NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
Foreign Relations of the United States
1945-1950
Emergence of the Intelligence EstablishmentDepartment of State
Washington, DC
Hillenkoetter's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence
390. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the National Security Council
Washington, July 25, 1949.
//Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC Intelligence Directives. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for IntelligenceREFERENCES
A. NSC Action No. 231/1/
B. NSC 50/2//1/See footnote 2, Document 385.
/2/Document 384.
Pursuant to the action of the National Security Council at its last meeting (Reference A) the enclosed report by representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense as to the desirability of a separate administration for the operations division proposed in paragraph 6-a-(1) of NSC 50 is submitted herewith for consideration by the Council./3/
/3/Document 389.
It is recommended that, if the Council accepts the enclosed report, the Director of Central Intelligence be directed to carry out the provisions of paragraph 6-a-(1) of NSC 50 with respect to a separate administration within CIA for the operations division substantially as indicated in the enclosure, and report on progress toward their implementation together with the report called for on the previously approved recommendations of paragraph 6 of NSC 50.
It is requested that the enclosure be handled with special security precautions.
Sidney W. Souers/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
391. Letter From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, July 29, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 80-01731R, Box 43, Folder 7. Top Secret. A further exchange of letters and memoranda is ibid.
DEAR ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER: Our representative on the Joint Ad Hoc Committee which prepared ORE 46-49, "The Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1949," has advised me of the desirability of continuing operation of this committee in such a way as to form a pool for interdepartmental consideration of Soviet intentions for war. Probably all the intelligence organizations find frequent need for means by which, at any time, they may produce comprehensive, factual data as a basis of estimates on this subject. Also, it seems to me, that a committee engaged in studying Soviet intentions would be of great aid in handling most of the "crisis type" requests that are likely to arise.
We have, of course, just discussed and agreed to the establishment of a Jigsaw Committee to coordinate the intelligence approach to problems of world communism. That Committee, however, although its work will contribute in part to the analysis of Soviet intentions, has a distinctive responsibility of its own which takes in many other matters such as the development of Communist theory and Communist techniques, and the growth of Communist activity of all sorts in local situations throughout the world. I have in mind rather the need for continuing, current analysis closely applied to indications of the likelihood of Soviet military action, analysis which will integrate, for instance, OB information from all three Services with political and economic indications.
I would like to suggest therefore that you consider establishing under CIA a permanent interdepartmental committee (which might be called the Watch Committee) to pool information on Soviet intentions for war. I attach a draft proposal which sets forth in detail a possible manner of operation and which might, together with this letter, form an item for discussion at the IAC.
Sincerely yours,
W. Park Armstrong, Jr.
Enclosure/1/
/1/Secret.
PROPOSED IAC AGREEMENT
SUBJECT
Permanent Committee on USSR Intentions1. A permanent committee (hereinafter referred to as the Watch Committee) is hereby established to coordinate intelligence information on the short and long range warlike intentions of the USSR and to produce periodic intelligence estimates on this subject as it affects national security. The Watch Committee will work in accordance with the established NSCID and DCI directives.
2. The Watch Committee shall act under the chairmanship of CIA and shall comprise:
Chairman--CIA
Vice Chairman--State
Member--Army
Member--Navy
Member--Air Force
Member--CIA/OSO
Ad hoc members as needed may be determined by the regular members.
Secretariat--CIA3. The Watch Committee will, in the first instance, establish methods of procedure.
4. The Committee will meet at regular intervals, adjusting the frequency of its meetings from time to time in relation to the need for maintenance and revision of its work.
5. The Committee will be responsible for:
a. On a long range basis
(1) Bringing up to date in a comprehensive basic estimate existing papers which relate to USSR intentions for war
(2) Developing basic EEI for such estimates
(3) Producing at appropriate intervals or upon request revisions of the comprehensive estimate
b. On a short range basis
(1) Arranging periodic exchange amongst its members of items of information pertinent to the EEI
(2) Producing from each such exchange an interim estimate which will indicate the bearing of available current information on the most recent basic comprehensive estimate.
392. Letter From Secretary of State Acheson to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, August 1, 1949.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/8-149. Secret. Drafted by F.C. Oechsner and W.T. Stone. An attached note indicates that a similar letter was being sent to the Secretary of Defense but no copy has been found. See the draft memorandum from Stone to Acheson, July 22, in the Supplement attached to an August 11 letter from Acheson to Hillenkoetter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/8-149)
MY DEAR ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER: Following conferences among consultants of the National Military Establishment, the National Security Resources Board and the Department of State, looking to the implementation of NSC-43, I have proposed to the Secretary of Defense that the planning and coordination work, and the full-time staffs, provided for under NSC-4 and NSC-43 can be combined./1/
/1/NSC 4, December 9, 1947, entitled "Coordination of Foreign Information Measures," and NSC 43, March 9, 1949, entitled "Planning for Wartime Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351)
I have suggested that the combined staffs consist of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency, this having proved an effective composition under NSC-4. In addition, I have requested that a full-time representative of the Office of the Secretary of Defense be detailed to the staff.
NSC-43 provides only for "liaison representatives" of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Resources Board on the NSC-43 staff. Inasmuch as the Central Intelligence Agency representative on the NSC-4 staff is, however, assigned on a full-time basis, it would be appreciated if your Agency could continue to provide full-time representation on the combined staff. Experience will show whether further CIA personnel is required beyond the one representative presently serving.
