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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963, Volume I
Vietnam, 1961Department of State
Washington, DC
155. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/
Washington, October 11, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia General. Top Secret. The source text and three attached papers were sent to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a memorandum of October 11, signed by W.G. Brubeck of the Department of State's Executive Secretariat on behalf of Executive Secretary Lucius D. Battle, explaining that the papers were to be discussed at the meeting on Southeast Asia at 10:45 a.m. that day. The paper entitled "Concept for Intervention in Laos" (SEATO Plan 5 Plus) (Tab A) is not printed. Tab C, Plan for Intervention in Vietnam, is printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 300-311.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
I. Present Situation
[Here follow Sections A and B on the political and military situation in Laos.]
C South Viet-Nam--Political
1. According to Saigon country team, Diem Government has not significantly improved its political position among people or substantially furthered national unity.
2. Also, according to country team, Diem has still not delegated sufficient authority to field command and country team does not feel that "September saw progress toward attainment task force goals of creating viable and increasingly democratic society."/2/
/2/The quotation is from telegram 414 from Saigon, September 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/9-2861) An extract from this telegram is printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. 11, p. 71.
D. South Viet-Nam--Military
1. Although GVN military capabilities have increased, Viet Cong capabilities are increasing at more rapid rate and Viet Cong attacks have increased in size.
2. Viet Cong "regular" forces have increased from about 7,000 at beginning of year to approximately 17,000.
3. Viet Cong have moved from stage of small bands to large units. During September Viet Cong mounted three attacks with over 1,000 men in each. Viet Cong strategy may be directed at "liberating" an area in which a "government" could be installed.
4. Although vast majority of Viet Cong troops are of local origin, the infiltration of Viet Cong cadres from North Viet-Nam via Laos, the demilitarized zone, and by sea appears to be increasing. However, there is little evidence of major supplies from outside sources, most arms apparently being captured or stolen from GVN forces or from the French during the Indo-China war.
[Here follow Sections E, F, and G on the political situation in Thailand and Cambodia and the military situation in Cambodia.]
II. Additional Courses of Action
[Here follow Sections A and B on the political and military situation in Laos.]
C South Viet-Nam--Political
1. Upon determination that material warrants, urgently publish "white paper" now in course of preparation on DRV aggression against South Viet-Nam.
2. Undertake, in consultation with Government of South Viet-Nam, action in the UN to obtain UN observers in South Viet-Nam with a mandate to "report the facts" and help deter further infiltrations. (Details various types of UN action that could be set forth in the attached "Concept for Intervention in Viet-Nam" (Tab B).)
D. South Viet-Nam--Military
1. After determining its feasibility by investigation on the spot, and suitable preparations with our allies and the UN, undertake the introduction of SEATO forces into South Viet-Nam in accordance with the attached plan (Tab C). This plan can be undertaken whether or not "SEATO Plan 5 Plus" is undertaken in Laos and whether or not a political settlement is reached in Laos. However, it would be politically somewhat more difficult to undertake in the latter event. Also, as noted above, "SEATO Plan 5 Plus" should not be undertaken in Laos without also undertaking this plan in South Viet-Nam.
2. Whether or not foregoing plan for military intervention in South Viet-Nam is implemented, immediately undertake the following actions:
a. Subject to agreement with GVN now being sought, dispatch "Jungle Jim" air unit to South Viet-Nam initially on training mission.
b. Assist the GVN in strengthening its action against DRV infiltration by sea.
c. Encourage, including U.S. advisers, guerrilla action against Communist aerial resupply missions in Tchepone area, including introduction of special indigenous units in specific interdiction missions with ground anti-aircraft weapons.
[Here follow Sections E and F on the political and military situation in Thailand.]
III. Decisions Required at This Time
A. Whether to continue exploration with our allies and in SEATO, as well as detailed military planning on "SEATO Plan 5 Plus".
B. Whether immediately to send to South Viet-Nam a very high-level military figure to explore with country team, Diem, and CINCPAC, as well as on the ground, feasibility and desirability from both a political and military standpoint, of the proposed plan for SEATO intervention into South Viet-Nam. Such a person could also make recommendations for additional immediate action short of intervention which might be taken in the present situation.
C. If GVN agreement is received, whether immediately to dispatch "Jungle Jim" Air Force unit to South Viet-Nam.
D. Whether to approve guerrilla ground action, including use of U.S. advisers, against Communist aerial resupply missions in Tchepone area.
E. Whether to approve exploration with key members Foreign Relations Committee change in SEATO voting formula.
F. Whether to authorize Ambassador Harriman, in his discretion and at time of his choosing, to explore with Pushkin principle of movement of Meos from Xieng Khouang area to south Laos-South Viet-Namese border area as quid pro quo for movement of Pathet Lao from southern Laos during regroupment period.
[Tab B]
Paper Prepared by the Vietnam Task Force/3/
/3/Top Secret.
CONCEPT FOR INTERVENTION IN VIET-NAM
General
This paper presents a concept for the introduction of SEATO forces into South Viet-Nam, under a UN umbrella if possible, in an effort to arrest and hopefully to reverse the deteriorating situation in that country. It is closely related to and compatible with the plan for military intervention into Laos if the necessity for intervention into that country should arise.
