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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Hillenkoetter's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence

                           

380. Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 37th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, April 7, 1949.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File. Top Secret. Prepared on April 8.

The following notes contain a summary of the discussion at the 37th meeting of the National Security Council.

Mr. Webb called the meeting to order and remarked that the President had asked him to preside in the absence of the Secretary of State.

1. The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 24, March 2, March 8, and April 4, 1949, respectively)/1/

/1/Regarding the memoranda dated January 24, March 2, and March 8, see footnote 1, Document 376; regarding the April 4 memorandum, see the source note, Document 378.

Mr. Webb suggested, and the Council agreed, that Admiral Hillenkoetter should remain during the discussion of the first four points in the Department of State's memorandum,/2/ but that he should retire during the discussion of point five, with respect to whether the Director of Central Intelligence should be a civilian, after making a statement with respect thereto.

/2/Document 378.

Mr. Souers reviewed the action of the Council at its last meeting, when it was agreed that the Department of State should prepare a statement of the issues involved in the reference papers.

Mr. Webb then proposed that the Council consider whether each of the issues was properly stated, and turn to point one, that CIA is properly placed in the Government under the NSC.

Secretary Johnson referred to the comment in the Dulles Report, that CIA might be just another intelligence agency, and asked if it was intended that the Report be released to the public.

Mr. Souers said that the Report contained considerable highly classified information and that he knew of no intent to release it.

Secretary Johnson then said that he agreed with the statement of the first issue.

Since there was no other comment on that issue, Mr. Webb turned to point two, with respect to the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

Secretary Johnson said he did not agree with the statement of this issue and that he reserved the right to be heard. Although he did not concur now, he said he might later, and that he had the backing of the President to reserve his opinion until he had an opportunity to formulate his views. He mentioned that he wished to consider the problem in relation to the broad question of peace or war. In response to Mr. Webb's suggestion that only an agreement as to the statement of the problem was involved, Secretary Johnson replied that he wished no implications to flow from his remarks and that he did not wish to be stampeded into taking a position.

Mr. Ford said the Attorney General had some doubts about this point, too.

Mr. Webb then suggested, and the Council agreed, to defer consideration of the second issue until Secretary Johnson had formulated his views. He then turned to point three with respect to the proposal that the Director of the FBI be made a member of the IAC.

Mr. Ford remarked that the Attorney General had not been consulted in the drafting of the Dulles Report, and said he would speak briefly on the issue and then file a memorandum by the Department of Justice on the whole Report. He accepted, however, the statement of the issue.

Since there was no other comment, Mr. Webb then turned to point four, with respect to the integration of secret operations with secret intelligence. He suggested that perhaps the Secretaries of State and Defense, in seeking an answer to this issue, should follow closely the secret operations work and consult with the Director of Central Intelligence.

The Council accepted the statement of the fourth issue, and Mr. Webb turned to point five, with respect to the recommendation that the Director of Central Intelligence be a civilian. Mr. Webb remarked that the Department of State was inclined to feel that a civilian Director was preferable, but did not wish to tie the hands of the President in getting the best person available, civilian or military. He suggested that we might have a civilian Deputy Director if the Director was a military man. He then asked Admiral Hillenkoetter to comment on this issue.

Admiral Hillenkoetter said he felt that the whole question was unnecessary and that the question of a uniform should not enter into the selection of a Director. Only the man himself and his qualifications should be considered, he said. If he had any leaning, he said, it would be for a military officer. [5 lines of source text not declassified] CIA, he said, is primarily a military operation intended to foretell possible attacks on our national security and to provide information to beat our enemies in the event of war. If peace could be assured by the United Nations or other means, then there would be no need at all for a CIA. He concluded that the Director should be chosen solely as the man to do the job. He agreed, however, that the issue was correctly stated.

(Admiral Hillenkoetter retired at this point.)

Secretary Johnson said he was not sure that the issue was correctly stated, because it did not take into account the added issue as to whether the Director of Central Intelligence was to be the permanent chairman of the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board.

Mr. Webb inquired, if the Director were to be chairman of the USCIB, whether he would have to be a military officer.

Secretary Johnson said that would pre-judge the issue. He added that the Dulles Report recommended that the Director be permanent chairman of the USCIB and suggested that Mr. Souers prepare and circulate a restatement of this issue for consideration by the Council.

Mr. Souers referred to the growing stack of papers that had accumulated on the whole subject and the difficulty of the Council in dealing with any one or all of the issues which had been raised. Accordingly, he suggested that the Council refer all these papers to the Secretaries of State and Defense, as the most interested parties. They, in turn, might designate officers to sift through all the material and prepare specific recommendations in appropriate form for Council action./3/

/3/The State-Defense recommendations are in NSC 50, July 1; Document 384.

Secretary Johnson thought this was a good suggestion and said he would designate General McNarney to do the job.

Mr. Souers also suggested that State and Defense consult with Treasury and Justice in preparing recommended actions for the Council.

Secretary Johnson said he felt that Justice had a general stake in the whole intelligence problem.

