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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963, Volume I
Vietnam, 1961Department of State
Washington, DC
VIII. The Taylor Mission to Southeast Asia
October 15-November 3, 1961169. Editorial Note
The Taylor Mission departed Washington on the afternoon of Sunday, October 15, 1961. In addition to Taylor and Rostow, the mission included Sterling Cottrell; Rear Admiral Luther C. Heinz; Brigadier General William H. Craig; Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale; Colonel Robert M. Levy, USAF (J-3, JCS); Colonel Albert W. Campbell, USMC (J-4); Dr. George W. Rathjens (ARPA); William Jorden, Policy Planning Council, Department of State; James W. Howe, International Cooperation Agency; David R. Smith, Central Intelligence Agency; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Steinhauser, USA (J-2); Lieutenant Commander Worth H. Bagley, USN, Naval Aide to General Taylor; and Major James W. Dingman, USA, Army Aide to General Taylor. Andrew Hatcher, associate press secretary to President Kennedy, was included in the mission, but did not make the trip. A representative of the CINCPAC staff was to join the party at Honolulu and William H. Godel was to join the party at Saigon. Taylor, who planned to wear civilian clothes, asked that there be no military honors, social functions, press briefings, or interviews. (Telegram 429 to the Embassy in Vietnam, October 12; Department of State, Central Files, 120.155K/10-1261)
The mission arrived at CINCPAC headquarters in Honolulu on the evening of October 15. Taylor recalls that the following morning the mission received an exhaustive briefing on the situation in Southeast Asia from Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief, Pacific. Admiral Felt was convinced the situation in Vietnam was critical and needed prompt United States assistance. At the same time, he also stressed the importance of getting Diem to keep his provincial governors from intervening in military matters and to overcome a propensity of his commanders to sit on static defensive positions. Regarding the need for United States forces in South Vietnam, Felt was inclined to favor the introduction of logistic units, including engineer and helicopter units for selective assistance to the Vietnamese, but to withhold combat forces for the time being. In the long run, he saw no answer to the problem of halting infiltration short of placing sizable ground forces, preferably SEATO troops, in Laos across the Ho Chi Minh trails. See Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pages 227-228, and Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, volume II, pages 83-84. Felt's report on the October 16 briefing of the Taylor Mission was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in telegram 180250Z, October 18. (Office of Naval History, CINCPAC Message Files)
The mission left Honolulu the evening of October 16 and arrived in Saigon during the morning of October 18.
170. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Honolulu, October 16, 1961.
/1/Source National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-015-69. Secret.
SUBJECT
A Plan for CINCPAC to Prepare in the Next Two Weeks1. I believe it would be useful if CINCPAC would prepare for our examination on the return of your mission to Honolulu an additional plan. The plan would consist of limited but systematic harassment by U.S. naval and air power of North Viet-Nam. It would not envisage, at our initiative, the landing of U.S. forces north of the 17th parallel for sustained fighting; but it might include hit-and-run naval and air action to place and remove landing parties to destroy key military bases and installations. The plan would be designed to minimize civilian casualties.
2. The plan would require, and be based on a detailed analysis of North Vietnamese military installations, especially on installations related to the Viet-Cong offensive in the south; and on a detailed analysis of the North Vietnamese economy. It may be that Admiral Felt would like to request the prompt dispatch from Washington of the best transport and economic experts on the North Vietnamese economy from CIA.
3. The considerations underlying this concept are the following:
a. It is apparent that it will be difficult to produce a prompt and radical improvement in the tactics, organization, and direction of Diem's forces. This we must seek to do, but the pace of increased Viet-Cong pressure may outpace the maximum that persuasion and bargaining can bring about soon.
b. It is apparent that the highest authorities in Washington and Saigon will resist the introduction of new forces on a scale capable of producing a rapid change in the situation. We may find-in air reinforcement-a move which would bring about such a turning point; but we can not be satisfied with such a proposal on the evidence presently available to us.
c. The underlying situation we confront is that Communist strategy is-as always-working around our main strength (the Seventh Fleet), and exploiting our main weaknesses: Diem; and the political limitations on the role of white men in an Asian guerrilla war. I believe we have a responsibility to see what could be done by exploiting their fundamental weakness, (the vulnerability of the Hanoi-Haiphong complex) and our main strength (naval and air power).
4. I am, of course, aware of the political problem of creating an international setting in which a substantial part of the international community would regard this action as legitimate. This would have to be carefully checked out; and I am only suggesting that we have in hand a carefully tooled precision plan to match the concept. But I believe the political and diplomatic problem is not insuperable given the Jorden Report;/2/ given the fact that we would not be setting out to conquer North Viet-Nam, but only to harass until it closed to communicate with supply, and infiltrate its agents in the South [sic]; given the fact that this move could be legitimately presented to the U.N. as a way of stopping a form of international banditry which must be stopped-by the U.N. or some other instrument-if we are to have a world of law.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 161.
5. I am also, of course, aware that the possibilities of escalation would have to be carefully considered. We would have to be prepared for an overt attack across the 17th parallel; a Chinese Communist entrance into the war; a Soviet reaction in Berlin or elsewhere. But I see nothing we can do to save South Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia which does not require measuring these risks; and I think this form of graduated air-naval harassment would be a real puzzler for them-just as guerrilla war is for us. Moreover, there are real inhibitions in Hanoi and Moscow against getting the Chinese Communists into Hanoi; real inhibitions in Moscow against nuclear war.
6. Finally, it should be clear that this kind of action would be a supplement to-not a substitute for-efforts to aid Diem. It is designed to produce a favorable turning point in the guerrilla war; it would not end it. Therefore, the examination of how Diem's and our own resources might better be utilized must, of course, go forward.
W.W. Rostow/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
171. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 16, 1961, l p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/10-1661. Secret; Niact. Repeated to CINCPAC for General Taylor, Geneva for Harriman, Taipei, Bangkok, Vientiane, Paris, London, and Phnom Penh.