If there is continued delay in reaching a satisfactory political settlement in Laos and the present ambiguous situation there continues, consideration should be given to prompt implementation of this plan with respect to South Viet-Nam in order to assist in protecting that country from the large scale Viet Minh infiltration now going on through Laos and otherwise to assist South Viet-Nam. (Enemy knowledge that a plan such as this is being considered and the preliminary moves that would be made in the UN also might have a favorable effect on expediting a settlement in Laos.)
If there is a breakdown in the negotiations in Laos and renewal of Communist offensive action there, this could be met in Laos only by SEATO Plan 5 Plus. However, it would take some considerable time before that plan alone could offer material protection to the borders of South Viet-Nam. Therefore, in this eventuality, the implementation of both SEATO Plan 5 Plus and this plan with respect to South Viet-Nam should be undertaken.
While a satisfactory political settlement in Laos would considerably reduce Viet Minh infiltration through Laos into South Viet-Nam, it would not entirely eliminate it. While such a reduction would materially assist the GVN in meeting the Viet Cong threat, there is no assurance that, even under these circumstances, the GVN will in the foreseeable future be able to defeat the Viet Cong. Under these circumstances, although the need of South Viet-Nam for outside assistance such as proposed in this plan would probably still be very strong, it would be much more difficult to find a satisfactory political base upon which to implement this plan.
The visibility of this plan would be dependent upon the degree to which it could and would also result in the GVN accelerating political and military action in its own defense. A judgment on this can only be reached after thorough exploration on the spot with the country team and the GVN.
The paper also discusses a number of lesser actions that might be ordered at once and that would be of some help in arresting the deteriorating situation in Viet-Nam.
The Concept
Political Objective
To prevent South Viet-Nam from being destroyed by Communist guerrilla activity inspired, directed and supported from North Viet-Nam.
. . . . . . .
United Nations Action
Assuming that the situation in South Viet-Nam has deteriorated seriously, due to continuing Vietminh infiltrations and harassments, there are two possibilities with respect to UN action: (1) Recourse to the Security Council and the regular General Assembly prior to any SEATO intervention with a view to seeking UN observers, and failing this to at least help rationalize politically a subsequent SEATO move into South Viet-Nam; and/or (2) a simultaneous move in the UN and SEATO designed primarily to justify SEATO intervention.
1. Recourse to UN prior to SEATO Intervention in South Viet-Nam
Diem could request the UN to send observers with the mandate to "report the facts" and help deter by their presence further infiltrations, those from Laos and those moving south across the 17th parallel. In such circumstances, the U.S. could have the Security Council convened in the first instance. A Soviet veto in the Council is likely since, as in Laos, the USSR and Communist China can be expected to oppose supplanting the ICC mechanism with UN observation. Assuming a veto, the next move might be to place the item on the agenda of the Sixteenth General Assembly which will be in session at least until December 20.
Whether the required two-thirds majority could be mustered in the Assembly will depend on a number of considerations including: whether direct military intervention is imminent; how good a public case we can make documenting Communist intervention from the outside; whether the prospect of Communist takeover is immediate; and what the attitude is of key states in the area, and in particular India, Ceylon, Burma and Cambodia.
The thrust in the General Assembly will probably be a disinclination to have the UN intervene (the three main principals are non-UN members-Communist China, South and North Viet-Nam) in favor of an exhortation to the ICC to look into the problem and perhaps the calling of a conference, as was the case in Laos.
2. Recourse to UN at Same Time as SEATO Moves Into South Viet-Nam
If SEATO action in Viet-Nam is decided upon, we must make the assumption in our contingency planning that inevitably the Viet-Nam case will be brought to the UN by a third party. We would be in a better position politically if, on the Lebanese pattern, we took the initiative by coupling a move by SEATO with a move to the SC. Our objective would be to get the UN to send a small group of observers. We would adopt the public posture in the SC that SEATO need stay in South Viet-Nam only and until such time as the UN could deter effectively further infiltrations and help maintain the independence of South Viet-Nam. As in the previous contingency, recourse to the General Assembly would probably prove necessary.
156. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric)/1/
I-19146/61
Washington, October 11, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Vietnam-2 Jan.-Oct. 1961. Top Secret. Drafted by Gilpatric. A note on the source text indicates that a copy was sent to Lansdale. Also printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 322-323.
SUBJECT
South VietnamAt this morning's meeting with the President/2/ the following course of action was agreed upon with relation to South Vietnam:
/2/Attending this meeting, which lasted from 11 a.m. to 12:25 p.m., were the President, Rusk, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Dulles, U. Alexis Johnson, Cottrell, Wilson, Bissell, Ball, Gilpatric, and McGeorge Bundy. (Kennedy Library, JFK Log, Book II) Only one other record of this meeting has been found. In telegram 1563 61 to McGarr, October 11, Lemnitzer reported that at a White House meeting that morning the President had decided to send to Vietnam a mission headed by General Taylor and including Rostow, Cottrell, Craig, Lansdale, a CINCPAC representative, and probably other representatives from ISA, CIA, and the Department of State. The mission planned to leave Washington on October 15 and to proceed to Saigon via Honolulu, spending about 2 weeks in Vietnam with subsequent visits to Bangkok and Vientiane if the situation permitted. According to Lemnitzer, the mission's task was "to review situation and explore with country team, President Diem and CINCPAC, as well as on the ground, feasibility and desirability from a political and military standpoint of U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Mission will make recommendations for additional action short of intervention which might be taken in the present situation." (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, 1961 Eyes Only Messages)
1. The Defense Department is authorized to send the Air Force's Jungle Jim Squadron into Vietnam to serve under the MAAG as a training mission and not for combat at the present time.
