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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume I Vietnam, 1961 Department of State Washington, DC

21. Memorandum of a Conversation, Embassy Residence/1/

Bangkok, March 27, 1961, 7:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1823. Confidential. Drafted by Durbrow on March 29 and approved in S on April 4. Rusk and Durbrow were in Bangkok for the SEATO Council meeting, March 27-29.

US/MC/7

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary
Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow, American Ambassador to Viet-Nam

Viet-Nam
Nguyen V. Thuan, Vietnamese Secretary of State for the Presidency and Acting Secretary of State for Defense
Mr. Dang Due Khoi, Vietnamese Charge d'Affaires in Bangkok

SUBJECT
Situation in Viet-Nam

At the request of the Government of Viet-Nam, the Secretary had a talk with Mr. Thuan for 50 minutes in the evening of March 27.

The Secretary opened the discussion by stating he was pleased that Mr. Thuan could take the trouble to come to Bangkok to discuss Vietnamese problems with him, since he unfortunately could not spare the time to visit Saigon. The Secretary asked Mr. Thuan to extend his best wishes to President Diem which Mr. Thuan promised to do.

Thuan then stated he wished to discuss two matters: 1) the situation in Viet-Nam and 2) the Vietnamese Government's concern regarding Lao developments. Mr. Thuan said it was unfortunate that the world in general did not realize the seriousness of the Viet Cong (VC) activities and threat in Viet-Nam. Often foreign correspondents praised the progress being made in Viet-Nam in the economic and agricultural fields but usually they emphasized the lack of democratic freedoms in his country. These correspondents failed to realize that Viet-Nam is an under-developed country both economically and politically, and they seem to ignore the fact that since the end of 1959 the Viet Cong have changed their tactics from subversion and persuasion to all-out guerilla terrorism. The Viet Cong have increased the number of trained cadre coming from the north and the DRV (North Vietnam) have announced publicly that they are doing all they can to overthrow the GVN (South Vietnam) in order to prevent economic progress and set up a weak Communist front government in order to unify the country under the Viet Cong. For these reasons President Diem cannot put into effect all the democratic freedoms, but as the Viet Cong threat diminishes and the people become educated and more sophisticated democracy can make progress.

To emphasize this point, Thuan reported a conversation that Mr. G. Menon, the Indian Chairman of the International Control Commission (ICC), had had with Gen. Giap, the DRV Chief of Staff. According to Menon, Giap recently told him that the DRV desired to get rid of the Diem regime and replace it with a "friendly'' government in order that the latter could carry out the provisions of the Geneva Accords to unite North and South Vietnam. Thuan interpreted Giap's statement to mean that the latter desired to set up a front government in South Vietnam which in fact would be fully Communist controlled.

Thuan then reminded the Secretary that President Diem and his entire government are 100 percent anti-Communists and have, during the last 7 years, cooperated fully with the free world and done all they could to prevent the Communists from taking over South Vietnam. Thuan added very few in the free world realized that the GVN is actually at war. To point this up, he stated that between two and three hundred South Vietnamese troops were being killed each month and many more civilians were being killed by Viet Cong terrorists. He continued, very few on the outside realized that the Viet Cong occupied practically the entire countryside in South Vietnam for ten years prior to 1954. During this time, they indoctrinated a large part of the population with Communist ideas, kidnapped a lot of South Vietnamese youth when they moved north under the Geneva Accords and many soldiers in the Viet Cong Army are married to South Vietnamese or are the brothers or sons of people from that area. Because of this fact, the Viet Cong are able to bring strong pressure on relatives in the south to collaborate with them. When President Diem took over the government in 1954 from the French, the latter only controlled the main towns and the main highways. For that reason, Diem had to exert a great deal of effort and energy from 1954 to 1956 to regain control of the countryside and generally stabilize the internal security. From 1956 to 1959 considerable progress was made in economic and agricultural development and basically for this reason the Viet Cong in late 1959 changed their tactics and are now trying to prevent further progress.

Thuan then referred to the Counter-Insurgency Plan (CIP) which we presented to the GVN some six weeks ago. Thuan stated that in recent meetings in Saigon, American and Vietnamese experts had come to substantial agreement on the U.S. plan as presented. While the GVN agreed basically with the plan, they were very much concerned by the fact that the plan would require them to meet all the piaster expenses. Thuan continued, that by extraordinary efforts such as putting in new taxes, collecting old taxes more effectively and by making arrangements with local banks to float a government loan, the GVN would be able to meet most of the piaster costs of the CIP for calendar year 1961. He added, however, that although the banks had agreed to try to float the loan, they had insisted that half of the loan should be used for economic development purposes instead of entirely for military counter insurgency expenditures. Thuan then said that the GVN frankly did not know how it could raise sufficient piasters for calendar year 1962 to pay the cost of the CIP. He said one of the reasons for this was that the "Buy American" program and the U.S. insistence that all aid shipments be made in U.S. ships would, in fact, reduce the effective amount of U.S. aid by 30 percent in the future. He backed his arguments about the piaster shortage by quoting from statements made to him by the Brookings-Ford Foundation financial expert team now in Vietnam. According to Thuan, the team experts after several months' study came to the conclusion that the GVN could not raise more taxes without raising prices or causing a fairly serious inflation. Thuan added the reason prices had so far not gone up more, although heavier taxes had recently been imposed, is that there have been sufficient stocks of consumers goods in the country to meet the basic demands. Once these stocks are exhausted, there is bound to be a shortage and inflation. The financial experts also told Thuan that before an accurate figure could be set for the devaluation of the piaster, it would be necessary to make a careful study of the entire Vietnamese price structure. The experts believed that until this is done it would be wrong to set the new piaster rate at 60 to the dollar since this might cause serious disruption of the economy, stop progress, and might cause further inflation, unless it turned out to be the right rate. The experts said it would take them about 5 months more to complete the price structure study. For this reason, the GVN could not accept the suggestion in the CIP that as a last resort the GVN could devalue in order to obtain sufficient piasters for their counter insurgency needs. He admitted that the GVN had earned comparatively large amounts of foreign exchange in 1960 and had fairly large reserves. However, because of the Buy American policy and their extraordinary expenditures in connection with the fight against the Viet Cong, the GVN had to spend a comparatively large amount of this exchange for necessary imports.

