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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Hillenkoetter's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence

                           

317. Central Intelligence Group Paper No. 24/1

Washington, undated.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276. Confidential. Attached to a May 13 memorandum from Earman to the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, which noted that it was circulated at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence as an alternative to CIG 24 (Document 189).

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD PROCEDURES

The Problem

To establish procedure for the Intelligence Advisory Board.

Facts

Although certain basic policies are established by the President's letter of 22 January 1946 and by subsequent N.I.A. Directives, no procedure has been formally agreed upon for the accomplishment of the mission of the I.A.B.

Discussion

In accordance with N.I.A. Directive No. 1,/1/ paragraph 3, all recommendations to the N.I.A., initiated by the Director of Central Intelligence and related to the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the departments as related to the national security, are referred to the I.A.B. for concurrence or comment before submission to the N.I.A.

/1/Document 141.

At its 9th meeting, the N.I.A. established the procedure it desired for the implementation of N.I.A. Directive No. 5, paragraph 3./2/

/2/Document 160. Paragraph 3 reads "the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized and directed to act for this Authority in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security to ensure that the over-all policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed." The reference to the procedure established at the NIA's 9th meeting is to the NIA's approval of Vandenberg's recommendation that the Director of Central Intelligence should "operate within his jurisdiction as an agent of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy."

The I.A.B. has itself agreed upon an acceptable procedure for implementation of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 6, which relates to intelligence reports prepared by the Central Intelligence Group.

Recommendations requested of the Director of Central Intelligence by the N.I.A. are not considered as falling into the pattern provided in N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 3. Nor is it considered that it was the intent of the President or of the N.I.A. that all reports, papers, and statements prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence for presentation to the N.I.A. be first submitted to the I.A.B. for advisory opinion. The Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the N.I.A. can not correctly make the I.A.B., which was created solely for the purpose of advising him, privy to all matters before the N.I.A. Similarly as the agent of the N.I.A. he can not make the I.A.B. privy to all of his relations with the N.I.A.

Since it is not the current practice of the N.I.A. to formalize agenda in advance of its meetings, it is impossible for the Secretary, N.I.A., to undertake to supply N.I.A. agenda to the I.A.B. At such time as the N.I.A. may formalize such agenda, distribution thereof will necessarily be determined by the N.I.A. and not by the Director of Central Intelligence or the I.A.B.

After careful consideration, it is believed that no procedure should be established which requires the I.A.B.-D.C.I.-N.I.A. channel for the presentation of opinions by an Intelligence Chief to his respective departmental head. No such procedure appears contemplated by the President's letter nor subsequent N.I.A. Directives. This opinion is further borne out by the absence of any provision requiring the submission to the N.I.A. by the Director of Central Intelligence of any recommendation, paper, etc. originated elsewhere than with him. Thus it would appear that any recommendation originated by a member of the I.A.B., even though it may receive concurrence of all other I.A.B. members, can not properly be submitted to the N.I.A. by the Director of Central Intelligence unless it is accepted by him as a recommendation from him. Any such recommendation would apparently have to be submitted individually by each I.A.B. member to his respective N.I.A. member.

Conclusion

It is concluded that a formalization of I.A.B. procedures is appropriate.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Board adopt the following procedures for its consideration of recommendations properly coming before it for advisory opinion:

1. All recommendations envisaged by paragraph 3b of the President's letter of 22 January 1946 will be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence to the I.A.B. in writing, accompanied by copies of such papers or statement with which the Director of Central Intelligence may contemplate accompanying the recommendations upon presentation to the N.I.A. These recommendations will have attached a voting slip providing opportunity for (a) concurrence; (b) comment; (c) request for an I.A.B. meeting to express oral advisory opinion. Voting slips will be returned to the Secretary, N.I.A., within one calendar week after receipt. If any I.A.B. member so requests, an I.A.B. meeting shall be promptly called by the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be the sole judge of the advisability of referring any proposed recommendation to a special study group or for otherwise delaying the submission of the recommendation to the N.I.A. If he considers such reference or other delay inadvisable, he shall give I.A.B. members one calendar week for the submission of any desired statement of non-concurrence, the basis of which will accompany the recommendation to the N.I.A.

2. All implementations envisaged by N.I.A. Directive No. 5, paragraph 3, will be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence to the I.A.B. in writing, accompanied by a voting slip providing opportunity for (a) comment, and (b) calling of a meeting. Written comment by any I.A.B. member, after consideration by the Director of Central Intelligence, will be filed by the Secretary, N.I.A., with the file copy of the related implementation. Oral comment will be fully spread on the minutes of the I.A.B. meeting, if held. Any implementation modified by the Director of Central Intelligence as the result of I.A.B. advisory opinions will be distributed by the Secretary, N.I.A., to the I.A.B. The decision to hold subsequent I.A.B. meetings or otherwise to delay the issuance of any proposed implementation rests with the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. The Secretary, N.I.A. shall circulate to I.A.B. members all proper recommendations, proposed directives, papers, etc., which any I.A.B. member may originate for consideration by the Director of Central Intelligence and the I.A.B. Each shall be accompanied by a voting slip providing opportunity for (a) concurrence; (b) comment; (c) request for meeting.

4. Unless otherwise directed by the N.I.A., the Secretary, N.I.A., shall circulate to the I.A.B. copies of all minutes, decisions, and directives approved by or issued by or in the name of the N.I.A.

318. Minutes of the 13th Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board

Washington, May 15, 1947, 2:30 p.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Secret. The meeting was held in the North Interior Building. The text printed reflects changes in a correction sheet issued on May 26, which was attached to the minutes. See the Supplement.

PARTICIPANTS

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

Members Present
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Maj. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2
Brig. General Walter E. Todd, Deputy Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Capt. Abel C. Sabalot, Acting Chief of Intelligence, O.N.I.

Also Present
Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
Mr. Park Armstrong, Department of State
Colonel Riley F. Ennis, U.S.A.
Capt. R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Lieut. Colonel Frank B. Chappell, U.S.A.
Major W. C. Baird, U.S.A.

Secretariat
Mr. J.S. Earman, Secretary, N.I.A.

1. Letter of Appreciation to Lieut. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg

The Director of Central Intelligence brought to the attention of the Board a proposed letter of IAB appreciation to General Vandenberg submitted by the Chief of Naval Intelligence. The letter was signed by Mr. Eddy and General McDonald and given to Captain Davis to secure the signature of Admiral Inglis. The letter will then be returned to the Secretary, N.I.A., who will secure the signature of General Chamberlin upon his return to Washington, after which it will be forwarded to General Vandenberg.

2. Coordination of Intelligence Production (I.A.B. #1)/1/

/1/Document 195.

The Director stated if there were no comments on paragraphs 2 a (1) and (2) of the proposed N.I.A. Directive on the "Coordination of Intelligence Production," he wished to recommend that paragraph 2 a (3) be amended to read as follows: "When completed as provided for above, this outline and initial allocations of production and maintainence responsibilities shall be issued in the name of the N.I.A. by the Director of Central Intelligence as an implementation of this Directive. It is expected . . ." (The remainder of the paragraph to read as presently written.)

Colonel Ennis noted that General Chamberlin was extremely concerned about the exact wording of this paragraph since he felt that its contents were the backbone of the allocation of personnel, the organization of various agencies for production, and, therefore, that the outline of basic intelligence and initial allocations of production and maintenance responsibilities should be approved on the highest level and that he, General Chamberlin, was particularly anxious to have the phraseology "submitted for N.I.A. approval" included in the paragraph.

After considerable discussion where it was noted by Captain Sabalot that the outline of all basic intelligence and tentative allocations of production and maintenance responsibilities should be submitted for N.I.A. approval rather than issued in the name of the N.I.A. by the Director of Central Intelligence,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed to amend paragraph 2 a (3) to read as follows: "When completed this outline and tentative allocations of production and maintenance responsibilities shall be submitted for N.I.A. approval and issued as an implementation of this Directive. It is expected . . ." (The remainder of the paragraph to read as presently written.)

The Director stated he wished to recommend that the last sentence of paragraph 2 a (4) be amended to read as follows: "The National Intelligence Surveys will be distributed in such form as shall be determined by the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned."

After some discussion, where it was noted by Major Baird that a proposed outline of National Intelligence Surveys/2/ was now being circulated to the agencies for approval,

/2/Reference is to a program of basic ("static") intelligence studies.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed to amend the last sentence of paragraph 2 a (4) as recommended by the Director, with the exception that the word "distributed" be changed to "disseminated."

The Director then recommended the word "sometimes" be placed between the words "them" and "without" in paragraph 2 b (1). After some discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed to insert the word "usually" between the words "them" and "without" in paragraph 2 b (1).

