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Foreign Relations of the United States
1945-1950
Emergence of the Intelligence EstablishmentDepartment of State
Washington, DC
Vandenberg's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence
175. Letter From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Eddy) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg)
Washington, November 4, 1946.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/10-2446. Secret.
My Dear General Vandenberg: I am writing in reply to your letter of October 24, 1946, in which you request that the Department of State reconsider its position of not releasing Policy Statements to serve as a basis for intelligence requirements. Our desire to cooperate fully with the Central Intelligence Group has led to a very thorough study of your request. The problem has been taken up on the highest level where the position of the Department has been reaffirmed, namely that it would be unwise for the Department to furnish its Policy Statements to serve as a basis for either Departmental or national intelligence.
Briefly, the Department's position with regard to its own Policy Statements is that intelligence information should be available to influence Department policy, but that current Department Policy Statements should not be made available to influence intelligence information. For this reason the Policy Statements are not furnished to our own planners and researchers in this office.
The problem is not one of security of the documents, which it is quite clear would be fully protected in CIG. It is the conviction of the Department, however, that the security of the essential information in the Policy Statements would not be insured merely by protection of the documents. If, as stated in paragraph 2 of your letter, a CIG draft of national intelligence requirements for China were to consist of three parts, the first part of which would be "U.S. policy towards China," it would follow that the mobilization of intelligence resources would be made to fit that current policy. With the possible reorientation of that policy, whether in China or in any other country, there would follow presumably a reorientation of the directives for collecting, reporting and processing intelligence. Intelligence based upon, and shifted with, current political foreign policy would, therefore, be a clear indication to a great many workers, and to their contacts, of the evolution of our foreign policy in its most delicate and crucial areas.
The Department would deplore any such development for the very good reason that the Department's occasional Policy and Information Statements are off-the-cuff guides to policy officers, subject to constant revision, not considered by the Department as documents either to be quoted or filed for future reference. The same, of course, is not true of basic U.S. foreign policy valid throughout the world, a knowledge of which should be available to all Departments of the Government, such as the open door in economics, the self-determination of sovereign states, the five freedoms of the air, etc.
Although it has been my duty to report that the Department does not feel that it can change its decision not to release Policy Statements, I am instructed to assure you of our desire to cooperate fully in transmitting to you personally and less formally any information on the Department's foreign policy which you may require from time to time. Such information can be readily made available, upon your request, in personal conference with one of your representatives, or in IAB meetings, where I would, as instructed by the Department, furnish policy information required./1/
/1/This decision was modified by the Department of State Advisory Committee on Intelligence at its seventh meeting on November 12. The committee decided to "make free to the Director personally or his deputy any policy statements he might wish to have, with the clear understanding that the documents should be seen by no other persons in CIG." (Ibid., RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Interdepartmental Committees--State Department, Lot File No. 122, Records of the Secretary's Staff Committee 1944-47, Box 94)
Sincerely yours,
William A. Eddy/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
176. Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board
Washington, November 7, 1946, 2:30 p.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. The meeting was held at the New War Department Building.
PARTICIPANTS
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
Members Present
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2Also Present
Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence GroupSecretariat
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
1. National Intelligence Requirements--China (C.I.G. 19)/1/
/1/CIG 19 as amended became NIA Directive No. 8, February 12, 1947. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132) See the Supplement.
General Chamberlin said that he had difficulty understanding the purpose of this paper. If it was intended to cover over-all long-range intelligence requirements, he felt that it was incomplete. If, however, it covered only some intermediate objective, he did not have much to say except to suggest a few minor changes.
Mr. Edgar explained that this paper did not cover departmental requirements, which it was assumed would be drawn up by the various agencies. He pointed out, however, that uncoordinated and uncorrelated sets of instructions were going out to the field which did not completely fill national requirements. Therefore, the only requirements put in this paper were those which are most important from a national viewpoint. This paper covered only China as a trial area. It did not attempt, however, to define the ultimate requirements for national policy intelligence.
General Chamberlin noted that only three subjects were covered, whereas there are many others of interest to the War Department.
General Vandenberg said that the War Department was expected to send those out, except in those cases where C.I.G. might specifically ask for additional information.
Mr. Edgar explained that at the first interdepartmental meeting on coordination of the intelligence effort, it was agreed that the first step should be to develop a coordinated collection of intelligence requirements area by area throughout the world. Each agency representative was asked to turn in the requirements it considered most important. These were then synthesized by the Office of Reports and Estimates in C.I.G. Some of the information required was of interest to more than one department, and when the departments agreed, these requirements were put in the paper. If this paper is approved, the collection representatives from all agencies will look over Part II in order to decide which field representatives are best located to obtain the desired information and to attempt to allocate these requirements to the various field agencies.
General Chamberlin did not see how coordination could be accomplished in this way unless the whole problem was solved.
Mr. Eddy pointed out that this was merely a test case, and that this paper might look radically different a year from now.
Mr. Edgar noted that these requirements would be reviewed quarterly.
General Chamberlin asked why other items of importance, such as topographic data, were not included.
Mr. Edgar explained that no attempt had been made to include static or basic intelligence. Also, no scientific intelligence requirements were included because it was felt there was nothing of interest in this area.
Admiral Inglis noted that these requirements covered only those that are currently essential.
General Chamberlin expressed the belief that this was intended to be an attempt to coordinate the whole collection effort in China.
General Vandenberg said that it was impossible to do this until the agencies had agreed on more basic issues, such as assignment of primary responsibilities. Meanwhile, this was an attempt to move forward as far as possible.
Admiral Inglis said that he was willing to approve the paper as it stands, but that he was also baffled by the wording "Essential Elements of National Intelligence". He thought they were all right, however, as targets for the next three months and as a trial case.
Mr. Eddy said that he was willing to approve the paper as it stands.
General Vandenberg said that the value of this paper would depend upon the effort which all agencies put behind it.
General Chamberlin said that if the three items mentioned were considered the most important, the War Department would fulfill its part of the effort as a matter of priority.
General Samford understood that this was an experiment in stating current emphasis. He considered the paper all right as it is.
General Chamberlin expressed the belief that the terminology was twisted.
Mr. Edgar explained that the first step had been to study national policy toward China, on the theory that intelligence should operate for the policy-makers, to show them whether the policy was a success or needed change. It was felt that the essential elements were stated too broadly and were therefore broken down into collection requirements which could be turned over to the collection representatives to draft a collection directive. He realized that the terms used were somewhat different from military usage, but that the four agency representatives had agreed upon the present terminology. C.I.G., however, did not feel strongly about making a change in the terminology. Mr. Edgar suggested, and it was agreed, that "Essential Elements of National Intelligence" should be changed to read "Current Essentials of National Intelligence."
General Chamberlin said that he would prefer not to approve the paper until he had seen the collection directive based thereon. He did agree tentatively that the paper was all right as a basis for preparation of a further collection directive.
Admiral Inglis suggested that the meeting of collection representatives be held to break down the requirements into allocations to each agency. These could then be checked with the I.A.B., and when approved each agency would issue directives to accomplish its part of the mission.
General Vandenberg asked if a further I.A.B. meeting would be necessary if the representatives of the agencies agreed on the collection directive.
Admiral Inglis did not think it would be necessary to put the paper on the agenda for another meeting, but felt that it could be checked informally with the I.A.B. members and issued as another C.I.G. paper.
Mr. Eddy suggested approval of the paper with the understanding that distribution would be withheld until assignment of collection responsibilities was agreed upon.
In answer to Mr. Eddy, Mr. Edgar said that the directives would be distributed to ambassadors and theater commanders through the appropriate departments.
After further discussion,
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
a. Agreed upon the following amendments to the Enclosure to C.I.G. 19:
(1) Change "Essential Elements of National Intelligence" to read "Current Essentials of National Intelligence" throughout the paper.