The National Security Council:/4/

/4/The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 202. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)

Considered the reference papers on the subject and referred them to the Secretaries of State and Defense to prepare, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General and in the light of the discussion at this meeting, specific recommendations for Council action.

Note: The above action subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense.

[Here follows agenda item 2, NSC status of projects.]

381. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)

Washington, April 15, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 50, Box 4207. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT
Material for use in connection with proposed conversations with General McNarney, et al.

1. Pursuant to your oral request of last evening, I am submitting to you herewith a number of points which I believe could be employed to great advantage in your forthcoming conversations with General McNarney./1/ These points all relate to the central issue which is involved in this matter. This issue is a fairly delicate one, not merely because of the anticipated opposition, but also because of the disposition on the part of the service people to feel that there is an implied criticism of the competence of the services as a whole in the suggestion that there should be a civilian director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The following points have been drafted in the light of these "angles".

/1/No record of these conversations has been found. McNarney was an adviser to the Secretary of Defense who subsequently prepared the comments and recommendations on the Dulles Report embodied in NSC 50, Document 384.

2. In the first place, I should like to call your attention again to the arguments set forth in subparagraph (f) of paragraph 4 of my memorandum/2/ to Mr. Webb dated 18 March. Although I agree with you that not all of these statements are appropriate for use in connection with your proposed conversation with General McNarney, there are, nevertheless, some points here which are very important and which could and should be used. For example, I think that you should point out the fact that virtually every individual who has had occasion to deal with or to look into the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency has recognized that the system of rotating the director and the top staff personnel at frequent intervals has had disastrous consequences. This is the argument about continuity. I am convinced that continuity of direction is essential for the Central Intelligence Agency "not only for the reasons which make it desirable in any governmental department but also because secret intelligence and secret operations are the most highly specialized undertakings, and it is very harmful to be constantly educating a series of new chiefs and their immediate staffs". It should take a new chief up to at least a year to begin to understand the very technical and complicated ramification of this business and to learn about the personalities throughout his own service and also in the foreign intelligence services sufficiently well to be able to deal with them intelligently and incisively. The service system of rotation renders it inevitable that just about the time a man becomes proficient at this new complex job, he can expect to be relieved. Apart from the question of secret operations (OPC), the significance and character of a sound secret intelligence operation is a very slow and long range affair. In order to accomplish really valuable penetrations, it is sometimes necessary to allow the operatives to lie completely dormant for a period of years, gradually working their way into the confidence of their chiefs. Such operations are not apt to have much of an appeal to people who will only be with the outfit for a short period of time, for they will regard themselves as only sowing the seeds for a harvest to be reaped by a successor. The tendency, as already demonstrated, is to achieve quick and spectacular results in order that the incumbent may have something to show for what he has done while in office. Along with this comes the very strong tug to allow or even stimulate publicity. The recent series of articles and news items which have appeared in a number of magazines and newspapers can no doubt be traced to this, at least in part. The absolute requirement of this particular profession is a "passion for anonymity".

/2/Document 375.

3. A related security argument is that the chief of the CIA must necessarily come to know all of the most significant secrets of the organization, and upon his departure it is inevitable that he will take many of these with him and outside the organization. It is generally impossible to predict what his next duty will be but it may well turn out to be such as to place him in an exposed position. He might become a military attache in a sensitive area or be placed in command of a battleship or division in some forward area with the incident risk of capture. He would obviously be a prize target for capture and it would be foolish to suppose that the enemy would not make a concerted effort to pick him off and to squeeze out of him all possible information which he might have.

4. The next argument proceeds from the regrettable but very definite fact that the services generally have never in the past and do not now acknowledge that intelligence is a function which requires (a) specialization, (b) continuity, or (c) particular recognition. (There are, of course, many in all the services who disagree with this standardized point of view--such as Generals Gruenther and Wedemeyer--but even they acknowledge the existence of this condition.) It is the natural consequence of this general approach toward intelligence within the services that the best service people shun an intelligence service assignment like the plague--and are even less prone to accept an outside intelligence assignment than one within the services, such as G-2, ONI and A-2. Al Gruenther has told me that unless and until recognition in terms of both rank and influence is given to the function of intelligence in far greater measure than is now the case, it is unreasonable to expect and unfair to ask the people with bright futures in the services to go into it. [I think that this is a particularly good line of argument to use with General McNarney, and even more so with Mr. Johnson, because Mr. Johnson has already recently taken issue on this precise point with the various service representatives with whom General McNarney is discussing this matter. When these persons told him that they did not think much of the argument of continuity, he replied, with Johnsonian firmness and some heat, that intelligence is a highly specialized business which requires experience to learn. Obviously this bracketed material is for your own information and guidance, since it would be unwise to reveal our knowledge of the argument which took place in the other camp.]/3/ You should also be careful to make it clear that the arguments in favor of a civilian chief do not mean that the State Department does not fully recognize and heartily subscribe to the importance and necessity of the fullest service participation in the CIA enterprise. The argument has been used and will be used again and again by the military that the CIA is a joint venture and that even under present circumstances the percentage of military personnel on duty with CIA is very small (2 or 3% of the total). I would suggest a response that the number of military personnel should be much increased--and that is certainly the line which I am taking in my activity. This is the best way that I can think of to dispose of this very specious argument.

