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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Hillenkoetter's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence

                           

370. Memorandum From the Chief of the Intelligence Coordinating and Planning Staff (Childs) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, February 21, 1949.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. No classification marking. The source text indicates it was prepared for discussion with Mr. Souers.

SUBJECT
Crisis Situations

REFERENCE
Section 102(d), (1), (2), and (5) National Security Act 1947

1. ICAPS has given consideration to the above subject and thinks the real problem is in the delay and difficulty in the intelligence agencies' obtaining promptly within their own Departments information indicating that a crisis is developing.

2. If this information were in the intelligence offices, the provisions prescribed in NSCID 1, paragraph 8 and the procedures set forth in DCI 1/1, paragraph 2 would cover the expeditious handling of this material, and the calling of an IAC meeting to give it proper attention.

3. Furthermore, any facts or information of this category coming to the attention of executive departments and agencies outside the IAC, should be transmitted without delay to the DCI who will process the material as outlined in the same directives just mentioned.

4. We think, therefore, that the NSC should give consideration to this matter so that the Heads of all Federal Departments and agencies, Chiefs of Staff, etc. would be instructed to make available to their intelligence officers, or to the DCI as appropriate, facts or knowledge regarding any potential international crisis affecting the national security.

5. We suggest, therefore, that you discuss this important problem with the Executive Secretary of the NSC with the objective of issuance by the President of a directive covering this subject adequately.

Prescott Childs/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

371. Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum of Comments on the Dulles Report

Washington, February 28, 1949.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. Secret. The full text, including the tables not printed here, is in the Supplement. Sent to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council who transmitted copies to the members of the NSC. (Memorandum from Souers to the NSC, March 2; Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5) See the Supplement.

The Committee's report is an admirable effort to direct the Central Intelligence Agency to fundamentals and is a genuinely constructive effort to improve the production of intelligence on which the policy of the United States should be based. The observations of the Committee are, in general, accurate, and its objectives are sound; its conclusions, however, are, in many respects, faulty, and the recommendations for their attainment are, in many cases, impracticable.

The larger part of the Report is concerned with the amount of coordination exercised by the Central Intelligence Agency in regard to the other intelligence activities of the Government. It is realized that an optimum coordination has not yet been reached; however, not only a start, but considerable progress along the path of complete coordination has been attained. No gaps remain even though all duplication has not yet been abolished. On this subject of coordination, I am sure the members of the National Security Council realize the difficulties encountered; particularly, those members having to do with the unification of the Armed Services. A comparable problem has confronted the Central Intelligence Agency with the added obstacle that one additional department is involved.

The Committee states (page 5): "--coordination can most effectively be achieved by mutual agreement among the various agencies." There is no question as to the validity of that statement. However, to achieve coordination in such a manner, compromises of wording, emphasis, etc., have to be accepted. For example, three months were required to secure agreement on most of the present NSCID's, while it required one year to resolve the differences between the Air Force and the Navy on one NSCID.

The Committee begins its discussions on coordination with the above-mentioned declaration, but, in numerous cases thereafter, throughout the Report, the element of "direction" in coordination is intimated and even stressed. This element of "direction" has usually been entirely unacceptable to the interested agencies. Further, the Director of Central Intelligence, per se, has no authority to enforce coordination, and, indeed, the Committee (page 41) recognizes this when it says, "The Act does not give the Central Intelligence Agency independent authority to coordinate intelligence activities." Yet many of the Committee's recommendations hinge upon having such authority, and many of the alleged shortcomings are due to this lack of authority. The phrase, "such procedure would violate the chain of command," was repeated over and over again in the discussions during the drawing-up of the present NSCID's.

In view of this lack of explicit authority, in view of the progress made in the relatively short time this activity has been in operation, and in view of the progress already made in coordination by mutual agreement, it is considered that in not too long a period the continued augmentation of such a program will more than justify any delays incurred.

A second alleged shortcoming is that the Central Intelligence Agency is "overadministered in the sense that administrative conditions have been allowed to guide and, on occasion, even control intelligence policy, to the detriment of the latter." The administration of the Central Intelligence Agency has been developed on the following pattern:

(1) Budget, personnel, and other support services are essential to any operation, and are centralized to serve all components of the Agency.

(2) Control procedures are restricted to keeping within the budget requirements, insuring that illegal transactions are not permitted, avoiding waste and duplication in expenditures, and maintaining certain standards required by security, the Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and the General Accounting Office. No agency, regardless of its nature, and most emphatically one that handles confidential government funds, can possibly avoid such controls.

Administration has advised on policy matters and should continue to do so, particularly, in the determination of the ability to support operational proposals and in the achievement of greater efficiency with the means available for operations. Administration has no voice in determining the substance of operational direction, guidance, and production, nor should it ever have.

There is a never-ending argument on the merits of administration versus operations. The operating people would like to be given a lump sum for their operations and complete latitude with regard to numbers and grades of personnel, travel authorities, new projects, etc. The results of such action, without controls, is obvious--chaos--and, again, it simply cannot be done where government funds are involved.

The Committee further declares: "Administrative arrangements which do not at first appear to be efficient or economical may be necessary in the Central Intelligence Agency. Personnel requirements for certain types of work cannot conform to normal civil service standards, and the demands of security often impose special and unusual procedures. This situation must be understood not only by those responsible for the internal organization of the Central Intelligence Agency but also by Congress and the Bureau of the Budget."--"The centralization of all administration in one office is undesirable since secret operations require their own separate administration."

The Committee's report seems to indicate undue emphasis and alarm in connection with complete autonomy for covert components of the Central Intelligence Agency. There has to be an umpire some place, and no one, directly responsible for operations, should be his own final authority and judge in the utilization of funds and personnel.

Security is adequately served through the physical segregation of covert administrative branches and the establishment of direct channels, both to the covert operational officials and to the responsible administrator who is the third senior official in the Agency. Covert and overt support activities are not intermingled, but a single administrative chief over each phase insures adequate mutual support and minimizes duplication. The Central Intelligence Agency saved over sixty positions by the new organizational approach and so far has had few complaints. From a strictly security point of view, there will be better security than before because of not pointing up autonomous separate support functions in a single agency.