495. Pursuant Embtel 488/2/ following analysis and preliminary recommendations submitted.
/2/Dated October 13. (Ibid., 751K.5-MSP/10-1361)
In recent requests for additional US commitments to SVN Diem's govt is acting in light of present security conditions in SVN and their estimate of increasing pressures in future. There is no evidence of panic, and fact is that Diem and his govt, if they do not win out, are so committed that they will have to go down fighting or be ousted by coup d'etat. Recent requests for additional US help have come as result calculations to bolster GVN against following: evidence of increased Communist determination and accelerated organization in SVN, the Laotian situation as seen by GVN at present and potential infiltrations, GVN concern about a possible Korean-type attack, present size of SVN armed forces and time required to recruit, equip, and train additional forces, and time required to bring into effect crash economic-social programs. Diem has given up, at least temporarily, some of his basic philosophy on how to win struggle by asking, first for a bilateral security treaty with US, and secondly and perhaps alternatively for the dispatch of US combat forces (even though ostensibly for guard duty, not for combat unless attacked).
Obvious first question from US point of view is whether or not world balance of power is sufficiently affected by what happens in SVN to cause us to take measures necessary to prevent loss of SVN to Communists. In light of factors as seen from here, physical, moral, and psychological, answer would appear to be clearly affirmative.
As previously reported, a major factor causing increased GVN anxiety and leading to substantial additional requests of US by GVN in last week is situation in Laos and GVN view that approaching solution there is going to transfer communist pressure and force from that country to SVN. Not only GVN, but also ARVN (at least its leaders) strongly hold this view. To what extent it is a factor in public morale is not yet clear. This mission has already (Embtel 373/3/ and others) submitted its recommendations on this subject as it affects SVN. All indications, however, point to a negotiated solution in Laos, eventuating in a neutral govt under Souvanna Phouma. The main focus of US attention and diplomatic endeavor seems now to be on how to assure strict neutrality, including the prevention of the use of Laotian territory for Communist aggressive purposes against Laos' neighbors, by means of a proper composition of a Laotian Govt and an international treaty. I should point out in this connection that the GVN cannot be brought to believe (at least, I cannot bring them to believe) that paper guarantees on this score, plus any ICC mechanism comprising Poland, India, and Canada, will in fact protect SVN's western border. They have had similar guarantees in their own country, and these have not worked. All evidence we have here points to conclusion that, if the Communist strategists are willing to settle for a neutral Laos at this time, it is for the purpose of concentrating their attack upon SVN, utilizing a neutral Laos for the purpose to whatever extent proves necessary. We have, however, done our best to persuade Diem and others that US policy vis-à-vis Laos is not inconsistent with our determination to protect SVN. We have had a certain measure of success in this, although one should not assume that their failure strongly to dissent, here or in Geneva, indicates consent or even concurrence on the part of these people. They do not think it is polite or productive to argue, but they do make up their own minds and determine their own course of action on the basis of their own judgment. They have made up their minds that the presently-envisioned settlement [in] Laos is going to make things harder for them, and they are now trying to build hedges against that.
/3/Document 133.
This is major reason for their request for US reinforcements, involving Diem's breaking away, in part at least, from his long-held belief that a victory over communism here, if it is to be enduring, must be achieved by Vietnamese sacrifice and manpower alone. In requesting US reinforcements (and thinking about inviting Chinese), he has adopted an expedient which runs against his own convictions, and he is apparently willing to accept the attendant diminution of his own stature as an independent and self-reliant national leader.
If, then, a major cause of the deterioration in SVN cannot be attacked in Laos (or the proposed remedy there cannot be convincingly sold to the GVN), our alternative is to go all out to reinforce this country internally. This would seem to involve even faster, more far-reaching and more expensive measures than those now in train or in prospect. The measures can, I think, be considered under two headings-those designed to protect from external attack and/or large-scale infiltrations, and those designed to strengthen internal cohesion, to create national will and unity necessary to overcome present large-scale guerrilla activity.
Under measures against external attack, following have been and should be further considered:
1. Means to seal 17th parallel and borders with Laos and Cambodia; defoliated strip, barbed wire (electrified?), mines, patrols, posts, other means. Use of US combat engineer battalions to help with construction.
2. US combat forces, as requested, to be stationed near 17th parallel and possibly other places (towns) in high plateau near Lao border, to free ARVN troops for counter-guerrilla action.
3. Additional fighter-bomber aircraft; additional transport aircraft; best means of supplementing shortage Vietnamese pilots and maintenance personnel (US civilian-contract personnel for non-combat operations commends itself to US).
4. Use of forces other SEATO countries (possibly Philippines or Thailand) for above purposes.
With any such far-reaching measures on US side, I think that we have right and obligation to assure Diem takes extensive steps on his side to strengthen his govt politically. These measures would relate to (a) organization, (b) rallying mass support, and (c) unifying local elements (i.e., educated class) in support of govt. Steps in these three areas would to some extent be overlapping since improving governmental organization likely for example have favorable effect other areas, while at same time being important in itself for efficient prosecution of war against VC.
List our suggestions these three areas being further refined. While not complete or unalterable, they do indicate some useful steps which we believe should be taken in both Diem's interest and our interest of preserving free VN, under following headings:
A. Govt organization at both national and local levels.
B. Mass support measures.
C. Gaining broader support.
D. Educational class.
E. Tax reform.
F. Financial reform.None of these areas are new, and many have been previously tried, with some, but not rapid enough, results. A very careful balance has to be struck between the ideal and the possible, assuming Diem's continuance at the helm and given his extraordinary blend of quality, fortitude, deep conviction, determination, lack of political instinct, lack of organizing and administrative ability and many others.
Your subsequent message this subject/4/ delayed in transmission and just arrived. Will be prepared to discuss thoroughly.
/4/Not further identified.
Nolting
172. Briefing Paper Prepared by the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
No. 2
Saigon, October 17, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-637-71. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text, but the paper is 1 of 11 attached to a cover sheet entitled, "Briefing Papers: Current Situation in Viet-Nam." The following papers are not printed: (1) Status of US GVN Action Programs, (3) Geneva Accord Aspects of U.S. Military Assistance to GVN, (4) Summary of Recent Aid Levels and GVN 1962 Budgetary Problem, (5) Fact Sheet-Personnel Build-up of RVNAF, (6) Status of Preparation of a Geographically-Phased Strategic Plan for Bringing VC Subversion under Control, (7) Upgrading Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps Training Equipment, (3) Civilian Counter-Insurgency Plan, (9) Proposed Montagnard Program, (10) Unrest in North Viet-Nam: Current Manifestation and Potential, and (11) Concept of Border Control.
POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY GVN AS QUID PRO QUO FOR
ADDITIONAL U.S. SUPPORTI. Organizational steps:
1. Retain Thuan in one of three jobs he now holds, but appoint capable officials to other two jobs in order permit all three of these key positions function adequately.
2. Delegate real coordinating authority to the three coordinating "super ministers".
3. Flesh out delegation of authority to Field Command for counterinsurgency operations so that authority will be commensurate with responsibility.
4. Set up functioning internal security councils at central, regional, provincial, and district levels along lines of models used in other countries which have conducted counterinsurgency campaigns.
5. Give Central Intelligence Organization substance, and not just shadow, of authority and control over all intelligence operations.
6. Free both Diem and Assistant Secretary of National Defense from operational functions to sufficient extent to permit them to visit scenes of ARVN victories or defeats immediately after action has occurred and to maintain more frequent informal contact with armed forces in other ways.
7. Higher and more regular pay to local officials.
II. Steps to rally mass support:
1. Increase Diem's personal contact with people through more informal trips to countryside, by making himself available at palace to ordinary people, either in groups or individually, by occasionally hearing mass in small church or visiting Buddhist Pagoda, et cetera.
2. Travel by Diem, wherever possible, by helicopter directly from palace in order reduce adverse reaction from closing off of streets, motorcades proceeding at high speed, behavior of security guards, et cetera.
3. Frequent, frank, and down-to-earth talks over radio (at least once a month) and on TV if system set up.
4. Use flood actions as opening gambit in campaign for less luxury in Governmenf in view general emergency in which country finds itself.
5. At same time stop emphasizing "sacrifice and discipline" theme in talking to the people and tell them what they are anxious to hear-that better times are coming and that soon they will not be afraid to sleep at night.
6. In Saigon and other cities institute, visit, and dramatize laborconsuming projects for unemployed who have increased considerably as result influx into cities because of insecure conditions in countryside.
7. Initiate and publicize economic and social programs aimed at improving conditions in every village.
8. Proceed set up provincial councils which Diem has already promised publicly.
III. Steps to rally support of educated class:
1. Bring non-Communist political prisoners promptly to trial, including Dr. Dan and Pham Khac Suu.
2. Set up public tribune for free expression of ideas and criticisms as safety valve.
3. Establish political consultative council and consult this body sincerely and frequently. Council should include leading oppositionists since they are not in National Assembly.
4. Try to make it clear that National Assembly can vote freely on measures placed before it. Send back for thorough open debate measures recently adopted at Madame Nhu's instigation re taxi girls and establishment women's paramilitary force.
5. Permit opposition parties to operate and put up candidates for 1962 National Assembly elections.
6. In effort reduce criticism of family, place Nhu in ministry where he will have to accept responsibility.
IV. Armed forces:
1. Higher pay or increased family allowances to soldiers.
2. Better food.
3. Better system of promotion.V. Social
1. Tax reform-higher rates and collections from well-to-do.
VI. Financial:
1. A realistic military rate of exchange.
173. Paper Prepared by the Taylor Mission/1/
Saigon, October 18, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series Taylor Report (Rostow Working Copy). Top Secret. There is no heading on the source text, but another copy bears the following handwritten notation on the cover sheet: "Questions Distributed by Taylor Mission for Answer by Task Force Saigon. October, 1961." (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, SGN (61) 19-GVN August through December) The questions were apparently given by the Taylor Mission to Embassy personnel at the briefing of the Taylor Mission by the Saigon Task Force on October 18.
I. Political-Social (Responsibility-Mr. Cottrell)
1. How stable is the Diem Government?
2. How can the political base for the counter-insurgency program be improved?
3. What would be the political effect of the following:
a. Introduction of SEATO and/or US forces?
b. A political settlement in Laos?
c. A major increase in US military and economic aid?
4. What are the pros and cons of a bilateral treaty?
5. What are the essential reforms to urge on Diem? What approaches to use?
II. Military (Responsibility-General Craig)
1. Operations and Training.
a. How is the ARVN presently disposed and how does it operate against the VC? Are present resources being used to best advantage?
b. How can the tactics and organization of ARVN be improved for combatting the VC?
c. How can the rate of increase of ARVN be accelerated? What should be the ultimate strength?
d. How can SVN forces take offensive action against the VM?
e. What can be done to combat more effectively the VC infiltration by land and sea?
f. What is the status of Special Force training? Is it adequate? Are the trained units properly used?
2. Logistics.
a. Are present logistical resources being used to best advantage?
b. What additional equipment is needed? Why? When? How much? Who operates?
c. What improvements are needed to facilities such as ports, airfields, roads and signal communications? Why? How much?
d. What can US logistical units, or US contractors do to help in logistics field? Engineers? Helicopters? CAT?
e. What prepositioning of military equipment and supplies is warranted now?
3. Intelligence.
a. What are the hard facts with regard to the VC insurgency? Tactics? Location? Routes of infiltration? Sources of supply?
b. How can the SVN intelligence system be improved? Photography?
c. What are the possibilities of organizing an effective village alarm system?
d. What are the reconnaissance capabilities? Ground? Sea? Air?