Sincerely yours,
Dean Acheson/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Acheson signed the original.
393. Letter From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. Secret. The enclosures were often referred to as the "Four Papers" or the "Four Problems." On August 5 Hillenkoetter sent them to the members of the IAC with a covering memorandum that noted that Armstrong had decided to drop a fifth problem designated as "Guidance to CIA." (Memorandum from Hillenkoetter August 5; ibid.) See the Supplement.
Washington, August 2, 1949.
DEAR ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER: In accordance with the statement I made in connection with consideration of NSC-50 at the last IAC meeting, July 22, I enclose four papers on aspects on NSC-50 which the Department believes should be implemented at the earliest feasible time. If you agree these papers could be placed on the IAC Agenda.
Sincerely yours,
W. Park Armstrong, Jr./1/
/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Armstrong signed the original.
Enclosure I
COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Problem: To Implement NSC 50 with Respect to the Coordination of Intelligence Activities.
Discussion:
1. NSC 50 states that the responsibility of CIA with respect to the coordination of intelligence activities has not been fully discharged (para. 2a(1)). It also calls for ICAPS to be reconstituted as a staff responsible only to the DCI, with the task of developing plans for the coordination of intelligence activities; to perform the present task of the Office of Collection and Dissemination with respect to the coordination of collection requirements and requests, and the dissemination of intelligence (para. 6a(5)).
2. ICAPS in the past has suffered from the somewhat ambiguous nature of assignment of officers to it; that is, whether they "represent" their agency in ICAPS activities, or are responsible only to the DCI. The Staff of the National Security Council serves as an example for an ICAPS staff under the direction of the DCI to study and plan for the coordination of intelligence activities. Officers should be assigned from an agency or service to the staff, not in a "representative" capacity, but rather to bring the knowledge and interest of the several agencies together in a joint effort.
3. In a similar fashion, the Standing Committee can serve as a staff committee, with identical representation to IAC, acting in the same fashion as the Consultants do to the NSC.
4. Coordination of the intelligence activities among the several agencies and under the leadership of the CIA has not been fully effective, particularly with respect to the coordination in the research effort, owing in part to the fact that CIA has not made itself a center of information on intelligence to which the other agencies can turn, has been passive rather than aggressive in liaison, i.e., has relied upon receiving liaison officers from the other agencies, and has not fully accepted its proper role of passing on requests for research service to the agency best equipped to handle it. CIA effort has gone too much to miscellaneous research and reporting which, in the words of the Dulles Committee, "by no stretch of the imagination" could be considered national intelligence.
Recommendation:
1. That ICAPS serve as a joint staff under the direction of, and responsible to, the DCI, be composed of members contributed by the several agencies on a fulltime basis, but not "representing" the agency, and be headed by a chief who will also be the Executive Secretary of the IAC.
2. That matters of coordination be referred to ICAPS for study and recommendation by the DCI, or through the DCI by the IAC, but that ICAPS itself may submit to the DCI, or through the DCI to the IAC, recommendations which it considers appropriate for consideration.
3. That the representation on the Standing Committee be the same as that of the IAC, and that the Standing Committee serve as a subordinate or staff committee to the IAC to consider on an interagency basis, problems referred to it by the IAC.
4. That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibility on research programs primarily through the Estimates Division, whose primary function should be such coordination, in accordance with the following principles:
a. CIA will constitute itself the center of information on all U.S. foreign intelligence activities, including current research intelligence projects;
b. CIA will have free access to the plans and programs of the several intelligence agencies, subject to overall departmental regulation;
c. CIA will recognize that it should have active liaison responsibility to other agencies as well as receiving liaison from those agencies;
d. CIA will effect coordination as much by positive action in stimulating appropriate intelligence effort as by negative action in preventing undesirable duplications;
e. CIA will recognize that requests for intelligence other than national intelligence, as defined, shall be forwarded for action to the agencies in accordance with established allocations and existing programs;
f. CIA will recognize that coordination also implies assistance to the agencies in meeting their responsibilities, including in some cases the temporary assignments of personnel to the agencies.
Enclosure II
PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Problem: To Implement NSC 50 with Respect to the Production of National Intelligence.
Discussion:
1. NSC 50 calls for a small Estimates Division to draw upon and review the specialized intelligence production of the departmental agencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates (para. 5a). It also calls upon the IAC to discuss and approve national intelligence estimates with provision for dissenting opinions (para. 2a). Finally, it calls for special provisions to be made for prompt coordinated national intelligence estimates in crisis situations (para. 4a(3)).
2. The NSC action, as well as the Dulles Committee Report, reaffirms in definite terms the basis principles of the NSCID's with respect to the production of national intelligence. National intelligence is by definition interdepartmental, and is distinguished by a substantive overlap between more than one field of departmental interests as allocated. It does not become national intelligence merely because it is of national interest, or because it is in response to a request by an interdepartmental body.
3. The NSCID's prescribe that national intelligence be composed to the maximum extent possible of departmental contributions of finished intelligence. This would require that CIA estimates, to a greater extent then is now the case, be discussed and planned at the earliest stage with appropriate collaborating departments, and, subject to the review responsibility of CIA, in the normal course be composed of texts contributed by the agencies. This would properly result in the discontinuance of duplicative research and report writing by CIA, with presumably economy of staff allocated to this function.