It is all very well for a group with no responsibilities or authority to state that both Congress and the Bureau of the Budget must understand that the Central Intelligence Agency must be given, in effect, a blank check and a free hand. In practice, the Central Intelligence Agency must justify its demands with some reason and logic and must reassure both of those bodies that the Central Intelligence Agency is, at least, somewhat careful with government funds and does its best to guard against waste and fraud.

Another Committee comment is: "Many able persons have left the organization and few qualified ones have been attracted to it. On the higher levels, quality is uneven, and there are few persons who are outstanding in intelligence work."

The above statement seems to be totally unwarranted, as well as to have no actual basis in fact. Out of 267 employees in the three top grades (P-6 to P-8 and CAF-13 to CAF-15, both inclusive), 20 employees have left, not all of them voluntarily. The following table shows this turnover.

[Here follows a table of losses of CIA personnel in the top three grades for CY 1948.]

For the calendar year 1948, the turnover in the Central Intelligence Agency for all personnel, for all causes--death, sickness, maternity leave, and all other voluntary or involuntary separations--has averaged 1.6% per month. This is a considerably lower rate than for most other government agencies.

The charge that there are few persons outstanding in intelligence work is another general one and is difficult to sustain. It is admittedly difficult to establish an absolute criterion as to ability, but, if scholarship and experience do have some bearing, the following tables will demonstrate that the Central Intelligence Agency is not totally devoid of capable people.

[Here follow two tables showing the qualifications of professionals in the CIA and ORE as of September 1948.]

Another error, states the Report, is "The placing in key positions of a large percentage of military personnel, many of them on relatively short 'tour of duty' assignment, tends to discourage competent civilian personnel from looking to employment in the Central Intelligence Agency as a career."

Omitting the post of Director, which is considered in another part of the Report, there is only one--out of six--Assistant Director who is a military man. Four--out of six--Deputy Assistant Directors are from the military services, but, considering the fact that the military services are both the greatest suppliers and the greatest customers, this does not appear unreasonable. The overall figure is 58 military personnel, or less than 2% of the total number of employees in the Central Intelligence Agency.

The above Committee statement seems somewhat inconsistent with recommendations in other parts of the Report which urge the assignment of military personnel to various branches of the organization.

Budget

On page 33 of the Report is the statement: "Both Congress and the Bureau of the Budget have refrained from examining in detail the internal workings of the Central Intelligence Agency in order to determine the justification for the budget." This statement is only partially correct as, while Congress, so far, has not inquired into detail, the details have been gone over in the Bureau of the Budget by an official who has full security clearance. It was at the insistence of the Bureau of the Budget that a centralized administrative staff was set up.

Security

The Committee recognizes the need for security, "--in the Central Intelligence Agency which has unfortunately become publicized as a secret intelligence organization." The Central Intelligence Agency concurs completely in this, and the publicity received has neither been sought nor encouraged, but has been actively discouraged. By special plea of the Director, various periodicals and newspapers (Life, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News, New York Herald Tribune, among others) have refrained from publishing articles. Under the existing conditions of press and radio, it would be practically impossible to conceal completely, desirable as it undoubtedly would be, activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The more practicable manner, which has been adopted, is to conceal the covert sections by allowing the overt sections to serve as a "lightning rod" and draw off attention from the clandestine activities.

Concise comments on the individual conclusions and recommendations of the Committee follow:

[Here follow 11 pages commenting on Chapters II-IV.]

Chapter 7, page 81./1/

/1/This and similar chapter, page, and paragraph references are to the text of the Dulles Report; see Document 358.

"(1) In the Central Intelligence Agency there has been confusion between the responsibility of producing coordinated national intelligence estimates and responsibility for miscellaneous research and reporting activities."

This is a broad statement that needs qualification. Both types of activities may have been performed, but there has been no confusion between them, and both were found to be necessary. It is believed that what the Committee describes as "confusion" has resulted from the Central Intelligence Agency's recognition of its threefold responsibilities as the producer of national intelligence estimates, as the intelligence facility of the National Security Council, and as the agency responsible for performing services of common concern. The Committee has failed to recognize the gap that exists between the Central Intelligence Agency's explicit responsibilities, as set forth in NSCID #3, and the Central Intelligence Agency's implicit responsibilities as the intelligence facility of the National Security Council. Moreover, NSCID #3 is so rigid with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency's production responsibilities and so flexible with respect to those of the departmental intelligence agencies that its usefulness as a working document is seriously impaired. The Committee's conclusion is made on the basis of a dangerously limited view of the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibilities for intelligence production. Such responsibilities should be considered not solely in terms of the production of "coordinated national intelligence estimates" and "intelligence in fields of common interest" but also in terms of the Central Intelligence Agency's role as the intelligence facility of the President, the National Security Council, and such agencies as may be designated by them.

The Central Intelligence Agency's intelligence production responsibilities should include the following, and NSCID #1 and NSCID #3 should be modified accordingly to include a revised and more appropriate definition of national intelligence:

(1) To produce intelligence required to reduce to a minimum the element of surprise in foreign situations and developments which affect United States national security.

(2) To produce coordinated intelligence estimates required for national planning, policy, and operational decisions.

(3) To produce intelligence required to support those agencies designated by the National Security Council to receive it.

(4) To produce intelligence in fields of common interest to the Central Intelligence Agency and the departmental intelligence agencies, including economic and scientific intelligence.

(5) To produce intelligence required for Central Intelligence Agency estimates not normal to any departmental responsibilities.

(It should be noted that paragraph (2) above is the only category of intelligence which conforms to the definition of national intelligence in NSCID #3.)

"(2) The provisions of the National Security Act for the production of national intelligence estimates, as interpreted by the National Security Council Intelligence Directives, are sound but have not been effectively carried out."

Concur in the assertion that the provisions of the National Security Act for the production of national intelligence estimates are sound, but, after almost a year's experience, believe that NSCID #1 and NSCID #3 should be revised for the reasons cited immediately above and for the following reasons:

(1) The directives do not provide for adequate treatment of the matter of priority within the departmental intelligence agencies with respect to their support of the Central Intelligence Agency. Consequently, the Central Intelligence Agency is unable to make optimum use of departmental intelligence and cannot depend upon timely departmental action in meeting Central Intelligence Agency commitments and deadlines.