/3/Brackets in the source text.

5. There is also the argument which you yourself suggested concerning the fact that no representative of one of the services could adequately and fairly reflect the point of view of the other two services. I shall not develop on this argument because it is already well known to you. However, I should like to point out that there may be some loopholes in this general argument which should be well plugged in advance of use. For example, it is conceivable that the service reply to this argument might be that the directorship should consist of a director with two deputies and a periodic rotation as between the services for these three spots. This is admittedly a weak counter to your argument because it overlooks entirely the essentiality of continuity--but it might nevertheless be used by persons who are no respecters of continuity.

6. Here is a tricky one which I am a bit uncertain about myself and which I would not suggest at all but for the fact that General McNarney is the person with whom you will be dealing. I am reliably and I believe accurately informed that notwithstanding the dressing down which General McNarney received at the hands of General Marshall in connection with McNarney's UN responsibilities, he is very beholden to General Marshall for his rapid advancement in rank during the war, for his elevation to the position of Mediterranean Theater Commander and for many other things. Moreover, he well knows General Marshall's great abilities of mind and is believed to hold his judgment in some degree of veneration. General Marshall has constantly been concerned, and he reiterated this concern to me only yesterday, about the damage to the services which can result from the popular distrust of too much brass in too many high places in the government. This is the "military mind" line which has been so heavily played by certain columnists and editorial writers and General Marshall's views on this can best be summarized as a conviction that it is best for the country and best for the services themselves for the military--and most particularly those still on active duty--to stick to their last and not allow themselves to become too deeply and personally involved in other governmental affairs. I say that this is a tricky argument because it is difficult for a non-service person to make it to a service person--and accordingly, I leave it to your own best judgment as to whether and if so how to employ it.

7. In conclusion, I should like to take the liberty of suggesting to you that the happy issue out of these present afflictions can be a matter of great importance to yourself in the new position to which you are going. You are no doubt aware of the fact that the Western Union and Atlantic Pact setups and apparati in France will include as a very significant part thereof a mechanism for the coordination of clandestine efforts on both the secret intelligence and secret operations sides. If at Paris you should find yourself in a position of having to deal with unenlightened and unsympathetic individuals on the American side in the intelligence side of the show, it will render your overall job much more difficult. As a concrete illustration of what I mean, the present chief of this service had already designated General Pinkie Wright as the top CIA representative upon the Western Union Clandestine Committee, and this would have become effective but for the fact that General Wright was "rotated" to some relatively minor duty in Japan. If you are not personally acquainted with Pinkie and desire further information about him, I suggest that you speak to George Kennan or John Davies. In a word, however, he is the Regular Army top-sergeant type, the smallness of whose knowledge and comprehension of foreign affairs and foreign personalities is matched only by his certainty that he knows these and all the other answers.

FGW

382. Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 38th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, April 20, 1949.

//Source: Harry S. Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File. Top Secret. Prepared on April 21.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1 and 2, construction of airfields and stockpiling of aviation gasoline in Turkey and Japanese reparations.]

3. Value to the President of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency

The President said that the National Security Council was one of the best devices available to him in helping him to make decisions on the basis of coordinated papers. Before the establishment of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, there was a great vacuum in obtaining coordinated advice and information on which to base decisions. Without the National Security Council the President would have to confer individually with everyone at the meeting on the questions which had just been discussed. He said he was anxious to see the National Security Council continue to operate as it had been operating. He added that when he assumed office during the war there had been no coordinated intelligence either; he received reports from various agencies and had to try to coordinate these reports himself. The coordination was now accomplished by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Secretary Johnson said he had noted a good illustration of such coordination this morning in connection with the problem of national organization for intelligence. General McNarney had told him that the differences of views on this matter would be reconciled before the question came before the Council again.

The National Security Council:/1/

/1/The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 207. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)

Noted the oral remarks by the President that the reports of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency have proved to be one of the best means available to the President for obtaining coordinated advice as a basis for reaching decisions.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 4 and 5, review of the world situation and NSC status of projects.]

383. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Johnson to the Secretaries of the Army (Royall), the Navy (Sullivan) and the Air Force (Symington)

Washington, April 27, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/4-2749. Top Secret. The source text is the copy sent to the Secretary of State. It was covered by a brief note from the Assistant Director of the Executive Secretariat, forwarding it to the Counselor and asking him to read and transmit it to the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence.

1. Reference is made to the Report/1/ on the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Organization for Intelligence submitted to the National Security Council by the Survey Group known as the "Dulles" Committee. Chapter V of this Report deals with "crisis" intelligence estimates and the coordination relationship of various intelligence agencies of the government. In one particular "crisis" situation there was a delay of twelve days before the President and top policymakers were provided with an authoritative intelligence estimate./2/

/1/Document 358.

/2/The episode referred to, which is discussed briefly in the Dulles Report, concerns General Clay's message of March 4, 1948, and the intelligence estimates given the President on March 16.

