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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume I Vietnam, 1961 Department of State Washington, DC

I. Visit of General Edward G. Lansdale to Vietnam
January 2-14, 1961

 

1. Paper Prepared by the Country Team Staff Committee/1/

Saigon, [January 4, 1961.]

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/1-461. Secret. The Country Team Staff Committee was chaired by Mendenhall and composed of officers from MAAG, USOM, USIS, OSA, and the Embassy. Transmitted as enclosure 1 to despatch 276 from Saigon, January 4.

The plan consisted of a table of contents, the basic plan, 3 annexes, 15 appendices, and 5 tabs. Only the basic plan is printed here. For the draft plan transmitted to Saigon in 1960, see Def 982994, September 16, Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. I, p. 572. In despatch 486, Ambassador Durbrow commented that a number of the indispensable recommendations would "probably not be particularly palatable" to the Government of Vietnam, especially certain political actions and ideas about military-civilian relationships. The Ambassador completed his comments by stating that consideration should be given to what steps "we are prepared to take to encourage, or if necessary to force, acceptance of all essential elements of the plan."

Throughout January the Embassy in Saigon transmitted minor changes in the plan, especially in the summary table of costs. These messages are in Department of State, Central File 751K.5-MSP.

BASIC COUNTERINSURGENCY PLAN FOR VIET-NAM

1. Situation

a. General:

(1) Communist-inspired insurgency in SVN, aimed at the destruction of authority and prestige of established government, is a prelude to further inroads designed ultimately to absorb SVN into the Communist bloc.

(2) Existing Conditions:

(a) General: Developments in South Viet-Nam over the past year indicate a trend that is adverse to the stability and effectiveness of President Diem's government. Beginning in December 1959 and continuing to the present, there has been a mounting increase throughout South Viet-Nam of Viet Cong terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare. This activity has included armed propaganda and leaflet distribution; taxing of the population for food, money, and medicines; kidnapping and murder of village and hamlet officials, road and canal ambushes; and armed attacks against agrovilles, land development centers, Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps posts, as well as small army units. Through the use of these tactics current Viet Cong military and political objectives are the overthrow of the Diem Government. Their immediate objectives are to eliminate any semblance of GVN control in rural areas, particularly the Mekong Delta, and establish so-called "liberated zones."

(b) Political: Politically, discontent with the Diem Government has been prevalent for some time among intellectuals and elite circles and has been rising among the peasantry and, to some extent, labor and urban business groups. Criticism of these elements focuses on Ngo family rule, especially the roles of the President's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and Madame Nhu and the influence of the clandestine Can Lao political apparatus of the regime. An even more important element in the political situation is the criticism of the President's leadership within government circles, including the official bureaucracy and the military. In the past, such discontent and criticism had been centered on Diem's brothers, Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, as directors of the allegedly corrupt Can Lao Party.

Further aggravating many of the government's problems is the active and partly successful campaign of the Viet Cong to discredit President Diem and weaken the government's authority through political subversion, as well as through military action. Among other factors making this possible is the void between the GVN and its people which stems from the failure of the GVN to communicate understandably with the population and, in reverse, the lack of an effective mechanism whereby the people can in their terms communicate with the GVN. Taking advantage of this lack of effective communication and the GVN's inability to protect the people the Viet Cong has had considerable success in sowing disaffection and disrupting effective administration of the government among the population. This is especially true in the Capital, 1st and 5th Military Regions. Viet Cong successes in these regions are due to the large number among the population who, whether out of terror or sympathy, give support to the Viet Cong. Aided by this situation, the Viet Cong is striving to establish a political apparatus parallel to the GVN. Below province level in the 5th Military Region, no effective GVN control exists in many areas. The Viet Cong are increasing the void by taxation, terroristic acts, attacks on Self Defense posts, assassination of village and provincial officials, and simultaneously a systematic development of the Viet Cong political apparatus to fill the void. In view of the above conditions the principal task facing the GVN is restoration of individual security.

(c) Military: Military force, in the form of increased communist insurgency, is clearly the major immediate threat to the stability of Viet-Nam today. South Viet-Nam is unique in that it is the only country in the world which is forced to defend itself against a communist internal subversion action, while at the same time being subject to the militarily supportable threat of a conventional external attack from communist North Viet-Nam. The RVNAF force basis is inadequate to meet both these threats./2/

/2/See two last sentences of penultimate paragraph of covering despatch for Ambassador Durbrow's views on this subject. [Footnote in the source text. Regarding these views, see footnote 1 above.]

The problem is twofold, although at present the counterinsurgency phase is the more dangerous and immediate. In this counterinsurgency fight RVNAF is on the defensive. Approximately 75% of ARVN is committed to pacification missions, about half of these being committed to static guard and security roles. The military chain of command has usually been violated at the expense of unity of effort and command. No adequate operations control or overall planning system presently exists, although significant progress has been made in the development of military plans. The President has exercised arbitrary control of operations, by-passing command channels of the JGS and often Corps and Division staff. Resources have been fragmented to provincial control. The above practices appear to have been designed to divide responsibility in order to guard against the possibility of a military coup through placing too much power in the hands of a single subordinate. The guerrilla problem has become much more serious than the Civil Guard can manage, thereby requiring a disproportionately large RVNAF commitment, which has further resulted in a serious weakening of the RVNAF capability for defense against internal or overt attack in force. Rotation within RVNAF and Civil Guard cannot be accomplished regularly. Many units have been on operations for a year or more without relief, because RVNAF strength is insufficient to permit an adequate rotation policy and to conduct adequate border and coastal surveillance. Many troops are battle weary, in a state of low morale, and in need of recuperation and training. Notwithstanding the above deficiencies, GVN plans have recently been developed for the RVNAF Command Control and Logistic structure which upon implementation, possibly in the near future, should correct major deficiencies if adequate military strength is provided.

The complete divorce of command control from logistics support in the field has resulted in a lethargic and cumbersome requisitioning and supply system. Requisitions from tactical units even below division level must be submitted through channels to agencies of the Defense Department in Saigon with consequent red tape before issues can be authorized and deliveries effected. Reorganization plans being developed will establish "Logistic Commands" in place of present military regions and under operational control of their respective Corps commanders, thus enabling tactical units to follow-through on deliveries against their requisitions. The poor, and in some regions nonexistent, communications systems and road net are primary logistics obstacle [obstacles] in Viet-Nam. Although the President has continued to make strenuous efforts to improve the road net, military movements must continue to rely on light more mobile systems and airlift for the foreseeable future. Implementation of the concept of light mobile logistic support with pack supply suitable to mountain trails is urgent if RVNAF is to take offensive against insurgency.