The Director stated he wished to recommend that paragraph 2 b (3) be amended to read as follows: "Interagency dissemination of current intelligence shall be subject to the overall planning and coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence and shall be based on stated requirements of the agencies and upon their known missions and dominant interest." After discussion where Mr. Eddy stated that the Department of State preferred that this paragraph be left unchanged, and Captain Davis stated that ONI has always held the view that dissemination of current intelligence had been going satisfactorily so far, and further, to centralize dissemination in this case when there are so few agencies involved was needless,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed that paragraph 2 b (3) should stand as written.

The Director stated that the words "production capabilities" had unwittingly crept into the wording of paragraph 2 c (2). He recommended that these words be omitted and the word "or" be added after the word "responsibility."

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Approved the deletion of the words "production capabilities" and the addition of the word "or" between the words "responsibility" and "recognition."

The Director recommended that the word "intelligence" be added between the words "Any" and "agency" in paragraph 2 c (3).

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Approved this recommendation without discussion.

The Director then stated A-2 had recommended that paragraph 2 c (4) be amended to read as follows: "For the purposes of paragraph (3) above, the following division of interests, subject to refinement through a continuous program of coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence, shall serve as a general delineation of dominant interests.

Political, Cultural, Sociological Intelligence--State Department
Military Intelligence--War Department
Naval Intelligence--Navy Department
Air Intelligence--Army Air Forces
Economic and Scientific Intelligence--Each agency in accordance with its respective needs"

After some discussion, where it was pointed out by Captain Davis that ONI was willing to agree to the amendment of this paragraph as proposed by A-2, with the suggestion that consideration be given to placing this paragraph as a new general paragraph 4, and rewording of the first line to read as follows: "For the purposes of intelligence production the following division . . ."

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Approved the changes as recommended by A-2, together with the additional change suggested by Captain Davis in paragraph 2 c 4.

General Todd then stated that paragraph 2 d (2) had previously read, when discussed by the Ad Hoc Committee: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce and disseminate national intelligence." After some discussion

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed to amend paragraph 2 d (2) to read as indicated by General Todd.

The Director stated he wished to recommend that one of the following revisions of paragraph 2 d (3) be approved by the Intelligence Advisory Board:

a. "The Director of Central Intelligence shall with the advice of the IAB agencies plan and develop the production of national intelligence with due regard to the production capabilities and dominant interests of the Intelligence Advisory Board and other departmental intelligence agencies concerned."

b. "The Director of Central Intelligence shall plan and develop the production of national intelligence in coordination with the IAB agencies in order that he may obtain from them, within the limits of their capabilities, the departmental intelligence which will assist him in the production of national intelligence."

After some discussion, the Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed to adopt the revision of paragraph 2 d (3) as indicated in b above.

The Director stated he also wished to recommend that paragraph 2 d (4) be amended to read as follows: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall by agreement with the pertinent agency or agencies request and receive such special estimates, reports and periodic briefs or summaries to be prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually or by the direction of the President or the National Intelligence Authority."

After considerable discussion, where it was brought out that estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities were considered to be those prepared in the past, present and future,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed to amend paragraph 2 d (4) to read as follows: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall by agreement with the pertinent agency or agencies request and receive such special estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually."

The Director suggested and

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed that the word "sufficient" in the second and fifth lines of general paragraph 3 be changed to "adequate."

Captain Davis stated that ONI felt that before this Directive is issued by the National Intelligence Authority, it should go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a request that they consent to merge the JANIS program with NIS, and further that the Director of Central Intelligence request the Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S., to consent to merge SID with NIS.

The Director stated it was his understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were preparing a paper recommending that JANIS be merged with NIS. However, in the event such a paper did not materialize, it was his desire that the proposed N.I.A. Directive on the "Coordination of Intelligence Production," as amended at this meeting, be forwarded to the National Intelligence Authority recommending that the N.I.A. refer the proposed Directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment with reference to the merger of JANIS and NIS, and further that a letter would be prepared to the Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S., recommending that SID also be merged with NIS.

The Director stated he did not agree altogether with paragraph 6 d of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, particularly that part which stated "with the aid of as many sub-committees as necessary." He went on to say that if G-2 and JIC transferred to the Central Intelligence Group the SID and JANIS programs, he believed that the present IAB Ad Hoc Committee, as an interagency planning board, plus working committees similar to that now operating on the defense project under ORE guidance, would be capable of efficient handling.

Captain Davis stated only one Ad Hoc Committee had been recommended, unless it was necessary to get down to the JISPB, the people who were familiar with the JANIS program. He further stated that no definite number of sub-committees were recommended except as might be necessary to initiate the production of NIS.

Colonel Ennis stated that he was in agreement with the Director and that the permanent IAB Committee, if appointed, could invite representatives from the agencies indicated in paragraph 6 d of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

After further discussion, the Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed that the presently established IAB Ad Hoc Committee would in fact be the committee recommended in paragraph 6 d of the above-mentioned Ad Hoc Committee report and further that representatives of the other agencies would be invited to sit as members as they were needed.

3. Action by the Intelligence Advisory Board on Matters Submitted to the National Intelligence Authority (C.I.G. 24 and C.I.G. 24/1)/3/

/3/Documents 189 and 317.

After some discussion The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed to hold this paper over until the next meeting in order to give the members of the Board an opportunity to study the alternative proposal contained in C.I.G. 24/1.

4. Amendment of the Definition of Strategic and National Policy Intelligence (I.A.B. #2)/4/

/4/Dated May 9. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-280) See the Supplement.

The Director stated that he did not feel it was within his province to recommend to the National Intelligence Authority that that Authority amend the definition of strategic and national policy intelligence after such definition had in fact been approved by the N.I.A.

The Director noted that any member of the Intelligence Advisory Board had a perfect right to appeal direct to his N.I.A. member.

After considerable discussion, where it was noted by Captain Davis that ONI wished to gain the views of the other IAB members on the present definition of strategic and national policy intelligence,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed, in the absence of Admiral Inglis, to postpone further discussion on this paper.

5. Exploitation of Enemy Document Repositories (C.I.G. 21 and C.I.G. 21/1)/5/

/5/Dated November 21, 1946 and April 10, 1947. (Both in Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.

The Director stated that in view of the fact that the cost ($82,950) of carrying out the recommendations contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee appointed to explore the document situation was not included in the CIG budget, and further that the budget had not been approved, he wished to recommend that action be deferred on this paper pending approval of the CIG budget.

After some discussion, The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed to defer action on C.I.G. 21/1 as recommended by the Director.

6. Report by Mr. Eddy

Mr. Eddy informed the IAB in detail of an agreement reached between him and the Director with reference to certain proposed action to be taken as a result of the House Appropriations Committee's recommended cut in the State Department's budget./6/

/6/Possibly a reference to the transfer from the Department of State to CIG of the Division of Map Intelligence and Cartography and the Joint Intelligence Studies Publishing Board. (Memorandum from Eddy to Peurifoy, June 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration--Subject Files, 1944-1947: Lot 53 D 28) See the Supplement.

319. Minutes of the 10th Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority

Washington, June 26, 1947, 10:30 a.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-245, Job 84-00473R, Box 3. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the State Department.

PARTICIPANTS

Members Present
Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal Representative of the President
Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence

Also Present
Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen
Under Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan
Mr. William A. Eddy, Department of State
Major General S. J. Chamberlin USA
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis USN
Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge USN
Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group

Secretariat
Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary

Discussion of the Authority Granted the Director of Central Intelligence by the National Intelligence Authority at its 9th Meeting To Issue Orders and Directives

Secretary Marshall requested Admiral Hillenkoetter to explain the subject authority approved by the National Intelligence Authority at its last meeting./1/

/1/See Document 185.

Admiral Hillenkoetter, after a brief explanation, stated that at the present time the Director of Central Intelligence did not need this authority and he felt that its rescission would create a better feeling with the member Intelligence Advisory Board agencies. However, he would be the first to request its reinstatement if ever needed.

Secretary Patterson stated he had no objection to the withdrawal of the authority provided it was no longer needed.

Admiral Leahy noted if the authority had not been used to date he did not see the necessity of its withdrawal.

Under Secretary of the Navy Sullivan asked Admiral Hillenkoetter if he thought the withdrawal of the authority in question would result in better cooperation between the member IAB agencies.

Admiral Hillenkoetter replied that in his opinion this was correct.

Secretary Forrestal stated the authority granted the Director of Central Intelligence to operate within his jurisdiction as the agent for the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and to issue directives in their names made the CIG appear as a Gestapo and caused unnecessary friction.

General Chamberlin, upon being questioned by Secretary Patterson, stated he felt Admiral Hillenkoetter was correct in requesting the rescission of the authority.

Secretary Marshall asked whether the withdrawal of this authority would adversely affect the status of CIG and its relationship with the agencies.

Admiral Hillenkoetter replied that on the contrary he expected it would improve the relationship.

After further discussion,

The National Intelligence Authority:

Agreed to withdraw the following authority delegated to the Director of Central Intelligence: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall operate within his jurisdiction as an agent of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, and the necessary authority is hereby delegated by the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy to the Director of Central Intelligence so that his decisions, orders and directives shall be considered as emanating from them and shall have full force and effect as such, provided any aggrieved agency may have access to that agency's Secretary and through him to the N.I.A."

