The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001.  Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date.  This site is not updated so external links may no longer function.  Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume I Vietnam, 1961 Department of State Washington, DC

VI. Consideration Within the United States Government of the Special Financial Group Recommendations
July-August 1961

 

96. Editorial Note

From June 8 through 25, 1961, a research and development team headed by William H. Godel, Deputy Director of the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency, visited Vietnam to discuss with United States and Vietnamese officials the establishment of a joint research and development center. The visit was in response to Article 20 of the Presidential Program for Vietnam. (Document 56) In a conversation with Godel and McGarr on June 15, President Diem said, among other things, that he was very interested in the development of a defoliant and would prefer one that permitted subsequent agricultural growth. (Telegram MAGCH-CS 921, June 16; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803)

As a result of the visit, President Diem directed the Vietnamese Armed Forces to establish a Combat Development and Test Center to be commanded by a senior engineer officer, Colonel Trach, who was to report to him through the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. General McGarr concurred in the team's recommendation that a separate element be established within the Military Assistance Advisory Group, a research and development office composed initially of five people to form the United States component of the joint operation. The team also developed a precept for the establishment of the joint center which was approved by President Diem and Ambassador Nolting. Working with MAAG representatives and RVNAF authorities, the Godel team also prepared an initial list of problems and proposed projects to be considered by the center. In a memorandum of July 12 to Lansdale, Godel reported on the background and results of the team's visit. Attached to the memorandum was a copy of the precept for the center and the list of problems and proposed projects. (Ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Vietnam-2 Jan.-Oct. 1961)

A summary of Godel's report on his visit to the seminar on Southeast Asia at the Foreign Service Institute on July 6 is in a memorandum of July 7 from Robert H. Johnson to Walt W. Rostow. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Staff Memos-Rostow)

On July 17, Godel discussed the results of his mission with the Vietnam Task Force. According to the minutes of this meeting:

"Mr. Cottrell introduced Mr. William Godel, an expert from the Department of Defense on the techniques and practices of psychological warfare. Pursuant to Article 20 of the Presidential Program Mr. Godel and a team of experts went to Saigon and established, in conjunction with the ARVN, a combat development test center to experiment with new techniques and weapons for the guerrilla war that is being fought in Viet-Nam. The Vietnamese responded to the idea of a development test center with enthusiasm: Diem conducted no less than three personal interviews with Godel and assigned Colonel Trach to command it. Trach was placed directly under the supervision of the President. Among the new equipment introduced by Godel are: a power glider, a light highly-maneuverable aircraft which can fly for long periods on one tank of gasoline (an airborne Volkswagen), a paddle wheel boat with a steam engine burning cane alcohol which could operate in 3 inches of water, carrying 20 to 30 men, an armolite rifle, something the short, small Vietnamese can fire without bowling themselves over. This is a 22 caliber, commercially produced weapon with a high propellant charge. It could be used to great effect. It might be possible to issue this weapon to a ranger battalion and test it thoroughly under battle conditions. Dogs, trained to work with patrols, could introduce some mobility into the largely static patrol operations of the Vietnamese Army when night falls. Mr. Godel also explored many new techniques. Among them is a quiet, tiny, effective village alarm system that could alert the ARVN at a distance of 25 miles without giving away the identity of the village informer. This alarm system is being developed simultaneously with a similar project by ICA. ICA is developing a bulky piece of equipment, which could hardly be hidden and could be immediately spotted by the alert Viet Cong. Another experiment concerns a defoliant to denude border infiltration areas. This is a costly operation which would require some three years for maximum effectiveness. Godel spoke of a hormone plant killer to eradicate the manioc crop on which the Viet Cong subsist while operating in the northern mountain regions. Godel analyzed the problem of bringing medical aid to the villages and affirmed that this operation should be part of the ARVN's civic action program. Uniformed medical orderlies, corpsmen or aides could best perform this difficult task as they could protect themselves from the Viet Cong while public health teams, Americans or Vietnamese could not. The 'flying doctor' technique whereby sick villagers are flown to hospitals in the major urban centers could also help to ameliorate the problem. Godel also spoke of the problem in the areas where Montagnards, mountain people, live. These people resent the pretensions of the Vietnamese to govern them and administer their needs, what they would desire is a degree of autonomy within the Vietnamese state.
 
"Godel concluded that the program had begun well by showing the Vietnamese what kinds of weapons they need to fight their peculiar kind of war. The program will have, in time, a significant impact. Godel stressed that the procurement problem must be met by more expeditious handling of requests within the Defense Department for these special items of equipment." (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Minutes of TF Meetings)

 

97. Letter From Secretary of State for the Presidency Thuan to the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Wood)/1/

Saigon, July 18, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files ERC 66 A 878, TF VN 1961. Confidential.

Dear Ben: Since I returned from Washington to my paper mill, quite a few things happened. So I want to write you a few words.

1. The financing problem for 20.000 additional men is solved as you know. May I have to say how much do I appreciate your help?

