time required for processing a typical C.I.G. field officer to be from four to six months. He explained that this was intended to indicate one of the reasons for what might seem to be delay in establishing field operations such as in Latin America. He assured the N.I.A. that every attempt was being made to reduce the length of time involved in this processing.
Secretary Forrestal stated that he would prefer to see this work done carefully rather than too hurriedly.
The National Intelligence Authority:
Noted the report of C.I.G. activities by General Vandenberg.
170. Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board
Washington, October 1, 1946, 2:30 p.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Secret: Limited Distribution. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held at the New War Department.
PARTICIPANTS
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
Members Present
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2Also Present
Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
Mr. George B. McManus, Central Intelligence Group (for Item 1 only)
Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence GroupSecretariat
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
Mr. John S. Earman, Assistant Secretary, N.I.A.1. [3 lines of source text not declassified]/1/
/1/[text not declassified] (Central Intelligence Agency Histroical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
General Vandenberg stated that subsequent to the last I.A.B. meeting he had conferred with Mr. Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After discussing C.I.G. 12/2, Mr. Hoover agreed with the paper provided some changes were made. It appeared that Mr. Hoover's chief objection to C.I.G. 12/2 was exploitation by C.I.G. of subversive groups which the F.B.I. might be contacting or investigating.
Admiral Inglis asked specifically what changes had been made in C.I.G. 12/2.
General Vandenberg explained the changes and stated that he was willing to go along with the paper, as amended, since he was fully in accord with Mr. Hoover's viewpoint.
Admiral Inglis questioned the phrasing of paragraph 2 of C.I.G. 12/2,/2/ and particularly that part thereof which reads "and American residents travelling abroad". He suggested that consideration be given to clarifying that phrase.
/2/Inglis apparently was referring to the changes in CIG 12/2 that Vandenberg had mentioned (no written version of which has been found) [text not declassified].
Admiral Inglis then brought up the question of whether or not the changes in this paper would preclude O.N.I. from contacting "hyphenated" groups and individuals.
General Vandenberg replied that it would not, since such individuals and groups were not mentioned in the paper at all and there was no effect whatsoever.
Admiral Inglis suggested, and it was agreed, that an understanding to that effect appear in the minutes.
Mr. Lay read an interpretation of the intent of paragraph 3-b, which was accepted.
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
a. Concurred in the revision of C.I.G. 12/2 (subsequently issued as C.I.G. Directive No. 15).©
/3/[text not declassified] (Central Intellegence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
b. Noted that the revision of C.I.G. 12/2 eliminated provisions for coordination of the exploitation of other non-governmental groups and individuals not specifically mentioned therein.
[6 paragraphs (22 lines of source text) not declassified]
2. Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties With Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G. Directive No. 8)/4/
/4/Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-275)
General Vandenberg stated that C.I.G. Directive No. 8 was based upon the arrangement existing at that time under which departments assigned personnel to C.I.G. The departments, therefore, assumed the responsibility for conducting necessary security investigations. He further stated that two developments had made this Directive out of date. First, it is clear that in the future the majority of C.I.G. personnel must be recruited from sources other than the departments. Second, the War Department finds it impossible to carry out the necessary investigations because of reduced personnel ceiling. As a result of these facts it will be necessary for C.I.G. to assume responsibility for all future security investigations required to clear its personnel. In conducting these security investigations, C.I.G. will adhere to the same security standards as established in this Directive and will, of course, check with the departments in each case. General Vandenberg assumed that when the departments nominate individuals in the future for C.I.G., the nominating department has at least made a preliminary check on its own files to determine that the individual meets C.I.G.'s security standards. General Vandenberg also assumed that the departments will complete all investigations initiated up to this time.
General Chamberlin stated that the War Department could check records on any new personnel nominations to C.I.G. and also that those checks they have started can be completed. However, that was about as far as he could go, in view of the greatly restricted personnel ceiling and tremendous backlog of requested checks now on hand.
Admiral Inglis stated that the Navy Department could also give a quick check on any personnel nominations they might make to C.I.G., but that the Navy Department too was suffering from reduced personnel and also had a large number of requested checks on hand. Admiral Inglis further stated that he believed that C.I.G. should in some way be covered to take care of the type of individual who did not pass a full security check but whose services would be of value to the Central Intelligence Group.
General Chamberlin suggested that exemption in these cases should be made by the Director of Central Intelligence.
General Vandenberg agreed that provision for such exemptions would be made.
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
a. Concurred in the proposal by General Vandenberg that C.I.G. undertake responsibility for all future security investigations required to clear its personnel, subject to the same security standards as established in C.I.G. Directive No. 8 except for exemptions authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence. (Recision of C.I.G. Directive No. 8 subsequently circulated.)
3. Assignment of Functions in the Field of Static Intelligence to the Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G. 13)/5/
/5/Dated September 17. (Ibid., HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
General Vandenberg noted that the C.I.G. has already given consideration to this problem and its broad implications. Inter-departmental discussions on coordination, allocation, and centralization are being held under C.I.G. auspices. However, these discussions have indicated the need for an early I.A.B. or N.I.A. decision regarding the broad basis on which the assignment of primary responsibilities should be considered, and how each agency of secondary interest will have its needs for finished intelligence met.
Mr. Eddy asked what was meant by the term "statis intelligence".
Admiral Inglis explained that it involved roughly the field covered by JANIS studies./6/
/6/The Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) were basic country handbooks intended to provide essential information for military planners.
General Vandenberg considered that it involved gathering a large mass of data and then preparing a basic study which would be of use to many agencies. He explained that political matters of a more or less permanent nature were included, such as the constitution of the country and the form of government if this was fairly stable.
Mr. Eddy felt that political and economic matters were at the present time in a state of change throughout a large part of the world. He said that the State Department did not object to coordination of these fields, but was not willing to turn over to C.I.G. the responsibility for getting this intelligence. That responsibility must remain in the State Department.
Admiral Inglis explained that O.N.I. must retain an interest in political and economic matters as they affect naval affairs. He did not think that naval and military attaches should be blind to political and economic developments. The subject paper, however, was not concerned with the problem of collection. Admiral Inglis explained that the War and Navy Departments had been studying what functions and activities could be performed jointly. It was useless, however, for these departments to make any joint arrangement if C.I.G. proposed to take over various functions and activities. The purpose of the subject paper was to initiate a study to find out what C.I.G. planned to do. He explained that the JANIS studies were used only as an example of the fields involved, but not as an example of the procedures to be used. The subject paper contemplated the possibility of turning over to C.I.G. people in the various agencies working on geographical desks who prepared material which is edited by the JANIS Board. Admiral Inglis stated that the paper was not confined to the subject of JANIS studies.