(2) In paragraph 1, line 4, change "requirements" to read "objectives".
b. Approved the Enclosure to C.I.G. 19, as amended, tentatively as a basis for the preparation of a subsequent collection directive, with the understanding that distribution would be withheld until the collection directive had been agreed upon.
2. Establishment of a Channel Between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (C.I.G. 15)/2/
/2/Dated September 18. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement. For a summary of this long-running issue during Vandenberg's tenure as Director of Central Intelligence, see Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950, pp. 154-160.
General Vandenberg explained that consideration of this problem had been deferred at a previous I.A.B. meeting, and requested any further comments.
Admiral Inglis said that the matter had been discussed in the J.I.C. It was a complicated problem, and it was hard to decide whether J.I.C. or I.A.B. should discuss it further. He said that the Navy Department feels that one solution is General Vandenberg's original proposal, which goes much farther then Admiral Inglis' proposal in C.I.G. 15. Admiral Inglis circulated a sketch showing how the Navy thought General Vandenberg's proposal might be put into effect. This involved moving the J.I.C. and the J.I.S. into the structure of the C.I.G. It also formed a link between the J.C.S. and the Director of Central Intelligence and between J.C.S. subcommittees and the C.I.G. It proposed a change in the membership of J.I.C. to service members only, plus the addition of the Director of Central Intelligence as a member in the same manner as on the I.A.B. With the change in membership it was suggested that the name be changed to Joint Intelligence Board (J.I.B.). Admiral Inglis thought that in peacetime the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible to the N.I.A., but that this might be reversed in wartime to make him responsible to the J.C.S. He felt that this proposal provided a necessary security wall around the military activities of J.I.C. The J.I.S. membership would stay the same except for the elimination of the State Department member. Liaison with the State Department, however, would be continued, but through the I.A.B. rather than the J.I.C.
Admiral Inglis explained that for the preparation of intelligence estimates the proposed J.I.S. would go both to O.R.E. and, for departmental intelligence, to the other departments. J.I.S. would belong to the J.I.B., with lateral communications with C.I.G.
Mr. Eddy thought that might be an ultimate solution, but suggested as an interim stop that the J.I.S. serve as an intelligence advisory staff to the I.A.B.
General Chamberlin said that he had not figured out a solution to the problem yet, but that he did have some fundamental principles which he felt should be considered. First of all, the Joint Chiefs of Staff must remain an essentially military agency. General Chamberlin felt, however, that General Eisenhower would be hesitant to change any existing arrangements for coordination with the State Department.
Admiral Inglis said that he would like to make it perfectly clear that the Navy Department wants a link with the State Department and considers it absolutely essential. There is no intent, in the proposal he just outlined, to stop such coordination. It was felt, however, that coordination with the State Department would be adequately assured through the I.A.B.
General Chamberlin noted that the mission of the Director of Central Intelligence goes far beyond the scope of the J.C.S. Therefore, nothing should be done to circumscribe C.I.G. into a lesser mission. This is a second fundamental which General Eisenhower feels should be observed. Third, it would be bad to circumscribe free and direct contact, especially in wartime, from the J.C.S. to the President. Fourth, there should be nothing in the arrangement, as far as the making of war plans is concerned, which interpolates a civilian agency between planning agencies of the J.C.S., but, as General Vandenberg noted, these J.C.S. agencies should not be denied any intelligence necessary to enable them to perform their mission. Fifth, no agencies other than strictly military should have access to military plans. This should be a matter of right on the part of military agencies, for security reasons. General Chamberlin said that he was unable to figure out an organization which observed all of those fundamental principles. He felt, however, that there was great advantage in Admiral Inglis' original suggestion in C.I.G. 15, since it would at least provide a piecemeal approach to the problem.
General Vandenberg said that the principles enunciated by General Chamberlin were also the objectives for which the C.I.G. was striving. He pointed out that the C.I.G. proposal provided a watertight compartment for the military. He observed, however, that allied to that consideration is the fact that the war planners must have the best intelligence and that it must be constantly supplied to them. The intelligence agency, therefore, should work right along with the planners. Specifically, General Vandenberg noted that Admiral Inglis' new proposal established a watertight military compartment, but placed it next to the C.I.G., where it could draw on all available intelligence.
General Chamberlin noted that there were some subjects covered by J.I.C. subcommittees which C.I.G. should not have.
Admiral Inglis said that some could be put under the J.I.B. and others, such as the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board and the Publications Review Subcommittee, could be integrated into C.I.G.
Mr. Eddy said that he was willing to accept Admiral Inglis' new proposal as an ultimate objective. He thought, however, that it would be possible to proceed immediately to liquidate the J.I.C. subcommittees and then follow that with Admiral Inglis' proposal.
General Vandenberg felt that it would be difficult to justify the initial step proposed in C.I.G. 15 until a broad plan had been presented for approval. He thought that the broad plan should first be approved in principle and then the initial step approved for immediate implementation. He noted that if the process stopped after the initial step had been taken, C.I.G. would be accountable but not responsible.
Admiral Inglis said that one difficulty which had been discovered in his proposal in C.I.G. 15 was that personnel assigned to J.C.S. subcommittees may not be assigned additional duties without the approval of the J.C.S. He agreed with General Vandenberg that the ultimate objective should be presented at the same time that the initial step is submitted for approval.
Mr. Eddy felt that the question of the ultimate objective involved very broad considerations. He pointed out that there were three policy-forming groups--namely, the State Department in the political field, the J.C.S. in the military field, and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in politico-military matters. He thought that the relationship of those groups should be carefully considered and presented in any ultimate solution. He felt that it might be premature to attempt to outline the ultimate objective.
General Vandenberg thought that it might be possible to show the end objective in broad terms, how far it was now possible to go, and why the initial step was being taken.
Mr. Eddy felt that this would require considerable time-consuming staff work to prepare. Therefore, he would like to see the first step taken as soon as possible.
General Vandenberg suggested that if there was general agreement, Admiral Inglis' new proposal could be used as the ultimate objective and the proposal in C.I.G. 15 as the initial step. He suggested that people from ICAPS and the agencies be designated to write up such a proposal for consideration by the N.I.A. and the J.C.S.
General Chamberlin stated that he could not say at this time that he approved the end result suggested by Admiral Inglis. He thought a way should be found to get the intelligence from C.I.G. without interpolating C.I.G. into the J.C.S. He explained that he was not opposed to General Vandenberg personally, but was in general doubtful of the wisdom of mixing up in the J.C.S. the head of an agency who reported to civilian authority.
Admiral Inglis asked if, in case of war, it would not be desirable to have the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Group under the command of the J.C.S.
General Chamberlin said that in case of war he thought that the C.I.G. should be brought into the J.C.S. organization and made responsible for the whole intelligence effort. He granted that this would involve abolishing the J.I.C.
Admiral Inglis expressed the belief that the J.C.S. would not agree to abolish the J.I.C. any more than they would to the abolition of the Joint War Plans Committee. He noted that at present the Director of Central Intelligence reported to the N.I.A. His proposal was that the Director of Central Intelligence be assigned additional duties to serve the J.C.S. If at any time the Director of Central Intelligence was not agreeable to the J.C.S., the J.C.S. could easily cancel the agreement.
Mr. Eddy said that he agreed with this proposal, but noted that it must be submitted to the N.I.A. and the J.C.S.
General Vandenberg agreed because he felt that they would want to know what lay behind the initial step.
Mr. Eddy thought that would be desirable, but felt that if they could not agree on the ultimate objective, the initial step should be recommended as improving liaison between C.I.G. and J.I.C.
General Vandenberg said that he would like to wait a week or so to see if staff members could not write something which would be agreeable to the I.A.B.
