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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963, Volume I
Vietnam, 1961Department of State
Washington, DC
II. United States Efforts To Obtain South Vietnamese Acceptance of the Basic Counterinsurgency Plan
February-April 1961
9. National Security Action Memorandum No. 12/1/
Washington, February 6, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs. Presumably the memorandum is from the President.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LEMNITZER
Is it possible for us to distribute the available forces we now have in Vietnam more effectively in order to increase the effectiveness of anti-guerilla activities. Are there troops stationed along the border who could be made available for this activity? It is my recollection that the Vietnam army now numbers 150,000, and that we are planning to add 20,000 more, making a total of 170,000. Reports are that the guerillas number from 7,000 to 15,000. I would think that the redistribution of available forces immediately would make them more effective in this work and we would not have to wait for action during the training period of the new troops. Would you give me your judgment on this when next we meet?
10. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, February 8, 1961, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/2-861. Confidential. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Singapore, Vientiane, CINCPAC for PolAd, London, and Paris.
1351. Embassy telegrams 1348 and 1349./2/ Following are my initial comments on broad program of reforms announced by President Diem at full dress press conference February 6.
/2/On February 6, Diem held a press conference to announce a series of reforms aimed at decentralizing governmental powers, improving democratic institutions and village administration, and encouraging private citizens and groups to contribute to governmental activities. Telegram 1348, February 7, transmitted a summary of the reforms and the text of a statement made by Thuan at the press conference. (Ibid., 851K.00/2-761) Telegram 1349, of the same date, transmitted the texts of questions asked of and answered by Diem following Thuan's statement. (Ibid., 751K.00/2-761)
Importance Diem attached to matter shown by facts appeared for first time before both foreign and Vietnamese press, made statement, answered questions on variety subjects. Answers to questions straight-forward and helpful. After conference Diem did good public relations job, joking with correspondents in relaxed manner.
Not surprisingly, reforms announced have number of positive and negative aspects, but tone as whole is encouraging. With enough time to work them out in detail, and if Diem grants more authority to Department heads as he said he would, result should be improved functioning of GVN.
Reforms clearly go considerably beyond more modest and hesitant list of changes reported in G-309./3/ Most encouraging aspects include following: (1) General tone is forward-looking, and reforms clearly product of prolonged reflection and discussion on part of President and most progressive elements in GVN; (2) Emphasis is wisely placed on improved administration of functioning programs through better coordination of existing agencies, thus making use of momentum already gained and avoiding personnel problems that more radical change would have entailed; (3) Movement into some new fields such as elected youth member of village councils (for youth and information matters) and establishment of councils at national level to promote economic, social, and cultural activity; (4) Some decentralization of power from provincial down to municipal and village levels.
/3/Not printed. (Ibid., 751K.00/1-3061)
Notably lacking were political changes of an impact nature or any immediate concessions of democratic freedoms except election youth representative. Diem's answers this connection might have shown more finesse, particularly on village council elections, but he did admit frankly that because of security situation it not possible permit general village elections this time.
GVN had already begun moving to implement several points in President's program prior to press conference. . . . told me evening February 6 special session of Assembly will begin consideration laws on National Economic Council, National Cultural-Social Council and Superior Council of Judiciary February 7. (Assembly Commission had met February 5 to consider draft law on National Economic Council.)
Program Diem announced February 6 is substantial, forward-looking and, if properly implemented, should provide solid base to build on. While he has been slow in acting, the steps he has taken are in the direction we have been urging.
Durbrow
11. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, February 13, 1961, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/2-1361. Secret. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, London, Paris, and CINCPAC for PolAd.
1367. Accompanied by General McGarr and General Isaac D. White/2/ who here on farewell visit, I gave Diem thirteenth an abridged version counter-insurgency plan under cover of letter which underlined most significant points contained Deptel 1054./3/ Thuan also present during hour forty-five minute talk.
/2/Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific.
/3/For text, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 14-16. Copies of the 3-page letter and 12-page summary were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 351 from Saigon, February 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/ 2-1461) For text of the Basic Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam, see Document 1.
After reading letter, Diem and Thuan expressed concern as to how they could finance piaster costs for twenty thousand additional men. I told them plan included concrete suggestions how this could be accomplished and expressed firm conviction that by taking extraordinary measures GVN could raise sufficient piasters. Thuan stated Ford Foundation financial group here had just recently expressed some doubt as to how GVN could raise more piasters in near future. I replied I hoped our suggestions would help them find solution. Diem then spoke some length about extraordinary expenses he is faced with backing planned road along Cambodian border from Gulf of Siam, road in Tay Ninh area and costs of many other essential projects. He then stated he needed at least 5,000 more troops immediately to help guard construction gangs, for instance those to complete Kontum-Tourane road, new industries being built, as well as to give more protection to population. Thuan asked what our position would be if, for instance, GVN could not see way to finance plan as whole. I replied plan is comprehensive document and therefore all facets should basically be carried out although our position not inflexible and we ready work up agreed plan.
Diem then outlined Communist plans to disrupt election which he learned from captured documents. Communists have two plans: (1) To prevent people from voting in elections, or (2) to try to induce enough people to vote for weakest presidential candidate so as to establish weak government in south Viet-Nam which would be easy prey to Communists later. According Diem, reasons Communists less active on terrorist front January was because they have regrouped their cadres to indoctrinate them on how to disrupt elections and train others to carry out phase two of Communist plan, i.e., cause riots, demonstrations and bombings in cities. He stated Communists will try some bombing during Tet. Because of this he has to deploy large number present security forces around Saigon to thwart Communist's plan. Diem's remarks added up to: His piaster expenses are extraordinarily high and he does not know where he can get more; and he needs more troops immediately to give protection to installations and people and prevent Communists from disruption elections.
