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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

The National Security Act of 1947

                           

196. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Group (Houston) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg)

Washington, June 13, 1946.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-803, Item 13. No classification marking. The source text was a transcript prepared for the CIA Historian on June 6, 1952.

SUBJECT
Administrative Authority of CIG

1. On 22 January the President directed the NIA to plan, develop and coordinate Federal foreign intelligence activities, to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to national security. He further directed the respective Departments to assign persons and facilities, which persons shall collectively form the CIG under the Director thereof to assist NIA. The mission of the Director of CIG is to correlate, evaluate and disseminate intelligence, making full use of the staff and facilities of intelligence agencies; to coordinate activities of such agencies and recommend over-all policies and objectives for the national intelligence mission; and to perform for "said intelligence agencies such special services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally".

2. The above appears to give the complete administrative authority of CIG. As outlined, it is purely a coordination function with no substance or authority to act on its own responsibility in other than an advisory and directing capacity. Thus, it has no power:

(A) To take personnel actions;
(B) To certify payrolls and vouchers;
(C) To authorize travel;
(D) To procure supplies directly for itself or enter into contracts.

All the above are fundamental technicalities which apply equally to vouchered and unvouchered funds.

3. Thus, the essential problem is that CIG has no power to expend Government funds. The Secretary of War could give the Director, CIG, unvouchered funds to spend at the latter's discretion, but even so the certification of the voucher would have to be done by the Secretary. A good example of the problem is the case of a civilian employee now assigned to CIG full time. The classification sheet and personnel action papers are headed not "CIG", but "State, War and Navy Departments," and actual payment is made on the payroll of one or the other of these Departments as may be appropriate. The case in question is paid on War Department Contingencies payroll. If necessary or expedient for one reason or another, he could be cut off War Department and be put on either State or Navy payrolls. A body serving CIG could be built up in this way, but it would still be in the form of facilities furnished by the Departments, just as Army officers are assigned for duty with the Director but remain on the Army finance records for pay and administration. A time element is injected by Public Law 358, which in brief provides that no funds may be made available to any agency or instrumentality which remains in existence for more than one year without a specific appropriation from Congress during that year. Consequently, after 22 January 1947, Departments could not even furnish unvouchered funds to the Director, CIG, and it would be questionable whether the Departments could furnish personnel and supplies paid for out of vouchered funds.

Lawrence R. Houston/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

197. Memorandum for the File

Washington, July 17, 1946.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, National Military Establishment: CIA. No classification marking.

On 16 July Mr. Clifford met Mr. Houston and Mr. Lay from the Central Intelligence Group, in his office and discussed with them a proposed bill for the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency. Commander Elsey was also present.

The basis of the discussion was the draft bill/1/ which had been submitted by General Vandenberg to Mr. Clifford for comment, and Mr. Clifford's memorandum in reply of 12 July 1946./2/

/1/Not printed. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. A later draft is printed as an enclosure to Document 201.

/2/Not printed. (Truman Library, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, National Military Establishment: CIA) See the Supplement.

Mr. Clifford pointed out that it was not the President's original intention that a new agency be created/3/ and he remarked that it appeared that the proposed bill was departing from the President's intention by establishing a separate and sizeable government agency. Mr. Clifford also remarked that the President had intended that his letter of 22 January 1946 would provide a workable plan for the Central Intelligence Group. Mr. Clifford than asked if experience had shown that the plan outlined in the President's letter was not workable.

/3/This phrase which read, "Mr. Clifford pointed out that it was the President's original intention that a new agency not be created" was amended by hand.

Mr. Houston and Mr. Lay discussed at some length the administrative difficulties which the Central Intelligence Group has had due to its being a step-child of three separate departments. They stated that experience showed that enabling legislation was necessary in order that the Central Intelligence Group could operate as an integrated organization. They also informed Mr. Clifford that experience had shown that the Central Intelligence Group should become an operating agency with a large staff of Intelligence experts.

After lengthy discussion, it was agreed by all present that the original concept of the Central Intelligence Group should now be altered; experience had shown that it would be ineffective if it remained only a small planning staff and that it must now become a legally established, fairly sizeable, operating agency. Mr. Clifford stated that he would discuss this new concept with Admiral Leahy and the President./4/

/4/No record of Clifford's proposed discussion with Truman and Leahy has been found.