2. The Staley group has completed their report. They took a few trips to get a more precise idea of the Vietnamese context. On the spot they did realize the difficulties and they did see that we are working and fighting hard. Three major things have to be implemented right away: increasing the force level, building up a wireless system for all villages, and expanding as much as we can the agrovilles network. I get the impression that the Ambassador agrees with me. He took quite a few trips with President Diem and myself. He gets convinced now, I think, that we must have more troops to occupy different areas, to protect population and we have too to regroup them. If you don't occupy villages, the Commies get in and the population can't resist.

The village level is the basis. Silver will report to you longer about the trip we took yesterday in Kien Hoa Province. That's a successful test. The necessity is to act rapidly to create an impact right away. Better to increase noticeably the Armed Forces now to get rid of subversion in one or two years and to increase them afterwards than to take half measures. So, if Cottrell and yourself can get the force level of 200.000 approved for 1962 and the corresponding level of commercialised (sic) aid, i.e., 170 millions US$, that would help a lot.

3. You know the victory our troops got over the Commies in the Plaine des Joncs. The Communist unit knocked out is their best one. Objectively that's quite a hit. They lost 187 men and 10 prisoners. Weapons captured: 76. As far as I remember, nothing like that happened before to the Commies in South Viet-Nam, even during Indochinese war. I ask Silver to bring back to the Vietnamese Task Force a cane we got from the Commander of VC unit, namely Battalion 502. I would like that you will show it to President Kennedy. I have been in the front right away after the hit with newsmen. I did see the arms captured, the bodies all over in rice fields. We still have plenty of guts so don't worry about (us).

4. Our main difficulty: the rice situation. Many causes to that:

a. Estimate made by Department of Agriculture too different from estimate made by provincial authorities about the rice production this year. The latter is less optimistic.

b. Smuggling through Cambodian border. They play on the "change" (exchange). Because of insecurity the black market rate of exchange is like that: 1.6 VN piaster for 1 riel. So people prefer to send rice to Cambodia to be exported and to change afterwards the riels they get into VN piasters at the "faux noir."

c. Communists prevent population to sell their rice.

d. Rumors about devaluation. Peasants prefer to keep rice than to get piasters.

I know that you are very busy Ben. I am too. So I stop here.

My best to Cottrell the "dragon". Mes homages a Madame et mes amities a votre jeune fils de 14 ans./2/

/2/On August 19, Wood sent a letter to Nolting enclosing a reply dated August 18 to Thuan, and asked Nolting to transmit the reply to Thuan. In his letter Wood congratulated Thuan on recent military victories by the Government of Vietnam, which he said "have been very encouraging to persons in our Government at every level." He also wrote that the questions raised by Thuan were ones that he worked on every day and that while some had been answered, "the others keep us so busy that I have postponed any plans of visiting Vietnam until early 1962." In a letter of August 28, Nolting informed Wood that he had sent Wood's letter to Thuan that day. All these letters are ibid.

Truly yours,

Nguyen dinh Thuan/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

98. Memorandum of a Conversation/1/

Washington, July 18, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Regional Security Southeast Asia-General. Secret. Prepared by Rostow on July 19. A note on the source text indicates that the original was sent to the President and copies to Taylor, Robert H. Johnson, and Steeves.

PARTICIPANTS:
General Maxwell D. Taylor

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

Mr. W. W. Rostow

The inter-connection between various elements of policy in Southeast Asia was discussed.

1. The problem of improving the diplomatic foundation for a military contingency plan which would be aimed in part against North Viet-Nam was considered. Mr. Johnson undertook (a) to collect and examine the persuasiveness of the evidence on North Viet-Nam aggression against South Viet-Nam; (b) to examine the best diplomatic forum or sequence of forums in which the issue might be raised. He expressed a tentative view that we might start with the ICC in Viet-Nam. If we did not get satisfaction there; if the legal status of Viet-Nam in relation to the United Nations was sound; and if the case was good enough, the matter might be then taken into the United Nations.

2. The lack of common feeling among the Vietnamese, the Cambodians, and the Thais was considered in relation to the possibility of mounting a local effort to protect that area from guerrilla warfare and subversion. It was agreed that, while the job might not be impossible, important political and psychological obstacles would have to be overcome. The crucial long-term need for such an association of effort was emphasized.

3. The problem of creating quickly a program for northeast Thailand and finding the funds to finance it without undue delay was examined.

4. The advantages of clearing out the Pathet Lao pocket at Tchepone was considered as well as the difficulties of doing it while the cease-fire still operated in Laos.

5. The possibility of using evidence of North Viet-Nam aggression as a foundation for more aggressive limited military action against North Viet-Nam was discussed.