We discussed RKG-GVN relations for about forty minutes (reported separately/4/).
/4/In telegram 1368, February 13, Durbrow reported that he had stressed to Diem that the new administration hoped relations between Cambodia and South Vietnam would improve. (Department of State, Central Files, 651H.51K/2-1361)
Comment: Thuan promised to study plan carefully and discuss it with us soonest. Letter proposes agreed plan between US and GVN be worked by end of February but I am not very sanguine GVN will move that fast. Copies abridged plan and letter by pouch.
Durbrow
12. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) and the Vietnamese Ambassador (Chuong), Department of State/1/
Washington, February 13, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/2-1361. Confidential. Drafted by Wood on February 15 and approved in U on February 17. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Saigon in telegram 1088, February 15. (Ibid., 790.00/ 2-1561) A briefing memorandum for the meeting by Parsons, February 13, is ibid., Vietnam Task Force Files: Lot 66 D 193, 16.USA,GVN 1961.
SUBJECT
Viet-NamSecretary Bowles recalled that he had visited Viet-Nam six or seven years ago. He hoped he would again be able to visit Viet-Nam. He had met the then Prime Minister, Nguyen Van Tham, who had seen the necessity of giving the people of Viet-Nam reforms and more freedom. Ambassador Chuong recalled that Tham had good ideas, but had lacked courage. Secretary Bowles agreed. Ambassador Chuong emphasized that President Diem by contrast, had had enough courage to tell the French that complete independence was necessary for Viet-Nam. Secretary Bowles then mentioned the Communist tactic of distributing land to the landless and emphasized how important it was to provide land for the peasants. Ambassador Chuong mentioned that in some cases where this was done too rapidly the peasants found themselves with insufficient land, livestock and tools. Secretary Bowles agreed that land reform had to be well-planned and then mentioned the success of such programs in Thailand and Japan. He also mentioned the effectiveness of the Indian Civil Service whose people, although not originally trained for agriculture, were such good administrators that they were now able to supply Rural Extension Service to about 70% of India. He then spoke warmly of Wolf Ladejinsky's role in the land reform program of Japan. Ambassador Chuang recalled that Mr. Ladejinsky was now working for the Government of Viet-Nam.
Secretary Bowles said that in his view, the peasants not only wanted more material things but also a sense of justice and of participation in the government.
Ambassador Chuong asked if the Under Secretary would give him specific comments on the present situation. Secretary Bowles said that it was certainly necessary to be extremely firm with the Russian and Chinese Communists; but at the same time, military power was not enough. Ambassador Chuong commented that French failures had certainly proved that point. Secretary Bowles continued that we wished to bring the people of Southeast Asia together so that they would have a sense of common destiny. This was not easy. They had traditional differences, but our aim was to help these people to be confident in their own future rather than to be grateful to the United States. He cited the analogy of the British who in the 19th century through the protection of their fleet made it possible for the United States to grow into a strong country. It would seem that the main ingredients needed domestically within the countries of Southeast Asia were justice and more equality.
As to our relations with Viet-Nam, the Secretary emphasized we would certainly continue our support and live up to our treaty obligations. It would also be found that there would be a greater emphasis on looking further ahead and on long-range projects such as the Mekong Valley.
Ambassador Chuong agreed on the necessity of closer cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia, continued cooperation with the United States and a greater sense of participation amongst the Vietnamese people.
Secretary Bowles said that if such a spirit could be built up, there would no longer be the feeling that the Viet Cong were aiming their attacks against the United States, but rather that they were attacking the future of the Vietnamese people themselves.
Ambassador Chuong, referring to Laos and Viet-Nam, said that a war situation existed and that Asia was terribly weak in terms of defending itself. Thus in planning for the future of Asia it should be remembered that free Asia must sail with the wind. Mr. Bowles suggested that it was also possible to tack into the wind.
Ambassador Chuong mentioned the usefulness of the Civil Guard and the fact that the Government of Viet-Nam paid for its support.
Secretary Bowles inquired how much taxes the Vietnamese Government collected. Ambassador Chuong talked rapidly, replying that good taxes required good production.
Mr. Bowles spoke of the importance of strengthening SEATO and said that Secretary Rusk was planning to attend the Council Meeting on March 27. Ambassador Chuong asked if the Secretary might consider stopping off at Saigon. Mr. Bowles made it clear that the Secretary would even have difficulty in finding the time to visit Bangkok.
As the Ambassador took his leave, Mr. Bowles again stated that the United States would continue to support the Government of Viet-Nam.
13. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State/1/
Washington, February 21, 1961
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/2-2161. Secret. Drafted by Wood and initialed by White. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Saigon in telegram 1106, February 24. (Ibid., 751K.00/2-2461) A briefing memorandum for the meeting, dated February 15, is ibid., Vietnam Task Force Files: Lot 66 D 193, 1-A.2 Briefing Papers, GVN 1961.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam-Discussion with the BritishPARTICIPANTS
Lord Hood
Mr. Denis Greenhill, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. C.D. Wiggin, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. J.B. Denson, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Ivan B. White, Deputy Asst. Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. William C. Burdett, Jr., Director, BNA
Mr. James D. Moffett, BNA
Mr. Chalmers B. Wood, Officer in Charge, Viet-Nam Affairs
Lord Hood felt that it would be worth discussing the present tensions and threats which existed in Viet-Nam. Mr. White requested Mr. Wood to give our views briefly.