Mr. Edgar stated that the question raised by C.I.G. could be explained as follows: If political intelligence, in which O.N.I has an interest, is allocated to the agency of primary interest, would O.N.I. expect to receive this intelligence directly from the primary agency in proper form, or would O.N.I. have a group to put it into form, or would O.N.I. expect C.I.G. to do that?
General Vandenberg said that C.I.G. desired an expression of opinion from the I.A.B. as to whether they would like C.I.G. to operate as a middleman between departments, or if they would like direct contact between departments with C.I.G. in a coordinating role. He explained that if C.I.G. was to take over the preparation of static or strategic intelligence studies, C.I.G. would either have to receive the intelligence from the departments as JANIS now does, or would have to take over the people in the agencies who are now preparing this intelligence.
General Chamberlin felt that it was clear that certain departments were responsible for certain elements of intelligence, although this had never been put in the form of a written statement, to his knowledge. He wondered if it wasn't possible for C.I.G. and the departments to parcel out functions on the basis of primary responsibility. Then each department would furnish finished intelligence to other departments who could rework it to meet their particular needs.
General Vandenberg said that the question involved in such a plan was whether C.I.G. should operate in the middle between departments or on the side.
General Samford stated that he voted for C.I.G. in the middle position.
Mr. Edgar said that a further question was whether the required intelligence should be written in proper form by the agency of primary responsibility, or by C.I.G.
General Chamberlin felt that another solution was preferable. This was that the proper function of C.I.G. should be to obtain intelligence from all departments and put it in the best form for the use of all departments.
General Vandenberg said that it was hard to have the intelligence put in the form required by any single department. For example, it would be difficult to get people in State to put intelligence in final form for use by the War Department.
Captain Davis said that the subject paper suggested a study of the possibility of placing C.I.G. in the middle role.
Mr. Eddy said that the problems facing the various departments were different. He thought that most of the intelligence now produced in the War and Navy Departments was for potential use in case of active operations. Political operations, however, are going on day by day, and the State Department has to produce intelligence for those current operations. He said that he would be glad to have State's product sent to C.I.G. and integrated with similar intelligence from the War and Navy Departments.
General Vandenberg pointed out that the economic intelligence produced by State did not cover all of the needs in that field of the War and Navy Departments.
General Samford said that what each intelligence agency does stems from what its chief wants done. He felt that with C.I.G. in the middle role, the agencies would find that C.I.G. could do completely many of the things they required, and would eventually find that it was best to rely on C.I.G.
Mr. Eddy said that he would like to feel that C.I.G. would send to State the military and naval intelligence required by the diplomats.
General Chamberlin stated that if G-2 had an insight into State's needs, G-2 could incorporate those needs into its documents. If all agencies sat down with C.I.G. to find each other's needs, each agency could produce documents containing all the essential elements in its field of primary responsibility that any other agency needed to extract and pass to its operating officials.
Mr. Edgar felt that would mean that C.I.G. would devise a format of a national intelligence handbook to meet the individual requirements of each of the agencies.
General Chamberlin said that was not quite what he intended. Rather, if C.I.G. would find out what military intelligence State needs, then C.I.G. could arrange that G-2 include these needs in its documents.
General Vandenberg felt that a further step was involved. He thought that General Chamberlin was talking about weekly and daily reports, whereas the subject paper was concerned with the preparation of basic handbooks for use by all agencies. The question was whether C.I.G. should produce these handbooks, or ask each agency to produce appropriate sections of them.
General Chamberlin said that he preferred the latter arrangement. He noted, however, that the present JANIS covers only a part of the basic intelligence required.
Admiral Inglis enumerated the following fields which he felt should be studied by the committee proposed in the basic paper:
1. Establishment of elements which are susceptible of operation by C.I.G.
2. Proposed organization for the operation of such elements by C.I.G.
3. Space requirements.
4. A time schedule for the steps involved in taking over by C.I.G.
5. Standard filing system and central library, standard report form, and form for intelligence directives.
6. Method for responding to urgent requests.
General Samford felt that each agency should retain its own group to prepare reports, but that the basic material would be easier to work on if it were integrated by C.I.G.
Admiral Inglis thought that each agency should retain responsibility for operational intelligence and for collection and dissemination. He felt the place that C.I.G. could be of most help would be in the processing required between collection and dissemination. He felt that each agency must retain a staff to disseminate and to put material into the final form desired by its customers. He thought that each agency should assist in obtaining the basic intelligence information for C.I.G.
Mr. Eddy and General Samford said that they were in favor of the proposal as described by Admiral Inglis.
General Chamberlin felt that one other element must be retained in the departments, namely, that the intelligence officers must always be able to give their commanders an independent judgment.
General Vandenberg said that this was possible if the intelligence produced by departments was based on the same source but differently oriented.
General Chamberlin stated that each agency should not be excluded from getting information through their field representatives on subjects outside of the field of its primary interest.
General Samford agreed that each agency should be able to exploit all sources available to it.
General Chamberlin reiterated that it was necessary for each agency to retain independence of judgment.
Admiral Inglis said that this should be satisfied by each agency having its own people in C.I.G. He felt strongly that when naval officers were assigned to C.I.G. they were still naval officers and responsible for seeing that C.I.G. gets all necessary naval information and that the Navy gets all C.I.G. intelligence of interest to it.
General Vandenberg added that naval officers in C.I.G. should also ensure that C.I.G. estimates have the proper naval slant.
Admiral Inglis felt that if this was understood, the concern of each intelligence head regarding responsibility to his chief, was largely obviated.
Mr. Eddy said that State would be willing to cooperate if C.I.G. produced documents the use of which was permissible but not mandatory. If the subject proposal, however, lead to referring State Department requests to C.I.G. for preparation, he felt this would be a dangerous practice.
Admiral Inglis said that one of the problems is that, if personnel are turned over to C.I.G. and the departmental agencies accept this reduction of their force, they must be assured of the quick service required by their departments.
Mr. Edgar noted a further step in that, if the primary responsibility is allocated to another agency, C.I.G. will have to arrange that the latter agency meets requirements on time.
Mr. Eddy reiterated that each agency must retain responsibility for intelligence of primary interest. What is passed to C.I.G. will involve material of secondary interest to the various agencies.