Discussion of Unfavorable Publicity Directed at the Central Intelligence Group

Admiral Hillenkoetter stated he had prepared a letter to the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments for the signature of the members of the NIA with reference to the recent numerous newspaper articles which stated that the Central Intelligence Group had usurped various departmental functions and forced established operating organizations out of the field./2/

/2/See, for example, "Army World Intelligence Ring Reported Halted by New Agency," The New York Times, May 21, and Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 387, 392, and 395.

Secretary Patterson stated that the presidential letter establishing the NIA and the CIG was silent as to the operations of CIG and left this responsibility to the NIA.

Admiral Leahy stated the President had no thoughts on the details of CIG operations, but at the time of the issuance of the letter of 22 January 1946 the President felt he was not receiving properly coordinated intelligence reports.

Secretary Patterson stated he had received several inquiries with reference to the recent unfavorable publicity of CIG clandestine activities. He said that while he had no reason to believe that CIG was not ably performing this activity, there might be some basis for these accusations and, therefore, he would like to hear any comment the other members of the NIA might have relative to replying to such inquiries.

Admiral Leahy stated it was his opinion that clandestine operations were far less effective when operated by more than one agency. He further stated that such operations could not be any worse now than they were during the time he was in France prior to the late war.

Secretary Patterson noted that NIA had the authority to delegate conduct of clandestine operations within their respective agencies as they saw fit.

Secretary Forrestal asked Admiral Hillenkoetter if Mr. Hoover was in sympathy with the present clandestine operations of CIG.

Admiral Hillenkoetter replied that he was.

Secretary Forrestal stated that the NIA had to rely on the soundness of the organization to which the operation of clandestine activities was delegated and further he did not see how answers could be given to unfavorable publicity in this regard due to security reasons.

Secretary Marshall stated that it was his opinion if the operation of clandestine activities were, for example, centered in the War Department, the Navy Department would not agree, and conversely, if these activities were centered in the Navy Department, the War Department would not agree. Therefore, they must be in a "neutral" agency.

Secretary Forrestal suggested that Admiral Hillenkoetter contact the leading newspaper publishers with reference to the printing of criticisms of CIG.

Admiral Hillenkoetter replied that this had already been done.

After further discussion,

The National Intelligence Authority:

Signed the letter to the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments./3/

/3/Document 135.

Report by the Director of Central Intelligence

Admiral Hillenkoetter gave a brief resume of the following report:

"Atomic Energy Commission

"It will be recalled that at that last meeting you approved the issuance of NIA Directive No. 9, providing for the transfer from the Manhattan Engineering District to the CIG of military intelligence personnel and the centralization in CIG of the coordinating responsibility for collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence pertaining to foreign atomic energy developments. Immediately thereafter informal working agreements were established, and we have every reason to hope that a formal agreement is imminent. Admiral Souers is working with the AEC toward this goal./4/

/4/Souers' report to the Atomic Energy Commission is in the Supplement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/7-347)

"State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

"Running a close second to the Atomic Energy Commission in importance as a customer of CIG and, in my opinion, probably leading it eventually on the basis of volume is the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

"SWNCC is the interdepartmental or national policy group; CIG is the interdepartmental or national intelligence group. National policy should be built on national intelligence. A most satisfactory formal liaison has been established by CIG with the SWNCC secretariat. I plan personally discussing with Mr. Saltzman, the new Chairman of SWNCC, the manner in which CIG can further assist through the preparation of those intelligence reports and studies which the SWNCC committees should have, particularly right now, the Ad Hoc Committee for Economic Aid.

"Joint Research and Development Board

"In implementation of established agreements between the Joint Research and Development Board and CIG, wherein CIG acts as the scientific intelligence facility of the Joint Research and Development Board, detailed working arrangements have been established, formulation of a National Scientific Intelligence Program has been initiated, and JRDB has started a flow of requests to CIG for scientific and technical intelligence. Consideration has been given by CIG in collaboration with the JRDB and the IAB agencies to scientific intelligence, and CIG has made continuing progress in meeting JRDB requirements. One weakness that has been disclosed by CIG coordination is the almost complete lack of fully qualified collectors of scientific intelligence.

"Joint Chiefs of Staff

"It will be recalled that the NIA has in the past discussed the CIG relationship to the JCS and the confusion and duplication which exists due to a lack of demarcation of duties between CIG and Joint Intelligence Committee of the JCS. To date almost all CIG planning has had to be adjusted to this continuing problem. I understand that the JIC is now considering a proposal which may resolve the matter. I do not know its details. In fact I have no official way of knowing what takes place in JIC. I can only hope that at an early date the Director of Central Intelligence will be placed on the distribution list for JIC papers and will be invited to sit with the JIC, at least as an observer. Without some such close tie-in, there will continue to be a sad lack of coordination.

"CIG Intelligence Program

"In our attempt to meet our responsibilities to the President, to yourselves as members of the NIA, and to such special organizations as I have mentioned above, CIG has, as its personnel and facilities have permitted, gradually developed an intelligence program which when fully activated will, I believe, accomplish what was intended in the President's originating letter of 22 January 1946.

"We believe that no military or diplomatic planning can be successfully done except against a background of incontrovertible facts. These facts we call basic intelligence. In one degree or another these facts are needed by each of your departments. We are undertaking to coordinate the compilation of these facts, this basic intelligence, in handbooks to be called National Intelligence Surveys and to make them available in multiple copies to the departments. They will be loose-leaf so that they can be kept currently correct and so that they can be subdivided and distributed for specialized use. They will contain data on foreign government organization, pertinent history, topography, population and manpower, climate, strategic areas, health, and sanitation, etc. In a form strictly limited to wartime military use, some basic intelligence was compiled by the JIC in the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies. We are trying to obtain agreement that this JIC undertaking, which continues in a less active manner, be consolidated with our National Intelligence Surveys. It is my understanding that the JIC is supporting this proposal before the JCS.

"Situation Reports

"Another form of intelligence reference we call Situation Reports. These reports are to cover countries or areas, and those special international subjects not restricted to countries or areas. They are designed to contain a concise summary of the situation, its implications, and its possible or probable effect on our own national security. These reports will also be loose-leaf in form for ready revision. They will give military, naval, political, economic, and diplomatic coverage, and the facilities of the several agencies will be used to a maximum in their preparation.

"From time to time we hope to put out a composite overall analysis of the world situation, based on these separate Situation Reports.

"Interagency Coordination of Production

"The line of demarcation between national intelligence and agency intelligence is not always clear. But we try consistently to limit our production efforts strictly to that national intelligence which is essential to national policy planners, leaving to the agencies that agency intelligence required for operational use of departmental officers.

"Further to avoid duplication, CIG has prepared and the IAB has unanimously approved a plan for the interagency coordination of the production of intelligence. The plan attempts to insure complete coverage and eliminate unproductive duplication. We are awaiting the comments of the JCS and the agency planners before submitting it to the NIA.

"Our big problem in the production field is the NIA requirement that the concurrence or comment of each IAB agency to each CIG intelligence report must be obtained, excepting current intelligence reports. I plan to review this situation personally with the IAB.

"Current Intelligence

"By NIA Directive No. 2, CIG is required to produce current intelligence for use of the President, the members of this Authority, and a few others. These are the Daily and Weekly Summaries. Personally, I feel that these summaries are pretty poor, and we are now endeavoring to make changes in them to increase their value. Any suggestions or ideas to make them better would be warmly received."

Admiral Leahy commented that the President was pleased with the contents of the daily summaries, and further he read these summaries every day even going so far as to read the cables attached to his copy.

Under Secretary of the Navy Sullivan stated he thought the information contained in the CIG Weekly Summary was excellently presented.

Secretary Forrestal stated that the veracity of the contents of the daily and weekly summaries should be without question. He further stated that he made this point since a portion of the information contained in a recent daily summary had not been correct.

Admiral Hillenkoetter reaffirmed his position that there was great room for improvement.

"Collection Coordination

"Two NIA Directives have been issued affecting the collection of intelligence. One established a program for the overall coordination of collection activities./5/ Recent field surveys by CIG officers indicate that in some posts abroad this directive has had a positive and beneficial effect. In others the generality of its terms has vitiated its force. A continuing study is being made by CIG, and suggestions for improvement will probably be made to the intelligence sections of your departments. With recent budget cuts, the Government's limited facilities must be employed to their maximum efficiency to protect the national security.

/5/Document 181.

"The second Directive announced the current essentials and intelligence objectives of this Government as regards China./6/ The purpose behind this Directive was to pool all agency requirements and allocate them in accordance with field representative capabilities, thus using manpower efficiently and avoiding duplication. Further National Intelligence Requirements are in preparation.

/6/NIA Directive No. 8, "National Intelligence Requirements--China," February 12, 1947. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132) See the Supplement.

