The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001.  Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date.  This site is not updated so external links may no longer function.  Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume I Vietnam, 1961 Department of State Washington, DC

180. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, October 20, 1961, midnight.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 851K.49/10-2061. Secret. Also sent to CINCPAC for action and repeated to Phnom Penh.

520. We are struck by opportunity afforded by severe flood in Delta to undertake with GVN fast public demonstration of unity of purpose and action. We intend to conduct right away further survey of flooded regions related to following possibilities:

A. Restoration of four provinces to permanent GVN control, based on improved physical and social conditions and improved security arrangements.

B. Feasibility of using flood relief operation as means of introducing into SVN US military units for humanitarian purposes, which might be kept if necessary.

C. Demonstration of US concern and action on behalf of ally in non-military field by using military equipment and personnel (engineer battalions, boats, equipment, etc.) with important ICC and world opinion angle.

D. Publicity at time when much press attention focused this area.

E. Joint planning and operation with GVN which may point way to similar closer cooperation in other spheres.

Will submit further recommendations after survey. Purpose this message to give idea our preliminary thinking, in view shortness of time available for follow-through (approx two weeks) in event survey validates idea.

Nolting

 

181. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (McConaughy) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)/1/

Washington, October 20, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files ERC 68 A 5159, New Command Arrangements 1962. Top Secret; Official-Informal. A handwritten note in the top margin reads: "Rec'd 11/2/61."

Dear Fritz: In view of the recent rumors about changes at the Palace . . . I thought it might be useful to bring up to date the memo entitled "Suggested Contingency Plan" which John Steeves sent to Durby under cover of his letter of April 13, 1961./2/

/2/Neither Steeves' letter nor the memorandum has been found.

The present memorandum is intended to replace the earlier one so that you will only have one file for easy (and possibly urgent) reference. Naturally the suggestions which follow are subject to your comment which we would very much value.

I would like to take this opportunity to tell you how pleased we are by the sensible, steady and conscientious embassy which you are carrying on in Saigon under the most difficult circumstances. I think the quality of steadiness is particularly important in our relations with the Vietnamese at this time.

Please convey my greetings to your staff and their families. I am very proud of them all. If there are any personal or professional problems on which we can be of assistance please be sure to let us know.

Very sincerely,

Walter

PS-Some of the statements in the enclosed memorandum will be obvious to you, but will provide

clarification to high level persons in Washington who may wish to read it.

 

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State/3/

Washington, October 20, 1961.

/3/Top Secret; Limit Distribution. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.

SUGGESTED CONTINGENCY PLAN

The knowledge of the existence of this memorandum is to be restricted to the smallest possible number of persons. It is not an Instruction. It is designed for reference by the Chief of Mission, but is not binding on him.

It is suggested that it be kept available and that it be reviewed with the Department whenever considered necessary by the Chief of Mission either through official informal correspondence with the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs or by telegram if necessary.

The United States continues to give President Diem full support by every appropriate means. For so long as Diem exercises effective control over the GVN, the US should take no action, overt or covert, which would give any encouragement to his opponents. During a possible coup the American Embassy should continue to support Diem fully until a decision is reached by the Chief of Mission that the time for change has arrived./4/

/4/Several marginal notes, apparently in Mendenhall's hand, are on the source text. Alongside this sentence is written a question mark.

If in the best. judgment of the Chief of Mission the situation arises where Diem has lost effective control, the United States should be prepared to quickly support the non-Communist person or group who then appears most capable of establishing effective control over the GVN. The nature of US support in such a situation should be strong enough to achieve rapid results but not so blatant as to make such a person or group appear as a US puppet. This will require the most careful handling.

While the final choice should not be frozen in advance, since it is impossible to foresee a situation which may arise, it is believed it would be wise if the Embassy prepared and kept current through regular consultation with the Department a list of persons and groups who might be acceptable. This might save priceless time in the event of a crisis and reduce the chances of mistakes or vacillation. Preliminary views follow:

1. The choice should be limited to persons in Viet-Nam on the grounds that they would be the only ones who would have any chance of rallying support in the face of the probability that the Communists would move fast./5/

/5/Alongside this sentence is written "Buu Hoi?"