There followed a detailed examination of the draft bill in light of the comments and criticisms made in Mr. Clifford's memorandum of 12 July. Mr. Houston and Mr. Lay agreed that all of Mr. Clifford's points were well taken and they agreed to rewrite the bill incorporating his suggestions.

It was apparent during this part of the discussion/5/ that neither Mr. Houston nor Mr. Lay had given much thought to the words which they had used in drafting the bill. Both stated that large parts of it had been extracted from other proposed legislation or other documents relating to Intelligence. In their hasty preparation of the draft in this scissors-and-paste method, they had failed to grasp the essential point that the National Intelligence Authority should be a planning group and the Central Intelligence Agency an operating group.

/5/The phrase "during this part of the discussion" originally read "during the lengthy part of the discussion"; it was amended by hand.

Mr. Clifford pointed out to them the probable opposition which a proposed bill would arouse if great care and thought were not given to the choice of words used.

Mr. Houston and Mr. Lay will prepare a new bill and send it to Mr. Clifford for comment.

G.M.E.

198. Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority

Washington, July 17, 1946, 10:30 a.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-245. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the State Department.

PARTICIPANTS

Members Present

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Acting Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal Representative of the President
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence

Also Present

Dr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Department of State
Colonel Charles W. McCarthy, USA
Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN

Secretariat

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National Intelligence Authority

1. Report by the Director of Central Intelligence

Secretary Byrnes asked General Vandenberg to give the members a report on present and future matters concerning the Central Intelligence Group.

General Vandenberg invited attention to the conclusions contained in the "Progress Report on the Central Intelligence Group" by Admiral Souers, former Director of Central Intelligence./1/ General Vandenberg explained that at the present time each intelligence agency is working along the lines of primary interest to its department. It is his belief that C.I.G. should find out what raw material received by one department is of interest to the others. In order to do this, C.I.G. must be in a position to see and screen all raw material received. For example, as regards a given steel plant, State is studying what products are made there and the rate of production. War Department, however, is interested in the construction and physical details of the plant, the railroads serving it, and other data required for target information. State Department, if it broadened the base of its studies, might well be able to furnish at least part of that type of economic intelligence. It is the job of C.I.G., therefore, to find out the needs of all the departments and to meet them, either by recommending that one department expand its activities or by performing the necessary research in C.I.G. In order to do this, an adequate and capable staff is urgently required in C.I.G. It is extremely difficult administratively to procure the necessary personnel under the present arrangement. General Vandenberg therefore feels that he must have his own funds and be able to hire people. This means that C.I.G. must be set up as an agency by enabling legislation.

/1/Document 154.

Secretary Byrnes expressed the understanding that the N.I.A. was intentionally established as it is in an effort to avoid the necessity for an independent budget.

Secretary Patterson agreed, and explained that this was designed to conceal, for security reasons, the amount of money being spent on central intelligence.

Secretary Byrnes thought that it would be difficult to explain to Congress the need for intelligence funds without jeopardizing security.

General Vandenberg thought that such considerations should be balanced against the added administrative difficulties they caused. He expressed the belief that the important thing was that the Central Intelligence Group should be an effective and efficient organization.

Admiral Leahy said that it was always understood that C.I.G. eventually would broaden its scope. It was felt, however, that the Departments initially could contribute sufficient funds and personnel to get it started. He is about convinced that N.I.A. should now attempt to get its own appropriations. These appropriations, however, should be small, since the three departments should continue to furnish the bulk of the necessary funds.

Secretary Patterson thought that the administrative problems could be worked out under the present arrangements.

Secretary Byrnes believed that the major problem was to find a way for the departments to give C.I.G. the money it needed.

Secretary Patterson stated that he was perfectly willing to direct Army Intelligence to furnish the necessary funds to C.I.G. and then let the Director of Central Intelligence pick his own personnel with those funds. He opposed a separate budget because he does not want to expose these intelligence operations.

Secretary Byrnes agreed that we could not afford to make such disclosures in this country.