"CIG Collection

"In addition to coordinating agency facilities for collection, CIG maintains centrally, for the benefit of all, four operations.

"There is the Office of Special Operations

(Off the record remarks)/7/

/7/Not found.

In the Office of Operations are the

1. Contact Branch
2. Documents Branch
3. Foreign Broadcasts Intelligence Branch

"The Contact Branch has continued to develop the exploitation of American organizations and individuals having a foreign intelligence potential. Interagency offices are now operating in New York, Washington, Chicago, and San Francisco. Intelligence classified by the agencies as important has been obtained from these contacts. In addition, a contact register is being developed listing future potential sources.

"The Documents Branch is continuing the work of the old Washington Document Center in the exploitation of captured documents from the Far East and is now absorbing the German Military Document Section and the Special Document Section of the War Department Intelligence Division. Some of these were joint British-Canadian-American projects. This presents a difficulty because of the lack of authority of CIG to maintain liaison with foreign governments, a difficulty which may require NIA resolution. As the backlog of these captured documents decreases, we hope to transfer the attention of our translators to the exploitation of current foreign periodicals.

"The CIG, under State Department auspices, has recently reached reciprocal agreement in principle with the British Government. This provides for complete interchange of foreign broadcast monitoring material between the BBC monitoring service and our Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Branch. This reciprocal agreement is designed to obtain economical monitoring coverage by a division of the world into U.S. and U.K. zones of monitoring interest. The new arrangement provides for a transfer of our monitoring station in Cairo, an area which is rapidly becoming politically unstable, to the British Crown colony of Cyprus. The British will assume responsibility for our transmissions from Cyprus to London. In return for this concession, as well as for the continuation of the wartime arrangement whereby we receive the entire British monitoring product of BBC, CIG will transmit to London a selected file of our Far-Eastern and Latin-American monitoring product.

"Collection and Dissemination Coordination

"In addition to the above active collection efforts and to field coordination, CIG is devoting much time to the coordination of the collection efforts of the agencies here in Washington through clearinghouse arrangements and central reading panels.

"Other Problems

"The continued absence of legislation continues to hamper the soundest development of CIG in several directions, both within and without the Government.

"I believe I should bring to your attention one serious problem. CIG is being called upon by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Research and Development Board, and others for scientific intelligence. CIG is unable fully to meet these requirements because of the general lack of properly qualified collectors of scientific intelligence. Some quarters have proposed the designation of scientific attaches to missions abroad. I have no present solution, but CIG is working closely with Dr. Vannevar Bush to obtain, as may be possible, qualified scientific collectors. Several plans, including one of obtaining scientists and then giving them a course of intelligence, are under discussion. This is admittedly a difficult and urgent problem but one on which we are working and which we hope to solve."

Secretary Patterson asked Admiral Hillenkoetter if the "CIG Section" in the Unification Bill was satisfactory to CIG.

Admiral Hillenkoetter replied that it was.

Secretary Forrestal asked Admiral Hillenkoetter if General Donovan was in agreement with the present organization of CIG.

Admiral Hillenkoetter replied that General Donovan, Mr. Cheston, his principal assistant in OSS, and Allen Dulles were in perfect agreement with the present organization of CIG, and further that Mr. Cheston and Mr. Dulles had agreed to appear before the Committee in CIG's behalf. General Donovan had written a letter to the Committee in CIG's behalf since it was impossible for him to appear personally due to the fact that he was out of the country.

Discussion of Relationship Between the JCS, JIC and the CIG

As a result of that part of Admiral Hillenkoetter's report on the relationship between the JCS and CIG and the lack of demarcation of duties by the CIG and JIC, Secretary Patterson stated he thought there had been some previous discussion relative to the dissolution of JIC.

Admiral Hillenkoetter replied that this was correct and that the discussion had taken place at the last NIA meeting.

Admiral Leahy stated it was his opinion that JIC should be abolished. However, JCS had under consideration a plan for collaboration between JCS and CIG.

Secretary Patterson asked General Chamberlin if the JIC at present served any useful function.

General Chamberlin replied in the affirmative, and noted if JIC were abolished and its functions assumed by CIG it would thus make an outside civilian agency a party to projected war plans.

Admiral Leahy noted that as a possible solution to this problem intelligence information required by the JCS could be furnished by CIG to JIC, who, in turn, could put the information in the form desired by the JCS.

Transfer of the State Department's MAP Intelligence Division and State Representatives Serving With JISPB to CIG

Admiral Hillenkoetter stated at the request of the State Department member of the Intelligence Advisory Board an investigation of CIG appropriations was made and it appears that CIG can carry these functions for the next fiscal year. The work and product of the subject organizations are of considerable importance to all the member agencies and it had been agreed by the Director of Central Intelligence and the State Department member of the IAB, subject to IAB and NIA approval, that CIG would take over these activities.

Secretary Marshall stated it would be appreciated if the NIA would approve the transfer of the above-mentioned activities to CIG. He noted that there was a total of 106 employees involved.

After some discussion,

The National Intelligence Authority

Agreed to the transfer of the State Department's Map Intelligence Division and that Department's representatives serving with the JISPB to the CIG and directed the Director of Central Intelligence to work out the details with the proper authorities in the State Department.

Secretary Marshall stated he was still troubled by the debates in Congress over the allotment of money for intelligence activities, and further it was his opinion that the allotment of funds for intelligence activities should be appropriated in a lump sum and controlled by one person.

Secretary Marshall went on to state that Congressman Taber/8/ was in agreement and during recent discussions on the appropriation of funds for intelligence activities Mr. Taber stated it was necessary for him to talk to twenty-six different people. Secretary Marshall said it was his belief that the tenor of the conversations of NIA members in appearing before Congressional Committees on the subject of appropriation of funds for intelligence purposes should be that "in order to get our money's worth" the amount of such appropriations must be kept secret and some one person had to be trusted in the disbursement of these funds.

/8/Representative John Taber (Republican-New York), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.

320. Minutes of the 14th Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board

Washington, July 17, 1947, 2:30 p.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Secret. The meeting was held in the North Interior Building.

PARTICIPANTS

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

Members Present
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, WDGS
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
Maj. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2

Also Present
Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
Mr. Park Armstrong, Department of State
Colonel Riley F. Ennis, WDGS
Capt. R. K. Davis, USN
Lt. Colonel Edgar J. Treacy, WDGS
Major W. C. Baird, AAF-2

Secretariat
Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary, N.I.A.

1. Employment of Reserve Officers as Agents (IAB 3/1/ and IAB 3/1/2/)

/1/On June 30 the NIA's secretary, at the request of the Acting Chief of Naval Intelligence, circulated IAB 3, "Employment of Reserve Officers as Agents," recommending that reserve military or naval personnel not be used as agents unless "the information is most important and can not otherwise be obtained." (Ibid., HS/HC-280) See the Supplement.

/2/IAB 3/1, July 15, summarizing an ICAPS study, suggested that employment of agents, military or civilian, for espionage or counter-espionage by agencies other than CIG ran counter to the intent of NIA Directive No. 5. Reservists acting in a civilian capacity as observers and reporters for their parent agencies did not fall within the definition of espionage or counter-espionage agents, but their activities should be coordinated in accordance with NIA Directive No. 7. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-280) See the Supplement.

The Director of Central Intelligence opened the meeting with the statement that he wished to add the following to the last sentence of paragraph 5 of the Enclosure to IAB 3/1/3/ "except those employed by CIG" since CIG was presently employing Army and Naval Reserve officers as agents in a full time capacity.

/3/The sentence reads: "Consequently, this practice [use of reservists as observers and reporters for parent agencies] must be considered a purely departmental undertaking unrelated to the special operations of CIG [,] but all reserve personnel of the Armed Serv-ices residing abroad in civilian capacity should be used as observers and reporters of intelligence only by their respective departments."

General McDonald stated he was inclined to believe that the provisions of IAB 3 were too restrictive. He said, for example, the Army Air Forces have contracts with institutions, some of whose employees are Reserve Officers, and pointed out that recently it was necessary for such an employee to go to Europe in a civilian and overt capacity in performance of duties assigned to him by his civilian employer. General McDonald further stated that he believed that instances of this nature were likely to occur many times.

Admiral Inglis stated that cases of the nature indicated by General McDonald brought out the fact that the Intelligence Advisory Board should have a coordinated policy on the employment of individuals as intelligence agents in an overt capacity since agreement had already been reached that CIG will have jurisdiction and cognizance over covert intelligence collection, and while he was not necessarily championing any particular ground rules he did think there should be a common understanding as to whether or not ground rules were necessary. He went on to state that if it were necessary for such an individual to go overseas as an agent of a department or an institution other than CIG and was not a part of CIG's organized operations, he felt that such action should be coordinated or at least information given to CIG as to the identity of the individual.

