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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Psychological and Political Warfare

                           

260. Office of Special Operations Directive No. 18/5 (Interim)

Washington, February 24, 1948.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2154, Job 83-00739R, Box 3, Folder 19. Secret. On February 24 Office of Special Operations Personnel Order No. 25 announced the designation of Thomas G. Cassady as Chief of the Special Procedures Branch. (Ibid., HS/CSG-2155, Job 83-00739R, Box 3, Folder 20) See the Supplement.

ACTIVATION OF SPECIAL PROCEDURES BRANCH

1. In accordance with instructions of the Director of Central Intelligence, and pending formal authorization, a Special Procedures Branch within the Office of Special Operations was activated effective 1 January 1948.

2. The Chief, Special Procedures Branch, will draft an appropriate amendment to S.O. Directive No. 18, setting forth the functions and responsibilities of the branch in detail, which, when approved and published, will supersede and supplant this directive.

3. The Chief, Special Procedures Branch, will be directly responsible to the Assistant Director for Special Operations.

Alan R. McCracken

261. Memorandum From the Chief of the Special Procedures Group (Cassady) to the Deputy Chief of the Special Procedures Group (Dulin)

Washington, March 11, 1948.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-609, Job 83-00036, Box 4, Folder 10. Secret.

SUBJECT
Conversations with Mr. Charles Davies,/1/ State Department

/1/Reference is probably to John P. Davies.

1. On March 1, I visited Mr. Davies to state that we had, after my discussions pro and con, arrived at the conclusion that the most effective method of penetrating the iron curtain would be via clandestine radio situated in an artificially created sterile area of our occupied zone. Inasmuch as the execution of this plan would involve considerable expenditure of public funds, the hiring of personnel, etc., we did not want to undertake such a commitment without clearing with State, for the reason that State was soon to take over the administration of the American zone in Germany. Aside from that fact, I further stated that we desired at all times to cooperate with State in the prosecution of our new endeavor.

2. Mr. Davies called today to ask me to come over. He apologized for being ten days in coming back to me and said finally he had been able to get to Mr. Cannon/2/ who, as I understood it, had talked in turn to Mr. Lovett pertaining to this matter. Mr. Davies states that Mr. Lovett's reaction was that he wanted to know very little about our project but in principle he had no objection. Mr. Cannon's attitude was that we have the green light but State wanted to be apprised of our progress and proposed operations in order that they would not conflict with State's policies. This I agreed to do.

/2/Presumably George Kennan.

262. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Forrestal to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

Washington, March 26, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563, Pol & Psych Warfare 1948-50, Box 11. Top Secret. On March 30 Souers sent Forrestal's memorandum to NSC members, noting that it would be on the agenda of the April 2 meeting. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

SUBJECT
NSC 4 Series (Coordination of Foreign Information Measures)

1. Several months have elapsed since the National Security Council approved the NSC 4 Series, dealing with foreign information activities. I believe that both the State Department and CIA have begun setting up the staff organization to carry out their respective responsibilities under this program. Since the Council's action the international situation has become more critical and it is more important than ever that our foreign information activities be effectively developed and that they be coordinated with the other phases of our foreign and military policies.

2. Therefore, I recommend that the National Security Council assure itself that the NSC 4 Series is being satisfactorily implemented and that the programs thereunder are being conceived and carried out in full accord with the intentions of the National Security Council and in effective coordination with political and military plans and activities. I request that this question be placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the National Security Council and suggest that at that time the Council direct the staff consultants to look into this problem on its behalf and submit an early report with my necessary recommendations.

James Forrestal/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Forrestal signed the original.

263. Office of Special Operations Directive No. 18/5

Washington, March 29, 1948.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2154, Job 83-00739R, Box 3, Folder 19. Top Secret.

ACTIVATION OF SPECIAL PROCEDURES GROUP

1. Authorization

In accordance with the authorization contained in the memorandum for the Assistant Director for Special Operations from the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 22 March 1948, Subject: "Additional Functions of the Office of Special Operations,"/1/ the "Special Procedures Group," as activated 1 January 1948 under the name "Special Procedures Branch," is confirmed effective 22 March 1948.

