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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume I Vietnam, 1961 Department of State Washington, DC

160. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Bell)/1/

Washington, October 12, 1961, 2:57 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau of the Office of the Secretary.

The Sec said Vietnam can be critical and we would like to throw in resources rather than people if we can. Can we in the Depts involved if the Pres directs it be done put the costs on it on a chit and go to Congress in early January for the necessary special action? B said no problem at all with respect to Defense. They have special authority for military aid. CIA no problem. Contingency fund exists for State and economic aid so that should mean this is all right. If the Sec wants a more precise answer B should put Hansen/2/ in touch with whoever is working on it and it should be worked out before they go too far down the road.

/2/Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Kenneth R. Hansen.

 

161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, October 12, 1961, 7:33 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-1261. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only Ambassador and General McGarr. Drafted by Johnson (G), cleared with Taylor and Rostow and S/S, initialed by Johnson for the Acting Secretary, and repeated to CINCPAC exclusively for Admiral Felt and PolAd.

428. Following for your background and guidance in preparing for General Taylor's visit.

General Taylor will be consulting with Ambassador, General McGarr, other members country team as appropriate, GVN officials and CINCPAC on additional courses of action that can immediately be taken to avoid further deterioration in South Viet-Nam and eventually contain and eliminate the Viet Cong threat. He will be examining possibilities of quickly improving effectiveness of GVN forces, including provision of additional equipment, manned if necessary by US personnel, to extent possible under civilian contract or MAAG cover, as well as possible means of speeding up and improving training GVN forces. He will also explore possibility further increasing size of GVN forces. Concurrently, he will want to look into what possibly could be accomplished by introduction various levels of SEATO or US forces into South Viet-Nam, considering role, composition, and best disposition of alternative force levels, taking account of political and psychological as well as military factors.

General Taylor will also want to examine whether all our military and economic aid is being applied to main problem of internal threat in South Viet-Nam, including its non-military dimensions. He will hope to determine whether greater simplicity and directness can be introduced into chain of economic and military responsibility between Washington and Saigon so as to permit faster reactions on our part. He will be examining all factors without regard to narrow fiscal considerations, on assumption that additional funding will be available if required and that funding should not inhibit us from now expending what may be required to save the situation as compared with incalculable costs that would result from large-scale hostilities involving US forces in Southeast Asia or loss of South Viet-Nam to Communists. General Taylor will hope to receive suggestions on unconventional forms of assistance which might also be brought to bear on this situation if we apply all our initiative and ingenuity.

With respect to GVN, General Taylor will, in his discretion and after consultation with Ambassador Nolting and General McGarr, also expect to talk with President Diem and other GVN officials in whatever terms it is felt are best calculated to bring about those additional political and military reforms which it is considered Diem can and should accomplish if present and contemplated additional US assistance is to be effective. Such assistance necessarily implies an even closer and more intimate relationship between USG and GVN. It will be important that Diem recognize that increase US assistance carries with it inevitably implications additionally involving US prestige, which may involve an increased US voice in GVN affairs.

Problems of ICC and Geneva accords that will inevitably arise from increased US support are of course recognized. Our general philosophy on this is that, while we do not seek to break those accords and will as long as possible attempt to maintain public posture of general compliance with them, we will not permit them materially to inhibit us in doing those things which need to be done. DRV is flagrantly disregarding accords, both with respect to Laos and South Viet-Nam, and ICC frustrated by DRV, its terms of reference, and attitude of Poland and India in carrying out its functions. Therefore, under international law GVN clearly entitled disregard accords at least up to extent they disregarded by DRV. Nevertheless recognize it important establish public and political base for any action which is clearly and publicly in contravention of accords. While GVN has done much in this regard, more remains to be done. Our tentative thinking is along lines of publication by GVN of Jorden white paper, followed by appeal to UN by friendly power on behalf of GVN for observers or other such action prior to action on our part that would clearly and publicly not be in consonance with Geneva accords. Timing of such action will of course require careful coordination and working out with GVN. Jorden, who is traveling with Taylor party, is bringing with him draft of white paper/2/ for clearance and coordination with GVN and will discuss this matter further with you. However, in meanwhile would welcome any views you may have.

/2/The draft taken by Jorden may have been the one dated October 8, entitled "Communist Subversion and Infiltration in South Vietnam," a copy of which is ibid., Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, VN 1961 Presidential Program Psychological TF 26 through 31.

Although some members of press are traveling to Saigon on same plane as General Taylor, they are in no sense part of or members of his party nor do they have any special privileges or mandate to cover his mission. In spite of the presence of members of press, it is hoped that public aspects of visit can be minimized and serious working aspects maximized. General Taylor desires that purely social aspects be kept to absolute minimum so as leave himself and party free as possible for large amount of work that will be required.

