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Foreign Relations of the United States
1945-1950
Emergence of the Intelligence EstablishmentDepartment of State
Washington, DC
Hillenkoetter's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence
340. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Allen W. Dulles, Mathias F. Correa, and William H. Jackson
Washington, February 13, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 80-M01009A, Box 1, Folder 12. Restricted. The source text indicates that a copy was sent to the Director of Central Intelligence.
SUBJECT:
Survey of the Central Intelligence AgencyThis is to confirm our understanding that you will serve as the group to make a survey of the Central Intelligence Agency, in accordance with the enclosed resolution/1/ approved by the National Security Council.
/1/Document 336.
This memorandum is your authorization to proceed with this survey and, upon presentation by you, will constitute a directive to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Chiefs of the Departments represented on the Council, to furnish you necessary information and facilities as indicated in the second paragraph of the enclosed resolution.
Your willingness to participate in this vitally important survey is sincerely appreciated by all members of the National Security Council.
Sidney W. Souers
341. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Secretary of State Marshall
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/3-848. Restricted.
Washington, March 8, 1948.
SUBJECT
Survey of the Central Intelligence AgencyREFERENCE
NSC Action No. 25/1//1/Document 336.
Pursuant to the resolution of the National Security Council, arrangements have been made for a survey of the organization, activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency and its relationship to other agencies. This survey is to be conducted by Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Mr. Mathias F. Correa and Mr. William H. Jackson.
These gentlemen feel that the resolution of the National Security Council authorizing the survey is not broad enough to permit them to present a comprehensive study of all Federal intelligence activities relating to the national security.
I explained to them that I did not believe the National Security Council had the right to authorize an examination of departmental intelligence agencies beyond that contemplated in the Council resolution. Mr. Jackson, representing the group, then discussed the matter with the Secretary of Defense, who expressed a desire to have the intelligence agencies of the Military Establishment examined and stated that he would place the matter before his War Council./2/
/2/Additional information is provided in Souers' February 26 memorandum to Forrestal. (Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5) See the Supplement.
I am now informed that the Secretary of Defense concurs in the examination of such intelligence activities within the service departments as relate to the national security. He has also asked the service Secretaries, as heads of their respective departments, to indicate their approval of the attached draft memorandum/3/ as a means of assuring a coordinated and comprehensive consideration of the entire intelligence problem related to the national security.
/3/The draft, not printed here, is virtually identical to the final version of the memorandum; see Document 343.
I would appreciate your advice as to whether the terms of the enclosed memorandum are acceptable to you, both as a member of the Council and in your capacity as head of the Department of State.
Sidney W. Souers
342. Memorandum From Secretary of State Marshall to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, March 12, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/3-848. Restricted. Drafted by W. Park Armstrong.
SUBJECT
Survey of the Central Intelligence AgencyREFERENCE
Your memorandum, same subject, dated March 8, 1948, enclosing draft memorandum to Messrs. Dulles-Correa-Jackson/1//1/Document 341.
The terms of the draft memorandum forwarded with your covering memorandum are acceptable to me. A comprehensive survey of the Central Intelligence Agency will necessarily include the relations of that agency to the intelligence organization of the Department as well as an examination of the intelligence facilities of the Department relating to the national security.
I shall instruct the appropriate officers of the Department to cooperate fully with the Dulles-Correa-Jackson Committee and its staff in accomplishing the purposes of the survey.
G.C. Marshall/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
343. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Allen W. Dulles, Mathias F. Correa, and William H. Jackson
Washington, March 17, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148. The source text is Annex 2 of the Survey Group Terms of Reference II report to the National Security Council entitled "The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence," January 1, 1949.
SUBJECT
Survey of the Central Intelligence Agency1. I have already sent you a memorandum/1/ with the terms of the resolution of the National Security Council providing that a survey should be made of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and its relationship to other Departments and Agencies.
/1/Document 340.
2. As a result of our further discussions on this subject, it may be helpful if I set forth my understanding regarding the scope of the survey and the procedures to be followed.
3. The survey will comprise primarily a thorough and comprehensive examination of the structure, administration, activities and inter-agency relationships of the Central Intelligence Agency as outlined in the resolution of the National Security Council. It will also include an examination of such intelligence activities of other Government Departments and Agencies as relate to the national security, in order to make recommendations for their effective operation and over-all coordination, subject to the understanding that the group will not engage in an actual physical examination of departmental intelligence operations (a) outside of Washington or (b) in the collection of communications intelligence. On behalf of the National Security Council I will undertake to seek the cooperation in this survey of those Government Departments and Agencies not represented on the Council which have an interest in intelligence as relates to national security.
4. It should be understood that the survey of the Central Intelligence Agency and its relationship to other Departments and Agencies will be done for and with the authority of the National Security Council. The survey of the intelligence activities of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, however, will be for and with the authority of the respective heads of those Departments.
5. The survey group will submit from time to time recommendations on individual problems which need to be brought to the attention of the Council or the heads of the respective Departments and Agencies concerned. Problems concerning CIA will be given priority over those involving other Agencies. It is contemplated that the survey will be completed and final report submitted on or before January 1, 1949.
6. It is my understanding that at your request Mr. Forrestal has agreed to lend to the investigating group the services of Mr. Robert Blum to head the staff work. I would appreciate the group's advice as to additional staff members it may require in order that I may clear them for this work. The members of the staff, when cleared by the heads of the Agencies concerned, will be given access to information and facilities required for the survey in the same manner as provided for your group in the Council's resolution.
7. Compensation and expenses for the members of the investigating group and its staff will be paid for out of funds available to the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency.
8. I will be pleased to render so far as practicable any further assist-ance which you may require in conducting your survey.