Admiral Inglis further stated that this was based on the assumption that such an individual was acting in a covert capacity. If the work of this individual were in the overt field and he were a Naval Reserve officer, Navy regulations required that he notify the Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department, prior to his departure, and further that he "check in" with the Naval Attaché or Senior Naval Officer in each country visited. Admiral Inglis noted that CIG's position in this matter seemed to be quite logical and he accepted it without reservation.

General McDonald stated he did not believe that the Army had any like requirements as outlined by Admiral Inglis, but Army Reserve officers often volunteered to pick up any information they could in their travels abroad.

Admiral Inglis noted that some embarrassment might be caused if a Reserve officer were "caught," since he could not divorce his identity with the services unless he had previously resigned his commission. However, it might conceivably be that the job he was performing was so important that he would resign his commission in order to take over a particular task.

General Chamberlin asked if the problem presented in IAB 3 was purely from a covert viewpoint.

Admiral Inglis replied that the problem was centered on the covert. Presumably when a Naval Reserve officer acted as an overt representative of the State Department, for example, the Navy was ordinarily kept informed.

General Chamberlin stated that he doubted the advisability of the conclusions of paragraph 5 a of IAB 3/4/ since he believed that this paragraph stifled liberty of action. He went on to say he thought in covert intelligence the Central Intelligence Group should be able to hire the best man suitable for the job whether he was military or Naval Reserve, and further that he did not think that the IAB should place any barriers that might be restrictive.

/4/Paragraph 5 a of IAB 3 recommended that reserve officers not normally be used as agents abroad.

Admiral Inglis stated that he did not think that covert methods should as a general rule be used if the same objectives could be accomplished by using overt methods. He noted that targets given covert personnel were those that could not be gained by overt means, and further that they were not hired because they were Naval Reserve officers but rather on their ability to do the job.

General Chamberlin stated that in his opinion there should be very little, if any, restrictions imposed on operations in the covert field.

Admiral Inglis stated that he was not quite in agreement that covert operations should have no restrictions and reiterated that if a Reserve officer of the Army, Navy or Air Forces were caught it would surely cause unfavorable publicity and embarrassment to his service.

After further discussion where it was brought out by the Director that CIG had exclusive organizational jurisdiction over operations in the clandestine field and that there could be no objection to the member IAB agencies employing casual agents,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Approved the conclusions in IAB 3 with the following exceptions:

Paragraph 5 a to be omitted.

Paragraph 5 b to be rewritten as follows:

"Members in the Reserve of one military service shall ordinarily not be employed as agents by, and then only after informing, the other service."

Paragraphs c and d to remain as written./5/

/5/The "conclusions" section of IAB 3 as amended became NIA Directive No. 10, Document 322.

2. Action by the Intelligence Advisory Board on Matters Submitted to the National Intelligence Authority (CIG 24 and CIG 24/1)/6/

/6/Documents 189 and 317.

The Director stated the purpose of CIG 24 and CIG 24/1 was to formalize procedure on matters submitted to the National Intelligence Authority. He said he did not believe that the Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the National Intelligence Authority could correctly make the Intelligence Advisory Board, which was created solely for the purpose of advising the Director of Central Intelligence, privy to all matters presented to the National Intelligence Authority. He noted that in the last two months he had received calls from Admiral Leahy and Secretary Forrestal on matters that did not concern the coordination of intelligence. He further stated that up until the last N.I.A. meeting there had been no agenda published. However, prior to that meeting Secretary Forrestal requested that an agenda be published. An agenda was prepared and circulated to the member IAB agencies.

Mr. Eddy stated that the State Department was wholly in agreement with CIG 24/1 with the exception of two changes, one of which was substantive and the other one of clarification, the substantive change being that on matters involving the request for personnel or facilities by CIG to the member agencies that such requests should be submitted to the IAB in writing prior to submission to the N.I.A.

In this connection Mr. Eddy noted that the President's letter of 22 January 1946 stated in part that full use shall be made by the Director of Central Intelligence of the staff and facilities of the member IAB agencies.

The Director read paragraphs 3 a, b and c of the above-mentioned letter.

Upon being asked by the Director Admiral Inglis replied that he went along with the change recommended by Mr. Eddy, and further that he had a number of other exceptions as to the whole philosophy of CIG's position as set forth in the discussion of CIG 24/1. He said he took particular exception to the item in paragraph 1 of the recommendations in CIG 24/1, which stated: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall be the sole judge of the advisability of referring any proposed recommendation to a special studies group or for otherwise delaying the submission of the recommendation to the National Intelligence Authority."

The Director stated that he believed that item was a result of the delays in receiving recommendations from ad hoc committees appointed by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

Admiral Inglis stated he also took exception to that part of CIG 24/1 which required the IAB to submit any desired statement of non-concurrence in one week.

The Director stated that he was often limited in time in the preparation of replies to other agencies and cited for an example the urgent request of the Atomic Energy Commission for comments of the National Intelligence Authority on the proposed intelligence organization within the Atomic Energy Commission.

Admiral Inglis noted that in reality any paper sent to the Intelligence Advisory Board for consideration could not be answered by "yes" or "no."

General McDonald stated it was his opinion that by allowing a week and in some cases less for consideration of a paper, the work was being taken out of the hands of the intelligence staffs and was being performed by the members of the IAB.

The Director stated he agreed with General McDonald but he still felt there should be some time limitation set on papers circulated to the IAB for comment.

Admiral Inglis stated that in cases where urgency was of the essence, if a statement to that effect were indicated he would do all in his power to return his comments in the time allotted. Admiral Inglis went on to state that Secretary Forrestal had told him that he expected the IAB to thresh out and reconcile their differences on papers before they were submitted to the N.I.A., and further that Mr. Forrestal did not like the recent procedure of submitting recommendations to the N.I.A. without having such recommendations discussed by the intelligence chiefs of that Authority. Admiral Inglis said, however, he recognized that the Director of Central Intelligence had encountered from time to time inordinate delays in IAB handling of papers and he sympathized with the desire to reduce such delays.

Admiral Inglis also stated that it was his opinion that paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 did not restrict the matters which are referred to the IAB to matters related to coordination. Admiral Inglis said he was also not in agreement with paragraph 4 of the discussion in CIG 24/1, which read: "Recommendations requested of the Director of Central Intelligence by the National Intelligence Authority are not considered as falling into the pattern provided in N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 3, nor is it considered that it was the intent of the President or of the National Intelligence Authority that all reports, papers, and statements prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence for presentation to the National Intelligence Authority be first submitted to the Intelligence Advisory Board for advisory opinion" since a great deal depended upon the subject matter presented to the N.I.A.

The Director stated that he agreed with Admiral Inglis and suggested that the word "all" precede the word "recommendations" in the beginning of the above-quoted paragraph.

Admiral Inglis stated since the Director of Central Intelligence was a non-voting member of the National Intelligence Authority, it was his opinion that this fact gave a different implication to the statement contained in CIG 24/1 that "The Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the National Intelligence Authority can not correctly make the Intelligence Advisory Board, which was created solely for the purpose of advising him, privy to all matters before the National Intelligence Authority." He went on to state that he certainly assumed from the reasoning behind the organization of the Intelligence Advisory Board that that Board should be privy to practically all matters going to the National Intelligence Authority.

The Director stated he agreed with the viewpoint of Admiral Inglis that practically all matters presented to the National Intelligence Authority should have had prior discussion by the Intelligence Advisory Board. He noted, however, that it would be difficult to define in advance those matters which should go to the National Intelligence Authority without previous IAB discussion.

Admiral Inglis stated with reference to the preparation and circulation of formalized agenda for NIA meetings that it was Mr. Forrestal's desire that agenda should be prepared by the Secretary, N.I.A., and items thereon discussed by the IAB prior to their discussion by the N.I.A.

Mr. Eddy noted that even if formalized agenda for N.I.A. meetings were prepared that the Intelligence Advisory Board could not expect that the N.I.A. would not discuss other matters than those appearing on the agenda, if they so desired.

Admiral Inglis stated that it was not the intent that the National Intelligence Authority could not discuss any matter they saw fit. However, he was advocating that the Intelligence Advisory Board use the same procedure as used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, i.e., that all matters be thoroughly discussed and differences reconciled on the working level prior to submission to a higher authority.

General Chamberlin stated that he was in agreement with Admiral Inglis that there should be an agenda prepared for N.I.A. meetings, and further if the N.I.A. chooses to bring up items other than those appearing on the agenda that was, of course, their prerogative.

Admiral Inglis stated that it was his opinion that the provisions of the last three sentences under the discussion in CIG 24/1 were unsound, and further that neither the Director of Central Intelligence nor any other lone member of the Intelligence Advisory Board could nullify the desires of all other members in sending any paper to the National Intelligence Authority. He pointed out that he did not believe it was practicable to require the head of one of the intelligence agencies to go through his secretary in order to get a paper to the National Intelligence Authority, and further that such a practice was not fair to the members of the N.I.A. not to have the advice of the Intelligence Advisory Board. He also said it was his opinion that the logical and practical way to submit papers to the N.I.A. was through the IAB with the recommendations, if any, of the members of the IAB appended to such papers in the event agreement could not be reached. Admiral Inglis went on to say that this procedure was followed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and any other way seemed irregular to him.