2. General Maxwell Taylor accompanied by Dr. Rostow from the White House, General Lansdale, a representative of JCS, Mr. Cottrell from State and probably someone from ISA will leave for Vietnam over the weekend on a Presidential mission (to be announced by the President at this afternoon's press conference/3/ as an economic survey) to look into the feasibility from both political and military standpoints of the following:
/3/For the transcript of the President's press conference held in the Department of State auditorium at 4:30 p.m., see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 656-664. The announcement of the Taylor-Rostow mission was made public in Saigon before Ambassador Nolting was notified, which he noted in telegram 478, October 12. In telegram 430 to Saigon, October 13, the Department expressed regret that the circumstances of the decision precluded advance notice to Nolting, but pointed out that the Charge at the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington had been informed prior to the President's announcement. Both telegrams are in Department of State, Central File 120.1551K/10-1261. In a note of October 12 to President Diem, Nolting offered his "personal apologies concerning the manner in which the announcement of the proposed visit of General Maxwell Taylor to Viet-Nam was handled." Nolting explained that Washington authorities had undoubtedly "failed to take into account the time differential" in not giving him prior notification. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, 350 Vietnam-Taylor)
(a) the plan for military intervention discussed at this morning's meeting on the basis of the Vietnam task force paper entitled "Concept for Intervention in Vietnam";/4/
/4/See Tab B, Document 155.
(b) an alternative plan for stationing in Vietnam fewer U.S. armed forces than those called for under the plan referred to in (a) above and with a more limited objective than dealing with the Viet Cong: in other words, such a small force would probably go in at Tourane and possibly another southern port principally for the purpose of establishing a U.S. "presence" in Vietnam;
(c) other alternatives in lieu of putting any U.S. combat forces in Vietnam, i.e., stepping up U.S. assistance and training of Vietnam units, furnishing of more U.S. equipment, particularly helicopters and other light aircraft, trucks and other ground transport, etc.
3. During the two or three weeks that will be required for the completion of General Taylor's mission, State will push ahead with the following political actions:
(a) protest to the ICC on the step-up in North Vietnamese support of Viet Cong activities,
(b) tabling at the UN a white paper based on Mr. William Jorden's report concerning Communist violations of the Geneva Accords, and
(c) consultations with our SEATO allies, principally the British and the Australians, regarding SEATO actions in support of the deteriorating situation in Vietnam.
Roswell Gilpatric/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
157. Draft Instructions From the President to His Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, October 11, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-142-69. A handwritten notation on the source text reads, "Draft prepared by Gen. Taylor. Final version dated 13 Oct." In a memorandum of October 12 to U. Alexis Johnson, William Bundy wrote that Gilpatric and Lemnitzer were prepared to concur in the draft instructions subject to certain changes and additions which he listed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-1261) Johnson transmitted a revised draft to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a memorandum of October 12, in which he said that it had been cleared with William Bundy, Gilpatric, and Lemnitzer. (Ibid.) The instructions as given by the President to Taylor on October 13, which were substantially different from either of the earlier drafts, are printed in Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 225-226.
I should like you to proceed shortly to Saigon for the purpose of appraising the situation in South Vietnam, particularly as it concerns the threat to the internal security and stability of that country. After conferring with the appropriate United States and South Vietnam authorities, I would like your views on the courses of action which our government should take at this juncture to avoid a further deterioration in South Vietnam.
As a part of your appraisal, I should like you to evaluate what could be accomplished by the introduction of SEATO or United States forces into South Vietnam, determining the role, composition and probable disposition of such forces. Concurrently, you should examine the possibilities of improving the effectiveness of South Vietnamese forces by additional equipment and training as well as by a further increase in the size of the armed forces of South Vietnam.
I would like to be assured that all of our United States aid, military and economic, is being applied to this main problem of the internal threat to South Vietnam. This aid, once approved, should flow into Vietnam with minimum procedural delays. Having noted the long and complicated chain of economic and military responsibility between Washington and Saigon, I have wondered whether greater simplicity and directness might not be possible. Please look into these questions and let me have your comments.
I suspect that there are many unconventional forms of assistance which we might bring to this situation if we apply all our initiative and ingenuity. Will you see that we are not overlooking any possibilities which fall outside of strictly orthodox measures?
This trip offers you the opportunity to observe at first hand the operations of the CIA in the areas which you visit. I am asking Mr. Dulles to have his field representatives put themselves at your disposition for such briefings and discussions as may be necessary.
In Saigon, you will look to Ambassador Nolting to arrange your contacts with the South Vietnam government and to provide you guidance on the local situation. You will necessarily have to discuss with President Diem and his officials some of the courses of action which we have under consideration in order to elicit their views and to assure their cooperation if we take certain decisions. In these contacts, it is important to emphasize that your talks are exploratory and in no wise commit the United States Government to subsequent action.