Thuan then thanked the Secretary for approving the force increase of 20,000 men which were [was] urgently needed to give adequate protection to the population now seriously harassed by the VC. In view of the fact that the VC are stepping up their attacks prior to the coming presidential elections in April, he, Minister of Defense, had given firm orders to all security forces to go on and continue on the offensive. While these tactics were effective, they were causing considerable losses on both sides. He added that the despite [sic] the all-out effort that must be made to fight the VC, it is also essential to carry on as much economic and agricultural development as possible under the circumstances.

The Secretary thanked Thuan for his explanation of the situation and assured him that the United States Government would give as much assistance to Vietnam as it can to fight the VC threat and maintain its independence and integrity. He then asked Thuan whether the GVN had any long-range development plans. Thuan replied that they had a three-year plan which is being carried out as best it can be under the present circumstances. He pointed out that one of the main objectives of the plan is to bring about a gradual devaluation of the currency. Despite the efforts made in this field, Thuan stated that he disagreed with the U.S. contention in the CIP that the GVN for various reasons could not usefully absorb any more aid. Thuan admitted that if the present list of goods which can be imported through U.S. aid is maintained and if the Buy American policy remained in effect, the GVN might not be able to use even all the U.S. aid available for FY 61. He contended, however, that if USOM would revise the list of commodities paid for by American aid, the GVN could not only use all the FY 61 aid money but a considerably larger amount. In this connection, he agreed that the present US balance of payments criterion for aid would have merit if the GVN was not confronted by a serious VC threat. Under the circumstances, however, exceptions should be made to the balance of payments approach in order to permit the GVN to obtain enough piasters to implement the CIP. Thuan emphasized that one of the principal needs was to give security protection to the people in the countryside who were being constantly harassed, propagandized and intimidated by the VC. This costs a great deal. He added that this extra aid is needed until the many factories now being built or in production can produce enough goods to meet the consumers' needs and if these needs are not met, serious inflation will ensue.

The Secretary again thanked Thuan for his full explanation and assured him of continued US support. He added that President Kennedy himself had personally approved the CIP. The new administration, however, has found it necessary to study carefully the methods and results of US aid programs in the past 15 years in order to find out what mistakes had been made and which methods had proved most efficacious. The administration believes that, in the past, there were too many short term plans and projects which, as good as they may have been, were not aimed at long range goals in individual countries. For these reasons, the Administration is asking the Congress to make available funds for longer periods of time. If this is granted, not only can the United States plan ahead but it is essential that each individual country put into effect their own long range plans to attain desired goals ten years hence and then draw up plans to work on projects each year which would lead to these goals.

The Secretary then said that economic and military aid will do no good if efforts are not made simultaneously to explain to the people what the government is doing, the goals they hope to attain and the sacrifices needed. This is particularly essential in countries fighting Communist "promise." The Secretary then urged that the GVN do all it can to better its international relations, particularly with countries in its own area. He mentioned such countries as India and Burma. He stated unless these countries are aware of Vietnam's problems, what they are doing about it and how they hope to attain their desired goals and explain to them the seriousness of the VC threat, these countries will neither understand the plight of Vietnam nor do anything to help the GVN. The Secretary stated it is essential also to fill in the foreign press on these same problems.

Reverting to the CIP, the Secretary stated it is essential that the GVN establish as soon as possible an effective chain of military command in order that the security forces may be used as effectively as possible in the battle against the Communists. If the country does not use all its resources, military, political, psychological and economic, to best advantage, it will be difficult if not impossible to overcome the VC threat.