4. The effectiveness of participation by IAC in the production of national estimates will depend heavily upon the selection of matters appropriate for consideration. Presumably the authority of the IAC in such participation can be delegated to subordinate groups. Nevertheless, the IAC must stand ready to consult and pass on any questions of substance on which there is not general agreement, or on which any member requests consideration.
5. The special procedures required in crisis situations will need to be worked out in some detail for subsequent consideration by the IAC. In any event, these procedures should be based upon the same considerations of departmental responsibility and consultation at all stages as apply to all national intelligence estimates.
Recommendations:
1. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national intelligence estimates:
a. That national intelligence applies only to intelligence which is interdepartmental in substance;
b. That national intelligence should be developed with a maximum use of departmental facilities and minimum duplication of departmental intelligence activities;
c. That except in crisis situations no step be taken in the preparation of national estimates before consultation with appropriate agencies.
2. That the IAC discuss and approve all national intelligence estimates on which there is substantial disagreement among the agencies or upon the request of a member.
3. That ICAPS review and make recommendations for any revision of procedures for the production of coordinated national estimates in crisis situations, such procedures to be, as far as possible, in accordance with the principles outlined in existing NSCID's, NSC 50, and Recommendation 1 above.
Enclosure III
RESEARCH AND REPORTS
Problem: To Implement NSC 50 with Respect to the Responsibility for Research and Reports.
Discussion:
1. The NSC 50 states that in CIA there has been a confusion between national intelligence and miscellaneous research and reporting, and that while NSCID's on this subject are sound, they have not been effectively carried out (para. 5a). It also states that out of the present ORE there should be created (a) a small Estimates Division which would draw upon and review the specialized intelligence product of the interdepartmental agencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates, and (b) a Research and Reports Division to accomplish research in and coordinate production of intelligence in recognized fields of common interest.
Recommendation:
1. That, aside from national intelligence, CIA will produce intelligence reports only in fields of common concern, as prescribed by the DCI on the advice of the IAC.
2. That, on a priority basis, ICAPS prepare for consideration in IAC recommendations on the delineations of fields of common concern.
Enclosure IV
POLITICAL SUMMARIES
Problem: To Implement NSC 50 with Respect to Political Summaries.
Discussion:
1. NSC 50 states that consideration should be given to a proper allocation of responsibility for political summaries (para. 4a (4)).
2. The preparation of political summaries, daily and weekly, pre-sents a difficult problem involving the dissemination of information which is in part intelligence and in part operational. It also involves the responsibilities of each agency to distribute information which pertains to its responsibilities or stems from its sources.
Recommendation:
1. That ICAPS study and prepare recommendations for consideration by the IAC on the proper allocation of responsibilities for political summaries, both daily and weekly.
394. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to Secretary of State Acheson
Washington, August 19, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. Top Secret.
MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you know, the National Security Council in NSC 50/1/ approved the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense and yourself regarding certain changes in the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency. Among those changes was a directive to consolidate all "covert and semi-covert field intelligence and related operations" in a single branch to be called "The Operations Division." To carry out this directive, the attached organization plan with the attend-ant list of functions for its components has been evolved./2/
/1/Document 384.
/2/Not attached to the source text. A copy is attached to an August 16 memorandum from Hillenkoetter to Souers. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2)
This proposed reorganization has received the full concurrence of all interested parties in the Central Intelligence Agency (including the Offices of Policy Coordination, Special Operations, and Operations).
In this proposed plan the functions of the various offices are preserved, and their responsibilities are unchanged. However, to bring NSC 10/2 into consonance with the new directive contained in NSC 50, the former paper will necessarily have to be revised slightly, particularly, in that part relating to the autonomous character of the Office of Policy Coordination within the Central Intelligence Agency.
An advance copy of the attachments to this letter has been furnished to Mr. George F. Kennan/3/ in order that he may have an opportunity to go over it before you may desire to receive a briefing from him.
/3/Reference is to an August 16 memorandum from Hillenkoetter to Kennan, et al. (Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R) See the Supplement.
I should like respectfully to request your concurrence or your comments on this proposed plan in order that, if agreeable to you, I may pre-sent it to the entire National Security Council, through the Executive Secretary, as a report on the progress which the Central Intelligence Agency is making in carrying out the decisions in NSC 50.
With kindest regards, believe me.
Sincerely,
R.H. Hillenkoetter/4/
Rear Admiral, USN/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
395. Memorandum From Shane MacCarthy to the Chief of the Intelligence Coordinating and Planning Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (Childs)
Washington, August 24, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. Secret.
SUBJECT
Clarification of Points in Mr. Armstrong's SubmittalIn accordance with your instruction, and in keeping with the statement of Mr. Armstrong, I spent considerable time today with Mr. Allan Evans, Director, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, to seek further clarification on parts of the four problems submitted by Mr. Armstrong to CIA under his memorandum of 2 August 1949./1/
/1/Document 393.
I-1. That ICAPS serve as a joint staff under the direction of, and responsible to, the DCI, be composed of members contributed by the several agencies on a fulltime basis, but not "representing" the agency, and be headed by a chief who will also be the Executive Secretary of the IAC.