/1/Not found. A draft of this memorandum, dated February 26, is in Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 83-00036, Box 9, Folder 16.

2. Functions

The basic function of Special Procedures Group will be to engage in covert psychological operations outside the United States and its possessions, for the purpose of (1) undermining the strength of foreign instrumentalities, whether government, organizations, or individuals, which are engaged in activities inimical to the United States, and (2) to support United States' foreign policy by influencing public opinion abroad in a direction favorable to the attainment of United States' objectives.

3. Definition of Covert Psychological Operations

As used herein and as conducted within the Office of Special Operations, covert psychological operations may include all measures of information and persuasion short of physical in which the originating role of the United States Government will always be kept concealed.

4. Chief of Special Procedures Group

In accordance with directives and policies of the Assistant Director for Special Operations, the Chief of Special Procedures Group shall exercise direction over all covert psychological operations outside the United States and its possessions. In carrying out this responsibility, he will:

a. Act as adviser to the Assistant Director relative to covert psychological operations and submit to him, for approval, specific directives on covert psychological operations for field implementation through the facilities of the Chief of Operations.

b. As directed by the Assistant Director, make recommendations for the final approval of all proposed covert psychological operations from the standpoint of their conformity to United States' foreign policy, suitability of general program content and objectives, and the commitment of funds.

c. Exercise direct control and supervision over all personnel and functions of the Washington office of Special Procedures Group.

d. Exercise general program and technical direction over all field representatives engaged in covert psychological operations, coordinating closely with the Chief of Operations who will exercise operational field control over such representatives.

e. Maintain close planning and operational liaison with the Chief of Operations in connection with plans, directives, and other matters relating to covert psychological operations which require implementation through the facilities and resources of the Chief of Operations.

f. Provide for the development of program plans to implement policies and directives applicable to the activities of Special Procedures Group.

g. Provide for all necessary operational action, including the preparation of detailed operational directives, required for the execution of approved program plans and projects developed by or delegated to Special Procedures Group.

h. Establish a project control over all field operations involving covert psychological operations.

i. Maintain, as directed by the Assistant Director, such liaison with the Department of State, or other authority charged with formulation of foreign policy, as may be necessary to obtain guidance on United States' foreign policy and objectives, as they affect the operations of Special Procedures Group.

j. Issue, with the approval of the Assistant Director, directives defining the editorial and political policies to be followed in conducting covert psychological operations in the field.

k. Establish, for approval of the Assistant Director and on the basis of United States' foreign policy and aims, the basic program objectives and targets for covert psychological operations.

l. In accordance with liaison requirements and procedures of Budget and Liaison Control, establish and control authorized liaison of Special Procedures Group with other elements of Office of Special Operations, Offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, and other United States Departments and Agencies which provide for direct liaison on secret operational matters.

m. Develop and maintain, as directed by the Assistant Director, such liaison with private individuals, organizations, or institutions in the United States as may be necessary to the effective conduct of covert psychological operations abroad, keeping Budget and Liaison Control generally informed of such liaison.

n. Insure that operations of Special Procedures Group do not conflict with or overlap the open foreign informational activities of the Department of State and, to that end, effect such liaison and coordination with the Department of State as may be directed by the Assistant Director.

o. Coordinate with the Chief of Administrative Services to insure full support of operations of Special Procedures Group by Office of Special Operations administrative and supporting services.

p. Insure adequate training for all personnel engaged in covert psychological operations, using for such purpose the facilities of the Training Staff of Office of Special Operations and, with practical limits, making available to the Training Staff, for lecture and other instruction in covert psychological operations, experienced personnel of Special Procedures Group.

q. Provide for the conduct of inspections of local activities of his office and, when directed by the Assistant Director, of overseas operational activities involving covert psychological operations, effecting the necessary coordination with the Chief of Operations.

r. For the purpose of insuring proper policy and program coordination in the field, take appropriate measures in coordination with the Chief of Operations and through his field facilities, for keeping the chief diplomatic representative in an area or the Chief United States Commanding Officer in an occupied zone generally informed of covert psychological operations.