After stating that the nadir might have been passed during the last month or two, Mr. Wood spoke of the repeated suggestions which Ambassador Durbrow had made on the subject of liberalization, indicating that while the Vietnamese were well aware of our views, we would continue to keep this subject alive. However, there was some feeling that certain Western observers, especially newspapermen, tended to over-stress the question of liberalizing the regime. There were other illiberal regimes in Asia. While it was perhaps more important for President Diem to establish a better "dialogue'' with his people, the main problem in Viet-Nam appeared to be the Communist threat. As to liberalization, we had noted some responsiveness on President Diem's part; the National Assembly was playing a somewhat greater role and the press occasionally gave voice to cautious criticism.
As to security, we had recently put forward to the Vietnamese Government a plan/2/ which had been carefully worked out by our various specialists and had been approved in Washington at a very high level. In general this plan called for certain changes in the Vietnamese Government which would increase its efficiency in dealing with the Communists and envisaged increasing the Vietnamese armed forces by 20,000 men. Certain parts of the plan had already been adopted, such as our training program for the Civil Guard. We had recently explained this plan to President Diem./3/ In addition to requiring a great deal of cooperation on both sides, it would also cost the Vietnamese a good deal of their own money. We felt that their economy was capable of meeting these additional expenses. President Diem had not been sure of this when the plan was explained to him. For the present the plan was being studied by the Vietnamese Government. It did not seem profitable to go into detail on the plan until agreement had been reached with the Vietnamese.
/2/Document 1.
/3/See Document 11.
We had been pleased by President Diem's press conference of February 6,/4/ particularly as this appeared to be the first time in which he had been willing to engage in questions and answers with the correspondents. We hoped that this custom would continue and that Diem could also be persuaded to make at least occasional informal radio talks. It seemed to us that this might provide an area where our Ambassadors in Saigon could work together.
/4/See Document 10.
The substance of Diem's public appearance on the 6th had also been encouraging since it showed that he was seeking to increase the coordination and efficiency of his government and to increase the participation of various groups such as the peasants (demonstrated by his plans for electing youths to village councils and the eventual creation of district and village councils) as well as by the creation of councils which were designed to attract the intellectuals and the businessmen.
Finally, in terms of Diem's security, we felt it essential for him to seek some improvement in his relations with Prince Sihanouk in order to achieve at least a minimum of border control. Here again there might be room for joint efforts between the American, British and French Ambassadors in Saigon and possibly in Phnom Penh. We felt such efforts could best be arranged in the field.
Lord Hood expressed his government's interest in the counterinsurgency plan and indicated that the British, on the basis of their Malayan experience, hoped to be able to cooperate. They would appreciate receiving fuller information on the plan. It was indicated that we would give them more on this as the situation developed.
Lord Hood felt in general that their own appreciation of the over-all situation in Viet-Nam was somewhat more pessimistic than ours, but he was inclined to agree that Diem was at last taking some realistic steps to meet the problems he faced. He agreed that there might well be room for coordination in attempting to persuade President Diem to be more communicative and in encouraging him to improve his relations with Cambodia.
14. Editorial Note
On February 24, Wolf Ladejinsky wrote a 7-page letter to Walt Rostow covering the political and economic situations in light of the Communist threat. He concluded, "everything must be brought into play to insure the survival of Vietnam." (Kennedy Library, President's Office File, Staff Memoranda, Rostow)
15. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, February 28, 1961, 7 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/2-2861. Confidential. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, London, Paris, and CINCPAC for PolAd.
1414. Joint Embassy-USOM-MAAG message. Our 1391./2/ GVN SecState for Presidency Thuan given briefing on military aspects Counterinsurgency Plan Feb 27 in response his request. Political, psychological, and economic aspects of plan not included since Thuan indicated he understood those aspects but Emb and USOM representatives present to answer questions in those fields. During briefing and as result suggestion that discussion be opened on procedure for reaching agreement between two govts on plan, Thuan expressed views re certain aspect of plan:
/2/Telegram 1391, February 22, reported that in a meeting with Thuan, Durbrow stressed the need to discuss the counterinsurgency plan and work out an agreed program of action. Thuan replied that he and other Vietnamese officials had not yet had a chance to study the plan carefully. (Ibid., 751K.5-MSP/2-2261)
On military aspects Thuan said:
1. He in general agrees with recommended organizational changes in DOD and has already initiated action to study these. Specifically change of director of personnel into manpower directorate with shift of operational management to JGS is being studied. Also consolidation of signal services with signal command in ARVN is under study. He stated he sees no problem in consolidating Navy and AF technical service directorate within Navy and AF HQS respectively.
2. With regard to consolidation of Engineer Command Services Thuan expressed considerable doubt. He fears that placing of responsibility in one man for expenditure of largest portion of military budget (other than pay and food) is not proper. He stated frankly temptations are too great. This problem is being studied.
3. The recommendation that certain powers of Director of Administration, Budget and Accounting be decentralized to Joint General Staff, Thuan expressed concern that military do not have qualified personnel to assume operational phases of financial and budgeting matters.