Evans sees no conflict between ICAPS acting as the Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence and performing, as required, certain staff work for the IAC, of which the DCI is the Chairman. He did not visualize a permanent staff in the sense of the National Security Council organization, and he was not pressing for the choice of the title "Executive Secretary." What State does desire here is that adequate staff work be performed for the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
I-3. That the representation on the Standing Committee be the same as that of the IAC, and that the Standing Committee serve as a subordinate or staff committee to the IAC to consider on an interagency basis, problems referred to it by the IAC.
Evans contends that the representation on the Standing Committee should be the same as the membership on the IAC. If any one agency, for example the Joint Chiefs, does not desire representation on the Standing Committee, they may make this decision themselves without disrupting the basic concept. ICAPS' relationship to the Standing Committee should change to the extent that the members of ICAPS as a whole would no longer be members of the Standing Committee; that the Chief of ICAPS, in chairing the Standing Committee, should represent CIA; and that the other members of ICAPS should remain out of the Standing Committee meetings, except as needed for specific purposes.
Further discussion of this whole problem about the relationship of ICAPS to the Standing Committee brought certain modifications into the stability of Evans' thinking process. He could see the benefit to be achieved by the other members of ICAPS in listening to and participating in the discussions at the IAC meetings. However, he felt that CIA usually had too many of their members coming to meetings, and that their presence was having a bad effect upon agency representation.
I-4. That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibility on research programs primarily through the Estimates Division, whose primary function should be such coordination, in accordance with the following principles:
When I told Evans that NSC 50 allowed us to solve our problems in a manner which we determined most appropriate, he still expressed the view that the "Estimates Division" is the only way for CIA to conduct its coordinating responsibility on intelligence research programs.
I-4a. CIA will constitute itself the center of information on all U.S. foreign intelligence activities, including current research intelligence projects;
The word "activities" was used in purposeful manner. They do not want CIA to be considered the center of all foreign intelligence information. On the other hand, State does feel that CIA should know what all intelligence agencies are doing, which is not making of CIA a central reservoir on all foreign intelligence information. This is the "central index" concept of having in one spot a knowledge of all agency programs at all times. For example, quite some time ago the Atomic Energy Commission wanted to know what agency or agencies were doing research on electric power in Russia. CIA did not know, and eventually it was found out that OIR was doing such a project.
I-4b. CIA will have free access to the plans and programs of the several intelligence agencies, subject to overall departmental regulation;
The accessibility to "plans and programs" is modified by the words "subject to overall departmental regulation." It is true that this paragraph is intended to liberalize the present viewpoint regarding inspection of "intelligence matters" mentioned in NSCID No. 1. The words "subject to overall departmental regulation" refer to the agency personnel rather than to the people from CIA. The agency is to determine what their own people may talk about and what they may not talk about. Accordingly, the words "subject to overall departmental regulation" involve policy as well as security.
I-4f. CIA will recognize that coordination also implies assistance to the agencies in meeting their responsibilities, including in some cases the temporary assignments of personnel to the agencies.
State did not mean to convey the concept that coordination always and generally involves financial assistance to the agency being coordinated. What State does infer is that the function of coordination does include assistance of any type to avoid the establishing of functions on the duplicated basis. As a specific example in support of this point of view, Mr. Evans stated that on frequent occasions when assignments are to be accomplished on an ad hoc basis, it may be ascertained that the departmental organization is not adequately staffed or equipped to accomplish the task. Under such circumstances, he contends that the tendency is for us in CIA to conclude that the agency cannot perform the task, and therefore we must set up a section or unit to do so. Such "sections" or "units", according to Mr. Evans, remain as permanent adjuncts of the CIA organization. He reiterated that all such duplications could be avoided if everything that needed to be done on an ad hoc basis, recognizing that it fell within the allocated responsibility of the agency, can be done if CIA will help the agency do so.
II-1a. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national intelligence estimates:
That national intelligence applies only to intelligence which is interdepartmental in substance;
Evans does not feel that the present definitions of the NSCIDs need revising. In fact, he emphasizes the view that this recommendation, together with sentence 2 of paragraph 2 of the discussion under "Production of National Intelligence" is merely stating what the directives already propound.
II-1b. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national intelligence estimates:
That national intelligence should be developed with a maximum use of departmental facilities and minimum duplication of departmental intelligence activities;
Evans does not feel that DCI 3/1 needs revising. He does indicate that we do not live up to it, and that we are always inclined to put production items into the category of "urgent" and "exceptional." I asked him if he did not agree with the statement that CIA may under certain circumstances produce political intelligence and that under 3/1 the Department of State had admitted such. He became a little bit peeved at this question and was somewhat evasive and circuitous in his answer. In a supercilious manner he stated:--To deny that CIA may on occasions do political estimates is too narrow a viewpoint. When they do so, according to Evans, it is a matter of "common interest," which words he used interchangeably with "common concern." He added that of course in such cases the political estimates would be prepared by an individual like Mr. Montague. In other words, he assigned this happening to a person rather than to a segment of our organization.
II-2. That the IAC discuss and approve all national intelligence estimates on which there is substantial disagreement among the agencies or upon the request of a member.