5. Deputy Chief

a. Acts for the Chief of Special Procedures Group in his absence.

b. Performs such duties as may be assigned by the Chief.

c. Maintains over-all supervision of the activities of Special Procedures Group to insure the proper execution of directives and policies relating to Special Procedures operations.

6. Chief of Plans Section

As directed by the Chief of Special Procedures Group, the Chief of the Plans Section:

a. In General

Shall be responsible for defining the program objectives of covert psychological operations, developing programs in line with such objectives and preparing directives defining the editorial and political policy to be followed in the conduct of field operations.

b. In Particular

(1) Shall, on the basis of United States' foreign policy and foreign objectives of the Central Intelligence Agency, define and currently maintain the basic program objectives and targets for covert psychological operations and prepare, as required, field directives defining such objectives and targets.

(2) Shall, on the basis of United States' foreign policy and aims, prepare field directives defining the editorial and political policy, theme, and general line to be followed in the conduct of covert psychological operations, insuring that such directives are consistent with United States' foreign policy as it affects covert psychological operations.

(3) Shall initiate and develop, as directed by the Chief, Special Procedures Group, programs, themes, and ideas for covert psychological operations in the field.

(4) Shall, as a basis for evaluating and countering foreign propaganda or other psychological activity directed against the United States, conduct a continuing selective analysis of foreign news and other informational sources, including pertinent intelligence collected by Central Intelligence Agency and other informational materials available to Central Intelligence Agency.

(5) Shall conduct, for the purpose of developing background data and information for covert psychological operations, research relating to foreign news and events, international propaganda and the psychological and political character of operational targets, including individuals, groups, and organizations.

(6) Shall initiate or develop, in response to requests from authorized sources, editorial production, in complete or substantive form, for transmission to overseas stations for operational use.

(7) Shall analyze and evaluate, to the extent practicable, the results of covert psychological field operations in terms of their propaganda or psychological effectiveness.

(8) Shall assist in the training of personnel engaged in covert psychological operations, insofar as training relates to the functions of the Plans Section.

7. Chief, Operations Section

As directed by the Chief of Special Procedures Group, the Chief of the Operations Section:

a. In General

Shall be responsible to the Chief of Special Procedures Group for the operational aspects of covert psychological operations and assure proper coordination between Chief of Operations, Office of Special Operations, and Special Procedures Group in the field implementation of policies and programs relating to covert psychological operations.

b. In Particular

In carrying out these general responsibilities, the Chief of the Operations Section:

(1) Shall prepare detailed plans and instructions and take any other necessary, authorized action to implement basic policies, programs and directives received from the Chief of Special Procedures Group.

(2) Shall establish a project control over all approved covert psychological operations to provide for the controlled expenditure and proper accounting of funds used for covert psychological operation and a constant review of authorized projects, including assignments, progress, cost and effectiveness of agents and informers used in covert psychological operations.

(3) Shall inform the Chief, Administration and Services, Office of Special Operations, of operational plans and insure adequate joint planning with interested elements of his offices to support the implementation of such plans.

(4) Shall assist in the training of personnel engaged in covert psychological operations insofar as such training relates to the functions of the Operations Section, Special Procedures Group.

(5) Shall coordinate with the Training Branch and the Personnel Division, Office of Special Operations, the training of new staff employees, advising both of the detailed training requirements of Special Procedures Group.

(6) Shall keep Budget and Liaison Control generally informed of liaison with private individuals, organizations, or institutions in the United States, as referred to in c.(2)(j) below.

c. Liaison Responsibilities

The Chief, Operations Section, will conduct liaison and coordinate with the Chief of Operations, Office of Special Operations, on covert psychological matters requiring field implementation through facilities and resources of his office for the following purposes:

(1) General

(a) In the field implementation of covert psychological operations, to make available to the Chief of Operations, Office of Special Operations, any required information, data, facilities, or other services at the disposal of Special Procedures Group.