III. Political Warfare (Responsibility-Mr. Rostow)
1. What are the techniques of political warfare which can be brought to bear on the VC insurgency problem?
2. What importance is there to improving radio and TV facilities?
3. How is white and black propaganda organized? Is it effective?
4. What can be done to improve Diem's image before his own people and outside world?
IV. Unconventional Warfare (Responsibility-General Lansdale)
1. What unconventional warfare techniques should be considered in coping with VC insurgency?
2. How can we carry unconventional warfare to the enemy?
3. Are preparations adequate for waging unconventional warfare?
V. Covert Activities (Responsibility-Mr. Smith)
1. What are the covert and clandestine capabilities of SVN? Should they be increased?
2. What covert offensive actions should be considered?
3. What is being done to reduce or eliminate US participation in covert activities?
4. What are the possibilities of exploiting third country nationals in covert operations?
5. What is the extent of disaffection directed against the Diem Government?
6. What is the state of loyalty of the Armed Forces to Diem?
7. What is the true attitude of the SVN toward US?
VI. MAAG and Military Aid (Responsibility-Adm. Heinz)
1. How is the quality, size and organization of the MAAG?
2. Is the MAAG close to the RVNAF? How many are in the field? How are US advisors assigned to units?
3. Is there need for a program for further "encadrement"?
4. What is the status of organization and training of the Civil Guard and the local Security Forces?
5. How can the Secretary of Defense be kept better informed?
6. Is US military aid being used to the best advantage? Is it properly related to economic aid? Can the reaction time be reduced?
VII. Economic (Responsibility-Mr. Howe)
1. Is there need for a revision of the economic aid program to direct it more specifically to combatting VC insurgency?
2. Is economic aid properly related to military aid?
3. What are the short-term projects of greatest promise which should be pushed forward now?
4. What economic reforms which we are justified to urge on Diem? What approaches to use?
VIII. R&D (Responsibility-Dr. Rathjens-Mr. Godet)
1. What R&D items offer promise in the short term in combatting VC insurgency? What is needed to expedite them?
2. Can the R&D organization be improved?
174. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 18, 1961, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1551K/10-1861. Secret; Priority. ReDeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, Bangkok. Vientiane. and Phnom Penh.
508. General Taylor, Rostow and Cottrell called on Diem together with local American officials for initial discussion October 18. Taylor opened by explaining reasons for his mission, its interest in all fields activity and its authority to make recommendations to President Kennedy, who will make decisions.
In response Taylor's request for description situation in Viet-Nam, Diem gave long historic account developments here. Main point which emerged concerned lack sufficient number of GVN troops. In addition insufficient armed forces he stressed need for large number well equipped and trained Civil Guard and self defense corps for protection of hamlets to prevent Viet Cong from feeding on countryside. Taylor asked whether increase armed forces could not be stepped up. Diem and Thuan replied that shortage of cadres is main bottleneck since additional officers and NCOs needed for all branches of security forces. Pointed to recent action doubling officer trainee class at Thu Duc school.
Since Diem's description underlined need for large security forces for various defensive purposes, Taylor noted that offensive warfare against guerrillas is less costly than defensive, and asked whether greater offensive action, striking at Viet Cong bases and ambushing them on infiltration trails could not be undertaken. Diem replied this being done in part but many trails not known and Viet Cong find it easy to deviate past GVN units on known trails.
Taylor asked for Diem's view on recent step-up in Viet Cong campaign. Diem said that Viet Cong aim is to induce GVN to withdraw troops from southern area (where they have been more successful in recent months) to meet greater activity in central Viet-Nam, thus again giving Viet Cong opportunity for greater initiative in southern area. Diem noted Viet Cong now often regroup into bigger units to attack more important targets but added that Viet Cong are not yet trying to engage in conventional warfare by holding on to places taken.
Taylor said he understood there had been recent discussions of introduction of American or SEATO forces into Viet-Nam and asked why change had occurred in earlier GVN attitude. Diem succinctly replied because of Laos situation. Noting it will take time to build up GVN forces he pointed to enemy's reinforcements through infiltration and increased activities in central Viet-Nam and expressed belief that enemy is trying to escalate proportionately to increase in GVN forces so that CVN will not gain advantage. He asked specifically for tactical aviation, helicopter companies, coastal patrol forces and logistic support (ground transport).
Diem indicated he thought there would be no particular adverse psychological effect internally from introducing American forces since in his view Vietnamese people regard Communist attack on Viet-Nam as international problem. Rostow inquired whether internal and external political aspects such move could be helped if it were shown clearly to world that this is international problem. Diem gave no direct comment on this suggestion. He indicated two main aspects of this problem: (1) Vietnamese people are worried about absence formal commitment by US to Viet-Nam. They fear that if situation deteriorates Viet-Nam might be abandoned by US. If troops are introduced without a formal commitment they can be withdrawn at any time and thus formal commitment is even more important in psychological sense. (2) Contingency plan should be prepared re use American forces in Viet-Nam at any time this may become necessary. In this connection Diem seemed to be talking about combat forces. While it was not completely clear what Diem has in mind at present time he seemed to be saying that he wants bilateral defense treaty and preparation of plans for use American forces (whatever is appropriate) but under questioning he did not repeat his earlier idea relayed to me by Thuan that he wanted combat forces.
Taylor several times stressed importance of overall plan-military, political, economic, psychological, etc.-for dealing with guerrillas. Diem tended avoid clear response this suggestion but finally indicated that he has new strategic plan of his own. Since it was not very clear in spite efforts to draw him out what this plan is, Taylor asked him to let us have a copy in writing.
I asked Diem about significance state of emergency decree just issued (our 504/2/). He said he took this action under conditions of Constitution and has sent it to National Assembly for approval in 30 days as required by Constitution. If Assembly approves establishment of state of emergency he said that executive decrees could then be issued. I asked whether this measure was taken because of security or flood conditions. He said both but it was evident that security considerations were uppermost since he referred to his mention of this proposed action in his October 2 National Assembly speech.
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., 751K.00/10-1861)
Nolting
175. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 18, 1961, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-1861. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to New Delhi, Ottawa, London, CINCPAC for PolAd, Geneva for FECON, Paris, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and Vientiane.
507. Task Force VN.
Body of Col. Hoang Thuy Nam, Chief GVN Liaison Mission to ICC who kidnapped by VC Oct 1, recovered from Saigon River Oct 17 near bridge on northern outskirts of Saigon. Body to lie in state at GVN Liaison Mission headquarters in ICC compound beginning 1530 Oct 18. Funeral be held Oct 20. Suggest Department bring this development to attention of press. USIS sending to IPS GVN press release/2/ on this subject.
/2/Not found.