This refers to the members of IAC and not to the agencies. The words "substantial disagreement" mean that when there is an estimate with dissent under present procedures that amounts to a "substantial disagreement" and as such should be discussed. The very fact that the dissent is published makes it, in Mr. Evans' viewpoint, "substantial." He did say that every effort should be made to eradicate the possibility of publishing an estimate with dissent, and he feels that under present procedures this is being done. He holds the view that the publishing of an estimate with dissent is a rather important decision, especially for the dissenting agency, and that the collective discussion at this stage by the IAC members may lessen to a considerable degree the number of dissents. Furthermore, he holds that this is the thinking process of the Dulles report and NSC 50.
III-1. That, aside from national intelligence, CIA will produce intelligence reports only in fields of common concern, as prescribed by the DCI on the advice of the IAC.
In discussing this recommendation, Evans referred back to what he felt was the meaning of "national intelligence" in the directives; namely that it was distinguished from departmental intelligence "by a substantive overlap between more than one field of departmental interest as allocated." We spent much time discussing the limiting word "only" in line 2 of this recommendation. And again, I asked him the question as to whether State had not already concurred in the viewpoint that we may produce what is definitely a departmental intelligence under certain circumstances. The affirmative reply from Mr. Evans on this question was again very weak, in which he indicated that no one will deny the fact that under certain unusual circumstances CIA "as well as any other agency" may do certain things which are not normally looked upon as within the prerogative of the agency. He elaborated on this viewpoint by stating on rare occasions his office may get a request from the Secretary for something which is almost solely military in content, and that since his office has the necessary information, they work up the answer without referring the request to G-2. At this juncture, I felt like saying that we should no longer receive accusations from State about the fact that ORE was duplicating OIR. But I felt that silence was golden.
"Common concern" means of interest to two or more agencies, and as an illustration of this he mentioned "transportation" and "communications."
IV-1. That ICAPS study and prepare recommendations for consideration by the IAC on the proper allocation of responsibility for political summaries, both daily and weekly.
Evans said that he did not feel very strong about the daily political summary. In fact he didn't feel too strong about the whole recommendation. However, he felt that the question involved pertained more to the weekly summary than to the daily. I do not believe that anything will be pressed by State on this recommendation.
Shane MacCarthy/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
396. Memorandum From the Chief of the Intelligence Coordinating and Planning Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (Childs) to the Members of the IAC Standing Committee
Washington, August 25, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. Secret.
SUBJECT
State's Four Problems re NSC 50REFERENCE
(a) Circular memorandum 5 August 1949/1/ to IAC Members "Implementation of NSC 50 (Dulles Report Recommendations)" enclosing copy of a letter dated 2 August 1949/2/ from Mr. Armstrong, submitting for IAC consideration Four Problems raised by NSC 50./1/See the source note, Document 393.
/2/Document 393.
(b) Decision at IAC meeting of August 19th that the Standing Committee would give consideration to Mr. Armstrong's Four Problems
1. In giving consideration to Mr. Armstrong's four problems, CIA thought that a certain amount of clarification was needed on the following recommendations:
I-1.
I-4a.
II-1b.
III-1.
I-3.
I-4b.
II-2.
III-2.
I-4.
I-4f.
II-3.
IV-1.
2. In discussing these paragraphs with the State Department, it was ascertained that:
"I-1. That ICAPS serve as a joint staff under the direction of, and responsible to, the DCI, be composed of members contributed by the several agencies on a fulltime basis, but not 'representing' the agency, and be headed by a chief who will also be the Executive Secretary of the IAC."
State desires that ICAPS be the staff of the DCI and also of the IAC (the latter a part-time job).
"I-3. That the representation on the Standing Committee be the same as that of the IAC, and that the Standing Committee serve as a subordinate or staff committee to the IAC to consider on an interagency basis, problems referred to it by the IAC."
ICAPS as a group would no longer be a member of the Standing Committee. Only the Chief of ICAPS, as Chairman of the Standing Committee, would represent CIA. The Standing Committee Members would continue to work for their IAC members, but not on the ICAPS level in drafting papers.
CIA Comments on the above two recommendations:
The DCI is opposed to making the working committee and staff (Standing Committee and ICAPS) too formal. ICAPS apparently is to become not only the staff of the DCI, but also the staff of the IAC and the Standing Committee is to become a little IAC; i.e., an additional higher layer advisory committee inserted to grant approval or disapproval to the papers prepared by ICAPS in its capacity as a staff of the real Advisory Committee. The DCI thinks this layer of "consultants" is unnecessary for such working groups and they should not be aggrandized and restricted by formal parliamentary procedures. He thinks discussions in the ICAPS-Standing Committee group among themselves and with specialists from the agencies, when necessary or desirable, are healthy and should not be limited and restricted to only certain members, especially when technical matters come up that are more familiar to the working specialists then to the overall planners. Furthermore, the DCI thinks it most desirable that the IAC agencies participate from the beginning in actually drawing up the proposals.
"I-4. That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibility on research programs primarily through the Estimates Division, whose primary function should be such coordination, in accordance with the following principles:"
State thinks there should be an "Estimates Division" and that one of its prime functions should be coordinating intelligence research programs. The establishment of such an "Estimates Division" in the Dulles Report is not obligatory in NSC 50 and is not one of the internal organization changes which is contemplated by the DCI at present.
"I-4a. CIA will constitute itself the center of information on all U.S. foreign intelligence activities, including current research intelligence projects;"
This does not mean that CIA is to be a central reservoir of foreign intelligence or foreign intelligence information, but rather is to know what all intelligence agencies are doing; i.e., a "central index" having knowledge of all agency programs.