Ball

 

162. Editorial Note

For text of National Security Action Memorandum No. 104, October 13, 1961, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, page 328. NSAM No. 104 was transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence in a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy that conveyed the results of Presidential directives on Vietnam approved on October 11.

 

163. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)/1/

Washington, October 13, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, 1961 Eyes Only Messages. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated for information to McGarr.

SSO JCS 1596-61. 1. At a White House meeting today/2/ to discuss directive to be issued to General Taylor,/3/ President expressed concern over build-up of stories to effect U.S. is contemplating sending combat forces to Vietnam. He feels that too much emphasis is being put on this aspect and could well result in a tremendous letdown in Vietnamese morale if they expected such action and we decided otherwise. Accordingly, emphasis publicly is being put on fact Taylor will review entire situation particularly to determine if increase[s] in our current efforts are called for. However, you should know (and this is to be held most closely) General Taylor will also give most discreet consideration to introduction of U.S. Forces if he deems such action absolutely essential.

/2/Presumably a reference to the National Security Council meeting which took place from 10:30 to 11:40 a.m. (Kennedy Library, JFK Log Book) No other record of the discussion at this meeting has been found.

/3/The President's instruction to Taylor is printed in Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 225-226.

2. Sec Def and I requested, and obtained, mention of fact that Taylor will review entire situation, to include political and economic as well as military aspects.

3. For your information, correspondents (including Alsop) are not part of or in any way related to Taylor mission. They are merely being given a ride to Saigon as a courtesy.

 

164. Telegram From the Consulate General in Switzerland to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, October 13, 1961, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-1361. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Saigon and passed to the White House. A copy of this telegram at the Kennedy Library has the following handwritten notation in the margin: "Sent to H[yannis] P[ort] 10/13. Pres. saw." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Trips and Conferences Series, Vice President to the Far East)

369. From Harriman. I am much gratified to learn of General Taylor's and Rostow's visit to Saigon. I trust that in addition to military appraisal, some analysis of political situation can be made. In my travels during past six months as well as here in Geneva, I find everywhere concern over Diem's dictatorial regime, Palace Guard, family and corruption. These comments come from friendly sources, both highest and lower levels, expressing view that after good early record Diem has become increasingly isolated, particularly since attempted coup last year. Various accounts indicate lack of confidence among military, provincial government officials, intellectuals, business, professional and university groups. There is general prophesy that another coup is apt to happen, in which case insurgents will not be as considerate of Diem as last year. The British come closer to recognizing our difficulties, since they see no alternative to Diem, but even they hope that increased pressures will be brought for major reforms, not alone in social and economic, but in political field, particularly elimination of undesirable family influence and broadening base of Diem Government.

I recognize extreme difficulties of the situation and have no recommendations to make from this distance, but believe we may well be sitting on powder keg that could blow up, conceivably not disastrous if it was touched off by constructive forces. I recognize that these are matters with which everyone in Washington is familiar. I only want to add my voice to those who believe more recognition must be given to political situation which no amount of military assistance or participation can cure.

I hope Jorden report can be released soon as most people have little comprehension of true nature Viet Minh aggression.

Martin

 

165. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Wood) to the Director (Cottrell)/1/

Washington, October 13, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-1361. Top Secret. Initialed by Wood.

CHECK LIST

Rationale for U.S. Support

While rice potential of SEA and strategic geography of a peninsula extending to 10 degrees N are important, real reason for communist desire takeover in Viet-Nam is to show rest of world how dangerous it is to be allied with U.S.

Problem

Too much aid; not enough judgment. War being fought without plan. Our own chain command and theirs. Can they make better use of what they receive?

Recommendations: Based on necessity of Quantum Jump

Political

An Aide-Memoire to Diem: let it be known that you will permit the creation of two (not less) opposition parties with five deputies each in the National Assembly (123 deputies) provided these parties agree that the first priority is the defeat of the Viet Cong. If you do not agree, U.S. will find ways of criticizing you publicly for suppressing political freedom. This is necessary to improve your national and international prestige and gain further sympathy for increase international support. Practically, two small opposition parties full of ambitious and inexperienced leaders would cancel each other out and their foolishness would increase your prestige. It would be easy to arrange by elections to bring these people into National Assembly. Their speeches in National Assembly should receive brief, but factual press coverage. They should not be allowed to have their own newspapers.