Although you may need to visit other places in the area before returning, the Vietnam situation is urgent and requires priority of attention. I would like you to cable me your impressions and recommendations as soon as they are firm.
158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 11, 1961, 7:12 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 851K.49/10-1161. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Heavner, cleared with Wood, ICA, DOD, and the Bureau of the Budget, initialed for the Acting Secretary by Cottrell, and repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok for Anspacher.
416. Embtel 471./2/ Suggest flood offers major opportunity GVN demonstrate concern population, ability do something for them, particularly since flood area coincides with area strong Red influence and is situation which offers opportunity show people GVN solicitude their welfare in concrete terms they can understand. If GVN gives flood only "guarded publicity", flood area will doubtless absorb its losses and recover in time, but chance for major psychological victory will have been lost. Recommend Embassy urge Diem declare disaster area, request assistance friendly nations, perhaps make radio appeal to nation, mobilize resources government bureaucracy and military on crash basis. Could this be opportunity for Civic Action type program by ARVN? Thompson may have suggestions re control rice and supplies which may be distributed.
/2/Document 153.
Department, ICA, DOD studying possibilities US disaster aid. Request Embassy assessment needs soonest. Assume any US aid would be provided in manner calculated maximize GVN credit with VN populace. Understand some disaster equipment such as water purification may be available Phnom Penh.
Embassy may wish consult CA-11026 of June 16, 1958,/3/ which outlines possible actions such disasters. Note Ambassador may offer up to $10,000 assistance at his discretion.
/3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 800.49/6-1658)
Ball
159. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)/1/
Saigon, October 12, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 334, MAAG/Vietnam Files: FRC 64 A 2424, 250/16 Operations Planning. Secret.
Dear General Lemnitzer: I trust that by now you have received my report to CINCPAC on my first twelve months as Chief MAAG Vietnam together with the important classified communications intelligence inclosure./2/ Although this report gives a fair encapsulization of progress, problems yet to be solved, and further objectives together with a projection of our mission into the future, I feel that I should attempt to wrap up in one letter for your personal information, my frank appraisal of the developing situation. My feeling of concern generated by many State and Task Force Vietnam messages from Washington of which State-Defense 337/3/ is a fair example appears to be growing in validity. For your information, all of the members of the Country Team, which is the Task Force group here in Vietnam, received the distinct impression that while this State-Defense message provides welcome and encouraging support, it was written primarily for high level civilian consumption to cover State Department with paper in the eventuality that the situation here goes from bad to worse. Also, State 269 to Saigon (TS)/4/ which went to all Ambassadors in this area dealt largely with military matters was followed by obvious pressure here to get a military statement that RVNAF could commit significant strength in Laos under coalition control. State-Defense 337 was discussed at the Ambassador's conference during Admiral Felt's recent visit./5/ It was mentioned at that time that this message in effect, points up dangers in the situation here of which we were already well aware and which we have previously reported from this end. It then goes on to suggest a number of areas in which we may wish to take further action with the statement and implication that these things should be accomplished within the next thirty days if Vietnam were to be saved. Again, these suggested items are mostly items which we have reported from this end and upon which we are working and have made varying degrees of progress. Indications are that State has only recently been "reading their mail" and acquainting themselves with many of the details on the situation here.
/2/ A copy of this report, dated September 1, is attached to a memorandum of October 25 from McGarr to Nolting. (Ibid., RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Internal Security 1961)
/3/Document 136.
/4/Not found.
/5/See Document 142.
For this reason, I feel that for the protection of the Armed Forces of the United States and specifically the Army which runs MAAG Vietnam, you should have my analysis and appraisal of the basic causes behind the presently worsening situation here. Although we are operating on the principle that we must get on with the job and not worry about past mistakes, I am firmly convinced that a history of these past errors is quite necessary to an objective understanding of the developing situation today. This is highlighted by the evident desire of State Department to gloss over or forget previous basic differences of opinion between them and the military, especially in this area, which have contributed so greatly to the present situation and which of necessity will continue to exert a significant and even controlling impact on what happens here in the foreseeable future. The extent of this control will be dependent on the communist timetable.
As you will recall, upon my arrival more than thirteen months ago, I immediately initiated action to increase the military strength of the Armed Forces of Vietnam. This was because the situation here was much more critical than had been indicated to me in my briefings enroute, and because it was apparent that we did not have the required sense of urgency either in Washington or here. Also, because of this deterioration and because it was apparent to me from a political-military viewpoint that the situation had changed radically since the formation of the Armed Forces of Vietnam in 1954, I made an all out effort to take the basic steps I considered necessary for improvement. President Diem had foreseen this change ahead of either the Embassy or MAAG here and had since 1955 continuously requested of our various Ambassadors and MAAG Chiefs additional MAP supported forces both regular and paramilitary. I have heard him a number of times ask former Ambassador Durbrow for a raise of 20,000 men in force ceiling. He also, acting on his own, organized the Civil Guard and continued to increase it to its present strength of 68,000, although initially our government's representatives here and at home refused to support it with MAP or Defense support money. He stated over and over again to Ambassador Durbrow that the situation was worsening, and he did not have the force with which to stop it. As you recall, I fought a losing battle for my first ten months against the entire Country Team, which was then being ably supported by State Department, in an attempt to secure the increased force level which I considered an absolute minimum for the provision of a rotational training base so that the ARVN could be at least partially trained to successfully meet the Viet Cong threat. Contrary to general opinion in Washington then and apparently even now to some extent, this 20,000 was not primarily for the purpose of adding additional combat units for commission to the hot war going on at that time and still going on with increasing tempo. It was mainly for the establishment of a rotational base for training mentioned previously, to strengthen a rudimentary logistical system, and to give additional much needed strength to the engineer support as well as a practically non-existent military intelligence capability here at that time. Although I presented valid military justifications to Ambassador Durbrow and the Country Team here over a period of eight months after my arrival, and although the Ambassador finally admitted that my arguments were sound, he merely stated that in his opinion, additional force was not necessary and he would not approve it.