Sidney W. Souers/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
344. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Intelligence Survey Group (Blum) to Allen W. Dulles, Mathias F. Correa, and William H. Jackson
Washington, April 12, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. Secret.
This is an attempt to set forth briefly a summary and appraisal of the present position of the Survey, with recommendations for future procedure.
In my memorandum of March 12, 1948, which is in your files, I recommended that the Survey Group attempt, within a relatively short time, to arrive at a general appraisal of CIA, its position in the national intelligence picture and its overall management. I urged that this general survey be completed as soon as possible and before looking into the details of CIA operations or of the other intelligence agencies. I suggested that this procedure was desirable because the group might conclude that detailed recommendations would serve no useful purpose in the absence of changes in major policies and among principal personnel. I also proposed the allocation of responsibility to individual members of the Survey Group, for inquiry into particular parts of CIA and for the contact with the other departments and agencies so as to ensure a fairly rapid overall coverage during the first stage.
Although there seemed, at the time, to be general agreement with these recommendations we have in fact departed from them. I suggest therefore that we review our present progress and reconsider what should be our priorities and working program. It is appropriate to do this now for the further reason that, beginning April 19th we will have at least one and probably two additional staff members. The most effective way of using them can be determined only in light of our general plan.
The present picture is approximately the following: We have already collected a fair amount of documentary material, first-hand impressions and second-hand reports concerning most of the principal parts of CIA, some of CIA's major problems and the position of CIA in relation to the other parts of the Government.
In particular, Mr. Dulles has begun looking into OSO but, so far, has not had time to do more than attempt to mediate the controversy between CIA and the State Department [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He is also proposing to look particularly into the question of OSO's role with respect to anti-Soviet subversive activities, resistance groups, etc., in order to determine whether they are developing the full scope of their opportunities. He has not yet looked at OO.
Mr. Correa has begun investigating the present arrangements for atomic energy intelligence with which there is general dissatisfaction. He has not yet looked at OCD or the CIA administrative setup.
Finally, Mr. Jackson has had initial conversations regarding ICAPS and ORE, and has also spoken with General Sibert, head of OO.
I have followed up on all of these lines of inquiry and in addition have collected information and impressions on the other problems and parts of CIA and the intelligence picture in general. This has included contacts with intelligence personnel in State, Army and Navy.
Thus, the coverage has been uneven and necessarily incomplete and we do not now seem to be proceeding toward an early, overall appraisal of CIA. Although we have been and are still actively concerned in part with some of the fundamental problems concerning CIA, we are also giving priority to certain specific problems brought urgently to our attention. It seems to me that there are a number of difficulties in this procedure which does not correspond to any clear objective or, in my opinion, to the requirements of the situation. In the first place, the dissatisfaction with CIA is so widespread throughout the government and some of the internal problems of CIA seem so acute that I do not think our present procedure will produce adequate results regarding CIA on a priority basis as provided for in the Terms of Reference for the survey. It is necessary, I believe, to proceed on the basis of a simple fairly clear, and flexible, program, which does not have to be substantially altered in order to absorb the particular problems and controversies which will be brought to our attention from time to time. We can expect urgent problems to be referred to us as we progress and while we must, of course, be ready to do what we can to help in these matters, we must not be deflected too widely from our course. For example, [1 line of source text not declassified] but it does not take us to the heart of the problem of evaluating OSO's performance. As another example, the problem of atomic energy intelligence is obviously of outstanding importance, but I am beginning to doubt whether we can make any effective contribution there without placing the problem in its proper setting and examining at the same time some of the broader questions on which it depends (scientific intelligence generally and CIA's responsibilities for collection, evaluation and coordination). If we do not constantly try to relate specific problems to the general setting of which they are a part, we may find ourselves tackling symptoms with very little effect upon the causes.
There are two other things which should also be mentioned in this connection. The present procedure is, I think, being seized upon by some of the people who are unfavorable to our efforts as an excuse for saying that we are not effectively tackling our job. Thus, in advance, an attempt may be made to discount the results of our work. In addition, there are within CIA a large number of people who are very friendly to our efforts and hopeful that we will help correct the deficiencies of the present setup. The morale of these people is very low and, rightly or wrongly, they are looking to the Survey to remedy what they think is a deplorable situation.
Finally, events of the past few months, including the recent trouble in Bogota--on which subject Representative Clarence Brown of Ohio is asking Admiral Hillenkoetter for an explanation--together with public criticism of our intelligence setup, may lead to Congressional demand for an investigation, which it will be difficult to resist unless the Survey Group can show substantial progress in a relatively short time.
CIA has three broad functions and, in my opinion, our immediate objective should be a quick appraisal of the soundness of these functions, the way in which they are being performed and of the principal personnel responsible for them. In the first place, there is CIA's responsibility for coordinating all intelligence activities concerning the national security. This is an administrative and planning function which is supposed to be carried on through the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with ICAPS as the responsible staff within CIA. In fact, CIA has been very inactive along these lines, the IAC is a field for departmental skirmishes rather than a forum for coordination, and ICAPS is looked upon with scorn both within CIA and outside. In the second place, CIA is supposed to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security. The purposeless way in which this task has been attempted by CIA through ORE has caused considerable antagonism outside CIA as well as dissatisfaction and demoralization within ORE. Finally, CIA is charged with performing certain common services of an intelligence character. It is under this mandate that OO and OSO operate, and it is probably fair to say that although there is a good deal of criticism of the efficiency of their operations, there is not the antagonism and controversy regarding them that there is for other parts of CIA, particularly ORE.