4. In discussing the requirement for some type of JGS reorganization which would establish centralized operational control for counterinsurgency, Thuan asked about relationship between a junior general, as Chief of Staff, with a senior general, as Chief of Operations Division, or Chief of Field Command. Thuan appeared to understand US Command relationship (chief of staff acting only for his chief) but feared it could not be applied to personalities in RVNAF.
5. Thuan expressed considerable concern over the government's inability to control inland waterways in south. He was particularly worried about minor canals which lead to major waterways. MAAG concept of area control, securing an area from VC then moving on to an adjacent area, was described to Thuan in considerable detail as an approach to solution of this problem.
6. Thuan recalled Gen McGarr's suggestion of "no man's land" along border. He stated that this would require movement of many villages within this area and would present problems of considerable magnitude for GVN.
7. In summary he stated that recommended composition of 20,000 man force increase was acceptable. He stated that most of DOD reorganization might be accepted within day or two, except as noted above. JGS reorganization (centralized control for counterinsurgency) would be expedited and an answer might be expected in about a week.
On economic side Thuan said decree being issued on measures to place tax collections on current basis and that discussion would be undertaken with USOM about other means financing counterinsurgency plan on imminent return of Hoang Thanh, Chairman Credit Commercial, from abroad. These discussions would relate particularly to deficit financing since Thanh had already discussed sale government bonds with local banks who might take up to 1.5 billion piasters in such bonds at 3 per cent. Thuan said rubber taxes now in force would increase yield from rubber companies by 200 million piasters annually (his estimate given on Feb 25 to USOM director was 180 million).
On political side Thuan commented in general terms that GVN is taking measures along lines proposed in plan. Emb officer agreed this is true with respect certain of recommended measures. Thuan then took up specific political measures proposed in plan (enclosure 2 despatch 351/3/) emphasizing action being taken on certain recommendations but skipping over others:
/3/See footnote 3, Document 11.
1. He said that as GVN ministers already appear before National Assembly committees they could be questioned about operation their departments and he indicated this might be done publicly. GVN however opposed adoption of US system of investigation by legislative branch of executive department since that exists in no other country. It was pointed out that main purpose our suggestion was to find means to dispel rumors and doubtful that limited questioning of ministers would achieve that objective.
2. Thuan said wider legislative initiative now being permitted but made no comment on broader publicity about debate in National Assembly.
3. He said appointment oppositionists to cabinet posts would depend upon their acceptance of policy of chief. Was pointed out to him however that establishment national unity, which vital for conducting war against insurgents, may well require compromise on both sides. Thuan referred to current efforts outside government to establish national unity front (our G-346/4/).
/4/Dated February 16, it reported the efforts of the Government of Vietnam to create a broad peoples' organization, which included both opposition and government supporters. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.001/2-1661)
4. He said he would take up with president proposals about altering or disbanding Can Lao Party.
5. He noted quickly in passing that GVN agreeable to encouragement adoption liberal press code bill by Assembly, to more frequent press conferences and to permit foreign correspondents to travel in interior.
6. He said arrangements for Vietnamese to study abroad already liberalized and noted even relatives of oppositionists permitted go abroad for study. He said SecState Interior Vui Van Luong had eased restrictions on departure Vietnamese from Viet-Nam after assuming office last Oct. Thuan claimed no particular difficulties exist about exit from Viet-Nam other than those related to foreign currency restrictions and fears of smuggling. (We believe there has been some recent easing of controls for leaving Viet-Nam. USOM reports students taking its competitive examinations for scholarships now being approved by GVN on straight merit basis. CAS states delays met by other Vietnamese in obtaining passports appreciably cut down since Luong took over Interior and lower level officials instead of denying applications also required provide superiors with reasons for proposing deny issuance of passports.)
On internal security council aspects of plan Thuan expressed intention increase authority of present secretary of council (Permanent Secretary General for National Defense) but Embassy suspects that SecState for Presidency himself will continue to be main coordinator of ISC decisions. Thuan said GVN considering establishment internal security council at regional, provincial, district and village levels, noting that British had also recommended this idea since it was used successfully in Malaya.
Country Team Representatives told Thuan in conclusion that Ambassador would probably wish discuss plan (especially political aspects) further with GVN on his return./5/
/5/Durbrow raised the question with Thuan on March 11, but the Secretary of State for the Presidency added little to the information in this telegram. Durbrow concluded his report on the conversation by stating that he would confine to press for a detailed agreed plan. (Telegram 1454 from Saigon, March 11; ibid., 751K.5-MSP/ 3-1161; Declassified Documents, 1975, p. 315A)
Cunningham
16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, March l, 1961, 8:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/1-2561. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wood on February 24; cleared with Anderson, Cleveland, Steeves, Rice, Admiral Heinz, SPA, S, S/S, and ICA; and approved by Parsons. Also sent to CINCPAC for PolAd and repeated to Paris for Nolting.
1115. White House ranks defense Viet-Nam among highest priorities US foreign policy. Having approved Counterinsurgency Plan, President concerned whether Viet-Nam can resist Communist pressure during 18-24 month period before Plan takes full effect. Therefore White House has asked Department study what steps could be implemented as promptly as possible to further strengthen defenses Viet-Nam.
Unless Ambassador perceives objections following actions, largely taken from Counterinsurgency Plan, to be undertaken immediately without awaiting GVN approval Plan:
A. Actions primarily responsibility of DOD, CINCPAC and MAAG to be approved by Ambassador prior to implementation, provided CINCPAC perceives no objections.