"I-4b. CIA will have free access to the plans and programs of the several intelligence agencies, subject to overall departmental regulation;"
This paragraph is intended to liberalize NSCID No. 1, which allows access only to "intelligence materials;" but, on the other hand, its last qualifying clause refers to the policies as well as the security of the various departments.
"I-4f. CIA will recognize that coordination also implies assistance to the agencies in meeting their responsibilities, including in some cases the temporary assignment of personnel to the agencies."
State still maintains that such assistance is a function of coordination and cited as an example that, when it is not adequately staffed or equipped to accomplish a task within its field of dominant interest, CIA should provide assistance to State for this purpose rather than performing the task in CIA. CIA maintains that such work in CIA would be complementing, not duplicating, State's work and that financial and personnel assistance to outside agencies from CIA cannot be considered "coordination." In the matters of extra funds and personnel, there no longer is the "elasticity" in CIA that there once was!
"II-1a. That national intelligence applies only to intelligence which is interdepartmental in substance;"
State visualizes no change in the existing definitions of national intelligence.
"II-1b. That national intelligence should be developed with a maximum use of departmental facilities and minimum duplication of departmental intelligence activities."
State thinks CIA is not living up to DCI 3/1 and that CIA is always inclined to put its production into the category of "urgent" or "exceptional."
"II-2. That the IAC discuss and approve all national intelligence estimates on which there is substantial disagreement among the agencies or upon the request of a member."
This refers to the members of the IAC, not to the IAC agencies; i.e., the IAC members should discuss around a table together any "substantial disagreements" which may lead to a dissent, hoping that much collective discussion by the IAC members themselves before a paper is finalized may lessen to a considerable degree the number of dissents.
"III-1. That, aside from national intelligence, CIA will produce intelligence reports only in fields of common concern, as prescribed by the DCI on the advice of the IAC."
OIR in State feels that ORE in CIA is duplicating its work and wishes to confine CIA's activity only to "national intelligence" and only to "fields of common concern." State thinks that "common concern" are items of interest to two or more agencies and cited as an example "transportation" and "communications." The DCI, however, is often called upon by the President, the NSC, the JCS and others on a high level for intelligence estimates which they need. He feels that he must comply with such requests as expeditiously as possible.
"IV-1. That ICAPS study and prepare recommendations for consideration by the IAC on the proper allocation of responsibility for political summaries, both daily and weekly."
State no longer seemed to feel strongly about the daily and weekly publications mentioned herein.
3. It is requested, therefore, that we have a Standing Committee Meeting to consider Mr. Armstrong's Four Problems on Tuesday afternoon, 30 August 1949, at 2:00 p.m. in the Director's Conference Room on the Ground Floor of the Administration Building, 2430 E Street, N.W. The discussion at this meeting could be used to formulate a memorandum showing wherein the other IAC agencies agree or disagree with State's recommendations. These data can subsequently be used as part of the reply due the Executive Secretary of the NSC in answer to his circular memorandum of July 7th.
Prescott Childs/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
397. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Special Operations (Schow) to the Chief of the Intelligence Coordinating and Planning Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (Childs)
Washington, August 26, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
The NSC 50 Approval of the Dulles ReportReference is made to your memorandum dated 22 August 19491 concerning the above subject. Pursuant to your request, there are set out below appropriate comments on the last three items mentioned under Section 4 of the circular memorandum from the DCI dated 12 July 1949./1/
/1/Not found.
1. Coordination of Covert Intelligence Activities in Occupied Areas.
With regard to this problem action has been taken recently directly with the Intelligence Division GSUSA to effect a closer coordination of such activity which has resulted in an appreciable improvement in the situation and a substantial increase of coordination in both the Far Eastern and European Areas. The ultimate solution to the problem presented depends, however, in my opinion, upon appropriate agreement between, first, the IAC agencies and secondly, the National Security Council for an exact allocation and coordination of all covert intelligence activities in the areas involved. This agreement and the implementation thereof necessitate requesting certain basic revisions in NSC Intelligence Directives, particularly in NSCID-2 and NSCID-5. It is recommended that at the proper time the IAC agencies propose to the NSC a revision of these two directives which will centralize the responsibility for the coordination and procurement of all covert intelligence in the hands of the DCI both in occupied areas and in all other areas outside of the United States and its possessions. NSCID-5 should, in addition, on recommendation of the IAC Agencies be amended by the National Security Council to more specifically limit the exceptions (contained therein) to the allocated responsibility of the DCI for the conduct of all Federal espionage and counterespionage outside the United States and its possessions. Specific recommendations in this connection to be approved by the IAC and presented to the NSC for issuance as amended directives are presently being considered and will be proposed at the appropriate time by this office.
2. Coordination of the Handling of Defectors.
As your reference memorandum indicates, the proposed coordination of the handling of defectors depends to a large extent on the issuance as soon as possible of the proposed NSCID on defectors which is being circulated to the IAC Standing Committee for consideration. It is noted that this proposed NSCID has been under consideration and in the proc-ess of preparation by the interested agencies for almost a year, during which time various unfortunate incidents involving the uncoordinated handling of defectors have clearly demonstrated the absolute necessity for coordination and control in this field. I feel I should point out in addition that even the issuance by the NSC of the proposed NSCID on defectors as now written cannot be expected to provide any immediate solution to the problem, inasmuch as before such a solution can be reached it will be necessary for the IAC agencies and the DCI to agree on and issue detailed implementing instructions and procedures which, if the progress of the proposed NSCID is any standard, may take a number of additional months to complete. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
3. Increased Emphasis on the Counterespionage Activities Abroad of CIA and Closer Liaison on Counterespionage Matters with the FBI.