Some elements of desirable counterinsurgency actions have been recommended piecemeal to GVN and RVNAF authorities. These elements have been incorporated herein in order to form a comprehensive and coordinated plan for counterinsurgency actions. President Diem and RVNAF military authorities appear to be receptive to significant improvement of the national military establishment and some of the actions contemplated by this plan have actually been taken and others are under consideration by the RVNAF authorities. The GVN's plans for implementing counterinsurgency measures are progressing at an increasing tempo concurrently with the preparation of this counterinsurgency plan. It should, therefore, be read with the thought that some elements may already have been implemented or may be in the process of implementation.

The current military intelligence capability of the RVNAF is inadequate to support the critical intelligence requirements of all echelons of the armed forces. Although the GVN has recently agreed that improvement is needed the intelligence agencies of GVN are not now adequately integrated with the various military and quasimilitary intelligence systems. The processing of military intelligence is too slow for timely tactical reaction. The major reason for this slow intelligence responsiveness is the total lack of an adequate civilian communications system in the provinces. While the military command communications system is frequently the best in an area, it is often inadequate, overcrowded, and not comprehensive enough for anti-insurgency intelligence gathering and disseminating needs.

(d) Economic: The economic health of the country, though not robust, has been improving rapidly. In the future, if current economic trends continue and the economy is not further disrupted by adverse security developments, the economy will be able, insofar as physical wealth is concerned, to provide for the consumption needs of a growing population and at the same time to finance a steadily increasing proportion of local military costs and could under favorable conditions meet essentially all these costs. Along with lack of confidence in the future, a principal deterrent to economic progress is the avowed and effective VC campaign for the systematic sabotage of the public works program including progressive destruction of lines of communication, structures, agrovilles and the like when left unprotected by Civil Guard or ARVN units.

For the first several years after institution of direct U.S. aid to Viet-Nam the aid level was determined primarily on a budgetary gap basis, but early in 1959 this was shifted to a balance of payments basis. Since exports plus aid received exceeded imports, sizeable foreign exchange reserves were accumulated. The increase in reserves, together with the GVN's reluctance to tax the wealth accumulating in private hands, has led to a large money supply and an increasing budgetary deficit which could cause inflation.

Distribution of income is very uneven, with rural population receiving little of the benefits of an expanding economy, a fact which is believed to bear on their lack of positive support for the GVN.

The earlier U.S. Country Team-approved military budget of 6,066.9 million piastres for 1961 does not include various GVN proposals relating to the military and security forces. The budgetary aspects of these proposals will be fully discussed in Appendix IV to Annex C which will be submitted separately.

The several proposals in this counterinsurgency plan (see table on following page) will further increase the costs of the GVN's military and related budgets for security forces by perhaps as much as 478.8 million piastres. In subsequent years if the 20,000 force level increase is fully realized, annual costs of the Counterinsurgency Plan proposals will be about 876.9 million piastres.

In addition, a number of other suggestions have been accepted by the GVN, such as subsidization of rice prices to peasants, which will further increase financial pressures. Still other suggestions have been made, such as establishment of a system of payment for corvee labor and institution of a system of subsidies for agroville inhabitants, which, if accepted by the GVN, would add even more to budgetary costs.

Summary Table of Costs

Counterinsurgency Plan (In Millions)

	1961			Annual Costs
	VN$	US$		VN$	US$
		MAP	DS		MAP	DS
(1) 20,000 Force Increase:	280.8	25.1	--	703.3	4.12	--
(2) Transfer of Civil Guard	140.2/3/	14.4/4/	6.9/5/	77.6/3/	5.5/4/	3/5/
(3) Psychological Operations	.5	--	.15	/6/	--	/6/
(4) Communications, i.e., Village Alarm Systems	1.5	--	.5	/6/	--	/6/
(5) Junk Force	55.0	/7/	--	96.0	/7/	--
(6) Intelligence Activities	.3	/7/	--	/6/	/7/	--
(7) Canine Alarm Detachment	.5	--	--	/6/	--	--
Total	478.8	39.5	7.5	876.9	9.6	.3

/3/Amounts given are in addition to annual Civil Guard costs of about 1,125 million piastres for pay and allowances, transportation, etc., all of which is normally covered by GVN's own budget. [Footnote in the source text.]

/4/These are initial costs of transfer and of first full year of force maintenance. Totals given do not include ARVN excess material to be used by the CG valued at $5.3 million in 1961 and approximately $2.0 million annually thereafter. [Footnote in the source text.]

/5/This is MAAG estimate of ICA programmed items pursuant to FY 1959 and FY 1960 ProAgs. (Project No. 430-71-219) required by Civil Guards. This estimate is now under study by USOM. [Footnote in the source text. This project has not been identified further.]

/6/There may be small amounts required annually for the continuation of ongoing activities; these amounts would not be significant in terms of the overall magnitude of costs of the plan. [Footnote in the source text.]

/7/There will be certain MAP requirements for these purposes, but amounts are as yet undetermined. [Footnote in the source text.]

The economic chapter being developed for separate submission will (a) provide further details on cost, (b) estimate the effect of these costs on the total budgetary deficit of the country, (c) suggest means of financing this deficit and (d) suggest certain economic activities to help counter Communist insurgency.

(e) Summary: In view of known communist objectives in SVN, the known general situation and the dangerous political and military situation, if the GVN does not take immediate and extraordinary action to regain popular support and to correct the organizational and procedural weaknesses which contribute to the growth of the Viet Cong power, the Viet Cong can cause the overthrow of the present GVN government in the months to come.

b. Enemy Forces: See Current Intelligence Estimates.

c. Friendly Forces:

(1) U.S.: See current Operations Plans. U.S. administration and logistic support to GVN will be coordinated by the Ambassador with the coordination of military logistics support to RVNAF the responsibility of Chief MAAG.

(2) GVN has an active military force of 150,000 spaces and an unorganized pool of about 120,000 prior service reservists. The major elements of the active force are three Corps headquarters; seven reduced strength Infantry Divisions; one Airborne Brigade; a Ranger Organization of approximately 9,000; token Air Force and Navy support, to include three Marine Battalions; and sub-minimal logistic support units. A Civil Guard Organization was placed under the operational control of the Department of Defense by Presidential decree early in December 1960 and will commence training on January 3, 1961, on a twenty-four week training cycle. Action is being taken to furnish MAP support to 32,000 of the Civil Guard Force of approximately 60,000. There are no approved plans for adding regular units to the 150,000-man force now in existence. However, President Diem has consistently stated his urgent need for a minimum 20,000 man increase in the RVNAF to improve security and permit rotation of ARVN units for training.

d. Assumptions:

(1) That the greatest immediate threat to the continued existence of the Republic of Viet-Nam is posed by the steady expansion of guerrilla warfare by the Vietnamese Communists, with the Mekong Delta as a political and military base.