Thuan thanked the Secretary for his explanations of the Administration's point-of-view and stated that shortly after the elections the GVN expects to have Tunku Abdel Rahman and Gen. Nasution visit Vietnam in order to strengthen relations with these neighbors. The GVN is also endeavoring to build up its prestige in Africa, but this is proving difficult because of what: they term the ChiComs "Operation Checkbook". Thuan explained that the Chinese National Foreign Minister had explained to the GVN Foreign Minister recently that in connection with GRC efforts to win friends in Africa one of the African leaders asked how much the GRC could give in aid and the GRC Ambassador promised to inquire into the matter. Shortly thereafter, the Chinese Communist Ambassador was asked the same question and when given the answer, he was presented with a check immediately by the Communist representative. Mr. Durbrow interjected, to remind Thuan that part of the CIP called for serious efforts by the GVN to better its relations with Cambodia. Thuan, citing how difficult this is, stated hat the Vice President had had discussions with the Cambodian Foreign Minister just the day before and it was hoped that these talks would lead to good results. In this connection, Thuan particularly commented on the anti-GVN campaign recently mounted in Phnom Penh in connection with the alleged flight of hundreds of Vietnamese of Cambodian origin to Cambodia. He decided it was too bad that this Viet Cong organized incident had caused so much difficulty. He then referred to the Cambodian Assembly resolution of March 24 which was particularly derogatory to the GVN and stated that he was pleased to have been told by Mr. Durbrow that it was quite evident that this resolution had been written and pushed through by the Communist elements. Thuan stated that the GVN is making extraordinary efforts to have better international press relations and reminded the Secretary of the rather sweeping governmental reforms Diem has already announced. He added that most of these reforms would be put into effect by April 15, a few days after the presidential election.

Thuan spoke for only a minute or two about Laos, indicating that the GVN was naturally deeply concerned about the prospects of the country going Communist and stated that the GVN supports the Boun Oum Government. He expressed concern about growing reports that the Viet Cong are coming through the passes from North Viet-Nam into Laos to create bases in the Southeastern part of that country which are being used for attacks into Viet-Nam.

In conclusion, the Secretary thanked Thuan again for his clear expose of the situation in Viet-Nam. The Secretary then said that the Administration is endeavoring to speed up procedures and decisions; therefore, he suggested that Mr. Thuan discuss these problems frankly and fully with Mr. Nolting, the Ambassador-Designate to Viet-Nam, a man of proven ability who will be very understanding. The Secretary again assured Thuan that we appreciate fully the anti-Communist stand of the Diem Government and we will do all we can to help, but our efforts must be mutual.

 

22. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 50-61

Washington, March 28, 1961.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, VP Security Files, Nations and Regions Series, Program of Action for Vietnam. Secret. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on March 28.

OUTLOOK IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Problem

a. To analyze the basic political and social conditions and trends in mainland Southeast Asia;/2/

/2/Laos, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, and Malaya. [Footnote in the source text.]

b. To identify potential political-military crisis situations and to estimate probable developments over the next year or so in domestic stability and international orientation of the countries of the area; and

c. To estimate the probable effects on the peoples and governments of these countries in the event there were significant Communist gains in Laos or South Vietnam.

Conclusions

1. Most Southeast Asian countries are either now experiencing or will encounter in the next year or two serious political crises arising out of foreign intervention, domestic strains, or a complex of factors attributable to their basically unstable and unhealthy political, social, and economic structure. By far the most serious problems are the deteriorating situation in Laos and the mounting Communist threat and precarious governmental situation in South Vietnam. (Paras. 22-68)

2. The Pathet Lao probably have a greater military capability than they have yet chosen to exercise. They could sharply step up the action at any time and probably achieve a series of local victories. This would increase the likelihood of the disintegration of the Laotian Army and the subsequent collapse of the non-Communist position. The Laotian crisis has become a matter of contention among the major powers and its resolution rests primarily in non-Laotian hands. (Paras. 28-30)

3. In South Vietnam, the situation of the Diem government seems likely to become increasingly difficult, not only because of rising Communist guerrilla strength and declining internal security but also because of widening dissatisfaction with Diem's government. Since the coup attempt of November 1960, Diem has reasserted his control of the government and made some cautious moves toward government reform; he has taken action to improve the antiguerrilla capabilities of the army and stepped up military activities against the Viet Cong. Nonetheless, the factors which gave rise to the November 1960 coup attempt still exist, and we believe that the odds favor another coup attempt by non-Communist elements in the next year or so. The Communists would attempt to exploit any new efforts to unseat the government. We are not confident that the army would be able to keep the situation from getting out of hand. (Paras. 36-38)

4. There is deep awareness among the countries of Southeast Asia that developments in the Laotian crisis, and its outcome, have a profound impact on their future. The governments of the area tend to regard the Laotian crisis as a symbolic test of intentions, wills, and strengths between the major powers of the West and the Communist Bloc. (Para. 69)

5. Those countries which are in close alignment with the US favor stronger measures to assure at least a non-Communist and preferably an anti-Communist, western-oriented regime in Laos; neutralist Burma and Cambodia, as well as Malaya, favor a neutralist but not Communist-dominated government. These latter governments favor some form of international political agreement to end the crisis. They would be alarmed if Laos were lost under conditions which indicated to them that the US position in the area had gravely weakened. (Para. 70)