6. It was agreed that Mr. Johnson would undertake to design a general set of guidelines for policy in Southeast Asia as a whole, as well as recommendations for the organization of more unified political and military staff work in Washington. All hands agreed that there was a sense in which the region was made up of quite disparate countries; but a number of important inter-connections isolated, notably these:

a. The stability of Thailand in relation to Laos and the outcome of the Laos negotiation.

b. The extent to which public evidence and international acknowledgement of North Vietnamese aggression against South Viet-Nam might affect the shape of our contingency planning in respect to a breakdown of the Laos conference.

c. The connection between the situation in the Laos panhandle and the pressure the Vietminh could exert on southern Viet-Nam.

d. The connection between the future of neutrality in Cambodia and the future of the Laos panhandle./2/

/2/Rostow appended the following note to the memorandum: "On July 20 Mr. Johnson informed me that the Secretary of State had assigned Mr. Steeves full time to work on the problem of Southeast Asia as a whole."

 

99. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)/1/

I-16753/61

Washington, July 19, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, North Vietnam 1961 000.1. Top Secret. Drafted by J.W. Clinton and Robert H.B. Wade, Director of ISA's Coordinating Staff for NSC and Collateral Activities. According to Wade's note on the interoffice control sheet attached to the source text, there was a discussion at the Planning Group luncheon on July 5 of the military problems connected with intervention in Vietnam. During the course of the discussion, the Department of Defense was asked to make a study of the consequences of a naval blockade of North Vietnam.

SUBJECT
North Viet Nam

Continued Viet Minh subversive activities in South Viet Nam suggest the desirability of evaluating military measures which the U.S. might institute in reprisal against North Viet Nam. Accordingly, it is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide their views on the consequences and effectiveness of:

(1) Maritime control measures against North Viet Nam up to and including a blockade;

(2) Varying degrees of interdiction-type air and sea patrols (e.g. surface patrols along the coast from the 17th parallel southward, a barrier patrol from the Paracel Islands to the South Viet Nam coast and air patrols across the northern border of South Viet Nam).

These measures, if approved, would supplement those actions recently approved by the President. As you are aware, the President, on 11 May, authorized various actions as listed on pages 4 and 5 of the Task Force Report on "Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Viet Nam",/2/ with the objective of meeting the increased security threat resulting from the situation along the frontier between Laos and Viet Nam. Among these actions is the provision of MAP support for the Vietnamese Junk Force in order to improve the protection against infiltration by sea.

/2/ See footnote 2, Document 51. and Document 42.

The Task Force Report also indicates that "it will be necessary for CINCPAC's naval component to assume an active responsibility jointly with the Vietnamese for coastal patrol activities from the Cambodian border to the mouth of the Mekong River." Increased guerrilla activities may warrant such additional U.S. efforts as indicated above. These air and naval operations against North Viet Nam would be, in a sense, our equivalent of the guerrilla operations which the Viet Minh are conducting in South Viet Nam.

It is requested that your views on the foregoing be made available by 11 August 1961.

William P. Bundy/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

 

100. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/

Washington. July 20, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret.

SUBJECT
Are We Pushing Hard Enough in South Vietnam?

Nolting's cable,/2/ despite some optimism, is basically disturbing. While it may simply be too early to tell, we do not yet have things turned around in Vietnam. In part this reflects one of the real problems for any government-how to get adequate follow-through. We whack up a big exercise on a crash problem, take some strong initiatives, and then the agencies tend to slip back toward business as usual with only the White House providing much of a prod.

/2/Document 92.

But more important, there are some strong political reasons for stepping up the momentum in South Vietnam. I believe it very important that this government have a major anti-Communist victory to its credit in the six months before the Berlin crisis is likely to get really hot. Few things would be better calculated to show Moscow and Peiping that we mean business than an obvious (if not yet definitive) turnaround in Vietnam. Moreover, here the odds are still in our favor, which makes Vietnam a better place than Laos to achieve the desired result.

Such a victory is also indispensable to the process of reassuring our Far East allies, most of whom have been led by Laos to wonder whether we have the moxie to protect them any longer.

What should we do? How about the President directing that all wraps are off in the counter-guerrilla operations, etc. in South Vietnam? We will fund and pay for any crash measures, however wasteful, which will produce quick results. We will do anything needed in sending arms and ammunition, providing MAAG advisers, and in associated social and economic operations designed to win back the country side. The objective-to achieve before the end of the year a major defeat of the Viet Cong.

The important thing would be a change in operational philosophy. Instead of haggling with Diem over who should finance what proportion of the effort, we would regard this as a wartime situation in which the sky s fee limit. The only caveat would be that outlays must be related to the counter-guerrilla campaign. Hence, we would not give Diem a blank check on economic development or on building up the regular army for defense of the 17th parallel as McGarr would have us do.

What would it cost? Even with a blank check, could we spend more than $100 million or so extra in Vietnam over the next six months? Moreover, if such a really crash effort were feasible, it would probably be a sound investment in the long run. To let the counter-guerrilla operations drag on over the years might well involve a far greater total cost to us than that involved in moving fast now. Of course, the gut question is feasibility; could South Vietnam absorb and utilize quickly enough another great infusion of funds? Could we actually get more GVN forces into the field? At least let's look into it.