General Vandenberg pointed out that each personnel action must be handled at present by 100 people in each department. This means that knowledge of C.I.G. personnel is exposed to 300 people in the three departments. He feels that handling personnel actions within C.I.G. itself would improve security.

Admiral Leahy agreed that it was undesirable that so many people in the departments should have knowledge of C.I.G. He felt that if each department gave C.I.G. funds, personnel actions could be taken by C.I.G. itself without exposing them.

General Vandenberg pointed out that this would still require defending three separate appropriations acts before the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Dr. Langer agreed that the funds would have to be defended before the Congress in any case.

Secretary Byrnes recalled that members of Congress had offered to include the State Department intelligence budget under such terms as "investigations abroad" or as an added amount in any other budget account. He felt that since Congress was apparently willing to do this, the funds might easily be hidden in this manner within departmental budgets.

Dr. Langer thought that Admiral Leahy's suggestion would be very effective. It might be possible to give N.I.A. an independent budget for the more overt activities, and hide other funds in departmental appropriations. This would serve as ideal cover for covert activities. Moreover, he believed that an independent appropriation for C.I.G. would make General Vandenberg more effective in supporting departmental intelligence budgets.

Admiral Leahy felt that this problem must be approached very carefully. He believed that no one was better qualified to advise N.I.A. on this than Secretary Byrnes, with his Congressional background. Admiral Leahy stated that the President authorized him to make it clear that the President considered the responsible agency in the present arrangement to be the N.I.A. The President stated that the Director of Central Intelligence is not responsible further than to carry out the directives of the N.I.A. Admiral Leahy said there were some indications that the Director of Central Intelligence, with the Intelligence Advisory Board, might tend to assume greater control over intelligence activities than was intended. Admiral Leahy reiterated that the President holds the Cabinet officers on N.I.A. primarily responsible for coordination of intelligence activities./2/

/2/The membership of the National Intelligence Authority and the periodic meetings of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy were the same except that Leahy and the Director of Central Intelligence did not participate in the Three Secretaries meetings. The first part of this meeting was a session of the NIA; the second a meeting of the Three Secretaries. John D. Hickerson of the Department of State was responsible for preparing a record of the Secretaries' meeting, but he also took notes on the NIA meeting. In Hickerson's minutes, Leahy reported that "the President stated that the National Intelligence Authority has the responsibility for collection of intelligence; the President expects to look to the National Intelligence Authority for the performance of this task and to hold them responsible for it. The Director of C.I.G. carries out the orders of the National Intelligence Authority and the President expects to deal only with the NIA in regard to intelligence and to hold NIA responsible for the work done by the C.I.G." (Minutes of the Meeting of the Three Secretaries, July 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Branch Reference File, Minutes of Meetings of the Committee of Three 1944-1947) See the Supplement.

Secretary Sullivan compared the Director of Central Intelligence to an executive vice president who carries out the instructions and policies of the N.I.A.

Admiral Leahy stated that with regard to a bill to obtain an independent budget and status for N.I.A., the President considers it inadvisable to attempt to present such a bill before the present Congress. The President feels that there is not enough time for the N.I.A. to give this question sufficient study. The President feels, however, that a bill might be drafted and be under study by the N.I.A. with a view to the possibility of presenting it to the next Congress. Admiral Leahy stated that in the meantime he felt that General Vandenberg should be given, so far as practicable, all the assistance that he requires.

General Vandenberg pointed out that C.I.G. is not an agency authorized to disburse funds. Therefore even with funds from the departments, it would require disbursing and authenticating officers in all three departments, plus the necessary accounting organization in C.I.G. He felt that this was requiring four fiscal operations where one should suffice.

Admiral Leahy suggested, and Secretary Byrnes agreed, that this might be taken care of by the wording of an appropriations act.

Dr. Langer questioned this possibility unless C.I.G. was given status as a disbursing agency.

Secretary Byrnes thought this status could be given the agency by the President under the authority of the Emergency Powers Act.

General Vandenberg said that he understood that this solution was decided against because it might indicate that N.I.A. was a temporary expedient which would terminate with the end of the President's war powers.

Secretary Byrnes was sure that it could be done by the President under his reorganization authority and without reference to the Emergency Powers Act. Secretary Byrnes undertook to talk with the Bureau of the Budget on this matter and report back to the N.I.A.