(2) That North Viet-Nam has the capability of supporting guerrilla operations in SVN by infiltrating regular forces and cadres to strengthen locally recruited elements. (Guerrilla forces have increased from 3,500 to an ARVN estimate of 9,800 during 1960.)

(3) That at the present time the Diem Government offers the best hope for defeating the Viet Cong threat.

(4) That the Government of Viet-Nam has the basic potential to cope with the Viet Cong guerrilla threat if necessary corrective measures are taken and adequate forces are provided.

(5) That the gravity of this threat will continue until a maximum offensive and coordinated retaliatory effort is made by civil and military authorities.

(6) That the most vital consideration of US policy in Viet-Nam is to create governmental stability by the eradication of insurgency in the Republic of Viet-Nam and to that end the activities of all US agencies will be coordinated.

(7) That the Viet Cong, in coordination with the communist parties of Laos and Cambodia, will continue to build up a maximum effort against the Republic of Viet-Nam. The April '61 elections constitute particularly critical period.

(8) That the DRV has a current continuing military capability for external aggression against SVN.

2. Mission: Defeat Communist insurgency efforts in SVN.

3. Execution:

a. Objectives:

(1) GVN must take immediate and extraordinary action to:

(a) Suppress and defeat disruptive Communist activities in South Viet-Nam and concurrently maintain a capability to meet overt aggression.

(b) Establish and maintain political and economic control and stability.

(c) Interdict aid flowing to insurgents across Vietnamese borders, to include both police and military action in coordination with the adjacent nations of Laos and Cambodia.

(2) Country Team:

(a) Induce the GVN to adopt and vigorously prosecute Country Team Plans designed to defeat Communist insurgency.

b. Tasks:

(1) Political:

(a) Political tasks have been outlined in Embassy Telegram 624, September 16, 1960, and Embassy Telegram 1151, December 4, 1960. Action already taken to carry out those tasks was described in Embassy Telegram 802, October 15, 1960; Embassy Despatch 157, October 15, 1960; Embassy Telegram 1216, December 24, 1960; and Embassy Despatch 264, December 27, 1960. Further action in execution of these tasks is proposed in Embassy Telegram 1151./8/ In addition to tasks relating to the GVN administration itself, further steps are required in the field of development of independent and quasi-independent political institutions and organizations, such as labor unions, youth movements and political parties. Possible steps in this field are under study by the Country Team.

/8/For texts of telegrams 624, 802, 1151, and 1216, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. I, pp. 575, 595, 707, and 739. For texts of despatches 157 and 264, see ibid., pp. 598 and 745.

(2) Security:

(a) Establish an Emergency Operations Control System to include (Appendix I, Annex B):

1. A national emergency council (GVN established an Internal Security Council 7 October 1960).

2. A director of operations (Permanent Secretary for National Defense so designated 7 October 1960) with responsive regional, provincial, district, and village internal security councils.

(b) Implement fully planning aspects of the national planning, programming, and budgeting system (Appendix II, Annex B).

(c) Develop and employ to optimum RVNAF capabilities to support emergency and related internal security operations on a fully coordinated schedule (Appendix III, Annex B).

(d) Take extraordinary action starting at highest levels of government and extending to the lowest political subdivision (the village) to establish and maintain internal security.

(e) Assign high priority to the development of intelligence/ counterintelligence staff and operational procedure to provide not only timely and accurate knowledge of Viet Cong activities and organization within Viet-Nam, but also provide information to enable the GVN to correct sociological and economic problems which the communists are exploiting (Appendix IV, Annex B).

(f) Develop an adequate border/coastal patrol system (Appendix V, Annex B).

(g) Develop an adequate communication capability within GVN agencies to support emergency and related internal security operations (Appendix VI, Annex B).

(h) Employ full use of psychological and civil affairs programs in support of internal security actions (Appendix VII, Annex B).

(i) Establish concurrently means for assuring continued security (Appendix III, Annex B).

(j) Retain the Civil Guard under the temporary control of the Department of Defense for the duration of the emergency (Appendix VII, Annex B).

(k) To develop the force basis for the RVNAF to cope with the insurgency now threatening the GVN and to build capacity for resistance to external aggression (Annex A).

(3) Economic: to be forwarded in supplemental submission to this basic plan.

(4) Psychological:

(a) Improve communications between the Government of VietNam and its people.

(b) Attract the loyalty of the population to the GVN and to the Diem regime.

(c) Acquaint the people with the aims and actions of the GVN and persuade them that the GVN is acting in their interests.

(d) Counteract among the people and in the military sense within the RVNAF VC propaganda denigrating the Diem regime and painting it as opposed to the unification of North and South Viet Nam./9/

/9/A handwritten note on the source text at this point reads: "Easy on this; he does oppose."

(e) Foster a spirit of national unity and purpose among all elements of the Vietnamese society.

(f) Strengthen the people's confidence in and respect for the RVNAF as a security force vis-à-vis the VC.

(g) Raise South Viet-Nam's prestige among the peoples of other countries especially in Asia and Africa as a means of enhancing the GVN's national security and stability.

c. Concept of Operations:

(1) General:

(a) Political Operations. Refer to Embassy communications listed in political section under "Tasks" above.

(b) Politico/Military Operations. In order to provide protection which the people require, it is necessary to exercise more than an ordinary degree of control over the population. Among the more important operations required are those for exercising control in such manner as to isolate insurgents and sympathizers from the support of the populace. Such techniques as registration and identification food control and control of movement will be implemented as appropriate.

(c) Military Operations:

1. There are immediate actions, civil and military, which the GVN can and must take to halt or slow down the current and extremely serious adverse security trend until such time as the necessary increased offensive capability can be brought to bear. These actions include, of course, extraordinary action by the GVN to:

a. Further develop a national emergency operations control system. (Command relationships as described in Appendix I, Annex B.)

b. Implement the National Planning System.

c. Implement the plan for a national intelligence organization and system with particular emphasis on obtaining information at the village level, and integrating effort at the national level.

d. Fully employ military capabilities to include strengthening and reorganizing military command and control channels.

e. Establish a border/coastal surveillance system.

f. Improve the civil and military communications system.

g. Reduce attrition rate of armed forces and utilize the trained manpower pool.