(b) Within limits approved by the Chief of Operations, Office of Special Operations, to consult with operating elements of his office concerning operational possibilities for covert psychological operations, and the acquisition of operational information required by Special Procedures Group in the planning of such operations.

(c) To insure that proposed plans and projects of Special Procedures Group are operationally practicable from the standpoint of field capabilities and conditions.

(2) Particular

Specifically, the purpose of such liaison will be to effect, in accord-ance with arrangements approved by the Chief of Operations, coordination with the Deputy Chief of Operations for Counter Espionage, the Deputy Chief of Operations for Plans and Projects, and appropriate Foreign Branch Chiefs, on the following matters relating to covert psychological operations of Special Operations.

(a) Development of agent cover and related possibilities in connection with planned covert psychological operations.

(b) Objectives, recruiting, engagement, and training of covert personnel who will engage in covert psychological operations.

(c) Briefing, assignment, and movement of covert psychological operations. Such personnel will not be reassigned, transferred, or moved in any manner inconsistent with their current assignments, without prior approval of the Assistant Director for Special Operations, except where emergency conditions justify independent action in the field.

(d) Obtaining operational information and data for field directives and for the development of methods, techniques, and plans for use in connection with approved or planned covert psychological operations.

(e) Providing guidance and assistance to field representatives engaged in covert psychological operations, including useful background information, comments, and criticisms on methods and sources and technical advice.

(f) Obtaining reports from the field on the progress, results, and status of covert psychological objectives.

(g) Establishing the program objectives and targets for covert psychological operations.

(h) Following up action taken by the field on directives pertaining to covert psychological operations.

(i) Developing long-range plans and projects for covert psychological operations.

(j) Employment, on a covert basis, of individuals in the United States, including American citizens and foreign nationals, for information and other operational services in connection with current or planned covert psychological operations overseas.

(k) Security investigations of all personnel of Special Procedures Group other than the staff to be used in the Washington office.

8. S.O. Directive No. 18/5 (Interim), dated 24 February 1948,/2/ is rescinded and superseded by this Directive.

/2/Document 260.

Donald H. Galloway
Assistant Director
Special Operations

264. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Allen) to Acting Secretary of State Lovett

Washington, March 31, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 4, Box 4205. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Coordination of Foreign Information Measures

At the National Security Council meeting on Friday/1/ you may be pressed to agree to a proposal by the Armed Services to set up immediately a psychological warfare organization. The more enthusiastic representatives of the Armed Services would apparently like to begin actual psychological warfare operations at the earliest possible moment. I suggest that you go slow on any positive commitments along this line until we can go into the matter further.

/1/April 2.

It is important to remember that psychological warfare is in its essence a political activity and in Russia and Great Britain among other places is and has been traditionally an instrument of the Foreign Office. Under a National Security Council Directive of December 9, 1947 (NSC-4), it is clearly recognized that the State Department has jurisdiction in the matter and this point should be maintained. Claims which may be advanced by the War Department that the State Department has been lax in taking any action under NSC-4 are exaggerated to say the least. We have taken a good deal of action under this directive already as the attached will indicate.

Following approval of NSC-4 by the President on December 18th, 1947, letters were sent out on January 2nd, 1948, by Mr. Lovett to the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, requesting them to designate representatives to consult with Mr. Allen, in order to carry out the NSC-4 Directive.

The Central Intelligence Agency named its representative on January 5th, the Air Force on February 4th, the Army on February 5th, and the Navy not until March 9th.

On March 10th the first meeting of this informal Inter-departmental Consultative Group was set for March 15th. Mr. Allen chaired this meeting, and called upon representatives of the other Departments to prepare written memoranda on the overseas activities of their Departments falling within the scope of NSC-4, and to name representatives to the full-time Working Staff called for by NSC-4, the duties of which were (1) to coordinate all federal foreign information facilities, and (2) to initiate and develop for the approval of the Assistant Secretary specific plans and programs in the foreign information field.