Peasants

1. Flood victims should get food, medicine and shelter now.

2. Provincial officials: 50 % higher salaries and allowances than Saigon officials.

3. Air evacuation of civilian and military casualties: 24 doctors and 96 corpsmen and nurses (all Vietnamese, Filipino or Chinese) plus 12 aircraft (e.g. heliocouriers) loaned by U.S., but piloted and maintained by Vietnamese, Filipino or Chinese. Not more than six U.S. military doctors as advisers. Planes to be used only for medical air evacuation.

4. We will build 250 kw transmitter if Diem will agree that he or another top official will broadcast at least once a week.

5. Simplify USOM programs, reduce emphasis on industrial development; increase emphasis on training provincial administrators. Reduce training in U.S. (cultural shock); increase training in Viet-Nam.

6. Strengthen village defense, barbed wire, bamboo stockades, flares, mines, food control, dogs.

7. Trips by FSO's with MAAG advisers to get political reporting on provinces./2/

/2/Paragraph 7 was added by hand.

Military

1. Land Frontier.

General Taylor fly over it.

20 U.S. encadred Ranger Companies.

U.S. air supply frontier posts.

All means to give confidence to patrols-dogs, walkie-talkies, flares, armalites.

2. Sea Frontier and Canals

USOM has had great success in motorizing fishing junks and sampans. Sampans can be used for canal patrol. See attached photo./3/ Ask Ambassador to order MAAG Naval people to borrow USOM technicians and use their techniques now.

/3/Not found attached to the source text.

Role of 7th Fleet should be limited to patrolling 17th as show of force, reporting sightings to Vietnamese Navy and resupply.

No one from a U.S. ship should board a VN junk.

Should we supply 20 small, simple Coast Guard boats to VN Navy for inshore patrol? Place two Filipino technicians on each (radio and engineer)?

3. Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps

Put one good VN NCO in each untrained CG and SDC company.

Double size of CG training facility.

Start immediately MAAG training: and equipping of SDC.

4. Areas under VC Control

Install DF station at U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to get better fixes.

Possible flying DF station on a Caribou; Caribou to carry napalm for use on radio station.

Use U.S. encadred Ranger companies to penetrate VC controlled areas for intelligence and sabotage.

Develop food control program with Thompson.

Overfly with talking planes (see Thompson).

5. Province Chiefs and Chain of Command

A fixed and limited number CG and SDC under sole command of Province Chief; all other forces under ARVN. Province Chiefs, as Civil Authorities, have right of appeal to Diem.

6. Intelligence

Further unification under Col. Y.

7. Strategic Planning

Diem must accept a joint ARVN-MAAG planning board, composition ARVN: Rangers or divisions?

8. Foreign Troops

U.S. troops to encadre VN Ranger companies.

One U.S. School-Troop Unit (Embtel 488, attached)./4/

One U.S. Engineer Unit.

One ChiNat Division./5/ (Embtel 488).

One USAF combat crew training team (Embtel 489, enclosed)./6/

/4/Not printed.

/5/At this point the following sentence was crossed out: "Yes, give us strong recommendation. We are overcurbing and underusing the ChiNats. They cost us a lot and feel very frustrated (Burma, VN)."

/6/Not attached to the source text, but in this telegram, October 13, Nolting reported that the deployment of the Jungle Jim unit for training, research and development purposes, and photo reconnaissance work was "highly desirable." Nolting wrote that the Embassy had been assured by MAAG that the Jungle Jim unit would not engage "in missions, including airdrop against selected targets or undertake other operational missions, aside from photo reconnaissance, without our first referring question to Department for decision." Nolting also offered his views on how the introduction of the aircraft and its personnel should be handled with the ICC. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5 MSP/10-1361)

9. NVN

We have handcuffed ourselves. Will cable./7/

/7/No subsequent cable on this subject from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saigon during the time of the Taylor mission was found.

10. Prisoner defection

Simple, well publicized bounty and punishment system. If you are captured by force, you are killed or imprisoned. If you surrender, no charges. If you surrender and bring friends, big money. See Thompson.

Transportation

Emphasize air (landing strip program next six months); Deemphasize more roads for next six months (insufficient VN resources).

U.S.

Command Structure.

Direct delegation of authority to Ambassador from President placing him in control of all U.S. agencies and Departments represented in Viet-Nam?

Since VN is biggest war in world today and directly involves U.S., we need best command and command structure.

Play Down

Negotiations with Cambodia-waste of energy.

Bilateral (U.S.-GVN)-can't give them bigger commitment than they have.

SEATO--a drag.

Don't Forget

Jorden

Harriman

 

166. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/

Washington. October 14, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 10/16/61-10/19/61. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Bagley.