With regard to the above problem this office has placed increased stress on the counterespionage function and on counterespionage activity abroad on a continuing basis. Attention is directed to the proposed order codifying and centralizing the counterespionage functions and responsibilities of the Office of Special Operations which has been recommended to the DCI for his approval and which he is presently considering. Plans and procedures which have been drawn up for an increased emphasis on counterespionage activity are included in the recommendation which has been submitted concerning the merger of the covert offices and related functions of CIA. To an extent, of course, the accomplishment of this increased emphasis cannot be undertaken until there is some implementation of the proposed integration of the covert offices and related functions. In connection with counterespionage activity abroad, appropriate amendment of NSCID-5 which, as noted above will be recommended in due course, will permit greater clarity and coordination in the counterespionage field as well as a more effective fulfillment of the CIA counterespionage mission.
In connection with the question of closer liaison on counterespionage matters with the FBI, I feel I should point out that this liaison and the cooperation attendant thereon have increased effectively for a considerable period of time and particularly in the past two years. Obviously the development of the closest possible working relationship in this regard is not only necessary but highly desirable. Recommendations for a more orderly centralized control and effectuation of the liaison with the FBI were recently made to the Executive but the complete implementation of these recommendations is again dependent upon the integration of the covert offices and related functions of CIA. Every effort is being made, of course, not only pursuant to the recommendations of NSC 50, but particularly pursuant to the long standing instructions of the DCI, to develop the closest possible counterespionage liaison with the FBI, and I feel sure that the appropriate officials of the FBI are in agreement with me that this liaison relationship at the present time is close, effective, and mutually advantageous.
Robert A. Schow
398. Memorandum From the Deputy Special Assistant (Howe) to the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong)
Washington, September 8, 1949.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776, Office of Policy Coordination. Confidential.
I understand that a very stiff fight is now going on between Schow and Wisner as to who will take over the direction of the reorganized, combined OSO-OPC office. Hilly is pushing for Schow, but Mr. Webb has entered the fray, quite firmly telling Hilly that Schow is unacceptable and telling Wisner that he cannot resign as he was selected by the Department and is considered the Department's choice--at least for OPC. For the moment the problem seems to be in abeyance, since Mr. Webb is tied up with the British talks.
The situation has the real makings of a jumble, because it is obviously impossible to get a man big enough to be over Wisner and small enough to be under Hilly. Furthermore, I do not believe we can hope for a solution of the State Department insisting on Wisner, and Hilly resigning on the issue.
My personal view is that it would probably be an excellent thing for Wisner to take over the new job and if possible retain Schow in OSO and get, as he is capable of it, an able man to replace him in OPC.
Again I am a little disturbed that the Department seems to be taking a position on a CIA matter without informing us--let alone consulting.
FH
399. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence (Machle) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, September 29, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 84-T00286R, Box 5, Folder 1. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Inability of OSI to Accomplish Its Mission1. Both the Dulles and Eberstadt Committees expressed particular concern with respect to the inadequacies of scientific and technical intelligence and stressed the likelihood of their over-riding importance. As stated by the Eberstadt Committee:/1/
/1/Not printed. (Ibid.)
"Failure properly to appraise the extent of scientific development in enemy countries may have more immediate and catastrophic consequences than failure in any other field of intelligence."
2. Little has been accomplished toward correcting these inadequacies. They are high lighted by the almost total failure of conventional intelligence in estimating Soviet development of an atomic bomb. Important current inadequacies are summarized below and are discussed in more detail in Enclosure I:/2/
/2/None of the enclosures is printed.
a. Atomic Warfare (Tab I-A)
(1) The USSR completed an atomic bomb in half the estimated time required.
(2) The rate of Soviet production of atomic bombs must be determined accurately. On the basis of present knowledge this is impossible. Therefore, estimates of potential bomb stockpiles have been attempted on the basis of estimates of total uranium ore available to the USSR. The probability of error in estimates of domestic USSR supply of uranium ore is large because they are predicated almost entirely on geologic reasoning. Similar reasoning has been proved to be in error by a factor of five in the case of estimates of Satellite uranium mining operations.
b. Biological Warfare (Tab I-B)
The only defense against BW is timely and accurate intelligence on:
(1) Specific agents to be employed.
(2) The means for dissemination.
(3) Location and capacity of research and production installations.