Further meetings of the Consultative Group were held on March 18th and March 29th with Mr. Allen in the Chair each time. At these meetings there was informal discussion of the functions of the Consultative Group and of the full-time Working Staff, with a view to carrying out NSC-4 as early as possible. April 12th was agreed upon as the earliest target date by which the Working Staff members would be designated by the other Departments and commence activities. Appropriate office space and working facilities have been held ready by the Assistant Secretary since March 15th. A member of Mr. Allen's staff has also been ready since the inception of the Consultative Group to serve as Executive Secretary of the full-time Working Staff.

A list of proposed projects on which the Working Staff shall commence its duties has been prepared; these are to be integrated with the projects of the OIE, so as to avoid duplication or overlapping.

265. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Information and Educational Exchange (Stone) to Acting Secretary of State Lovett

Washington, April 1, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 4. Top Secret. Following his handwritten initials above the subject line Stone wrote: "(In the absence of George Allen.)"

SUBJECT
Proposed Creation of Psychological Warfare Agency

With reference to the question of foreign information activities which Mr. Allen mentioned in his memorandum/1/ to you yesterday, and which will come up for discussion in the meeting of the National Security Council on Friday,/2/ there is additional information which you should have as background:

/1/Document 264.

/2/April 2.

I am informed that the Armed Services are again pressing to set up an independent psychological warfare agency under the National Security Council at the earliest possible moment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved a paper recommending such action. The paper which had gone to Admiral Leahy is in the form of an amendment to an earlier report of the SANACC Subcommittee which has been studying future plans for a wartime psychological warfare organization. If Admiral Leahy approves, the paper in question will come up before the SANACC Committee at a meeting next Wednesday, April 7, at which time the Department will have an opportunity to state its position.

I have discussed this matter with George Allen (who is in New York today) and checked with operating division who are concerned in the Department. The consensus is that no new organization should be set up at this time for the following reasons: 1) Except in time of war, psychological warfare is essentially a political activity and the responsibility must rest with the Secretary of State. 2) The National Security Council has placed this responsibility with the Secretary in NSC-4, under which Assistant Secretary Allen is responsible for coordinating all foreign information activities . Mr. Allen is now discharging this responsibility, operating through a consulting group and working staff composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Forces and CIA. 3) The wartime plans prepared by SANACC Subcommittee have not been completed and are not suitable for immediate application.

The above is for your information in the event this matter comes up at the meeting of the National Security Council tomorrow.

WTS

266. Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 9th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, April 2, 1948.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File. Top Secret.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1 and 2, U.S. policy in Korea and U.S. position on short-term assistance to China.]

3. Coordination of Foreign Information Measures (Memo for the NSC from the Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 30, 1948.)/1/

/1/See the source note, Document 262.

Mr. Lovett read a memorandum/2/ from Assistant Secretary Allen, stating that the Department of State believed that no new psychological warfare authorization should be set up now because in peacetime the State Department should control this activity, as provided in NSC 4. Mr. Lovett also described the steps that had been taken so far in implementation of NSC 4.

/2/Document 264.

The National Security Council:/3/

/3/The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 42. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)

Directed the NSC Consultants to review the implementation of certain aspects of NSC 4 series and to submit to the Council an early report with any necessary recommendations.

[Here follows discussion of agenda item 4, internal security.]

267. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the Members of the National Security Council

Washington, April 26, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 4, Box 4205. Top Secret. In a May 10 note to Lovett, Kennan referred to a report "made after the National Security Council Consultants had met with the Director of Central Intelligence to review the implementation of foreign information measures," and he recommended that he be authorized informally to tell Souers that the Department approved the Consultants' two recommendations. (Ibid., Policy Planning Staff Files, 1947-1953, Box 11A) See the Supplement. This referenced report is probably the source text.

SUBJECT
Coordination of Foreign Information Measures

REFERENCES
a. NSC 4 Series
b. NSC Action No. 42/1/

/1/See Document 266.

Pursuant to directive by the National Security Council (Reference b), the NSC Consultants have reviewed the implementation by the Director of Central Intelligence of certain aspects of the NSC 4 Series. Mr. George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, participated in this review.