(2) The directives do not adequately allocate production responsibilities and do not define intelligence fields of common concern.

"(3) There should be created in the Central Intelligence Agency a small Estimates Division which would draw upon and review the specialized intelligence product of the departmental agencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates."

The Report is vague concerning the details of the proposed reorganization, and, therefore, opinion is divided on the necessity or desirability of a drastic internal reorganization now. However, if the Committee's recommendation means that the Estimates Division is to be large enough to provide its own relatively high level research support, the recommendation is workable and might result in simplification of the process of producing estimates. The problem of a greater duplication of effort, than now exists, immediately arises. It is believed, therefore, that this recommendation is premature and should be considered only after a revision of NSCID #1 and NSCID #3.

"(4) Under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, these estimates should be submitted for discussion and approval by the reconstituted Intelligence Advisory Committee whose members should assume collective responsibility for them.

"(5) Provision should be made in these arrangements for the handling of crisis situations when coordinated estimates are required without delay.

"(6) Coordinated intelligence estimates produced in this way must, in order to be effective, be recognized as the most authoritative estimates available to the policy makers."

These three recommendations have been considered together as parts of the same problem. The Central Intelligence Agency cannot agree with the view that members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee should assume collective responsibility for Central Intelligence Agency estimates. It is considered that the main question is what sort of estimates should emerge from the national intelligence structure. Those who developed the original concept of a central intelligence group had clearly in mind the ever-present factor of departmental bias as well as the shortcomings of joint intelligence, which often produces estimates so watered down in the process of reaching agreement as to be valueless. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates can be free from such faults only if they are produced with full cognizance of departmental views but without subservience to departmental prejudices. Intelligence Advisory Committee review of the Central Intelligence Agency drafts should undertake to eliminate minor or apparent differences but not to gloss over divergences of informed opinion. The resultant estimate must be essentially that of the Central Intelligence Agency and not that of the Intelligence Advisory Committee collectively. Any statements of dissent should be limited to substantial and well-defined issues, as the directives now provide. Moreover, these directives should be further modified to restrict dissent to the field of responsibility of the dissenting agency. (For example, the Office of Naval Intelligence has an interest in political matters but is not responsible for estimates in that field, and the Central Intelligence Agency should not be required to publish a dissent by the Office of Naval Intelligence on purely political matters if the State Department concurs in the Central Intelligence Agency position.) The logic of this contention is simply that, just as a dissenting member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee cannot be expected to share in the responsibility for a Central Intelligence Agency estimate in which he dissents, so, by extension, the Central Intelligence Agency has sole responsibility for its estimates, even when Intelligence Advisory Committee concurrence is complete, and does not share this responsibility collectively with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Concurrence should fortify the estimate; it should not create an artificial responsibility. The Report does not reflect a clear understanding of this vital aspect of the coordination theory. To the Committee, "national" intelligence is merely "coordinated" intelligence, and coordinated intelligence is joint intelligence, at the mercy of departmental bias.

Although the Report favors the method of preparing drafts in an ad hoc committee, experience shows that this procedure is time-consuming and inefficient. The Central Intelligence Agency believes that coordination procedures will be effective only if its own estimates personnel produce the initial draft as a basis for discussion with a permanent, full-time substantively competent Intelligence Advisory Committee sub-committee, prior to the submittal of the estimates to the Director for Intelligence Advisory Committee action.

There must be effective means for handling crisis situations. In the past, an informal procedure, which worked, was in effect. This procedure is now in process of being formalized by agreed, written understanding.

The Central Intelligence Agency's estimates must earn their distinction as the most authoritative intelligence available to the policy makers. It is, however, recommended that the National Security Council enjoin the policy makers to give the Central Intelligence Agency such guidance in matters pertaining to national policy that Central Intelligence Agency support will be more directly responsive to their needs.

[Here follow 16 pages commenting on Chapters VI-IX.]

Chapter X, page 138.

"(1) The directing staff of the Central Intelligence Agency has not demonstrated an adequate understanding of the mandate of the organization or the ability to discharge that mandate effectively."

Do not concur. Had the Central Intelligence Agency been constituted in a vacuum, where relations with other established agencies need not have been taken into account, progress in coordination, organization, and production might have been much more rapid. However, the relationships and impacts between not only the other intelligence agencies, but also the administrative agencies of the Government--the Bureau of the Budget, the General Accounting Office, the Civil Service Commission, etc.--had to be adjusted and had to be lived with. Dismissing the theoretical conditions which one might have liked to enjoy, and considering the realistic conditions which have confronted the Central Intelligence Agency, it is believed that much progress along sound lines has been made. And, what is more gratifying, this tendency is increasing in both scope and in the right direction.

"(2) Administrative organization and policies tend to impede the carrying out of the essential intelligence functions of the Central Intelligence Agency under the Act."

Do not concur. The development of our organization and functions has been based on a policy of centralization of specific responsibilities in single offices and the coordinated work of the offices as a team, each concentrating in its own field and looking to the others for support from other fields. Only in this manner can we avoid the confusion, duplication of effort, inefficiency, and major frictions which always attend a situation wherein every component tries to be self-sufficient and attempts to do the same things, at the same time, in the same sphere, and in constant competition. Our organizational policy has resulted in the centralized groupings shown below:

(1) Research, evaluation, and production, and coordination in these fields:

Office of Reports and Estimates (except science)
Office of Scientific Intelligence

(2) Collection and liaison control, dissemination, liaison service, and information service, and coordination in these fields:

Office of Collection and Dissemination

(3) Overt field collection:

Office of Operations

(4) Covert field collection and counterespionage:

Office of Special Operations

(5) Covert field operations:

Office of Policy Coordination.

(The last two functions which had been integrated into one covert office were separated as a result of a directive issued by the National Security Council.)

"(3) Continuity of service is essential for the successful carrying out of the duties of Director of Central Intelligence."

Concur. This principle is obvious, and a lack of the assurance of continuity works a hardship on both the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency and the quality of work performed. Changes of Directors with the following changes of organization tend to make the Central Intelligence Agency employee feel uncertain and insecure in his job with consequent harm to the quality and quantity of his output. This was particularly noticeable last Fall just before election when literally dozens of rumors were extant in Washington that one of the Committee members was to become Director of Central Intelligence as soon as the election was over.