General Chamberlin said that he could not see what progress would be made, because he was fundamentally opposed to the principles involved in Admiral Inglis' new proposal.
General Vandenberg said that he felt it was the responsibility of the I.A.B. to recommend approval of some plan. He suggested, therefore, that if there was disagreement within the I.A.B., both a majority and a minority report be submitted to the N.I.A. He noted that nothing was being done about this situation at the present time. He wanted to stop unnecessary duplication, and felt that the solution of this problem was one of the best ways to avoid it.
General Chamberlin believed that the Director of Central Intelligence should not be on the J.I.B.
Admiral Inglis felt that if the Director of Central Intelligence is made responsible for furnishing intelligence, he must know the purpose which the intelligence is to serve.
General Chamberlin felt there was some way to provide for a lateral communication with the Director of Central Intelligence in order to obtain intelligence which would then go up through the J.I.B. He thought that the initial stop proposed in C.I.G. 15 was worth trying.
General Vandenberg said that this would put either the Director of Central Intelligence or the J.I.C. in an untenable position if it lasted for long. He said that he would agree to that arrangement for a short period, but that there must be a limit placed on its duration.
Admiral Inglis felt that the proposal in C.I.G. 15 was all right as a first step, but that it would not solve the problem. It would not tie C.I.G. in close enough with the J.I.C., and it would not eliminate all of the duplication.
General Chamberlin said that he could understand General Vandenberg's objections. He thought, therefore, that General Vandenberg's suggestion for preparation of a staff paper was best. It would then be possible to see what points could be agreed on, and to put up a minority report on those points that are not agreed. He said that he thought it was a responsibility of the J.I.C. to get intelligence from the C.I.G. He hoped to see a solution. He thought that the J.I.S. should work with the C.I.G. to get intelligence, provided security of military information was not jeopardized.
General Vandenberg felt that this would lead to the same difficulty that the J.I.C. is now encountering with the Joint War Plans Committee, in not knowing what is wanted. He felt strongly that if C.I.G. was asked for intelligence without being familiar with what was involved, it would put out intelligence without giving it proper weight or considering the ramifications or including all of the intelligence that might be available.
General Chamberlin did not think that C.I.G. should be taken into military planning.
General Vandenberg pointed out that Admiral Inglis' new proposal would provide a watertight military compartment within C.I.G.
Admiral Inglis said that there must be a watertight compartment somewhere. The question is just where it should be established.
After further discussion,
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
Designated the following individuals as representatives to work with the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff of C.I.G. in drafting proposed recommendations to the N.I.A. and the J.C.S. on the relationship between C.I.G. and the J.C.S., including, if necessary, a majority and minority report:
For Mr. Eddy:
Mr. Merritt B. Booth
Mr. A. Sidney Buford
For General Chamberlin:
Colonel E. J. Treacy, Jr.
Colonel L. L. Williams
Colonel J. K. DickeyFor Admiral Inglis:
Captain R. K. Davis
Captain F. S. HabeckerFor General McDonald:
Colonel E. P. Mussett
Colonel L. C. ShermanFor Secretariat, J.I.C.:
Captain R. U. Hyde
3. Assignment of Functions in the Field of Static Intelligence to the Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G. 13/3/ and C.I.G. 13/1/4/)
/3/Dated September 17. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
/4/See footnote 7, Document 170.
General Vandenberg said that ICAPS was now trying to solve the basic issues in the subject papers. Therefore, even if this specific study were cancelled as proposed in C.I.G. 13/1, this would not mean that further action on the subject would not be taken.
Admiral Inglis said that he was willing to concur in C.I.G. 13/1, but that he wanted the record to show that the Navy will go just as far as other participating departments in collaborative efforts in this field.
General Chamberlin said that he would like to state some principles which he felt should govern the solution of this problem. First of all, he felt that each department should be supreme in its field of primary responsibility. For example, in its field of primary responsibility he did not think that the War Department could assign its functions to another agency because the War Department is charged by law with performing them. General Chamberlin thought, therefore, that the first thing to do was to assign areas of primary responsibility to each department. Then matters which are not in the field of these primary responsibilities should be assigned to C.I.G. He thought that those assignments should carry into the field of collection, but that they should not draw a narrow corridor which would prevent any field representative from getting useful information.
General Vandenberg said that he thought everyone agreed to these principles, but he questioned whether they had been transmitted to the agency representatives who were working with ICAPS.
General Chamberlin said that the implementation of those principles should be carefully timed to cause a minimum of interruption in the performance of necessary functions. He expressed the belief that the War Department now had the best balanced intelligence agency, and was fully engaged in the preparation of Strategic Intelligence Digests (S.I.D.). He hoped to obtain permission to complete these S.I.D.'s as a basis for assignment of responsibilities. Even after responsibilities had been assigned, he felt that each department must have a unit which is capable of presenting the whole picture to the officials of that department. He therefore would like to see the War Department preserve a strong Military Intelligence Service to fulfill the requirements of the Chief of Staff. For example, the War Department was working on war potential, which covers a very wide field. On this matter, the War Department was getting advice from other departments, but nevertheless was ultimately responsible for that field. He hoped that this statement of fundamentals would indicate the reason why he was voting as he had.
Admiral Inglis agreed that the principles were fine, but required definition. For example, what is military intelligence? He felt that while it was granted that the War Department was responsible for military intelligence, it should also be granted that the War Department must get intelligence elsewhere in order to complete the picture. This meant looking to other departments over which the War Department had no authority.
General Chamberlin said that he was perfectly willing to trust the State Department, Navy Department, and Air Forces for the intelligence in their fields of primary responsibility.
Admiral Inglis thought, then, that if it was granted that the War Department must obtain intelligence from agencies other than those under its command, it then became a question of which agency or agencies were best qualified and most efficient to produce the intelligence required. That was the principle Admiral Inglis had in mind in C.I.G. 13. He thought it would be possible to pool items of common interest in C.I.G. Then each agency would make available all that it received in those fields, and would draw off from C.I.G. what it needed. Admiral Inglis noted that General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz had directed General Craig and Admiral Inglis to join M.I.D. and O.N.I. in all possible fields. He said that an effort had been made to accomplish this, but that nothing had happened. Now with C.I.G. formed, he thought it might be possible to turn over some of these functions of common interest to C.I.G.
General Chamberlin did not recall having seen the directive to which Admiral Inglis referred, but said that he was nevertheless willing to follow the principles which he had enunciated.
Mr. Eddy said that he was in sympathy with the committee report, C.I.G. 13/1. He would like, however, to see the responsibility and functions of the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board transferred to C.I.G. He said that if that recommendation were made, he would vote for it.
General Vandenberg expressed appreciation for Mr. Eddy's suggestion, but felt that it was first necessary to settle the broader questions involved. If action was blocked after such piecemeal steps had been taken, it would not help the over-all intelligence picture.
General Samford thought that the guiding principle was that the functions required by each agency staff must be performed in that staff. Everything else he was willing to centralize.
General Chamberlin said that an example was the question of war potential in Russia. He noted that the War Department was now engaged in a comprehensive study of that subject, and he wondered whether it was intended that this project should be stopped.
Admiral Inglis thought that was an excellent example, since it involved intelligence of interest to all three departments. While G-2 was responsible for furnishing that data to the Chief of Staff, Military Attaches and other War Department sources were not adequate to get what was needed. The same thing is true in the Navy and State Departments. No one agency is competent to get all that information; each must rely on the other. Each now has a collecting agency feeding in that type of material. Admiral Inglis said that his idea was that when this information was received, instead of each agency having about a hundred people picking the brains of other agencies, fifty from each department could be transferred into C.I.G., where, with half the people, they would receive all departmental source material and do a better job.