6. The loss of Laos to the Communists, or perhaps even the division of the country, would almost certainly incline the Thai toward accommodation to Communist power in Southeast Asia. A predominantly Communist-controlled Laos would vitally threaten South Vietnam's independence: it would greatly extend the Communist frontiers with South Vietnam; it would bring substantially greater Communist military power to bear on the crucial Saigon defense complex; and it would greatly facilitate Communist infiltration and subversion. The close proximity of a Communist state would make more difficult Western efforts to starch up local resistance. In short, the loss of Laos would severely damage the US position and its influence in Thailand and South Vietnam. (Para. 72)

7. The future course of all of the countries of Southeast Asia would be strongly influenced by the actual circumstances in which the loss or division of Laos had occurred as well as the local appraisal of the attitude and actions of the US in response to the situation. The extent to which these countries would go in resisting Bloc pressures or in withstanding local Communist threats would depend in great degree on whether they still assessed that the US could stem further Communist expansion in the area. They would feel more keenly than before a strong temptation to take a neutral position between the two power blocs, even though they recognized that the US is the only country with sufficient power to oppose the Communist Bloc in the area. Although they probably would be deeply disillusioned regarding US resolution after the loss or division of Laos, they would nonetheless welcome demonstrations of US firmness and might in response modify their appraisal of their own future in due course. (Para. 73)

8. Although the Communist threat to South Vietnam has reached serious proportions, the chances of a Communist takeover in the next year or so are considerably less than they are in Laos. Nevertheless, Peiping and Hanoi almost certainly attach greater importance to their efforts in South Vietnam than they do to their efforts in Laos. US prestige and policy are particularly deeply engaged in South Vietnam. Diem's policy of close alignment with the US is on trial in the current crisis. All countries of the area would attach great importance to a failure of the South Vietnam Government to cope successfully with the rising tempo of Communist subversion and armed insurrection. If South Vietnam were to fall to the Communists or be forced to swing toward neutralism, the impact upon the countries of Southeast Asia would be similar in kind but considerably more severe than that resulting from the loss or division of Laos. (Para. 74)

[Here follow paragraphs 9-74, a detailed discussion of the question.]

 

23. Editorial Note

At the third closed session of the SEATO Council meeting, March 29, 1961, the United States Delegation introduced a draft resolution that had the unanimous support of all the attending Foreign Ministers. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the resolution read:

''The Council also noted with concern the efforts of an armed minority, again supported from outside in violation of the Geneva Accords, to destroy the Government of Vietnam and declared its firm revolve not to acquiesce in any such take over of that country.

"Finally, the Council records its view that the Organization should continue to keep developments in Laos and Vietnam under urgent and constant review in the light of this resolution."

This resolution was approved by the Council as part of the final communiqué with the addition of the word "South" before Vietnam in paragraph 7. For full text of the final communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 9-43. The United States Delegation record of the third closed session was transmitted in Secto 27 from Bangkok, March 29. It and other documentation on the SEATO meeting are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366. CFs 1822-1931.

 

24. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President/1/

Washington, April 3, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office File, Counterinsurgency. Secret. Initialed by Rostow.

SUBJECT
Counter-Guerrilla Programs

Herewith Bob McNamara's replies to the questions which arose from my visit to Bragg. I am sending a copy to Bissell who is in charge of our general review of counter-guerrilla operations. He will consider with his team the substantive problems involved, and they will form a part of his final submission. Secretary McNamara could not have been more helpful in all this.

 

Attachment

QUESTIONS CONCERNING
COUNTER-GUERRILLA PROGRAMS/2/

/2/On the source text McNamara wrote: "3/30 To Mr. Walt Rostow. Walt, here is information relating to the questions you raised."

Question 1. "Why are the capabilities of the helicopter not being fully exploited in the counter-guerrilla program of the Vietnamese? The helicopter is uniquely effective in tracking down guerrillas."

General McGarr, Chief of the MAAG in Vietnam, is intensely interested in the counter-guerrilla problem there and is well aware of the importance of helicopters in a counter-guerrilla role. Instruction of the Vietnamese Army, under supervision of the MAAG, currently includes training in the use of helicopters in counter-guerrilla operations. The Vietnamese armed forces now have 14 H19 helicopters. The current military aid program includes an additional 11 H34's, which were asked for for the specific purpose of use in counterguerrilla warfare. Ten of these H34's have actually been delivered and the remaining one will be delivered in the near future. During General Trapnell's visit to Southeast Asia/3/ he discussed the counterguerrilla problem with General McGarr, who told him that the total of 25 helicopters appeared to be about all that the Vietnamese could effectively use and maintain. However, General McGarr is being further queried by cable with reference to full exploitation of helicopters in Vietnam and his reply will be forwarded.

/3/Lieutenant General Thomas J.H. Trapnell, USA, visited Vietnam, March 1617, on McNamara's orders to review the insurgent threat. A copy of his report to the JCS on the visit, JCSM 20261, March 28, is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, VN 1961, 370.5384. A record of the discussion of the report at a meeting of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS on March 27 (I-18283/61) is in Department of State, Bundy Files, 1961 Chron. In a similar mission, Colonel Flesch visited Vietnam, March 31April 7, to review the Viet Cong threat. A copy of his 13-page report is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, VN 1961, 310.1333.

Question 2. "Why were the Special Warfare units withdrawn from Vietnam in November 1960? Why are they not being sent back to work with our MAAG there? General Decker, when asked, indicated that CINCPAC had opposed. Why?"