General Samford agreed that all agencies must still concentrate on intelligence of primary interest.
General Chamberlin said that G-2 does not handle operational intelligence, but is concerned solely with strategic intelligence.
Admiral Inglis agreed that this was also true of O.N.I., except that it must retain a skeleton force for mobilization in case of active operations.
General Chamberlin felt that the solution lies along both lines suggested. Certain activities must be performed in the departments and other activities should be done centrally when they are of common interest and can be more efficiently handled centrally. He did not think that the I.A.B. could give definite guidance one way or the other. He felt that each case must be studied separately.
Admiral Inglis agreed that the problem could not be solved at this time, but that a committee must be formed to break the problem down into its various elements.
General Vandenberg said that he would ask for nominations for such a committee in the next few days. He explained that the purpose of this discussion was to have Mr. Edgar hear the viewpoints of the I.A.B. members so that he could guide the committee's discussions.
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would ask for nominations for a committee to conduct the study proposed in C.I.G. 13./7/
/7/The committee appointed to make the study reported on November 4, 1946. The report, CIG 13/1, concluded that fundamental differences precluded a study. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
4. War Plans for Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G. 14)/8/
/8/Dated September 19. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
General Vandenberg noted the recommendations in C.I.G. 14 and stated that as a general principle he firmly believed that the personnel requirements of the C.I.G. should be as fully mobilized in peace as in war. On that basis he stated that he would furnish the War and Navy Departments with an estimate of C.I.G. personnel requirements based on present planning, taking into account the probable number of Reserve officers assigned to C.I.G. He stated, however, that at C.I.G.'s present stage of organization any such estimates should be considered tentative and subject to substantial revision as the organization develops.
Admiral Inglis agreed that all C.I.G. personnel figures to be submitted at the present time could only be estimates. However, he wanted to be sure that all Regular Line officers assigned to C.I.G. would not be frozen in case of an emergency. He stated that he felt that the Navy Department should have some assurance that the Regular and Reserve Line officers assigned to C.I.G. would either be retained in toto or that a certain number of them would be released to the Navy for sea duty.
General Vandenberg agreed to give the Navy this information, and that such information would be based on the best possible estimation.
General Chamberlin stated that the War Department would like to have the same estimate on both Regular and Reserve Army officers assigned to C.I.G.
Mr. Lay stated that C.I.G. had already received such a request and that a reply was being prepared.
Mr. Eddy asked if C.I.G. would try to protect civilians assigned to C.I.G. in case of an emergency, in order that their services would not be lost.
General Vandenberg stated that these civilians would be protected unless they would be of more service to the Government elsewhere.
Mr. Eddy brought out the point that he believed that the civilians in C.I.G. would generally feel that they should be in uniform. He suggested that provision be made for retaining C.I.G. civilian personnel in time of war.
General Vandenberg stated that this involved a much longer range problem and should, in his opinion, be considered at a later date.
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would furnish to the War and Navy Departments estimates of C.I.G. military and naval personnel requirements in case of mobilization.
5. Establishment of a Channel Between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (C.I.G. 15)/9/
/9/Dated September 18. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
General Vandenberg stated that Admiral Inglis had raised the question of the relationship between C.I.G. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result of this, C.I.G. has prepared a proposed directive on the subject, which he believed had been seen by all I.A.B. members. General Vandenberg further stated that it was his understanding, as a result of informal discussions in the departments by members of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, that this proposed directive was generally acceptable to the I.A.B., and he therefore recommended concurrence in its submittal to the N.I.A. and the J.C.S.
Admiral Inglis and General Chamberlin stated that this paper as written was not entirely acceptable.
Mr. Lay stated that it was his understanding that members of ICAPS had coordinated this paper with representatives of the intelligence agencies of the State, War, and Navy Departments.
Admiral Inglis said that he was afraid the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be embarrassed if N.I.A. approved this proposal prior to the J.C.S. having a chance to comment.
Mr. Lay said that this was merely an attempt to find an appropriate recommendation for a solution to the problem. He also said that this paper, if acceptable to the J.I.C., could be submitted by them to the J.C.S. prior to N.I.A.'s consideration.
Admiral Inglis explained that this problem had been brought up by a J.I.S. request for information on nuclear energy, which had been prepared without knowledge of the fact that C.I.G. was also working on this problem. His original proposal, that J.I.S. serve as a staff for the I.A.B., was intended to offer an immediate interim means for coordinating C.I.G. and J.I.C. activities.
General Vandenberg felt that we should go the whole way if an acceptable final solution could be found. He felt that it might even be desirable for him as an intelligence representative to sit in on J.C.S. meetings as a non-voting member in order to learn what areas of the world were being worked on.
Admiral Inglis stated that he had the following changes to suggest in the C.I.G. paper: He had no objection to having the Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the J.I.C., but he did not think that any one individual should be designated as chief intelligence adviser to the J.C.S.
General Vandenberg stated that for his protection he wanted some assurance that, if he served both the N.I.A. and the J.C.S., it was clear that only one of them was his master.
General Chamberlin pointed out that the difficulty was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be assured that their priorities are met. He thought that they would therefore wish to retain an intelligence organization under their control.
Mr. Eddy suggested a modification of Admiral Inglis' proposal whereby the J.I.S. would formulate J.C.S. requirements for intelligence and would transmit them to C.I.G. for compilation. In this way the J.I.S. would serve more as a secretariat, and the intelligence would be produced by C.I.G.
General Samford noted that this would retain the J.I.S., who could then fulfill J.C.S. requirements if C.I.G. was unable to give them the necessary priority.
General Chamberlin questioned whether this would be acceptable to the planners, since he wondered whether they would be willing to let an outside agency in on their plans. He stated that the J.I.C. even now was still working on the problem of persuading the planners to let the intelligence people in on their plans.
General Vandenberg suggested that this problem be deferred pending further study.
General Chamberlin agreed, and said that he would like to discuss it with General Eisenhower.
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
Deferred action on C.I.G. 15.
171. Central Intelligence Group Directive No. 15
Washington, October 1, 1946.
[Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-275. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
172. Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority
Washington, October 16, 1946, 11:15 a.m.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132. Secret; Special Distribution. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held at the Department of State.