2. The first priority should go to civilians within the Government with emphasis on US backing for a constitutional solution. Before abandoning Diem every effort should be made to consider how he might be reestablished even if he appeared temporarily to have lost control./6/

/6/Alongside this paragraph are written two question marks.

3. If the Chief of Mission should decide that Diem had lost control, the first decision would be whether to support Vice President Tho as the constitutional successor. A recent Embassy telegram (Embtel 516 dated October 20/7/) describes him as lucid, having detailed knowledge and as being close to the people. It would be necessary to persuade Tho and persuade the military to support him. This might be achieved through General Duong van Minh who is an old friend of Tho's (they were cellmates in a French jail about 1946) and who is well thought of in the army. It would be important to hold off the President's family. It might be well for Nhu to take a trip.

/7/Document 178.

4. Failing Tho, a second choice might be Nguyen dinh Thuan who is increasingly widely known as a result of the extensive representation which he does for Diem and who has preserved good relations with the Vietnamese military dating back to his days as a civilian official in the Vietnamese Department of Defense./8/ Both Thuan and Tho are capable men, experienced in the Vietnamese Government and friendly to Americans. Although Thuan is not in the constitutional line of succession, this would probably not be a major problem in the present crisis situation.

/8/Written in the margin next to this sentence are the following comments: "without political support & has made too many enemies."

5. Constitutionally, if Tho did not take office, President of the National Assembly Truong vinh Le would be next in line (Article 34) and would, according to the Constitution, preside for two months pending elections. He is dedicated, but has little public appeal and does not seem capable of firm imaginative leadership. At best he would be a temporary figurehead needing strong military support and a competent cabinet.

6. Other possible civilian candidates within the Government might be Bui van Long, Secretary of the Interior, Vo van Hai, the President's Chief of Cabinet or Tran van Dinh if he were in Viet Nam (he is now at the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington).

7. Another possibility which might be preferable paragraphs 5 and 6 would be a military caretaker government under General Duang van Minh./9/

/9/Written in the margin alongside this sentence are the following comments: "Or under Kim. Might also be preferable to any of foregoing choices."

8. The strength of the Communist challenge in Viet Nam would appear to rule out a Government of anti-Communist oppositionists. These men are disunited, inexperienced and do not have a wide following. It would seem almost impossible for them to organize an effective Government before the Communists took over.

Giving U.S. support to men now in the Vietnamese Government would reduce the risks of a dangerous interregnum and would probably be acceptable to most influential Vietnamese who do not appear to object so much to their present Government as to Diem's alleged inability to lead it effectively./10/

/10/Written in the margin alongside this sentence are the following comments: "Why not consider possibilities of Tran qui Buu, or Lt. Col. Thao, or perhaps even Maitre Dzu?"

9. It would also seem best to rule out any possibility of a Government under Diem's unpopular brothers, even if Luyen were front man. However, it might be wise to suggest that Brother Ngo dinh Can be left temporarily in control of his satrapy at Hue.

10. Meanwhile we face the very difficult problem of Diem's leadership. Most of those close to him do not now appear to think he is sufficiently effective. Diem seems unwilling to listen to advice on this subject. The U.S. is committed to support the Government of Viet-Nam of which Diem is President. It should be assumed that any U.S. initiative to remove Diem would become known and would be resisted ferociously by Diem and his family. But if it is clear that he can no longer obtain the effective collaboration of the members of his own government, we shall have to consider what we should and can do. We presume you will have discussed this with General Taylor and that he will have your views. We will discuss this with him when he returns. In the meanwhile, in view of the reported decrease in support which Diem seems to be receiving even from his closest advisers, we would appreciate your thoughts in this regard by cable.