There have been two basic problems in properly training the South Vietnamese in counter-guerrilla activities. The first of these involved both U.S. organization and the manner by which President Diem of Vietnam had organized his own forces. Until quite recently the MAAG was responsible for counter-guerrilla training of only the regular armed forces of Vietnam. The USOM (ICA) was responsible for training the Vietnamese Civil Guard and police. Further, CIA was responsible for training in guerrilla warfare. President Diem, on his part, has in the past been trying to conduct counter-guerrilla operations almost personally and with a complicated fragmentation of responsibilities in the lower levels. The conduct of operations in any particular area which involved primarily local resources, including the Civil Guard and police, were supposedly coordinated by the political head of the area. If regular armed forces were involved, the operations were supposedly coordinated by the military region commander. During the past year, however, great progress has been made both in the simplification of U.S. responsibilities and in the Vietnamese organization. The MAAG, Vietnam developed a comprehensive Counter-insurgency Plan/4/ which was finally approved by the Country Team and later in Washington. At the same time, President Diem-despite the fact that he has not yet agreed to all aspects of the Counter-insurgency Plan-has moved forward considerably and has assigned primary responsibility for counter-guerrilla action to the Ministry of Defense and has also put training of the Civil Guard under the same Ministry. This has greatly facilitated MAAG training in this field.

/4/Document 1.

The second complicating problem has been the limitation in numbers on the size of MAAG, Vietnam, deriving from the "legal" requirements of the Geneva settlement of Indochina in 1954. The settlement permits no increase in foreign military in Vietnam above the number there at the time the settlement was made. It has been the U.S. position for the past years that the MAAG should not exceed 685. Conceivably the figure could be recomputed now because of reduction in the French military there

In March 1960 the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, noting the deteriorating situation in Vietnam, offered MAAG, Vietnam through the JCS and CINCPAC a "Cold War Task Force," consisting of 156 Special Forces personnel and 19 Civil Affairs, psychological and intelligence specialists. However, because of the personnel ceilings on the MAAG, mentioned above, only 30 U.S. Army Special Forces personnel could be accepted of the overall proposed Task Force. Teams of these Special Forces personnel were used to instruct elements of the Vietnamese armed forces in counter-guerrilla warfare during the period May through November 1960. As Vietnamese instructors were trained, they assisted each Special Forces team and gradually assumed a larger share of instruction as they became qualified. Since becoming fully qualified these Vietnamese instructors have been working under MAAG, Vietnam supervision to continue training of others in their specialties. As we understand it, this training is moving ahead quite effectively and the training load is being adequately carried.

Because of the current limitation on the size of the MAAG, Vietnam, General McGarr must carefully balance the makeup of his personnel against his over-all training requirements. However, he is now in the process of reassessing the situation and will report if he believes more Special Forces type personnel are needed and can be accommodated within the ceiling. Presuming that the current ceiling is not changed, it is possible that it could be evaded by various subterfuges, but it has so far been the policy of the Country Team to require the MAAG to remain within its ceiling.

The Cold War Task Force of the size originally offered by the Army in 1960 is still available for employment in South Vietnam if desired.

[Here follow questions 3-7 which deal with other subjects.]

 

25. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State/1/

Washington, April 8, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/4-861. Confidential. Drafted by Ruff.

SUBJECT
Call of the Ambassador of Viet-Nam on Mr. Steeves

PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency Tran Van Chuong, Ambassador of Viet-Nam

Mr. John M. Steeves, Acting Assistant Sec'y for Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. Chalmers B. Wood, Officer in Charge, Viet-Nam Affairs

Mr. Samuel O. Ruff, Foreign Affairs Officer

Ambassador Chuong called on Mr. Steeves to inquire about the SEATO Meeting which he (Mr. Steeves) had attended and about the conversations which had taken place between the President and Mr. Macmillan on Viet-Nam./2/

/2/British Prime Minister Macmillan paid an unofficial visit to the United States, April 4-8. In a meeting with the President on April 6 he discussed Vietnam briefly, in particular the number of civilians assassinated by the Viet Cong, and Vietnam was mentioned in passing in the joint statement issued on April 8. For text of the statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 545-546. A memorandum of the conversation, in which Steeves participated, between the President and the Prime Minister is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1833.

Mr. Steeves replied that he was particularly happy to have the chance to explain to the Ambassador because the developments had a very vital bearing on his country's interests. He said that in one conversation with our British colleagues we had tried to focus our attention on the larger issue of security in Southeast Asia as a whole. We had dramatized to them the fact that the place where more of our friends were being directly attacked and killed by the Communists was in Viet-Nam. We informed them of the things we intended to do in Viet-Nam, our plans for stepped-up assistance, etc. They were interested, sympathetic, and cooperative.

The Ambassador wanted to know if we had an understanding about what should be done.

Mr. Steeves in reply reviewed the SEATO Conference saying that the members faced up to the fact that they must assume their responsibilities. For example, M. Manach, the French representative, certainly left the meeting with a full understanding that responsibility lay with the SEATO process if there were no settlement. Thailand and the Philippines both felt content with the decisions.