2. Equally as essential as the above is the requirement to overcome inherent weakness in the current RVNAF force structure which contributes directly to the present deterioration in the morale, state of training, and combat effectiveness of the RVNAF. A minimum force increase of 20,000 is required to correct these present weaknesses and to furnish the offensive potential required to defeat the Viet Cong and maintain concurrently a capability for combatting overt attack. In this respect, increased capabilities required to accomplish critical counterinsurgency objectives include:

a. Meaningful rotation of combat units.

b. Effective training.

c. Sufficient ARVN units to replace certain Civil Guard companies to be disengaged for training.

d. More effective surveillance of tremendous and rugged jungle and border areas and inland waterways.

e. Increased helicopter lift and close air support. (Indications are that Viet-Nam will receive 11 H-34's by end of March, 1961.)

f. An adequate intelligence capability.

g. Correction of the present imbalance between logistic support and combat units, and inclusion of additional support for the proposed increase in RVNAF combat troops and for logistical support of the Civil Guard.

h. Adequate forces in position to deter and to combat overt aggression and to prevent further expansion of the Viet Cong insurgency and concurrently communist infiltration of regular troops into SVN in support of the Viet Cong insurgency effort.

i. Establishment of communication means and procedures for lateral and vertical exchange of information at all levels, civil and military.

(d) Economic Operations: To be forwarded in supplemental submission.

(e) Psychological: (See Appendix VII, Annex B)

The exchange of information between the Government and its people is of underlying significance to drawing the two segments of Vietnamese society closer together. By means of a coordinated mechanism at the highest level of the GVN, psychological programs should be developed which not only will keep the people advised quickly and factually of what the government is doing and why, but also will encourage the people to respond to the government's actions in terms which will strengthen their feeling of participation in government and thus their loyalty to it.

Specifically:

1. the expansion of communications facilities (press, radio, films) to the provinces,

2. frequent and frank contact between the government and the press

3. reflecting government operations (especially the National Assembly) via public media to the people,

4. improving the public relations techniques at the Presidency,

5. developing by means of public relations techniques a sense of "mutuality of interests" between the Army and the people,

6. maintaining public awareness of GVN economic development progress,

7. exposing the people to the fallacies of DRV propaganda in popular terms at the local level.

(2) Specific Task Concepts. Attached to Annex B is a detailed analysis of each counterinsurgency task required of the GVN to include purpose, scope, present situation, concept and implementation, with the exception of the required force increase, which is in Annex A.

 

2. Editorial Note

General Lansdale visited Vietnam from January 2 to 14, 1961. On January 17, he reported on his trip in a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Gates, recommending: "The U.S. should recognize that Vietnam is in a critical condition and should treat it as a combat area of the cold war, as an area requiring emergency treatment." For text of the memorandum, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967,Book 11, pages 1-12.

 

3. Summary Record of a Meeting, The White House/1/

Washington, January 28, 1961, 10 a.m-12:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/1-2861. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Parsons. Although the source text indicates the meeting began at 11:45 a.m., according to the President's Log Book and Rusk's Appointment Book, the meeting began at 10 a.m., and Lansdale and Parsons did not join until 10:45. (Kennedy Library, President's Log Book; Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) For another account of the meeting, see the memorandum from Rostow, infra. Parsons in his oral history interview incorrectly dates this meeting on January 21 or 22. (Kennedy Library, Oral History Program, J. Graham Parsons)

In a memorandum to Dulles, Rusk, and McNamara, January 27, McGeorge Bundy reported that the meeting was called to discuss Cuba and Vietnam, the latter because of the President's "keen interest in General Lansdale's recent report and his awareness of the high importance of this country." (Ibid., National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series)

PARTICIPANTS
The President

The Vice President

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

General Lemnitzer, Chairman JCS

The Director of CIA--Mr. Allen Dulles

Assistant Secretary Nitze, Defense Department

Brigadier General Lansdale, USAF

Mr. Broe, CIA

Mr. Parsons, State Department

The President greeted General Lansdale and complimented him on his report on Viet-Nam./2/

/2/See Document 2.

Secretary Rusk asked whether the President would prefer to consider this report first or have a briefing from Mr. Parsons on the Viet-Nam counter-insurgency plan/3/just submitted by the Country Team at Saigon.

/3/Document 1.

Mr. Parsons then outlined the plan, saying that it comprehended not only military, but political, economic and psychological programs. Inspired originally by Defense, it was worked out by a group chaired in the Embassy with participants from MAAG, USOM, USIS and CIA. Apart from the recommendation for a 20,000-man increase in the Vietnamese army and accelerated training under MAAG of the 30,000-man civil guard, the plan recommended organizational changes in the Vietnamese Government having to do with security planning and execution, centralization of intelligence and other factors. The initial cost of the army and civil guard portions of the plan would be approximately $40 million chargeable to MAP in FY 61. Mr. Parsons said that the essence of the plan, including analysis of the situation, assumptions, tasks and recommendations, was in a 20 page double-spaced prelude to the full text. He added that, as regards status of the plan in Washington, it had only just arrived, was elaborated in some 220 pages of detail and in the State Department had received initial approval only at the lower levels of the Far Eastern Bureau. It was probable that FE would recommend to the Secretary that all the main features should be implemented as speedily as possible. Mr. Parsons did not know its status in other Departments. He also mentioned that the Country Team believed that implementation of the military portions of the plan would enable the Vietnamese army to turn from the defensive to the offensive against the Viet Cong guerrillas.

The President remarked that if the situation in Viet-Nam was now so serious he wondered why the recruitment of troops and the training of police, who could become effective only a year or two hence, would be of any use. He also wondered why, if there were only 10,000 guerrillas, an increase from 150 to 170,000 in the army was necessary.

Mr. Parsons responded that it was the judgment of the people out there that this plan would be useful, that civil guard training was already under way, and that it should be borne in mind that the Vietnamese army had two tasks, first to provide a deterrent against conventional attack by the 300,000-man army of north Viet-Nam and, second, to combat widespread and determined insurgency over a large area which, of course, has elsewhere pinned down a much greater number of men.

