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Foreign Relations of the United States
1945-1950
Emergence of the Intelligence EstablishmentDepartment of State
Washington, DC
The National Security Act of 1947
201. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg) to the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)
Washington, December 2, 1946.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, National Military Establishment: CIA. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
Proposed enabling legislation for the establishment of a Central Intelligence AgencyTransmitted herewith is a proposed draft of enabling legislation for the Central Intelligence Agency./1/ It is somewhat more detailed and comprehensive than the draft submitted last July.
/1/Not printed. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
The current draft has been expanded in the light of the experiences of the last ten months and the administrative facilities available. However, it does not materially change the interdepartmental relationships conceived in the original Presidential letter of January 22, 1946.
Section 1 (a) of the current draft consists of Findings and Declaration.
Section 1 (b) Consists of the Purpose of Act.
Section 2 consists of Definitions, as it was felt, in line with your Memorandum to General Vandenberg of July 12, 1946,/2/ that a definition of terms was desirable.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 197.
Section 3 (a) sets forth the Organization of the National Intelligence Authority, and delineates its powers. This is also in line with your Memorandum of July 12.
Section 3 (b) sets forth the Organization of the Central Intelligence Agency. The salaries have been set on a level established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946./3/ It was felt that this was necessary in order to attract the highest calibre of personnel to the Agency. In addition subsection (5) has been included in order to avail ourselves of experienced, retired personnel of the Armed Forces. The language is similar to that of Public Law 718 (79th Congress),/4/ which made similar provisions for the Veterans' Administration.
/3/Approved August 1, 1946; 60 Stat. 755.
/4/Approved August 10, 1946; 60 Stat. 978.
Section 3 (c) establishes the Intelligence Advisory Board.
Section 4 sets forth the Functions of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Section 5 has been omitted. It is thought to include, at a later date, a section on Control of Information, somewhat similar to Section 10 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. This has been delayed, pending receipt of information as to the position to be taken by the Department of Justice on revisions to the Espionage Laws recommended by the War and Navy Departments and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Section 6 contains the General Authority, including a provision for termination of employment of personnel in the interests of the United States. This is similar to a provision in the Department of State Appropriation Act, 1947 (Public Law 470, 79th Congress, p. 14)./5/
/5/Approved June 29, 1946; 60 Stat. 339.
Section 7 is the section on Appropriations.
Section 8 is the section on Separability of Provisions.
Section 9 is the Short Title.
There is also included herewith a copy of your Memorandum for General Vandenberg, dated July 12, 1946, Subject: Proposed Bill for the establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency, and a Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence containing comments addressed to your Memorandum./6/
/6/Memorandum, Houston to Vandenberg, July 16, 1946. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Troy Papers) See the Supplement.
For the Director of Central Intelligence:
E.K. Wright
Colonel, GSC
Executive to DirectorEnclosure
A BILL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY AND A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
Declaration of Policy
Sec. 1. (a) Findings and Declaration.
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive and continuous program which will effectively accomplish the national intelligence mission of the United States by supplying the President of the United States, the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, and such other governmental officials as shall be appropriate, with foreign intelligence of the highest possible calibre. To accomplish this mission, a central intelligence agency is required by the United States. This agency shall insure the production of the foreign intelligence necessary to enable the appropriate officials of the Government to be informed fully in their dealings with other nations, and to enable these officials to formulate national policies and plans which this Government is to pursue in order to avert future armed conflicts and assure the common defense and security of the United States. The accomplishment of this service is the national intelligence mission of the United States.
Experience preceding, during, and following two World Wars has proven that the uncoordinated decentralization of the collection, research, and dissemination of foreign intelligence information among many departments and agencies of the Government is unsatisfactory. In an attempt to remedy this situation in times of national crises, emergency means have repeatedly been adopted. These experiences have shown the need for a permanent, centralized, intelligence agency so that all the foreign intelligence sources and facilities of the Government may be utilized to the fullest extent in the production of foreign intelligence, and so that their greatest potentialities may be realized most efficiently and economically, with a resultant elimination of unproductive duplication and unnecessary overlapping of functions in the accomplishment of the national intelligence mission of the United States.
Accordingly, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the people of the United States that in order to strengthen the hand of the Government in formulating national policies and conducting relations with other nations, and subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and security, the foreign intelligence activities, functions, and services of the Government be fully coordinated, and, when determined in accordance with the provisions of this Act, be operated centrally for the accomplishment of the national intelligence mission of the United States.
Section 1. (b) Purpose of Act.
It is the purpose of this Act to carry out the policies set forth in Section 1 (a) by providing for the execution, among others, of the following major programs relating to intelligence:
(1) A program for the centralized operation of such foreign intelligence activities of the Federal Government as the National Intelligence Authority determines can so be performed most effectively, efficiently, and economically.
(2) A program for the planning and development of all foreign intelligence activities of the Federal Government, and including the coordination of those activities of the departments and agencies of the Government designed for the production of foreign intelligence.
(3) A program for the collection of foreign intelligence information by any and all means deemed effective.
(4) A program of evaluation, correlation, and interpretation of the foreign intelligence information collected, in order to produce intelligence for the President and the appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government.
(5) A program for dissemination to the President and the appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government of the intelligence produced.
(6) A program for the full administration and implementation of the above.
Definitions
Sec. 2. As used in this Act.
(1) The term "foreign intelligence" shall be construed to mean the product of the timely evaluation, correlation, and interpretation of foreign intelligence information.
(2) The term "foreign intelligence information" shall be construed to mean all data pertaining to foreign governments or areas, which may affect the foreign policy or the national defense and security of the United States.
(3) The term "research" shall be construed to mean a process of evaluation (selection), correlation (synthesis), and interpretation (analysis) of intelligence information for the production of intelligence.
(4) The term "evaluation" shall be construed to mean a process of systematic and critical examination of intelligence information for the purpose of determining its usefulness, credibility, and accuracy.
(5) The term "correlation" shall be construed to mean a process of synthesis of intelligence information with all available related material.
(6) The term "interpretation" shall be construed to mean a process of determining the probable significance of evaluated intelligence information.
Organization
Sec. 3 (a) National Intelligence Authority.
(1) There is hereby established a National Intelligence Authority (hereinafter called the Authority) of five members. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy shall be members of the Authority. The President shall designate a fourth member of the Authority to serve as his personal representative thereon. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the personal representative of the President shall constitute the sole voting members of the Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence, hereinafter provided for, shall sit as the fifth member of the Authority, as a non-voting member thereof. The Secretary of State shall serve as Chairman of the Authority.
(2) The members of the Authority shall hold their positions thereon by virtue of their respective offices. The members of the Authority shall serve without compensation for this service and shall perform this serv-ice in addition to such other activities, public or private, as they may engage in.
(3) In the absence of the Secretaries of State, War, or the Navy, the appropriate Acting Secretary shall sit as a member of the Authority. If the personal representative of the President is absent, the Secretaries (or Acting Secretaries) of State, War, and the Navy shall constitute a quorum of the Authority.