2. It is believed that this delay was due in part to the fact that an "Eyes Only" message did not come immediately to the attention of appropriate intelligence agencies, and in part due to the lack of established procedures for dealing with such matters. However, proper coordination did ultimately result in the production of an estimate of the situation.

3. I have been informed that the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee have agreed that critical information coming to the attention of any one of them will be referred immediately to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, in order that evaluation by the Committee may be undertaken at once. I, therefore, desire that provision be made for the immediate distribution of critical information to your respective Intelligence Agencies for appropriate action.

4. Copies of this communication are being forwarded to the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

Louis Johnson/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.

384. Report by Secretary of State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Johnson to the National Security Council

NSC 50

Washington, July 1, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 50. Top Secret. When the Dulles Report and agency comments thereon were submitted to the NSC, the Council decided at its 37th meeting (see footnote 4, Document 380) that the Secretaries of State and Defense should recommend specific actions. To prepare these recommendations, Johnson designated General Joseph T. McNarney and Acheson appointed Carlisle H. Humelsine. According to Darling, the report is largely McNarney's work, which explains why NSC 50 was commonly referred to as the McNarney Report. (The Central Intelligence Agency, p. 347) Filed with the source text was a July 1 covering note from Souers to the members of the Council briefly summarizing the background of the report and indicating it would be considered at the next NSC meeting. See the Supplement. A cover sheet attached to the source text indicates it was approved on July 7 by the President. See the Supplement. The report, the covering note and the title page, without a notation of Truman's approval, are reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 295-313.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE REPORT OF THE DULLES-JACKSON-CORREA COMMITTEE PREPARED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Report on "The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence"/1/ includes 57 individual conclusions and recommendations which we have regrouped in order to facilitate Council consideration. Although some of the conclusions do not require Council action, we wish to bring them to the Council's attention with our comments. Other conclusions and recommendations call for concurrence or non-concurrence by the Council and appropriate implementing action.

/1/Document 358.

1. Legislative Provisions Governing CIA and its Position Under the National Security Council.

a. Summary of the Report.

The Survey Group report concludes that:

(1) Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 which sets up CIA is sound and that no amendments are necessary at this time;

(2) CIA is properly placed under the National Security Council, but that its Director should establish closer liaison with the two members of the Council on whom the Agency chiefly depends, namely, the Secretaries of State and Defense.

b. Comments.

We concur in these conclusions and recommendations which do not require specific Council action or authorization. It should be noted, however, that the National Military Establishment and CIA are presently studying the wartime status and responsibilities of CIA and that recommendations may be presented at a later date on this subject. It may be determined that certain functions and responsibilities should be under the control of the military in time of war.

c. Recommended Action.

That the National Security Council concur in the Survey Group conclusions on this subject, with the understanding that study may determine that certain functions and responsibilities should be under the control of the military in time of war.

2. The Coordination of Intelligence Activities.

a. Summary of the Report.

The Report concludes that:

(1) The responsibility of CIA with respect to the coordination of intelligence activities has not been fully discharged;

(2) The Intelligence Advisory Committee is soundly conceived as an advisory body, but should, under the forthright initiative and leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, participate more actively in the continuing coordination of intelligence activities and in the discussion and approval of intelligence estimates.

b. Comments.

We concur in the observations and conclusions of the Report on this general subject. We believe that the objectives sought for can be achieved by the recognition and implementation of these principles and by the organizational and operational improvements recommended elsewhere in the Report.

In accordance with these principles and as partial implementation thereof, we recommend certain amendments to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1, as indicated in Annex "A", appended hereto. These amendments would (1) define the status of the Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and (2) clarify the procedure whereby dissents are included in coordinated intelligence estimates.

c. Recommended Action.

That the National Security Council (1) concur in the conclusions and recommendations stated under para. 2 a above as a statement of principles to be followed by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee; (2) amend National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 in accordance with the changes proposed in Annex "A" appended hereto.

3. Membership of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

a. Summary of Report.

The Report recommends that the Federal Bureau of Investigation be added to the membership of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and that the Joint Staff (JCS) and Atomic Energy Commission be dropped from membership.

b. Comments.

We concur in the proposal that the Federal Bureau of Investigation be added to the membership of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, but do not agree that the Joint Staff (JCS) and Atomic Energy Commission be dropped from membership. A sufficient number of problems arise which are of joint concern to foreign intelligence and domestic security intelligence to warrant the membership on the IAC of the FBI in order that coordination and cooperation in the national interest may be achieved.

We also wish to point out that the Recommended Action under para. 2 c above would, if approved, have the effect of clarifying the status of the Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

c. Recommended Action.

That the National Security Council (1) invite the Attorney General to have the Federal Bureau of Investigation become a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee; (2) if this invitation is accepted, amend National Security Council Director No. 1 accordingly, as provided in Annex "A" appended hereto.

4. Particular Intelligence Questions Requiring Coordination or Attention.

a. Summary of the Report.

Throughout the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Survey Group Report, attention is drawn to a number of particular intelligence questions requiring special attention or coordination. These may be listed as follows:

(1) Scientific Intelligence.

(2) Domestic Intelligence and counter-intelligence insofar as they relate to the national security.