Mr. Steeves then stated that we now have the problem of attempting to find a peaceful solution. Since we are afraid to attend an international conference while military activity continues, we have taken a firm stand that a cease-fire must be de facto in effect. As to the current situation, we are disturbed that one prong of the PL near Paksane is close to cutting Laos in two. On the other hand, two days ago the Government of Laos dropped paratroops at Muong Kassy.

The Ambassador then urged that it was necessary to keep on fighting and defending to the last moment; he was encouraged to see that our side had not stopped before the conference. He then addressed himself to an item from the press which he thought needed comment:

Chinese troops. He had been disturbed by editorials which cited the danger that Chinese troops would enter the conflict. He thought that the press misunderstood the fact that Red China, the USSR, the Pathet Lao, and the Viet-Minh were all fingers on the same hand. The Chinese do not have to send troops directly into Laos because Communist cadres have been trained in North Viet-Nam for the last fifteen years. The enemy can inject this nucleus into Laos with no trouble at all because they speak the same language, have trained with the Pathet Lao, etc. He recalled that he had seen Souphanouvong in Hanoi in 1945 when he attended a meeting to help in the organization of Viet-Minh in Laos.

The Ambassador then urged the necessity of having more troops in Viet-Nam; not American Marines, but Asiatics who know the terrain. He thought that the US understood the military situation very well but had hesitated for years on an increase in the Vietnamese army. He then asked for confirmation if it were correct that we had recently given his country an offer of help of $41 million, on condition that the Vietnamese make a counter effort which he said would involve 1,500 million piastres. Mr. Steeves confirmed this. The Ambassador closed with an eloquent plea for help of various kinds saying that his people were still ready and willing to fight to defend themselves. He said that his government was glad to make reforms such as land reforms, etc., but he was afraid that reforms would be ineffectual unless they were backed up in depth with means of resettlement, farm machinery, etc., intimating that the US could help along other lines.

 

26. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/

JCSM-228-61

Washington, April 11, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489, VN(Sensitive). Secret. Printed also in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 19-21. The source text bears the stamp "Sec Def has seen."

SUBJECT
Recommendations on South Vietnam

1. On 28 March 1961, Lieutenant General T. J. H. Trapnell submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report and ten recommendations on the situation in South Vietnam./2/ These recommendations were:

/2/See footnote 3, Document 24.

a. US should support Counterinsurgency Plan and promote its acceptance by the Government of Vietnam.

b. Decide and direct military matters through military rather than Country Team channels.

c. Avoid reduction in MAAG strength.

d. Provide Defense Support funds on same basis for 170,000 force as for 150,000.

e. Provide MAP support for entire 68,000 Civil Guard.

f. Provide MAP POL support for Civil Guard.

g. Provide MAP support for British-made personnel carriers and scout cars.

h. Expedite immediate shipment by air of 12,000 M1 carbines.

i. Expedite shipment of 625 AN/GRC-9 and 2245 AN/PRC-10 radios; 80 RS-6 radios and 80 GN-43 generators.

j. Expedite shipment of 3000 Claymore anti-personnel mines.

2. On 31 March 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations listed in subparagraphs 1 a, b and c above and requested the Secretary of Defense to take action deemed appropriate./3/ The recommendations listed in subparagraphs 1 d, e, f and g above were forwarded to CINCPAC for comment and recommendation. The recommendations listed in subparagraphs 1 h, i, and j above were referred to CINCPAC for action deemed appropriate, with advice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of action taken, and of requirements for further assistance on such action.

/3/A copy of JCSM-202-61, March 31, is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489, VN(Sensitive).

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have received and considered the comments of CINCPAC, and his reports on action taken./4/ The Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the Trapnell recommendations below subject to the following considerations:

/4/Not further identified.

a. Provide Defense Support funds on same basis for 170,000 force as for 150,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken due cognizance of the primary functions and responsibilities assigned to the State Department and ICA in determining the source and allocation of Defense Support funds. However, the Government of Vietnam apparently feels it cannot provide the financial support required in the Counterinsurgency Plan. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that prompt acceptance of the Counterinsurgency Plan by the Government of Vietnam is a matter of overriding concern in that country's present critical situation. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request the Secretary of Defense to take action to the end that Defense Support funds are provided for a 170,000 man force on the same basis as that now provided for 150,000.

b. Provide MAP support for entire 68,000 Civil Guard. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval for provision of MAP material and supplies within the limits of the current FY 61 MAP, to carefully selected Civil Guard units beyond the 32,000 ceiling currently authorized MAP support. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend full MAP support for 68,000 Civil Guard be initiated in FY 62, and approximately $20 million be added to the Pacific Command FY 62 MAP ceiling to support this.

c. Provide MAP POL support for Civil Guard. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval for provision of MAP POL to the Civil Guard.

d. Provide MAP support for British-make personnel carriers and scout cars. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval for MAP support of British vehicles in Vietnam to the extent only of providing general supply and repair parts of items common to the MAP.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the increased US contributions to the Government of Vietnam, proposed above, be appropriately exploited by US representatives in Vietnam to induce that government's acceptance of the Counterinsurgency Plan.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that CINCPAC has taken appropriate action to implement the recommendations of General Trapnell:

a. To airlift 12,000 carbines.

b. To expedite shipment of needed radios and generators.

c. To expedite shipment of Claymore mines.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

 

27. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President/1/

Washington, April 12, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 20 US Govt, GVN 1961. Secret. Printed also in Declassified Documents, 1975, p. 329B. Attached to the source text was a note initialed by Anderson which reads: "Mr. Nolting, this is further evidence of high-level interest in your country.'' The note was also initialed by Nolting.