Admiral Leahy was convinced that C.I.G. must have funds for which it does not have to account in detail.

Dr. Langer questioned whether General Vandenberg was not more concerned over the cumbersome arrangement for handling personnel actions in all three departments.

General Vandenberg stressed the fact that without money there could be no personnel actions. For example, he noted that the State Department does not have sufficient funds to pay personnel required for C.I.G. General Vandenberg agreed, however, that personnel actions were extremely difficult under present arrangements. For example, it takes an average of six weeks to obtain security clearance from the Departments, and he does not feel that he should employ anyone without such clearance. General Vandenberg stressed the fact that his greatest interest was in getting C.I.G. into operation by whatever means possible. He felt that time was of the essence during this critical period.

Secretary Byrnes believed that the only way at present to avoid the administrative difficulties was to arrange to have each department transfer the necessary funds to C.I.G.

General Vandenberg pointed out the difficulty of obtaining funds from the Departments. For example, although the State Department requested about $330,000 for N.I.A., only $178,000 is being made available. While he appreciated the need of the State Department for the other funds, this case exemplified the fact that C.I.G. could never be certain of receiving the funds which it requested and defended unless they were appropriated directly to C.I.G.

Dr. Langer believed that this situation would not recur in the future, but he did agree that State's contribution to C.I.G. was not adequate. He did not see, however, how this could be increased except through a deficiency bill.

Secretary Sullivan asked why additional funds might not be secured from the President's emergency fund.

General Vandenberg stated that total funds available to C.I.G. for the fiscal year 1947 were $12,000,000, which left a shortage for effective operations of $10,000,000. He asked whether it might be possible to obtain permission to spend available funds at an accelerated rate in anticipation of the submission of the deficiency bill.

Secretary Byrnes thought that such permission could not be obtained. He noted that what General Vandenberg had stated was that C.I.G. had $12,000,000 and wanted $22,000,000.

Dr. Langer questioned whether any mechanism was to be available for reviewing this proposed budget.

General Vandenberg stated that he had the details available. He noted, however, that comprehensive review meant that this information must be widely disclosed to personnel in three departments.

Secretary Sullivan felt that since the President's remarks indicated that he held N.I.A. responsible, they must know the details regarding any C.I.G. budget request.

At Secretary Byrnes' request, General Vandenberg then made a brief report on C.I.G. activities. He noted that C.I.G. was taking over Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service and all clandestine foreign intelligence activities. In addition, however, C.I.G. is receiving daily requests to take over functions now being done by various State, War and Navy Committees. One example is the suggestion that C.I.G. centralize the handling of codes and ciphers to improve their security. Another example is the concern of the War Department about exchange of information with the British. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has a subcommittee covering this exchange but it handles only about 20 or 30 percent of the information actually exchanged. This subcommittee confines itself purely to secret matters, whereas the Army Air Forces believe that a central clearing house should be established where the bargaining value of this information may also be taken into account.

Dr. Langer pointed out that the SWNCC subcommittee deals only with technical military information. He feels, however, that the problem also involves such matters as the transfer of non-military information and the declassification of material. Unless these matters are centralized, each department will continue, as at present, going its own way.

General Vandenberg reported that he has already set up an Office of Special Operations. He has also established an Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, but only on a skeleton basis because of his need for additional personnel.

Secretary Patterson felt that all of General Vandenberg's present problems should be solved if the Secretary of State can obtain help from the Bureau of the Budget.

General Vandenberg stated his problems, briefly, were that he needed money, the authority to spend it, and the authority to hire and fire.

Secretary Byrnes felt there were really two problems: First, to find ways to handle the money now available, and second, to get whatever additional funds are required. He thought it would be difficult to get additional funds fifteen days after the fiscal year had begun. He questioned whether present funds should not be sufficient since the understanding was that C.I.G. was primarily continuing functions which have been previously performed.

General Vandenberg explained that C.I.G. was now undertaking certain new functions and also expanding some existing ones. In answer to questions, General Vandenberg stated that he proposed to have about 1900 people in secret intelligence and a total of something less than 3000 in C.I.G. by the end of the fiscal year.