. . . Oct 18 informed EmbOff as follows. GVN evening Oct 17 sent urgent letter to ICC,/3/ copies of which delivered to ICC commissioners at their homes, concerning Nam case. Letter stated impossible doubt that Hanoi authorities responsible for death of Col. Nam and earnestly requested ICC within one week inform GVN of measures ICC intended take against Hanoi authorities as result this incident. Letter added GVN and Vietnamese people awaiting with greatest attention word of action to be taken.
/3/Not further identified.
ICC met morning Oct 18 and unanimously agreed send letter GVN expressing "deep sorrow" over death of Col. Nam and asking ICC condolences be transmitted to family. Canadians and Indians also proposed ICC send additional letter asking GVN submit further proof that DRV implicated in Viet Cong activities such as kidnapping of Col. Nam, in order permit ICC consideration of possible investigation. During discussion this proposal Indian chairman warned Poles ICC might be in for serious trouble if no action taken on Nam case. Poles requested delay in order seek instructions from Warsaw but subsequently agreed to send letter proposed by Indians and Canadians. This done afternoon Oct 18.
Comment: ICC letter, which so worded as to invite evidence of DRV connection with Viet Cong in relation allegation latter's responsibility for Nam kidnapping, represents real "breakthrough" in subversion issue. ICC bound consider information submitted in response its own request and GVN, as result earlier Jorden visit, /4/ has developed useable and effective evidence which can now be exploited to fullest. . . .
/4/See Document 139.
"Time limit" for ICC action contained GVN letter unprecedented GVN tactic. GVN may have in mind using Nam case as justification for anti-insurgency actions in direct conflict with Geneva Accord.
We shall endeavor impress on GVN unprecedented opportunity presented by ICC letter and necessity exploit it.
Nolting
176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 18, 1961, 9:27 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/10-1861. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood, cleared with Anderson (SEA) and Defense, initialed by Wood for the Secretary, and repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd.
451. Ref: Deptel 192./2/ Joint State-Defense message.
/2/Telegram 192, August 15, notified the Embassy in Saigon that the question of the introduction of jets into Vietnam was still under study in Washington and that the Embassy would be informed when a decision was made. (Ibid., 751K.5-MSP/ 8-861)
1. In view factors involved in obvious breach of Geneva Accords, no firm date on introduction jets into Viet-Nam has yet been set. Any decision not to conform Accords as they pertain to jet aircraft will be made as political situation dictates at such time and to such degree as will best advance US interests. Nevertheless concur training should start now thereby enabling GVN accept jets when and if actual delivery is approved.
2. You are therefore authorized inform GVN of US offer to provide training in US to begin FY 62 for jet pilots and technicians in numbers required to operate six T-33's.
3. In discussions required for this purpose with GVN officials it should be made clear that:
(1) No public announcement be made of possible future delivery of jet aircraft pending final resolution US-GVN position on continued observance of Articles 16 and 17 Geneva Accords.
(2) That any decision to provide jets or other weapons must be made in light GVN need and ability to use them at the time. Item of most importance at present is adequate capacity of GVN to prosecute the counter-insurgency plan and to handle the immediate problem of Communist advances. Timing of jet delivery will be made in context of this capacity and eventual decision regarding Geneva Accords.
Rusk
177. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Saigon, October 19, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-637-71. Secret. A note on the source text reads: "This memorandum is based on interpreter's translated, fragmentary notes, expanded from memory. It is in no sense a stenographic record of the meeting and is neither official or approved." A memorandum of a conversation on the same day between Taylor and Lieutenant General Le Van Ty, Chief of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF, is ibid.
SUBJECT
Meeting held at Field Command Headquarters, ARVN, on Thursday, 19 October 1961 on the Occasion of the Visit of General Maxwell D. Taylor to Vietnam (the meeting was conducted in French)ATTENDANCE
General Maxwell D. Taylor, Special Military Advisor to the President of the United States
Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr, Chief, MAAG, Vietnam
Major General Duong Van Minh, Commanding General, ARVN Field Command
Brigadier General Le Van Kim, Deputy Commanding General, ARVN Field Command
Colonel Thomas A. McCrary, U.S. MAAG Senior Advisor to ARVN Field CommandAfter an exchange of amenities, General Taylor told General Minh that his visit to ARVN Field Command was in the nature of a courtesy call and that he hoped to speak with General Minh a number of times before his departure./2/ He was sure that General Minh was aware of the reason for his trip to Vietnam-of his ambition to study the problems of the country and to help find a solution to them. Speaking as one soldier to another, he asked General Minh for his views on the guerrilla situation, how he could help to solve the problem and what General Minh's estimate of the present situation was as compared with conditions which existed two years ago. He told General Minh that he found it hard to judge and asked if, in the opinion of General Minh, the progress made by the communists was at a normal rate or if he felt that the tempo had increased sharply.
/2/No record was found of any subsequent Taylor-Minh conversations during the visit.
General Minh replied that, first of all, he considered the visit of General Taylor to be a great honor. He knew that General Taylor had spoken with all of his higher authorities and already knew much of what was happening. Speaking as a soldier, he wanted General Taylor to know that he considered the situation to be extremely grave. Not only had the Viet Cong grown alarmingly, but, worse, more and more, the Vietnamese Armed Forces were losing the support of the population. In reply to General Taylor's question as to why he felt this, General Minh said that he had known Vietnam under President Diem since 1954. The intelligence provided by the population was a guide to their attitude. In 1955 and 1956, they were full of enthusiasm and the spirit of cooperation. Now the population was giving trouble. When General Taylor asked if this was because of a loss of confidence and whether it was restricted to threatened areas, General Minh replied that the attitude prevailed in all areas-Saigon, for instance, could certainly not be considered to be a menaced area.
General Taylor then told General Minh that what he was saying was important and asked him if he had any ideas as to how confidence could be restored. Would success in war do it? General Minh replied that the government had to strive to be better understood-there should be no favorite groups or classes (he invited General Taylor to send out special teams to check). There should be no distinctions of people either because of race or religion. Under present conditions certain religions felt that they were less favored. General Taylor asked if there was a clear division along religious lines. General Minh replied that, although he, himself, was in favor of all religions, the government conferred too many favors on one and gave nothing to others.