(3) Provisions for prompt coordinated intelligence estimates in crisis situations.

(4) The proper allocation of responsibility for political summaries.

(5) The exploitation of intelligence from foreign nationality groups and foreign individuals in the United States.

(6) The coordination of covert intelligence activities in occupied areas.

(7) Coordination of the handling of defectors.

(8) Increased emphasis on the counter-espionage activities abroad of the Central Intelligence Agency and closer liaison for counter-espionage matters with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

b. Comments.

We concur in these conclusions and comments as interpreted above and point out that recent progress has been made in some of these fields. For example, that of scientific intelligence through the creation of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, by an agreement on a procedure for providing prompt coordinated national intelligence estimates in crisis situations, and by an agreement under consideration by the IAC agencies and the FBI with respect to the exploitation of defectors and other aliens.

For the purpose of clarity and guidance:

Paragraph 4 a (2) is considered to refer to the coordination of foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence with domestic intelligence and domestic counterintelligence for the purpose of correlating and evaluating intelligence relating to national security.

Paragraph 4 a (3) is considered to refer to provision for prompt coordinated national intelligence estimates in crisis situations.

Paragraph 4 a (5) is considered to refer to the exploitation of foreign nationality groups and foreign individuals in the United States for the purposes of foreign intelligence.

We anticipate that the addition of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the membership of the Intelligence Advisory Committee will contribute particularly to the objectives under points (2), (3), (5) and (7) above. With respect to paragraph 4 a (8) above, we believe the maintenance of close liaison for these purposes is essential.

c. Recommended Action.

That the National Security Council:

(1) Draw the particular attention of the Director of Central Intelligence and Intelligence Advisory Committee to the need for early and sustained action for more effective coordination in the fields listed under para. 4 a above as discussed in the Survey Group Report;

(2) Request the Director of Central Intelligence to submit to the Council within a period of six months a report on progress in these matters.

(3) Invite the Attorney General to have the Federal Bureau of Investigation become a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

(4) If this invitation is accepted, amend National Security Council Directive No. 1 accordingly, as provided in Annex "A" appended hereto.

(5) Note that nothing contained in NSCID1, as amended, is intended to affect or change NSC 17/4, approved by the President on March 23, 1949 and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee for the purpose of coordinating domestic intelligence and related matters with foreign intelligence matters and his relations with the CIA shall be as provided in Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947.

5. National Intelligence Estimates.

a. Summary of the Report.

The report concludes that in CIA there has been a confusion between the responsibility for producing coordinated national intelligence estimates and the responsibility for miscellaneous research and reporting. It finds further that the Council's Intelligence Directives on this subject are sound, but have not been effectively carried out. It recommends, aside from organizational changes described in the following section, that CIA should draw upon and review the specialized intelligence production of the agencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates and that these estimates should be discussed and approved by the IAC, whose members should be collectively responsible. Such estimates should be recognized as the most authoritative available to policy makers.

b. Comments.

We concur in these conclusions except that we do not believe that the Director and the IAC should be bound by the concept of collective responsibility, because this would inevitably reduce coordinated national intelligence to the lowest common denominator among the agencies concerned. A procedure should be adopted which would permit the Director and the IAC to fulfill their respective responsibilities to the President and the NSC regardless of unanimous agreement, but providing for concurrent submissions of dissent. The CIA, however, should interpret and follow the NSC Intelligence Directives so as to refrain as far as possible from competitive intelligence activities in the production of research intelligence estimates.

c. Recommended Action.

That the National Security Council concur in the conclusions and recommendations stated above, as interpreted by our comments, as a statement of principles to be observed by the Director of Central Intelligence and the IAC.

6. Organization of the Central Intelligence Agency.

a. Summary of the Report.

The Survey Group Report proposes a number of major changes in the internal organization of CIA with a view to supporting the objectives set forth in the Report. These changes are the following:

(1) The operations of the Office of Special Operations, the Office of Policy Coordination and the Contact Branch of the Office of Operations should be integrated under single overall direction in an operations division, with its separate administration, within CIA.

(2) Out of the present Office of Reports and Estimates there should be created (a) a small estimates division which would draw upon and review the specialized intelligence product of the departmental agencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates and (b) a research and reports division to accomplish central research in, and coordinated production of, intelligence in recognized fields of common interest.

(3) The Foreign Documents Branch of the present Office of Operations should be included in the proposed research and reports division.

(4) The Foreign Broadcast Information Branch should be included in the proposed operations division.

(5) The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff should be reconstituted as a staff responsible only to the Director of Central Intelligence, with the task of developing plans for the coordination of intelligence activities. It would also perform the present tasks of the Office of Collection and Dissemination with respect to the coordination of collection requirements and requests and the dissemination of intelligence.

b. Comments.

We concur in these recommendations with the exception that we do not agree that the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch should be included in the proposed operations division. This division should include those activities (the present Office of Special Operations, Office of Policy Coordination and Contact Branch of the Office of Operations) which conduct covert or semi-covert field intelligence and related operations which are closely interdependent and have similar administrative and security problems.