"(4) As the best hope for continuity of service and the greatest assurance of independence of action a civilian should be Director of Central Intelligence. If a Service man is selected for the post he should resign from active military duty."

This is a question that has arisen time and time again. Perhaps the best discussion of this problem is that stated in the report of the Eberstadt Committee which is quoted, as follows:

"A moot question is whether the Director should be a civilian or a professional military man. The argument in favor of a service man is that he will command more confidence from the armed services who talk his language and will respect his position and security. With a military man, the present pay scale will not prove a deterrent. The job could be developed into one of the top staff assignments available to members of the three services.

"Against this, it is said that the position requires a broader background and greater versatility and diplomatic experience than is usually found in service personnel; that the best qualified and most competent officers would not accept the position if to do so meant permanent retirement and an end of the road to important command or operational responsibility. If a military man is assigned to the position as a tour of duty, he will, it is said, inevitably be influenced to some degree, in the execution of his duties, by his rank and status as compared with that of other officers with whom he deals. He may also be influenced by concern for his next billet.

"The principal argument against a civilian is the difficulty of getting a good one. It will be difficult to attract a man of force, reputation, integrity, and proven administrative ability who has an adequate knowledge of foreign history and politics and is familiar with intelligence technique and the working machinery of the Government and the military establishment. Not only is the pay low in comparison to industry and the professions, but the reward of success is anonymity. The wisdom of putting an individual who lacks intelligence experience in charge simply because he is a competent administrator is dubious. A civilian would have the advantage of being free from taint of service ambitions or rivalries. On the other hand a civilian may be more subject to political pressure than a military man. In certain foreign countries this has occurred. In any event a civilian would have to be a man of commanding reputation and personality in order to secure the respect and cooperation of the services. CIA's relations with the State Department would undoubtedly benefit from the presence of a civilian director, known and respected by the Secretary of State and his assistants.

"The intrinsic interest of the work, its potential influence on policy, and recognition of public service to be performed might combine to persuade a competent civilian to accept the position. If so, his appointment would seem desirable. A change in the statute that would disqualify a military man is not, however, recommended.

"Moreover it would not be wise, at this time at least, to amend the statute to include a mandatory requirement that a military man, appointed as Director, must retire from the service. A competent officer could be persuaded to retire from his service and abandon his career to become Director of CIA only if he felt some assurance of a reasonable tenure of office. That no such assurance exists today appears from the fact that three different Directors have been appointed since January of 1946. A provision requiring the retirement from service of any commissioned officer appointed Director might appropriately be included in the statute--if coupled with the provision for adequate retirement pay in case he is removed as Director."

[Here follow 9 pages commenting on Chapters XI and XII and charts showing the organization of the CIA.]

372. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to Secretary of State Acheson

Washington, March 3, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 50, Box 4207. Top Secret. Drafted by Armstrong. Cleared in C, A, S/P, EUR, NEA, ARA, and FE.

SUBJECT
Comments on the Dulles Committee Report and Recommended Action for the NSC

Discussion.

1. There are attached:

(a) A proposed action paper for the NSC on the Report (Tab A).

(b) The comments of the Department on the several recommendations of the Report (Tab B)./1/

/1/See the Supplement.

(c) A briefing of the Report and Summary (Tab C).

(d) The Dulles Committee Report (Tab D)./2/

/2/See Document 358.

2. The Department strongly endorses the Report and believes it desirable to propose to the NSC a positive course of action to carry out certain of the recommendations.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence expresses disagreement with important parts of the Report on grounds of undesirability, unworkability, etc.; he states that a number of the Report's recommendations have already been effected.

4. The Navy takes the position that the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) should be constituted as a "board of directors" over the Director, thus assuming more the status of a sub-committee of the NSC on intelligence matters, in contrast to its present function of a coordinating element in conjunction with, and advisory to, the Director. Its position is based on the theory that the Dulles Report tends to give the IAC responsibility without comparable authority. The Department believes that such a concept is in contravention of the National Security Act, which places the Director immediately under the NSC.

5. The NSC will almost certainly be confronted with a diversity of views on the implementation of the Report which it cannot itself take the time to reconcile. For the resolution of such differences, the Staff of the NSC would hardly be the most competent body in the face of the technical character of the subject. If an ad hoc sub-committee of the NSC is appointed to review the several comments and views of the agencies, it should not include the Director as a number of the conclusions and recommendations bear upon his position and person. The same consideration applies to a referral to the IAC, of which the Director is chairman.

Recommendations:

1. That the attached letter be sent to the NSC enclosing:

(a) A paper for the consideration and action of the Council, and

(b) The comments of the Department in accordance with the request of the Executive Secretary.

2. That in order to resolve the differences of views submitted to the NSC, you suggest that the Council constitute a representative each of the Secretaries of State and Defense and possibly a representative of the JCS as an ad hoc subcommittee to review the proposals of the Department in the light of the comments from the several agencies and to recommend further action to the Council.

Tab A/3/

/3/Top Secret.

FOR NSC CONSIDERATION

Problem:

To take the necessary action to implement the recommendations of the Dulles Report.

Analysis:

1. The Dulles Committee has performed an extremely useful serv-ice in producing, after diligent study and analysis, a comprehensive report on the Central Intelligence Agency, and the organization for national intelligence.

2. Certain of the conclusions and recommendations can and should be the subject of immediate implementation. Other recommendations will require further study and their implementation will take some time.

3. The all important conclusion reached by the Report is that if we are to have an effective Central Intelligence Agency continuity of tenure of the Director is essential and that to achieve this the Director of Central Intelligence should be a civilian. Although the ultimate objectives of the Report cannot be reached until such time as a properly qualified civilian assumes responsibilities as Director of Central Intelligence, immediate steps should be taken to implement as far as possible those recommendations of the Report as can be effected promptly.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

1. That the Executive Secretary be directed to commend, in the name of the Security Council, the members of the Dulles Committee and its staff for the extremely able and objective study and report, on which the Security Council is taking immediate action.

2. That the President give consideration to the early selection of a highly qualified civilian as Director of Central Intelligence.