Taking into consideration the fact that only four months have elapsed since the issuance of the initial directive to the Director of Central Intelligence, and the difficulties of screening personnel both as to security and qualifications for such duties the NSC Consultants and Mr. Allen feel that satisfactory progress has been made. They also believe that existing organizational relationships both at home and abroad appear to be developing satisfactorily.

At Mr. Allen's suggestion, the Director of Central Intelligence was advised to concentrate so far as possible upon the use of anti-Communist democratic forces in foreign countries, particularly those which are politically left of center. The Director of Central Intelligence also was requested to project these operations forward, both as to scope and area coverage, as rapidly as possible.

The NSC Consultants recommend that the National Security Council:

a. Approve the above findings.

b. Direct the NSC Consultants to undertake a similar review and report in approximately two months.

Sidney W. Souers

268. Memorandum by the Chief of the Special Procedures Group, Central Intelligence Agency (Cassady)

Washington, undated.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-909, Job 83-00036, Box 6, Folder 11. Secret. No addressee is indicated on the source text. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "Approximate Date--1 May 48."

POLICY LIAISON FOR SPG ACTIVITIES

1. Since black propaganda activities may have a direct relationship to both the foreign policy of the U.S. and the responsibility of the Director of CIA for conducting operations consistent with such policy, it is recognized that close and continuing policy liaison must be maintained between SPG and the proper foreign policy authority of the U.S. Government. For its day-to-day activities, it is recommended that SPG rely on the Department of State as the primary outside source for policy direction and guidance. In addition, it is possible that the National Security Council may, from time to time, request CIA, through SPG, to undertake certain programs and activities which may not have originated exclusively at the suggestion of the State Department. However, any such programs or activities would necessarily have to be consistent with foreign policy of the U.S. as established by the State Department. Therefore, it would seem that the primary source and authority for foreign policy and, consequently for policy direction for SPG activities, is the Department of State.

2. Regarding the question of how policy direction from the proper level at the Department of State can be transmitted to SPG, it is believed that this could be effectively achieved by the following arrangement:

a. Foreign policy of the U.S. Government, as reflected and expressed in the overseas informational program of the U.S., is already currently stated in policy directives issued by the CIE (Voice of America) in the State Department to its foreign informational offices throughout the world. It is understood that these directives are issued on a weekly, and sometimes on a daily, basis. They specifically state what the U.S. Government seeks to achieve through its overseas informational program in terms of our foreign policy and general objectives. They are, therefore, both an expression of foreign policy and an indication of how foreign policy is to be promoted through the overseas informational media available to the U.S. Government. It is recommended, therefore, that these informational directives of CIE be likewise made available to SPG for policy guidance in connection with its black propaganda activities. In making these directives available to SPG, the State Department would be free to modify the directives, if necessary, so as to adapt them better to the needs of black propaganda.

3. As a channel for communicating these directives, and any additional appropriate comment, from the State Department to SPG, it is proposed that SPG appoint a liaison officer for the purpose of effecting the necessary liaison with the State Department in this particular field. It is believed that liaison within the Department of State should be made with a high ranking staff officer attached to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. The rank and position of this State Department officer should be such as to enable him to obtain prompt and authoritative action on all policy matters affecting SPG activities. He should likewise be in a position to assist SPG in obtaining information, data, material, etc., from OIE and from other branches of the State Department which might be helpful to SPG. In this connection, the OIE has undoubtedly accumulated much information and data concerning the overseas informational picture which would be of direct interest to SPG, and this latter Group should be in a position to draw freely on this material for its black propaganda operations.

4. In addition to the current directives issued by the State Department for the foreign offices of OIE, it is conceivable that the Department of State, through the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, will wish to transmit to SPG supplemental propaganda themes and lines, and possibly even general target objectives. In such cases, SPG would likewise be guided by such supplemental directives and, to the extent possible within its limitations, endeavor to implement such directives operationally.