With respect to these considerations, nothing is known about the BW agents under investigation in the USSR; only allusions as to means of dissemination can be cited; and there is no positive information on research and production installations.
c. Chemical Warfare (Tab I-C)
Almost no information is available on Soviet development of new CW agents, particularly nerve gases; nor is reliable information available with respect to CW preparations in general. Crude estimates are based almost entirely upon German intelligence from World War II.
d. Electronics (Tab I-D)
Electronic systems, which include radar and communication equipment, are the means of integrating operations of modern military organizations. Our knowledge of Soviet developments in communications, navigation, interception, fire control, and other electronic systems is extremely limited or non-existent. Most estimates are based upon extrapolations of knowledge of equipment obtained by the USSR through Lend-Lease or capture from the Germans.
e. Aircraft (Tab I-E)
In general, knowledge of Soviet aircraft development is limited to information available with respect to their exploitation of German equipment. The one exception is the limited intelligence obtainable from observation of new aircraft displayed at the May Day and Air Force shows. In particular, information is lacking on night fighter aircraft, rocket-propelled intercepters, long-range heavy bombers, supersonic research aircraft, and jet and rocket engines.
f. Guided Missiles (Tab I-F)
Very limited information indicates that the Soviets are continuing the German developments in guided missiles. However, there is no information as to the extent of the effort or the progress being made.
g. Medical Intelligence
Medical Intelligence is vital in operations involving AM, BW, CW, RW and, in fact, in any preparations for military operations. The Eber-stadt Committee stated that "medical intelligence is virtually non-exist-ent." There has been no significant improvement since this statement was made.
h. Basic Scientific Research
In addition to the specific inadequacies of intelligence outlined in the preceding paragraphs, there is a vast area of ignorance of basic scientific research in USSR and Satellite countries. Knowledge of scientific progress is essential to foresee the development of new weapons.
3. The inadequacies in present national scientific intelligence exist because of conditions both inside and outside CIA.
Conditions Outside CIA
4. The conditions outside CIA which are preventing OSI from accomplishing its mission are:
a. Refusal of the Departments to recognize CIA as the central coordinating agency in the national intelligence structure. This refusal is evidenced by active non-cooperation which is summarized and documented in Enclosure II.
b. Lack of authority to effect coordination of intelligence activities through emasculation of the authority of the National Security Act by the NSCID's. This subject is covered admirably in the memorandum from General Counsel to Executive, subject: "Legal Responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency," dated 27 September 1949./3/
/3/Not found.
c. Domination of CIA by the departmental intelligence agencies through the mechanism of the IAC.
5. These conditions can be corrected only if the Departments are forced to recognize the intent of the National Security Act and the authority granted CIA thereunder. This can be accomplished only through clear-cut implementation of the National Security Act. Therefore, it is recommended that the National Security Council be requested to:
a. Reinstate the authority granted the Director of Central Intelligence in the directive approved by the National Intelligence Authority at its 9th meeting on 12 February 1947./4/ This directive provided that the Director of Central Intelligence "shall operate . . . as an agent of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy . . . so that his decisions, orders and directives shall be considered as emanating from them . . . ."
/4/See Document 185. The language quoted was not embodied in an NIA Directive as such but was an "authority" or "delegation" approved by the NIA at the meeting and formally entered in the minutes. The NIA rescinded the authority at its 10th meeting on June 26, 1947; see Document 319.
b. Readopt the definition of "strategic and national policy intelligence" approved by the National Intelligence Authority at its 9th meeting, but amended to include "scientific" intelligence. (See Tab D, Enclosure III.)
c. Revise the NSCID's in conformity with the foregoing which should include the elimination of IAC as the "Board of Directors" of CIA.
Attached hereto as Enclosure III is a suggested memorandum to the National Security Council incorporating the above recommendations.
Conditions Inside CIA
6. The underlying condition within CIA which is preventing OSI from accomplishing its mission is the failure of the collecting offices to recognize that they exist only to provide services for the producing offices and agencies. As a result, collection, dissemination and library functions have become ends unto themselves. This is evidenced by the statement of the AD/OSO that:
"[OSO]/5/ must weigh the demands of all customers and determine priorities for all operations in the field." (See Tab N, Enclosure IV.)
/5/Brackets in the source text.
7. Because of this situation, OSO has failed completely to discharge its responsibility for covert collection of scientific and technical intelligence. The effect of this failure on specific fields of scientific intelligence is illustrated by references to OSO in Tabs A, B, G and N of Enclosure I. A compilation of specific cases and an analysis of organizational and operational deficiencies of OSO are contained in Enclosure IV. These deficiencies may be summarized as follows:
a. There is no effective planning of scientific and technical intelligence operations in OSO nor any mechanism for relating such planning to the needs for national scientific intelligence.
b. The position of the scientific staff of OSO as a purely advisory group makes impossible effective implementation of plans for scientific and technical intelligence operations.
c. A fallacious concept of operational security dangerously limits the dissemination of useful intelligence to OSI and prohibits technical guidance of operations by informed and competent analysts.
8. In order to provide the positive covert support required by OSI from OSO, it is recommended that:
a. OSO be directed to collect scientific and technical information in conformity with the importance of that information to the national security and to conduct its operations in accordance with integrated priorities determined jointly by OSI and ORN.
b. In order to provide day to day guidance by OSI in the collection of scientific and technical information, controlled direct liaison be established between OSI and the Foreign Branches of OSO.
c. The qualified staff members and the functions of TGS/OSO be transferred to OSI, in so far as these functions relate to planning and coordinating technical and scientific operations, processing requirements for technical and scientific intelligence information, procuring technical advice for OSO, and editing scientific and technical intelligence for dissemination outside CIA.
d. OSO be directed to obtain approval by AD/OSI, or his specifically designated representative, of the technical and scientific objectives of any covert operation prior to its initiation.
9. With respect to OO and OCD, it is recommended that the policies and functions of these offices be reviewed in order that their operations may reflect more adequately the guidance of the producing offices and agencies.
Willard Machle/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Continue with Document 400