As you know, State dragged its feet for some months on the initial Defense-ISA efforts to develop a Counter-Insurgency Plan for Vietnam. Prior to State participation, Defense had already issued instructions and MAAG had developed the military portion of the Counter-Insurgency Plan for Vietnam as well as a rudimentary political-economic-psychological section as it impacted on the military. When, finally, the State Department directed Ambassador Durbrow in October 1960 to write such a plan,/6/ our completed plan was avidly seized upon as the initial Country Team effort. However, after the initial flowery approval, the Country Team then spent the next six weeks requiring MAAG to rejustify all the military facets of the military section of this Counter-Insurgency Plan before they would let it go forward. Then, some weeks and months later, they finally came up with their comprehensive political-psychological-economic sections.
/6/See Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. I, p. 604.
The main stumbling block on the approval by the Country Team of MAAG's counter-insurgency section was our unequivocal demand for at least an additional 20,000 addition to the force basis. By State Department directive to the Ambassador here,/7/ the approval of the Counter-Insurgency Plan was then made a quid pro quo for sweeping political reforms. The end result was that Ambassador Durbrow could not get what he considered adequate approval by the Vietnamese Government to this overall Counter-Insurgency Plan which, of course, held up the implementation of the 20,000 force increase. MAAG did go ahead without Counter-Insurgency Plan approval on its reorganization of RVNAF and its drive for a single chain of command as well as other military items which were approved and implemented or gotten underway during the period of the Durbrow-Diem Counter-Insurgency Plan negotiations in which Durbrow attempted to gain political concessions. When Ambassador Durbrow finally informed President Diem of the approval on the 20,000, President Diem's reaction was cool, stating the approval only allowed him to spend his own money, which he did not have. A few days after the Ambassador left and before the arrival of the new Ambassador, President Diem gave his approval which started the final action on the induction of the 20,000. President Kennedy's pronouncements on Vietnam as well as Vice President Johnson's visit here, not to mention increasing Viet Cong pressure, made it imperative that this force increase be implemented as soon as possible. However, here again we lost approximately two months more trying to resolve the budgetary problems incident to how much the Vietnamese Government would pay toward the overall military budget. The Vietnamese Government had stated that they could not finance this additional increment of 20,000 and they did not start induction in earnest until after the Thuan visit to Washington and after the budget committee here in Vietnam composed of MAAG, GVN and the Country Team had approved the money as a supplement to the 1961 budget. This again lost more valuable time and has further set back the time when these units will become effectively operational. It appears that this "lead time" for induction and training which I emphasized over and over again during my fight for the additional 20,000 has now been more or less conveniently relegated to the background by State, with the approval of the 20,000 and an additional 30,000 at President Kennedy-President Diem level. However, this is one of the primary causes which is at the base of most of our current and future military problems here today. I feel this salient point must be kept in mind and restated periodically in discussions and correspondence affecting the situation as it is developing now. Of course, the facts of life of the impact of Laos was also used during the unsuccessful months of my attempt to obtain the additional 20,000 increase. As we now know, our military estimate on the seriousness of the Laotian situation as it impacts on Vietnam was not overstated at that time. Personally, I feel that if the communist steps up his timetable, which is well within his capability, in an effort to take advantage of our weakness here before these additional forces can be organized, trained and brought to bear, we may well lose South Vietnam. If so, the year's delay in agreeing to increase the Vietnamese Armed Forces would be largely responsible.
/7/Transmitted in telegram 1054 to Saigon, February 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/1-461) For text of the basic counterinsurgency plan, see Document 1.