(4) The Authority shall hold such meetings, conduct such hearings, and receive such reports as may be necessary to enable it to carry out the provisions of this Act. The Authority shall meet at least once each month.
(5) The Authority shall be served by a Secretariat, consisting, of a Secretary and such other technical, administrative, and clerical assist-ance as the Authority shall deem necessary. The Central Intelligence Agency, hereinafter provided for, shall be responsible for furnishing the Secretariat with personnel. The Secretariat of the Authority shall also serve as the Secretariat of the Intelligence Advisory Board, hereinafter provided for, performing the same duties for this Board as for the Authority.
(6) The Authority shall determine policies and objectives for, and supervise and direct, the Central Intelligence Agency, hereinafter provided for, in the planning, development, and coordination of the foreign intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government, as well as in the conduct of those foreign intelligence operations performed centrally, in such manner as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.
(7) The Authority shall have the right to transfer responsibilities and authorities in the field of foreign intelligence between departments and agencies of the Government.
(8) Policies approved by the Authority in relation to the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, insofar as they affect the national defense and security, shall govern the intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies of the Government.
(9) If the decisions of the Authority on matters set forth in Sec. 3 (a) (6) and (7) of this Act are not unanimous, the Authority shall refer the matter to the President, whose decision shall be final.
Sec. 3 (b) Central Intelligence Agency.
(1) There is hereby established a Central Intelligence Agency (hereinafter called the Agency), with a Director of Central Intelligence who shall be the head thereof, to be appointed from civilian or military life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at the pleasure of the President. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of $17,500 per annum.
(2) There shall be a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, appointed from civilian or military life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at the pleasure of the President. The Deputy Director shall receive compensation at the rate of $15,000 per annum. The Deputy Director shall be authorized to sign such letters, papers, and documents, and to perform such other duties as may be directed by the Director of Central Intelligence, and to act as Director in the absence of that officer, or in the case of a vacancy in the office of Director.
(3) The functions of the Agency, as outlined in Sec. 4 of this Act, shall be performed by the appropriate offices of the Agency. Each office shall be under the direction of an Assistant Director, who shall be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence, and shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 per annum. The Assistant Directors shall be not less than four (4) and not exceed six (6) in number.
(4) Any officer of the Department of State, or of the Foreign Service of the United States, and any commissioned officer of the United States Army, the United States Navy, or the United States Army Air Forces, may be assigned to or detailed for duty with the Agency; and such service shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the Department of State, the Foreign Service of the United States, the United States Army, the United States Navy, or the United States Army Air Forces, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade, notwithstanding the provisions of Title 10 U.S. Code, Sec. 576 and Public Law 724, 79th Congress, approved August 13, 1946,/7/ and entitled "An Act to improve, strengthen, and expand the Foreign Service of the United States and to consolidate and revise the laws relating to its administration," or any other law pertaining to such pay and allowances. Any such officer of the Department of State, the Foreign Service of the United States, or commissioned officer on the active list shall receive, while serving in a position established in Sec. 3 (b) of this Act, the State Department, the Foreign Service, or the pay and allowances payable to an officer of his grade and length of service, and shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at a rate equal to the difference between the salary set forth for such position in Sec. 3 (b) of this Act and the amount of such State Department, Foreign Service, or military pay and allowances.
/7/60 Stat. 999.
(5) Notwithstanding section 2 of the Act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 205), as amended (5 U.S.C. 62), or section 6 of the Act of May 10, 1916 (39 Stat. 120), as amended (5 U.S.C. 58, 59), the Director of Central Intelligence may appoint to, and employ in, any civilian office or position in the Agency, and pay, any retired commissioned officer, or retired warrant officer, of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Public Health Service. The retired status, office rank, and grade of retired commissioned officers, or retired warrant officers, so appointed or employed and, except as provided in section 212 of the Act of June 30, 1932 (47 Stat. 406), as amended (5 U.S.C. 59a), any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade, shall be in no way affected by reason of such appointment to or employment in, or by reason of service in, or acceptance or holding of, any civilian office or position in the Agency or the receipt of the pay thereof.
Section 3. (c) Intelligence Advisory Board.
(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board, (hereinafter called the Board), consisting of the heads (or their representatives) of those civilian and military intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to the national defense and security, as determined, from time to time, by the National Intelligence Authority.
(2) Members of the Board shall serve without compensation for this service and shall perform this service in addition to such other activities, public or private, as they may engage in.
(3) The Intelligence Advisory Board shall be served by a Secretariat, as provided for in Section 3 (a) (5) of this Act.
(4) Any recommendation of the Agency which is approved unanimously by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Board, and which they have the existing authority to execute, may be put into effect without action by the Authority.
(5) Any recommendation of the Agency which does not receive such unanimous concurrence shall be submitted to the Authority for decision, together with the dissenting opinions.
Functions
Sec. 4. Functions of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(a) In order to assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission of the United States, the Agency shall, under the supervision and direction of the Authority:
(1) Develop and recommend to the Authority establishment of over-all policies, plans, requirements, objectives, and procedures to assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission and to implement the provisions of this Act;
(2) Coordinate such of the foreign intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national defense and security;
(3) Collect foreign intelligence information originating outside the continental limits of the United States by any and all means deemed effective;
(4) Give timely evaluation, correlation, and interpretation to foreign intelligence information;
(5) Disseminate national intelligence to the President and appropriate departments and agencies of the Government;
(6) Operate such foreign intelligence services as the Authority determines can best be performed, or be more efficiently or economically accomplished, centrally;
(7) Administer the personnel and logistical needs of the Agency, including the procurement, training, and supervision of the Agency's personnel, its budgetary requirements and disbursement of funds, and the provision of administrative and logistical support for the foreign activities of the Agency;
(8) Be responsible for fully protecting sources and methods used in the collection of foreign intelligence information received by the Agency;
(9) Provide for the internal security of the Agency, including the complete security of its policies, plans, requirements, objectives, procedures, operations, and personnel;
(10) Formulate and promulgate integrated security policies and procedures pertaining to the safeguarding of classified information and matter of the various departments and agencies of the Government, in the interest of the national defense and security; and
(11) Perform such other functions and duties relating to foreign intelligence as the President or the Authority may direct.
(b) The responsibility and authority of the departments and agencies of the Government to collect, evaluate, correlate, interpret, and disseminate departmental intelligence shall not be affected, except to the extent that the Authority may relieve them of such responsibility and authority pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 3 (a) (8) of this Act.
(c) As required in the carrying out of the provisions of this Act, there will be made immediately available on a continuing basis to the Agency all intelligence, information, and such facilities as may be necessary, in the possession of the various departments and agencies of the Government.
(d) To the extent recommended by the National Intelligence Authority, the intelligence operations of the departments and agencies of the Government shall be open to inspection by the Agency in connection with its planning functions.
(e) The Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or functions, nor shall it have any functions concerning the internal security of the United States except as specifically authorized by Secs. 4 (a) (8) (9) and (10) of this Act.