In summary, it is my present impression that CIA has not performed well or not performed at all its two functions of coordinating governmental intelligence activities and of correlating the evaluation of intelligence. CIA's mission and actual operations within both these fields are uncertain, undefined and subject to much controversy and bitterness. On the other hand, CIA's "common services", OSO and OO, seem reasonably well established, and unless we wish to raise the question whether these collection functions should properly remain combined with the coordination functions, the investigation of these common collection services is more a question of testing and promoting their effectiveness than of beginning afresh to define their position in the government intelligence setup, which is substantially what has to be done with the two functions of coordination outlined above.
In addition and as part of this, there is the problem of appraising the quality of CIA's principal personnel and the effectiveness of its management and staff procedures. On some of these points there seems to be unanimity of critical opinion, both within CIA and among the agencies which deal with CIA. The criticisms that CIA is organized as a top heavy bureaucracy and is hampered by a predominance of military personnel in key positions meet one at every turn. I think that very little investigation is needed to test the validity of these accusations. It may be that no substantial progress can be made on needed reforms unless there are changes here.
In light of the above statement, which I could expand and fill in at great length, I wish to renew my recommendation that we aim at completing within a reasonably short period (for example May 15th or June 1st) a preliminary report on certain key problems on which the success of the entire survey depends. These would include the following:
General competence of CIA's top staff.
Efficiency of CIA's administrative and staff procedures.
Balance between military and civilian personnel in key positions.
CIA's function to coordinate governmental intelligence activities relating to national security.
CIA's mission to correlate evaluation of intelligence.
The appropriateness and adequacy of the "common services" performed by CIA.
In each case we should try to analyze the problem, develop our views and establish recommendations which will enable us to proceed with a more detailed investigation with confidence that there is a readiness to remedy the basic difficulties on which the details depend.
In furtherance of this recommendation, I suggest that we complete, if only in a provisional manner the two special problems with which Mr. Dulles and Mr. Correa are concerned. We should then expand our coverage within CIA, along the lines already agreed upon, using Sprague and Larocque to help out in regard to OCD, ORE and OO. We should also extend our contacts outside CIA so as to get the departmental views more fully than we now have. My own efforts will be devoted to coordinating this work, and covering OSO (once full clearance has been obtained), as well as the CIA managerial setup. After this has been completed, we will be able with greater assurance to go into more detailed problems of CIA and begin our inquiry into the departmental intelligence services.
After the above statement and recommendations have been discussed and revised by the Survey Group and a program approved for the first stage, I will prepare a more detailed statement of the problems and a working plan.
RB
345. Minutes of the 10th Meeting of the National Security Council
Washington, April 22, 1948.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Conference Room at the White House. Although the series of Presidential memoranda on the NSC meetings begins with the 9th meeting, no such memorandum was found for the 10th session.
PARTICIPANTS
Members Present
James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, Presiding
Robert A. Lovett, Under Secretary of State
Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army
John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy
W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force
Arthur M. Hill, Chairman, National Security Resources BoardOthers Present
Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence
C. V. Whitney, Assistant Secretary of the Air ForceSecretariat
Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary
James S. Lay, Jr., Assistant Executive SecretaryDECISIONS
[Here follows a decision on the U.S. position with respect to support for Western Union and other related free countries.]
2. Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods From Unauthorized Disclosures/1/
/1/Paragraphs a-b constitute NSC Action No. 45. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)
a. Agreed that a National Security Council Directive should be issued on this subject.
b. Directed the Executive Secretary to prepare such a Directive and submit it for approval by the Council./2/
/2/The directive was not issued until January 1950 when the Council approved NSCID Nos. 11 and 12 (Documents 430 and 431).
[Here follows a decision on review of the world situation as it relates to the security of the United States.]
346. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Intelligence Survey Group (Blum) to Allen W. Dulles, Mathias F. Correa, and William H. Jackson
Washington, June 4, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 80-M01009A, Box 1, Folder 12. Secret.
SUBJECT
Survey Group: Progress Report and Recommendations for Future Activities1. We are in sight of the end of the first stage of the Survey Group's work. This stage will be over with the completion of our first overall report on CIA. Our attention in the second stage will be concentrated on the other intelligence agencies, although we will certainly continue to follow CIA until the entire Survey has been completed, when it will probably be necessary to re-examine CIA and the whole intelligence picture as a result of all of our findings.
2. We have now about completed fairly detailed examination of the following parts of CIA: ICAPS, Executive for Administration and Management, Executive for Inspection and Security, Legal Counsel, Office of Reports and Estimates, Office of Collection and Dissemination, Office of Operations. Individual summary reports on these activities are being prepared. For security reasons survey of the Office of Special Operations and the Advisory Council has not been completed. We are also completing those contacts in the other intelligence services which seem necessary in order to clarify the relations between those services and CIA. More detailed examination of this question must await the survey of the other intelligence services.
3. In my opinion, our objective should now be to assemble and analyze the information and views we now have so that we can work toward establishing in the Survey Group a common understanding of the present organization and activities of CIA, the problems concerning them and the intelligence standards against which they should be measured. We can then decide on the type of report we will want to submit to the National Security Council. In deciding this, we must know more clearly the premises that underlie our work. For example, it now appears that even though it is generally recognized that Admiral Hillenkoetter is not entirely satisfactory as Director of Central Intelligence there is no readiness to replace him at present. On the other hand, there is a willingness approaching enthusiasm to dispense with the services of Wright (and presumably certain others with him) and Galloway. If this is the case, then we may want to work directly with Hillenkoetter in bringing about necessary reforms within CIA and in the relations between CIA and other agencies.
4. Whatever decision we take regarding the type of report we submit to the National Security Council, the first step, in my opinion, is to develop a common ground through the preparation of an overall draft report marking the end of this first phase of our work. This draft could be completed by about 15 July 1948, that is, after the members of the Survey Group have had time in Washington to study the material in our files, develop their contacts and direct the staff to complete further inquiries.