General Chamberlin agreed that this was all right in theory, but that it would cause delay. For example, the War Department has already written hundreds of pages on all countries, and he did not think that work should be interrupted.
Admiral Inglis said that his example was something that could be worked up to. He did not think that any project should be interrupted until it could be taken over efficiently by C.I.G.
General Chamberlin agreed, and said that he thought that 30 June 1947 would be a date on which his projects could be turned over to some other agency.
Admiral Inglis recommended that the procedure be worked out step by step and extend over a period of time.
General Vandenberg felt that each agency, when it transferred a function to C.I.G., should still have a feeling of responsibility and an interest in seeing that the people who were working on the project were also transferred, in order to ensure the best possible product.
Admiral Inglis said that 30 June 1947 was an agreeable date for turning over to C.I.G.
General Chamberlin said that he would be willing to furnish surplus personnel available on that date. He pointed out, however, that G-2 had already let out some 700 individuals and was about down to its minimum requirements for military intelligence. In fact, there were fields of military intelligence which G-2 is not now covering. Therefore, when the S.I.D.'s are completed, G-2 would have to turn those people to the performance of some other G-2 function.
Admiral Inglis felt that there were two additional principles that should be recognized: First, each agency, in fulfilling its responsibilities, must collaborate with other agencies to complete the picture. Second, each agency has a responsibility for the successful performance of C.I.G.
General Chamberlin said that he felt a responsibility, as a member of the I.A.B., for the manner in which C.I.G. grows. On the other hand, he felt that one responsibility of C.I.G. was to build strong organizations in the departments to fulfill their primary functions.
General Vandenberg agreed, but noted that C.I.G. has no control over that matter at the present time.
After further discussion,
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
Approved the recommendation in the Enclosure to C.I.G. 13/1, with the understanding that the basic issues involved are under continuing study by ICAPS and agency representatives.
177. Memorandum From the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District, Department of War (Groves) to the Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, November 21, 1946.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-208. Secret. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historical Staff on January 14, 1954.
SUBJECT
Foreign Intelligence Set-up1. In accordance with General Marshall's instructions, I established a special organization to collect information on the capabilities of enemy powers to use atomic energy for military purposes. The reason for these instructions, I believe, was a feeling that existing intelligence agencies had proven themselves unable to function satisfactorily. At first, personnel from other existing sections of my office were used part time on this foreign intelligence work; in 1944-45 some special overseas operations were fostered, field commanders and staffs were briefed and selected officers were assigned to duty with overseas theaters. By 1945 a full time Foreign Intelligence Section was required; late that year the Section was organized in substantially its present form.
2. It is vital to the security of the United States that foreign intelligence in the field of atomic energy be maintained and strengthened. The Central Intelligence Group which was organized in 1946 is the operating agency of the National Intelligence Authority and is now responsible for the coordination and direction of all foreign intelligence activities of the government. The CIG must be able to evaluate the capabilities of other nations to use atomic energy in the military field, and the best nucleus upon which to build the organization is unquestionably this Foreign Intelligence Section.
3. To continue the functions of the Foreign Intelligence Section in any other way except under the control of CIG would be very difficult. This Section has never had complete facilities or personnel to do its own collection; it has assembled intelligence material collected by other agencies, and correlated data from the Manhattan District. Its primary purpose is to secure a maximum of information and to interpret that information as to what is going on in the atomic energy field in foreign nations, with particular emphasis on the rate of progress of other nations in catching up with the United States' position and on determining estimates of resources of uranium where such information cannot be accurately obtained through the normal channels of Manhattan District. As a dissemination agency this Section has been prepared to act only as it was deemed necessary to supply information to other agencies. In the event it should find any indication of a foreign nation being in advance of us technically, it would of course promptly convey such information to those portions of the Manhattan Project to whom it would be of interest. Overseas its mission has been limited to liaison with Military Attaches, with Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater (USFET) and with British Intelligence. Through the Intelligence link, and only through that link, can the very productive cooperation with British Intelligence continue. I have long thought that the C.I.G. has the best resources for this intelligence collection and dissemination and for procuring and retaining personnel capable of serving the Atomic Energy Program in the future. It would be a mistake to use the present limited Manhattan resources based upon informal liaison with the State, War and Navy Departments or any organization set up with the A.E.C. This is especially true since the C.I.G. already controls the Strategic Services Unit and is assured of cooperation with British Intelligence.
4. The experience of my Foreign Intelligence Section and the mission and operation of the C.I.G. logically place them together, but future cooperation between C.I.G. and the A.E.C. will be absolutely necessary in the best interests of the country. The specialized Foreign Intelligence Section would be the best instrument to provide this coordinated effort. Continued access to the Commission sites and discussions between individuals already recognized on the working level are important in order to avoid an inordinate number of middle men and inefficient delays. Security demands that the liaison have the appropriate authority and control.
5. I feel that:
a. The Foreign Intelligence Section should be an integral part of the C.I.G.
b. The Foreign Intelligence Section should be the routine channel of liaison between the C.I.G. and the A.E.C.
c. The C.I.G. should collect and furnish all available information with respect to ore deposits and discoveries, mining activities, scientific development or other subjects from foreign countries needed in the work of the A.E.C. as desired by that latter body.
d. Representatives of the Foreign Intelligence Section in the C.I.G. should be permitted to visit sites in the United States, to consult with individuals and to receive technical papers of the A.E.C. as may be arranged.
L. R. Groves/1/
Major General, U.S.A./1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
178. Minutes of the 11th Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board
Washington, November 26, 1946, 10 a.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held at the New War Department Building.
PARTICIPANTS
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
Members Present
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2Also Present
Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2
Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
Mr. George R. Fearing, Department of State
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence GroupSecretariat
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
Mr. J. S. Earman, Assistant Secretary, N.I.A.1. Coordination of Collection Activities (C.I.G. 18/2)/1/
/1/CIG 18/2, November 21, was a report of CIG's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, submitted for IAB approval, which delineated responsibilities for the collection of foreign intelligence information. It allocated collection of political, cultural, sociological, economic, and "international" information to the Department of State; military information to the War Department; naval information to the Navy Department; and scientific information to "each agency in accordance with its respective interests." (Ibid., HS/HC-276) See the Supplement. The subject had been put on the IAB agenda at the request of the Department of State, which had proposed a "basic delineation of responsibilities" in the collection field. See CIG 18, October 25, and the enclosed October 18 memorandum from Eddy to Vandenberg in the Supplement. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276)
General Vandenberg gave a brief description of the contents of C.I.G. 18/2. He also stated that at this time he would like to make it a matter of record in the minutes that certain collection activities assigned to the Central Intelligence Group, namely, those covered by Special Operations, F.B.I.S. and information gained from business concerns and individuals who have traveled abroad, would not be governed by this paper.
General Chamberlin stated that this was the finest piece of work turned out so far and that as suggested by General Vandenberg we should get away from detail. General Chamberlin felt, however, that the paper should assign fields of primary responsibility for all activities, rather than being confined only to coordination of collection. He believed that the general assignment of responsibilities contained in paragraph 2 a of the proposed C.I.G. Directive should be taken out and made into a N.I.A. Directive.
Mr. Lay explained that the preparation of a S.I.D. on the U.S.S.R. is in fact now an inter-agency operation under C.I.G. coordination.
General Chamberlin suggested that the word "area" in paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive be changed to "country."
Mr. Edgar explained that the word "area" was used since it was not at all impossible that certain countries by name would not be covered, hence the responsibility for coverage would necessarily have to be given to the coordinator covering that area in which such countries might be located.
General Chamberlin said that we must realize that Ambassadors are political officers sent out without intelligence training. He therefore felt that we should define certain broad principles by which the Ambassadors should be guided.
Admiral Inglis stated that this was a fine paper. He said, however, that he had not had time enough to study the paper as thoroughly as he wished, but would agree to it in its broad principles.