The best U.S. approach would thus appear to be to support Diem so long as the Chief of Mission believes his control is effective and to use our influence with him to make it more effective. In this connection the Embassy might propose a draft of a letter from President Kennedy to President Diem based on General Taylor's recommendations. Such a draft could state that in the interest of the defense of Viet-Nam and of our heavy commitment there the U.S. considers it essential for President Diem to create an effective Internal Security Council with real executive responsibilities headed by a person of stature who would be loyal to Diem and respected by his colleagues. All government business would have to pass through the Internal Security Council. We should also request him to confirm to us the name of his successor. Other recommendations could include a real unification of intelligence functions. To obtain Diem's real concurrence it would have to be made clear that these moves were essential parts of the Counterinsurgency Plan which Diem agreed to carry out. It would also have to be implied quite understandably that if he did not, we would have to reconsider our policy towards Viet-Nam. Such a letter would require a prior decision that we would be prepared if necessary to run the risk of suddenly withdrawing our support from Diem and of almost simultaneously throwing our weight behind the most likely replacement. Such a move would require preparation, secrecy, surprise, and toughness.

 

182. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/

Saigon, October 21, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Vietnam-Taylor. Secret. Copies were sent to Nolting and Rostow. The source text is apparently Nolting's copy.

SUBJECT
Talk with Nhu, 19 October

Ngo Dinh Nhu invited me to visit him the morning of 19 October. I did so, . . . . met Nhu in his office in Freedom Palace.

The substance of Nhu's remarks were:

The events in Laos have given a psychological shock to anti-Communists in Asia. The governments of Thailand, Vietnam, Formosa, Korea, and the Philippines have expressed disapproval of events in Laos, on a government level. This may give the impression that it is only the governments which are concerned, and not public opinion. Just the opposite is true. The Asian man-in-the-street is profoundly affected.

For example, in South Vietnam the Communist guerrillas now present themselves in the villages as having just come from the successful Communist forces in Laos. This is not true, of course, but it is very effective psy war on the Vietnamese villagers.

The shock of Laos does not seem to be understood in the West. The West apparently looks upon this as governmental actions to blow up the Laos situation for their own ends. However, to the citizens in Asian countries, the events in Laos mean the end of SEATO and that the U.S. is now ready to abandon all anti-Communists. Therefore, the Asians are becoming demoralized.

The biggest weak point of the U.S. is the lack of psychological action on the world. There seems to be no unity of theme or action. The important thing is to make the people know what the U.S. wants. For example, during a visit to Morocco this summer, I noted an almost complete absence of U.S. propaganda. The journalists in Rabat asked about the meeting of the neutralists in Belgrade. After giving them some frank opinions on the neutralists, the journalists commented: "You have shown us the other side of the moon."

The Free World, including the Government of Vietnam, is working against Communism in an administrative fashion. This way of working doesn't create a movement of opinion. Without a movement of opinion, there can be no quick action. The Government of Vietnam is incapable of creating a great movement, even though it is doing many things.

Western propaganda against Communism doesn't exist. Western journalism often attacks the West and puts the West in the wrong. That's why people here were awaiting General Taylor's visit, to create a psychological shock both in South Vietnam and in North Vietnam. The visit is very important from the psychological standpoint.

Public opinion in Vietnam has it that General Taylor's mission has the power of decision, which I realize is not true. That's why I think there should be something in the communiqué about a decision. Perhaps the statement could be in the form of saying: "Something needs doing in Vietnam, but I am not saying just what right now. I am going back to Washington, where the decision will be made." (Comment: It was suggested that Nhu might touch on this topic when he talks with Dr. Rostow, which he intends to do./2/ Nhu agreed.)

/2/No record of a conversation between Nhu and Rostow was found.

The Communists make use of human capital to wage their subversive war. They can do all sorts of things with this human capital, such as terrorism and blackmail. After the Geneva Agreement in 1954, the Communists regrouped people for later efforts. 60,000 were readied for Cochin China, 40,000 for Central Vietnam and the High Plateau, and 35,000 for Cambodia. 10,000 of the people for Cambodia were Cambodians taken to the North from Cambodia itself.