In response to the President's invitation, General Lansdale spoke at some length along the lines of his report. He also said in reference to the counter-insurgency plan that it was written in the Defense Department and then sent out to Saigon for further consideration. He said that he had found that relations between the MAAG and CAS and President Diem were excellent and that the spirit of the MAAG and CAS people was constructive. Regrettably, it was otherwise in the Embassy and the Foreign Service people were defeatist and not as interested as they should be.

The President referred to General Lansdale's reference to the morale of President Diem and his belief that the Ambassador and others were not fully behind him and perhaps favored the coup d'etat rebels. He wondered if a letter or some gesture from the new administration would help. General Lansdale thought that something of this nature would help a great deal.

Secretary Rusk said that he had received a draft letter for the President to send in response to President Diem's congratulations/4/ and had sent it back for further redrafting with this morale problem in mind. It should reach the President shortly.

/4/Neither letter has been found.

Mr. Allen Dulles emphasized the need for speed and for doing those things which would increase immediately the anti-guerrilla capability in Viet-Nam. With Mr. Broe he also mentioned the limited efforts being made to produce South Vietnamese guerrillas capable of harassing the north Vietnamese. Mr. Broe agreed with Mr. Parsons' remark that thus far the Vietnamese Government had not been very receptive to this program. He added that the teams which had been trained were being used in the contaminated areas of South Viet-Nam.

Secretary Rusk mentioned that Ambassador Durbrow and his staff had had a very difficult role to play over these past three and a half years. Mr. Durbrow had had the unpalatable task of balancing representations designed to persuade President Diem to undertake reforms and other tasks to improve the Vietnamese position against the need to assure him of our support and friendship. This was never easy nor was President Diem an easy person. He thought that the Ambassador had energetically and effectively done this but that it was now time for a change and he should be relieved in the near future./5/

/5/On January 25, Wood drafted a memorandum to this effect for the Secretary of State. It was cleared by Anderson, Cleveland, Parsons, and Steeves and sent through the Under Secretary of State for Administration. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 1-C.2 Ambassador Durbrow, GVN 1961)

At the close of the meeting Secretary Rusk suggested, and the President agreed, that a task force should be set up similar to the one on Cuba to study at once and recommend soonest on the Country Team counter-insurgency plan./6/

/6/As a result of this meeting, the President on January 30 authorized an increase of $28.4 million to expand the Vietnam force level by 20,000 and an expenditure of $12.7 million to improve the quality of the Vietnam Civil Guard. For text of the memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense authorizing the money, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, p. 13.

 

4. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, January 30, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret. Initialed by Rostow, who attended the January 28 meeting, although not listed as a participant in Parsons' memorandum, Document 3.

SUBJECT
Meeting Saturday Morning, January 28, in the President's Office, on Viet-Nam

1. This memorandum is designed for Mr. Bundy only. It aims to give more detail than should go into a memorandum for the record.

2. The President thanked General Lansdale for his memorandum/2/ and stated it, for the first time, gave him a sense of the danger and urgency of the problem in Viet-Nam.

/2/See Document 2. Although paragraph 2 suggests that the President had seen Lansdale's report, Rostow has stated that he gave it to him on February 2 at 3:40 p.m. When the President had read it, according to Rostow, he looked up and said: "This is the worst one we've got, isn't it? You know, Eisenhower never uttered the word Vietnam." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-15-71, MS of Rostow book, Chapter 34, p. 531) Similar accounts of this meeting are also in Kennedy Library, Oral History Program, Walt W. Rostow, p. 44, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 320.

3. Mr. Parsons opened by describing the problems which had emerged out of joint work between Washington and the field for a plan to reverse the course of events in Viet-Nam./3/ Its elements are these:

/3/Document 1.

a. An increase in the force levels from 150,000 to 170,000, involving additional cost to the U.S. of $28.4 million.

b. The proposal to improve, over two years, the quality of the civil guard, involving additional cost to the U.S. of $12.7 million.

It is hoped that these two measures, along with the measures set out below, would permit Viet-Nam to move from the defense to the offense.

c. It is proposed that there be an improved integration of civil and military resources in the Viet-Nam government, from the top to the village level, including a reduction (from the present level of 43) in the number of people reporting personally to Diem and an improvement in the executive quality of those below Diem.

d. The creation of a national planning system for the economy.

e. Increased centralization of governmental institutions.

f. An improved border and coastal patrol system.

g. Improved domestic communications.

h. It is believed the local costs of this program, aside from those suggested above, for the armed forces and the civil guard can be met by the Viet-Nam government without inflation. There is a twenty-page foreword to this plan, and we might wish to get hold of it.

4. The President then asked whether this order of magnitude of increase in the armed forces of Viet-Nam would really permit a shift from the defense to the offense. He asked whether the situation was not basically one of politics and morale.

5. It was explained that a very high proportion of total Viet-Nam forces was now pinned on the front facing a Viet Minh force of 300,000.

6. The President asked whether guerrilla forces could be mounted in the Viet Minh area. It was explained that Diem had shown thus far little taste for such operations. Mr. Dulles said that four teams of eight men each had been organized for harassment; that the CIA had other notions about offensive operations; but thus far these teams had been allocated to working on a series of guerrilla pockets in the south of the country, which had moved in over the Laos border. General Lansdale said that he was familiar with the plan, as was Diem. He said that any plan that could work would require that the Vietnamese themselves become fully engaged. Diem's view was that some parts of the American plan made sense, others would be very difficult. For example, he has been able to find only three men who could bear serious executive responsibility beneath him; only three men who could make tough decisions and not simply buck them upward to himself. He also said that he believed an increment of 20,000 men to the armed forces could significantly affect the margin in the field available for counter-guerrilla operations. The Communists had just begun serious political work in the field. Their objective was to organize some kind of political front capable of bringing Diem down, which they could dominate.

7. The President asked what his estimate of the prospects was. Lansdale replied that the Communists regard 1961 as their big year. He believed that a maximum American effort could frustrate a definitive effort in 1961 and move over into the offensive in 1962. The essentials were three: first, the Americans in Viet-Nam must themselves be infused with high morale and a will to win, and they must get close to the Vietnamese; secondly, the Vietnamese must, in this setting, be moved to act with vigor and confidence; third, Diem must be persuaded to let the opposition coalesce in some legitimate form rather than concentrate on the task of killing him. It was Diem's view that there are Americans in the Foreign Service who are very close to those who tried to kill him on November 11. Lansdale found it impossible to dissuade him that this was a fact. Diem felt confidence in the Americans in the CIA and the MAAG. He had tried to persuade Diem to appoint his brother to an executive position out in the open; but Diem apparently needed the confidence of his brother's advice, given at night and in the early morning; Diem did not believe his brother had executive competence; and the loss of his brother--perhaps in an ambassadorship--would be a traumatic experience for Diem.