General Authority
Section 6. In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to:
(1) Procure necessary services, supplies and equipment without regard to the provisions of Section 3709, Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5), as amended, upon certification by the Director, or an official designated by him for that purpose, that such action is necessary in the interest of the common defense and security or upon a showing that advertising is not reasonably practicable, and partial and advance payments may be made under contracts for such purpose;
(2) Pay quarters and cost of living allowances or in lieu thereof a salary differential to employees having permanent station outside the continental limits of the United States;
(3) Transfer to and receive from funds available to other departments or agencies of the Government such sums as may be authorized by the Bureau of the Budget, either as advance payment or reimbursement of appropriation, for the performance of any of the functions or activities authorized in this Act, and any other department or agency of the Government is authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law concerning transfers between appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of this Act without regard to limitations of other appropriations;
(4) Order to the continental United States on leave of absence any officer or employee of the Agency upon completion of two (2) years continuous service abroad, and pay travel expenses incident thereto of employees and their dependents to their place of residence in the United States and return. Such leave will not exceed sixty (60) calendar days, and will be exclusive of time actually and necessarily spent in travel and awaiting transportation;
(5) Reimburse other Government departments and agencies for services of personnel assigned to the Agency, and other departments and agencies are hereby authorized so to assign or detail any officer or employee for duty with the Agency;
(6) Exchange funds without regard to Section 3651 Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 543);
(7) Authorize couriers designated by the Director to carry firearms when engaged in transportation of confidential documents and materials affecting the national defense and security;
(8) Establish advisory boards to advise with and make recommendations to the Agency on administration, legislation, operations, policies, research, and other matters;
(9) Make such studies and investigations, obtain such information, and hold such hearings as the Agency may deem necessary or proper to assist it in exercising any authority provided in this Act, or in the administration or enforcement of this Act, or any regulations or directives issued thereunder; and
(10) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his absolute discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.
Appropriations
Section 7. Appropriations:
(a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act.
(b) Within the limits of such appropriations, the Director is authorized to employ persons and means and made expenditures, at the seat of government and elsewhere, for personal services, rent, travel expenses, preparation and transportation of the remains of officers and employees who die abroad or in transit, while in dispatch of their official duties, to their former homes in this country or to a place not more distant for interment, and for ordinary expenses of such interment; rental of news-reporting services; purchase of or subscription to law books, books of reference, periodicals, newspapers, commercial and trade reports; purchase or rental and operation of photographic, reproduction, cryptographic, duplication and printing machines, equipment and devices, and radio-receiving and radio-sending equipment and devices including telegraph and teletype equipment; purchase, maintenance, operation, repair and hire of motor-propelled or horse-drawn passenger- carrying vehicles and other vehicles, aircraft, and vessels of all kinds; printing and binding; purchase, maintenance, and cleaning of firearms.
(c) The Acts appropriating such sums may appropriate specified portions thereof which may be expended, (A) without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds or the employment of persons in the Government service; (B) for objects of a confidential nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.
Separability of Provisions
Section 8. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.
Short Title
Section 9. This Act may be cited as the "Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1947".
202. Draft Central Intelligence Group Memorandum
Washington, undated.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 3. Secret. The source text, attached to a copy of Document 201, may be the document referred to in Vandenberg's office diary for December 9, 1946, which notes: "went to see Mr. Clifford at the White House with the article for the President's 'State of the Union' speech to find out if he approved our project of advocating immediate legislation." (Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 80-01731R, Box 31, Folder 1) Vandenberg also alluded to the possible inclusion of a recommendation for intelligence legislation in the State of the Union message in his January 8 conversation with Clifford; see Document 203.
MATERIAL PROPOSED BY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INCLUSION IN THE PRESIDENT'S "STATE OF THE UNION" MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, JANUARY 1947
The vital and urgent need of this nation for effective foreign intelligence has been amply demonstrated both by our pre-war and war-time experiences. This need has been recognized in the Congress by a number of bipartisan committee recommendations. During this atomic age in which the United States has pledged its fullest energies to the establishment and maintenance of a just and lasting peace, our statesmen who are charged with this heavy responsibility must not be asked to steer the ship of state over an uncharted course. The difficult and far-reaching decisions they are called upon to make must be based upon a clear knowledge and understanding of present and probable future developments in other countries if we are to live with them in peace and security. We have also learned from bitter experience that responsibility must be placed on one agency to ensure that this essential information pertaining to our interests in foreign lands is collected, interpreted and distributed to appropriate officials in cooperation with existing facilities such as the Foreign Service. Therefore, in line with the apparent desires of the Congress and in view of the demonstrated urgency, I directed last January the establishment of a National Intelligence Authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy and my personal representative, Fleet Admiral Leahy, to plan, develop and coordinate all Federal foreign intelligence activities. To assist this Authority, there was created a Central Intelligence Group under a Director of Central Intelligence who was charged with performing those intelligence services of common concern which could be more efficiently accomplished centrally, including coordination of departmental intelligence activities, and the production and dissemination to appropriate Government officials of strategic and national policy intelligence. This organization during its year of existence has clearly proved itself an effective and essential instrument of Government. To realize its full capabilities, however, this agency should have the benefit of permanent authorization from the Congress. I therefore urgently recommend that Congress give early consideration to the passage of enabling legislation for the National Intelligence Authority and a Central Intelligence Agency so that never in the future will our national interests or security be placed in jeopardy for lack of accurate and timely intelligence concerning foreign developments.
[Here follows the text of Document 201.]
203. Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, January 8, 1947.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of George M. Elsey, Central Intelligence. No classification marking. Drafted on January 9 by Elsey.
Lt. General Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, discussed with Mr. Clifford the proposal of Central Intelligence Group that legislation be introduced to authorize the establishment on a statutory basis of the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group.
It had been Vandenberg's understanding since last June when he first submitted a proposed bill to Mr. Clifford for comment, that the White House favored such legislation. He had also been led to believe that the President might include a recommendation along these lines in the State of the Union message.
Mr. Clifford told him on 8 January that such a recommendation had been included in the early drafts of the message but that both Admiral Leahy and the President felt that it was undesirable and unnecessary to bring this matter to the attention of the Congress at the present.
General Vandenberg stated that he believed that the NIA favored such legislation. Vandenberg will lay the matter before NIA and report its decision to Dr. Clifford.
G.M.E.
Commander, U.S.N.R.204. Memorandum From the Chief of the Legislative Liaison Division of the Central Intelligence Group (Pforzheimer) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg)
Washington, January 23, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Troy Papers, CIG and NSA of '47. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
Proposed Bill for National Defense Act of 19471. The following recommendations are made for changes and additions to the First Rough Draft of the proposed bill for merger of the Armed Forces:/1/
/1/Not found.
a. The title of the draft bill should be amended to read as follows:
"To promote the national defense by providing for three functionally balanced mil departments unified under a Sec of Nat Defense, to establish a Central Intelligence Agency, and for further integration, under a Council of Nat Def, with all other departments and agencies of the Gov concerned with the national defense."
This will serve to include the establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency as one of the purposes of the bill (page 1).
b. The Declaration of Policy (section 2, page 1) should be amended to include reference to the need of centralizing intelligence, and the intent of Congress to provide for such centralization as set forth in Section 1(a) of the proposed CIG Enabling Act./2/ This should include detailed reference to the major programs relating to intelligence as outlined in Section1(b) of the proposed CIG Enabling Act.