The key point in Communist doctrine is the belief in eventual victory. It is essential. You don't find this in the Free World. Everybody seems paralyzed by the prospect of Communist victory. Therefore, we have the serious problem of stopping this decomposition. Since 1945, the Free World has been thinking that it can defeat the Communists by strategic solutions. We want to fight the Communists by victory. This is exactly as though we were to say, "In order to win the war, you need victory." People think this is easy and this is the Western point of view.

In the Western world, we have the human capital of freedom. This is something that everybody has. So, this is not only the capital, but it also can be the motive for action. So, the equation is made: "To win the war, you must have liberty."

In countries not yet free, if you apply this equation to them, you are going to be beaten: "To be a developed country, don't be underdeveloped. You must not let yourself be attacked by the Communists. If you are attacked, you are guilty." It is felt that liberty exists without economics. Socialism has attacked capitalism on this very point.

Normally, when a house starts burning down, people help and call the firemen. Now this has changed. If your house burns down, you are somehow guilty. Those who come to aid you are somehow guilty, too. That's the history of Laos, and of other Asian countries. The Laotians feel they are guilty. Why did they provoke the Communists by wanting to be independent? Because they wanted to choose their own friends in the West freely, they were attacked by the Communists.

Now the Laotians who sought liberty are being called corrupt. Phoumi and Boun Oum are labelled "reactionaries". Souvanna Phouma and Kong Le are labelled "pure". Nobody says that Souvanna Phouma holds lots of economic resources, that the bank and the airline are his. Not a single reporter in the Free World seems to want to talk about that. Nobody points out that Kong Le has several wives and a Chinese concubine. At the same time, Western reporters say that Diem, Phoumi, and so on, are corrupt. Why? Because they were attacked by the Communists. So, in some way, they are guilty and all that is needed is to look for the details of guilt.

Until now, Cambodia has been fine. However, Cambodia wouldn't be looked upon so favorably if it were realized that it can be taken over by the Communists in 48 hours. Actually, Cambodia is not strong, is not to be counted upon.

Apparently, the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh reported to Washington a few months ago that there were no Communist concentrations in Laos, that any reports to this effect were Vietnamese inventions aimed at getting increased U.S. aid for South Vietnam. 3 Word of this report seeped from the French military experts in Cambodia who claimed to have collaborated in the American report. This is the kind of false information which doesn't inform Washington properly.

In hearing of this report, the Vietnamese then asked Washington for aerial reconnaissance of the Cambodian frontier./3/ This request was mainly in order to be certain that Washington had the correct information. The Cambodian frontier is truly fantastic as far as Communist military camps go. The Vietnamese have little capability for professional aerial reconnaissance. The Americans can do it so much better themselves.

/3/Not further identified.

In order to believe a report that there are no Communists in Cambodia, you would have to believe that the Communists have given up guerrilla warfare. Everybody knows that one of the cardinal principles of guerrilla warfare is to have bases on a border. Essentially, if the Communists gave up this principle, they would have to give up Communism. Communism which doesn't expand isn't Communism.

The Communists in South Vietnam are waging war in a brutal fashion. They rely heavily on terror. They are applying military doctrine, not Mao Tse Tung's doctrine.

The present Communist doctrine in South Vietnam appears to be: the sum of tactical victories establishes a favorable strategic situation. The tactical actions are not political, but lead towards the hope of victory. This puts the population off balance, without time enough to organize itself for defense.

There is much lack of unity in Communist forces in South Vietnam. Some of the Communist cadre are not in agreement with Hanoi's policy of terror. But, they can't get out of it. They are too enmeshed in the gears of Communism. Mostly, these are the people who were in the 1945-1954 war. During that war, they were favored by the population, which loved them. Now, due to the terror campaign, they are feared and hated. Many of the prisoners, and the Communists who defect, have told this.