SUBJECT
Subjects for Exploration in Viet Nam

This memorandum contains a checklist of subjects that you may wish to explore during your trip to Viet Nam. It does not pretend to be a comprehensive listing of all of the questions that might be examined; I have eliminated many subjects that will be on everyone's minds and probably on everyone's lists. In the attachment to this memo, however, I have made a very brief listing of various sorts of limited holding actions that have been considered at various times in the course of work on SEA Task Force papers.

I. Military

1. ARVN Deployment. Is the ARVN really ninety percent committed to counterinsurgency operations? At any given time, what percentage of the ARVN is engaged in patrolling activities or offensive actions against the VC? (If you attempt to get figures which separate out ARVN casualties from those for the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps, you ought also to get a breakdown of VC casualties which indicates which were ARVN-inflicted, which CG and SDC-inflicted. The GVN casualty figures alone, while reflecting the fact that the CG and SDC are more vulnerable and therefore more often attacked, will not necessarily prove that the ARVN is passive.)

2. Status of the Over-All Plan. While progress on getting GVN approval of the over-all plan is slow, the ARVN Staff is said to have approved over-all Corps-Area plans submitted by the corps commanders. Do these fit together to provide an over-all scheme of action?

3. Diem's Attitudes Toward Military Planning and Operations. Is it true, as I have heard alleged, that Diem is not really interested in a major effort against the VC at this time; that he views this as a long-term problem which can only be dealt with on a very long-term basis; that he therefore prefers to concentrate on improvement of communications and to base his military planning primarily on the gradual extension of GVN control outward from Saigon?

4. Identification of VC Concentrations. What can we do to identify with greater precision the location of VC units in areas such as Zone D where we know there are large organized units? More photo recon? Send in small ranger units?

5. The Evaluation Center. Is full use being made of the evaluations produced by the U.S. evaluation center in the embassy? Should the GVN be encouraged to develop its own war room comparable to our evaluation center? What is the status of the GVN Central Intelligence Organization? (We give the GVN information based upon our evaluations, but do not give them access to the center, apparently because some of our information is obtained from GVN personnel through non-official channels.)

6. U.S. Advisory Personnel. Would it be desirable to get U.S. advisory personnel down to platoon level and permit them to engage in all military operations? (The Special Forces Officer whom I heard recommend such action indicated that it would require 400 additional personnel.) In order to increase the number of U.S. advisors in the field with combat experience, should brevet rank be given to American NCO's?

7. Special Forces Personnel. Could more U.S. Special Forces Personnel be usefully employed? Is the supply of such personnel to the field too erratic? (A Special Forces Officer indicated that at times he was the only such officer in Viet-Nam; this problem has allegedly since been solved.)

8. Self-Confidence and Offensive Spirit of the ARVN. Is there a real problem of increasing the self-confidence and offensive spirit of the ARVN? If so, which of the various R and D projects directed toward this problem show most promise? (e.g., dogs, defoliation).

a. You recently expressed some skepticism on the subject of defoliation. As I understood your argument, it was that defoliation simply cleared the way for the VC. But isn't this a bit like the argument that one shouldn't build roads because they run in two directions? The question is not whether defoliation may help the enemy as well as our side, it is rather one of the net benefit. It seems to me that a guerrilla force benefits more from forest cover than an anti-guerrilla force.

b. The MAAG proposes to use dogs on static sentry duty; Godel's concept was that they should be used with patrols to help increase self-confidence by reducing prospects for ambush. Isn't use on patrols the better employment?

9. Exotic Weapons. What is the current view of the R and D test center of such items as the micro-jet, Tetrahedron and Lazy Dog?

10. Doctrine for Use of Helicopters and Helio-Couriers. Does MAAG and the GVN have a clear military concept for use of helicopters and Helio-Couriers? How many more could be usefully employed? (Maintenance of helicopters has been a problem, but I believe that we are prepared to supply additional maintenance personnel through Air America.)

11. The Radio Location Effort. In view of the continuous increase in the number of VC transmitters and the inherent problems involved in location of them, does it make sense to continue to devote resources and personnel to this effort? If it does, how can the GVN be made to take a more cooperative attitude toward the effort?

12. Deployment and Use of the 30,000 Man Increase. The President's approval of the 30,000 man increase in GVN armed forces (which will follow the 20,000 man increase now going forward) was given with the understanding that there would be agreement between the USG and the GVN on the use to which these forces were put. What are MAAG's plans? Do they make sense? What is the status of GVN work on the problem? Have we begun to think about whether a further increase beyond the 30,000 would be desirable, and about the use to which such forces might be put? (You will recall that Diem asked for a total increase of 100,000.)