8. Lansdale said that if Laos goes to the Communists, we might not have time to organize the turn-around required in American and Viet-Nam morale and action.

9. Mr. Dulles described the recent increase in the number of transmission stations used by the Communists to instruct the guerrillas in Viet-Nam, an increase from 11 to 29. He advocated a quick beef-up of counter-guerrilla forces before the 20,000 increment was organized. He advocated a review within our government of training of foreign guerrillas, a program for which there was no clear-cut line of authority. He said the MAAG organization was excellent but had no adequate provision for pare-military forces. There was no clear authority in Washington; the funding problem was not clear; and the CIA was properly confined to the training of the FBI-type men to seek out and identify dangerous Communists.

10. The President again stated he wants guerrillas to operate in the north and asked what the situation there was. Mr. Dulles replied the people were unhappy and that the government was strong. The military forces consisted of over a quarter of a million men. Moscow had its men in the government bureaus; but the Chinese Communists were more widely spread about in Viet Minh territory.

11. Mr. Rusk explained that the diplomats in Viet-Nam face an extremely frustrating task. They were caught between pressing Diem to do things he did not wish to do and the need to convey to him American support. It was a difficult balance to strike; and Diem was extremely sensitive to criticism.

12. The President asked whether he should write to Diem. Mr. Rusk said this would be a good idea, as part of a new approach by the new Ambassador. It was agreed there would be an early Presidential statement backing the effort in Viet-Nam. The President asked how do we change morale; how do we get operations in the north; how do we get moving? It was replied that the funding problem would be difficult. The emergency fund was low. We already had $41,000,000 committed to Viet-Nam and $30,000,000 committed to Laos. The President expressed in the meeting, as he expressed to me personally, his desire to be fully informed with respect to the emergency fund. He wishes a Viet-Nam task force set up like the Cuba task force. The question of whether General Lansdale or Mr. Kenneth Young should go to Viet-Nam as the new ambassador, was considered.

13. The President said that he wanted Mr. Bundy to make sure to get prompt action on the question of personal responsibility in Washington for the four crises areas: Viet-Nam; Congo: Laos; and Cuba. The President said we must change our course in these areas and we must be better off in three months than we are now.

14. In a conversation after the meeting with Mr. McNamara, Mr. Rusk and myself, Mr. Rusk expressed some anxiety that the development of these task forces might obtrude on the normal workings of the government. Mr. McNamara said he understood this; but for crisis situations such measures would have to be accepted.

 

5. Notes on a Meeting Between the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)/1/

Washington, January 28, 1961, 6:47 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 20 General Lansdale, V-N 1961. Secret. Drafted by Wood. The source text is Wood's handwritten notes.

JGP: Personalities Lansdale = Col. Hillandale./2/ Able performance in Manila. Close to Diem. Lone wolf and operator. Tagged as operator. Flamboyant.

/2/Colonel Hillandale, an American intelligence operative in the novel The Ugly American by Burdick and Lederer.

Secy: How tagged?

. . . . . . .

JGP: Not a team player. Has resented attitudes other Americans particularly FS./3/ Durbie: Tired. Shld be removed. Ladejinsky: Able, sensitive, close to Diem, about to quit. Tried to interest Diem in ordinary people. Durbie has gone pretty far on same line even recommending Nhus and Can Lao. This about ended his influence. Re unsuccessful coup d'etat, Durbie probably saved D's life indirectly. Also kept Diem from being too punitive. Some of his messages on this misinterpreted by Lemnitzer and DOD and played up too much. Thus military antipathy to Durbie.

/3/Foreign Service.

Secy: Does Diem feel Durbie doublecrossed him?

JGP: To some extent. We pushed so hard for liberalization [and failed]/4/ that Diem may think we went over to the other side to get more liberal regime. Trouble in VN is monologue. Diem has again shown his courage and coolness during coup attempt.

/4/All brackets in the source text.

Lansdale memo:/5/ Jibes generally with our views. Much emphasis on what US should [do]; little emphasis on what GVN should do.

/5/See Document 2.

It recommends we intensify support of Diem. We agree he needs help, inspiration and encouragement.

Recommends opposition party guided by U.S. We think unwise.

Secy: Is situation in VN soon to be critical?

JGP: It is near critical. Not hopeless. Diem best fellow.

Secy: Is Diem unpopular?

CBW: He is respected, not popular. Respect has weakened.

Secy: Geneva Accords limitation?

JGP: Amounts, kinds of weapons, numbers our people (MAAG).

Secy: There is an ICC?

JGP: Yes, they have failed in three ways: Kontum, insurgency,/6/ transit USSR aircraft.

/6/On November 10, 1960, the Republic of Vietnam reported to the ICC that Communist attacks during October in Kontum province involved regular North Vietnam troops and constituted open aggression.

Counterinsurgency plan looks like good way mobilize GVN resources.

Secy: Where does it stand?

CBW: Awaiting DOD recommendation, being studied here.

JGP: Recently received.

Re Durbie--should he and McGarr. They sometimes differ, but there are understandable differences.

 

6. Letter From the Secretary of Defense's Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to President Diem/1/

Washington, January 30, 1961.

/1/Source: Hoover Institution, Lansdale Papers, Chron File, D.

Dear Friend: Your thoughtful kindness made the trip to Vietnam a most interesting and memorable one for me. I was happy to see you looking so well, despite the many problems you face every day, and it was a real pleasure to have had visits with you. So, thank you for all your help, for letting Nguyen Dinh Thuan go along on the 5th Military Region trip, and for the sandwiches you sent along! I know that Joe Redick would want to join me in expressing appreciation, too.

On the way home, I stopped in Hawaii for a visit at CINCPAC. I had good talks with Admiral Felt and his staff. I called attention to the grave dangers of the current Viet Cong threat and the need for some extra attention by the U.S. He was extremely interested and, although understandably engaged with urgent duties concerning Laos, put some of his staff to work promptly on your problems. I understand that he sent General Thiemer out for a visit.

In Washington, Secretary Gates and Deputy Secretary Douglas of Defense were most receptive to my report./2/ Douglas in particular called it to the attention of our top people at the White House and State Department. When the new Administration took office, Douglas went to considerable lengths to make our new leaders aware of the situation. He is a very staunch friend. Allen Dulles, also, has been most helpful. General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke had been instrumental in getting me out on the trip and have taken great interest in what I reported.