We Vietnamese are not applying the same doctrine of the sum of tactical victories. We are looking for decisive battles. This is a real mistake. We must increase the number of ambushes of the Viet Cong, the tactical victories.

At a recent meeting in Ban Me Thuot, with local civilian and military officials, we went over details of the local problem. Frankly, they were not really waging war against the Communists there, either in civic or military action. The main reason was the old one of a lack in Asians of using systematic procedures. The Communists apply a Germanic system, in a very methodical manner. Communism is a Western movement, applying method and a thorough followthrough which really is quite foreign to Asians.

The Vietnamese is intelligent, but lacks the methodical spirit. Each takes action, but not systematically. If things don't work, they feel the reason must be elsewhere. In the two recent reverses in the High Plateau, garrisons were swept away and the troops coming to their relief were ambushed. The local officials admitted that they had previous information of possible attack, but that the commanders and troops involved were not vigilant enough. How does it happen then that nobody has learned the lesson? It is because orders were poorly given. (Comment: Nhu then explained the new orders that were to be given. Troops going to the relief of an attacked garrison are to have the primary mission of liquidating the Viet Cong ambush on the line of march. Otherwise, the commander will just rush his troops to the beleagured garrison in single file, be ambushed, and never get there. Thus, the new orders will be: don't say go to the rescue, but give the mission as annihilate the ambush. By provoking ambushes, you can retain the initiative. This can be called "drawing the tiger out of the forest".)

The military always say, "we don't have intelligence", to excuse inaction. But, with the present system, there is exploitable information. Admittedly, there is a need for more organization. (Comment: Here I interposed a question about the Central Intelligence Organization. I said that the Americans wanted the Vietnamese to win, that we had really counted on Nhu himself to act strongly on getting this CIO started dynamically and meaningfully. From various reports, this seemed to be going slowly.)

People put the problem the wrong way. The Intelligence cadres on the higher levels have not been trained. The Americans have been helping, but they trained the lower-level cadres, in large numbers. Not the chiefs, though. In the old days, the French directed everything from the top. Now, the Americans have promised to train the chiefs. But, the chiefs have not been trained, and without trained chiefs, there is nobody to direct the effort.

This is an example of accusing an underdeveloped country of being underdeveloped. I am accused of many things. Probably the accusations are correct, because I have to substitute for ministers in a lot of matters. The communists say that I take care of everything, probably so that I'll be paralyzed by the fear of being criticized. But, then, people say that I am responsible for the bad things, never the good things. I'm afraid that I've let myself become paralyzed by the fear of criticism.

(Comment: The meeting was breaking up. I reassured him firmly that we wanted Vietnam to win and that we were counting on his personal help strongly.)

Edward G. Lansdale/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

183. Editorial Note

On October 21, 1961, Maxwell Taylor and some members of his mission, accompanied by representatives of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Embassy staff, and Vietnamese officials, left Saigon for a 2-day tour of the countryside. In his memoirs, Taylor wrote that one of the days was spent in the north near the demilitarized zone and the other flying over the Mekong Delta. (Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, page 239) Although there are passing references to this trip in other documents in this chapter, no other documentation on the trip has been found.

 

184. Draft Paper Prepared by the Political Counselor of the Embassy in Vietnam (Mendenhall)/1/

Saigon, October 22, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Coup Rumors GVN 1961. Secret.

HOW STABLE IS THE DIEM GOVERNMENT?

It is less stable than it was six or three months ago or even than it was a week ago. Major Viet Cong incidents in September and October indicating serious deterioration of security in Central Viet-Nam and the provinces north of Saigon have revived in increasingly acute form long-standing dissatisfaction with Diem's lack of efficient organization and failure to rally broad political support among the masses and the educated class. The greatly increased infiltration of regular VC units through Laos and the horrible death inflicted by the VC on Colonel Nam have produced an atmosphere bordering on panic in Saigon.