5. Such a draft report should include the following:
(a) A discussion of the elements of a sound central intelligence organization, including answers to the following questions: who should control the central agency; should coordination functions and collection functions be in the same agency; how should coordinated intelligence estimates be produced; what should be the relation between secret intelligence and secret operations; should the set-up be different in time of war than in time of peace; to what extent and in what manner should there be centralization of services common to several agencies; how should intelligence collection policies be coordinated; what coordinating authority should the central agency have over the departmental services and how should this authority be exercised?
(b) A descriptive analysis of the present responsibilities, organization and activities of CIA and the relations between CIA and other departments and agencies.
(c) An analysis of the opinions generally held regarding CIA, its personnel and its performance of its task as now conceived.
(d) Our conclusions and appraisal regarding CIA's proper mission and its present organization and operations.
(e) Recommendations, which should be subject to review in light of our findings in the departmental intelligence agencies.
R.B.
347. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Intelligence Survey Group (Blum) to the Intelligence Advisory Committee
Washington, June 10, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. Secret. Although the memorandum has no addressee it presumably was prepared as a background or information paper for the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
1. The IAC created by NSC Intelligence Directive No. 1 is a successor to the former Intelligence Advisory Board which existed during the life of the Central Intelligence Group under the National Intelligence Authority. Some of the present difficulties concerning the IAC can best be understood by reference to its development out of the former IAB.
2. The IAB was created by the Presidential letter of 22 January 1946 which set up the Central Intelligence Group. This letter was implemented by NIA Directive No. 1 of 8 February 1946 which provided that CIG "shall be considered, organized and operated as a cooperative interdepartmental activity". The NIA directive also established the composition of the IAB and provided that "all recommendations, prior to submission to this Authority (i.e. NIA) will be referred to the Board for concurrence or comment". The general effect of this situation was to give the IAB a position coordinate with that of the Director of the CIG, stemming from the same authority that controlled CIG.
3. The National Security Act which created CIA made no reference to an Intelligence Advisory Committee, although it included, among its general provisions, an authorization to the Director of Central Intelligence (as well as to other officials created by the Act) to appoint such advisory committees as he deems necessary. When, last fall, discussions began as to the setting up of an advisory committee to work with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency created by the Act, two divergent points of view were brought out in sharp opposition to each other. On the one hand, the Director of Central Intelligence held that a new IAC should simply be created by him by virtue of the general authority granted him under the Act, and that this Committee would be turned to by him for advice. The departmental agencies, on the other hand, held that a new IAC should act in a sense as a board of the directors to the Director of CI. They refused to accept membership on an advisory committee simply set up by him and agreed to serve only on a Committee created by the National Security Council. The Department of the Army was particularly adamant during this controversy.
4. Finally, after several months of discussion, the present IAC was created by NSC Intelligence Directive No. 1, of 12 December 1947. In the words of the Directive, in order "to maintain the relationship essential to coordination between the CIA and the intelligence organizations, an Intelligence Advisory Committee . . . shall be established to advise the Director of Central Intelligence". Under the Directive, the Director of Central Intelligence is required to obtain the views of the IAC before making any recommendations to the National Security Council pertaining to the intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies. In the event of non-concurrence by one of the Members of IAC, the problem is to be referred to the National Security Council for decision. The Members of the IAC, sitting under the Chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence, consist of the respective intelligence Chiefs from the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Staff, and Atomic Energy Commission.
5. It is not clear, even to the people in CIA, whether the IAC has held one or two meetings since its creation; in any case, no more. The one meeting which is clearly established was called on the initiative of the Executive Secretary, NSC, to discuss a specific question pursuant to the wishes of the NSC. (This question was that of how to protect the intelligence agencies from being required to disclose confidential information to Congressional Committees.) The IAC has never met to consider actual foreign intelligence situations and intelligence estimates, although Admiral Hillenkoetter seems to be somewhat confused on this point and has made statements to the contrary. However, the IAC has cleared and submitted to the NSC eight National Security Council Directives, which have been approved by the Council.
6. In practice, IAC action has been carried out through the routing of papers for concurrence and by the delegation of responsibility for the preparation of intelligence directives and other interdepartmental intelligence papers to a Standing Committee comprising representatives of each of the IAC agencies, usually from the planning staffs. This Standing Committee has just recently considered the advisability of further delegating its responsibilities to a subcommittee under it.
7. The fact is that the IAC machinery has not been effective in promoting interdepartmental coordination, and there seems now to be a feeling, at least in CIA, that it is preferable to avoid meetings which usually give rise to formal statements of position by the various representatives and, instead, to use informal channels for obtaining approval of necessary papers.
8. One fact contributing to the failure of the IAC has been the co-existence of similar bodies, comprising somewhat the same membership, with important responsibilities in the intelligence field. The membership of the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board is almost the same as that of the IAC, and the four Members of the Joint Intelligence Committee are, at the same time, four of the seven Members of the IAC.
9. The basic weakness reaches back to the unwillingness of the IAC Members to give their full cooperation if they are to be purely advisory and the absence of strong CIA leadership which would be necessary to overcome this unwillingness and make IAC effective.
Robert Blum/1/
/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
348. Verbatim Minutes of Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
Washington, June 16, 1948, 2 p.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-657. Secret. The meeting was held in the Federal Works Building. A note on pages 10 and 11 of the source text indicates that they were corrected copies.