Simultaneously, we must put the blocks to Diem on finally doing the necessary to regain popular support. Nolting concludes that he must undertake such measures within the next few months or face the prospect either of a military coup or a civil war. We must somehow impress Diem with a sufficient sense of crisis to move faster than he is.

Perhaps the above package would provide a lever for the President to personally impress on Diem that (1) latter is being caught up in a desperate crisis in which his very survival is at stake; (2) we are now prepared to pull out all the stops in providing anything necessary to meet this threat promptly and vigorously; but (3) the time has come when he too must undertake the massive and dynamic reform program without which the countryside cannot be won.

What do we lose if such an initiative fails? Are we any worse off than before? Our prestige may have become a little more heavily engaged but what else? And the risk involved if we fail to prevent the Viet Cong threat from developing into a full-fledged civil war is clearly overriding. After Laos, and with Berlin on the horizon, we cannot afford to go less than all-out in cleaning up South Vietnam.

Bob K.

 

101. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/

Washington, July 21, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-27-71. Top Secret. Signed "Ed". Initialed by Taylor with the notation "To SE Asia file." Copies were sent to McNamara and Gilpatric.

SUBJECT
Vietnam Force Increase

This is in response to your query about the 100,000-man increase requested by the President of Vietnam for the Vietnamese Armed Forces. The matter is under study in Defense now, at staff levels. Since it hasn't been before the Secretary or the JCS for a determination, the most helpful thing to you might be to see some of the staff considerations. After discussing this with Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, I obtained some of the thinking in Defense on this subject and am passing it along to you, informally, prior to a substantive Defense position. The two staff officers most concerned with this subject are Col. Kent in ISA and Col. Levy in the Joint Staff.

Force Levels

Increases in Vietnam's force levels have been discussed as being in three phases. Based on an authorized level of 150,000, the phases were increases of 20,000 (to 170,000), 30,000 (to 200,000), and concurrently the 100,000 (adding to the 170,000 to make 270,000). The only approved increase, to date, was the 20,000.

Although authorized strength of the RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces) was 150,000, funds were never provided for this size force by either the U.S. or Vietnam. So, the force level in fact was approximately 142,000. When the 20,000 increase was approved, the Vietnamese started building up their force. They have now reached approximately 150,000. Inductions are at the rate of about 4,000 per month, in addition to about 2,000 conscripts and volunteers each month to offset normal attrition. It is estimated that the 20,000 increase won't be absorbed until December 1961.

The second phase, an increase of 30,000 (170,000 to 200,000) has received careful consideration by JCS and CINCPAC. Both agreed in principle that the increase would probably be required but withheld outright approval subject to continuing assessment of the situation in Vietnam, the training of the 20,000 increase, including officers and NCO's and the use made of these additional personnel. If the continued assessment indicates further increases up to 200,000 are required, the decision should be made in time to permit the second phase to smoothly follow the first without interruption in the induction of personnel. Estimates of the time required to field this 30,000 increase range from 8 to 18 months, due to the many uncontrollable factors involved. It is likely that a year's time will be involved. During this period there will be ample time to assess the requirement for a further additional increase of up to 70,000 making a possible total of 270,000.

Thus, the actual problem of the increase from 200,000 to 270,000 will not be ready for physical solution in Vietnam until about 18 months from now. CINCPAC has indicated that he does not think there is the need or justification for such an increase at this time. The feeling is that there are a number of months available, during the build-up to 200,000, to make a continual assessment of the capability of the RVNAF to obtain, train, and use officers and men. A timely and justifiable decision could be made during this period as to the necessity for and size of the increase

Some Factors

President Diem, Secretary Thuan, and some of the U.S. staff in MAAG-Vietnam are looking for a "breakthrough" of the problem of the current Viet Cong guerrilla threat by the proposed force increases. About 75 970 of the RVNAF is now required for these operations, with units having had combat missions for many months now (since 1959) without relief nor with a chance to have sorely needed training. They look for sufficient troops to dominate the enemy, liquidate him quickly, and to give a spirited lift to troop morale and combat effectiveness by rotation of units out of the line for rest and needed training.

Troops have been engaged extensively on operations in which months have now been stretched into years of strain, fatigue, and casualties. Morale and efficiency is lowered as a result. Major Millett, a Medal of Honor man who has just returned from MAAG Vietnam, made a point of this when he talked to the Vietnam Task Force in Washington,/2/ underscoring the fact that his Purple Hearts were earned only after fatigue had set in after months of continual combat.

/2/The minutes of the July 5 Task Force meeting, during which Millett made his presentation, are in Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Minutes of TF Meetings.

Lack of the prospect of success, of turning the tide, is a dangerous morale problem. It generates the atmosphere in which coups are likely. Added to this is the fact that, in a country where family relationships have deep meaning, there has been an extended separation now of soldiers from their families.