13. Training and Use of the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. Is training of the CG proceeding as rapidly as it could? Wouldn't it be desirable to have the training and equipping of the CG and the SDC proceed simultaneously? (At present the CG is trained and equipped first and then it trains the SDC. The SDC has wholly inadequate weapons until it completes its training.) Could more be done (perhaps with mobile training teams) to train the CG where they are stationed rather than take them into special training camps? Do the concepts for use of the CG and SDC developed by the MAAG make sense? (A training plan and concept of use was submitted by the MAAG to the GVN in August and GVN comment is awaited.) SDC personnel are now often deployed in a way that makes no military sense. Is the CG deployed in areas with which the personnel are generally familiar?

II. Economic

(You will, of course, be exploring the current validity of the several programs of emergency economic and social action contained in the Staley Report./2/ I have commented on those programs below on which I have some question.)

/2/See Document 93.

1. Program Priorities. Are there U.S. projects now being conducted in Viet Nam which interfere with the effort against the VC by absorbing the time of President Diem and other top personnel and by diverting resources from essential military tasks? On the other hand, to what extent are important economic programs being cut back by the GVN because of concentration on the military threat or an unwillingness to mobilize necessary domestic resources? (For example, it is said that agriculturists and nurses being graduated from U.S.-supported schools are not being used on the grounds that GVN resources must be concentrated on the security problem. USOM is presently reviewing the Staley proposals and on-going programs with a view to determining priorities. It is not easy for any USOM, caught up in an existing program with every element of the program supported by proponents within the USOM, to re-orient its program. Outside advice could be most useful.)

2. Village Alarm System. What is the current status of the village alarm system? I do not know the details on this, but I have the impression that there may still be unresolved questions between USOM and the MAAG or the R and D center with respect to the kind of system that should be installed. This is one of the most important economic projects now going forward in VietNam.

3. Diem's Road Program. Does Diem's recently developed road program make any sense? A member of the recently returned Army Civic Action team indicated that it was grossly over-ambitious and that planning and execution were not adequately related to real priorities. Can it be cut down to essentials by agreement with the GVN on a first-stage program?

4. Rural Dispensary System. Are there ways that the existing rural dispensary system can be improved? For example, it has been indicated that supplies of anti-biotics intended to meet some weeks of need are exhausted within a couple of days of delivery while aspirin and other less wanted items are in more than adequate supply. (Note that the Staley Report's recommendations on the rural medical program concentrated exclusively on the care of the wounded. They thus reflected pre-occupation with the security aspects of the medical problem. A much broader approach is needed.)

5. Rice Shortage. We shall be tackling the immediate problem created by the flooding in the Delta area. But what is the over-all rice situation? (Two months or so ago the embassy asked for some PL 480 rice. Rice was offered, I believe under Title II as a local currency sale. Partly because they were asked to pay for it in piasters and partly because the situation seemed to ease, the GVN turned down this proposal.)

III. Political-Social-Psychological

(I have included in this category several items which are economic or military in content or execution, but which have primarily social or psychological purposes.)

1. Attitudes of Troops and Local Officials. This is the most important non-military element involved in obtaining the cooperation of the villagers. It is said that Diem has disciplined and removed an increasing number of local officials guilty of graft, excessive harshness and ineffectiveness. Is the progress significant or only marginal? How can he be stimulated into further action?

Troops are also said to treat the local populace very harshly. The Civic Action Team is said to be recommending in its report that orders be issued to direct that speed limits shall be enforced against military vehicles and to enforce other criminal laws within the army. Will this be effective? Is the army's behavior in part related to low pay (e.g., as when a soldier pays an exorbitantly low price for a chicken)? What can be done about the lack of adequate provision for the dependents of armed forces personnel when they are away from their homes? (Unlike the situation in most Asian countries, the families do not live with the troops in the field and so do not benefit from the soldier's rice ration etc. I am not certain to what extent, if any, this problem was created by the redeployments which we have insisted upon under the CIP.)

2. Civic Action. The report of the U.S. Army Civic action team/3/ will have just been submitted to the MAAG. You will want to review it. One question that will need to be examined is whether adequate provision is made for giving funds to the ARVN for civic action purposes-to buy well-drilling equipment, simple brick-making machines, etc. A small immediate amount was recommended and may have been provided, but longer term needs will also require examination.

/3/Not further identified.

There is an important limitation in existing DOD military directives on this subject. They apparently provide that civic action may be conducted only to the extent that it does not interfere with military operations. If strictly applied this rule could bar all civic action in SVN. Obviously in a place like SVN where programs of this kind could make a most important contribution to the security effort, it is very short-sighted indeed to view them simply as competitive with military operations.