1. Make IBM run to find military personnel best qualified give counterguerrilla training to VN armed forces. On priority basis send such personnel to MAAG/Saigon and cut short tours less qualified MAAG personnel now in Viet-Nam.
2. In order hasten training VN armed forces and use experience gained by British in Malaya, Department will discuss with British whether they willing send two or three British and/or Malayan officers to MAAG to discuss best means incorporating group British and Malayan personnel into well defined part ARVN or Civil Guard counterguerrilla training program. It is suggested that a place be found for British and Malayans in program.
3. Assign high priority to MAP program for Viet-Nam.
4. Without awaiting VN acceptance Counterinsurgency Plan devise and implement program for insuring adequate counterguerrilla training within 18 months of 65 ARVN Ranger Companies now in existence.
5. Give higher priority within Plan to activating 21 additional Ranger Companies.
6. Modify Plan to increase number of Ranger Companies by 40 and reduce proposed additional Infantry Regiments proportionately.
7. In conjunction with CAS increase emphasis on training individuals to penetrate VC.
8. Give high priority within Plan to Border Patrol (B-V), village transceivers (B-VI-5) and Civic Action (B-VII)./2/
/2/These and similar letter-number combinations in this telegram refer to the annexes, appendices, and tabs of Document 1.
9. Start immediately, with or without GVN participation as judged best by Ambassador preparation over-all Operations Plan for driving Viet Cong from Viet-Nam. Unless other methods can be proved better, this plan should be geographically phased. Plan should spell out minimum degree border control and cooperation with RKG which would be needed. It should include best means consolidating safe areas (taking into consideration Nhu's views on "lines of strength") as bases from which to move against nearby insecure areas. Plan for consolidation safe areas should set forth explicitly best means holding safe areas after ARVN moves on and best means retaining and increasing popular support in safe areas (latter to include types civic action to be undertaken by ARVN in newly won safe areas, whether feasible encourage GVN send promptly to such newly won areas competent VN administrators and health, education and agricultural technicians (preferably in that order), election youths to Village Councils and installation village radio receivers (B-VII-A-10,11).
B. Actions for approval and implementation by Ambassador.
1. Counterinsurgency Plan calls for several actions in economic field (Despatch 317/3/). These actions, rightly, are primarily aimed at retaining loyalty of peasants. In interests achieving continuing results as rapidly as possible, it suggested these actions be given priorities. Priorities suggested below are based on assumption that what VN peasants want can be listed in following order of importance: a) physical security (purpose entire plan); b) more money; c) land; d) health; e) education; f) better farming methods. On this assumption priorities for the peasant would be in this order: a) higher prices to peasants for rice (while realizing GVN has instituted such program, there are many middlemen between peasant and piaster and it recommended we lay heavy and continuing stress on importance GVN take all steps insure effectiveness this program). b) Increase availability credit to farmer (GVN has now with USOM assistance established successful National Agricultural Credit Organization (NACO), but its capital inadequate reach majority peasants.) Request USOM study how US can help NACO increase rate capital expansion more rapidly. c) Consider how and when GVN might be encouraged take next step rice land redistribution by lowering maximum holdings to 50 hectares. d) Re Administrators, assume we will continue our support National Institute Administration. Re employment administrators and health, education and agricultural technicians, see A, 9 above.
/3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/1-2561)
2. Ambassador may wish suggest appropriate member Country Team and staff study question treatment VC prisoners for purpose encouraging defections. Such study should consider a) methods employed by Magsaysay whereby GOP actively assisted peasants who had fought on side Huks, but were not Communists, to establish themselves as farmers in Mindanao (will pouch more on this); b) Burman method described by Colonel Maung Maung whereby prisoner told that since he a prisoner he must have failed. Prisoner asked analyze why had failed, what wrong with (Communist) system which permitted such failure. If possible prisoners persuaded write self-criticism. If suitable, such statement distribution to guerrillas as part psywar operations. Such study to include consideration of whether GVN should be encouraged publicly offer large rewards for capture VC leaders as done in Malaya./4/
/4/On March 8, Durbrow cabled his general agreement with the points made in this telegram. The 19-page reply concluded:
"In summary, we have recognized since early stages formulation of C.I.P. necessity take immediate actions where possible without awaiting formal approvals. These actions have been subject repeated meetings with GVN military and civilian authorities including Thuan and Diem. As indicated above, MAAG particularly urged adoption of counterinsurgency measures to include development of an Operations Plan for phased reduction of insurgency and has even prepared proposed implementing directives for GVN. In spite of this repeated advice pressing for immediate counterinsurgency action, GVN has not decreed required measures and there are strong indications that they will continue to delay necessary actions unless highly pressured to act promptly and decisively, which we endeavoring do. However, since we can only advise, development and implementation of any plans rest solely with GVN. Until Diem agrees to mutually acceptable National Plan for Counterinsurgency, it is problematical whether RVNAF can develop, much less implement, meaningful Operations Plan for phased reduction of insurgency as described in pare A9 reftel, although Tactics and Techniques treaties already prepared by MAAG is sound basis for such a plan.