General Vandenberg then asked Admiral Inglis if it could be approved for use as a guide.
Admiral Inglis answered that he would like to request another week to study this paper and suggested that an ad hoc committee be appointed to consider the paper further, in view of the fact that he had some changes to recommend.
General Vandenberg stated that he felt that there should be no further delay and that those parts of the paper that were highly controversial could be taken out and resubmitted at a later date for further consideration.
Mr. Eddy agreed with General Vandenberg's suggestion and stated that he was in agreement that an ad hoc committee be appointed. He further stated that ICAPS had prepared a very fine paper. Mr. Eddy said that the collection of intelligence in the field presented a separate problem from that of the over-all policies governing coordination of intelligence activities. Mr. Eddy went on to say that the intelligence scene in Washington differed from that in the field in view of possible reduction in one Department and increases in others.
General Chamberlin stated that he believed the assignment of basic responsibilities should be the same for Washington as the field.
Mr. Eddy stated that he did not quite agree with this and that he felt that there should be an over-all policies and objectives directive and a separate collection directive for the field.
Admiral Inglis stated that he believed that there should first be an N.I.A. Directive on collection policies.
Mr. Eddy suggested that General Chamberlin's over-all written suggestions,/2/ which were previously passed to the I.A.B. members, be turned over to ICAPS for consideration and that we go ahead on the collection direction.
/2/Not found.
General Chamberlin stated that he felt that the broad principles of the paper should cover all contingencies.
Mr. Eddy stated that he felt that the collection directive should be separate.
General Chamberlin stated that he felt that the first place to tackle this problem was on the evaluation level here in Washington rather than in the field.
Mr. Eddy stated that he believed that collection in the field could be covered separately, particularly since there may be changes in Washington which in a great many instances would not affect the collection activities in the field.
Admiral Inglis suggested that the collection problem be considered now and the over-all problem be considered at a later date.
General Chamberlin stated that he was ready to vote on both problems, taking into consideration his suggestions.
Admiral Inglis stated that he could not go along with General Chamberlin's suggestion since he felt that Navy had not had enough time to study the problem. He suggested that an ad hoc committee be appointed to work on C.I.G. 18/2 and that ICAPS undertake another study on the ultimate responsibilities of the production of intelligence.
General Chamberlin agreed to go along on getting out the collection directive if agreement could not be reached on the whole problem.
Mr. Edgar stated that he hoped that S.I.D. would not be turned over all at once, in order to give C.I.G. a chance to build up a staff, since he did not feel it would be right to begin recruiting a staff at the present time, and have them sit around until June with nothing to do.
General Chamberlin stated that as they completed a chapter it would be turned over to C.I.G.
After further discussion,
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
a. Agreed to have ICAPS reconsider C.I.G. 18/2 in the light of General Chamberlin's written suggestions and the general discussion in the meeting./3/
/3/See Documents 179 and 181.
b. Agreed that ICAPS prepare a companion document covering the coordination of the production and dissemination of intelligence./4/
/4/See Document 318 and footnote references thereto.
c. Agreed that an I.A.B. ad hoc committee composed of Colonel Fearing, Colonel Ennis, General Samford and Captain Davis will review the revision of C.I.G. 18/2 and subsequently the directive which will be prepared by ICAPS for the coordination of the production and dissemination of intelligence.
d. Agreed that the revision of C.I.G. 18/2 be submitted to the I.A.B. and that the directive for the coordination of the production and dissemination of intelligence be submitted when prepared to the I.A.B.
2. Production of Political-Psychological Study on U.S.S.R. (C.I.G. 20)/5/
/5/CIG 20, November 21, was a proposal by the Chief of Naval Intelligence for a "comprehensive political-psychological study" on the USSR. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
General Vandenberg briefly explained the recommendations contained in this paper. He stated that there appeared to be two courses of action open:
a. A specialist or specialists in this particular field could be contracted to prepare such a study which would be disseminated as intelligence information, the contents of which would be the views of the individuals preparing the study, only.
b. A specialist or specialists in this particular field could be contracted to prepare such a study under C.I.G. (ORE) guidance. An ORE evaluation would be placed on the study prior to dissemination.
He further stated that C.I.G. preferred course a.
Admiral Inglis stated that he did not quite understand what was meant.
General Vandenberg explained that the study would be prepared and presented to the interested agencies over the signature of the person preparing the study and that there would be no evaluation whatsoever by C.I.G. The study in short would be presented for "what it was worth." He also stated that this study then could be used as a basis on which the agencies could expand their own thoughts on what was presented.
Mr. Eddy thought it might be better to have a group work on this study.
Admiral Inglis stated that at the present time he felt that there were only a limited number of people who could prepare such a study, and furthermore that such a study, if prepared by Dr. Ladislas Farago, would be what he thought and not a result of his being given access to the files of the agencies. He particularly pointed out that Dr. Farago was a Hungarian by birth and great care should be exercised relative to the classified material given to him in the event he was selected to make a study.
General Vandenberg felt that for the timely completion of the study it would be better to have one person prepare it.
Mr. Eddy suggested that possibly one man could be found to go along with whoever might be selected to make the study.
General Vandenberg agreed and asked Mr. Eddy if he could find some one.
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
a. Approved the recommendations in C.I.G. 20 pending the securing of a person and possibly an assistant to conduct this study.
3. Exploitation of Enemy Document Repositories (C.I.G. 21)/6/
/6/In CIG 21, November 21, the Chief of Naval Intelligence recommended that CIG "arrange for and coordinate the search of all repositories of captured enemy documents for the purpose of extracting, cataloging and abstracting all documents relating to political-social-psychological warfare." (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
General Vandenberg briefly outlined the recommendations contained in C.I.G. 21 and stated that in view of the fact that the priority on such a plan is questionable and that C.I.G. is not prepared to undertake this program it be held in abeyance until the document situation is sufficiently clarified for constructive C.I.G. recommendations.
Admiral Inglis stated that this was just the reason why he had made the recommendations contained in this paper at the present time since he was afraid that the documents might soon be lost.
General Vandenberg replied that C.I.G. is at the present time awaiting a reply from the Navy relative to the transfer of the Washington Document Center to C.I.G.
Admiral Inglis stated that he thought that this reply had been made and that he would take action to see why C.I.G. had not received an answer from the Navy.
General McDonald stated that there were a lot of documents still in Berlin and that he believed that microfilms of the documents were presently in this country.
General Chamberlin stated that he felt that quite a few of these documents in Berlin were still there in view of the War Crimes Trials.
Admiral Inglis stated that there are literally, not carloads nor tons, but shiploads of captured enemy documents.
General Chamberlin stated that he was well aware of this fact and that in view of his personnel situation he could only contribute a limited amount of help.
General Vandenberg suggested that a committee be appointed to look into all the problems involving the present document situation.
General McDonald stated that a representative of the Library of Congress had looked through some of the captured documents in the possession of the Air Forces.
General Vandenberg suggested that it might be well to appoint an inter-agency group to look over the problems arising from this paper.
General McDonald felt that it was dangerous to delay too long in considering the document question.
General Vandenberg asked Admiral Inglis whether he felt we should wait or appoint a committee to consider the problems which had arisen from this discussion.
Admiral Inglis stated that he felt that we should appoint a committee and go ahead.
General Vandenberg questioned whether it would be well to have a representative of the Library of Congress as a member of this committee.
Admiral Inglis stated we should be very careful about the person selected from the Library of Congress and that we should make certain that the selectee was secure.
General Vandenberg stated that C.I.G. would select an individual from the Library of Congress who would be agreeable to all agencies and that we should make certain that he had been cleared before being put to work.