PARTICIPANTS
Members Present
Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal Representative of the President
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central IntelligenceAlso Present
Under Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Assistant Secretary of State Donald Russell
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Department of State
Mr. Dean Rusk, War Department
Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN
Colonel William H. Harris, CIG
Mr. Edward R. Saunders, CIGSecretariat
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
1. Central Intelligence Group Budget for Fiscal Year 1948
Secretary Acheson said that he had received a recommendation by the CIG Budget Review Board that the NIA approve and sign an authorization to the Director of Central Intelligence to submit a budget of specified amount for the fiscal year 1948./1/ He said that General Vandenberg had been asked to talk to the NIA about this recommendation.
/1/According to the minutes of the meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy held on October 9, there was a discussion of the CIG budget, which was recorded as follows:
"Mr. Acheson said that there had come to him for signature a memorandum approving a budget of 40 million dollars for the Central Intelligence Group of which 25 million is unvouchered. The memorandum points out that the comparable expenditures by OSS were 165 million dollars but beyond this there is very little information on which to base a judgment. Mr. Acheson said that this proposed budget figure was probably all right but that he felt that it would be useful if it could be explained to the members of the N.I.A. in order that they could understand better what they were doing. It was agreed that Mr. Hickerson would ask that arrangements be made for a meeting of the N.I.A. next week and that if there were urgent reasons why an earlier meeting was necessary arrangements should be made for a special meeting before the end of this week. (After the meeting arrangements were made for a meeting of the N.I.A. at 11:15, October 16)." (Ibid., RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/10-946)
General Vandenberg explained that he did not think the NIA wanted a detailed discussion of this proposed budget, but he had brought men along who could explain any point the NIA questioned.
Secretary Forrestal asked how much money the CIG planned to spend during the current fiscal year.
General Vandenberg stated the amount now available to CIG for the conduct of present operations. He explained that many of the CIG personnel were now being paid by the participating departments rather than by CIG. In 1948 it was proposed that CIG would reimburse the departments for any personnel assigned to CIG. He felt that this was proper since CIG would be submitting a separate budget for 1948.
Secretary Acheson asked whether this meant that the proposed budget was not based upon the present Presidential directive establishing NIA and CIG.
General Vandenberg stated that the proposed budget was based on the present Presidential directive. He said that it was designed to cover CIG activities which would grow out of existing NIA directives. He explained that it was visualized that this budget would necessarily be larger than normal during the period of training and establishment of overseas operations. Once personnel had been established in overseas posts, expenses would only be required to take care of normal turnover of personnel. It was contemplated, therefore, that this might be the highest budget CIG would have to submit.
Secretary Patterson asked for an explanation of the breakdown of vouchered and unvouchered funds.
General Vandenberg explained that this contemplated using vouchered funds for domestic activities and unvouchered funds for all foreign activities. He said they used this basis for vouchered funds in an effort to approximate the basis used by other Government departments. He said that he would like to keep unvouchered funds to a minimum necessary to safeguard security.
Secretary Acheson asked what the proposed budget would be if personnel were not assigned from departments on a reimbursable basis.
General Vandenberg said that he was unable to estimate such a figure since he did not know how many CIG personnel would be service personnel or others assigned from departments. He explained that this budget was based on the total personnel required, including any service personnel at their comparable civilian grades and salaries. He said that if NIA so desired, he would attempt to make another guess, but explained that it would be very difficult to arrive at a more accurate estimate at this time.
Admiral Leahy agreed that this budget was bound to be nothing more than a guess.
Secretary Acheson believed that the budget people would raise the point that the reimbursable feature in this budget would undoubtedly create some duplication between CIG and the departmental budgets.
General Vandenberg stated that this point had already been discussed with the Bureau of the Budget.
Admiral Leahy questioned the size of the estimate for Personnel and Administration.
Colonel Harris granted that this figure might look large, but explained that it was designed to furnish support for all CIG activities at home and abroad. He said that CIG had used the experience of the Joint Logistics Plans Committee and the Army Service Forces, which indicated that 25% for support was the best planning figure. This proposed budget was based on the assumption that CIG would not depend on the departments for any supplies or support. Therefore, the CIG figure was actually less than the normal 25% planning figure. Of this, a large proportion would be engaged in communications work alone. In addition, all supplies and services for all CIG offices are included in the figures shown for Personnel and Administration.
Admiral Leahy expressed the belief that many of the functions enumerated were now being performed by existing agencies who might be able to handle CIG requirements more economically.
Colonel Harris said that this procedure would be questionable since it would jeopardize security in the purchase and shipment of supplies. He also noted that the actual number of personnel engaged in normal procurement, supplies, personnel, and medical activities was actually very small for the size of the organization.
Admiral Leahy then expressed the feeling that the budget for Research and Evaluation looked rather large.
Secretary Forrestal asked how many people OSS had engaged in similar activities.
Mr. Russell said that OSS had at one time about 1,400 engaged in research. He explained, however, that the State Department had taken over the remainder of that organization and, therefore, State's research personnel should be added to the CIG figure if they were to be compared with OSS.
Colonel Harris noted that OSS had not attempted to cover Latin America or General MacArthur's theater, as CIG would do. He also explained that the departments had asked CIG to investigate taking over the Washington Document Center. CIG had also been asked to establish an information center. He said that the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS had been used only because it was considered the best norm for estimating purposes, except that CIG would cover much more territory in their activities.
Admiral Leahy asked what the Washington Document Center was.
General Vandenberg explained that this unit was exploiting documents from Japan for certain intelligence purposes. He explained that it was not a permanent unit, but will probably complete its work in about a year and a half.
Mr. Russell noted that if the CIG budget was based on the former OSS Research and Analysis Branch, this would create complications, since the State Department has already asked for funds for the successor to that Branch.
General Vandenberg explained that CIG had not used OSS as a basis in order to establish a similar or duplicative unit. CIG had only used OSS as an example of the research personnel required to cover certain areas of the world. He explained that CIG required this research personnel to put together the finished intelligence from the departments plus information collected by CIG itself, and to give all this material a national slant. He noted that even when CIG receives finished intelligence from the departments, CIG still has to analyze it and find out whether it is pointed up from a national point of view. Each agency normally prepared intelligence from its own departmental viewpoint. There must, therefore, always be in CIG a research unit which looks at the intelligence from the viewpoint of all departments rather than any one. He assured NIA that CIG was not going to do the same research done by the departments, but rather would cover marginal areas and fill gaps not covered by any department.
Mr. Eddy stated that originally the figure for CIG Research and Evaluation had struck him as being rather large. Further examination indicated that CIG was being asked to do research on large areas which no department can do. He thought that CIG might well have to build up its research organization to the size indicated in the budget.