The heart of the Counter-Insurgency Plan written by MAAG was the phased, coordinated, cohesive action in the political-military-psychological-economic fields under the overall direction and control of a National Plan to counter the Insurgency. This plan must exploit all elements of National Power, fully consider the border problem and subdivide the country into geographic areas which differ for varying types and degrees of guerrilla activity. This subdivision is based on the availability of food, terrain and characteristics of the population. The concept of operations cannot consist of a series of isolated, uncoordinated skirmishes and pacification measures cannot be applied uniformly in all parts of the country simultaneously because of the prohibitive number of troops this would require. Rather, the concept visualized on a pre-planned basis, the progressive pacification of selected areas. Further, it must be recognized that to drive the guerrilla force from a particular area is only the beginning. The guerrilla "sub surface" or political structure must then be eliminated, and replaced with a viable governmental structure which will rally the population to National objectives. This plan has not yet been written much less implemented. I feel this is currently one of the most important problems which must be solved and that this problem is now basically political as our significant military progress cannot be fully effective until this political progress is made. This is because of the absolute requirement for gaining and maintaining trust and confidence in the established government, particularly at village and hamlet level. Best estimates at present indicate that 25% of the population actively assist the Viet Cong, while another 25 % are sitting on the fence. Military, politico-economic and psychological plans-however fully coordinated at National and Regional level-are meaningless unless an integrated military-civic program is developed, recognized, understood and implemented in the villages and hamlets. It will require exceptionally firm and urgent pressure by our Ambassador and the State Department if we are to have such a plan in time. I have spoken about this necessity to President Diem and Secretary Thuan over and over again as it impacts on the military and have written a number of letters to them without success, copies of which have regularly been sent to you, pointing up the need for such a National Plan so that a Military Operations Plan could be made really meaningful. The government has organized a National Internal Security Council but it is not working to the degree that it is making a meaningful contribution to the overall vital control and coordination of the Counter-Insurgency Plan. The military member tells me, very confidentially as it could mean his neck, that he has little say in the operations of this group on military matters-that he merely goes to be told what to do. This apparently is true in varied degrees for the other agencies of the government also. The end result of this failure to develop a National Plan is disjointed and unconnected governmental actions in the overall counter-insurgency field. These uncoordinated, uncontrolled actions make it very difficult for the military to function effectively in the military phase of this counter-insurgency effort. Consequently, they are mostly reacting to Viet Cong threats rather than acting in an overall coordinated military effort.
As you know, MAAG has been pressuring and assisting the Joint General Staff and Field Command to develop a Military Operations Plan for inclusion in the National Plan when that plan is written. The Counter-Insurgency Plan and Tactics and Techniques of Counter-Insurgent Operations treatise written by MAAG/8/ have been used by the Commanding General of Field Command as a basis for the directives for this Operations Plan. His directives were sound and have gone to the three Corps Commanders for their guidance in writing their portion of the plan on a cohesive, coordinated, countrywide basis. He has received and returned their plans for additional refinement together with his additional guidance. It will probably take some two or three months before the final Military Operations Plan will be completed. Although this is not preventing a more coordinated purely military approach to the overall problem in so far as possible-it is slowing it down. In addition, I am convinced that until a meaningful valid National Plan is produced into which the Military Operations Plan can be integrated, the overall military operation in Vietnam cannot be adequately carried out with any certainty of success. At present, our problems are in the area of a firm control and coordinating framework under the National Internal Security Council extending down through subordinate councils or committees at the district, village and hamlet levels. This lack of an adequate framework, together with the chaotic, uncoordinated state of the intelligence effort in this country, will continue to handicap the operations of the military. Although a central intelligence organization has been set up, Colonel Y who is in charge is little more than an office boy, working on mostly inconsequential problems, rather than a director and a coordinator. He is being undercut by other civil intelligence agencies who do not wish to lose their power. It is problematic if President Diem intends to really build up a strong central intelligence office as he appears sensitive to the concentration of power in any one agency. On the military side, MAAG has brought in mobile intelligence training teams and has revamped the intelligence school system here to make it more responsive militarily to field work against the Viet Cong. However, with the lack of cooperation and coordination by the Province Chiefs, who collect intelligence at hamlet and village level and do not adequately inform the ARVN, this improvement in military intelligence cannot be meaningful. Here again is an area in which our Ambassador and the State Department must take necessary strong, positive and early action to insure that we do have an integrated and coordinated national intelligence effort here controlled at national level and reaching down to, and up from, the grass roots "hamlet" level.
/8/A copy of this treatise, first published on November 10 and 15, 1960, and then reissued in four revised versions, the last of which was dated February 10, 1962, is in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Internal Security 1961.
I was concerned when State Department directed the Task Force group here to develop a phased Pacification Plan on a dateline basis./9/ We most certainly agree and have been working for a phased, coordinated, cohesive, geographical plan for clearing the entire country of the communist guerrilla under an overall National Plan. However, it is impossible to get such a pacification plan developed unless we can get an overall National Plan developed first. Even then, it will be impossible to give State Department the phased plan with dates for completion of successive portions of that plan for which they continue to press. I understand second hand that Doctor Rostow and Ben Woods [Wood] are still pushing for this timetable of conquest in the clearance effort here in Vietnam. As previously stated, our recommendations to the government and to the RVNAF have pointed up the need for such a plan, without, however, the unrealistic timetable control. We feel this timetable approach to be highly questionable because of the advanced state of the insurgency and because of the lack of adequate forces to counter it. Although the plan must be geographically phased on the amoeba principle starting with the clearance of various key areas and expanding these areas until the entire country is covered, we do not feel it should or could be prepared on a mechanical timetable basis.
/9/Not further identified.