/2/See Document 2.

The new Defense leaders (Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, and Paul Nitze the new Assistant Secretary for ISA) all had me in for talks with them about your problems. Then, last Saturday, President Kennedy had me in for a long talk on the subject./3/He was warmly interested and asked many questions. I am sure that you can count upon him as an understanding friend and that you will be hearing further about this. It would have "warmed your heart" to have heard this conversation. So, you see, you do have some sincere friends in Washington.

/3/See Documents 3 and 4.

However, there will be some here who will point out that much of the danger of your present situation comes about from your own actions. They say that you try to do too many things yourself, that you refuse to give real responsibility to others and keep interfering with what they do, that you feel you are infallible personally, and that too many of your organizations like the Republican Youth Corps and the Can Lao Party are actually formed by coercion--that is, people join because they are afraid not to--rather than being genuine organizations rooted in the hearts of the Vietnamese people. I believe there will be many of these criticisms voiced in private talks here as word gets around about favorable reactions to my report.

The best answer to these criticisms would be actions by you in Vietnam. The critics would then have to close their mouths in the face of your actions. One action would be for you to announce your reorganization of the government very soon. Also, you could make your Security Council become alive and dynamic. Please remember my suggestion: call the military commanders and province chiefs in from the 1st and 5th Military Regions--to meet with the Security Council. You could make a talk to this group, and broadcast it all over Vietnam to all of the people of Vietnam. Your country needs you to rouse spirits right now, the way Winston Churchill did for Britain at a dark hour. Your countrymen need to be told that Vietnam is in grave danger from the Communists, that the help of every citizen is welcomed by the government, and that Vietnam must and will be kept free and independent.

After your talk to this group, it would be smart to turn the meeting over to Vice President Tho or Secretary Thuan. The meeting should be a secret one. I believe that each province chief, each responsible military commander, and the regional delegues, should report openly and frankly on the problems they have in their own areas. You did this once before, in February 1955, and it was a very wise and healthy action. You will hear many things, not only bad problems but also good ideas. So will all of those at such a meeting.

It would help you very much if you could include some of the Americans who are trying to help you--let them attend this meeting and take notes. You can invite those you believe to be sincere. They, too, would learn a lot and would become more realistic in their work in Vietnam. I would include McGarr and Colby.

Now, the political opposition to you worries me greatly. I have thought about it for many hours and days since leaving Vietnam. There is much ugly talk and bad feeling among many people in Saigon. It is so ugly and bad that I am afraid it will prompt some thoughtless persons to attempt another coup. You are one of the great leaders of the Free World and a friend for whom I have deep affection. So, please take my words in the friendship with which they are offered.

Simply suppressing this political feeling of opposition by arresting people or closing down newspapers will only turn the talk into deep emotions of hatred and generate the formation of more clandestine organizations and plots to oppose you. This is so far from your real nature and your gifted talents of leadership that I know you are seeking a better solution.

An idea suggests itself for your consideration of this problem of the political opposition. If you could get most of the oppositionists working on a program of specific ideas to save the nation, and to work on this program freely among themselves outside of the government, you would turn the major share of their political energies into constructive work. They would argue among themselves over their ideas, trying to get each other to accept these ideas, rather than spend their political energies attacking you.

How do you do this? Perhaps you yourself cannot. But, you are the only person who can set the proper political climate for such an action. It needs you to tell the people, including the oppositionists, that Vietnam is in grave danger. It needs you to remove the lurking fear of secret arrest at night as punishment for political activity; whether such fears are based on fact or falsehood, the point is that many people believe that special police under Dr. Tuyen make political arrests at night, with the knowledge of your brother Nhu.

Perhaps the wisest move would be to call in the younger people among the opposition. It would be best if you talked to them personally. You might tell them that Vietnam stands to lose its freedom, that all Vietnamese must go to work now to save that freedom, that you know the oppositionists have not agreed with all your programs but that running a government which is under savage Communist attack is not as simple as critics apparently think. You want people not to merely criticize their government. If they believe they have good ideas, they should write these down and agree to a program they believe would save the country. Not a Communist program, but a program by Free Vietnamese. If they go to work to write and agree upon such a program, you can assure them that you won't stand in their way--even if it means the formation of a strong, single opposition party.

You might talk to them, too, the way you did to me in 1955 and 1956--that your dream for Vietnam was to have two strong political parties. You might point out that you called the younger people in from the opposition groups because they are the ones who have to build the future. They will live in it. Too many of the older politicians are living in the past or are selfishly looking for power for themselves.

Well, this became a very long letter. My suggestions were prompted by the fact that many people in Washington, just like many people in Asia, are watching you right now to see what you will do next. I am sure that whatever you do, you will do it resolutely and with wisdom. I will help to the extent that an American official can.

With warmest and best personal wishes, as always.

Sincerely

Edward G. Lansdale/4/

Brigadier General, USAF

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

7. Remarks by the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr)/1/

 

Saigon, January 30, 1961

/1/Source Washington National Records Center, RG 334, MAAG/Vietnam Files: FRC 64 A 2424, 250/17 Emergency Planning Files. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. The remarks were made by General McGarr at a meeting with his senior advisers.

Gentlemen: This Senior Advisors meeting has been called to discuss our mutual problems, bring you up-to-date, and refine our Better Automobile, or Tactics and Techniques paper./2/ With the rapid turn-over we have here in Vietnam, you'll notice many new faces today that were not with us in November and I want you all to make it a point to get acquainted. In this respect, I am sorry the operational situation and the wide dispersal of advisory detachments prevents more frequent meetings. Therefore, let's all take maximum advantage of this opportunity to exchange ideas among each other and with the members of my staff.

/2/Not further identified.

Before proceeding with the meeting proper, I wish to take this opportunity to clarify and reemphasize the official U.S. and MAAG position toward the GVN and President Diem.

Here in Saigon, in particular, as well as in the Provinces where you are stationed, you have heard many rumors and statements about the GVN and President Diem. These run the gamut from corruption of governmental officials, to nepotism, favoritism, political dogmatism, undue interference by Diem in military matters, and normally end with the statement or implication, that Diem "must go" if the country is to be saved.

These rumors and statements are normally instigated by dissatisfied politicians, misled intellectuals, Communists or certain elements of the foreign community. Human nature being what it is, these rumors are, unfortunately, picked up, repeated and elaborated upon by certain elements of the U.S. community here in Vietnam and by certain well meaning Vietnamese officers and civilians.