Mr. Edgar stated that the N.I.A. and the IAB were not comparable to the JCS and JIC. The JCS has a committee where the N.I.A. has a Director of Central Intelligence who is an individual responsible for certain activities and the IAB is merely advisory to him.

Admiral Inglis stated that he did not agree that the IAB was merely advisory to the Director of Central Intelligence and further it was not intended in the philosophy that established the IAB.

Mr. Edgar said that the title of the IAB indicated that it was in fact an advisory body.

Admiral Inglis stated that he did not believe this was the concept. He said the IAB, in addition to being an advisory body, is also an implementing body, and further the IAB is a liaison channel between the Director of Central Intelligence and the member agencies. It also permits the heads of the intelligence services themselves to implement and take special personal interest in the work of the CIG. He pointed out that the IAB was intended to make the heads of intelligence services share the responsibility of the success of CIG and in sharing this responsibility the members of the IAB must have a certain amount of authority.

Mr. Eddy stated it appeared to him that to send a paper to the N.I.A. without the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and the majority of the members of the IAB would be expecting a lot of the N.I.A.

Admiral Inglis thought that any member of the IAB who filed a paper should get the concurrence of not less than one other member. However, if it was desired to adjust this to a majority, that was a compromise, and that he did not feel too strongly one way or the other.

General Chamberlin stated that he thought the IAB might approach the overall question better if CIG 24 and CIG 24/1 were withdrawn and a complete new paper prepared. He went on to state that he objected to CIG 24/1 somewhat along the lines of Admiral Inglis. He said he agreed perfectly with Admiral Inglis that the IAB was a little more than an advisory body and further that the idea that the IAB had authority to commit their own departments to action could be justified. He went on to state that the success of intelligence in the government is dependent entirely on cooperation. He said that the above was a general summary of his feeling. However, he had other objections in detail and believed that time could be saved by appointing an ad hoc committee to redraft a new paper.

Mr. Eddy stated that he would agree to the appointment of an ad hoc committee to redraft a new paper. However, he believed that a close examination of the recommendations contained in CIG 24/1 left nothing to be desired, and further that he hoped that the ad hoc committee, if appointed, could start with these recommendations and see how they could be amended. He went on to say he did not find much in the recommendations which would not be acceptable to him.

General McDonald, upon being asked by the Director, agreed to the appointment of the ad hoc committee mentioned above.

Admiral Inglis asked Mr. Eddy whether the ad hoc committee in drawing up a new paper should restrict itself to the recommendations contained in CIG 24/1.

Mr. Eddy replied that he hoped that they would consider the recommendations and that in the main these recommendations could form a basis for the new paper.

After some discussion where it was noted by Admiral Inglis that he felt that the IAB should have a staff as did the JIC,

The Intelligence Advisory Board

Agreed to appoint an ad hoc committee to submit a new paper on the subject of action by the Intelligence Advisory Board on matters submitted to the National Intelligence Authority, the committee to consist of Mr. Edgar, Mr. Armstrong, Lt. Col. Treacy, Capt. Davis and Col. Mussett.

3. Amendment of the Definition of Strategic and National Policy Intelligence (IAB 2)/7/

/7/Dated May 9, 1947. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-280) See the Supplement.

The Director stated that the phrase "strategic and national policy intelligence" had its origin in a memorandum from General Donovan to the President dated 18 November 1944./8/ Therein General Donovan distinguished between intelligence pertaining primarily to departmental action and intelligence material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out the national policy and strategy. General Donovan went on to say in this memorandum that while recognizing that production of the former must remain decentralized, he contended for centralization with respect to the latter. He proposed as one of the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency the "final evaluation, synthesis, and dissemination within the government of intelligence required to enable the government to determine policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and war and the advancement of broad national policy." The Director went on to say that in a counter proposal prepared by the JIS the above passage was revised and stated that

/8/See Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 445-447.

"Accomplish the synthesis of departmental intelligence relating to the national security and the appropriate strategic and national policy intelligence."

This counter proposal was in turn carried over into the President's letter of 22 January 1946 with the substitution of "correlation and evaluation" for "synthesis" and the deletion of "departmental." The Director said that Admiral Souers attributed the first change to the mere preference of Latin to Greek. The second was intended to deemphasize the idea of dependence on departmental agencies. A new sentence was added to require their full (but not exclusive) use. The Director said the JIS draft, which served eventually as the basis of the President's letter, was based on the following concepts:

a. That each department would continue to produce the intelligence required to meet its own operating needs (i.e. pertaining primarily to departmental action).

b. That such intelligence was inadequate as a basis for national strategy and policy (i.e. for decisions transcending the responsibilities of any particular department).

c. That a central agency free of departmental bias was required to provide, through evaluation and synthesis, the intelligence required as a basis for such decisions.

The Director said that from the beginning strategic and national policy intelligence was conceived to be one thing, not two. Strategic was used in view of the emphasis upon relation to national security and because it was anticipated that the central organization would supersede the JIC in the realm of overall national strategy. National policy was used to broaden the implications of strategic to exclude, on the one hand, such matters of operational strategy as purely military plans for the seizure of Okinawa, and to include on the other considerations of a policy nature. The phrase, as a whole, was intended to describe that politico-military area of concern to the State, War and Navy Departments transcending the exclusive competence of any of them.

Mr. Eddy stated that he preferred the original definition as approved by the N.I.A.

General McDonald stated that he believed that the counter proposal submitted by the Navy on the definition in question was on the right track and that he had a proposal to go along with it. General McDonald said he thought the last sentence of the Navy definition might be modified to read as follows:

"It is political-economic-military in scope including such strategic data, as is necessary, of common concern at least to one military and one non-military agency."

Admiral Inglis stated that he thought operational intelligence had to be reserved to the military, if it was military, and if diplomatic to the State Department.

Mr. Edgar stated that he thought the definition of staff intelligence clearly indicated that anything that would be called operational would come under staff intelligence rather than under national intelligence.

Captain Davis said he questioned Mr. Edgar's remark. He said it had been mentioned a number of times in discussions at other IAB meetings that CIG had no jurisdiction over operational intelligence. He went on to say that CIG no doubt did some operational intelligence but it was necessary for the military to keep control over their own operational intelligence. He said that nowhere did he find in writing or in the laws drafted in relation to CIG that exception, and it seemed to him that such should be put in writing.

Admiral Inglis stated if it could be worked in somewhere "that intelligence which is necessary for their operations" and if there could be an understanding that strategic and national policy intelligence "must transcend the exclusive competence of both War and Navy Departments or any other Department thereafter that may arise from unification," then he was agreeable to the definition of strategic and national policy intelligence as written. Admiral Inglis went on to say that he thought this matter could be settled by writing into the minutes or having a memo- randum prepared that the meaning of the definition was justified by implication since it included the words "political-economic-military," and further that it must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department or of the Army and Navy Departments together.

Mr. Eddy asked whether the IAB could be sure that the JCS were not going to call on CIG for basic intelligence related to military and naval problems. He noted that the JIC already goes out of the chain of command for required intelligence information.

Admiral Inglis replied that it would be hard to give a "yes" or "no" answer.

Mr. Eddy stated that although the IAB did not know the final form of the JIC, he had no objections to the above proposal of Admiral Inglis.

Mr. Edgar suggested that the IAB accept Admiral Inglis' proposal until such time as the JIC's future was determined and then, if necessary, again raise the question of the definition of strategic and national policy intelligence from the Army and Navy angle.

After some discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed to Mr. Edgar's proposal.

321. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Group (Houston) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter)

Washington, July 29, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-806, Item 2. Secret. Sent to the Director of Central Intelligence through ICAPS. The source text is a transcript made for the CIA Historian on October 15, 1952.

SUBJECT
Memorandum on IAB Procedures--25 July 1947

1. This office has been requested to give its opinion on the legality of the provisions of Paragraph 2 and 3 of the subject memorandum./1/ Paragraph 2 provides for distribution of recommendations by an IAB member and that a vote be taken thereon. Paragraph 3 provides that recommendations, originating by any IAB member in which at least one other IAB member concurs, will be forwarded by the Director of Central Intelligence to the National Intelligence Authority, with his comments and those of other IAB members.

/1/Not found, but probably a draft of, or a memorandum related to, National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 11, September 16; Document 325.

2. On Paragraph 2 alone, there is no question, as the IAB could not perform properly its advisory functions without the full opportunity to consider recommendations of its individual members. Paragraph 2 and 3 taken together, if followed literally, would compel the Director to submit recommendations with which he might disagree, to the NIA, if two or more members of the IAB concurred. Proposal of such compulsion requires a review of the responsibilities of the Director, and of the functions of the Advisory Board. At present these are set forth in the Presidential Directive of January 22, 1946, a document which does not have statutory authority, but has, upon the Executive Departments, the force and effect of law, and if therefore, subject to the normal rules of statutory interpretation. Without going in detail into the legal doctrines of such interpretation, it may generally be said that a law, or similar directive, is taken to mean exactly what it says, and only in the case of complete ambiguity, or of facts on which a distorted construction is proposed, is there need to go behind the final document in an attempt to determine whether the intent of the law given was other than appears on the fact of the document.