3. That the Director of Central Intelligence be instructed to take the necessary steps immediately to effect changes in accordance with the following recommendations of the Dulles Committee Report, and to report on a monthly basis to the Council, with the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) the progress made:

(Note: The recommendations of the Dulles Committee are summarized by chapters for identification only, and in no sense as an interpretation.)

Chapter III--Organization and Administration of CIA:

(3) The Director should refer to NSC questions of compliance with requests for disclosure of information.

(4) CIA should accent role as coordinator rather than as organization for secret activities.

Chapter IV--Responsibility of CIA for Coordination:

(5) The IAC is soundly conceived, but should participate more actively with the Director in continuing coordination of intelligence activities.

(7) The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff should be reconstituted as a staff responsible only to the Director with task of developing plans for coordination.

(8) Responsibilities of Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) re collection and dissemination should be carried out under a new Coordination Division.

Chapter V--Responsibility of CIA for National Intelligence Estimates:

(3) There should be a small Estimates Division in CIA to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates (draw upon specialized intelligence product of the agencies).

(4) Under the Director these estimates should be discussed and approved by the IAC, whose members should be collectively responsible.

(5) Provision should be made to handle crisis situations.

Chapter VI--Services of Common Concern, Intelligence Research and Reports:

(1) A Research and Reports Division in ORE should accomplish research in and coordinate production of intelligence in fields of common interest. Staff should include representatives from State and the Services.

(2) The Coordinating Division (reconstituted Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff) should be responsible for studying the scope of the Research and Reports Division and for recommending the services of common concern which should be performed centrally.

(4) Various reports, studies and summaries which are not national intelligence or recognized services of common concern should be discontinued.

Chapter VII--Services of Common Concern, Overt Intelligence:

(3) The Director and IAC should take steps for more active coordination of efforts to exploit intelligence from foreign nationality groups and individuals in U.S.

(4) The Foreign Documents Branch should be made part of proposed Research and Reports Division.

(5) If retained in the CIA, the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch should be administered by the new Operations Division, but its product should be available for analysis in the new Research and Reports Division.

Chapter VIII--Services of Common Concern, Secret Intelligence:

(1) Covert operations of the Office of Special Operations (OSO), the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) and the activities of the Contacts Branch of the Office of Operations (OO) should be integrated under the single direction of an Operations Division.

(3) CIA should seek methods for better coordination in handling defectors [from] intelligence agencies abroad and in the continental U.S.

(5) Cover policies of OSO in field should be reviewed and tightened. Consideration should be given to increasing use of non-official cover as demands for diplomatic or military cover are reduced.

(6) Counter-espionage of OSO should be increased and closer liaisons established with the FBI.

(7) Relations between departmental agencies should be brought closer and the guidance which OSO receives from the intelligence consumers should be strengthened.

(8) The Director should assure that OSO is receiving adequate information on current and strategic intelligence needs of the Government. Closer relations might be established with the Secretaries of State and Defense.

Chapter IX--Services of Common Concern, Secret Operations:

(2) OPC should be integrated with OSO and Contacts Branch of the CIA, all under single direction of an Operations Division.

4. That in accordance with Chapter IV, Recommendation 6, the FBI be added to the IAC, but that the AEC and JIG be retained on the IAC, which revisions appear acceptable to the other IAC members.

5. That the Director of Central Intelligence be directed to begin the necessary steps and to plan for the implementation of the following other recommendations of the Dulles Report which will require a longer time to accomplish and to report monthly to the NSC, with the IAC, on progress:

Chapter III--Organization and Administration of CIA:

(5) Large percentage of military personnel in CIA key positions discourages competent civilian personnel from looking to employment in CIA as a career.

Chapter VIII--Services of Common Concern, Secret Intelligence:

(4) OSO (or new OP Div) should give primary attention to building a corps of trained personnel for operations abroad.

6. That the Director of Central Intelligence be directed to review, in conjunction with the IAC, such recommendations and conclusions other than those listed above, with a view to implementation where desirable, and to recommend further action to the Security Council when appropriate.

Tab C/4/

/4/Top Secret.

Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to Secretary of State Acheson

Washington, February 9, 1949.

SUBJECT
Report of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee to the National Security Council entitled "The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence"

Discussion:

1. The Report was made by a committee comprised of Allen Dulles, William H. Jackson, and Mathias F. Correa, on the authority of the National Security Council (NSC) dated February 13, 1949. It consists of 163 pages, with a concise summary of 13 pages at the beginning. The State Department figures in the Report throughout, essentially in its relations on intelligence matters with CIA, the military services, and the intelligence functions of the Department itself. A very condensed summary/5/ of the Report is attached hereto.

/5/See the Supplement.

2. The NSC Secretariat has asked for the comments of each agency, including the CIA.

3. The exhaustive character of the Report, including sections on certain very sensitive activities, presents a security problem in distribution even beyond its Top Secret classification, necessitating a handling on the basis of "need to know," rather than simply "Top Secret clearance."

4. Particular attention is drawn to the following sections which have a direct bearing on the Department, aside from the specific organization of intelligence:

The Intelligence Problem (Chapter I)

The Relation of Coordinated National Intelligence to Policy Formulation and to the NSC (pp. 55, 68, 69, 72, 73, 79)

Current Intelligence Summaries (p. 84)

Domestic (FBI) vs. Foreign Intelligence (pp. 56-58; 98, 99)

Department and Secret Intelligence, particularly field representation (pp. 117-119; 122-124; 127)

Department and Secret Operations (p. 131)

5. It is of particular importance to realize the budgetary significance of the CIA and therefore its position in the governmental organization. At a rough estimate, the total budget for all government foreign intelligence is approximately $82,500,000. Of this, the State Department budget is approximately 2-1/2 million, the CIA, including Secret Operations (OPC), 50 million, and the other services combined, 30 million. This budgetary predominance, when viewed in the light of the central and coordinating position which the CIA holds in the intelligence field, indicates the overwhelming significance of any determination of CIA function and operation.