"I shall continue vigorously push with Diem and Thuan for adoption comprehensive plan. Diem is procrastinating because main features of plan involve personnel and personalities, and these are hardest decisions for Diem to make because of his reluctance risk sharing power with anyone outside his family. If no appreciable success in obtaining Diem's decision by time I go Bangkok I hope Secretary can give me personal instructions at Bangkok to lay before Diem in effort bring about decision. If that does not succeed, we may then be compelled to request strong personal message from President Kennedy to Diem." (Telegram 1444; ibid., 751K.5-MSP/3-561)
Rusk
17. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Director of Military Assistance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Palmer)/1/
Saigon, March 3, 1961.
/1/Source Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files FRC 64 A 2382, Vietnam 1961, 370.5-384. secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.
Dear General Palmer: I am convinced that implementation of State Limited Distribution Message 1115, March 1, 1961, would be counter productive in that it will confuse and will retard the offensive of the Government of Vietnam against the Viet Cong which is finally getting underway. For this reason, I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I wrote Admiral Heinz, Director, Far East Region, OASD, International Security Affairs, which bears directly on the problem./2/
/2/Not printed. In this six-page letter, dated February 27, McGarr elaborated on his reasons for opposing the Department of State position.
I sincerely hope Defense is not stampeded into going along with the referenced State message as, contrary to its contention, it is counter to the approved Counter-Insurgency Plan in significant respects. We already have the approved overall Operations Plan for driving the Viet Cong from Vietnam which the message directs and parts of it are already underway. What we need now is time to implement our present sound plans with GVN-not directives to make major changes. It must also be understood that neither MAAG or the Ambassador can direct the GVN to follow our recommendations-we can only work through persuasion and advice.
Under the provisions of the Military Assistance Program and the authority of the Ambassador stated as a qualification to United States approval given the Counter-Insurgency Plan for Vietnam, military aid and other support can be withheld or withdrawn from the Government of Vietnam for noncompliance with certain requirements. This kind of action could, of course, lead to a weakening of GVN military action, would allow further Viet Cong successes, be dangerous to our position in Southeast Asia and be at variance with President Kennedy's announced intention to hold Vietnam. Therefore, our decision-making people will probably wish to reconsider the possible withholding of such aid as contrary to our President's policy.
Sincerely,
Lionel C. McGarr
Lieutenant General. USA
18. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to Secretary of State for the Presidency Thuan/1/
Saigon, March 13, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files FRC 66 A 878, Durbrow Demarches. Confidential. Attached to a memorandum from McGarr to Durbrow, March 13, which stated that the letter to Thuan had been less pointed than McGarr had wanted in order to protect his source of information.
Dear Mr. Secretary: Following the presentation of the Counter-Insurgency Plan by Ambassador Durbrow to President Diem on February 13th,/2/ I was encouraged by our apparent unity of interests and the likelihood that the plan in its entirety would prove substantially acceptable to your government.
/2/See Document 11.
My conversation with President Diem on Monday, March 6th,/3/ bore out my feeling that he was favorably inclined to adopting the plan substantially as presented. Staff discussions on the proposed implementation of the plan have cast some doubt as to the understanding by your government of certain important military provisions of the Counter-Insurgency Plan which presumably had been agreed upon. These together are of such magnitude that their rejection would in MAAG's professional military opinion negate much of the plan's required effectiveness. I am most anxious that none of the several actions contemplated by the plan, particularly those which would involve MAP support, be taken piece meal until agreement has been reached on the military portion of the Counter-Insurgency Plan as a whole.
/3/A memorandum of McGarr's conversation with Diem on March 6 and the aide-memoire which he presented to the President were transmitted in despatch 422 from Saigon, March 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3-2361)
I am sure you realize that effectiveness of the plan will depend to a large extent on the equipment and supplies for the forces including the 20,000 ARVN augmentation and the 32,000 Civil Guard. I am unable, as you were informed by the Ambassador, to order any MAP materials for these forces in spite of the long procurement lead time and consequent delayed arrivals involved, until formal agreement on the complete Counter-Insurgency Plan has been reached.
Among the major military provisions of the plan which I feel necessary and hope will be found acceptable to your government, are the following:
a. A military command structure providing an exclusively military chain of command (ie no civil agency included) from the Chief of the Joint General Staff RVNAF to the operational units in the field. Comment: The placing of substantial military forces under civil agencies not subordinate to military command control would operate to defeat this most contributive provision of the Counter-Insurgency Plan as this would give the military responsibility without commensurate authority.
b. A logistic system capable of unifying and coordinating the technical services at national level and carrying logistic control down through a logistic command structure at Corps level. Comment: You recently expressed to me your reluctance to adopt the central Logistic Command which under "Plan A" would balance the Field Command envisioned therein. I hope that General Sibley's recent discussion of this with Lieutenant Colonel Liem of your office has dispelled your apprehensions as to both the feasibility and desirability of the central Logistic Command which I feel confident will best meet your understandable requirements for sound DOD organization./4/
/4/No record of this discussion between Brigadier General Alden K. Sibley, Deputy MAAG Chief, and Lieutenant Colonel Ky Quam Liem has been found.
c. The elimination of duplicate technical services such. as presently exist in the case of the Chief of Engineer Services and the Engineer Field Command.
d. The composition of the force basis for the 20,000 RVNAF augmentation.
e. An improved and more cohesive intelligence and counter intelligence organization and operation.
f. Improved border and coastal patrol systems.
g. An improved and coherent national planning system for counter-insurgency and national security.
h. Certain military aspects of psychological warfare plans and operations.
i. The military aspects of an improved communications system.