Diem's tenacious holding power may enable him to weather this crisis just as he has survived numerous others. Three political alternatives appear possible: a) a palace revolution of sorts; b) a military coup; or c) Communist overthrow of the government. Chances of either of the first two are about 50-50 as against Diem's continuing essentially unchanged. Direct Communist overthrow seems unlikely during the next few months at least since the Communists do not yet have the military power for this purpose.

The palace revolution apparently now under discussion by senior GVN officials would aim at greater efficiency in government operations and broader national unity through increased use of mild anti-Communist oppositionists. Diem's role would apparently be restricted to policy questions, and execution would be left to an emergency council. The group considering this has no clear idea as to how to achieve its aim. This plan might well improve government organization and somewhat broaden political support.

Only the military has the power to carry out a coup aimed at removing Diem from power. The possibility of such a coup is proportionate to the degree of success or failure in the war with Viet Cong, which in turn depends on proper governmental organization and extent of political support for the government. Coup mutterings are on the rise because of the recent deterioration in security.

A major risk in any non-Communist coup attempt is that the Communists would profit from the attendant confusion either to extend their hold in the countryside to major towns or even to succeed in taking over the government. Communist takeover of the government might be indirectly through a weak coalition or possibly (though this is unlikely) by seizing power and setting up a Communist government. There is greater danger from this at present than from direct frontal Commie overthrow of the Diem government since they still lack adequate forces and weapons for direct assault.

 

185. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/

[Saigon, October 23, 1961.]

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam-Taylor Group. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Unconventional Warfare

Here are answers to the first of three questions/2/ you posed to me on the above subject.

/2/See Document 173.

1. What unconventional warfare techniques should be considered in coping with the VC insurgency?

Perhaps the truest thing that could be said about the situation in Vietnam today is that the accomplishments do not match the efforts that are being made. In reviewing programs and plans, I was struck by the wealth of ideas, abilities, and equipment which the U.S. has put into Vietnam. Yet, the Vietnamese governmental machinery seems to be bogged down, and somehow things simply don't get done effectively enough. This might well remain true despite our sending in more people, new types of weapons, or changing organizational structures. Thus, just adding more of many things, as we are doing at present, doesn't appear to provide the answer that we are seeking.

I suspect that too many of the people we are counting upon to get things done are frustrated by red tape or by lack of real understanding of the problems confronting them, with the result that they simply go through the motions of their work like puppets. Mistrust, jealousy, and self-seeking compound the error. Yet, the Vietnamese are an able and energetic people. They don't seem to be themselves today. They are going to lose their country if some spark doesn't make them catch fire to go to work to win this war.

The spark could well be to place the right Americans into the right areas of the Vietnamese government to provide operational guidance. These Americans should be collaborators, who quietly advise some key Vietnamese leaders on how to get things moving effectively, and are physically close enough to them to permit the guidance to be constant. Such work will require Americans of talent and compassion, who will engage in the task with considerable empathy. Perhaps the wisest method of selecting them would be to let each Vietnamese name the American he would like as an advisor; then the U.S. should go to work to make those people available. There have been close friendships between some Americans and some Vietnamese, with the Vietnamese responding warmly to the help of a friend while blandly circumventing the advice of an expert who wasn't a friend. Likely, some of the Americans now in Vietnam would be named.

This concept does not envision a large group of Americans moving into the whole Vietnamese governmental structure. It is intended only for key spots in the Vietnamese government, where decisive action will pay off the most. Selected cabinet officers and a few Directors in some bureaus should have such American advisors. The list of key posts, where decisive action is needed to make the difference between winning and losing, should be made by the U.S. Ambassador.

The introduction of American operational advisors into key points of the Vietnamese government, of course, can only be done with the help of President Diem. He might find the idea attractive for several reasons. It would help stabilize the political situation and cut down the feelings for a coup. It would make his own decisions be more effective; when he wants something done, there will be an American quietly seeing to it that there is some real follow-through.