6. Since the Report is rather strongly condemnatory of the direction of CIA and of the CIA's present effectiveness, it raises an embarrassing problem for the Director of CIA in making appropriate comments upon it. It may be anticipated, however, that the reaction to the Report by the Director of CIA will, on the whole, be belittling of its significance. He has already indicated the view that the Report is (a) academic, (b) non-professional, in the sense that it was written by a staff not expert in intelligence matters, and (c) inconsequential, because its recommendations are only slightly at variance with present conditions and organization.

7. The Department, on the other hand, would strongly concur in the Report and most of the recommendations therein. The Department believes the Report to be penetrating and objective, the result of exhaustive study by the Committee and its staff members, all of whom in one way or another have excellent background both in intelligence matters and governmental organization. The Department furthermore believes that the recommendations represent a drastic change in the concept and organization of Central Intelligence and are by no means inconsequential. Finally, the Department believes that the Report may well serve as a strong incentive toward effecting sorely-needed changes in CIA and its relations with the other agencies, and particularly the Department.

8. The attitude of other agencies--specifically the military serv-ices--toward the report is as yet unknown, but it can be anticipated that they will endorse the report in general, and possibly most of its recommendations, although with less interest and force than the Department.

Recommendations:

1. That, on the basis of "need to know," this report be circulated, at the outset, only to the following (aside from the Secretary and Under Secretary):

S/S--Messrs. Humelsine, McWilliams, Barnes
S/P--Messrs. Kennan, Davies, Joyce
A--Messrs. Peurifoy and Hulten
EUR--Messrs. Hickerson and Thompson
FE--Messrs. Butterworth and Allison
NEA--Messrs. Satterthwaite and Hare
ARA--Messrs. Daniels and Woodward

2. That R prepare, in collaboration with S/P and with the concurrence of the appropriate offices of the Department, a paper for the Secretary to submit to the NSC, which will include

(a) The Department's comments in accordance with the request of the NSC Secretary

(b) An action paper for the consideration of NSC, recommending directives for immediate implementation of certain recommendations in the Report, and eventual implementation of others.

373. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Humelsine) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

Washington, March 8, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Box 1555. No classification marking.

Mr. Webb:

I had a good conversation with Frank Wisner about the possibility of Mr. Gordon Gray being made head of the CIA. In the course of this conversation I went into the question of whether Mr. Wisner would like to have this assignment. Wisner indicated that he was well satisfied to stay where he was, if he could look forward to having a person of the caliber of Gray as head of the organization. He said that Gray would be perfect in his estimation for the assignment and that he was certain that under such a set-up CIA could really become an effective instrumentality.

In querying him further as to how well he knew Gordon Gray he said he knew him quite well and that he would recommend as people we could check with to get recommendations for Gray the following:

Mr. John Graham, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Mr. Thurmond Chatham, Congressman from North Carolina
Mr. William Jackson, member of the Jackson-Dulles-Correa group

I talked to Mr. Lovett on the telephone to get his reaction to Mr. Gordon Gray. Mr. Lovett said "I know Gray and my hunch is that he would do a good job". Mr. Lovett said that he has had a chance to look into the CIA since leaving the Department as Under Secretary./1/ He said, in fact, it was the first real opportunity that he had had to consider this problem. He said he had talked to Bill Jackson and to Allen Dulles, separately, and he certainly concurred in their view that, unless something drastic was done with the CIA, Mr. Truman was in a position to be "let down worse that any President ever was" in this particular field.

/1/Lovett resigned as Under Secretary on January 20, 1949.

Mr. Lovett said that this required "damn fast action" and that the area should "be tidied up" as soon as possible. He said under the present circumstances anything could happen.

Mr. Lovett went on to say that he had better intelligence information in many respects available to him in New York through the Bank than he had while Under Secretary. He said that in his estimation Admiral Hillenkoetter was a very ineffective and pedestrian officer. He said this comment applied to the Admiral only in his present assignment and he had no opinion or idea as to his worth as a Naval officer.

Mr. Lovett went on to say that Frank Wisner was first class and that Gray and Wisner should make an excellent team. He did say that in his opinion careful consideration should be given as to whether or not Colonel Carter Clark should not be used in some capacity in the CIA. He said he knows of Clark's weaknesses but that in his opinion his strength far exceeds any weaknesses. He said to tell Mr. Webb that he had been considering this matter and was about to call him on it when he got the call from me.

I think it is significant that throughout my conversation with Mr. Lovett he used the word "lousy" to characterize the CIA operation.

CH

374. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Butler) to the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong)

Washington, March 17, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC Intelligence Directives, Box 2517. Secret.

It was suggested at a recent meeting of the Under Secretary's staff that suggestions be submitted to you regarding what the Department wants and needs from CIA. The following points are of interest to S/P:

1. Continued close liaison between OPC and S/P, in order that the former may receive policy guidance from the Department.

2. S/P needs and wants secret intelligence from all sources just as soon as it becomes available to CIA.

3. Better clearance with State before the publication of CIA estimates of situations. Clearance of summaries of information and similar CIA reports is not of great concern to S/P, but it is considered important that State have an opportunity to express its views regarding interpretations of or judgments about information obtained by CIA.

George H. Butler/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

375. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

Washington, March 18, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 50, Box 4207. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
NSC Consideration of the Dulles Report; selection of special issues for consideration

1. Pursuant to one of the two instructions which you gave Carl Humelsine and myself at the conclusion of our conversation of last Thursday, March 17, I have had a further discussion with Carl and I am submitting to you in this memorandum a number of issues which Carl and I have agreed would be appropriate for presentation and disposition at an early meeting of the National Security Council. I understand that you may want to call a special meeting for this purpose and that you might deem it advisable to discuss these issues with Mr. Souers in advance of the meeting.

2. In the selection of these issues an effort has been made to avoid recommendations in the Dulles report which are both controversial and difficult to comprehend. Emphasis has been placed upon broad issues which are important and at the same time capable of being understood and decided upon without the necessity of extensive briefing or examination into the intricate workings of the Central Intelligence Agency. For your own information, I have included brief parenthetical explanations following the statement of each issue. By all odds the most important of the issues selected is that concerning the character of the Director and if this one could be decided and acted upon with reasonable expedition, all other aspects of the matter will fall into their proper places. I have not placed it at the head of the list for tactical reasons which I believe will be apparent to you.