Dr. Langer stated that he agreed with almost everything that General Vandenberg had said, but that he was impressed with the imposing size of the proposed organization. He thought there should be a definite review of the program before a request for an additional $10,000,000 is approved.

General Vandenberg pointed out that there is a clear need for additional appropriations for intelligence in view of changing conditions. During the war there were American forces all over the world who were procuring information and intelligence in connection with military operations. These operations were not considered as intelligence activities, however, and the funds required for them were not charged to intelligence. These operations are now shrinking rapidly. It is necessary therefore, to have intelligence agents all over the world to get the same information which during the war was handed to intelligence agencies on a silver platter.

Secretary Patterson agreed with this statement. He noted that in each theater of operations G-2 activities were merely a part of the Army's operations and were not considered to be part of the intelligence organization directed from Washington.

General Vandenberg then discussed briefly his proposed organization chart for the Central Intelligence Group. He noted that there would be an Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff to assist in the coordination of all intelligence activities related to the national security. There would then be four offices to conduct C.I.G. operations, namely, Special Operations, Collection, Research and Evaluation, and Dissemination.

After further discussion,

The National Intelligence Authority:

a. Noted General Vandenberg's report on the Central Intelligence Group.

b. Noted that the Secretary of State would discuss with the Bureau of the Budget the solution of the problems mentioned by General Vandenberg, and would report back to the Authority./3/

/3/For the results of Byrnes' efforts, see Documents 199 and 200 and their enclosures.

c. Noted the organization of the Central Intelligence Group which General Vandenberg was planning to put into effect.

199. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg) to the National Intelligence Authority

Washington, July 30, 1946.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-804, Item 2, Job 84-B00443R, Box 7. Confidential. The source text is a transcript prepared for the CIA Historian on September 4, 1952.

SUBJECT
Establishment of a Special Working Fund for the Central Intelligence Group

REFERENCE
Minutes of N.I.A. 4th Meeting/1/

/1/See Document 198.

1. At the fourth meeting of the National Intelligence Authority, the Secretary of State undertook to discuss with the Bureau of the Budget the solution of the problems mentioned at that meeting by General Vandenberg. One of these problems was to devise a means whereby any funds made available for C.I.G. activities authorized by N.I.A. will be transferred by the State, War, and Navy Departments to the Director of Central Intelligence, and expended under the supervision of the N.I.A. by him without the cumbersome and duplicative administrative procedures now required.

2. The Secretary of State discussed this matter with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and personnel from the Central Intelligence Group subsequently explored the problem in detail with representatives of the Bureau of the Budget, the Treasury Department, and the General Accounting Office. The Bureau of the Budget and the Treasury Department have definitely indicated a willingness to cooperate, and the General Accounting Office has promised to give the matter sympathetic consideration. All three agencies have indicated that the transmittal of the enclosed letter is now in order, and that it will be considered expeditiously.

3. It is therefore recommended that the National Intelligence Authority approve the transmittal of the enclosed letter, and that it be signed by the Cabinet members as indicated therein.

Hoyt S. Vandenberg/2/
Lieutenant General, USA

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Vandenberg signed the original.

Enclosure/3/

/3/Confidential. The source text is marked "copy" and may be a transcript made for the CIA Historian, although it is not so marked.

Letter From the National Intelligence Authority to Secretary of the Treasury Snyder and the Comptroller General (Warren)

Washington, July 30, 1946.

Dear Sir: In accordance with the Presidential directive of 22 January 1946, the National Intelligence Authority has, through a series of directives to the Director of Central Intelligence, established over-all policies for foreign intelligence activities related to the national security, and has directed that the Central Intelligence Group engage in certain centralized intelligence activities which are of common interest to the Departments herein concerned. To implement properly the wishes of the President, the National Intelligence Authority has found it necessary to provide the Director of Central Intelligence with administrative and operational facilities which involve expenditure of funds and furnishing of personnel and equipment. This threefold method of supply has become so cumbersome as to impair seriously the administration of the Central Intelligence Group, and is becoming an important threat to the security of its operations.