On the U.S. side, this group of Americans should be looked upon as a team, structured for guidance under the Chief of Mission. While there would be continual cooperation with U.S. organizations in Vietnam, the team would work more effectively if it looked upon itself as a team. Personnel would come from various U.S. organizations, which would have to transfer them to Vietnam. The team should have a small staff for administrative support. If the fiscal support of the team poses unworkable problems, perhaps Presidential contingency funds would provide the solution.

I believe that one year of devoted duty by such Americans would spark a complete psychological change in Vietnam's situation, give the Vietnamese the hope of winning, and take the initiative away from the Communists, as long as we sustain all U.S. activities at the current accelerated pace. The constant, constructive help of these advisors will upgrade the effectiveness of the whole U.S. assistance program.

At the same time, all U.S. organizations in Vietnam should move into the field of operational advice, doing so as helpers, not as orderers. Secretary Thuan's idea of a Combined VN-US Military Board is a good example./3/ The positioning of the 4400th CCTS (Jungle Jim) unit right in with the Vietnamese Air Force to help give operational guidance is another example. Most of the covert operations offer further examples. Much more of this should be done, until the Vietnamese get the feeling of real alliance with the U.S. and the Americans themselves become personally involved in having the Vietnamese win the war.

/3/Lansdale discussed this idea with Thuan on October 20 and related the conversation to Taylor in a memorandum of October 21. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam-Taylor Group)

Also at the same time, the U.S. officials in Vietnam should be freed of as much of the present burden of red tape as possible. Entirely too much time and energy is being devoted to responding to the demands for information, accounting for actions, over-planning, and opinions, particularly from Washington organizations. Some of this is essential. If the paper work could be reduced to the bare essentials, this should release much time and energy towards working more on winning the war in Vietnam. Perhaps a practical device would be in having the Washington Task Force visit Vietnam frequently enough to keep up with the situation. The Task Force members know their way around Vietnam well enough so that their visits need impose only a minimum extra effort on U.S. organizations in Vietnam.

There are numerous projects in the field of psychological warfare, civic action, and special operations which are being done now or are being developed, which I have discussed with the U.S. personnel responsible. There are many imaginative operations. I believe that one which might require an assist from you in Washington would be the TV proposal from USOM./4/

/4/Apparently a reference to the proposal described in Document 166.

A second project is one with which General Milton is concerned, the 4400th CCTS (Jungle Jim). Serious thought should be given to making this a combat force rather than an advisory group. If done overtly, it could become part of the token U.S. force requested by President Diem. However, it could be much more effective in accomplishing U.S. objectives if we were to free it into becoming the covert unit for which it was also designed. Personnel and aircraft could operate under cover of the VIAT. The unit could then undertake counter-guerrilla operations inside Vietnam, as well as support the 77th Tactics Brigade (the 1st Observation Group) in operations in Laos and North Vietnam. Its introduction now, even as an advisory group, is needed. A change in mission later could be done right in Vietnam.

 

186. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/

Saigon, October 23, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam-Taylor Group. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Unconventional Warfare

This is in answer to the second question you posed to me./2/

/2/See Document 173.

2. How can we carry unconventional warfare to the enemy?

Current plans for action against North Vietnam appear to be about as extensive as can be made under present U.S. policy. Better intelligence should start providing a further selection of targets for destruction and sabotage, but it is going to take a long time and a lot of hard preparatory work before the Vietnamese can do more than harassment activities in North Vietnam. The new 20 kw radio transmitter at Hue should be of some help when it goes into operation, but it will be a weak voice compared to Radio Hanoi. (Lawrence at USOM states that it is 135 kw.)

Some economic warfare should be given serious consideration, to develop unrest in the population. If debasing the currency is not feasible, then measures should be taken to slow up the economy. One such measure might be the seeding of the Red River with a variety of water lily that really clogs up waterways and can make navigation almost impossible without extensive and continuous clearing operations. If seeded near the dams in the upper areas, this should have the blight gradually move down stream and eventually hamper the shipment of rice from the delta region. Rice production in the Red River Delta is critical to the economy of North Vietnam. It now depends mostly on waterways for its transport.