Now that the Viet-Nam election is over,/2/ I believe we must turn to gearing up the whole Viet-Nam operation. Among the possible lines of action that might be considered at an early high level meeting are the following:

/2/In the presidential elections held April 9 Diem gained nearly 90 percent of the vote against two other opponents and was elected for the term 1961-1966. Documentation on the election is in Department of State, Central File 751K.00.

1. The appointment of a full time first-rate back-stop man in Washington. McNamara, as well as your staff, believes this to be essential.

2. The briefing of our new Ambassador, Fritz Nolting, including sufficient talk with yourself so that he fully understands the priority you attach to the Viet-Nam problem.

3. A possible visit to Viet-Nam in the near future by the Vice President.

4. A possible visit to the United States of Mr. Thuan, acting Defense Minister, and one of the few men around Diem with operational capacity and vigor.

5. The sending to Viet-Nam of a research and development and military hardware team which would explore with General McGarr which of the various techniques and gadgets now available or being explored might be relevant and useful in the Viet-Nam operation.

6. The raising of the MAAG ceiling, which involves some diplomacy, unless we can find an alternative way of introducing into the Viet-Nam operation a substantial number of Special Forces types.

7. The question of replacing the present ICA Chief in Viet-Nam, who, by all accounts, has expended his capital. We need a vigorous man who can work well with the military, since some of the rural development problems relate closely to guerrilla operations.

8. Settling the question of the extra funds for Diem.

9. The tactics of persuading Diem to move more rapidly to broaden the base of his government, as well as to decrease its centralization and improve its efficiency.

Against the background of decisions we should urgently take on these matters, you may wish to prepare a letter to Diem which would not only congratulate him, reaffirm our support, and specify new initiatives we are prepared to take, but would make clear to him the urgency you attach to a more effective political and morale setting for his military operation, now that the elections are successfully behind him.

 

28. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 12, 1961, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/4-1261. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd.

1596. I saw SecState Presidency Thuan April 11 on following:

1) I took up AP story along lines instructions Dept's 1250./2/ I reminded Thuan Secretary at Bangkok had emphasized that implementation CIP would require closest US-GVN cooperation and if further stories like AP's get out Dept may be forced to tell whole CIP story which much larger than question 20,000 increase. Thuan showed he was embarrassed but made no comment.

/2/Dated April 6, telegram 1250 summarized an April 6 AP report that the United States had approved a 20,000-man increase. The telegram advised the Embassy in Saigon to inform the Vietnamese Government that such stories would make approval of the whole counterinsurgency plan more difficult. (Ibid., 751K.5-MSP/4-661) For text of the AP report, see the New York Times, April 7, 1961, p. 5.

2) Thuan, in answer my query, stated GVN has been considering establishment in RVNAF of something along lines Political Commissar System used by GRC as psywar measure in order build up morale of troops. I said if system similar to GRC's, would include organization for spying on commanders and troops with channel of authority completely separate from normal command channel. I pointed out that CIP recommendations included surfacing operations of Can Lao Party in order get away from unfortunate secrecy which generated disgruntlement and mistrust. Thuan denied system being considered would operate as spy outfit. He said some system is necessary to explain to common soldiers commie tactics and give proper political guidance as commies have had some success in infiltrating army. Later that evening I discussed question with General Khanh, the officer sent to Taiwan to study and report on GRC system. He assured me if GVN adopts similar system any secret reports would pass through regular channels to co of even small outfits. Therefore would not generate disgruntlement.

3) I expressed hope Diem would announce reforms soonest. Thuan said he thought Diem would do so by April 30 (presidential inauguration date). I said it should be done sooner; Thuan then said reforms probably will be announced by April 15, but pleaded presence large number correspondents had so absorbed GVN that many things left undone for moment. I told him increasing number of Vietnamese expressing doubts as to whether any reform measures are indeed to be taken and stressed need for urgency. (It obvious that date reforms to be announced still not clear.)

4) I suggested to Thuan that although GVN had been successful in carrying out election despite announced commie desire disrupt it to maximum possible extent, it now important keep guard up for possible intensified VC efforts. Thuan assured me GVN had this in mind. He stated that although VC had harassed GVN somewhat during election period, GVN had also harassed VC to very considerable extent.

Durbrow

 

29. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting/1/

Washington, April 14, 1961, 11:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, State JCS Meetings: Lot 65 D 172. Top Secret. State Department draft undated, not cleared with Department of Defense.

[Here follows discussion of the first agenda item.]