I bring this to your attention because of the grave consequences involved in a failure to reach mutual understanding. These points have been discussed with Ambassador Durbrow since I feel success or failure in the fight against the Viet Cong rests on mutual understanding and agreement on the wise and early resolution of differences.
To preclude the possibility that the military provisions of the plan proposed by my government and the professional reasoning which led to their inclusion in the plan are not fully understood, MAAG would welcome the opportunity for further discussion of these points with you or your staff.
I would also hope that before final actions are taken by your government on the important military provisions of the plan, we may be advised of the nature of these actions in order that any differences between your proposed actions and those included in the plan may be resolved. This would result in reaching mutually acceptable decisions which will enable the United States to provide the necessary added support for the Counter-Insurgency effort.
Sincerely,
Lionel C. McGarr/5/
Lieutenant General, USA
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
19. Memorandum From the President's Military Aide (Clifton) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, March 14, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Confidential. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.
The President asked when our new Ambassador would arrive in Viet-Nam./2/ I explained to him that the man is staying in Paris to help General Gavin,/3/ that we expect him here the first week in May, and he will probably get to Viet-Nam about the first of June.
/2/President Kennedy sent the nomination of Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO, to the Senate on February 17. The Senate confirmed Nolting on March 15.
/3/General James M. Gavin, Ambassador in France.
The President directed that we see what we can do to speed this up. He feels that the man must help General Gavin "for two or three weeks." But he asked why the man couldn't go directly from Paris to Viet-Nam and get started.
I offered that the man had to stop in Washington for his debriefing on the situation in France, and a re-briefing for the situation in Viet-Nam, including a trip which Mr. Rostow plans for him to the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg for one day. The President said: "Well, I guess this has to be done, but let's see what we can do to speed up the operation so that it isn't the first of June before he is in charge out there."/4/
/4/In a memorandum to Lucius D. Battle, the Secretary's Special Assistant, March 21, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Jones stated that Nolting would leave Paris on April 15 rather than May 1 and after 2 weeks of consultations in Washington would fly directly to Saigon arriving early in May. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series)
C.V. Clifton/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
20. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Washington, March 16, 1961, 7 p. m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/3-1661. Secret. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, London, Paris for Nolting, and CINCPAC for PolAd.
1466. Reference Embassy telegram 1454./2/ saw Diem 16th for hour and quarter to urge his acceptance agreed comprehensive Counter-Insurgency Plan (CIP). From my conversation 11th with Thuan (reftel) General McGarr and MAAG officers have come to basic oral agreement with Thuan and others on acceptance main military CIP suggestions which MAAG considers it can live with provided GVN follows through with proper implementation. However as GVN position on several other fundamental CIP suggestions was not yet clear, I decided to take up directly with Diem. Following summary conversation:
/2/See footnote 5. Document 15.
I opened conversation by stating expected go Bangkok end of month to see Secretary who would surely ask me full details re GVN reaction to CIP. Since it imperative we work out agreed plan in some detail and this will take time, I urged Diem to nominate competent military and civilian officials with power of decision to go over our plan with MAAG and embassy officers in order to come to agreement on plan and avoid any future misunderstanding. Since I will leave for Bangkok in about 10 days, I urged Diem nominate his officials soonest so that group can get together in hope that I would be in position to inform Secretary agreed plan worked out. Diem assured me would do this and reaffirmed it just before I left.
I stated I was pleased learn MAAG had come to basic agreement with GVN on military aspects CIP and that Thuan had assured me of GVN agreement on many other aspects. Nevertheless, there were still certain important CIP suggestions which should be discussed in detail. I then enumerated following points:
(1) We believe it important to attain further national unity that Diem make reasonable offer take one or two non-commie oppositionists into cabinet.
(2) I stated we still receiving allegations and rumors about Can Lao party secret activities which, whether true or not, are harmful to GVN. I again urged that party come out in open or dissolve itself and suggested might be worthwhile pass law or issue decree stating against law have any secret parties Viet-Nam, pointing out this would help give legal basis act against various secret parties even covert communist-front organizations.
Diem interrupted me at this point to describe what he called favorable evolution among non-communist oppositionists which now taking place. He stated many of those who took part in coup see errors their ways and now realize if they had won they would have only assisted communist take-over. According Diem most oppositionists, whether those arrested because of coup or others, now in process changing their attitude and realize it in national interests they try to work more closely with GVN. For this reason too soon to make offer cabinet posts to oppositionists but, without making firm promise, he stated that if some non-commies could agree basic policy GVN he might take them into government after election.
He did not directly reply to my Can Lao suggestion but stated that more and more oppositionists and public in general coming to realize allegations and rumors re party are not true. I interjected these developments all more reason why Can Lao Party should come into open or dissolve and why he should seriously make reasonable offers non-communists enter Govt. Diem made no promises.
(3) I stated it's absolutely fundamental for success CIP to have effective central intelligence organization. Diem agreed and stated he had finally decided to appoint Col. Y as head of Central Intelligence. He spoke highly of Y who has good combat record and has done very well in running re-education centers. I expressed hope he would take over duties soonest and Diem stated he now working out details.
(4) I pointed out one of most necessary parts of CIP is to have better RKG relations. I reminded him I had talked to Mau and Thuan twice and once to him about bad effects of anti-Sihanouk articles in Saigon Mai,/3/ adding that we convinced these articles probably sparked RKG tirade against alleged ill treatment Vietnamese-Khmers. Diem said he had sent word to editors of Saigon Mai point out harm they doing by publishing such articles, but editors replied someone had to answer continuing anti-GVN press campaign Phnom Penh. I replied while I realized GVN had maintained press truce for many months during which anti-GVN campaign continued Phnom Penh, it fundamental that GVN not permit mere press campaign prevent efforts establish better RKG relations.