/2/See the enclosure to Document 201.
c. A section of "Definitions" should be included in an appropriate place in the draft so that such terms as "foreign intelligence", "foreign intelligence information", and similar phrases which have a particular meaning with reference to intelligence are not misconstrued. This is in accordance with Section 2 of the proposed CIG Enabling Act.
d. After Section 101(b) (page 2) there should be added a section substantially as follows:
"The Director of Central Intelligence shall serve as the Advisor to the Council on all matters pertaining to national intelligence. In this capacity he shall attend all meetings of the Council but shall take no part in the decisions thereof."
e. Section 102(a) (page 4) does not specifically create a Central Intelligence Agency, nor does it spell out chain of command and the authority which shall exercise policy guidance and control. In addition, the personnel provisions are felt to be inadequate in that they do not provide for direct employment by the agency of personnel of its own choosing. It is felt that Section 3(b) of the proposed CIG Enabling Act is generally preferable as establishing more clearly the nature of the agency. However, this section would have to be amended to make clear that the Director of Central Intelligence would report to the Council of National Defense but would receive policy guidance and control from a committee of the Council consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Defense, and the President's Personal Representative, if any.
f. Section 102(b) (page 5) should be eliminated in its entirety. This section defines the duties of the agency in terms which are extremely loose and lacking in detail. In its place should be put the provisions of Section 4(a) of the proposed CIG Enabling Act. The latter sections delineate the functions of the agency in far greater detail with less chance of misinterpretation or evasion. In addition, Section 4(a) gives the agency the right to supervise its personnel, its budgetary requirements and disbursements of funds, and specifically provides for administrative and logistical support for the foreign activities of the agency. Also Section 4(a) was written to set forth the functions of CIG in accordance with the offices into which CIG has been broken down. The draft submitted by the White House does not include any specific provision for the collection of foreign intelligence information.
g. The first sentence of Section 102(c) (page 7) permits other agencies to continue general intelligence activities. This should be amended to limit them strictly to departmental intelligence as provided by Section 4(b) of the proposed CIG Enabling Act. The remainder of Section 102(c), which provides that the agency shall have no police power, etc., should be qualified to the extent of permitting it to control its own security in accordance with Sections 4(a), (8), (9), (10) and 4 (e) of the proposed CIG Enabling Act.
h. Sections 102(d) and (e) (page 7) deal with the relationship of the Central Intelligence Agency with other intelligence agencies of the Government, and the use of their facilities. It is felt that the language of Sections 4(c) and (d) of the proposed CIG Enabling Act is preferable in that it provides for the full availability of both information and facilities on a continuing basis whereas the proposed draft from the White House is somewhat weaker.
i. The Director of Central Intelligence should be eliminated from the provisions of Section 404 (page 28) of the proposed draft inasmuch as these provisions tend to limit his powers of appointment of personnel to exempted positions and on unvouchered funds, and particularly his power to discharge employees for security reasons.
j. The draft act proposed by the White House nowhere provides for the authorities which are essential to the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. These include special procurement authorities, authorization for transfers between appropriations, certain special personnel practices, the right to exchange funds, and certain other but necessary powers. The proposed bill does not provide for appropriations for the Central Intelligence Agency nor for the special expenditures which should be authorized in these appropriations, particularly expenditures of a confidential nature to be accounted for on the certification of the Director, and expenditures otherwise made without regard to provisions of law and regulations relating to Government funds. The above special powers and authorizations should be added to the proposed bill as Sections 407 and 408 in the general form proposed by the CIG Enabling Act, Sections 6 and 7.
Walter L. Pforzheimer
205. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, undated.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Troy Papers, Legislation 1947. Confidential. The source text is undated; the date is from a handwritten date on the copy reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 105-109.
SUBJECT
Proposed Legislation for C.I.G.Sometime shortly after 1600 hours on 22 January 1947, a copy of the proposed National Defense Act of 1947/1/ was delivered to the Director of Central Intelligence for comment on those sections applicable to him. Immediate review of the intelligence sections indicated that they had been lifted virtually verbatim from S-2044, the Merger Bill introduced into the 79th Congress by Senator Thomas. These provisions are considered unsatisfactory to C.I.G. in many respects. The salient features of disagreement are included in the Memorandum from the undersigned to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 23 January 1947, subject: Proposed Bill for National Defense Act of 1947./2/
/1/Not found.
/2/Document 204.
A conference with the Director established the policy that an attempt should not be made to remove from the Defense Act all but a bare mention of the Central Intelligence Agency, and introduce a separate CIG Bill. The Director also indicated his desire to have included a provision that he would serve as the advisor to the Council on National Defense on matters pertaining to intelligence, and that in this capacity he would attend all meetings of the Council. It was agreed that the Director should take no part in the decisions of the Council as this was a policy making body, and it had long been agreed that Central Intelligence should not be involved in policy making.
At 1000 hours, 23 January 1947, a conference was held in the office of Mr. Charles S. Murphy, Administrative Assistant to the President, at which General Vandenberg, Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, Major General Lauris Norstad, the undersigned, and Mr. Houston were present. Mr. Murphy stated that the subject was new to him, as he had first entered the picture on 20 January 1947 and was charged with the over-all drafting of the White House version of the National Defense Act. He stated that he did not know that a proposed CIG enabling act had been submitted to Mr. Clifford's office. He suggested (concurred in by all present) that the draft of the proposed CIG enabling act be substituted for the intelligence sections of the proposed National Defense Act as an initial working basis.
In connection with paragraph 1 (a) of the memorandum for the Director from the undersigned, dated 23 January 1947, it was pointed out that no mention of CIA had been made in the title of the proposed bill. This was due to the fact that a considerable number of boards and councils were created by this bill and none of them were being named in the title. Therefore, it would not seem appropriate to mention CIA in the title. In this General Vandenberg concurred.
The proposed draft of the National Defense Act of 1947 was modified by the undersigned, with the assistance of Mr. Houston, to include the changes discussed at the meeting, and to incorporate the necessary. provisions of the proposed CIG enabling act. Copies of the revised act/3/ were personally handed to Admiral Sherman and General Norstad by Lt. Botsford shortly after 1700, 23 January 1947. A copy was also handed to Mr. Murphy by the undersigned at 1715. A copy of NIA Directive #5 was shown to Mr. Murphy. It was not left with him, due to the absence of any security in his office. Mr. Murphy suggested the addition of a paragraph providing for the dissolution of NIA and CIG, and the transfer of its personnel, property, and records to the Agency. This was concurred in on 24 January 1947 by the undersigned, after one or two minor changes.
/3/Not found.
On 25 January, the undersigned talked with Mr. Murphy, and was informed that all but the barest mention of CIA would be omitted, as the drafting committee thought that the material submitted by CIG was too controversial and might hinder the passage of the merger legislation.