Although there may possibly be some degree of validity to some of these rumors--there always is--they are mostly based on the Communist technique of half truths and insinuations and are not supported by hard facts. It has been my observation over a period of years that our Armed Forces are not entirely immune to this questionable pastime. I am convinced that the best defense against rumor is truth. With this in mind, the U.S. policy towards the GVN and President Diem is clear and unequivocal. Briefly stated, it is that the U.S. supports the GVN and President Diem. That although Diem has certain shortcomings, as do we all, he is pro-U.S., definitely anti-Communist, and has done a remarkably fine job during his five years in office against terrific odds. He is the most tough minded, dedicated practicing anti-Communist leader among our friends today.

Therefore, it is only fair that all personnel of this MAAG refrain from giving credence--tacit or openly--to these unfavorable rumors regarding President Diem and the GVN. Remember that they cannot be proven--and that there is definitely less corruption in the GVN than most similar countries. Diem will not countenance it!

[Here follow five pages of text reviewing the activities of MAAG since November 1960.]

 

8. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State /1/

Saigon, January 31, 1961, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/1-3161. Secret; Limit Distribution. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Durbrow. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878) Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd.

1329. In view of General Lansdale's experience in Viet-Nam, I have given considerable attention and thought to the suggestions he made in CINCPAC 172157Z January,/2/ and I have discussed these with key members of my staff. I fully agree with his evaluation, about the critical threat imposed by VC as well as potentially explosive nature of non-Communist position problem.

/2/In this telegram, Lansdale concluded that the opposition groups in Saigon appeared to be so close to explosion that a coup attempt might soon follow. He suggested two U.S. actions to forestall this possibility and the resulting chaos: 1) a clear statement of U.S. support for Diem and 2) U.S. encouragement of the opposition to form a responsible party. (Ibid., Internal Security, 1961)

1. His suggestion US make clear statement support Diem is, under appropriate circumstances, worth frequent reiteration especially in light of recent critical US press comment which have tended encourage activities of all elements completely disunited and disorganized non-Communist opposition, most of whom erroneously seem believe institution full democratic procedures Viet-Nam main thing needed to eliminate Communist threat. We have in the past on appropriate occasions restated our support for Diem, the last time being in a letter from President Eisenhower October 26th./3/

/3/For text of Eisenhower's message, dated October 22, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-1961, pp. 807-808.

While message indicating continued American support for development of Viet-Nam toward economic independence and political democracy under Diem from new US administration would be highly appropriate, two facts make any more pointed statement of support at this time dubious:

(a) Since Diem will undoubtedly be candidate for re-election during next two months, any pointed statement backing Diem personally and fully would give impression US taking sides and bringing undue influence in electoral campaign which we hope will be as genuine as circumstances will permit;

(b) We have devoted considerable effort pressing Diem to adopt certain needed liberalizing reforms and changes in GVN methods and structure which we believe he should adopt in his own interests in order to win further popular support vitally needed in face of growing VC military and political threat. While we have been told that many of our suggestions are under active consideration, considerable time has been lost since November attempted coup with little action taken. Therefore at this juncture strong public reiteration US support toward Diem personally might further convince him that we have no alternative but to support him no matter what he does. Such statement, therefore, might induce him further to procrastinate from taking necessary actions which I am convinced he must do to reverse present adverse trends and diminish VC threat.

I recommend, therefore, that any assertion of US support be limited at this time to a greeting by President Kennedy and appropriate general reference to Diem's strong anti-Communist stand and the economic development and progress which has taken place in the past five years.

2. While the ideal of a two-party system with a constitutional opposition should be our long-range goal for Viet-Nam, I have considerable reservation as to the possibility of accomplishing this in the near future or of the practicality and desirability of actively pressing for it at this time. The Vietnamese people lack the necessary sophistication and understanding, as well as the necessary sense of political responsibility to make a two-party democratic system work at this time. Furthermore, and more important, one key element of Vietnamese scene is lack of any hopes of opposition leadership or any distinction in diverse oppositionists' minds between a constitutional and unconstitutional opposition. Furthermore none has any clear-cut realistic program to offer. Thus any effort on our part to try to unite the heterogeneous non-Communist opposition elements into a cohesive loyal opposition would not only be most difficult if not impossible but might easily develop into real effort to unseat Diem, independent of any constitutional niceties, in a mistaken belief US desires replace Diem. Furthermore, in light of the current, most serious VC threat, any such effort on our part would be considered by Diem as mortal blow to his regime and would negate any encouraging official statements we might make. Moreover, such US effort would tend to drive Diem further to count on use of force only to win battle against VC and almost guarantee that he would take or implement few if any of the essential steps we have urged him to take in his own interests. Diem already is of strong belief that US does not understand or appreciate the problems of a newly-independent country, half-occupied by Communists, and that we tend to think, despite realities of situation, that adoption of full democratic procedures will win day.

3. Therefore I am firmly convinced that:

(a) We must do all we can to induce Diem to adopt, as many as practicable under the circumstances, liberal procedures and reforms which will plant the seeds of democracy and eventually create a solid enough base on which to build still further democratic institutions. These procedures should include safety valves for non-Communist opposition elements to make constructive criticism. These procedures cannot; however, be done overnight in a split country facing a most serious Communist internal threat.

(b) In view of the heterogeneous nature, lack of program and emotional nature of most non-Communist opposition elements, we should use all our influence overtly and covertly to make it clear to opposition groups that:

(1) Any effort on their part to pull coup at this time would bring about such confusion and perhaps chaos that chances of a Communist take-over would be greatly enhanced if not guaranteed;

(2) It in their interests to remain within constitutional limits, and urge constructive programs and reforms which they should encourage Diem to adopt in order to liberalize his regime as much as present circumstances will permit.

4. In this connection, I have already instructed all key members of various agency staffs here to adopt positive instead of defeatist attitude in discussions with GVN and opposition elements and instructed them to make clear that we oppose any coup which would only enhance prospects of Communist takeover. Furthermore, I have emphasized that all GVN elements should be urged to work together constructively in order put up united front against VC, while at same time urging Diem and his close collaborators to introduce more liberal and constructive procedures. I sincerely believe that with this approach, and with the maximum of US help as outlined in the counterinsurgency plan/4/ we can gradually overcome the Communist subversive threat, although if Diem insists on refusing to take the positive steps he is considering, Diem's prestige will lose further ground and his survival will be problematical.

/4/Document 1.

Department also pass General Lansdale.

Durbrow

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