General Vandenberg assured the NIA that CIG had no intent to infringe upon the fields of primary interest to the departments. He noted that both he and the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board were watching that point very carefully.
Mr. Russell asked if CIG could not call its office something other than Research and Evaluation. He explained that this name was so similar to that used by the State Department that it might cause difficulty in obtaining appropriations since it would appear to involve duplication.
General Vandenberg agreed that he would change the name of the CIG office.
Admiral Leahy asked what objection the NIA would have to author-izing the Director of Central Intelligence to proceed to attempt to obtain the proposed budget. He thought that if this amount could be obtained it could certainly be used judiciously in furnishing intelligence services. If there was a possibility of obtaining this amount, he thought General Vandenberg should at least try to get it. If the budget should be cut, it would then be necessary to cut the cloth to fit the reduced amount.
Secretary Forrestal asked what Congressional committee General Vandenberg had appeared before.
General Vandenberg said that he had always appeared before the Appropriations Committee.
Colonel Harris explained that the plan was to hide the CIG budget in the various departmental budgets. Then at an agreed time, as arranged by the Bureau of the Budget, General Vandenberg would appear before the Appropriations Committees to justify the CIG budget as a unit.
Colonel Harris, in answer to a question by Secretary Forrestal, said that only two individuals in the Bureau of the Budget saw the integrated CIG budget.
General Vandenberg explained that both of these men have been investigated for security by CIG.
Secretary Patterson asked what the final form of the CIG budget would be. He wondered whether it would appear anywhere as so many dollars for CIG activities.
General Vandenberg said that it would appear nowhere in that form.
Secretary Forrestal said it was his understanding that it would be buried in the budgets of the various departments.
General Vandenberg confirmed that this was the arrangement which had been worked out with the concurrence of the Bureau of the Budget.
Secretary Acheson, in answer to a question by Admiral Leahy, said that this meeting had been called at his request. He had thought it would be wise, before approving a budget of this size, to have a clear idea as to why this action had been taken. He thought that the discussion had been very helpful in that regard.
Secretary Forrestal stated that the important thing, as he was sure General Vandenberg realized, was that CIG should screen the use of its money, particularly its personnel, so that there would be no revulsion in the next Congress.
Mr. Russell then made a helpful suggestion as to the basis for estimating the proportion of vouchered and unvouchered funds.
The National Intelligence Authority:
Approved and signed a memorandum authorizing the Director of Central Intelligence to submit a budget of specified amount for the fiscal year 1948.
173. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Eddy) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration (Russell) to Secretary of State Byrnes
Washington, October 30, 1946.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/10-2446. Secret. The source text bears the handwritten annotation: "I approve. James F. Byrnes."
SUBJECT
Request from the Director of the Central Intelligence for State Department Policy StatementsIn the attached letter dated October 24, 1946,/1/ to Mr. Eddy, General Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, has requested that CIG be furnished with the Department's Quarterly Policy and Information Statements.
/1/Not printed. See the Supplement.
The reasons given by General Vandenberg for desiring to receive the Policy and Information Statements are that CIG feels intelligence requirements cannot be developed without full knowledge of pertinent national policy and that he considers the Department's policy statements to come within the category of material included in the phrase "necessary facilities, intelligence, and information in the possession of our respective departments" as used in paragraph 7 of NIA Directive No. 1, copy attached, to describe the material which CIG is authorized to receive in the performance of its mission. General Vandenberg appears to desire the Department's policy statements for the purpose of including them in Part I of documents on "National Intelligence Requirements," pertaining to various countries, to be distributed by CIG.
We, therefore, recommend that General Vandenberg's request be denied. Objective foreign intelligence is critically essential in the formulation of our foreign policy. The procural of this intelligence, its correlation and coordination is the function of CIG as the operating arm of the National Intelligence Authority. This process cannot be unbiased and objective if it is colored or affected by policy pronouncements which are based on intelligence derived from sources with which CIG is unfamiliar and which it is in no position to evaluate. It is believed that General Vandenberg's requirements in the field of policy orientation can be met by specific directives furnished him by the State Department's representative on the Intelligence Advisory Board after such directives have been considered and cleared by the Department's Advisory Committee on Intelligence (ACI).
Incidentally, the policy statements requested by General Vandenberg would appear not to be covered in the phrase "strategic and national policy intelligence" which paragraph 2 of NIA Directive No. 1 charges CIG with responsibility for furnishing to the President, the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to others.
William Eddy
Donald Russell174. Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board
Washington, October 31, 1946, 2:30 p.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held at the Department of State.
PARTICIPANTS
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
Members Present
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2Also Present
Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
Mr. James Heck, Department of State
Colonel E. K. Wright, Central Intelligence Group (for Item 1 only)
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence GroupSecretariat
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
Mr. John S. Earman, Assistant Secretary, N.I.A.1. Agenda and Weekly Date for I.A.B. Meeting
General Vandenberg asked Mr. Lay to explain why there were three items left off the agenda of today's meeting.
Mr. Lay stated that some of the I.A.B. members were not ready to discuss C.I.G. 13 and 15,/1/ and ICAPS was still working on C.I.G. 18./2/
/1/See Document 170.
/2/In CIG 18, "Responsibility of the Department of State for Reporting and Collection of Information and Intelligence," October 25, the Department of State recommended that in order to avoid duplication of effort it should assume complete responsibility for the overt procurement of information and intelligence in foreign areas on all political, economic, social, and cultural matters and such scientific information and intelligence which did not fall within the military and naval fields. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement. See also the minutes of the sixth meeting of the Advisory Committee on Intelligence, October 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Lot File No. 122, Records of the Secretary's Staff Committee 1944-47, Box 94) See the Supplement.
Mr. Lay then asked if it was agreeable with the Board to establish a standard time each week for I.A.B. meetings. He explained that in the event there was nothing to come before the Board, the members would be notified in advance and the meeting would be cancelled for that week.
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
Agreed to set aside 1430 each Thursday as the normal time for I.A.B. meetings, with the understanding that the Secretary would advise each member early in the week whether a meeting was to be held.
2. Intelligence Estimates Prepared by the Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G. 16 and C.I.G. 16/1)/3/
/3/CIG 16, October 14, which sought to establish a procedure for intelligence estimates, was a proposal by Rear Admiral Inglis, the Chief of Naval Intelligence. CIG 16/1 (October 26) was a counterproposal by the Director of Central Intelligence. (Both in Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement for both.