PARTICIPANTS
Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, in the chair
Members Present
Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Major General A. R. Bolling, Acting Director, GSUSA
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, USAF
Mr. William C. Trueheart, Representing Atomic Energy Commission
Major General Walter E. Todd, Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, JCSAlso Present
Mr. Prescott Childs, Central Intelligence Agency
Colonel Merritt B. Booth, Department of State
Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State
Lt. Col. Edgar J. Treacy, Department of the Army
Colonel Allan D. MacLean, Department of the Army
Captain P. Henry, USN
Captain J. M. Ocker, USN
Lt. Col. C. M. DeHority, USMC
Major W. C. Baird, Department of Air
Captain K. A. Knowles, USN(R), Central Intelligence Agency
Colonel William J. Clinch, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Shane MacCarthy, Central Intelligence AgencyDirector: The agenda for the meeting today is the NIS Program; to see what might be worked out. I think the thing we ought to get in is the target date and I would like to recommend the date of 1952--that the Ad Hoc committee drew up. Anyone want to discuss that?
Adm. Inglis: I can't meet that date with present funds and personnel for 75 NIS's. If that is what you mean.
Director: Yes.
Adm. Inglis: The maximum production during the pressure of war when we had unlimited funds and personnel, working seven days a week, was 12 per year. That is the most they ever turned out and we couldn't hope to exceed that with our present funds and personnel.
Director: That is for three years--four years--
Adm. Inglis: 12 a year--that would take six and a half years. We couldn't do more than six in 1948. It takes time to recruit and train people.
Mr. Armstrong: I wonder how we can establish the target date until we know whether we can get funds and personnel. That is the criteria on which the speed of the program depends.
Director: We would also like to bring up how we are going to ask for funds. Shall we put it all into one? We would also like to get an estimate of what funds you need, so we can stick it into the next budget. Shall it be for all of the Departments? We talked about this thing this morning. The non-IAC agencies gave us a terrifically large amount of funds needed.
Mr. Childs: Interior and Agriculture.
Director: Agriculture wants for the first year $160,000, and subsequent years $260,000; Interior the first year $188,000, and subsequent years $562,946; and Commerce says no additional cost. I don't see how they can judge it. It looks like it is going to run into a very sizable amount of money. We did get Agriculture to cut it down around 40% on another estimate. Since it is so much money maybe we should take it up with the Security Council and have them give us written authority to put it in our next budget. It is close to two and a half million dollars. That would give us a tough point with Congress.
Adm. Inglis: And you will reallocate that?
Director: I think it would be better to do it that way rather than leave it to each Department. The first would get it, the second would have a little argument, and the rest wouldn't get anything.
Mr. Armstrong: If the money is appropriated to the Departments, you let the Budget have a crack at it.
Director: That is right. We can get the Ad Hoc committee to make up an estimate.
Adm. Inglis: I have my figures now.
Mr. Armstrong: So have I.
Adm. Inglis: I would like to make this reservation that, even though we do get additional funds, there is grave doubt as to whether we can get the additional personnel to correspond to the additional funds and train them.
Director: It might be difficult.
Adm. Inglis: To meet a 1952 deadline, we think, even though they are both possible, their trying to push it that fast would be uneconomical, inefficient, and would result in probably an inferior product.
Director: There is a lot to do.
Adm. Inglis: 12 per year is a very large substantial start. That is the maximum they produced under the pressure of war.
Gen. Cabell: I don't quite see the necessity of meeting those deadlines in the lower priority groups. Why not leave off the unimportant ones in order to meet the deadlines on the important ones.
Adm. Inglis: I had the same thought. I inquired about that and was told that out of 105 that were wanted 75 were considered of sufficient urgency to be listed by the JCS as wanted in a comparatively short time. I still think, however, a lesser number than 75 would meet the requirements. I was also told that the JCS had overlooked one of the important areas--Italy was given as an example--and it is a sensitive spot and should have been included. I was also told by a person working on the Editing Board, working on this program, that they will be working along on a certain area and then a crash and the decision is to drop that and start on something else. It brings about inefficiency also.
Gen. Todd: That happened recently and if we can interest the planners more in a continual review of these priorities we might gain some time and avoid these stoppages.
Adm. Inglis: The important areas change. We have to bear in mind every time they change them it will slow it down.
Gen. Todd: It may be a 15 degree turn instead of a 90 degree turn, as in some cases.
Adm. Inglis: We got the money we asked for. I assume we will get it--it has passed the House and the Senate. We haven't got the bodies, but I think we can recruit over the period of a year. But six is the maximum this year, even if you gave us ten million dollars. We still couldn't turn out more than six. And if we get the same funds in our appropriations in ensuing years, and can estimate a build-up to an annual rate of 12 a year, after the Fiscal Year 1949, and that would mean we could produce 42 by July 1 1952, or 75 by April 1955. That would be the Navy's target date under current circumstances. Now if it is insistent that we turn out 75, then there would be in addition to the funds we now have, and expect to get, $120,000 a year, starting with the Fiscal Year 1950.
Director: I think that is one of the things we have to hook into the Security Council.
Adm. Inglis: It wasn't your idea in presenting your estimates to Congress that you would take over the entire expense; it is only additional funds.
Director: Additional funds.
Adm. Inglis: Because if it were the entire expense we could give you that figure.
Director: I think additional funds.
Adm. Inglis: I think it should apply to all the Departments. If you are going to absorb the whole cost, it will be more than $120,000 a year.
Director: We could put that either way.
Mr. Armstrong: Ours is capable of being refigured as well as the Navy's because we are currently at almost zero on capability of doing the studies. But to meet the program of 74 or 75 studies in four years from the time we got fully recruited, that would be a four-year period, we figured it would run an annual cost of $1,150,000, adding approximately 180 people to our organization to account for the three chapters that are assigned to State, and it doesn't include the amount that would be required on the farmed-out sections to Agriculture, Commerce, and so on.