The Intelligence Advisory Board:
a. Agreed to appoint a committee consisting of Mr. Kilgour, State Department, Colonel St. Clair, G-2, Colonel Robert Taylor, A-2, Captain Murphy, Navy, and a representative from the Library of Congress to consider the document situation.
b. Agreed to let C.I.G. 21 go over until a report had been received from the above-appointed committee./7/
/7/The Committee's report is in CIG 21/1, April 10, 1947. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.
179. Minutes of the 12th Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board
Washington, December 17, 1946, 2:30 p.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Confidential. The meeting was held at the New War Department Building.
PARTICIPANTS
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
Members Present
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, WDGS
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2Also Present
Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel James E. Briggs, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel Wm. M. Adams, Central Intelligence GroupSecretariat
Mr. J. S. Earman, Acting Secretary, N.I.A.
1. Coordination of Collection Activities/1/ (C.I.G. 18/3)
/1/Not found.
General Vandenberg stated that he understood that there was some confusion as to why C.I.G. 18/3, as circulated, only includes the texts of the proposed N.I.A. Directive and omits the proposed text of the C.I.G. Directive. He stated that C.I.G. 18/2, as circulated on November 21,/2/ included both a proposed N.I.A. Directive and a proposed C.I.G. Directive, but the transmitting letter carefully specified that I.A.B. approval was requested only for the N.I.A. Directive. Therefore, in consideration of the State Department's urgent request for early consideration of the N.I.A. Directive, it was circulated in C.I.G. 18/3 with the amendments proposed by the I.A.B. ad hoc committee./3/ He said that at the same time the completed draft of the C.I.G. Directive was circulated to the ad hoc committee members since there had not been time to present this cleaned up text to them; however, the ad hoc committee had approved this text in pencil form at its last meeting. General Vandenberg pointed out that C.I.G. 18/2 has only minor changes from C.I.G. 18/2 in the N.I.A. Directive section and that at the last I.A.B. meeting general approval of the N.I.A. Directive had been given and no specific requests for changes therein had been made. He said that he believed that the I.A.B. would be able to approve without extensive discussion the text as presented in C.I.G. 18/3, particularly since his proposals for implementation, as contained in the ad hoc committee's final draft, include all suggestions made by the agencies' ad hoc representatives and were concurred in by them at their final meeting. General Vandenberg recommended that in paragraph 1 c of the proposed N.I.A. Directive the words "unproductive duplication and uncoordinated overlap shall be discontinued so . . ." be allowed to remain.
/2/See footnote 1, Document 178.
/3/Appointed by the Board at its meeting on November 26.
Mr. Eddy stated that he would like to recommend that paragraphs 2 a and c of the proposed C.I.G. implementing Directive should be included in the proposed N.I.A. Directive since paragraph 2 a included allocations by subject and paragraph 2 c reserved the right of every agency to repeat even on secondary interest to its own agency anything it desired.
General Vandenberg then asked how A-2 and O.N.I. felt about the State Department's recommendation as indicated above.
General Chamberlin stated that after some discussion in the Intelligence Division, WDGS, they were not sure whether the meaning of paragraph 2 c of the proposed C.I.G. Directive was understood. He went on to state that all G-2 reports were submitted on duplicating pads and questioned whether or not G-2's representatives in the field should merely pass over to the proper agency at the post or the Embassy whatever information they might have.
Mr. Eddy then stated that this was his understanding.
General Chamberlin stated that he would object to any interpretation to indicate that, for example, the State Department's representative report directly to him or his representative (General Chamberlin's) report directly to the State Department.
Mr. Eddy then stated that those reports would be passed on to the representatives in the field and a copy sent to the State Department.
General Chamberlin then said that he would like to indicate that all the information passed in from the field, except radiographic forms, from the MA's come on a duplicating pad and not as copies.
General Vandenberg then stated that there was no intention to have any such interpretation as indicated by General Chamberlin.
General Chamberlin stated that he had no desire to make any change in the paragraph but that he wanted to be sure that somebody would not object to the Intelligence Division following its usual procedures of sending the duplicating pad to the Intelligence Division in Washington since the information contained therein was given immediately to the agency concerned.
Mr. Eddy then stated that in this paragraph they wanted the men in the field who came across intelligence not of primary interest to them, but of secondary interest, to pass that information to the field representative of the agency primarily concerned. Nothing, however, should prevent a representative from reporting to his own department chief for staff purposes.
General Vandenberg then stated that what Mr. Eddy had just said was the principle that was being enunciated in the directives and he would be the first to protest if the agencies were to stop sending information that was not of primary interest to them to C.I.G.
Admiral Inglis then stated that to clarify this paragraph we should be rather careful of the wording.
General Chamberlin then stated that he had this comment to make after reading these directives--The C.I.G. and N.I.A. Directives uniformly violate the basic principle that in assigning a task, the task should be described in sufficiently clear language for an agency to understand. The agency should be permitted to instruct its subordinates in its own language and that he did not propose to send a C.I.G. Directive to his own people.
General Vandenberg then stated that the implementation of C.I.G. Directives by the agencies concerned was "their own business."
Admiral Inglis then suggested the following change in the language of the paragraph in question: "That we delete the word 'directly' in the second line of sub-paragraph c and insert in the third line before the word 'representative' the word 'field' and then in the last line instead of 'copies' insert 'information to.' It would then read: 'Intelligence information and material, regardless of the collector, shall wherever possible be transmitted to the agency most concerned through the field representative of that agency. However, the collector may also send information to his own agency."
Mr. Eddy stated that he did not believe that he could approve the rewording of paragraph 2 c as indicated by Admiral Inglis.
General Chamberlin then stated that the Intelligence Division distributed to no one outside of the War Department unless a request was received through the Reading Panel and that no automatic distribution was made to the State Department's representative on the Reading Panel unless he (State Department's representative) requested it.
Mr. Eddy then stated that he thought the purpose was to get information to the agency primarily concerned and most interested.
General Chamberlin then stated "providing the agency is interested."
Mr. Eddy then went on to state that he would not expect reports on military and naval matters to appear in the State Department's Reading Panel which had been collected by a Vice-Consul where there was no military or naval representative present. Mr. Eddy further stated that he concurred in that a report prepared by military or naval personnel should have dissemination made in Washington; however, that political intelligence should be screened by the State Department, and military and air intelligence, for example, should be passed to the man in the field who represented that service. When such reports come to the Department's Reading Panel concerned that Department can then send these reports wherever they may deem necessary. The reporting officer's obligation is then the same as formerly--"He sends a copy of his information to his own agency."
General Samford then asked whether the use of the word "copy" meant it was identified by being outside the agency's primary field.
Mr. Eddy stated that before, when the State Department had an opportunity to get naval information, the Vice-Consul would send that information to the Naval Attache, since he (the Vice-Consul) couldn't interpret it and there would be confusion if they were to send it to the State Department.
Admiral Inglis stated that that was the very reason why he had recommended the re-wording of paragraph 2 c in order to avoid describing how a copy of a report was to be sent to G-2 or O.N.I.
Mr. Eddy stated that in Washington it is recognized as a report that is to be produced or distributed and be available in the department of primary interest.
Admiral Inglis then stated that he supposed that this fact would be written across the face of the report; that it was a naval subject, and that the Military Attaché, for example, had picked it up and given the information to the Naval Attaché. Admiral Inglis went on to state that the Military Attaché could, for example, write across the face of the report "I have given this information to the Naval Attaché."
General Chamberlin stated that he did not want to change his system since his people were accustomed to put in reports on duplicating pads and as these reports came in they were placed on a mimeograph machine and the number of copies indicated by the Reading Panel were run off. Thus copies are available for State, Navy, A-2 and C.I.G.
Mr. Eddy then stated that he foresaw difficulties in the future if the State Department, for example, disseminated widely and also had Reading Panels and disseminated reports from military and naval observers, and some dissemination was made the other way around. Mr. Eddy went on to state that he felt that distribution of reports should be made by the Department having primary interest.