/3/See footnote 4, Document 11.
I reminded Diem General McGarr convinced it would be almost impossible put down Viet Cong threat unless work out some border control arrangements. I then stated while we too deplored RKG tirade to UN, etc., GVN should use incident to point out RKG safety and welfare of population in Delta, including Vietnamese-Khmers, endangered by VC attacks and atrocities and therefore in interest of both countries work out border arrangement (Depcirtel 1370/4/).
/4/Circular telegram 1370 discussed reprisals against Khmers in South Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, 651H.51K/3-1061)
Diem went into his usual line re impossibility work out arrangement with Sihanouk, "who now considers himself world statesman". He added certain ex-French colonialists, particularly French army captain Vietnamese origin (I think he said Huyen Dinh La), had been permitted by Sihanouk to come to Cambodia after November coup to try to stir up GVN opposition. Diem stated other unnamed French colonialists permitted to return Cambodia for same purpose and certain of them in touch with Hanoi. This proved Sihanouk did not wish good relations. Diem then said when Pinay/5/ here recently he had pointed this out to him and given details re VC sanctuary Cambodia and Pinay had taken matter up with Sihanouk urging it very much RKG interests prevent VC using its territory since if VC should take over SVN, RKG would be next target. After Sihanouk had put on tirade against GVN, particularly treatment Vietnamese Khmers, Pinay--according to Diem--told Sihanouk he was "spitting in his own soup" by not trying have better GVN relations. Incidentally he mentioned in passing Ho Thong Minh trying stir trouble by talking Gen. Lawton Collins. Diem then stated recently province chief Kien Tuong had informally met with opposite RKG province chief in effort collaborate. According Diem, RKG province chief shortly thereafter removed. I replied this unfortunate but matter cannot be arranged at local level as it must be worked out with Sihanouk. Diem said that Vice President Tho had informally been in contact with friends who were RKG ministers in effort to try to encourage negotiations. Diem added these efforts got nowhere because Sihanouk opposed. I again reiterated no matter RKG provocation it essential in fight against VC to have better relations. Diem made no promises.
/5/Antoine Pinay, Independent Deputy in the French National Assembly.
(I took occasion discussion Saigon Mai articles to say I very concerned series of recent Saigon Mai articles stating "Americans" in touch with presidential candidate Truyen and while articles did not say official Americans they inferred as much. I stated such inference harmful all concerned and urged Diem use this false information as another lever to stop Saigon Mai anti-RKG attacks. Diem replied editors probably motivated by "evidence" Truyen and presidential candidate that have been showing local press consisting several pictures these two candidates at social gatherings with "Americans". Diem deplored this harmful publicity and promised to try stop it.)
(5) I stated pleased note several press code bills before assembly and urged one be passed soonest. Diem promised to do this and asked whether I did not believe press here now more active in criticism, etc. Replied I pleased this development which very helpful.
(6) Stated I also pleased learn press would be permitted be present when ministers interrogated by assembly commissions (reftel) and urged press be encouraged publish details assembly debates, particularly when several bills being discussed on same subject. Diem replied press free to attend all assembly meetings but subjects so dry they have no public appeal. I agreed but urged press be encouraged give details so some of public would be better informed pros and cons important questions.
(7) I again urged he make modest payments to peasants called upon furnish labor, particularly those for instance who work on agrovilles but would not live there and would thus get no benefit from their labor. Diem replied peasants everywhere except those in Cochin-China area gladly contributed to community development. He added if he tried to tax them it would cause more disgruntlement. He argued even those who did not get into agrovilles received considerable benefits from establishment nearby markets, schools, hospitals and maternity wards. I stated that while this undoubtedly true, corvee labor was one of principal things used by communists to cause disgruntlement Delta.
(8) I then asked whether elections of youth to village councils proceeding and whether internal security councils at provincial and district levels being established. He replied he has given strict orders youth elections be fully democratic since this first step in electoral process to be implemented later on broader scale and therefore public must be assured these honest elections. He corrected me by saying his plan did not call for internal security councils at provincial and district level but would be purely provincial councils, not necessarily limited to internal security. He would not implement this part of reform until after election since he could be accused using councils to back his campaign. I stated CIP called for lower level internal security councils as well. He promised think this over.
(9) I asked when he would implement other reforms announced February 6th. He had same answer that to appoint ministers and others, including members national economic council, before elections could be used by opposition to say he appointing his supporters to help in campaign. He pointed out he desires Vice President Tho to take other functions but it would hurt his campaign with business community if he changed from national economy to some other ministry before elections.
(10) I then urged Diem to put into practice many psychological warfare suggestions in CIP, particularly those which would induce VC's to desert. He said he doing this to certain extent but had to be careful because of VC reprisals against relatives. He added he nevertheless has chosen several ex-VC's who will make public statements against VC's just before elections.
Comments: Diem was most affable, exuded confidence and for first time expressed some gratitude our CIP efforts which he promised implement as best he could. Again before giving full green light believe we should await outcome detail discussion by GVN-US officials. In meantime MAAG quietly ordering some equipment for 20,000 increase (Embtel 1444/6/).
/6/See footnote 4, Document 16.
Durbrow
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