Director: I think we will put those in.
Gen. Cabell: It would be awfully difficult for us to segregate that part of our shop that would be working on NIS exclusively, and their determinate cost. I recommend we only call upon CIA for the additional cost, rather than for the entire program. Then I have another reservation. I would like to say that the bottleneck with us is going to be the weather data and the availability of IBM machines. At the present moment we need some 30 machines to take care of the weather chapters in these reports. And we are having difficulty in getting those machines. We may wish to ask for CIA encouragement in getting those machines. I don't know what we are going to be able to do, but it seems the IBM Company, or rather Agencies, would rather get new customers than to serve the older customers. I don't know whether you have a requirement in CIA for IBM equipment. If not we could use your prestige as a new customer to get these machines.
Director: We have some IBM machines. Maybe we can do that.
Adm. Inglis: It is a change in business policy from that of the corner grocery store--they give the chops to the old customers.
Gen. Cabell: They don't sell these, they are all leased material.
Director: Do all the agencies have money to do any work this year? This Fiscal Year, and the one coming up?
Mr. Armstrong: We do not.
Adm. Inglis: We have money for that--I am morally certain we have. We estimate we can get the personnel to turn out six.
Director: That is a good start.
Adm. Inglis: And from then on the personnel have to be educated. That is the best estimate we can make now.
Gen. Bolling: We are going to need additional funds for 1950 and 1951.
Director: We will put in for these additional funds. We have a better chance if just one asks for it. Park, what would you need in extra funds this year to get started on this?
Mr. Armstrong: To approach the program on full-scale business, that would be $1,150,000. Obviously if you are going to swing into it slowly, and we could do a lesser number, then the full program would call for in one year a lesser amount of money. I don't have an estimate on a graduated basis.
Director: We have some money for it now. It was originally set up for printing, binding, and maps. We might spare a little of that for the agencies not having the money.
Adm. Inglis: Reduce the number you originally set up, and reduce the amount. That money could be diverted.
Mr. Armstrong: We could certainly, in a short time, arrive at estimates and cost on the basis of six the first year, and an ascending scale thereafter to show what you have to ask for the current Fiscal Year.
Director: I think you ought to get that part in anyway. We won't get in any more this year.
Mr. Armstrong: Unless you are getting a deficiency appropriation.
Director: No, if a new Congress comes in. And it also depends on who is elected. It takes a terrible argument to get a deficiency appropriation. They ask you if you get this money whether or not you are coming back to ask for a deficiency. "Remember, if you are going to get this, you are not to ask for a deficiency."
Adm Inglis: That brings up another point. I think it would save a little embarrassment all the way around if we do decide to submit the request for additional funds for CIA that we make it clear, and give the specific amount of how much each department is already contributing to this department; make it clear what you are asking for so we can go up and say $350,000 is for the NIS program. Then they won't say to us that we have already given that.
Director: We can put in a statement.
Adm. Inglis: A table as to what each agency needs. That would certainly help me and get me off the hook.
Director: It seems like a strange question, and I probably know the answer, is there any way of allocating personnel doing other work? Does anyone have spare personnel?
Adm. Inglis: Speaking for ONI--it is a hope that we can get the bodies.
Mr. Armstrong: We haven't any slack at all, and have at present only a very small percentage of our personnel applied to similar studies that would be dropped when this program starts. Like the SID.
Director: It is agreeable then that we put down as one of the conclusions that you will let us know what extra money will be needed for next year so we can take that up and get the Security Council's backing on it and then put it up in the budget as soon as the boys meet again.
Adm. Inglis: Are you convinced that we must turn out 75 by '52?
Director: If it can't be done, it can't be done.
Adm. Inglis: I won't say it can't be done. We feel it will be wasteful and will result in not so good a product if we take it slower.
Director: What are your ideas on the "We"?
Gen Todd: I think that problem should be put up to the users. Recently the need for the review of priorities came to my attention and information they wanted concerning countries along the Mediterranean Coast. And in one breath they say they need it before they can complete certain studies, and that they don't want to review the priority on the basic intelligence areas. I think it is strictly a problem on which we should get recommendations from the users.
Col. MacLean: Speaking of these 75 studies, the Joint Planners have dipped way down to the bottom of these studies for one and they want it by the 15th of July.
Gen. Todd: That is the problem.
Adm. Inglis: They make it impossible to fulfill their demands.
Gen. Todd: And they want to compromise. They say we don't want to disturb the priorities, but we want some material we can do research work on ourselves. And I do think if they gave a little more time and a little more consideration to the importance of cutting down these priorities, or of the arrangement of them before it is too late, we will save time and money and get a better product.
Adm. Inglis: I would like to make a recommendation that we report to the users that the maximum output under war pressure was 12 per year, and that we feel that is a maximum which can be demanded. Unless the users have need of something urgent, which we must accept, it will start wasteful practices and inferior products. Tell them if they will accept 12 per year we can complete this program by 1955. If they insist on us meeting that date of 1952, what it will then cost, whatever the cost, in addition to the current funds, and that we recommend that 12 per year be accepted.
Gen. Bolling: Of course, we go for a little more speed. Our latest date is completion by June 1952. We fully realize that we have a start in this. We are working on it now and are pushing the other outfits. I think it would be very poor policy to put out an inferior product and sacrifice efficiency for speed.
Gen. Cabell: About what I said a while ago--I think that 75 is a little unreal on their part, and we have to ask them if that is unreal. But I should think, and this is a generality, that if our speed during the war was 12 per year, with the approved techniques and method of coordination, we could shoot that up near 20 a year. It would be a reasonable expectation. I would offer the figure of 20 per year.