The victories which were won by the 7th and 5th Divisions of the III Corps in the Plaine des Joncs and Delta area in July, August and part of September were heartening to us all. However, these victories must be placed in proper context as they apparently have whetted the appetite of our people back home for additional continuing and successive victories. It is being intimated that we should follow through to complete victory now that we have the Viet Cong on the run. This is in spite of the fact that since 1 September, particularly in the Dak Ha-Pleikodil areas north of Kontum, we started meeting not territorial Viet Cong but regular Viet Cong units in larger numbers of from 500 to 1,500, and these larger Viet Cong units have been gaining successes of their own. I was asked by the Country Team "how could this happen after our victories!" I explained the military facts of life to them but am sure it has not gotten through to their top sides. Basically, the fact is that the operations in the Delta area which were successful were pre-planned set-piece operations. Plenty of time was given to their planning and moving into position and tactical surprise together with superiority of force was gained. Even though the planning, movement to contact and actual operations were surprisingly well done, errors were committed which could have caused failure. In these operations, the Viet Cong in some instances were either cooperative enough or forced by encirclement to stand and fight in larger groups against stiff opposition-which is not their tactic. The reorganization of the Armed Forces with the single chain of command and the progress we have made in our training over the past ten months in developing joint operations gave these divisions the capability to fight the set-piece battle-not the approved strength increase which is not yet inducted and trained. However, the battles up north against larger, better equipped, better trained, more conventional type Viet Cong units coming in from across the Laotian border have been significantly different. There, we have been hit by superior numbers who have taken the initiative, gained surprise and won. Due to the state of ARVN training, follow-up action has not been quick or well coordinated enough to gain decisive results although action of this type has, at times, inflicted comparable casualties on the Viet Cong. We have not yet had the opportunity to train the Armed Forces of Vietnam to the degree that they can react to a sizable surprise attack effectively and efficiently. The training which has been given here over the past year has of necessity been a "boot strap" operation by various ARVN units with approximately 75% to 80% of the entire ARVN regularly committed against the communist guerrilla. This leaves little if any time for badly needed training on a pre-planned basis. This is the result again of not having adequate strength to both train and fight and it will be some time in the future, months and probably over a year, until this can be done to the required degree. And, it can only be done then if the communists do not continue the significant increase of infiltration of guerrillas into South Vietnam across porous borders which has been going on to my knowledge for the past year. In this respect, I feel it is necessary to keep in mind and to convince our civil opposite numbers in Washington by constant reiteration that the military situation thirteen months ago was critical and that we were only containing the emergency at that time. The build up of additional strength in the 20,000 and the 30,000 increments were for the purpose of providing a rotational training base and liquidating the insurgency, and were predicated on the stated assumption that the communists would not significantly increase their guerrilla strength in South Vietnam. Since the first of the year, this strength has risen from approximately 10,000 to 17,000 with 4,000 of that increase in the past four months. So, again the situation has changed significantly, a fact apparently not fully realized or adequately taken into consideration by Washington civilians. I feel it quite illogical to expect that this long delayed, insufficient and not yet organized or trained additional increment of strength can be expected to account for impressive victories "which should be extended and capitalized upon." Time, which was thrown away four years ago and even as late as thirteen months ago cannot be recaptured. It cannot be provided under MAP and delivered with the beans and bullets to the soldiers on the battlefield. MAAG is making every possible effort to speed up the training, keep pressure on for more rapid induction and to develop additional badly needed leadership-not to mention the urgent development of an all important National Plan. MAAG recommendations for large scale RVNAF effort against sizable Viet Cong build up in Zone D and along the I-II Corps boundaries have received approval and planning started last week. Properly supported, these look hopeful if done soon enough.
Another area which concerns me and which will no doubt have its impact to a greater and greater degree as the Viet Cong pressure mounts against the Armed Forces here is the force structure and capability of the regular ARVN troops. As you recall, State Department was insistent at the time of my arrival that the ARVN was too conventionally organized and operated. This was never so to the degree that they claimed and most certainly for the past year it has not been valid. Not only Rangers but all ARVN troops have received Ranger oriented training to the full extent allowed by hot war operations here. In figuring the force basis for the 20,000, State insisted on a great number of Ranger companies. We resisted this, fought a losing battle and finally settled for 21 Ranger companies. This was in addition to the 64 Ranger companies already in being which, if properly used, were considered militarily adequate by MAAG at that time. In order to activate these additional 21 Ranger companies, President Diem and the Joint General Staff, contrary to my recommendations, have been cadring all of the required leadership and enlisted strength from ARVN units. They claim that this is the only way they can develop these Ranger companies quickly enough in view of the "worsening" situation. This approach is proving counterproductive. After continued strong representation, I have finally succeeded in getting this system changed so that only 50 % of the leadership and men are taken from the ARVN units. However, I feel serious damage has been done to the capability of the divisional units which have been cadred for this purpose. For instance, the 5th Division is now only at 58/yo strength. In addition to this, Mr. Thuan is now insisting that we form four more airborne battalions from the additional 20,000 troop ceiling for use in the strategic reserve. As you recall, no airborne battalions were programmed in the 20,000. However, one was programmed for the additional 30,000 and three more if we go up to the 273,000. Although not fully supported by ARVN, Mr. Thuan demands all four battalions now, with the implication that we will lose the war if we do not allow this! In this respect, since the arrival of the Thompson Group, who were preceded here by Mr. "Dato" Fenner, Police Commissioner in Malaya for over 25 years and who naturally is a strong advocate of police rather than military counter-insurgency control,/10/ Diem and Thuan have tended to blame their defeats and shortcomings on American non-support to an increasing degree. I have agreed to the formation of one more airborne battalion which gives two regimental airborne groups. As only one battalion can be lifted by the airlift we have here at present and as 50 % of the country is impossible for paradrop, I feel this is more than adequate. These battalions, if they are forced upon us, will also be cadred from ARVN units which will further water down the current five airborne battalions as well as divisional capability past the point of no return and seriously unbalance the ARVN force structure. Even the ARVN Airborne Commander is "discreetly" concerned over this quantity vs quality approach. Frankly, the GVN appears to feel they can get anything they want, regardless of MAAG recommendations by going through the Ambassador to top American levels. What we need to win is National control and coordination of effort, not just hardware! I have alerted the Ambassador on this need and discussed it with him at some length. At present, he apparently agrees with me that we must present a united front but appears to be moving slowly on the problem.