Another situation which General Minh thought needed correction was the system of selecting Province Chiefs. He cited his own province as an example. One Chief appointed to the province was a contractor from Hue with no administrative experience. In addition, he spoke to the people in the language of Hue and this antagonized them. After two years of no success, another young man, from the South, was selected-a young Captain, made Major for the job--whom General Minh had known earlier. In the General's opinion, it had been necessary to stretch a point to make him a Corporal. In answer to General Taylor's questions, General Minh explained that nearly all Province Chiefs were military. Most were Captains--promoted to Major for the job and promoted again to Lieutenant Colonel within two years. Their authority stemmed directly from the President and they commanded all troops in the province except those on major operations. There were, in effect, two chains of command. General McGarr had fought hard for a single chain of command which had been agreed and which had worked-but only for several months. Now, old habits had returned. The Province Chief was always in command of the Civil Guard and of the local Self Defense Corps forces. Though the Civil Guard had been officially placed under the Ministry of Defense, they could not be touched by the military. When, acting on the guidance of General McGarr, an attempt was made to go on the offensive, it was found to be impossible to obtain the cooperation required for the establishment of security measures in areas which had been swept. There was no help from the Civil Guard. General Minh invited General Taylor to talk to General Don, Commanding General of I Corps, where the Civil Guard was organized and employed in a special way. General Minh went on to say that many things needed to be changed within the Army as well as out-morale had to be raised.
In reply to General Taylor's question as to whether the Presidential declaration of a State of National Emergency meant that all resources of the Nation would be united in the struggle against communism, General Minh shrugged, agreeing that such a united effort was necessary-that complete coordination of all elements of the government was a must-but many changes would be needed to make this a reality.
As long ago as last February, General McGarr had insisted that a National Plan to combat the insurgency was required. General McGarr added that he had been pushing for this ever since. General Minh, with the help of General Kim, had been working on a military plan which was just about completed. Only last week, according to General Kim, General Minh had requested that plans of other agencies be made available to him for comparison and coordination-he had not yet received any cooperation-and was not too confident of ever getting any.
In reply to General Taylor's question as to who in the government other than the President, was responsible for a united plan, General Minh said that he thought that the Secretary at the Presidency, Mr. Thuan, should be-but that he was faced with the same difficulties as others were.
When General Taylor told General Minh that he should not be discouraged, General Minh reminded him that he (General Taylor) had not been faced with a war problem like that in Vietnam and had been able to retire when he chose to do so. He was not completely discouraged but he was happy to have General Kim with him-they sustained each other.
In answer to General Taylor's question, he said that if he had the authority to do what he wanted to do, he would simply try to be impartial. To which, General Taylor commented that one was never intentionally unjust. General Minh smiled and said that he understood.
General Minh went on to say that, in general, the Vietnamese do not like the Communists, but some are allowed to fight them and others are not. He had fought against the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai, now these people were ready to die in the struggle against the Communists. The sects no longer existed as they were before, but it was hard to exterminate "what is in the head"-they persisted as religions. The earlier struggle against them was really a fight to exterminate a group of bandits masquerading under the name of the Hoa Hao. General Taylor suggested that the same tactics should be used against the Viet Cong.
(At this point, General Kim motioned that no further notes should be taken.)
General Minh then said that he considered himself to be a young military officer in a young army. He felt that the military needed prestige and leadership, and the assistance of superior authorities to obtain what they needed. He felt that not only was this not true-there seemed to be a desire to downgrade the military.
General Minh told General Taylor that he was happy to be able to speak to him frankly. Others would also, but only if it could be tete-a-tete or in a very small group. There was a feeling that they were on a plane in a dive, and that they would soon reach a point where it would have to be levelled off or it would be too late.
The meeting ended with General Taylor's expression of his hope to see General Minh again before his departure.
178. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 20, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1551K/10-2061. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and Vientiane. No time of transmission is given on the source text; the telegram was received in the Department of State at 2:12 p.m.
516. Gen. Taylor and Cottrell called on Vice President Tho October 19 accompanied by Mendenhall and me. Main points made by Vice President as follows:
1. Intelligence services function poorly because qualified personnel, equipment, and available funds spread too thinly among too many competing services. Central Intelligence Organization, which was formed at US request, not really functioning. Agreed with Taylor that adequate intelligence is of first importance in fighting guerrilla war.
2. Peasants do not support Communists politically but are forced help them because of pressure. Necessary to furnish proper protection to peasants including development protective measures at hamlet level. Stressed need for Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps, particularly latter, in sufficient number, better paid, better trained and better armed. Said that center is behind south in developing proper protective measures at village level.
Under questioning, expressed personal view that CG and SDC should have been increased rather than Armed Forces. Added current situation in central Viet-Nam requires some modification of that view but it is still valid for southern Viet-Nam. based this on fact that guerrilla war is fought at village level thus requiring local forces who know terrain and people. Also criticized Armed Forces for being overly-developed for modern warfare rather than being able to fight in mud and water, and said greater stress should be placed on Ranger forces.
3. When questioned on Montagnard problem, said this is most difficult problem facing Viet-Nam. He said that Montagnards are excellent as intelligence agents but not good in combat.
4. Stated that in general economy has not gone too badly despite insecurity. Asserted, however, that if Commies continue advance in countryside, cities will be gradually asphyxiated through loss of peasant purchasing power and growing unemployment resulting from influx people into cities. Thus absolutely necessary to hold countryside. Added that Communists have plan to try to seize upcoming rice harvest and province chiefs have been asked for ideas as to how to beat Communists to punch over this crop.
5. After brief account by Vice President of tactics and techniques followed by Communists in reaching present stage of guerrilla development, Taylor asked what should be done. Vice Pres in carefully phrased reply stated that US should "intervene" quickly and intelligently. He eluded questions directed at producing specific recommendations, but did state that US has already given lots of arms and other aid and more will be coming, and what we must insist upon is that this aid be used efficiently. Pointing to Taylor's initial questions about intelligence organizations, he asserted with smile that Taylor already knew what was wrong in Viet-Nam.