General Chamberlin then stated that there could be very easily inserted a statement in the report which would indicate to whom the report had been submitted.
Mr. Eddy suggested that paragraph 2 c could possibly read ". . . field representatives of the agency most concerned. However, the collector may send copies to his own agency."
General Chamberlin stated that he did not object to that wording. However, he wanted to be sure that everyone knew of the kind of copy used by the Intelligence Division, namely, a repeating pad. He went on to state that the Intelligence Division made distribution within its own agency and that they could attempt to keep from distributing to other agencies unless such agencies' representatives on the Reading Panel insisted on having the information.
Mr. Eddy questioned whether or not there were "other people" on the Reading Panel.
General Chamberlin stated that the only agencies outside of the War Department having representatives on the Intelligence Division Reading Panel were the State and Navy Departments, and occasionally C.I.G.
Mr. Eddy then suggested that paragraph 2 c of the proposed C.I.G. Directive read: "Intelligence information material regardless of the collector shall wherever possible be transmitted immediately to the field representative of the agency most concerned. However, the collector may send copies to his own agency."
Mr. Eddy then distributed a proposed change in the wording of the first page of the proposed N.I.A. Directive. Mr. Eddy, after some discussion of this proposal, stated that political and economic intelligence had been bracketed in the State Department for a number of years. Furthermore, modern economics are no more political, as related to political, that we used to study in school. It now pertains to industrial establishments, in addition to protection for most of our American trade. The State Department is quite prepared to have economic intelligence not allocated, but recognized as a vital interest.
General Chamberlin stated that this was difficult for him to go along with and that he could say frankly that he thought it was splitting a field that should never be split. He went on to say that the field of intelligence covered not only collection but also production of intelligence, and it was his feeling and had been all along that the Intelligence Advisory Board should get down to the fundamental principles and solve the overall responsibilities for those departments for the whole intelligence field, as suggested at the last meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board. General Chamberlin then said that apparently the Intelligence Advisory Board was not in complete agreement along these lines so he was willing to go along with this splitting of the collection field, before the Intelligence Advisory Board tackled the fundamental principles since he thought that this, perhaps, was a forward step.
General Vandenberg said that he agreed with the ultimate objective as stated by General Chamberlin and that this was a forward step. He went on to say that the Intelligence Advisory Board was going to have to cooperate and bite this problem off piece by piece. General Vandenberg further said that there are many things that the Intelligence Advisory Board can not now agree upon. However, there were some things on which there could be agreement by one or two of the members giving room.
General Samford stated that he thought it would be better to keep the allocation by subject, which was a step forward, in the proposed C.I.G. Directive, instead of placing it in the proposed N.I.A. Directive.
General Vandenberg said that he agreed with General Samford's statement, but if, as we go along, we find that we need something else done, amendments could be made. Further, that he would rather make amendments than make the original directives too broad.
Mr. Eddy stated that he wished to propose that paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive be changed to read as follows: "The American Ambassador or Minister, or the ranking U.S. Foreign Service Officer of each Diplomatic Mission or Foreign Service Post shall be responsible for insuring proper implementation of a coordinated collection program in that area. In areas where a U.S. Commander has the predominant responsibility, he is the Senior U.S. Representative responsible for insuring proper implementation of a coordinated collection program in that area."
Captain Davis then stated that the Navy had a comment to make. The 7th Fleet, for instance, operates outside the governing principles of this entirely. That thought was interchecked in C.I.G. 18/2 and was in line as recommended. He asked if something similar to the following could not be put back--"Where foreign service establishments and a senior U.S. military commander both have jurisdiction in an area, each will be responsible for the activities of the personnel under his administrative control."
General Vandenberg then stated that this could be accomplished by the agencies' writing their people their understanding of this Directive in the areas in question. He suggested that instructions by the home offices of the agencies be coordinated with ICAPS and the representatives of the agencies in order that the instructions be written in unison. General Vandenberg went on to say that this coordination could well be centered in ICAPS since that was where the agencies and C.I.G. come together.
Mr. Eddy suggested that there would be another sentence added to paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive to read as follows: "This does not apply to the intelligence personnel directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Theatre Commanders."
General Chamberlin stated that he was somewhat confused about the words "Senior U.S. representative" and said that he was perfectly agreeable to using the words "Senior Diplomatic representative."
General Vandenberg then suggested that paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive read as follows: "The senior U.S. representative in each foreign area where the United States maintains a foreign service mission shall be responsible for the coordination of all collection activities within his area, and for the proper implementation of the requirements and responsibilities of the respective agencies."
Mr. Eddy stated that "If you don't care about any recognition in the occupied areas, I don't differ from that."
General Vandenberg stated that it was up to the agencies to send out the proper instructions. However, he recommended that in any border line cases that the Intelligence Advisory Board get together on such cases before the instructions were sent to the field.
Mr. Eddy then stated that this recommendation was all right with the State Department.
Captain Davis stated that the Navy would like to have it in the minutes that this would not specifically apply to the operating forces.
General Chamberlin suggested that paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive be changed to read as follows: "For the coordination of all collection activities in his area within the spirit of the principles enunciated herein." He further stated that he believed that it was a mistake to charge the Ambassadors with the implementation of someone else's directive and authorize them in the line of command of that particular department since the Ambassadors were charged with coordination.
Mr. Eddy said that he felt that General Chamberlin's restriction should be in the heading and not in any one sub-paragraph since it applies only to the limits of this Directive within the limits of principle.
General Chamberlin stated that he would hesitate to give the Ambassadors authority to do anything they might desire. He further stated that his statement above was binding on them (the Ambassadors) since the Ambassadors should coordinate collection of intelligence in accordance with the agreement reached by the Intelligence Advisory Board.
General Vandenberg repeated his suggestion that paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive read as previously indicated.
General Chamberlin then stated that he wanted it very definitely understood that his agreement with this paragraph confines the responsibility of the implementation of the coordination measures, not the implementation of the intelligence collection.
General Vandenberg stated that he thought that General Chamberlin's understanding had to be accepted since he (General Chamberlin) had certain responsibilities as does the Chief of Naval Intelligence.
General Chamberlin then suggested another change that he had in mind which might help to clarify paragraph 1 f of the proposed N.I.A. Directive, which change reads as follows: "After the words 'transmission to' insert 'respective home offices in Washington.' Paragraph 1 f would then read: '. . . abroad are individually responsible for the collection and for the appropriate transmission to their respective home offices in Washington . . .'"
General Chamberlin further stated that the above change was suggested since he wanted to be sure that Military Attaches would not transmit information direct to the State and Navy Departments here in Washington.
General Vandenberg stated that he did not feel that this change was necessary since the Intelligence Division's instructions to its MA's could prevent any such action.
General Chamberlin stated that the reason he made this point was because it might violate another Directive which was on its way for consideration.
Mr. Eddy noted that if General Chamberlin's suggested change above was adopted, it would prevent certain coordination in the field.
After further discussion it was decided to leave paragraph 1 f of the proposed N.I.A. Directive as originally written.
General Chamberlin asked if he was correct in judging that this was authority given by the National Intelligence Authority to the Ambassadors, not the State Department, as the senior representative.
Mr. Eddy stated that he thought that it was broader than that and that it was a matter of the President's representative abroad.
General Chamberlin then stated that he just wanted to be sure that it was authority given to the Ambassadors in view of their position.
Mr. Eddy went on to state that the Ambassador's Charge d'Affaires represented him just as a Deputy Commander and that the Charge d'Af-faires had all the Ambassador's authority in his absence.