It had been felt by the drafting committee that the substantive portions of the proposed CIG draft were too controversial and subject to attack by other agencies. It was further felt that the General Authorities were rather controversial from a Congressional point of view, but that CIG might justify them in their own bill if they had the time to present them adequately. It was further felt that if detailed intelligence legislation was included in the merger bill CIG might not have time to present their picture to the Congress in detail in the course of the hearings.
The undersigned asked Mr. Murphy whether the elimination of CIA from merger legislation constituted permission to submit our own enabling act as a companion measure. He stated that he could not comment on this, as he was authorized (with his drafting committee) only to draft the merger bill, and could not approve or pass on other matters. Authority to draft and introduce a CIA Enabling Act would have to come from other sources.
The above information was transmitted to the Deputy Director (Colonel Wright), who cabled General Vandenberg of the developments.
Colonel Wright spoke with Admiral Leahy, to request information as to whether Murphy's position granted us a green light on our own legislation. The Admiral was inclined to agree. He felt that we should delete from the draft the phrase "Subject to existing law" (Sec. 302 (b)), as it would only serve to complicate things. He further felt that we should then let the draft go through.
It was determined to request that the position of Deputy Director be included in the draft, the phrase mentioned in the preceding paragraph be deleted, and an attempt made to include a clause which would designate the Director as the Intelligence Advisor to the Council.
In connection with paragraph 1 (b) of reference memorandum, it was agreed to make some mention of centralized intelligence in the declaration of policy in the proposed bill. This suggestion had strong support from Admiral Sherman, although it was initially thought by the others present that it might prove cumbersome.
In connection with paragraph 1 (c) of reference memorandum, it was felt that this suggestion was non-controversial and that the appropriate definitions would be acceptable.
In connection with paragraph 1 (d) of reference memorandum, General Vandenberg stated that he was strongly opposed to the Central Intelligence Agency or its director participating in policy decisions on any matter. However, he felt that he should be present at meetings of the Council. To this General Norstad voiced serious exceptions, as he felt that the Council was already too big. He thought that the Director should not even be present as an observer, as this had proven to be cumbersome and unworkable at meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Sherman suggested, however, that the Director should normally be present at meetings of the Council, in its discretion. General Vandenberg concurred in this, as did General Norstad, and it was accepted with the additional proviso that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also attend meetings at the discretion of the Council.
General Vandenberg indicated the difficulties which he had had in having to go to the N.I.A. on so many problems. He felt that the difficulties of his position would be multiplied, as he would have to ask policy guidance and direction from the Council on National Defense, which consists of many more members than the N.I.A. He was assured that the intent of the act was that the CIA would operate independently and come under the Council only on such specific measures as the Council may, from time to time desire to direct. It would not be necessary for the agency to ask continual approval from the Council. With this interpretation, General Vandenberg withdrew the opposition voiced in the last sentences of paragraph 1 (e) of reference memorandum.
The Director pointed out the difficulties of operation of clandestine methods in the absence of detailed legislation, empowering him to operate on unvouchered funds, select certain types of personnel, and discharge employees for any question of possible disloyalty. It was agreed that these provisions would be included in the proposed draft from CIG. It was requested further that this draft be submitted by the evening of 23 January 1947, in order to meet necessary deadlines.
It was the final sense of the meeting that the Director of Central Intelligence should report to the Council on National Defense. As General Vandenberg indicated that it would be necessary to report somewhere; that neither the President nor he was anxious to have another agency "free wheeling" around the government. However, it was thought that the agency should have sufficient power to perform its own functions without it being necessary to have specific approval from the Council on each action.
On 27 January 1947, the undersigned drafted a letter, for the Deputy Director's signature, to Mr. Charles Murphy./4/ This letter set forth the views of the Central Intelligence Group on the draft of the proposed section on central intelligence, submitted by the White House on 25 January 1947. After studying the memorandum of 27 January 1947, Mr. Murphy called the undersigned and requested a concurrence on eliminating paragraph 302 (b) of his draft of 25 January 1947, on the ground that in view of our objections (as expressed in paragraph 2 of our memorandum of 27 January 1947), nothing would be lost by the total elimination of this paragraph. After consultation with Colonel Wright, this concurrence was given by the undersigned. Concurrence was also given to the lowering of the proposed salary for the Deputy Director, as set forth in paragraph 1 of our memorandum of 27 January 1947, from $14,000 per annum to $12,000 per annum, as the $14,000 figure was greatly in excess of the figure received by the Assistant Secretaries of the various departments. In addition, Mr. Murphy agreed to urge strongly a point raised by paragraph 3 of our memorandum of 27 January 1947 designating the Director of Central Intelligence as the Intelligence Advisor of the Council of National Defense (to be renamed the National Security Council) and allowing the Director to sit as a non-voting member thereof.
/4/Document 206.
On 28 January 1947, Mr. Murphy requested the undersigned to come to his office, and there handed him the Third Draft (dated 27 January 1947) of the proposed National Security Act of 1947./5/ Mr. Murphy indicated that most of our requests had not been complied with, and that the Army and Navy had seen fit to overrule his recommendations in that connection. The salary of the Director was lowered from $15,000 to $14,000 on the basis that, in all probability, the incumbent would be a military or naval officer whose salary should not be greatly in excess of that of the Chief of Staff of the Army or Chief of Naval Operations; that the figure had been set on the basis of the same salary being paid to the Director of Military Applications of the Atomic Energy Commission; that the Army-Navy conferees did not want the salary merely a "juicy plum" for some officer for whom a berth was being sought.
/5/Not found.
The paragraph establishing the position of Deputy Director, which Mr. Murphy had urged, was eliminated as being too controversial, as was the paragraph regarding the position of the Director as the Intelligence Advisor of the Council. The Army-Navy conferees felt that the position of the Director as the Intelligence Advisor was inherent in the position itself, and that it would not be proper to provide by law that the head of an agency under the Council should sit on the Council.
Mr. Murphy stated that his role was simply that of a consultant on drafting in the Army and Navy. He further stated that the Drafting Committee would present their final version to Mr. Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to the President, at a meeting on the afternoon of 29 January 1947. He further stated that any comments which we might care to make to the White House on the proposed draft would be acceptable to him, and that his feelings would not be hurt.
After examination of the proposed Third Draft by Colonel Wright and the undersigned, it was determined that same was not satisfactory to C.I.G. Therefore, a memorandum was dispatched (under date of 28 January 1947) to Mr. Clifford, setting forth C.I.G.'s comments on the proposed draft./6/
/6/Document 207.
Walter L. Pforzheimer
Chief, Legislative Liaison Division206. Letter From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Wright) to the President's Administrative Assistant (Murphy)
Washington, January 27, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 3. No classification marking.
My Dear Mr. Murphy: In the absence of General Vandenberg, I wish to offer the following comments on the proposed draft of Section 302 of the National Defense Act of 1947, insofar as it affects the Central Intelligence Group.
1. Paragraph 302 (a) should provide for a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to be appointed from civilian or military life by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Deputy Director should receive compensation at the rate of $14,000.00 per annum. It is felt desirable to include this in the legislation in order to provide continuity of action in the absence of the Director or should there be a vacancy in that office. The Deputy Director should be a man of such caliber and stature as adequately to serve as an operating deputy to the Director.