Would it facilitate GVN acceptance of civic action if, instead of submitting our own report and waiting for months for the GVN to react to it, we got together with someone like General Minh who has his own program and, using that program as a base, worked our own ideas into it? This, incidentally, is a technique that might be explored for more general application. Our general approach has been to prepare a lengthy report on a subject and submit to the GVN for consideration. That may be an excessively formal and not very effective way to get action on military and non-military programs.

3. Montagnards. A U.S.-developed plan for assisting the Montagnards/4/ has recently been submitted to the GVN. You may want to examine it and determine what can be done to speed action.

/4/Not further identified.

4. Agrarian Reform. The Washington Task Force received a report some time ago that the agrarian reform program had about ground to a halt./5/ What, if anything, in the way of U.S. assistance or otherwise can be done to revive it?

/5/Not further identified.

5. Radio and TV. I have attached copies of the memos Donald Wilson left with us./6/ As I have been given the picture, past delays on the radio program have been due partly to arguments between ourselves and the GVN over objectives and partly to disagreements among the American technicians involved. Disagreement over objectives has revolved primarily around Diem's desire to have sufficient power (100 KW or more) to reach into North Vietnam and into other parts of Southeast Asia and our desire to concentrate upon a system directed entirely toward the internal communications problem. In August 1960 there was agreement with the GVN on our concept.

/6/Not found attached to the source text.

There are those who believe that much better cooperation could be obtained from the GVN if power were increased. (Diem has indicated in the past that once we have the station built, he will himself procure the equipment needed to increase the power.) The additional cost involved is a relatively minor element. Greater power would require a higher tower in Saigon which would have the additional advantage of providing the kind of tower required if a TV program is undertaken. However, the Country team has recently reviewed this power question and concluded that we should not reopen it, but should proceed with the agreed program. You may want to determine what continuing importance, if any, the power question has.

Lack of progress since August 1960 is caused in part by lack of trained personnel. We have never had more than two engineers in the field and have relied upon inadequately qualified GVN personnel to do much of the work. When the newly constructed radio tower in Hue fell to the ground because of inadequate engineering the USOM brought Chinese technicians from Hong Kong to supervise that part of the undertaking. At present there is no radio engineer in the USOM and ICA/Washington is having great difficulty finding one. This is primarily a Washington problem, but perhaps the USOM could explore the possibility of bringing in Chinese or other Asian engineers.

Non-project aid (commercial imports) are being used to provide some radio receivers. This arrangement, however, provides very haphazard distribution. The ICA Desk officer has been working on a proposal to procure receivers through project aid. This would permit the U.S. to subsidize purchase by picking up the difference between the purchase price and a lower selling price. It would also give us some control over distribution so that they would get out to the villages instead of being concentrated wholly in Saigon. This proposal has not yet been put to the field; you might want to explore it. You might also want to explore the feasibility of Japanese aid in this area.

The principal problem foreseen on TV is the problem of servicing under conditions where such skills are in very short supply and where security is very bad. A plan developed by Togoland to deal with this problem has been, I believe, sent to Saigon as a possible model. It is, I am told, a rather expensive and elaborate program.

Robert H. Johnson/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

[Attachment]

Memorandum Prepared by Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff/8/

Washington, undated.

/8/Top Secret.

Check List of Limited Holding Actions in Southeast Asia From SEA Task Force Papers

1. Small Thai and SVN paramilitary units in southern Laos.

2. Army engineer construction battalion to Thailand for training and work on Bangkok by-pass.

3. Rotation of U.S. forces to Thailand for combined training, or stationing of a brigade task force team there.

4. U.S. aircraft and personnel for a defoliant spray program.

5. Expand naval capabilities by (a) expediting radios and motors for junks; (b) use of U.S. ships and aircraft for interdiction; (c) providing GVN more small boats under MAP.

6. Expedite encadrement of FAR.

7. Resettle Meo to highland area of south Laos on Viet Nam border.

8. Expedite delivery of equipment to Thai border police.

9. Help Thais establish Mekong River patrol.

10. Strengthen suitable bases in southern Laos such as Savannekhet, Pakse, Attopeu, and Saravane for operations by Thai, VN and Lao units. (Idea here, which has never been fully developed in discussions, is to supplement paramilitary action referred to in par. 1 above by creating strong bases in south Laos from which probing actions could be mounted to keep enemy off balance.)

 

167. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, October 14, 1961, 4:33 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/10-761. Secret. Drafted by Walter Furst (ICA), cleared with Fowler and FitzGerald (ICA) and U. Alexis Johnson, and initialed by Johnson for the Acting Secretary.