II. Vietnamese Elections and Security Situation

In reporting on the Vietnamese elections, Mr. Jenkins/2/ remarked that they could be considered a significant victory for President Diem. An analysis of the returns indicate that he was able to hold the countryside in spite of Viet-Cong actions. Countrywide, there had been a turnout of about 90%. On the other hand, in Saigon the turnout was only 75%. Diem had received about 89% of the votes, but in Saigon he had received only 64%. This was probably due to the fact that opposition candidates were better known in the urban areas. There was no evidence of any blatant frauds in the election.

/2/Alfred LeS. Jenkins. Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

From a security point of view, the GVN armed forces had done surprisingly well. Though the Viet-Cong had attacked at several points, the situation was kept under control by GVN countermeasures and the Viet-Cong efforts had had little effect on the vote.

Mr. Jenkins remarked that the GVN had begun to release a good deal more information on Viet-Cong activities and the Government's own countermeasures. There had been an increase in our own press reporting on insurgency activities in Vietnam, but this probably resulted largely from the presence of a good number of press people in Vietnam who were essentially there to cover the elections.

Admiral Russell/3/ asked whether we are really supporting Diem and, if so, in view of his election victory, shouldn't we publicly affirm our support for him. Mr. Jenkins reported that we do continue to support Diem and that the Department is trying to arrange for President Kennedy to send a personal message to President Diem at the time of the latter's inauguration.

/3/Admiral James S. Russell, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

In connection with Admiral Russell's query, Mr. Rostow noted that in the next several weeks the Executive Branch will be taking another concerted look at the entire Vietnamese problem. One of the items that must be faced up to is the Geneva Accord as it relates to Vietnam. Current thinking is that we should disengage ourselves from the continued support of and adherence to the Geneva Accords since others are openly violating them. Mr. Jenkins remarked that the State Department's legal people feel that we can probably do so, particularly since we are not signatories to the Accords and since some of the signatory nations are grossly violating them.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

 

30. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President/1/

Washington, April 15, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret. Printed also in Declassified Documents, 1975, p. 329C.

SUBJECT

Durbrow on Alsop on Diem on Viet-Nam

1. It is the general consensus that Joe was exercising his great talent for needling ambassadors; and that, understandably, Durbrow has reacted with some force-perhaps excessive force./2/

/2/In telegram 1599 from Saigon, April 12, Durbrow reported on his talks with Joseph Alsop during the latter's recent visit to Vietnam. Alsop told Durbrow that Diem, in a 2-hour discussion, criticized the United States for not properly backing him. Durbrow suggested that the Department send him instructions to the effect that unless Diem began to implement the CIP, the United States would not provide MAP aid for a force increase. (Department of State, Central Files, 951K.62/4-1261: also printed in Declassified Documents, 1975, p. 317A)

2. It would be unwise for us to instruct Durbrow, in his final days in Saigon, to issue the kind of ultimatum he suggests. We shall have to negotiate with Diem on these matters with strength and tact; but this is not the moment nor the setting in which to do it. Durbrow should relax with Diem from here on out and leave the arm-twisting to men with fresh capital.

3. In terms of substance, the showcase province is a special case because of Thao's great capabilities; but it is also one of the most difficult provinces. They are not all like Thao; but he's done well with a tough area.

4. On the issue of centralization and decentralization, the Counter-Insurgency Plan calls for some elements of decentralization; but we would back Durbrow in his view that the centralization of intelligence and planning of counter-guerrilla operations is required.

5. The whole incident underlines the extreme urgency of getting our Viet-Nam program moving with new faces, enlarged resources, and renewed conviction. Perhaps a visit to the field by a Washington team to see what is going on, is called for. I gather that McNamara would like to go himself or send Gilpatric with Lansdale.

6. Nolting arrives back as of Wednesday, April 19; and we should, I believe, set aside time for a major meeting on Viet-Nam next week.

7. On Lansdale as Ambassador, he may have been good. I believe so, but Diem never had to deal with him when he bore the full burden of an Ambassador, with all the awkward inevitable problems of negotiation. I think we must go with Nolting, whom I know well personally. You will find him a man of rare strength and character. But I am sure we must find a way to send Lansdale for a visit to Viet-Nam soon in a way that will strengthen Nolting's hand-not weaken it. This is wholly possible./3/

/3/A memorandum to Rostow, presumably from Komer, dated April 14, reads:

"General Lansdale telephoned following message: Reference the Alsop telegram, Joe is expert at using the needle on Ambassadors and this is some evidence of it. Probably Durbrow wrote this message too soon afterwards while still in somewhat of a state of shock.
 
"Secondly, I think there is an obvious personality clash type of involvement in which Durbrow is involved with the President out there and this would make it a mistake to have him the one to go in and lay down the law to the President, as he requested the Department instruct him to do.
 
"Thirdly, I think the best answer might be some prompt Executive action and it would be the best answer to meet either forthcoming criticisms as they come or to do what probably the Boss would like to do now. Along these lines, I would suggest I would like to see Rostow, and either McNamara or Gilpatric, and myself go out for a quick visit for the President, and either [sic] pull Alexis Johnson from Bangkok for a meeting with us in Saigon, and maybe spend a couple of days talking to people and finding out where things stand today and advising some action we can start working with." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series)

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