3. It appears to us that the language of the present Presidential Directive is clear and non-controversial, and it is assumed that the wording was well considered when written. Thus, Paragraph 2 states that a Central Intelligence Group shall, under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence, assist the NIA, and that the Director shall be responsible to the NIA. Paragraph 3 [a and b]/2/ provides that subject to the direction and control of NIA, the Director shall accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, shall plan for the coordination of the activities of the Departments relating to national security and shall recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of policies and objectives to assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

/2/All brackets are in the source text.

4. It seems clear that these paragraphs place in the Director sole responsibility for correlation of intelligence, coordination of activities and recommendations to the NIA. It is obvious that departmental members of NIA act in a dual capacity, and in their capacity of Department Heads, must give heed to the recommendations and wants of their respective departments. It seems equally obvious, however, that when they sit as the NIA, their attention focuses on the Director alone, for his recommendations on central intelligence matters. Any other concept would appear to be incompatible with the theory of central intelligence developed in the last few years, and which Congress has recently approved. The heart of this theory is placing on one point the responsibility for foreign intelligence affecting the national security, in such a way that responsibility could not be shifted from that spot to any other agency or group. To give a Board authority to compel recommendations over the Director's objection would provide a basis for shifting responsibility from the Director to the Board. Since, as General Marshall pointed out recently, action by a Board is generally the action of compromise, the responsibility for such action falls nowhere.

5. It appears that this situation was clearly recognized by the President in establishing and assigning functions to the IAB. Paragraph 7, of the Presidential Directive, provides for the membership of the Board and states only that the Director shall be advised by such Board. We find some legal interpretation of the word "advise." Black's Law Dictionary, Third Edition 1933, definition of "advise", is "To give an opinion or counsel, or recommend a plan or course of action." It further cites the following court interpretations:

"This term is not synonymous with "persuade" [Wilson v. State, 38 Ala. 411] or with "direct" or "instruct." Where a statute authorizes the trial court to advise the jury to acquit, the court has no power to instruct the jury to acquit. The court can only counsel, and the jury are not bound by the advice. People v. Horn, 70 Cal. 17, 11 P. 470. "Advise" imports that it is discretionary or optional with the person addressed whether he will act on such advice or not. State v. Downing, 23 Idaho, 540, 130 P. 461, 462; Brown v. Brown, 180 N.C. 433, 104 S.E. 889, 890."

It seems clear therefore, that the IAB was to have no direct relationship, as a body, to the NIA, nor is the Director, in any way bound by their advice. He will, however, of course give due consideration to the merit of its content. Our conclusion is that establishment of the procedures in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the IAB procedures, dated 25 July 1947, would be an unauthorized assumption by the IAB of responsibility vested in the Director by law. Conversely, agreement by the Director to exercise by the IAB of his recommending functions would be an unwarranted divesting of assigned responsibility and, moreover, would not relieve him of accountability for results. He might, in such case, be the channel for policy recommendations with which he disagreed, but for which he would be held responsible.

6. Our opinion is not changed, and on the contrary, is confirmed by consideration of the Merger Bill, known as the National Security Act, of 1947. The sections pertaining to Central Intelligence provide [Sections 105 (d)] that it shall be the duty of the agency to advise the NSC on intelligence activities of departments and agencies relative to the national security, to make recommendations to the President through the N.S.C., for coordination of intelligence activities relating to the national security and to correlate, evaluate, and provide dissemination of such intelligence. As emphasized by underlining, Congress uses a more positive word than "responsibility" and states it shall be the "duty" of the Agency to perform the functions outlined. The Head of the Agency is of course solely responsible for the performance of the Agency's duties. This is completely in accord with the intent of Congress, expressed so often in hearings and on the floor, that the Executive Branch, the Legislature, and through them the country, have one place to go for intelligence related to the National security, with no chance for evasion or excuse by the responsible officer.

7. There is no provision for the IAB in the Act and it is apparent that the protection of departmental intelligence called for in the proviso of sub-paragraph 105 (d) (3) is the responsibility of the N.S.C. By Paragraph 105 (f), the NIA and CIG cease to exist, and in effect the Presidential Directive of January 22, 1946, is superseded and voided by the expression of the will of Congress. This, too, was repeatedly affirmed in hearings and debate on the Merger Bill, i.e. that functions of the Executive Branch should be established by Congress, not by Executive order. It would appear that presently the IAB has no legal status, and if it is to continue to function, it should do so only on direction from the N.S.C. as a result of a request from, and recommendations by, the Director of Central Intelligence.

Lawrence R. Houston/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

322. National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 10

Washington, July 30, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Files, No. 132. Secret.

EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVE OFFICERS AS AGENTS

The following overall policies and objectives are established by the National Intelligence Authority for the employment of reserve officers of the military services as agents abroad:

a. Members in the reserve of one military service shall ordinarily not be employed as agents by, and then only after informing, the other service.

b. When reserve personnel are employed as agents, procedures requiring them to report to local State, War and Navy representatives shall be eliminated.

c. When casual agents are employed by one department their activities shall be coordinated with all other such activities by the Director of Central Intelligence.

For the National Intelligence Authority:

J. S. Earman
Secretary, N.I.A.

323. Minutes of the 15th Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board

Washington, July 31, 1947, 2 p.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Secret. The meeting was at the North Interior Building.

PARTICIPANTS

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

Members Present
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, WDGS
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
Maj. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2

Also Present
Brig. General Geo. F. Schulgen, AAF-2
Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
Mr. Park Armstrong, Department of State
Capt. R. K. Davis, USN
Lt. Colonel Edgar J. Treacy, WDGS
Major W. C. Baird, AAF-2

Secretariat
Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary, N.I.A.

1. National Security Council

The Director of Central Intelligence requested the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board that a letter be written to the National Security Council, when formed, recommending that all directives, under which the IAB and the CIG now function, remain in full force and effect until such time as that Council may desire to make such changes as it sees fit in these directives.

After some discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board

Concurred in the request of the Director as outlined above./1/

/1/The letter was first addressed to the National Intelligence Authority (Document 220). Another version was subsequently sent to the NSC upon its establishment (Document 222).

2. CIG Representation On U.S. Government Missions Abroad (IAB 4)/2/

/2/Dated July 7. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-280) See the Supplement.

Upon being asked for comments, Mr. Eddy stated that the State Department did not favorably consider the recommendations contained in the subject paper. He said that this paper introduced CIG into the collection of overt and positive intelligence abroad which had already been divided by fields of dominant interest within the membership of the IAB.

After some discussion, wherein the Director and the members of the IAB stated they concurred in Mr. Eddy's statement,

The Intelligence Advisory Board

Agreed to withdraw the recommendations contained in IAB 4.

3. Coordination of Intelligence Production (IAB 1 and IAB 1/1)/3/

/3/IAB No. 1 is printed as Document 195; IAB 1/1, July 15, is not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-280) See the Supplement.

The Director stated that he felt that the IAB would be getting into difficulties if they changed the definitions of basic, current, and staff intelligence as approved by the IAB at its 13th meeting since he felt that the recommendations of the Lexicographer of the Library of Congress were a play on words.

Mr. Eddy stated that he thought the changes recommended by the Lexicographer lacked conviction.

Admiral Inglis stated that he believed that the changes recommended were good and, while it was not a matter of great moment, it was his belief that they gave a clearer meaning to the definitions.

General Chamberlin stated that he felt very strongly that the action of the IAB in regard to this matter should be interpreted by the spirit of the definitions in question and not by a play on an individual word. He went on to say that if the changes recommended by the Lexicographer were accepted, immediately the idea of "time evaluation" was given up.

Admiral Inglis asked General Chamberlin if he was referring to basic intelligence.

General Chamberlin replied that his remarks referred to both basic and current intelligence. He pointed out that distinction had been made on time and evaluation in the definitions of basic and current intelligence, as previously approved by the IAB.

General Chamberlin went on to say, however, that he felt that the changes recommended by the Lexicographer in the definition of staff intelligence made that definition read much better without changing its original meaning.

Mr. Eddy said he felt that the recommended changes in basic and current intelligence changed the meaning of these two definitions. He noted, however, that the change recommended in the definition of staff intelligence was an improvement.

General McDonald stated that he agreed with Mr. Eddy.

The Director stated that he agreed with General Chamberlin that the IAB's action in this matter should be governed by the interpretation of the spirit of the definitions in question and not by a play on an individual word.