435. Ref: Embtel 449./2/ Task Force VN. Basis your telegram, we recognize need to fix aid levels now in order improve relations with GVN and hope result will be accelerated preparation of concrete plans in military, economic and social spheres. Ambassador authorized inform GVN of FY 1962 non-project aid level of $140 million, consisting of $115 million Supporting Assistance and $25 million PL 480 commodities. As indicated Reftel, actual drawdowns subject to agreed criteria. This commitment contingent prompt GVN implementation of agreed exchange reforms. Also concur maintenance of unused pipeline at approximately present level ($40) million to help achieve political objectives.

/2/Dated October 7, telegram 449 made several recommendations regarding U.S. economic assistance to Vietnam and indicated the Embassy's desire to firm up the U.S. Government's negotiating position promptly "as GVN's planning and willingness to move is in part dependent on indication US position on aid matters." (Ibid.)

Cannot fix level now on grant projects and development loans. Assume main GVN focus is on commodity import level and have strained full effort to reach this figure in expectation this decision will help you.

Ball

 

168. Estimates Prepared in the Department of Defense and Other United States Agencies/1/

Washington, October 15, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 092 Vietnam 1961. Top Secret. Printed here are the first 4 of 20 estimates bound together and apparently given to the members of the Taylor Mission prior to their departure. A note on the table of contents page reads, "The summaries in this folder represent preliminary estimates which were prepared, in the limited time available, at action officer level in DOD, the Joint Staff, and the Services. They are furnished for the information and convenience of this party. Each of the problems will be completely staffed within the next two weeks." The estimates not printed include: (5) increase MAAG personnel as necessary to place advisers at company level, (6) expedite training of civil guard and self defense corps, (7) provide large-scale helo support to RVNAF for increased combat mobility, (8) provide GVN all technical assistance possible, (9) provide RVNAF with STOL aircraft capability with both medium and small aircraft, (10) provide ARVN army with organic air support capability, (11) provide RVNAF with jet aircraft, (12) increase pay of RVNAF including conscripts, (13) expedite GVN junk force and shallow draft boat company programs, (14) provide U.S. naval assistance in interdiction of Viet Cong junk traffic, (15) provide RVN navy with additional small ships through MAP, (16) undertake expedited construction program in SVN (airfields, roads, port facilities, etc.), (17) undertake with GVN a program of small airfield construction to exploit STOL aircraft capabilities, (18) use U.S. military aircraft for logistic support within SVN, (19) undertake defoliant spray program, and (20) provide increased bounties for information or capture of Viet Cong and increase covert efforts. A note on the source text indicates that the last suggestion was being explored by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Suggestion Number 1

1. Deploy a U.S. Combat Unit to SVN to Train RVNAF.

2. Brief. It will probably be difficult to make RVNAF units available for unit training. If they can be made available, possibly on a rotational basis, and a U.S. unit is used as proposed, RVNAF unit effectiveness can probably be increased. The proposed U.S. unit could possibly be deployed in connection with the CINCPAC exercise program. It should be noted, however, that the U.S. already has a large MAAG in South Vietnam and that CINCPAC has proposed almost a 50% increase to be effective in November and December of this year. It is also understood informally that the Chief, MAAG Vietnam will request another 300-man augmentation to be effective in January and February, 1962. These facts should be considered in connection with this proposal and with other related proposals summarized in this folder.

3. Availability. If the unit selected is from USARYIS or from Schofield, it could probably be made available relatively soon, possibly within 15 days.

4. Estimate of Effectiveness. Effectiveness would be dependent upon the regularity with which RVNAF units could be made available for training and upon the manner in which the language barrier was overcome. Generally, it is believed that considerable improvement could be achieved.

5. Acceptability. The Chief, MAAG Vietnam favors this proposal. Diem has been opposed to deployment in Vietnam of U.S. combat units, but might reconsider in light of the current situation. Diem's fullest support is a prerequisite if the program is to be effective. The position of CINCPAC on this specific proposal is not known at this time. Like other proposals herein, this proposal, if implemented, would be in violation of the Geneva Accord.

Suggestion Number 2

1. Station a U.S. Combat Unit (Battalion or Larger) at Tourane.

2. Brief. Stationing of such a force at Tourane could relieve GVN forces for other duties. It would probably be correlated with the stationing of another such force at a port in the south. It would demonstrate U.S. presence in the country. It might be used to assist in the program referred to in Suggestion No. 1. The proposal might be accomplished, in part at least, in connection with the CINCPAC exercise program. Hanoi would probably be uneasy at the presence of such a U.S. force so close to the 17th Parallel. DRV might test the seriousness of such an effort so close to its borders by subjecting the force and its LOC's to harassment, ambush, and guerrilla attack. Political and psychological objectives would probably, initially at least, be realized.