5. Moreover, general programs and general capabilities of the SPG would, under this liaison arrangement, be brought by the SPG Liaison Officer to the attention of his opposite number in the Office of the Assist-ant Secretary for Public Affairs. The SPG Liaison Officer would also bring to the attention of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, for State Department consideration, any suggested propaganda themes and general programs which might be originated by SPG and which are not covered by the directives received from the Department of State. SPG would not, however, reveal to the Department of State operational methods and techniques, or other classified operational details, involved in the conduct of black propaganda activities. There is no objection to revealing to the State Department the broad, general character of SPG programs and the general capabilities of SPG, but such specific operational details as to how, by whom and specifically where and through what channels SPG activities will be conducted should not be revealed in our liaison arrangement with State, primarily because (1) of the highly secret nature of such operations and (2) because the State Department, for its own protection, should remain in ignorance of such details so as to be in a position to deny knowledge thereof and thereby avoid possible diplomatic embarrassment.

6. Summed up, the foregoing liaison arrangement is one which can be effected quickly and simply. U.S. foreign policy, as reflected in the informational program of the U.S. Government, is already being currently established in connection with the activities of OIE. This policy, in the form of OIE directives, is specifically stated on a day-to-day and week-to-week basis. It would be a simple matter, through proper liaison with the Office of Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, to transmit such directives, with any additional appropriate comment, to SPG for its basic policy direction. SPG would thereby be receiving approved foreign policy directives of the U.S. Government which have been authorized and issued at the proper policy making levels of the State Department. This entire matter of policy liaison and direction for black propaganda activities of SPG is just that simple in its essence and solution.

TG Cassady

269. Policy Planning Staff Memorandum

Washington, May 4, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. An earlier, similar version, April 30, is ibid., RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1944-47: Lot 64 D 563, Box 11. The Policy Planning Staff minutes for May 3 state: "There was a discussion of the Planning Staff Memorandum of April 30, 1948 on the inauguration of organized political warfare. This paper was generally approved and Mr. Kennan will present it tomorrow for discussion at a meeting of NSC consultants." (Ibid., Box 32)

The Problem

The inauguration of organized political warfare.

Analysis

1. Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic meas-ures (as ERP), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.

2. The creation, success, and survival of the British Empire has been due in part to the British understanding and application of the principles of political warfare. Lenin so synthesized the teachings of Marx and Clausewitz that the Kremlin's conduct of political warfare has become the most refined and effective of any in history. We have been handicapped however by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war, by a tendency to view war as a sort of sporting context outside of all political context, by a national tendency to seek for a political cure-all, and by a reluctance to recognize the realities of international relations--the perpetual rhythm of [struggle, in and out of war.]/1/

/1/Although the following page of the source text indicates in an unidentified hand that 3 lines were missing from the bottom of the previous page, a comparison with the April 30 version of the memorandum cited in the source note above identified that only the 6 words in brackets were missing.

3. This Government has, of course, in part consciously and in part unconsciously, been conducting political warfare. Aggressive Soviet political warfare has driven us overtly first to the Truman Doctrine, next to ERP, then to sponsorship of Western Union [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. This was all political warfare and should be recognized as such.

4. Understanding the concept of political warfare, we should also recognize that there are two major types of political warfare--one overt and the other covert. Both, from their basic nature, should be directed and coordinated by the Department of State. Overt operations are, of course, the traditional policy activities of any foreign office enjoying positive leadership, whether or not they are recognized as political warfare. Covert operations are traditional in many European chancelleries but are relatively unfamiliar to this Government.

5. Having assumed greater international responsibilities than ever before in our history and having been engaged by the full might of the Kremlin's political warfare, we cannot afford to leave unmobilized our resources for covert political warfare. We cannot afford in the future, in perhaps more serious political crises, to scramble into impromptu covert operations [1 line of source text not declassified].

6. It was with all of the foregoing in mind that the Policy Planning Staff began some three months ago/2/ a consideration of specific projects in the field of covert operations, where they should be fitted into the structure of this Government, and how the Department of State should exercise direction and coordination.