We desire, therefore, under the provisions of Section 214 of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1946, to make available to the Central Intelligence Group, from the appropriations of the three Departments mentioned, amounts authorized by Congress for the support of intelligence activities and such other funds as it is in our discretion to use for this purpose. To administer these funds, it is proposed to establish a special working fund, as provided for in Section 601 of the Act of June 30, 1932 (47 Stat. 417). This fund will be, for record purposes, in the War Department, but, with the approval of the Secretary of War, its administration and fiscal supervision will be solely by officers of the Central Intelligence Group. Upon the establishment of such a working fund, it is proposed, in addition to committing such funds of our respective Departments for administration by the Central Intelligence Group, to delegate to the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representatives the necessary authorities for the administration of those funds, for personnel actions, for procurement of equipment and supplies, and for the certification of vouchers. We are informed that the Bureau of the Budget is in full accord with the establishment of such a working fund.

We therefore request, on behalf of the Departments we represent and in our capacity as members of the National Intelligence Authority, that you establish such a working fund under the provisions of Section 601 of the Act of June 30, 1932 (47 Stat. 417). All officials of our Departments and of the Central Intelligence Group are prepared to give you complete cooperation./4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates the original was signed by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and by Admiral Leahy, the President's Personal Representative on the NIA.

200. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg) to the National Intelligence Authority

Washington, August 21, 1946.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-804, Item 2, Job 84-B00442R, Box 7. Confidential. The source text is a transcript made for the CIA Historian on September 4, 1952.

SUBJECT
Delegation of Authority to Utilize Special Working Fund

REFERENCE
Letter from N.I.A. to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller General dated 30 July 1946/1/

/1/See the enclosure to Document 199.

In the reference letter, the National Intelligence Authority requested the establishment of a special working fund to administer funds made available by the State, War and Navy Departments to the Central Intelligence Group. The N.I.A. stated that "Upon the establishment of such a working fund, it is proposed, in addition to committing such funds of our respective Departments for administration by the Central Intelligence Group, to delegate to the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representatives the necessary authorities for the administration of those funds, for personnel actions, for procurement of equipment and supplies, and for the certification of vouchers."

The special working fund has now been established and the enclosed letter is designed to provide the additional authorizations which the N.I.A. proposed in the above quotation. This letter has been coordinated with representatives of the Treasury Department and the Comptroller General, and has been agreed to by them in principle.

It is requested that each member of the National Intelligence Authority, in turn, sign the enclosed letter and transmit to the next addressee, returning the letter to the undersigned when all the signatures have been affixed. Sufficient copies are also attached to enable each member to detach one copy for file.

Hoyt S. Vandenberg/2/

Lieutenant General, USA

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Enclosure/3/

/3/Confidential. It appears that this is not a draft but a copy of the signed original.

Letter From the National Intelligence Authority to the Comptroller General (Warren)

Washington, September 5, 1946.

Dear Sir: In our letter of 30 July 1946, we requested that you establish a working fund to assist in carrying out the President's wishes in regard to foreign intelligence activities. We proposed in that letter to authorize the Director of Central Intelligence to direct the administration and fiscal supervision of such a working fund upon its establishment. With approval of the Treasury Department and the Comptroller General, Working Fund, War, General, 1947, has been constituted and has been assigned the symbol number 2175900.

In order to comply with the Presidential Directive of 22 January 1946 that the Director of Central Intelligence perform such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally, we now on behalf of the Departments we represent, and in our capacity as members of the National Intelligence Authority, authorize the Director, subject to policies established by the National Intelligence Authority, to control, supervise and administer this working fund with full powers in respect thereto as would otherwise have been exercised by us over the funds contributed to the working fund by our respective Departments, including the powers and authority granted by the Military Appropriation Act, 1947, and the Naval Appropriation Act, 1947, approved July 8, 1946 (Public Law 492-79th Congress), pertaining to certificates of expenditures and determinations of propriety of expenditures.

The Director of Central Intelligence and his authorized representatives shall arrange with your Departments such procedures, practices and controls as are necessary to meet your requirements, and the Working Fund, War, General, 1947 shall be subject only to the immediate control of the Director in accordance with policies established by the National Intelligence Authority.

Dean Acheson/4/
Acting Secretary of State

/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of War

Forrestal
Secretary of the Navy

William D. Leahy
Personal Representative of the President on N.I.A.

Continue with Document 201