Captain Davis then stated that he wanted to indicate in the minutes that as far as the Army and Navy are concerned that the allocations contained in the proposed N.I.A. Directive were a little broad and that he would like to bring forth allocations made in the joint letter between the Army and Navy in August, 1945./4/ Captain Davis asked whether or not these allocations would still in fact be in effect.
/4/Not found.
General Vandenberg stated that the allocations had purposely been left broad.
General Chamberlin stated that he thought that the agreement mentioned by Captain Davis would still stand.
General Vandenberg stated that he could not say that this agreement was still in effect and that it was between the Army and Navy. General Vandenberg commented--"I can not agree or disagree."
The Intelligence Advisory Board adjourned without approving C.I.G. 18/3.
Note:
Subsequently, the Intelligence Advisory Board, by voting slip, approved C.I.G. 18/3, (which has been published as N.I.A. Directive No. 7)/5/ with the following changes:
/5/Issued January 2, 1947, as NIA Directive No. 7, Document 181. The IAB sometimes used the "voting slip" procedure--in effect, a "mail ballot--" to decide questions, especially those already discussed extensively at meetings of the Board. Before the procedure was used in this instance, however, there appears to have been another meeting of the IAB on December 20, see Document 180 and the minutes of the ninth meeting of the Advisory Committee on Intelligence in the Supplement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Lot File No. 122, Records of the Secretary's Staff Committee 1944-47, Box 94) No minutes of the December 20 meeting have been found, however, and the numbered sequence of IAB meetings does not reflect a session on that date. The CIG implementing document was issued as CIG Directive No. 18, Document 183.
Paragraph 2 c of the proposed C.I.G. Directive to read "Intelligence information and material regardless of the collector shall, wherever possible, be transmitted immediately to the field representative of the agency most concerned. However, the collector may also send copies to his own agency." inserted as paragraph 1 b of N.I.A. Directive No. 7.
Insertion of sub-paragraphs 2 a and c, as amended, of the proposed C.I.G. Directive into N.I.A. Directive No. 7, as paragraph 1 a and b, respectively.
Paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive to read as follows: "The Senior U.S. representative in each foreign area where the United States maintains a foreign service post shall be responsible for the coordination of all collection activities in his area and the proper implementation of that coordination within the spirit of the principles enunciated herein." inserted in N.I.A. Directive No. 7 as paragraph 1 c.
Paragraph 1 c of the proposed N.I.A. Directive was amended as follows: "In order to avoid unproductive duplication and uncoordinated overlap all collection facilities will be utilized to their maximum within budgetary limitations for the production of that full flow of intelligence material which is the major need of all departments." and inserted in N.I.A. Directive No. 7 as paragraph 1 d.
180. Memorandum From the Chairman (Eddy) to the Members of the Advisory Committee on Intelligence
Washington, December 24, 1946.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Lot File No. 122, Records of the Secretary's Staff Committee 1944-47, Box 94. Confidential.
I enclose a copy of the National Intelligence Authority Directive "Coordination of Collection Activities" as agreed by the Intelligence Advisory Board at its meeting with the Directive of Central Intelligence December 20, 1946./1/
/1/Not printed. For the directive as issued, see Document 181.
So far as the text is concerned, it is identical with the draft submitted to the ACI/2/ at the special meeting December 20, 1946, with the following exceptions:
/2/Not found.
(1) Paragraph 1b now reads "shall wherever possible be transmitted immediately to the field representative" instead of the former phrase "shall wherever possible be transmitted directly to the agency most concerned." This change makes it clearer that the intelligence is to be handed over in the field, and eliminates the ambiguity of the earlier reading which might have been construed to mean that a Military Attaché, for example, should send a political report to the Department of State, or that a Vice Consul should send a piece of military intelligence directly to the War Department.
(2) Paragraph 1c has been entirely rewritten. In the draft submitted to the special ACI meeting it will be recalled that this paragraph read as follows: "The American Ambassador or Minister, or the ranking U.S. Foreign Service Officer, of each Diplomatic Mission or Foreign Service Post shall be responsible for insuring proper implementation of a coordinated collection program in that area. In areas where a U.S. Commander has the predominant responsibility, he is the Senior U.S. Representative responsible for insuring proper implementation of a coordinated collection program in that area." The effort to define the Senior U.S. Represent-ative abroad as being always either the Senior Foreign Service Officer or a U.S. Commander of an Occupied Area was objected to by the intelligence agencies of the armed forces as not covering the ground. They pointed out that it would leave undefined the responsibilities of the intelligence personnel of the 7th Fleet or of other military and naval areas which overlap at points with the territory of foreign service missions. I pointed out that we were not concerned with such intelligence personnel who, of course, performed their duties to the Fleet or Theater Commander, but were only concerned with coordination of intelligence in areas where there is a foreign service post. It was agreed, therefore, to restrict the NIA Directive to areas where the United States maintains a foreign service post, whether Embassy, Legation, Consulate General, Consulate or Vice Consulate. There was no dissent from the well known fact that in all such areas the U.S. diplomatic or consular representative is the Senior U.S. representative for that area.
It will be recalled that the interest of the Department is largely confined to 1a, 1b and 1c of the enclosed Directive, around which all of the argument centered. Paragraphs d to g represent no change from earlier texts of paragraphs prepared and insisted upon by other intelligence agencies.
As a result of the very controversial and sometimes stormy meeting I should like to attempt at this point to assess the gains made by this agreement and, at the same time, to anticipate disappointment which will be inevitable, in my opinion. The gains are that we have now a clear recognition by the members of the National Intelligence Authority (including CIG, G-2, ONI and A-2) of the fields of primary responsibility for collecting and reporting of positive intelligence abroad. This allocation set forth in 1a is further supported in 1b by a clear recognition of the property right of each Department to receive and transmit intelligence within its field of responsibility, no matter who first may have come into possession of such intelligence.
On the other hand, no intelligence agency at the meeting was willing to deny to its field representatives the right to transmit to his own superiors in Washington copies of any and all intelligence collected by him, without regard to what the subject matter might be. While, therefore, the information and, presumably, the official report, is made by the field representative of the Department most concerned, copies may continue to go to other Departments. I inquired closely about this matter and discovered that in the War Department, for example, all reports from the Attaches are sent in on "mats" capable of reproduction like our hectographs. It would appear, therefore, that these "copies" will not differ in material form or number from original reports within the field of the War Department's primary interest. I was advised at the meeting that if the Department of State does not wish to see these copies, which will be required by the War Department for internal distribution for staff purposes, the Department of State has only to instruct its representatives at the Reading Panel to ignore Service reports on political matters and not burden the Department of State's eyes or files therewith!
Furthermore, I was told in emphatic terms, and it was recorded in the IAB Minutes,/3/ that the armed services recognize the Senior Foreign Service Officer at each foreign service post as "the Senior U.S. Represent-ative" by virtue of his seniority on the spot and in accordance with diplomatic precedence. They do not consider that this Directive permits the Department of State in Washington to police the collection activities abroad of the field personnel of the armed forces, each of whom, they insist, will continue to receive orders from his own Department. The implication of this position to me is clear: that any dissatisfaction with duplication of effort or with uncoordinated collection and reporting in the field, will have to be remedied by action taken on the spot by the Ambassador, Minister or Senior Foreign Service Officer, and not by protests to the other intelligence agencies in Washington. The Senior Foreign Service Officer has been recognized as "responsible for the coordination of all collection activities in his area and for the proper implementation of that coordination." I hope this will suffice to secure the proper division of functions, but if it does not it will obviously be useless to attempt to regulate activities of the other Departments around an NIA table. In the event that a foreign service mission is unable to secure the proper local cooperation it may be necessary to refer the matter directly to a meeting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy for action on the highest level.
/3/No minutes of the December 20 IAB meeting have been found.
William A. Eddy/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Continue with Document 181