With regard to the recommendations regarding the Office of Reports and Estimates, the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff and the Office of Collection and Dissemination, we concur in them and in the concept of CIA upon which they are based. However, we recognize that there may be other methods of organization which will accomplish the same objectives.

c. Recommended Action.

That the National Security Council (1) approve the recommendations of the Survey Group Report on the reorganization of CIA as listed in para. 6 a above, subject to the exception and comments noted in para. 6 b; (2) direct the Director of Central Intelligence to carry out these recommendations, as approved by the Council, and report to the Council in ninety days on progress toward their implementation.

7. The Security of Information and the Avoidance of Publicity.

a. Summary of the Report.

The Report recommends that (1) the Director of Central Intelligence should, in cases where the disclosure of secret information is sought from him and he has doubt as to whether he should comply, refer the question to the National Security Council; (2) in the interest of security, the Central Intelligence Agency should increasingly emphasize its duties as the coordinator of intelligence rather than its secret intelligence activities in order to reverse the present unfortunate trend where it finds itself advertised almost exclusively as a secret service organization.

b. Comments.

We concur in these recommendations with the reservation that, in principle, all publicity is undesirable and that only where it is unavoidable should the procedure set forth in subparagraph 7 a (2) above be followed.

c. Recommended Action.

That the National Security Council (1) approve the recommendations of the Survey Group Report on the security of information and the avoidance of publicity, subject to the reservation noted in para. 7 b above; (2) instruct the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare appropriate National Security Council Intelligence Directives covering these points and submit them for approval within a period of thirty days.

8. Chairmanship of the United States Communications Intelligence Board.

a. Summary of the Report.

The report recommends that the Director of Central Intelligence should be made permanent chairman of the United States Communications Intelligence Board.

b. Comments.

We do not concur in this recommendation. This matter was considered when the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board was set up and the present arrangements decided on. These arrangements, which provide for a rotating chairmanship, are operating satisfactorily and it seems undesirable to make a change.

c. Recommended Action.

That the National Security Council not concur in the recommendation contained in the Report.

9. Operating Problems Relating to Clandestine Activities.

a. Summary of the Report.

The Report sets forth certain recommendations regarding individual operating problems of the clandestine activities of CIA. These are questions which, according to the Report, require particular emphasis or have been neglected in the past. The principal questions so indicated may be summarized as follows:

(1) [5 lines of source text not declassified]

(2) Relations with departmental agencies should be brought closer and the guidance which the Office of Special Operations receives from intelligence consumers should be strengthened. This might be achieved by including representatives of the Service agencies and the State Department in appropriate sections of the Office of Special Operations.

(3) The Director of Central Intelligence should assure himself that the operating services of CIA receive adequate guidance on the current and strategic intelligence and policy needs of the Government.

(4) The operating services of CIA should have access to communications intelligence to the full extent required for guidance in directing their operations and for the more effective conduct of counterespionage.

b. Comments.

We concur in these recommendations all of which point to significant operating problems relating to clandestine activities which require particular and constant emphasis.

c. Recommended Action.

That the National Security Council (1) approve the recommendation of the Report as listed in para. 9 a above; (2) direct the Director of Central Intelligence to carry them out with the assistance of the other departments and agencies concerned and report to the National Security Council on any difficulties encountered.

10. The Question of Civilian or Military Personnel in Key CIA Positions.

a. Summary of the Report.

The Report concludes that:

(1) The placing in key positions in CIA of a large percentage of military personnel, many of them on relatively short tour of duty assignment, tends to discourage competent civilian personnel from looking to employment in the Agency as a career.

(2) Continuity of service is essential for the successful carrying out of the duties of Director of Central Intelligence. The best hope for insuring this continuity and the greatest assurance of independence of action is for a civilian to be Director of Central Intelligence. A serviceman selected for the post should resign from active military duty.

b. Comments.

We do not wholly concur in these conclusions. It is most important that both civilian and military personnel be represented in the key positions in the Central Intelligence Agency although we do not believe it is desirable to attempt to fix any precise ratio for the two. This is a matter to be worked out by the Director in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense.

We agree that continuity of service is essential for the post of Director. The most qualified person available should be selected for the post. In order to insure continuity and independence of action, he should be either a civilian, or if a service man or a foreign service officer, he should be either retired or one whose service as Director will be his final tour of active duty.

c. Recommended Action.

That the National Security Council:

(1) Concur in the above comments as an expression of its views on this question.

(2) Inform the President of these views insofar as they concern the post of Director of Central Intelligence.

(3) Inform the Director of Central Intelligence of these views insofar as they concern the staffing of other key positions in CIA.

11. General Appraisal of the Leadership and Policies of the Central Intelligence Agency.

a. Summary of the Report.

The Report concludes that:

(1) The directing staff of CIA has not demonstrated an adequate understanding of the mandate of the organization or the ability to discharge that mandate effectively.

(2) Administrative organization and policies tend to impede the carrying out of the essential intelligence functions of CIA under the Act.

b. Comments.