2. It is felt that the phrase "subject to existing law" should be eliminated from paragraph 302 (b) of the proposed draft as it appears to add nothing to the meaning of the Section. This is particularly true as many of the functions and authorities of this Agency are excepted from existing law. In this connection we have the concurrence of the Personal Representative of the President on the National Intelligence Authority. It is therefore felt preferable that section 302 (b) read as follows:
"Under the direction of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency shall perform foreign intelligence functions "relating to the national security."
3. It is urged that a paragraph substantially as follows should be included in the proposed bill:
"The Director of Central Intelligence shall serve as the Advisor to the Council on all matters pertaining to national intelligence and in this capacity he may attend meetings of the Council at its discretion but shall take no part in the decisions thereof."
In this connection attention is called to paragraph 2 of the Presidential letter of January 22, 1946 which states as follows:
"The Director of General Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof."
In line with paragraph 302 (e) (2) which specifically transfers the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence it would appear that his functions as a non-voting member of the National Intelligence Authority should be transferred to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in connection with his relationships to the National Security Council.
E.K. Wright/1/
Colonel, GSC/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
207. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Wright) to the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)
Washington, January 28, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 3. No classification marking. The memorandum bears no signature but appears to be from Wright.
SUBJECT
Comments on the Proposed "National Security Act of 1947"1. The Central Intelligence Group is in receipt of the Third Draft of the proposed National Security Act of 1947, dated 27 January 1947./1/ The Central Intelligence Group has addressed comments to an earlier draft of this legislation, insofar as it affected this agency./2/ These comments have served the dual purpose of:
/1/Not found.
/2/Document 206.
(a) Setting forth a working basis for a Central Intelligence Agency under the Merger; and,
(b) Eliminating from the proposed National Security Act any and all controversial material, insofar as it referred to central intelligence, which might in any way hamper the successful passage of the Act.
2. It seems proper to mention, however, that, in the course of securing the objective outlined in the previous paragraph, the drafters/3/ of the proposed National Security Act have reached the conclusion that the Act should not include the full text of the proposed Central Intelligence Group Enabling Act, which was transmitted by this agency to you under date of 2 December 1946./4/ It was felt that this text presented certain controversial issues which should not be included in the Merger Bill. It was the conclusion of the drafters that the proposed National Security Act should include a section creating a Central Intelligence Agency substantially as set forth in Section 302 of the Third Draft, and that the Agency should then secure its additional necessary powers and authority by means of separate legislation. In this position we have concurred.
/3/The team responsible for drafting the National Security Act of 1947 included Clark Clifford and Charles Murphy of the White House; Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations; and Major General Lauris Norstad, Director of Plans and Operations, War Department General Staff. (Central Intelligence Agency, Draft Legislative History of the Central Intelligence Agency, p. 26)
/4/Document 201.
3. However, the drafters have found it necessary to eliminate from the proposed draft certain provisions which the Central Intelligence Group considers vitally necessary.
4. It was urged upon the drafters that there be included a paragraph substantially as follows:
"The Director of Central Intelligence shall serve as the Advisor to the Council on all matters pertaining to national intelligence, and in this capacity, will attend meetings of the Council at its discretion but shall take no part in the decisions thereof."
It was felt that this paragraph was necessary in that Section 302 (c) (2) specifically transferred the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence to the new agency, and these functions included (as set forth in the Presidential Directive of 22 January 1946) the following:
"The Director of Central Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof."
It would appear that the Director's functions as a non-voting member of the National Intelligence Authority should be transferred to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in connection with his relationships to the National Security Council. This position was concurred in by the Administrative Assistant to the President, charged with the drafting of this legislation, but was eliminated at the insistence of the other members of the Drafting Committee as too controversial.
5. As now written, it is feared that the necessary freedom of operation for a Central Intelligence Authority might well be handicapped by the present wording of Section 302 (a). It is therefore urged that this paragraph be changed to read substantially as follows:
"There is hereby established a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof, to be appointed from civilian or military life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of $15,000 a year. The Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate the nation's foreign intelligence activities and shall operate centrally those foreign intelligence functions which can be most efficiently performed centrally."
In view of the fact that Section 302 (e) (1) specifically transfers the functions of the National Intelligence Authority to the National Security Council, and as these functions and relationships have been efficiently developed over a period of time, it would appear that the proposed language quoted above would be preferable to that presently contained in the Third Draft.
7. [sic] The Central Intelligence Group further urged upon the Drafting Committee that provisions be made in this legislation for the specific position of a Deputy Director to be appointed from civilian or military life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Deputy Director should receive compensation at the rate of $12,000 per annum. It was felt desirable to include this in the legislation in order to provide continuity of action in the absence of the Director or should there be a vacancy in that office. The Deputy Director should be a man of such caliber and stature as adequately to serve as an operation deputy to the Director. This position was concurred in by the Administrative Assistant to the President but was overruled by the other members of the Drafting Committee.
208. Memorandum From the Chief of the Legislative Liaison Division, Central Intelligence Group (Pforzheimer) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Wright)
Washington, March 5, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 3, CIG Enabling Act, 1947. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a handwritten note addressed to Pforzheimer which reads, "Noted. Concur. Wright."
SUBJECT
Comments by Mr. Allen Dulles on Proposed CIG Enabling ActMr. Allen Dulles has submitted, under date of 10 February 1947, his comments on the draft, dated 2 December 1946, of the proposed CIG Enabling Act./1/ The undersigned submits the following remarks in connection with Mr. Dulles' comments.
/1/Neither Dulles' comments nor the draft has been found.
1. Dulles: "Section 1(a). The use of the term 'national intelligence mission' seems to me somewhat awkward. Possibly instead of 'mission' the word 'objectives' would be more appropriate."
Comment: Either term would appear to be acceptable, but the word "objectives" can be substituted for "mission" if it is thought that it is less awkward or ambiguous.
2. Dulles: "Section 3(a). Consideration should be given to according to the Director of Intelligence the right to vote in the National Intelligence Authority, both for reasons of prestige and also to permit matters to be referred to the President under Subsection (9) in case by any chance there should be a difference of opinion between the Director and the other members of the Authority."
Comment: This suggestion can not be adopted. Under the proposed merger bill, the Director will not sit on the National Security Council and therefore cannot vote. Provisions could be included, however, under Subsection 3(a)(9), if it is thought desirable, to allow the Director to appeal an adverse decision by the Council to the President. However, such a course of action would be extremely difficult, as it would involve the President's over-ruling at least two Cabinet members.
3. Dulles: "Section 3(a)(6). The reference to the conduct of foreign intelligence operations 'centrally' does not have much meaning. I presume it means the operations which are to be carried on by the Central Intelligence Agency and I think this should be so stated."
Comment: This phrase has been amended to read "as well as in the conduct of those foreign intelligence operations performed by the Central Intelligence Agency" rather than "performed centrally."
4. Dulles: "Section 3(a)(4). In a moment of crisis it might be necessary to call a meeting of the Authority and it might be wise to provide the machinery to do this in the Act itself. I would favor giving the Director the right to call a meeting as well as any other members of the Authority."