/2/Although the following page of the source text indicates that 3 lines were missing from the bottom of the previous page, a comparison with the April 30 version of the memorandum cited in the source note above finds that no words were missing.

7. There are listed below projects which have been or are now being suggested by the Staff:

a. Liberation Committees.

Purpose: To encourage the formation of a public American organization which will sponsor selected political refugee committees so that they may (a) act as foci of national hope and revive a sense of purpose among political refugees from the Soviet World; (b) provide an inspiration for continuing popular resistance within the countries of the Soviet World; and (c) serve as a potential nucleus for all-out liberation movements in the event of war.

Description: This is primarily an overt operation which, however, should receive covert guidance and possibly assistance from the Government. It is proposed that trusted private American citizens be encouraged to establish a public committee which would give support and guidance in U.S. interests to national movements (many of them now in existence) publicly led by outstanding political refugees from the Soviet World, such as Mikolajczyk and Nagy. The American Committee should be so selected and organized as to cooperate closely with this Government. The functions of the American Committee should be limited to enabling selected refugee leaders [to keep alive as public figures with access to printing presses and microphones. It should not engage in underground activities.]/3/

/3/The words in brackets were taken from the April 30 version; see footnote 1 above.

What is proposed here is an operation in the traditional American form: organized public support of resistance to tyranny in foreign countries. Throughout our history, private American citizens have banded together to champion the cause of freedom for people suffering under oppression. (The Communists and Zionists have exploited this tradition to the extreme, to their own ends and to our national detriment, as witness the Abraham Lincoln brigade during the Spanish Civil War and the current illegal Zionist activities.) Our proposal is that this tradition be revived specifically to further American national interests in the present crisis.

[1 heading and 2 paragraphs (21-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

c. Support of Indigenous Anti-Communist Elements in Threatened Countries of the Free World.

Purpose: To strengthen indigenous forces combatting communism in countries where Soviet political warfare is a threat to our national security.

Description: This is a covert operation again utilizing private intermediaries. To insure cover, the private American organizations conducting the operation should be separate from the organizations mentioned in previous projects. [3 lines of source text not declassified] This project is a matter of urgency because the communists are reported to be planning the disruption of ERP through labor disturbances in France. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

d. Preventive Direct Action in Free Countries.

Purpose: Only in cases of critical necessity, to resort to direct action to prevent vital installations, other material, or personnel from being (1) sabotaged or liquidated or (2) captured intact by Kremlin agents or agencies.

Description: This covert operation involves, for example, (1) control over anti-sabotage activities in the Venezuelan oil fields, (2) American sabotage of Near Eastern oil installations on the verge of Soviet capture, and (3) designation of key individuals threatened by the Kremlin who should be protected or removed elsewhere.

8. It would seem that the time is now fully ripe for the creation of a covert political warfare operations directorate within the Government. If we are to engage in such operations, they must be under unified direction. One man must be boss. And he must, as those responsible for the overt phases of political warfare, be answerable to the Secretary of State, who directs the whole in coordination.

9. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

10. The National Security Council Secretariat would seem to provide the best possible cover for such a directorate. Such cover would also permit a direct chain of command from the Secretary of State and be a natural meeting ground for close collaboration with the military establishment.

Recommendations

11. There should promptly be established, under the cover of the National Security Council Secretariat, a directorate of political warfare operations to be known as the Consultative (or Evaluation) Board of the National Security Council.

12. The Director should be designated by the Secretary of State and should be responsible to him.

13. The Director should have initially a staff of 4 officers designated by the Department of State and 4 officers designated by the Secretary of National Defense.

14. The Board should have complete authority over covert political warfare operations conducted by this Government. It should have the authority to initiate new operations and to bring under its control or abolish existing covert political warfare activities.

15. Specifically, (a) the four projects mentioned in paragraph 7 above should be activated by the Board and (b) covert political warfare now under CIA and theater commanders abroad should be brought under the authority of the Board.

16. The coordination of the above covert operations with the overt conduct of foreign policy should, of course, be accomplished through the offices of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State.

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