3. I understand that in bringing these issues to the National Security Council, you and Mr. Souers may use the approach that the Dulles report raises so many detailed points that a full discussion of it by the National Security Council would be a very lengthy and tedious proceeding; and that in order to get underway with this very important matter, you have attempted to single out certain aspects of the report which you consider to be susceptible of relatively easy resolution.

4. The following are the recommended issues:

(a) That the Central Intelligence Agency is properly placed in the governmental structure under the National Security Council. (This may appear self-evident but as it is one of the leading recommendations of the Dulles report, it would appear worthy of confirmation and reaffirmation in connection with any general consideration of the report.)

(b) That the Intelligence Advisory Council is soundly conceived and that its present advisory relationship to the Director of Central Intelligence is correct, but that the IAC should participate more actively with the Director of Central Intelligence in the continuing coordination of intelligence activities. (It would lead to the complete frustration of the centralizing and coordinating functions of the Director of Central Intelligence if he were to be made subordinate to the IAC. This in turn would defeat the purposes of the legislation which created the CIA. The IAC is comprised of the service intelligence chiefs and human nature and bureaucracy being what they are--and this is most applicable in the field of intelligence--it would not be long before the CIA would be largely defunctionalized and rendered both impotent and insignificant.)

(c) That in order to improve coordination in the overall intelligence and security field, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be made a member of the IAC. (It is impossible to draw a clear and satisfactory dividing line between foreign and domestic intelligence activities for the reason that there is an inevitable interplay and interaction between developments within the United States and developments overseas. In order to insure an overall coordinated effort and to reduce the possibilities of confusion, duplication of function and friction, it would be highly desirable for the Director of the FBI to become a member of the IAC. As matters now stand the foreign and domestic intelligence activities are dealing with each other at arm's length and there is no satisfactory forum for the resolution of arguments and conflicts.)

(d) That in order to assist the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out his statutory duty in protecting intelligence sources and methods, he should, in cases where the disclosure of secret information is sought from him (for example by a member of the Congress) and he has doubt as to whether he should comply, refer the question to the National Security Council for a determination as to whether or not disclosure is in the public interest. (It would be a most helpful protection to the Director for the NSC, with all its authority and prestige, to act as a buffer between him and persons making demands for the disclosure of secret information. It would also aid him to have the benefit of the collective judgment of the NSC in questions of this character. Finally, it would provide necessary insurance against a duplication of the Bogota fiasco which ended up in a name-calling performance as between the Director for Central Intelligence and the State Department--Mr. Humelsine can supply the particulars.)

(e) That the Central Intelligence Agency be empowered and encouraged to establish through its Director a closer liaison with the two members of the NSC upon whom it chiefly depends, namely the Secretaries of State and Defense. (This might not seem necessary but it is believed to be advisable in view of the tendency which the CIA has developed toward establishing itself as an independent free-wheeling organization. Note in this connection the recent cable from Minister Jacobs in Praha complaining of an almost total lack of cooperation or mutual confidence as between himself and the CIA representative there. This same story has been told repeatedly by the chiefs of our missions throughout the world. This is evidence of unsound indoctrination of the OSO representatives. Distinctions can be drawn between operational matters which should be kept secret and policy matters which are primarily the concern of the State Department chiefs of mission.)

(f) That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be a civilian and that the President should be invited to give his early consideration to a person of considerable stature and prominence, possessing the requisite qualifications of experience and willingness to serve. (As stated above this is the crucial issue, for upon the determination of this depends the question whether the United States is or is not to have a sound and useful intelligence agency. Virtually every individual who has had occasion to deal with or look into the activities of the CIA has recognized that the system of rotating the Director and top staff personnel at frequent intervals has disastrous consequences, and that the status and reputation of the CIA can best and most quickly be revived by the appointment to the top position of a civilian director of outstanding qualifications. The appointment of such an individual would bring to the entire organization the leadership and inspiration which it so badly needs, and only in this manner can the organization be elevated from its state of low repute among the government agencies with which it must work closely in order to be successful. Continuity of direction is essential for the CIA not only for the reasons which make it desirable in any governmental department but because secret intelligence and secret operations are the most highly specialized undertakings and it is very harmful to be constantly educating a series of rapidly moving heads and their immediate staffs--especially when many of them regard their CIA assignment simply as an unwelcome stopgap to fill in between more desirable Army, Navy and Air Force commands.

With a military director, progress in the direction of real coordination of the national intelligence effort will be painfully slow. It is submitted that any military man, with his ingrained sense of awe in the presence of superior rank and his absolute dependence upon the good will of the top military hierarchy for his own future advancement, must be expected to make all of the "necessary compromises".

If this principle is bypassed or compromised, all the rest of the effort to straighten out and improve the CIA becomes relatively meaningless. It is believed that the President would not be unfavorably disposed toward the appointment of a permanent civilian director if a means for accomplishing the changeover can be devised which would not have the appearance of a "vote of no confidence" in the existing management. The issue of a civilian as against a military director provides this means.

FGW

376. Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 36th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, March 22, 1949.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File. Top Secret. Prepared on March 23.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1-4, internal security, U.S. position with respect to Korea, U.S. objectives with respect to Greece and Turkey to counter Soviet threats to U.S. security, and airfield construction.]

5. The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 24, March 2, and March 8, 1949)/1/

/1/The January 24 and March 8 memoranda were not found. Regarding the March 2 memorandum, see the source note, Document 371.

Mr. Souers reported that there was such a volume of comments on the Survey Group Report that he felt a meeting should be held shortly devoted solely to this subject. He suggested that the Council might care to appoint a committee of three, including representatives of the National Military Establishment and the Department of State to point up the issues for Council action.

Secretary Acheson said he had found the basic report difficult to read and, in addition, had comments by his staff almost twice as long as the report. He wondered if the Council could have the analysis of the issues before a meeting.

Mr. Souers said there would be great suspicion of such an analysis, but he felt that the papers included a lot of administrative matters which the Council need not concern itself with. He felt the Council might approve certain concepts and even set up a mechanism to watch over the execution of these concepts. One such issue was the question of a civilian director.

Mr. Acheson inquired if the NSC Staff could not prepare the analysis.

Mr. Souers replied that the Staff would tie back to the representative intelligence chiefs once again, whereas what was needed was a fresh appraisal by two or three good neutral men backed up by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in order to avoid departmental partisan feeling.