The "breakthrough" is seen as needed to give a sharp set-back to the Communist threat, and to give Vietnam a fighting chance to get set for future rounds with the enemy. The Republic of Vietnam will celebrate the beginning of its seventh year of independence this Fall. It had 8 years of war during the Franco-Vietminh struggle after the fighting of World War II, one year of intense civil strife (during 1954-55), and six years of increasing guerrilla conflict as an independent nation. It is badly in need of a breathing spell.

After the Geneva Accords of 1954, the Communists in North Vietnam modernized and strengthened their armed forces to about 380,000, the largest armed force in Southeast Asia. The threat posed by this force has grown as areas of Laos have fallen to the skillfully combined Pathet Lao-Vietminh forces, opening new routes of movement on the Laos-Vietnam border along the western flank of Vietnam. While coping with the internal problem of Viet Cong insurgency, this external threat cannot be ignored; the Communists have given the external threat added meaning by announcing that an enclave would be opened in South Vietnam for a "Peoples Liberation" government, and have indicated this would be aided by armed force across the border.

The territory of South Vietnam has about 66,000 square miles. About 20 % of this is dominated by the Viet Cong, and combat requirements for liquidating the Viet Cong are high. Another 40% has Viet Cong activity, ranging from small hit-and-run guerrilla bands hiding out in jungles and mountains to small teams of subversive agents; in this area, combat requirements are far less. The exact combat requirements are not precisely clear, but certainly appear to be beyond present capabilities. As the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense forces are improved, as the RVNAF forces are increased, the "breakthrough" might well occur before the 270,000 level is reached.

One facet of the force increase problem is the availability of Officers and NCOs. There is some shortage now. The demand for high quality leadership will be sharpened as troop strengths are increased. Training centers are reported to be crowded and there are many problems growing out of the difficulty to provide trainers without placing unacceptable demands on operational units.

The arithmetic of force increases has been based largely on divisions, (with the division being "papa and mama" to its regiments, battalions, and companies however they are detached for combat assignments). An RVNAF force of 270,000 is essentially a 15 division force. It would permit 2 more divisions in the Northern Corps area, 3 more in the Central Corps area, one more in the South, and two in the General Reserve.

It is believed that four divisions are required to provide adequate delay and the defense potential envisioned in the Hue-Danang (Tourane) area, and to conduct effective counter-insurgency operations (reportedly 8,000 Montagnards are being trained in North Vietnam and Laos for guerrilla operations in the High Plateau of South Vietnam, and there are records of 700 infiltrators per month). The fall of Laos has placed Route #9 in Communist hands, which flanks this area and gives the RVNF commander the task of delaying from both North and West, and then conducting the defense of Danang.

The High Plateau area is critical and the key terrain in the defense of South Vietnam. This area is vulnerable to attack by forces from a Pathet Lao controlled flanking position, in the Plateau de Bolovens of Laos on the West and Northwest, by forces from the East and Northeast by-passing Danang, and by infiltration. Enemy forces attaining control of the High Plateau area are in a position to drive South to the final objective of Saigon. Four divisions are believed required to secure this area against overt or covert attack.

The East coastal plain, south of the Hue-Danang area, requires one division to secure the Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang area against attack from the North and West and to provide the nucleus for determined defense in this area in case the High Plateau is lost. This division should provide surveillance, protection of lines of communications, conduct counter-insurgency operations and reinforce other areas as required. It should be assigned to the Corps controlling units on the High Plateau.

To conduct the defense and counterinsurgency operations in the Saigon-Delta area requires four divisions. The General Reserve would also initially be positioned in this area. A General Reserve of one division plus the division-equivalent Airborne Brigade would also be stationed initially in the Saigon area. Additional forces may be available from other areas or from the General Reserve if any enemy attack progressed to a degree of providing a major threat.

 

102. Paper Prepared by the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/

Washington, July 21, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia-Rostow Report Second Try. Secret.

EVALUATION OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FORCES IN VIET-NAM

The battle in Viet-Nam evidently hangs in balance. Positive and negative forces are at work. Since the negative forces will almost certainly increase in weight, it is time to act energetically to increase the strength of the positive forces.

Positive Forces.

These are the positive forces as they can be perceived at this distance.

--A degree of tactical success achieved by the GVN armed forces; e.g., in suppressing the Viet Cong election offensive; in conducting the delta sweep; in the ambush of July 16; in generally moving over to a more offensive posture.

--The reassurance of Diem and his government of continued U.S. support, despite events in Laos.

--The slow beginning of decentralized order in the army and in intelligence collection.

--The increased international awareness of the aggression being conducted against Diem from Hanoi.

Taken together, these forces have held the line-but no more-in recent months.

Negative Forces.

--The almost certain build-up of Viet Cong forces in recent months, looking towards an expanded offensive.

--The build-up of the Viet Cong base in Southern Laos, evidently designed to increase the military pressure on Viet-Nam in the months ahead.

--The continued insecurity of the population and their unwillingness to take the risks of denying food and intelligence to the Viet Cong, and of supplying it to the Viet-Nam cities and Diem's government, respectively.