Vice President added that morale of population is not bad and could easily be revived if government worked properly. People are anti-Communist and will fight but they must be convinced that what is being done is intelligently planned and executed.
6. In conclusion I raised flood conditions and Vice President said that urgent assistance already requested by GVN should arrive during first two weeks in November to produce proper impact.
Comment: It was clear that Vice Pres, when pressed for his views, was pointing his finger at Diem's methods of government and administration. He said he was not anti-Diem and expressed his support of President. But this was a plea for US to adopt a firm approach in order to make Diem and his government effective. Though lacking specifics, Vice President's appeal was both moving and disturbing in its stress on importance of time. He said six months from now would be too late.
Vice President made very good impression during talk. He showed detailed knowledge of what is going on in countryside, and had lucid ideas as to how to deal with it. He is close to people and experienced in dealing with them. Obvious, however, that he will not himself stand up to Diem and doubtful that he any longer even tries to make his voice heard by Diem.
Nolting
179. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Saigon, October 20, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-015-69. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text, which is attached to a covering memorandum of October 27 from McGarr to Taylor in which McGarr wrote that it was MAAG's memorandum for the record and was "a summarization of the items covered during the discussion." not a verbatim account.
SUBJECT
Minutes of Intelligence Discussion, 20 October 19611. General Taylor conducted a conference of intelligence matters concerning South Vietnam in Chief MAAG's office on 20 October, with following persons in attendance.
General Taylor Mr. Colby General McGarr Colonel Bryant General Timmes Major Hyler Dr. Rostow Major Freestone Mr. Cottrell 2. Following is summary of discussion during the approximately two hour conference.
General Taylor asked for explanation of intelligence sources. Col. Bryant described how MAAG field advisors receive, translate and forward all ARVN generated intelligence reports from divisions, corps and Field Command to J2 MAAG; J2 MAAG also receives J2 RVNAF intelligence reports, estimates, studies, etc. Copies of all such reports are in turn transmitted to Army Attache and Evaluation Center-Attache consolidates, comments and forwards to USARPAC, PACOM and ACSI; Evaluation Center processes and produces collateral order of battle . . . . Within limited capability MAAG J2 utilizes all information received to produce current staff intelligence which is presented in form of weekly staff briefing of enemy situation and a monthly intelligence summary. General McGarr commented that MAAG not specifically charged with intelligence mission to collect information on ARVN and must be careful in this respect so as not to prejudice basic mission, however, do receive information on Viet Cong and North Vietnam from opposite numbers.
General Taylor inquired into ARVN intelligence system. Col. Bryant explained it is designed to operate same as US Army with flow from bottom to top. However, GVN also has civilian security/intelligence agencies, such as NPSS, SEPES, etc., which report information through the Province Chief and/or directly back to central headquarters in Saigon without in many cases passing the information to ARVN present in the area.
General Taylor inquired as to how the system should work to provide timely intelligence. It was explained that there should be free and continuous exchange of information at all levels between ARVN battalions/regiments in provinces and the provincial administration (which receives information from civil guard, SDC, police, own intelligence net, etc). However, this is not presently done in a considerable number of instances. Mr. Colby commented that province chief has civil guard, NPSS, own net, etc. reporting information to provincial headquarters and which province chief often uses solely in his own security operations, or reports to GVN in Saigon without disseminating to ARVN in the area. It was explained that intelligence for ARVN military operations comes from ARVN combat intelligence efforts plus that which may or may not be obtained from province administration sources.
Mr. Colby explained the seven intelligence agencies (in contrast to US five) and stated are numerous as President believes intelligence is "power" and through such organizations President is able to control, and by not centralizing them under a subordinate he avoids giving that power to someone who might use it against the President. Agencies are the ARVN intelligence, military security service (controlled by President and not ARVN), NPSS (National Police and Security Service), SEPES (Service for Social and Political Studies), Presidential Liaison Service (a private security service), and the recently organized Central Intelligence Organization which was organized at urging of US in order to pull all intelligence information together centrally, as is not now the case, where it can be collated, processed, and disseminated to users. CIO is having hard time in getting off the ground-lack of full Presidential support, and some other intelligence agencies. General McGarr stressed the great need for timely dissemination of all available intelligence to the military for effective conduct of operations.
Capability of MAAG advisors to collect and report enemy information and activity was discussed, and was explained that under present set up advisors are unable to do little other than collect enemy information from ARVN and forward up. This is because enemy activity is so numerous and widespread and advisors are seldom present on the actual scene of action.
General Taylor commented that reports received in Washington build up large red blots on the map which continue to accumulate as no subsequent information received to up-date situation allowing some units to be removed perhaps, and this possibly gives a misleading and scaring picture back in Washington. Mr. Colby commented that very possible the red blots do not build up as fast as the Viet Cong actually are building.
General Taylor, Mr. Colby, and Major Hyler discussed Viet Cong strengths compiled by Evaluation Center based on compilation of collateral order of battle and special intelligence information (information furnished General Taylor in separate report/2/ and not repeated here). General Taylor stated all reports going to Washington should report VC battalion strengths (or estimates), otherwise present false picture to those who think of battalions as 800-1000 man units. Growth of VC military was discussed and explained that available information indicates armed strength in Delta area has not increased greatly, however, a consolidation and regularizing of forces into regular battalions has taken place. The significant increase has been in the 1st and 2nd Corps areas and indications are this has been accomplished largely by infiltration.
/2/Apparently a reference to eight pages of outline notes, dated October 20, entitled "McGarr Briefing for Gen. Taylor." Among the subjects covered in the notes were the terrain and climate in Vietnam, Viet Cong strength, RVNAF casualties and strength, actions which improve the situation in Vietnam, and actions the United States might take. Under this last heading, McGarr said the United States might "employ US combat troops to fight Viet Cong," but they should not "come in at all unless in sufficient strength to tip the balance." The minimum force recommended by McGarr was two full divisions, "suitably reinforced and supported with helicopters, engineers, etc." (Ibid., T-637-71)
The figure of 200,000 Vietnamese being available to Viet Cong, as stated in GVN Aide-Memoire/3/ was discussed. It was explained this figure result of RVNAF J2 study based on information from the provinces as to number of villages controlled, or heavily infiltrated by VC (cy of J2 report/4/ available if desired).