Secretary Forrestal commented that the Department of Justice would probably add some acid remarks.

Mr. Lay said that the Hoover Commission Reports had made recommendations in intelligence matters, and, in effect, these were also before the Council for consideration in connection with the present study.

Mr. Souers remarked that there had been some informal indication that State might undertake such an analysis of the issues.

Secretary Acheson agreed that the Department of State, with the assistance of the Executive Secretary, could prepare an analysis purporting to be its judgment of the main concepts. This could then be used more or less as an agenda for a debate on the issues.

Mr. Lay added that there was also a need for a statement of recommended Council actions.

Secretary Acheson suggested that the Council consider two meetings on the subject: the first to discuss the problems, and the second to sharpen the issues to decisions.

He added that his Hoover Commission experience had shown that it was profitable to spend three-fourths of the time on an examination of the problem, after which the solution would arise in the remaining quarter.

The National Security Council:/2/

/2/The paragraph and note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 198. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)

Agreed that the Department of State should prepare, for Council consideration at an early meeting, a statement of the issues involved in the reference papers on this subject./3/

/3/See Document 378. For NSC consideration, see Document 380.

Note: The above action subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 6 and 7, review of the world situation and NSC status of projects.]

377. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman)

Washington, March 24, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776. Restricted.

Charlie:

After reviewing your draft memorandum/1/ on the State-JCS relationship, I would like to suggest for your consideration the inclusion of the question of intelligence relations between the Department and the JCS as one facet of the general problem that is distinctly susceptible of improvement. If you agree, a section might be included under Discussion along the following lines, perhaps to be inserted between your Sections 9 and 10:

/1/Dated March 16. (Ibid.)

Intelligence Relations

During the war and for some time thereafter the Department maintained formal membership upon the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Intelligence Staff, JCS. In 1947, following the enactment of the National Security Act and the establishment of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency and the reorganization of the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department relinquished its representation in the intelligence echelons of the JCS, although it has maintained informal liaison with the Joint Intelligence Group (successor to the Joint Intelligence Staff). In theory, the expression of the Department's intelligence viewpoint is made to the JCS through the Central Intelligence Agency and, conversely, the intelligence requirements of the JCS are supposed to be conveyed to the Department through that Agency. The experience of the past 18 months, however, has proven this arrangement to be unsatisfactory and impracticable.

It is not believed necessary that the Department be specifically and formally represented upon the Joint Intelligence Committee, since its intelligence relations with the military intelligence services can be satisfactorily accommodated in the Intelligence Advisory Committee (established under the National Security Council to advise the Director of Central Intelligence), but it is believed desirable that a direct channel be re-established between the Department and the Joint Intelligence Group. Such a channel would permit the continuous conveyance of Departmental intelligence of interest to the military to its joint intelligence units and the expression of the joint requirements of the military for politico-economic intelligence.

If you agree that the foregoing should properly be included in your memorandum, it would probably follow that a brief recommendation also be included to cover the re-establishment of direct and official liaison relations between the intelligence area of the Department and the Joint Intelligence Group, JCS.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

378. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

Washington, April 4, 1949.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files. Top Secret. Souers circulated Webb's memorandum to Council members on the same day. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

Pursuant to NSC Action No. 198 and your memorandum dated March 23, 1949, the Department of State considers that the following are the basic issues raised by the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report:

1. That the Central Intelligence Agency is properly placed in the governmental structure under the National Security Council.

2. That the Intelligence Advisory Committee is soundly conceived and that its present advisory relationship to the Director of Central Intelligence is correct, but that the IAC should participate more actively with the Director of Central Intelligence in the continuing coordination of intelligence activities and in the production of finished estimates.

a. With respect to coordination of intelligence activities, the allocation of responsibilities among the agencies should be carried out under the forthright leadership of CIA.

b. With respect to the production of estimates for the President and the National Security Council, CIA should utilize the facilities of the IAC members who should assume collective responsibility for them.

3. That in order to improve coordination in the overall intelligence and security field, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be made a member of the IAC.

4. That secret operations should be integrated with secret intelligence and domestic exploitation of foreign intelligence in a single self-administered office within CIA, rather than being a separate office directly under the Director of Central Intelligence independent of but coordinated with other components of CIA.

5. That the Director of Central Intelligence should be a civilian and that the President should be invited to give his early consideration to a person of considerable stature and prominence, possessing the requisite qualifications of experience and willingness to serve.

James E. Webb/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Webb signed the original.

379. Memorandum From the Chief of the Intelligence Coordinating and Planning Staff (Childs) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, April 6, 1949.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. No classification marking.

1. With reference to the Under Secretary of State's memo/1/ to Mr. Souers, dated April 4, about the basic issues raised by the Dulles Report, I hope you will have a chance to express your opinion at the NSC meeting tomorrow and that you will be able to say--with reference to Paragraph 2 it is fine to have the Intelligence Advisory Committee "participate more actively", but as you will recall, there have been very few, if any, positive results reached at the meetings of this Committee, who prefer to have staff work done before and/or after any subject is brought up (and they usually disavow or do not agree with the result of such staff work!!). Certainly, such meetings could never, around that table, "produce finished estimates". Their "facilities" now do participate in the production of estimates by staff meetings at working levels, etc., and by concurrences, etc., but according to Admiral Inglis this is assuming no collective responsibility for these estimates. I think that "collective responsibility" phrase is misleading. The DCI and CIA have the responsibility for coordinating, etc., but the various intelligence agencies may well assume responsibility for their portions of the whole. If they would stick to their dominant interests, we would like it better.

/1/Document 378.

2. We hope any decision by the NSC on these "basic issues" will be very carefully and precisely worded (not generalities) as each IAC Agency will interpret it in its own light and in accordance with its established wishes if it can possibly do so. To clear up the ambiguities, definite instructions will have to come down from the top to the Intelligence Agencies. For example, we assume under CIA's "forthright leadership" mentioned in Paragraph 2a, we can prepare original drafts or indicate what we are going to do and tell the boys to follow on, i.e., take it or leave it just as much as though that paragraph said under the "direction" of CIA. Our own eager beavers will certainly interpret it that way.

PC

Continue with Document 380