Comment: The Enabling Act will be amended to allow the Director to request an immediate meeting of the Council when this is warranted by the urgency of the situation.
5. Dulles: "Section 3(b)(2). It is vitally important that the Deputy Director be a man who has the complete confidence of the Director. The relatively large salary would make this job an attractive political plum and there should be some safeguard against this. Possibly it could be provided that the Deputy Director should be appointed by the Central Intelligence Authority from among a list furnished by the Director."
Comment: This comment may be equally true of the offices of Director and Deputy Director. If the Director were a civilian, the Deputy Director would in all probability be a military or naval officer, and confirmation by the Senate would be preferable in view of the advanced salary this officer will receive. Public opinion is probably the only safeguard in preventing the offices of Director and Deputy Director from becoming political plums.
6. Dulles: "Section 3(b)(4). I question whether the enumeration here is broad enough. You might wish to avail of the services of someone in the civil service or from some other department of the government other than the armed forces and the State Department. Possibly also there is a danger in the provision for payment. If this clause means that in certain cases the person has to be transferred to, or a part of his pay assumed by, the CIG, it might disclose information and connections which you did not wish to have known. Your salary list will probably become public property sooner or later."
Comment: This Section was included to provide for special cases. Anyone else would be carried, either on Central Intelligence Agency rolls or on the rolls of some other Department on a reimbursement basis. In either case his Civil Service status would be established without the necessity of special legislation. The objection raised in the second portion of this comment should be met by normal CIG security provisions.
7. Dulles: "Section 3(b)(5). The right to employ retired officers might well be extended to include any retired civil servant as well as those who retire from the armed forces. I doubt the wisdom of Section 3(c)(4) as this might some day be interpreted as preventing any action by the Agency unless there is unanimous approval by the Board."
Comment: The normal retired civil servant (65 or 70) is generally considered too old for employment in the Agency. If he resigns from the Civil Service, he could be reinstated under the present procedures. The comment on Section 3(c)(4) is academic, in view of the fact that Section 3(c) deals with the Intelligence Advisory Board and has been eliminated in its entirety.
8. Dulles: "Section 4(a)(6). I suggest deleting 'centrally' and inserting 'by the Agency.'"
Comment: Agreed, as in Comment 3 above.
9. Dulles: "Section 4(a)(8). This should be rephrased as it imposes an impossible legal responsibility. It might read somewhat as follows: 'be responsible for taking measures to protect,' etc."
Comment: Concurred in.
10. Dulles: "Section 4(a)(9). Same comment as above with regard to the word 'complete.'"
Comment: Concurred in.
11. Dulles: "Section 4(a)(8), (9) and (10). This might be a good place to insert a provision to provide an 'Official Secrets Act,' in the case of all employees of the Agency as well as all government employees of any department who make any unauthorized disclosure or who are responsible therefor in the case of any information or documents coming into their possession and originating with the Central Intelligence Agency."
Comment: This matter is in abeyance pending final determination of the position of the Department of Justice on an Official Secrets Act.
12. Dulles: "Section 6(3). The provision that transfers of funds from other departments to the Agency is subject to authorization by the Bureau of the Budget may be essential from an accounting angle but introduces a serious security problem and it would be better if the power to authorize could be left to the Central Intelligence Authority. It is unwise that outsiders should know the amount of funds so transferred."
Comment: Procedures have been developed in conjunction with the Bureau of the Budget whereby specially cleared personnel of the Bureau of the Budget will handle these transfers, subject to careful security procedures.
13. Mr. Dulles suggests consideration of three special subjects for eventual legislation. In connection with his suggestion regarding intelligence training schools, it is felt that Paragraph 4(a)(1) of the proposed bill should include the establishment of over-all policies and objectives for intelligence training schools, including the training of intelligence officers for duties in the field of collection and dissemination. The Central Intelligence Agency may wish to take some part in the shaping of the intelligence courses at the National War College, the Armed Forces Staff College and the Air University, etc.
In connection with Mr. Dulles' suggestion as to eventual legislation in the field of cryptography, query whether the Director wishes to include at this time a provision for the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate the cryptographic practices of the government. In connection with the suggestion regarding an Official Secrets Act, see comment on Paragraph 11 above.
Walter L. Pforzheimer/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
209. Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, March 10, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/3-1047. No classification marking. Drafted by Sandifer.
SUBJECT
Legislative Interests of Central Intelligence GroupPARTICIPANTS
Mr. Walter L. Pforzheimer, Chief, Legislative Liaison Division, Central Intelligence Group
Mr. Durward V. Sandifer, AA/LMr. Pforzheimer called at my office by arrangement made by Mr. Donald Edgar. Mr. Pforzheimer, who is in charge of legislative relations for the Central Intelligence Group wanted to discuss problems of mutual interest. He took up particularly the following problems:
1. The National Security Act Provisions for a Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Pforzheimer said that they had considerable doubts about the provision in the National Security Act placing the proposed Central Intelligence Agency under the National Security Council. He thought that this was administratively unworkable, and suggested that it would probably not be satisfactory to the Department of State as the Secretary of State would be in a minority on the National Security Council. His agency is considering a proposal for the establishment of a supervisory committee consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Defense, and a civilian appointee, who would supervise the Central Intelligence Agency and make recommendations to the Security Council. Unanimous recommendations would be binding on the Security Council and, in the event of a difference of opinion, the matter would be referred to the President.
The Central Intelligence Group is working on enabling legislation for the establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Pforzheimer said that at a later date he would supply me with copies of the drafts they were working on.
2. Central Intelligence Group Personnel. Mr. Pforzheimer said that the proposed Central Intelligence Agency would have its own personnel and would not rely on personnel supplied by the State, War, and Navy Departments. Considerable action in this direction has already been taken. There are only a few persons who are with the Central Intelligence Group at the present time who are still on the State Department payroll.
DVS
210. Memorandum From George M. Elsey to the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)
Washington, March 14, 1947.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of George M. Elsey, Central Intelligence. No classification marking. Elsey was Clifford's assistant. Also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, p. 127.
SUBJECT
Central Intelligence Group1. C.I.G. is up to its old tricks again. It has submitted "informally" the draft of a proposed bill to be submitted to Congress very similar to the two previous drafts which Vandenberg has sent to you in recent months and which you filed without further action.
2. Mr. George Schwarzwalder of Donald Stowe's group, called to request advice and information on what Budget should tell C.I.G. I suggested that C.I.G. be informed that there was no necessity for such legislation in view of the sections concerning Intelligence which are included in the Unification Bill.
3. The Budget concurs in that position and will inform C.I.G. that it is inappropriate to propose legislation at this time in view of the President's support of the Unification Bill.
Respectfully,
George M. Elsey/1/
/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
211. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Eddy) to Acting Secretary of State Acheson
Washington, April 17, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/5-547. Confidential. Drafted by Eddy.