--The threat of rice shortage in the Viet-Nam cities.

--The persistence of pockets of serious disaffection in the officer corps of Diem's army and the apathy and fatigue of many of his soldiers.

--Diem's inability to link himself and his government with popular aspirations, including the weakness of his programs of village development and civic action.

--The lack of a program of positive national goals and purposes: the negative, anti-Communist stance of Diem's political appeal.

W. W. R./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

 

103. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions/1/

Washington, July 22, 1961-2:31 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5-MSP/7-2261. Confidential. Drafted by Claxton (H) and Swezey (FE/SEA), cleared with S/S and with Usher (FE/ SEA) and Cleveland (FE/SEA), initialed by Peterson (FE) for the Secretary, and sent to Bangkok, CINCPAC for PolAd, Manila, Phnom Penh, Djakarta, Saigon, Seoul, Taipei, and Vientiane.

138. Press recently reported certain remarks by Senator Fulbright re aid to SEA and Korea./2/ For your guidance in handling inquiries these remarks were part of repeated questioning by Senator Fulbright to make certain new Administration has fully reviewed principles and objectives underlying military and economic aid to SEA and to Korea and that proposals new aid program are based on fresh appraisal as distinguished from carrying out old policies from inertia only. Fulbright asked Secretary to return to Committee for full discussion this subject. Secretary did so and provided vigorous assertion of importance continued assistance to SEA and Korea based on re-examination underlying policies and objectives. Secretary firmly supported continuance of fundamental US policies in area and of full amount of funds requested. Because Secretary's testimony was given at special meeting and dealt with Berlin and many other problems none of it was printed. Therefore the responses of Executive Branch firmly supporting the SEA and FE programs will not appear in printed hearings. However, upshot of this questioning is that after re-examination fundamental policies are continued.

/2/Apparently a reference to Fulbright's remarks during testimony by Secretary Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 6, a transcript of which is in the National Archives, RG 46, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Records, and which is printed in Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Vol. XIII, Part 2 (Washington, 1984), pp. 327-376.

FYI. Fulbright also made point aid alone is not solution to SEA or FE problems. Fulbright requested Dept memorandum indicating re-examination. Dept prepared and submitted memorandum underscoring importance of assistance to SEA for protection independence against communist pressures from without and within./3/ Tone of Fulbright's questions suggests real concern about possible over-commitment of US and it is not clear that Executive answers completely satisfied him. However rest of Committee seems in accord with basic policies. End FYI.

/3/Apparently a reference to the paper prepared by the Policy Planning Council entitled "U.S. Security Alternatives in the Far East," an early draft of which was dated June 23. A copy of this paper, with a note on the table of contents page to the effect that the views of the Policy Planning Council were "advisory" and did not necessarily represent approved policy and with a cover sheet dating the paper July 24, and designating it PPC 61-4, was sent to U. Alexis Johnson by McGhee under cover of a note of July 31. McGhee explained that the attached paper had been approved by McConaughy and the Secretary and had been sent to Senator Fulbright on July 21, in response to Fulbright's request during the course of Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on foreign aid. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265)

Pouching text hearings and copy Dept memo./4/

/4/In telegram 128 from Saigon, July 27, Nolting reported that Fulbright's remarks as recently reported in the press caused President Diem and other Vietnamese officials "great concern." Diem voiced his concern in a meeting with Nolting on July 24. Nolting told the Department that circular telegram 138 helped him place Fulbright's remarks in some perspective for Diem, but that he had been handicapped by not having the text of the Senator's remarks nor specific information on the press coverage of the remarks. (Ibid., Central Files, 790.5-MSP/7-2761)

Rusk

 

104. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the President/1/

Washington, July 26, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia-General. Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. Copies were sent to Bundy (presumably McGeorge), Lemnitzer, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, Robert Kennedy, and Steeves.

SUBJECT
Southeast Asian Planning

1. In continuing my examination of the need for increasing the South Vietnamese Army in line with President Diem's request of June 9,/2/ I have become increasingly aware of the need for a rational analysis of the need for military forces in Laos and Thailand, as well as in Vietnam.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 69.

2. The immediate military danger to Vietnam as well as to its neighbors derives from the continued infiltration from the North into the Laotian panhandle and over the western border of Vietnam. There is no present military plan in existence which is adequate to cope with this threat. SEATO 5/3/ is a military plan designed primarily to hold Vientiane, Seno and several other important population centers. It offers no response to the continued attrition being carried on by the irregular invaders into Laos and Vietnam.

/3/Reference is to Plan 5/61, "A Plan To Assist the Royal Laotian Government To Counter Communist Insurgency in Laos," (MS/623/1/61), April 20, 1961. (National Archives and Records Service, RG 333, SEATO Registry Microfilm, Reel S-3 61)

3. The Royal Laotian Army (FAL), with or without the Meos, is inadequate to cope with this threat. You are aware of the program to improve the quality of the FAL which is being carried forward presently by the MAAG in Laos. However, all of the reports which I have seen suggest that many months of intensive work will be necessary to make this force truly combat-worthy. Even if it becomes so, its strength and resources are not sufficient to cope unassisted with the infiltration.