Admiral Inglis stated that he thought it quite important that the IAB have an unmistakable understanding of the meaning of basic, current, and staff intelligence, and he was not inclined to belittle the importance of definitions. He went on to say, however, that in this particular case he did not think the recommended change in the definitions of basic and current intelligence were of any great substance or consequence and he was willing to accept these two definitions as previously approved, and the definition of staff intelligence as rewritten by the Lexicographer. He noted, however, that he preferred all of the changes recommended by the Lexicographer in the definitions of basic, current, and staff intelligence.

After some discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board

a. Agreed to leave unchanged the definitions of basic and current intelligence, as previously approved by the IAB at its 13th meeting.

b. Agreed to change the definition of staff intelligence to read as follows: "Staff intelligence is that intelligence prepared by any department or agency through the correlation and interpretation of all intelligence materials available to it in order to meet its specific requirements and responsibilities."

4. Exploitation of Enemy Document Repositories (CIG 21 and CIG 21/1)/4/

/4/Dated November 21, 1946, and April 10, 1947. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement for both.

Admiral Inglis stated he would like to inquire as to the present status of the subject paper since he had recently received several requests from the Navy Department as to what action was to be taken on this matter. He said that the Director of Central Intelligence, at a previous IAB meeting, had stated that at that time CIG was unable to consider the recommendations contained in CIG 21/1 due to budgetary problems. He went on to say that it was his understanding that since that meeting CIG's budgetary problems had been settled.

The Director noted the remarks of Admiral Inglis and stated he desired to make a further check of the funds available to CIG which might be allocated to carry out the recommendations contained in CIG 21/1.

324. Minutes of the 16th Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board

Washington, September 11, 1947, 2 p.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Secret. The meeting was held at the North Interior Building.

PARTICIPANTS

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

Members Present
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
Major General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2
Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich, Director of Intelligence and Security, Atomic Energy Commission
Brig. General Walter E. Todd, Deputy Director of Intelligence, WDGS

Also Present
Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel Merritt B. Booth, Department of State
Captain R. K. Davis, USN
Colonel E. P. Mussett, AAF-2
Colonel G. C. Nye, AAF-2
Lt. Colonel Edgar J. Treacy, WDGS
Capt. Patrick Henry, USN

Secretariat
Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary, N.I.A.

1. Action by the Intelligence Advisory Board on Matters Submitted to the National Intelligence Authority (CIG 24/2)/1/

/1/Dated August 12. (Ibid., HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.

Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that the ad hoc committee appointed to prepare recommendations on the subject paper to the Intelligence Advisory Board was in agreement with the recommendations contained in the enclosure to CIG 24/2, with the exception that the member from the Intelligence Division, WDGS, and the member from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 did not concur in the inclusion of paragraph 4 in the enclosure to CIG 24/2.

Admiral Inglis stated that he wished to recommend that the fourth sentence of paragraph 1 be amended to read as follows:

"If the IAB proposes to refer any such recommendation to a special study group or otherwise to delay the presentation of the recommendation to the NIA (NSC), but the Director of Central Intelligence considers such delay inadvisable, the IAB members shall have seven working days, after receipt of the views of the Director of Central Intelligence regarding such delay, for the submission of any desired statement of non-concurrence, the basis of which will accompany the recommendation to the NIA (NSC)."

Mr. Eddy stated he wished to recommend the insertion of the following sentence between the second and third sentences of paragraph 1:

"Substance of the statement of the non-concurrence shall accompany the statement to the NIA (NSC)."

General McDonald noted that it seemed advisable to him to delete paragraph 4, since the contents of that paragraph presented a special problem in itself.

After some discussion the Intelligence Advisory Board approved the enclosure to CIG 24/2 with the following exceptions:

a. That paragraph 4 thereof be deleted./2/

/2/Paragraph 4 of CIG 24/2 required the DCI to notify the IAB in writing of any actions planned under paragraph 3 of NIA Directive No. 5 (which authorized the DCI to coordinate all U.S. foreign intelligence activities) and provided for IAB members to express concurrence or non-concurrence in such actions.

b. That the changes recommended by Mr. Eddy and Admiral Inglis, as indicated above, be adopted.

2. Coordination of Intelligence Production (IAB 1, IAB 1/1 and IAB 1/2)/3/

/3/IAB 1 is Document 195. IAB 1/1 and IAB 1/2, dated July 15 and September 5, are not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-280, and HS/HC-276, respectively) See the Supplement. IAB 1/2 consisted of a proposed NIA directive on coordination of intelligence production and a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Intelligence asking that the allocation of subjects by agency according to "dominant interest" be changed to reflect that the Air Force and the Navy had a shared interest in air intelligence.

The Director requested comments on the recommendations contained in IAB 1/2.

Admiral Inglis stated that the Chief of Naval Operations felt that in view of the National Security Act of 1947, which established naval aviation as an integral part of the Navy, the position of the Navy should be made clear in all papers which dealt with the jurisdiction, cognizance, or responsibility on the subject of naval aviation. The Navy had, in cooperation with the Intelligence Division, Army Air Forces, an agency called the Air Intelligence Division which has been serving both the Army and Navy and Army Air Forces under instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Navy wanted nothing to occur which would interfere in any way with the present effective operation of the Air Intelligence Division, and further that unless paragraph 4 of the proposed NIA Directive on the coordination of intelligence production was changed as recommended in IAB 1/2, some day after the present incumbents were gone, controversy might arise as to the interests of the Navy in air intelligence and, therefore, a change in the wording of this paragraph as recommended by the Navy was not only advisable and desirable, but necessary to recognize the interest of the Navy in air intelligence.

General McDonald stated that on the subject of the Strategic Vulnerability Branch which is in existence--this Branch was authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to function within the framework of A-2. However, the National Security Act of 1947 does define to some general extent areas of responsibility for the ground, sea and air forces. He had coordinated with the Air Staff the proposed change recommended by the Navy on the subject paper, and as a result the Air Forces recommended that paragraph 4 remain as written.

General Todd stated that General Chamberlin thought that the subject paper was not the paper in which to try to define fields of dominant interest, since, if it was attempted to define one field, an attempt should be made to define, for example, military intelligence. General Chamberlin felt that there should follow in a subsequent paper, defined in greater detail, fields of dominant interest. However, he felt that the fields of dominant interests as outlined in the subject paper were generally satisfactory. General Chamberlin felt that he did not believe dominant interest could be shared, since each of the member IAB agencies certainly had a great deal of interest in the other fields.

Admiral Inglis stated that he agreed with General Chamberlin's thoughts and was willing to make some alteration in the wording of his recommended change to the proposed directive in question. For example, the Navy and Army Air Forces to share air intelligence each to their respective needs.

Colonel Mussett stated that he thought this was taken into account in the definition of staff intelligence. He said that A-2 recognized that each Department must produce all intelligence that was necessary to its own needs.

Admiral Inglis stated that he did not quite agree with the A-2 viewpoint, since the Navy's need for air intelligence went beyond the question of staff intelligence. He said that naval air intelligence goes into the field of impact of foreign aviation on naval operations, not necessarily air operations, but the naval surface, submarines, amphibious, transports, logistics, and supply, and for that reason the Navy felt that it did have an interest in air intelligence which they believed had to be recognized.

After further discussion, the Intelligence Advisory Board agreed to forward the proposed directive on the coordination of intelligence production to the NIA, together with the non-concurrence of the Navy member and the comments of the Air member. (Note: The non-concurrence of the Navy member and the comments of the Air member are to be submitted to the Secretary, NIA, within seven working days after date of this meeting.)

3. Reorganization of Central Intelligence Group

The Director of Central Intelligence stated he was withdrawing the memorandum to the individual members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, dated 15 August 1947, subject--"Reorganization of the Central Intelligence Group",/4/ and would submit new recommendations on this subject.

/4/Memorandum from Hillenkoetter to Eddy et al., August 15, not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-208, Item 36) See the Supplement.

4. Transfer of the Janis Program to CIG

Admiral Inglis asked the status of the proposed transfer of the Janis program to the Central Intelligence Group.

The Director replied that CIG had received a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume responsibility for this program and that necessary action was being taken to effect the transfer of functions and personnel of this activity to the Central Intelligence Group.

5. Overall Policies and Objectives for the Coordination of Intelligence Relating to Foreign Industrial Establishments (CIG 22)/5/

/5/Not found.

Admiral Inglis asked the status of CIG 22.

Mr. Edgar replied that further consideration of this paper was being held pending approval of the proposed directive on the coordination of intelligence production.

6. Exploitation of Enemy Document Repositories (CIG 21 and CIG 21/1)/6/

/6/See footnote 4, Document 323.

Admiral Inglis asked what had been decided by the Director of Central Intelligence on the recommendations contained in the enclosure to CIG 21/1.

The Director replied that there was some question as to his authority to expend the sum of approximately $82,950 to carry out the recommendations contained in the enclosure to CIG 21/1.

After some discussion, the Director agreed to request formal approval from the National Intelligence Authority that authority be granted to the Director of Central Intelligence to expend approximately $82,950 of funds allotted to CIG to carry out the recommendations contained in enclosure to CIG 21/1.

Continue with Document 325