General Vandenberg asked Mr. Lay to give a brief explanation as to how ORE-1/4/ was prepared and coordinated with the departments.
/4/ORE-1, "Soviet Foreign and Military Policy," July 23, the first intelligence estimate produced by CIG's newly established Office of Research and Evaluation is reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 65-76.
Mr. Lay stated that C.I.G. was asked to prepare this estimate on Friday to be ready the following Tuesday. He also brought out the fact that the estimate was based on an existing J.I.S. study together with cables received from Moscow, and that it was coordinated with specialized representatives of the I.A.B. before going forward.
General Vandenberg stated that he believed C.I.G. would have difficulty in meeting deadlines if the concurrence of each I.A.B. member had to be obtained by a voting system prior to the forwarding of the estimates.
Admiral Inglis stated that it was his idea to separate concurrences of estimates into three parts, i.e., the Daily Summary, the Weekly Summary, and formal O.R.E. estimates. He further stated that the Naval members of O.R.E. are perfectly competent to represent and concur for the Director of Naval Intelligence in the preparation of daily and Weekly summaries. However, in the case of formal O.R.E. estimates, Admiral Inglis stated that he was in favor of using the J.I.C. vote method, time permitting, and that he would like to have two to three days to consider each paper. If time does not permit, he felt that the paper could be put through with a statement that the estimate does not bear the concurrence of the dissenting department but that such concurrence or comments would follow. Admiral Inglis further stated that while the relationship of J.I.S. to C.I.G. is not up for consideration at this time and is the subject of another paper, he believed its solution would go a long way in solving this present problem.
General Samford stated that A-2 would like the opportunity to comment on all estimates. He said that he realized that this procedure would be time-consuming, and believed possibly that an A-2 member of ICAPS could be designated to concur for A-2 on the estimates in question.
General Vandenberg stated that an A-2 member of ICAPS could not be the person to be used by A-2 in concurring on these estimates, since ICAPS is concerned with coordination problems rather than the preparation or content of intelligence estimates.
Admiral Inglis said that the Naval members of O.R.E. working on estimates would at all times be in collaboration with people in O.N.I., hence both O.N.I. and the Naval members of O.R.E. would be kept abreast of developments and the latter would know the Navy Department's views.
Admiral Inglis stated that the question regarding concurrence in the Daily Summary involves possible omissions which can distort the picture. He said that omissions had not happened lately, but he felt that General Vandenberg would be willing to let Naval members of O.R.E. complain to Admiral Inglis if they felt that omissions had occurred.
General Vandenberg expressed the belief that the whole situation would be clarified when the I.A.B. considered C.I.G. 15.
Mr. Eddy said that in the meantime he favored appointing an aide or a staff member as a representative in O.R.E. to check estimates as proposed in C.I.G. 16/1. His reason for favoring this solution, rather than C.I.G. 16, was that, although Army and Naval officers remain in uniform and loyal to their service, civilian employees are now becoming employees of C.I.G. rather than State. Former State Department employees in C.I.G. will therefore have no direct loyalties to State.
General Chamberlin said that he was fundamentally opposed to considering a man assigned to C.I.G. as partially responsible to him. He felt that such a man owes his whole loyalty to C.I.G., and that it is impossible to divide his loyalties.
General Samford thought that this was true except in ICAPS, where he felt there was a residual representation of departmental interests.
Admiral Inglis said that he understood General Chamberlin's point of view, but he also understood that C.I.G. was to be a cooperative interdepartmental venture. He could see the difference in the situation regarding the State Department. However, in the case of Naval officers, while they were working in C.I.G. he felt they had an additional duty representing the Navy. If they felt that Navy's interests were not properly represented in C.I.G., then they should express this feeling to Admiral Inglis as their contact with the Navy Department. He reiterated that he understood General Chamberlin's viewpoint and granted that this situation may cause trouble in the future, but felt that there had been no difficulty so far.
Mr. Eddy said that he thought Admiral Inglis' viewpoint would definitely cause trouble in the future, especially for the State Department.
Admiral Inglis expressed the understanding that there would always be a few people in C.I.G. who continued to be State Department employees, such as Mr. Huddle.
Mr. Eddy agreed that there would be a few key State Department positions in C.I.G., but these would carry on liaison with the State Department rather than be State Department representatives. He thought that this would encourage a closer relation with State, but expressed the belief that if one of these State Department people assigned to C.I.G. felt that State's interests were not properly represented, he would appeal not to the State Department, but to General Vandenberg.
General Chamberlin compared this to the situation on the General Staff, where personnel are expected to solve problems as they see it in the General Staff rather than from the viewpoint of the basic arm or service from which they come. He thought that if Admiral Inglis' interpretation prevailed, it would destroy C.I.G.
General Vandenberg thought that the discussion led back to the solution proposed in C.I.G. 16/1.
General Chamberlin felt that General Vandenberg was appointed to head C.I.G. and that the I.A.B. were only advisers. He felt that General Vandenberg was placed here by the N.I.A. to perform functions assigned by that Authority. He did not feel that the I.A.B. should concern itself with the detailed performance of those functions. He said that General Vandenberg was responsible solely to the N.I.A. and was expected to consult with the departments only sufficiently to ensure coordination.
Admiral Inglis said that the way the directive was written, the I.A.B. was more than an adviser. It is a two-way street and a link between C.I.G. and the departmental agencies. He felt that the I.A.B. had a responsibility for the operations of C.I.G.
General Vandenberg felt that he has the right to put out what C.I.G. thinks is correct. However, to fulfill its obligation as an interdepartmental agency, C.I.G. must have the views of the four departmental agencies. He felt it was best that C.I.G. have not only the agencies' views, but the reasons for these views. He agreed with Admiral Inglis that the I.A.B. has a responsibility to see, not whether C.I.G. is doing the wrong thing but that it is doing the right thing. In other words, General Vandenberg felt that the solution lay somewhere between the views of Admiral Inglis and of General Chamberlin.
General Chamberlin said that his viewpoint was that a person of General Vandenberg's caliber should be entrusted to find his own method for determining departmental views. If General Vandenberg sees a difference of opinion, it would be assumed that he would check it with the departments concerned. This should be easy, since C.I.G. will always have close liaison with the departments.