Adm. Inglis: They can't turn out airplanes now faster than they did during the war.
Gen. Cabell: A little more slowly.
Gen. Bolling: And better airplanes.
Gen. Todd: And we were not confronted with the problems of money and personnel.
Adm. Inglis: During the war money meant nothing. We had all the personnel we needed, and now we can't get either the money or the personnel; and you worked 6-1/2 and 7 days a week during the war, now you work five. And I think probably the quality of the personnel is not as good as it was during the war; which I can't substantiate before the Law.
Gen. Todd: Would it be possible to farm out any of the tasks to the agencies that do have the talent--the universities, etc.
Gen. Bolling: That is being done now.
Gen. Todd: Increase the amount that is being farmed out.
Gen. Bolling: That depends entirely on funds.
Adm. Inglis: I would like to ask my advisor on that--have we looked into that?
Col. DeHority: We investigated that and decided against it.
Adm. Inglis: Because you didn't think any outside agency was competent to do it?
Col. DeHority: It was a combination of that and that highly classified material can't be made available to them in adequate amounts.
Director: Park, anything?
Mr. Armstrong: Since we are starting virtually from zero, the difference between 12 and 20 a year is a question of the rate of recruiting and the amount of money. We could approach one probably as rapidly as the other. I haven't any real preference for one over the other. In either case it would be the figure, substantially or somewhat less, per annum indicated here.
Director: I think if this is agreeable with everyone, the first thing we will do is to take Todd's suggestion and see what the planners want and would like to get. And at the same time we can give them the difference in costs. Regardless whether or not you can get people--that is probably unknown--you have to get the money. 12 a year and 20 a year, and the difference in cost. Let them take a look and see if their need is overriding the cost, which is harder to get than it was during wartime.
Mr. Armstrong: Get the data from each of the participating agencies on those two bases in the terms of dollars and total them and you have a cost program to present to them as a very important consideration on which they will have to make a decision.
Director: They ought to have that information on the cost of the thing. To sit back and say we don't care how much it costs, we want to get it done--that is getting away from reality.
Adm. Inglis: We might as well make it 23 instead of 20 because if six is the maximum we can turn out during '49, that gives you three years at 23 per year.
Director: Let's make it 12 or 23.
Mr. Armstrong: Six the first year?
Adm. Inglis: That is all we can do the first year.
Director: I don't think anybody could get more than six this first year.
Mr. Armstrong: We can't do six without additional funds.
Director: You let me know approximately what you need.
Mr. Armstrong: What it would cost for six the first year, and then alternate 12 and 23 for the years after.
Adm. Inglis: Do you want two figures in the terms of what we are already committed to do on the program, and additional figures on how much more money would be needed to speed it up. And the second category, that requires appropriations from you?
Director: Practically all of the cases. Then we can give it to the users and tell them that money is going to be a question. It is more and more with Congress that they are getting up there and saying we have to make more economies.
Gen. Todd: It seems to me the trained personnel will also enter into it and would be worth while for the agencies that are preparing the material to look into the practices followed by other agencies to see if some of them couldn't be adopted--such as farming out the projects, and a view to getting better material and compiling it at a more uniform rate of speed by the contributing agencies, and perhaps a little faster.
Director: Again it comes back to money. If you farm it out you have to have money to pay for it.
Gen. Todd: It was my impression, when I was in the Intelligence Division, that we could get it done faster and cheaper by farming it out. That was the impression I got. I don't know.
Col. MacLean: We are getting some chapters on 18 studies this year by outside contract. When this program was started last fall, we made arrangements to have that done.
Mr. Armstrong: I am reminded that one thing about farming this out is the disclosure as to the priority of this program.
Gen. Todd: There are security considerations. The discussion will be on the working level, but at a later date we might use some short cuts.
Director: Any other remarks? Well, I think the first thing to be done on this is to check on this and the additional money, and then the additional amounts we will need in any case. Anyone else have anything on this?
There is just one other item. I am sorry we did not get it on the agenda, but it did not come over from Sidney Souers' office until about 15 minutes ago. It is a proposal from the Chief of Naval Operations to downgrade paragraphs 3d and 3e of NSCID No. 7/1/ from Secret to Confidential. I don't see that it would hurt us to do that. NSCID No. 7, "Domestic Exploitation," paragraph 1:
/1/For text, see Document 427.
"The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the exploitation, on a highly selective basis, within the United States of business concerns, other non-governmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information."
Paragraph 3:
"Further to implement this undertaking, the intelligence agencies shall:" d follows:
"Obtain, to the maximum extent possible, from their departments and agencies the foreign intelligence information which the departments and agencies have received as a by-product of the normal relationship with business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States in connection with non-intelligence activities, and transmit to the maximum extent possible, the information to the Central Intelligence Agency for editing for source security and for appropriate dissemination."
Paragraph 3e:
"Obtain, in so far as is practicable and within existing security regulations, from their departments and agencies information concerning business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States having foreign intelligence potential, which the department or agency possesses or subsequently acquires, and make the information available to the Central Intelligence Agency."
It is a request from the Chief of Naval Operations for authority to downgrade paragraphs 3d and 3e of NSCID No. 7 from Secret to Confidential. Do you want to read this? I frankly don't see why we can't do that, unless they want a more complete dissemination.
Mr. Trueheart: I heard them say when it came up at another meeting that they couldn't send it to the people who needed it, and that it wouldn't be implemented unless they could get it out.
Director: If we can do it we should. As far as I am concerned I am willing.
Gen. Cabell: I wonder if anybody here could give us the philosophy for the original classification.
Director: It is an occupational disease. Everything they touch is highly classified.