We do not wholly concur in these conclusions. While we recognize the existence of important defects in the organization and operation of CIA, we believe that these conclusions are too sweeping. Complicating factors in appraising CIA's efficiency have been the shortness of time during which to develop an effective organization and a lack of common understanding as to the respective missions of CIA and the departmental intelligence agencies. However, as indicated in the Report and concurred in by us, numerous and important improvements are necessary and need to be carried out promptly and effectively.

c. Recommended Action.

That the National Security Council (1) note the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Report on this subject; (2) approve the above Comments thereon.

12. The Service Intelligence Agencies.

a. Comments.

The National Military Establishment concurs in the Conclusions and Recommendations of Chapter 11 of the Report except that it does not agree that the Service intelligence agencies should be staffed with personnel who concentrate in intelligence over the major portion of their careers. It is the policy of the Military Establishment to assign qualified personnel to intelligence duties even though they have not had previous intelligence experience. However, continued efforts are made to attract the highest type personnel to intelligence duty.

b. Recommended Action.

That the National Security Council note the above Comments by the National Military Establishment.

13. The Department of State.

a. Comments.

The Department of State concurs in the Conclusions and Recommendations of Chapter 12 of the Report and is undertaking to put them into effect as part of general plans for reorganization within the Department.

b. Recommended Action.

That the National Security Council note the above Comments by the Department of State.

Annex A

1. To maintain the relationship essential to coordination between the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations, an Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of the Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be Chairman thereof, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the respective intelligence chiefs from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and from the Joint Staff (JCS), and the Atomic Energy Commission, or their representatives, shall be established to advise the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence will invite the Chief, or his representative, of any other intelligence Agency having functions related to the national security to sit with the Intelligence Advisory Committee whenever matters within the purview of his Agency are to be discussed.

5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate National Intelligence to the President, to members of the National Security Council, to the Intelligence Chiefs of the IAC Agencies, and to such Governmental Departments and Agencies as the National Security Council from time to time may designate. Intelligence so disseminated shall be officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall carry an agreed a statement of substantially dissent differing opinions.*

*"An agreed" and "dissent" are in canceled text on the source text.

385. Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 43d Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, July 7, 1949.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject Files. Top Secret. Prepared on July 8. According to the minutes of the meeting, the following members were present: Acheson; Edward H. Foley, Jr., Under Secretary of the Treasury; Stephen Early, Under Secretary of Defense; Gordon Gray, Secretary of the Army; Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy; W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force; and John R. Steelman, Acting Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. Also present were Hillenkoetter, Carlisle Humelsine of the Department of State, and General Joseph T. McNarney and John H. Ohly, both of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Three members of the NSC Secretariat attended: Souers, Lay, and Hugh D. Farley. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 43rd Meeting)

The following notes contain a summary of the discussion at the 43rd meeting of the National Security Council. Under Secretary Early attended the meeting in the absence of Secretary Johnson. The Attorney General, who had been invited to participate as a member for consideration of the first item, informed the Executive Secretary prior to the meeting that he fully approved NSC 50 and requested the Executive Secretary to state his action at the meeting, since he would not be able to attend.

1. The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence (NSC 50)/1/

/1/Document 384.

Secretary Acheson explained the background of the report and praised the able staff work which it represented.

Mr. Souers reported that the Attorney General wished to have his approval of the paper recorded in the minutes.

In response to Secretary Acheson's request for any queries, Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that there was a dilemma in the recommendation for a separate administration for an operations division, as recommended in paragraph 6 a (1). He remarked that both the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress last year had questioned duplication in the administration of the Central Intelligence Agency. Consequently, last December CIA had changed to a single administration for both operational and administrative affairs. Separate administration for secret operations had not worked well, and he added that OSS had combined them towards the end of its activities. By changing to a single administration, CIA had saved [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] jobs or [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and had stopped considerable fighting for space and personnel.

General McNarney said that, due to the special nature of the operations concerned and the bad effects of any publicity, he felt the Council should approve the recommendation and that the Director should not attempt to explain this in detail to the Congress, but should state that a separate administration was ordered by the NSC in the interests of the security of the special operations. Both the original survey group and the staff team which had prepared the present paper had agreed that this would be the proper course of action.

Secretary Acheson said he did not know enough of the merits of the issue to have a strong view one way or the other, and suggested that the point be deferred for further study.

Mr. Souers inquired if it might not be possible to steer an in-between course, using only certain people within a single administration to handle the special operations.

Secretary Gray remarked that the present language would be too inflexible to permit such a course.

Admiral Hillenkoetter asked for guidance from the Council as to the proper proportion of military personnel in CIA, in the light of the recommendations in paragraphs 9 and 10.

Mr. Souers pointed out that, if the Council approved the paper, it would then be in order for the Director to work out this matter in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense. General McNarney agreed and added that a ratio could not be fixed since the proportion of military and other personnel would depend on circumstances.

Secretary Acheson also agreed with Mr. Souer's interpretation.

The National Security Council:/2/

/2/The following paragraph and note constitute NSC Action No. 231. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)

Approved the recommendations by the Secretaries of State and Defense in NSC 50, subject to further study and recommendation to the Council by representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense as to the desirability of a separate administration for the operations division proposed in paragraph 6 a (1) thereof.