Admiral Inglis felt that it was a fundamental question whether the I.A.B. has a responsibility for C.I.G. operations. He thought that if General Chamberlin's philosophy were followed to its ultimate conclusion, it would mean that ten years from now O.N.I. would still have to have its same basic organization, since it would not be able to entrust C.I.G. to perform functions for it. If, however, O.N.I. has responsible Naval people within C.I.G., O.N.I. would then feel that the Navy's views were being represented. He felt that C.I.G. could not go off by itself. If the departmental agencies are represented, C.I.G. could then perform many duties which are now being performed by each departmental agency.
Mr. Eddy felt that the new budget plans for C.I.G. indicated a shift, since C.I.G. may now employ its own people. He did not feel, however, that this eliminated the possibility of having C.I.G. serve the departments. If each department concentrates on its primary interests, then C.I.G. can perform functions of secondary interest and special jobs which no departmental agency can perform. Then, so long as the I.A.B. is a two-way street, C.I.G. and the departmental agencies can make available the best service each to the other.
Admiral Inglis felt that this would not work unless the departments were represented in C.I.G.
General Chamberlin said that if he were called upon to submit a Naval estimate he would go to the Navy. He felt General Vandenberg would do the same. He thought, however, that if General Vandenberg felt the data on hand in C.I.G. corresponded to the opinions of the departments, General Vandenberg should be authorized to send that data forward as an intelligence estimate.
General Vandenberg said that he was afraid that if people in C.I.G. fail to represent the departmental viewpoint, C.I.G. would get off the track. He thought that C.I.G. personnel should be in close contact with the departments in order to obtain departmental views. He said that he was encouraging all C.I.G. personnel to get the views of all three departments.
General Chamberlin said that he was confident C.I.G. would do that, especially since Army officers in C.I.G. are always subject to detail and rotation. He thought that the War Department's viewpoint would be represented because of the years of Army training each Army officer in C.I.G. would have. He thought that C.I.G. personnel should express their own views and not pattern them after the opinion of someone in an outside agency.
Admiral Inglis thought that the idea was to assign people to C.I.G. in order to form a link with the departments, to utilize the sources therein, and have the benefit of the combined thinking of all departments.
General Vandenberg thought that Admiral Inglis' objective could be gained by having representatives detailed to O.R.E.
Mr. Lay pointed out that the procedure to be followed by each representative in clearing papers was a matter for decision by each I.A.B. member. Admiral Inglis could instruct his representative not to vote until Admiral Inglis had approved each estimate.
Admiral Inglis said that he was willing to appoint a representative part-time, but that this representative would act only as a messenger.
Mr. Eddy said that he would like to see this system tried. He thought that each I.A.B. member might designate a deputy who was well trained and could bring papers to the respective I.A.B. members for clearance when necessary.
General Chamberlin said that he would give his representative the responsibility for deciding whether to act on an estimate or to clear it with General Chamberlin. General Chamberlin felt, however, that this arrangement should not prevent C.I.G. research personnel from working closely with G-2 research sections.
General Chamberlin then expressed the belief that C.I.G. estimates sent to the President should not show a dissenting opinion.
Admiral Inglis thought that the President should know of any dissenting opinions, although he hoped that any differences could be reconciled before the estimates were issued. He felt, however, that estimates should not be held up unduly in an effort to reconcile divergent views.
General Chamberlin said that if each paper were handled in detail it would defeat the purpose of C.I.G., since every word or shade of meaning would be questioned.
Admiral Inglis noted that this was the procedure used in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although it had not worked perfectly, he felt that for every example where this procedure had failed to work there were ten examples where it had worked.
General Chamberlin noted, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff has no head or commander, as is the case in C.I.G.
Mr. Lay pointed out that the wording of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 requires only that "substantial dissent" should be noted in C.I.G. estimates, which was intended to preclude discussion of every word or shade of meaning.
Admiral Inglis said that the concept of N.I.A. was that all departments would be represented in all matters. The Director of Central Intelligence is the executive responsible for carrying out the policies of the N.I.A. The I.A.B. is more than merely an adviser. All through the N.I.A. and C.I.G. structure it was intended that there be equal representation of all departments.
General Vandenberg pointed out that it is a matter of record in N.I.A. minutes that the N.I.A. is the agency responsible to the President, and not the Director of Central Intelligence.
General Chamberlin noted that the Director of Central Intelligence is not responsible to the I.A.B., but rather to the N.I.A.
General Vandenberg pointed out, however, that the N.I.A. has delegated to the I.A.B. the right to concur for the N.I.A. members. Therefore, in the final analysis the I.A.B., by this delegation, has a measure of responsibility for the success of C.I.G. activities.
General Chamberlin questioned how this would work, since many other agencies of the Government were involved.
Admiral Inglis noted that this was covered by the fact that other agencies sat as members of the I.A.B. on matters of interest to those agencies.
After further discussion of detailed amendments to the Enclosure to C.I.G. 16/1,
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
Concurred in the issuance of the Enclosure to C.I.G. 16/1 subject to amendment to read as follows:
"1. To implement the provisions of Paragraph 6 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a personal representative to remain assigned to his office and detailed as liaison to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff of the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence Group.
"2. These representatives will, as their chiefs direct, either concur in C.I.G. intelligence estimates or present dissenting opinions.
"3. Each intelligence estimate issued by C.I.G. will either have the concurrence of all I.A.B. members or will have any substantial dissent appended as a part of the estimate or follow as provided in 4 below.
"4. This procedure will not be permitted to prevent the presentation of any estimate on the required date. If concurrence or dissenting opinions cannot be obtained in time to meet deadlines for completion and submission of estimates, such estimates will be submitted together with a statement that only limited coordination has been attained and substantial dissent, if any, will be submitted at a later date.
"5. C.I.G. will afford designated representatives complete opportunity to participate in all phases of the development of estimates."
(Subsequently issued as C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 32.)
3. Plan for Coordination of Biographic Intelligence (C.I.G. 17)/5/
/5/CIG 17, October 25, proposed to establish within CIG a central biographic reference file that would contain basic factual data on all foreign personalities on whom supporting files were maintained by the departmental intelligence agencies. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
General Vandenberg gave a brief description of the plan recommended in C.I.G. 17.
General Chamberlin raised the question as to whether paragraph 2-c of the proposed C.I.G. Directive would authorize biographic intelligence data of one department to be made available to another department.
General Vandenberg stated that if the biographic intelligence data of one department was not available to other departments, such a system would cause a great deal of duplication.
Mr. Eddy stated that he believed the word "responsibility" should be left out of the first sentence of paragraph 2-c.
General Vandenberg said that he was agreeable to this omission.