/3/Not further identified.
/4/Not found.
Dr. Rostow queried as to order of battle picture at various echelons of ARVN and provincial administration levels. It was explained that province chief normally presents a neat picture of VC situation, but impossible for US personnel to evaluate accuracy. Also, in ARVN, the lower one goes in the units, the worse the situation becomes-in the past RVNAF J2 and Field Command G2 have been quite conservative from a quantity standpoint compared to subordinate divisions and slower in accepting new VC units and strengths. Dr. Rostow asked about interrogation of prisoners. Was explained that US does not participate in this activity, however, we supposedly receive results of interrogations if anything of value is revealed. Prisoners captured by ARVN are normally interrogated at division level then turned over to provincial authorities for trial, rehabilitation, etc. Mr. Colby commented on lack of cooperation in this and other intelligence matters from the NPSS due to antipathy towards Americans of NPSS Chief, Brig Gen La-presently OSA only receives, above board, a monthly roundup report from NPSS, . . . General McGarr briefly commented on how VC prisoners generally handled in attempt to rehabilitate them. General Taylor stated that POWs should be interrogated to provide evidence of link from NVN in order to make a case for the ICC. Mr. Colby commented that it can be proved that VC went North in 1954-55, trained there and resumed to the South.
General Taylor brought up fact of VC build up in SVN and apparent little increase in Delta area as opposed to Northern 1st and 2nd Corps area. Mr. Colby and others commented that appears Nambo (Delta area) concentrated on organizing a regular force structure from numerous platoon and skeleton-type units with little increase, relatively speaking, in overall military strengths, whereas, Northern area (1st and 2nd Corps) has seen a significant increase in military elements since Fall of 1960. Mr. Colby commented that it is apparent the VC opened up a second front of activity, so to speak, in the Northern Highland and Coastal areas due to considerable GVN success in suppressing activity in the South.
General Taylor brought up subject of casualties both sides. Col Bryant stated we have no confidence in reports received from ARVN on their own casualties, but there are indications that ARVN is becoming more reliable in reporting VC casualties, although still believed to be inflated considerably in specific instances. General Taylor wondered about the large VC casualty statistics commenting it might indicate low quality of recruits. Mr. Colby pointed out that casualties also include any innocent local people who may not have actually been connected with VC, or were at least passive concluding that a dead Vietnamese is always considered a VC by ARVN if killed in area of action. Dr. Rostow queried if study of casualties versus incident rate had been made-answer was no due to unreliability of statistics which would be used (MAAG judges that all statistics are only relative and do not show the complete picture. For example, a considerable amount of VC activity in areas heavily infiltrated or dominated by VC is never reported as there are no friendly sources to report.)
Types of VC (recruited in South, infiltrated, etc) discussed. General consensus that some 70 percent are recruited and trained in the South, approximately 25 percent are regrouped Southerners sent to North after war end (or later), trained, and infiltrated back to South, with some 5 percent probably originating from the North and sent here as political and military cadre.
General Taylor asked if US has capability to interrogate VC prisoners-answer was no due to language barrier, and must use Vietnamese Nationals. This is probably exploitable field as VC prisoners have not been systematically interrogated in past.
General Taylor asked for fundamental facts as to intelligence production by US in country, appears no one charged with nor staffed to do this, all agencies are collectors and reporters. Major Hyler described Evaluation Center operation and fact that MAAG, ARMA, OSA, etc, funnelled information into the Center. General Taylor asked for mission of EC and this furnished by Major Hyler, and which General Taylor read./5/ It was explained that General McGarr got the Center going to assist in supplying hard targets to ARVN based on special intelligence and concealed as to source of information by use of collateral. The Center reports through SSO to ACSI and Task Force. Product of Center collateral order of battle effort made available to in-country and all US agencies. General Taylor posed question as to what should be done to provide efficient in-country intelligence apparatus for collection, processing, and dissemination of accurate, timely intelligence. Giving MAAG intelligence production capability, bringing in a team from USARPAC, straightening out GVN intelligence processes, were discussed. Mr. Colby stated that OSA has started on GVN but President does not want his intelligence funnelled through one person or agency. MAAG has and is exerting similar efforts in the military field to get MSS (counterintel effort) under the army where it belongs, organize an FOI capability, and train intelligence specialists. General McGarr stated that if US units came in we would want to control intelligence or at least have a strong hand in the effort. General Taylor asked for best way to set up a US intelligence production effort or agency. Col. Bryant expressed belief that Evaluation Center should be expanded. Dr. Rostow commented that first we need personnel to work on the raw material, and that G2 or intelligence activities must work closely with G3 or combat operations. It was also generally agreed that US intelligence effort, however organized, should include an organization to work hand in glove with ARVN intelligence producers to assure the effort is properly conducted, we receive all available information, and to gain benefit of being able to exchange ideas and rapidly clear up questions of doubt concerning translations, etc.
/5/Not further identified.
The discussion turned to plans for sealing the border in which General McGarr explained current ARVN plans of consolidating numerous isolated small posts into several large defendable border bases from which ARVN would conduct interlocking patrols, etc. General McGarr mentioned present capability of VC to infiltrate at will through many border points where there are no friendly units. General Taylor asked if important VC groups had been discovered or ambushed coming in from Laos. Mr. Colby stated yes and described several instances, all of which are included in GVN Aide-Memoire with supporting documentary evidence. Dr. Rostow posed question that if US should consider bringing infiltration question up in UN where should UN observers be stationed to detect infiltration. General consensus was that border is like a sieve and a half-dozen or so locations could not effectively detect infiltration along the numerous jungle trails. General Taylor finished reading EC mission, and stated that the US wants to and must know how the war is going from all aspects, and that although EC mission is important, it does not go far enough.
The conference was concluded with General Taylor stating it had been most profitable. However, problem remains as how to institute effective intelligence system for both GVN in countering the VC threat and US in order to be knowledgeable on the overall situation-both GVN and Viet Cong.
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