Note: The President subsequently informed of the Council's action on paragraph 10; the Attorney General invited to have the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation assume membership on the Intelligence Advisory Committee, pursuant to paragraph 3;/3/ NSCID No. 1, as amended, issued in revised form as of July 7, 1949;/4/ and the other approved actions transmitted either to the Director of Central Intelligence, or to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee, as appropriate.

/3/Documents 387 and 388.

/4/Document 432.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 2-4, future course of U.S. action with respect to Austria, possible U.S. courses of action in the event the Soviet Union reimposes the Berlin blockade, and NSC status of projects.]

386. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to President Truman

Washington, July 7, 1949.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files. Top Secret.

The National Security Council, as agreed at its 43rd meeting on July 7, 1949, wishes to inform you of its views with respect to the post of Director of Central Intelligence, that continuity of service is essential for the post of Director; that the most qualified person available should be selected for the post; and that, in order to insure continuity and independence of action, the Director should be either a civilian, or, if a service man or a foreign service officer, he should be retired or one whose service as Director will be his final tour of active duty.

Sidney W. Souers

387. Letter From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Attorney General Clark

Washington, July 7, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 43rd Meeting. Secret. Copies were sent to Hillenkoetter and Hoover.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: Pursuant to the action of the National Security Council at its 43rd meeting on Thursday, July 7,/1/ in which you participated as a member, you are cordially invited to have the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation assume his membership on the Intelligence Advisory Committee as of this date.

/1/See Document 385.

For your records, a copy of NSCID No. 1,/2/ revised as of July 7, 1949, which states the membership and functions of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, is transmitted herewith.

/2/Document 432.

Furthermore, in approving the attached revised NSCID No. 1, the Council noted that nothing contained therein is intended to affect or change NSC 17/4, "Internal Security", approved by the President on March 23, 1949,/3/ and that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee for the purpose of coordinating domestic intelligence and related matters with foreign intelligence matters, and that his relationships to the Central Intelligence Agency shall be as provided in Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947.

/3/Not printed.

Sincerely yours,

Sidney W. Souers/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

388. Letter From Attorney General Clark to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

Washington, July 15, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 43rd Meeting.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: Reference is made to your letter of July 7, 1949,/1/ inviting me to have the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation assume his membership on the Intelligence Advisory Committee as of that date. I am pleased to advise that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is ready to assume his membership on this Committee immediately on the basis set forth in your letter.

/1/Document 387.

It should be noted that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is becoming a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee for the purpose of coordinating domestic intelligence and related matters with foreign intelligence matters, and it is understood that nothing contained in NSCID No. 1, dated July 7, 1949, is intended to affect or change NSC 17/4, "Internal Security," approved by the President on March 23, 1949. It is also understood that the relationship of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Central Intelligence Agency shall be as provided in Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947.

Sincerely yours,

Tom Clark

389. Memorandum From General Joseph T. McNarney to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

Washington, July 22, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 50. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Recommendation of Dulles Survey Group Report that there be established an Operations Division, with its separate administration, within CIA

At the last meeting of the National Security Council the "Comments and Recommendations on the Report of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee Prepared by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense" were approved with a substantial exception which was to be reconsidered by the representatives of State and Defense. The exception involved the question of whether the administrative services in support of the agreed-upon Operations Division should be separate, as recommended, or derived as at present from a centralized administrative office reporting directly to the Director, CIA.

The representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense have reexamined this problem and have discussed it with Rear Admiral Hillenkoetter and two of his Assistant Directors who will be responsible for carrying out the recommendations. Based upon a careful reconsideration of the recommendation, and with full weight being given to the views presented by the Director of Central Intelligence and two of his Assistant Directors, the representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense hereby confirm their recommendation that administrative support of covert and overt operations of CIA should be separate. They thereby reaffirm the recommendation of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee.

They consider particularly desirable separate administrative organizations for the handling of such overt and covert functions as: personnel administration including recruitment (except clerical type personnel for headquarters) personnel security; fiscal, accounting and budgetary functions, including the handling and control of confidential funds; travel abroad; storage and warehousing for clandestine materials; contract administration where the contracts involve clandestine matters; reproducing and photo-copying; and other related administrative matters which require close relationship and knowledge on the part of a minimum number of administrating and operating officials to insure adequate flexibility and security of operations.

They recommend, however, that certain administrative functions which can be efficiently performed in a central administrative office without danger of loss of flexibility or security to covert activities be kept concentrated in such an office. Examples of such functions are: space allocations; procurement of ordinary supplies (except special equipment for clandestine use); legal services; transportation facilities in the United States; and other closely related administrative functions which, with full regard to special considerations of security and flexibility of operations, may be economically and satisfactorily performed in a central office.

The representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense believe that there now is sufficient overstaffing in the administrative services of the Central Intelligence Agency to permit the separation of the administrative support of overt and covert activities without any substantial increase at present in the allocation of personnel or funds for this purpose.

Joseph T. McNarney/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates McNarney signed the original.

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