3. Availability. In event the decision is made to implement this proposal, the force could be made available relatively soon, possibly in as little as 15 days.

4. Effectiveness. Implementation of this proposal would increase the combat capability and the morale of the RVNAF. It would probably bolster the morale of the Vietnamese people, and enhance the prestige of the Diem regime. In addition, it would contribute to the security of the port area, and its capabilities might be exploited in training.

5. Acceptability. As would be the case with many other suggestions this proposal would involve a violation of the Geneva Accords. Diem has been opposed to stationing U.S. combat units in South Vietnam, but, in view of the current situation, might favor this proposal at this time. The position of CINCPAC on this proposal is not known.

Suggestion Number 3

1. Deploy U.S. Combat Engineer Battalion (Army or Navy) to SVN for Support and Training Purposes.

2. Brief. This suggestion is closely related to Suggestions 16 and 17 and to other suggestions. If implemented, the proposal would make a significant contribution to the effectiveness of the RVNAF. The unit could assist in unit training if Diem would insure support of the training program (possibly by making RVN Army units available on a rotational basis). Use of this battalion to assist in road, port and airfield construction would enhance combat capabilities of RVNAF, and would facilitate the support of units in isolated areas. In view of the number of bridges being blown by the Viet Cong, the unit should probably be capable of considerable bridge construction and repair. The proposal might be implemented, in part at least, in connection with the CINCPAC exercise program. There is a related requirement for a similar unit to construct a by-pass road in Thailand (Chachoengsao-Prachinburi).

3. Availability. Unless additional requirements arose because of heightened tensions in other areas, the unit could probably be made available from CONUS sources, and could be operational in South Vietnam in less than six months. In event it was decided to utilize the USARYIS battalion on Okinawa, the time requirement could be considerably reduced.

4. Effectiveness. The unit would further the combat capability of the RVNAF. It would assist the road, airfield, and port construction programs, and possibly other infrastructure projects. It could help in the training of counterpart RVNAF units, if these units could be made available periodically for training.

5. Acceptability. CINCPAC recently supported a similar proposal for Thailand (see paragraph 2 above). Diem was originally opposed to deployment of U.S. combat units to South Vietnam, but in view of the current situation, might reconsider in this case. As in the case of other proposals, this proposal, if implemented, would be in violation of the Geneva Accords.

Suggestion Number 4

1. Station US logistic units in South Vietnam to assist RVNAF.

2. Brief.

a. Strictly speaking, this proposal is not in consonance with the Geneva accords. In view of this and our past experience in Laos it might be more appropriate to increase logistic support capability through suggestion 2, i.e. augmentation of the MAAG. Under this proposal (No. 4) the personnel would be working types rather than advisors. During General Craig's visit to South Vietnam in August 1961, the MAAG Personnel stated that the logistic support was sufficient for the current forces (150,000-170,000). However, expansion of the forces to 200,000 would tax the country's resources, i.e., availability of skilled and semi-skilled labor and maintenance and supply facilities.

b. A US logistic force, composed of selected direct support, general support, and depot units, could be deployed to appropriate locations in South Vietnam to provide for the receipt, storage, issue, and maintenance of MAP equipment as required. Such actions would result in more efficient distribution and maintenance of MAP equipment and supplies needed to buildup the RVNAF. The deployment of US logistic units to South Vietnam would be beneficial in the initial deployment of US combat forces should such a decision be forthcoming.

c. The introduction of US logistic units may retard the development of an adequate in-country logistic posture unless measures are taken concurrently to insure that the build-up in the RVNAF includes sufficient logistic units to provide for a properly balanced force. The US units could then be withdrawn as qualified indigenous units become available to take over their missions.

d. Current US Army logistic forces are austere. Diversion of forces to support in-country forces will degrade the capability to support our own forces.

3. Availability.

a. The force tabs which have been developed for augmentation and build-up of forces in Europe leaves only an understrength unbalanced logistic force for deployment. Therefore, availability of CONUS support units cannot be determined until specific logistic missions are defined. Each must be considered on a case-by-case basis.

b. The only theater logistic force considered to be available is the Army's 9th Logistical command on Okinawa. This type of contingency is within its mission assignment. It is organized at reduced strength and would have to be augmented by selected logistic operating units from CONUS. As presently organized, it could form the nucleus of a logistic force to function separately and/ or train in-country logistic units. Other theater forces are capable of carrying out only essential peacetime operations.

4. Estimate of Effectiveness. It is considered that the introduction of US logistic forces will improve the effectiveness of the in-country logistic systems.

5. Acceptability to South Vietnam. There are indications that this proposal might be acceptable to President Diem.

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