/10/McGarr sent a lengthy analysis of his reasons - for opposing the concept of police rather than military control in telegram SGN 693 to Lemnitzer, October 11. (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, 1961 Eyes Only Messages)
Lemnitzer's memorandum to Taylor, October 12, endorsing McGarr's views is in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 324-326.
I have told Mr. Thuan and the top commanders here that in my professional opinion, they have watered down the capability of the regular ARVN divisions beyond the danger point and I have strongly recommended that raiding these outfits to form special forces stop. The civilian top side here insists that this is the only way they can quickly build the military units with the proper esprit. In this respect, as you will recall, I have written letters to both President Diem and Mr. Thuan stating that units trained as Rangers are being used improperly on static guard duty and as Province Chiefs' body guards. A recent MAAG study shows a developing morale problem in the Ranger companies due to this misuse and poor support. I have also pointed out that the airborne units and the marine units in the strategic reserve are being used improperly which is breaking up their tactical integrity and cohesiveness as fighting units. This is also beginning to affect their morale. These small so-called elite groups lend themselves to misuse by the President through the Province Chiefs or by directive to ARVN as they are tailored in nice convenient packages. I have pointed this out in my attempts to convince Mr. Thuan that it would be unwise to form more airborne units. However, "airborne" has a magic connotation here and he is continuing to push for this. Actually, the facts of life for some time to come will be their continued use as regular infantry or truck transported units because of lack of airlift, airfields and large areas of operations. I cannot in good faith from my professional experience agree with the formation of new special units at the expense of the ARVN when it lowers the overall fighting capability of the entire armed forces. I do not believe the "psychological lift" claimed by the GVN compensates for an unbalanced Force Structure. This may be taken up over my head and, if so, I would appreciate your assistance. I have explained this situation to the Ambassador and as of now he agrees with me. However, GVN pressure could change this. If this continues, and if the communists continue to step up their timetable as is the case at present, we will be in bad shape to meet their growing conventional capability, already evidenced in the fighting in the north since 1 September.
I understand that State Department is again going to push for more Ranger companies in the 30,000 troop increase. In this respect, we have in the approved 30,000 troop increase two divisions which are badly needed, one each in the I and II Corps now being hit by the larger better equipped, better trained Viet Cong units infiltrating in from Laos. With the three more airborne battalions being demanded, this will be impossible and we should remember that the insistence on these Rangers does not emanate from here. Although this is a year in the future and may sound academic now, I feel we must insist on holding the line against these special type units especially as they are too often being used improperly and, therefore, do not contribute to the overall military posture of the country as they could and should.
I have mentioned the possible step up of the communist timetable and feel this could be a determining factor in holding South Vietnam. I am firmly convinced that our country's actions in Laos, Berlin and Iran will determine whether or not the timetable out here is to be stepped up by the communists. This is another point which I feel must be continually stressed to the field marshals in the State Department who will then be wondering why, with all the aid and promises of assistance which they have already given us, we cannot hold South Vietnam. In this regard, at a Country Team meeting today, I tabled a recommendation that we take advantage of the many Washington offers of help to request that the solution in Laos include assurance that the Lao border be sealed or sanitized by political action-international if necessary. This is the best way to help us here. Of course, I have long fought for meaningful politico-military action to seal the Cambodian border without success. I feel it boils down to the fact that unless these points are made crystal clear over and over again in all dealings with these people in higher civilian levels, the military will be blamed for a situation here which is not of its own making and for which it has not been adequately supported by our country. As I am jealous of the professional good name of our Army, I do not wish it to be placed in the position of fighting a losing battle and being charged with the loss. Of course, we will continue the fight, but the ultimate battle will be won or lost as a result of DOD actions vis-à-vis State on military matters. I know you will continue to do all in your power to hold the line.
Although this is a frank objective reading from where I sit, I wish to emphasize strongly that I am not overly pessimistic or defeatist. Neither am I overly optimistic. I feel we still have a chance to pull this one out of the fire but that that chance is getting slimmer and slimmer due to the communist build up, the impact of past failures on our part to allocate adequate, timely resources to this country and the impact of possible future developments in Laos and elsewhere-not to mention the problems involved in adequately training the troops. Also, a continuing problem is the difficult job MAAG has without command authority of any kind whatsoever to get the GVN to take the proper politico-military measures which will adequately coordinate the overall counter-insurgency effort from the viewpoint of required political-military-economic-psychological actions. These interlocking political actions need more pressure from our political side if they are to be accomplished in time!
With warmest personal regards,
Sincerely,
Lionel C. McGarr/11/
Lieutenant General. USA/11/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
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