Adm. Inglis: I think there is a pretty good reason for being close-mouthed. It is not so much the information they get from these commercial firms, but the protection of the firms as sources. They will feel a lot happier if they know that whatever they give us is very closely held. And some of it has to do with competition.
Director: That is what they said when we talked to them. They are willing to give the Government the information, but they don't want to see it come back later in the hands of the fellow across the street who is working against them.
Adm. Inglis: That was probably the factor in having the high classification.
Mr. Trueheart: It should. The fact that every effort will be made to protect them as a source--probably it would be a good idea to publish it so they will know that we are taking every precaution to protect them.
Mr. Armstrong: I don't see any objections.
Mr. Booth: I would like to check that.
Director: We will send it around with a voting slip. I brought it up because we got it just before lunch. At first glance it looks as if it is all right to do it.
The only other item is just for information. That is, DCI 2/1 is over on Mr. Forrestal's desk and we don't know how long it will be there.
Adm. Inglis: You had another item all tied up with that same argument. The preparation of NIS.
Director: The NIS, that is going on now. There is a joint group doing this work for the NIS program which could continue to do it. And since this Navy-Air dispute is within the Military Establishment and doesn't materially affect the NIS program, they will keep on doing what they are doing.
Adm. Inglis: As far as I am concerned it is all right with me if the air information is produced by the AID, which is a joint Navy-Air Force enterprise, and as long as they continue to function and produce those things for the NIS we can let this decision about responsibility ride until Mr. Forrestal puts out his clarifying directive. If that isn't satisfactory we had better go ahead with this.
Gen. Cabell: I don't see quite what you mean.
Director: It is going along all right now and I don't think you should interrupt it.
Adm. Inglis: That is all right with me, but I thought it was coming up for discussion today. This volume here is an outline of the NIS, and on one page it gives the tentative allocation of responsibility for the preparation of NIS. There are four items here which I believe the AID is working on. One has to do with civil air facilities, another has to do with military air business, etc. It is the type of work that AID is working on now. Now Navy has dissented from allocating the responsibility of that to the Air Force without any qualifying phrases. That dissent is still in a state of inanimate suspension and has not been reconciled because it is tied up with this business which is on Mr. Forrestal's desk. I don't think you care particularly as long as the work is continued.
Director: You can't continue very long without this thing being settled.
Adm. Inglis: Not indefinitely, but if you are willing to let it rest in that state of inanimate suspension as to the designation of responsibility, but that AID continue to produce the work and are going to continue the work, that is acceptable with us.
Gen. Cabell: We would propose to continue working on the basis of this allocation under the assumption that after that inanimate suspension it would be along the same lines.
Adm. Inglis: That is where I differ. I can't agree with that assumption. We would agree that the decision go the other way. That is where the conflict is.
Gen. Cabell: It seems to me, in any case, it would come to an overlap.
Adm. Inglis: There is no need for an overlap because it is AID stuff we are talking about.
Gen. Cabell: I don't see any reason to expect us contemplating the changing of that allocation. That is the best evidence there is right now.
Adm. Inglis: That allocation has not been formally agreed to and if the lack of a formal agreement interferes with the work, then it is serious and should be resolved right away. But if it is not we can continue.
Gen. Cabell: I don't see how the lack of an agreement on this point could affect the continuation of the NIS program.
Director: We would like to have it continue. Have you anything else, Prescott? Anybody else anything? We will call the meeting over. (2:45)
349. Memorandum for the President of the Discussion at the 14th Meeting of the National Security Council
Washington, July 1, 1948.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File. Top Secret. Drafted on July 2.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1-3, U.S. civil aviation policy toward the Soviet Union and its satellites, U.S. position with respect to support for Western Union and other related free countries, and the U.S. position on providing military assistance to nations of the non-Soviet world.]
4. Proposed NSC Intelligence Directive Re "Communications Intelligence" (Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 15, 1948.)/1/
/1/Not found.
Mr. Souers said that the question of legality which he had raised has now been corrected in the proposed Directive. He said that the other question which he had raised involved only a matter of form since no other board had ever been created under the NSC. He stated, however, that, from his point of view, the proposal by the Intelligence Advisory Committee was just as agreeable a solution.
Admiral Hillenkoetter explained the two points of difference. He said that his proposal was to achieve coordination under the aegis of the Director of Central Intelligence but with the unanimous concurrence of the Board. The IAC proposal placed the Board directly under the NSC but required unanimous concurrence, including the Director of Central Intelligence. He said that either solution appeared acceptable. His feeling, however, was that his wording, which was based upon Mr. Souers' suggestion, was more consonant with the National Security Act of 1947.
Mr. Souers explained that the IAC feels that no one person should be in the position of a single advocate before the Council. He said that the IAC proposal would place the Board directly under the NSC, would require that it operate only on unanimous agreement, would enable it to elect its own chairman, but would require that it come up to the NSC when disagreements arise.
In answer to Secretary Royall, Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that this Directive would not affect a merger of Army and Navy communications intelligence activities.
The National Security Council:/2/
/2/Paragraphs a-b and the Note constitute NSC Action No. 73. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)
a. Noted the comments by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Executive Secretary, NSC, that they saw no serious objection to the revisions of paragraphs 1 and 7 of the proposed NSCID recommended by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
b. Approved the proposed National Security Council Intelligence Directive, subject to amendment of paragraphs 1 and 7 thereof as recommended by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
Note: The proposed Directive as approved subsequently issued as NSCID 9/3/ and transmitted to the appropriate Departments and Agencies for information and action.
/3/Document 435.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items 5-7, handling of SANACC papers, atomic warfare policy, and NSC status of projects.]
Continue with Document 350