4. Without suggesting a reduction of effort in North Laos, my feeling is that a prime military requirement is the early establishment of a secure base in the south of Laos, capable of covering the flank of South Vietnam and capable of providing a point of support for operations in the North. Such a base can be secured only through the cooperative action of Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, assisted and encouraged by the United States.

5. Action to pull these countries together in coordinated action should be accompanied by a continuation of our efforts to improve the Laotian Army. Following agreement as to the role which the military and paramilitary forces of these countries would play in establishing this base, the United States can then see more clearly the kind of military aid programs which are necessary and appropriate in this region. In other words, to answer the question of the future size of the Vietnamese Army, we need a strategic plan for the entire Southeast Asian area.

6. These comments add up to a reinforcement of Mr. Rostow's terminal point in his Memorandum to you of July 25,/4/ that we need a tightly knit Southeast Asia task force to pull these complex issues together and to submit recommended solutions to the same Steering Group which is watching the Berlin situation. I have passed this paper to Mr. Steeves who is preparing the basic State position on a Southeast Asia program.

/4/Not found.

Maxwell D. Taylor/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

105. Memorandum From Edwin F. Black of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/

Washington, July 27, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Confidential. No drafting or clearance information is on the source text.

SUBJECT
The Situation in South Vietnam

This memorandum is to provide you with answers to certain questions which you raised during your conversation with Mr. Gilpatric on 26 July./2/

/2/No other record of the Rostow-Gilpatric conversation has been found.

1. Is it a fact that 90% of Diem s forces are committed to counter-insurgency actions?

Gen. McGarr and the MAAG staff who are intimately familiar with the day-to-day deployments of the RVNAF units confirm that this is the case. A glance at their latest order of battle map/3/ indicates how dispersed Vietnamese units are. Gen. Khanh, Chief of Staff, RVNAF, stated that this was a fact when he briefed both the U.S. and the Vietnamese Special Financial Groups the latter part of July 1961. Everything I saw during my fairly extensive travels throughout the country and during conversations with MAAG officers in the field led me to believe that the 90% figure was reasonably accurate.

/3/No copy of this map has been found.

2. What is Diem's plan for using the additional 30,000 troops?

The additional 30,000 troops are needed to create two additional infantry divisions and minimum supporting air, naval and logistic units. These forces will be employed primarily to meet the increased threat resulting from the deteriorating situation in Laos. This includes the stepped-up infiltration of Viet-Cong supplies and guerrilla forces across the southern Laos border, as well as the very real threat of flanking attacks from north Vietnam which might strike eastward across Route 9 toward Hue and into the Kontum-Pleiku area further to the south. It should be remembered that as of July 1961 President Diem only had two regiments in general reserve to protect his country in event of an overt military attack. As indicated above, all the rest of his forces are deployed on counter-insurgency actions.

3. Are there sufficient manpower resources to permit an increase in fee GVN force level to 200,000?

The Manpower Division of MAAG states that there are and that it is entirely feasible for the GVN to call up additional forces at the rate of 5,000 men per month. The problem of providing adequate officer and NCO cadres for these additional forces is to be met by a revision in the draft law which will permit the induction of adequate numbers of high school graduates and first and second-year college students. Secretary of State Thuan informed us in President Diem's presence that these proposed changes in the existing draft legislation were now on his desk and would be presented to the President for his approval in the immediate future. The GVN is well aware of the need to administer the draft intelligently so that key personnel needed in essential civilian capacities (for example, doctors which are in short supply) will not be absorbed into the Army to the detriment of the normal life of the country.

4. Is President Diem faking vigorous measures to carry out the essential administrative and organizational reforms needed to effectively pursue a successful counter-insurgency plan?

CINCPAC on 22 July responded affirmatively to this question-citing various specific steps which have been undertaken by the GVN since May to implement the recommendations contained in the U.S. counter-insurgency plan./4/ These include implementation of a territorial and command re-organization plan, organization of a central intelligence organization, establishment of an improved military chain of command, redeployment of RVNAF units as recommended in the CIP. The effectiveness of these measures is borne out by the recent successful and fairly large scale operations against the Viet-Cong which have taken place within the last several weeks.

/4/See Document 1.

Black

 

106. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/

Washington, July 27, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret.

SUBJECT
The 30,000 Man Increase in Vietnamese Armed Forces

I understand that Col. Black, Cottrell and Staley are coming to talk to you at noon today about your questions yesterday to Mr. Gilpatric./2/ This memo is prepared as a checklist of the points that might be discussed./3/

/2/See Document 105.

/3/No record of the July 27 meeting among Rostow, Black, Cottrell, and Staley has been found.