SUBJECT
Comment on National Security Act of 1947, Title II, Section 202, "Central Intelligence Agency"In connection with the hearings on national intelligence to which you have instructed me to accompany you Monday, April 21, I enclose copy of the National Security Act of 1947,/1/ wherein Title II, Section 202, sets forth the plan for the Central Intelligence Agency, concerning which I submit the following comments:
/1/See footnote 1, Document 220.
1. It is my conviction that the proposals in Title II, Section 202, would render more difficult the promotion of peaceful foreign relations by subordinating the political and economic intelligence activities of the Department of State to a Central Intelligence Agency completely dominated by the Armed Forces; and that it would further have the ultimate, if not the immediate, effect of placing the reporting activities of the Foreign Service under military control in time of peace as well as in time of war.
2. The National Intelligence Authority would be abolished and replaced by the National Security Council. (Section 202,(c) (1)) Whereas the Secretary of State is at present Chairman of the NIA composed of four members, he would be reduced on the National Security Council to an equality with one of the three subdivisions of the Armed Forces establishment, and civilian political intelligence would, therefore, have one representative out of six or more (see Title II, Section 201 (a)).
3. The Central Intelligence Group would be abolished and would be replaced by the Central Intelligence Agency (Section 202, (c)(2)). This CIA would be dominated by the military, with no indication that a representative of the Secretary of State would be accredited even as an adviser to the new Director of Central Intelligence, to whom it is proposed to give the salary and prerequisites of a 4-star general. The extended discussion of his right to retain his military salary and allowances, together with a supplement to bring the total to $14,000, makes it quite clear that there is an expectation to appoint to this elevated office an officer on active duty in the armed forces who will serve the primary interests of the five military members of the National Security Council rather than the civilian and peacetime interests of the Department of State.
4. In this connection it should be pointed out that the Foreign Service is the only collection agency of the U.S. Government which effectively covers the world. For every Military or Naval Attaché's office abroad, there are dozens of Foreign Service Officers and specialists, and for every Embassy or Mission with a Military or Naval Attaché there are many Consulates General, Consulates or Vice Consulates with no military or naval staff. It is, therefore, clear that at present our Government is served with foreign intelligence chiefly by the Foreign Service trained to preserve political and economic good relations with the rest of the world. Under the proposed act this world-wide coverage and personnel would be forced into the service of the military, directly or indirectly, with a consequent damage to our peace-time policy that would be difficult to estimate. The provisions of this act might have merit if made effective upon the declaration of war, but in time of peace the National Intelligence Service should be under genuinely civilian control and its estimates of political and economic situations abroad should be subject, as at present, to preview by the Department of State, which has the responsibility for foreign policy.
William A. Eddy/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
212. Letter From Secretary of State Marshall to Senator Chan Gurney
Washington, May 5, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/5-547. No classification marking. Drafted by Marshall. A note on the source text reads: "Delivered by hand 5/6/47."
Dear Senator: This is to confirm the message I asked General Carter/1/ to pass on to you Friday afternoon./2/
/1/Brigadier General Marshall Carter, Secretary Marshall's Special Assistant.
/2/Presumably Friday, May 2.
The legislation regarding the CIG reflects the unchanged status of the agreement reached in February by the Secretaries of War and Navy and myself./3/
/3/No documents concerning this agreement, and no other references to it, have been found.
Faithfully yours,/4/
/4/Printed from an unsigned copy.
213. Memorandum From the Chief of the Legislative Liaison Division, Central Intelligence Group (Pforzheimer) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter)
Washington, May 9, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 2. No classification marking. Attached to this memorandum is an undated draft (see the Supplement) of Document 214. It omits one sentence that is in the signed version. Also in the Supplement is a second May 9 memorandum from Pforzheimer to Hillenkoetter, transmitting a draft of the memorandum to Hillenkoetter, which is identical to the signed copy. (Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 2) Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter was sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence on May 1.
SUBJECT
CIG Enabling Legislation1. CIG enabling legislation should be drafted to meet one of the three alternatives set forth below:
a. If the Senate Armed Services Committee or the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments specifically demands detailed CIG enabling legislation prior to reaching an affirmative decision on Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947 (S. 758 and H.R. 2319)
b. If definite indications are received that there is no possibility that unification legislation (S. 758 and H.R. 2319) will be enacted into law at his session, or
c. If the National Security Act of 1947 is enacted into law.
2. If situation "a" occurs, the legislation will include no preamble. The first section will amend Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947 as presently drafted, to enumerate the duties of the National Security Council in the language of the President's Executive Directive regarding the powers of the National Intelligence Authority. The Act should be further amended to include provision for a Deputy Director, and to allow the Director to appoint retired officers of the armed services without regard to those provisions of the law regarding dual compensation. This will permit retired officers to accept civilian employment at CIG without loss of retired pay while on duty here. The functions of the agency should be more clearly delineated in line with the President's Executive Directive. There should also be included those general authorities and appropriation languages which it is considered necessary to have over and beyond normal procedures. This includes special language regarding the transfer of funds by the Departments, permission for use of unvouchered funds, and absolute right of the Director to terminate the employment of any member of the organization.
3. If situation "b" occurs, it will be necessary to have a short preamble setting forth the purpose of the legislation. It will also be necessary specifically to establish the National Intelligence Authority with the same terms of reference as presently set forth in the President's Executive Directive. It will also be necessary to establish the office of Director of Central Intelligence and the agency itself. The remaining functions are the same as in situation "a", as set forth above.
4. If situation "c" occurs, it will require the same provisions as situation "a" above.
It is understood that situation "c" is preferable and in accordance with our present agreement with the Bureau of the Budget.
214. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Authority to the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter)
Washington, May 14, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/5-1947. Confidential. The source text was an information copy sent by the NIA secretary to Eddy and the other members of the Intelligence Advisory Board. These instructions apparently were drafted in CIG for the signature of the principals. For a similar but more detailed memorandum, which probably is the forerunner of the text printed, see the memorandum from Pforzheimer to Hillenkoetter, May 9, in the Supplement. (Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 2)
SUBJECT
Enabling LegislationYou are hereby directed to prepare drafts of enabling legislation for the Central Intelligence Group. This legislation should be drafted to encompass the principles of the President's Executive Directive of 22 January 1946, and subsequent Directives of the National Intelligence Authority.
These drafts should be drawn to meet each of the following possible situations:
a. That the Senate Armed Services Committee or the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments specifically demand detailed CIG enabling legislation prior to reaching an affirmative decision on Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947 (S. 758 and H.R. 2319),
b. That definite indications are received that there is no possibility that unification legislation (S. 758 and H.R. 2319) will be enacted into law at this session, and
c. That the National Security Act of 1947 is enacted into law.
Upon completion of these drafts, they will be presented to the Intelligence Advisory Board for comment, prior to submission to this Authority. Upon approval of the drafts by this Authority, they will be submitted to the President with the recommendation that they be forwarded to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget for formal comment and approval.
G.C. Marshall/1/
Secretary of StateRobert P. Patterson
Secretary of WarForrestal
Secretary of the NavyWilliam D. Leahy
Personal Representative of the President/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Marshall, Patterson, Forrestal, and Leahy signed the original.
Continue with Document 215