Admiral Inglis said that he objected to the last sentence in paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, since O.N.I. does have a good index system and it is maintained up to date.
Mr. Edgar stated that at the time the covering memorandum was written he did not know that the Navy's index system had been completed.
Admiral Inglis questioned whether this proposed Directive would govern domestic coverage and, if so, the Federal Bureau of Investigation should have a chance to express its views on the matter under consideration.
General Vandenberg replied that the paper did not govern domestic coverage, and was for foreign biographic intelligence only.
Admiral Inglis stated that the majority of inquiries made to O.N.I. were in the domestic field and he felt that this paper was too elaborate a plan for the coordination of foreign biographic intelligence.
General Vandenberg stated that if the plan in this paper did not work, it could be recalled.
Mr. Edgar stated that it was desirable to get approval on this paper in order to gain proper coordination in the field.
General Vandenberg stated that he should have central machine records in order to point out biographic intelligence information contained in other agencies.
Admiral Inglis agreed.
Mr. Eddy stated that the provisions of paragraph 3-b of the covering memorandum would cause too much work for the State Department to undertake at this time, since the State Department had a mass of biographic information that dated back to 1790, and that to reproduce this information would be a staggering job.
Mr. Edgar explained that it was not the intent of this paper to reproduce all biographic information presently on file in the departments, but rather C.I.G. would start anew from a given date, and the information contained in the central file would be only enough to indicate the type of personality whose name appeared on each card. This would make it possible to decide whether it was desirable to obtain further details from the department having the basic file on a given individual.
Mr. Heck stated that the State Department drew from a wider scope than would be reported on standard forms, and that only one or two per cent of the names in State Department file would be covered by standard report forms. He suggested that each agency concentrate on an assigned area of responsibility.
General Chamberlin said that he was heartily in favor of a central file which could be consulted rather than having to contact all of the agencies in each case on which information might be desired.
General Vandenberg said that to have to go to the files of each agency on each case would take a lot of unnecessary time.
Mr. Heck reiterated that such a central file would show only a small per cent of the names presently on file in the State Department.
General Vandenberg stated that the central file proposed would be starting anew, and, while he realized it would be slow in building up, eventually it would be of benefit to all concerned.
Mr. Heck stated that he believed that if the information contained on these cards got much beyond a name stage, it would involve too much duplication.
General Vandenberg said that there would naturally have to be some duplication. However, at the present time, with the volume of files in the agencies and no central index system, no one knows exactly what we do have.
Mr. Heck felt that this proposal would put a heavy burden on the departmental agencies, since it would require additional people to extract the information and put it on standard cards.
General Chamberlin suggested that each time an agency made a summary for its own index, it send a copy to C.I.G.
Admiral Inglis suggested that to eliminate workload, cards for C.I.G. be prepared on each new report from the field or whenever departmental agencies took action to prepare a summary--as, for example, in answer to a request. He thought that on this basis the C.I.G. file would be very useful five years from now.
General Vandenberg said that was all C.I.G. asked the agencies to do.
Mr. Edgar said that C.I.G. would be willing to receive the standard form on new field reports, and copies of completed summary reports which are prepared by the agencies in answer to a request. He said that in the latter case C.I.G. would be willing to make up the central file card.
Mr. Heck pointed out that this would mean that C.I.G. had a very incomplete file, representing only about five per cent of the State Department's files.
Mr. Edgar expressed the belief that, if C.I.G. received all completed summary reports, it would have information at least on personalities in which there is an active interest.
Admiral Inglis agreed that would be true in many cases, but pointed out that it would be a long time before any reliance could be felt that C.I.G.'s list was complete.
Mr. Eddy stated that he believed this file should be called the central index.
Mr. Edgar stated that he believed the name of the file should indicate that it contained more than just names.
Mr. Eddy suggested that the file be called a "reference index file".
Admiral Inglis recommended that the phrase "nor does any department keep a master index of their own biographic files", in paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, be omitted.
The Enclosure to C.I.G. 17 was then discussed and amendments thereto agreed upon by the Board.
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
a. Agreed that the phrase "nor does any department keep a master index of their own biographic files", at the end of paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum of C.I.G. 17, should be deleted.
b. Concurred in the recommendation in paragraph 3-b of the covering memorandum of C.I.G. 17, subject to insertion of the word "index" between "reference" and "file" on the second line thereof.
c. Concurred in the Enclosure to C.I.G. 17, subject to the following amendments:
(1) Delete the word "responsible" from the second line of paragraph 2-c.
(2) Reword the first sentence of paragraph 3-a to read as follows: "The chief of mission of each embassy, legation or foreign post has the over-all responsibility, in accordance with the principles of this Directive, for coordinating the collection of biographic intelligence in his geographical area."
(3) Delete paragraph 3-b-(7).
(4) Delete paragraph 5-b.
(Subsequently issued as C.I.G. Directive No. 16.)/6/
/6/Dated November 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 130) See the Supplement.
4. National Intelligence Requirements--China (C.I.G. 19)/7/
/7/CIG 19 as amended became NIA Directive No. 8, February 12, 1947. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132)
Mr. Eddy suggested that this item be postponed until the next I.A.B. meeting.
General Chamberlin agreed, since he had not had sufficient time to study this paper. He expressed the belief, however, that the titles of Parts I and II of the proposed N.I.A. directive were reversed.
Mr. Edgar asked if, since the proposed directive had the concurrence of representatives of the I.A.B., the Board would authorize use of the directive, pending final approval, as a basis for the preparation by an interdepartmental group of a collection directive.
General Chamberlin said that he would like to know what collection responsibilities are involved before deciding what information should be collected.
Mr. Edgar explained that it was felt that the collection people must know what information the researchers want before they can decide on the assignment of collection responsibilities.
Admiral Inglis said that although he felt the wording could be improved, he was prepared to approve the directive as it stands.
After further discussion,
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
a. Agreed to defer consideration of C.I.G. 19 until a meeting next Thursday, 7 November 1946.
b. Pending final approval, authorized the use of the Enclosure to C.I.G. 19 as a basis for the preparation by an interdepartmental group of a collection directive.
5. Status of N.I.A. 6/8/
/8/See Documents 163 and 164.
Admiral Inglis asked what was being done on N.I.A. 6, in view of the appointment of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Mr. Lay explained that N.I.A. 6 was presently awaiting approval by the President, and that General Vandenberg was taking steps to get a decision on this matter.
Continue with Document 175