1. In general we believe that the President should have a comprehensive analysis of the basis on which the recommendations will be made to him for the 30,000 man increase. This analysis should be more than a formal military justification. Specifically, with respect to:

2. Military aspects. We would like a military analysis which covers such matters as the following:

a. The formal statement of mission of the added forces includes, I believe, dealing with the possibility of a major North Vietnamese attack. Is this necessary? Isn't the U.S. sure to intervene in such a situation? Would GVN forces really be needed for delaying purposes?

b. What will be the true missions of the added forces-how will they be actually employed? What kind of training will they get? Will they be anti-guerilla units?

c. Does the U.S. government really accept the judgment that about 90 per cent of GVN combat forces are committed to counterinsurgency operations? For example, does the term "counter-insurgency operations" in this context include protection of the position of various political leaders? (I do not argue that some of this may not be necessary.)

d. At what rate do we expect the already approved 20,000 man buildup to proceed? Will it really go as fast as presently estimated (completion by end of CY 1961)?

e. Do we need parallel action by the U.S. and the GVN to ensure completion of a comprehensive, geographically-phased military plan for dealing with the VC?

3. Economic Aspects. We would like an analysis of the effect of the proposed increase in real terms upon the Vietnamese economy to supplement the analysis of the financial impact made in the Staley report.

4. Political Aspects. The President ought to be provided with the political assessment called for by the recommendations in the original VN Task Force Report which he approved. A political assessment was provided by Nolting sometime ago./4/ If State accepts this as an adequate assessment, it should do the job.

/4/Presumably a reference to Document 92.

Bob

107. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) and the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President/1/

Washington, July 27, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia-General 7/25/61-7/28/61. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Issues for Decision-Southeast Asia Meeting, Friday, July 28

1. We do not know precisely what the Secretary will present on the basis of the paper being written by Mr. Steeves./2/ Following, however, is our view of the issues which will arise for your decision.

/2/Not further identified.

2. A Choice of Strategy. We must choose an integrated strategy for the entire area because the position in Southeast Asia is precarious: Laos could be lost to Communist control; the Viet-Cong offensive could overwhelm South Viet-Nam; Thailand could slide toward an ambiguous neutralism; Cambodia could despair of maintaining its neutrality. In the face of this situation we must choose among three broad strategies:

--to disengage from the area as gracefully as possible;

--to find as soon as possible a convenient political pretext and attack with American military force the regional source of aggression in Hanoi; or

--to build as much indigenous military, political and economic strength as we can in the area, in order to contain the thrust from Hanoi while preparing to intervene with U.S. military force if the Chinese Communists come in or the situation otherwise gets out of hand.

We assume it is the policy of this Administration to pursue the third strategy; but some discussion of the alternatives may be useful. In any case, as we enter the Southeast Asia planning exercise, you should define your preferred strategy.

3. Concrete Tactical Issues. Depending on the degree of development of State's basic paper, the Friday conference will raise a good many concrete issues. Some may be ready for settlement between you and Mr. Rusk: others may be assigned to the new Task Force which is being formed under Mr. Steeves. The major issues as we see them follow.

4. Laos. With respect to the Laos Conference, we must decide soon:

--What our sticking point at Geneva shall be and what kind of a Laos Government is minimally acceptable to us.

--In case of a breakdown of the Laos Conference we must decide whether SEATO Plan 5 is an adequate contingency plan. Here there are two questions: the present plan does not provide for the protection of the Laos-Viet-Nam border and the Laos panhandle as a whole; the present plan would attempt to contain a substantial increase in Viet Minh interference in Laos by force applied in the Mekong Valley-it may be wiser to envisage less force in the Mekong Valley and Viet Minh containment via a heavier direct threat to Hanoi, to be applied only if the Viet Minh cross their frontiers in strength.

--Are we to accept a split Laos as an inevitable outcome of the present situation?

5. Hanoi. Should we apply increased political pressure on Hanoi by exposing its role in both Laos and South Viet-Nam? If so, how, where and when should it be done?

6. Viet-Nam.

--How shall we respond to the Staley Report,/3/ including the commitment to expand Diem's forces up to 200,000 in the next eighteen months? The decision on the force increase should be made prior to September 1.

/3/Not printed, but see Document 93.

--Shall we send a military review mission to Viet-Nam? If so, when?

--What should be our attitude toward use of Viet-Nam forces in Laos?

7. Thailand.

--What kind of military and economic assistance program, in addition to that recently authorized in a message to Ambassador Young,/4/ should we mount in Thailand?

/4/Not further identified.

--What do we want from Thailand in blocking further guerrilla infiltration into Laos?

8. Cambodia.

--How can we exploit Sihanouk's present more worried mood to increase Cambodian cooperation with Viet-Nam and Thailand? Should we invite Sihanouk to Washington?

9. Contingency Planning.

--What kind of contingency plan should we have should Khrushchev radically expand Communist aggression in Southeast Asia during the Berlin crisis?

[Continue with the next documents]

Volume I, Vietnam, 1961 Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State