Consideration should be given to a longer-range policy towards North Vietnam. If the Communists can wage subversive war to capture a country, then it is high time that we paid them in the same coin. Admittedly, it is a long and arduous task to free a country behind the Iron or Bamboo Curtain. But, if our objective was to create a situation akin to that in Hungary, and then be prepared to help, with the end objective of uniting Vietnam again under a Free Government, there would be a considerably larger program to be planned for actions against North Vietnam.

First, however, the situation in South Vietnam would have to be stabilized much more before it can be an effective base for operations aimed at liberating North Vietnam. On the other hand, if the Vietnamese thought that we were serious about freeing all of Vietnam from Communism, our present defensive counter-measures would be greatly enhanced. The Communist cadres and those supporting the regime do so mainly in a belief that they are going with the wave of the future. If we started actions to destroy the conviction that the Communists were here to stay, a lot of the support would start weakening, including support in the South.

Operations in southern Laos, by the 77th Brigade (1st Observation Corps), need to be continued as currently planned. DOD in Washington is now considering a request for assistance in training more Vietnamese for the 77th Brigade. It is possible that further teamwork . . . could be developed for such operations. An example would be the use of Redeye weapons by Army Special Forces personnel, who could accompany a 77th Brigade team to the Tchepone area to knock out Soviet aircraft; selected Special Forces personnel are now taking a familiarization course with this weapon, which is being developed further to improve its guidance system, with the intent of undertaking just such an operation as noted above.

 

187. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/

Saigon, October 23, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam-Taylor Group. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Unconventional Warfare

This is in answer to the third question you posed to me on the above subject./2/

/2/See Document 173.

3. Are preparations adequate for waging unconventional warfare?

One of the vital elements in waging war against guerrillas is to have the military and the population so close to each other that the guerrillas cannot enjoy popular support. Reports of the situation in Vietnam indicate that the VC continue to enjoy much popular support, even though this is often obtained through terrorist activities. It is a difficult task to ensure the continuing "brotherhood" of the Vietnamese soldiers with Vietnamese civilians, but this important command responsibility cannot be over-emphasized. The U.S. Army was recently assigned executive responsibility for Civic Action in Defense, and has officers in Vietnam who have just completed an intensive study of Vietnamese civic action. It might be worth while to make Vietnam a major test center for this Army activity, and I intend to so recommend to the Secretary of Defense.

The Vietnamese Army is in need of loudspeakers for tactical psychological warfare. Present equipment is old and inadequate, and includes some makeshift equipment I sent in from the Philippines in 1953. None are available under MAP, since apparently the U.S. has not developed a loudspeaker for tactical operations. The Combat Development and Test Center is working on the problem, with a prototype of a lightweight, high-powered (272 miles range) set. The set is "High Power Voice Amplifier, Type DE-1492-A", made by Electro Mechanics Inc.

Major Bentz, Psywar advisor at MAAG, recommends that the 3 months test by CDTC be shortened and that if successful, a sufficient number be obtained to equip each Psywar Battalion and each Regimental G-5 section. If a Psywar Battalion is organized in the Civil Guard, it should be so equipped also. 45 loudspeakers for the Psywar Battalions, 24 for the Regiments, and 36 for the Civil Guard.

A powerful airborne loudspeaker also is needed. USAF does not have this capability at present. However, the 4400th CCTS (Jungle km) offers a good means for its introduction into the USAF inventory. I will work on this.

Two 17x22 presses are included in the TOE of the Vietnamese Psywar Directorate. It is estimated that it will require 280 days for delivery to Saigon. Major Bentz suggested that these presses might be procured from U.S. Army organizational equipment, to expedite delivery, and the equipment replaced in the U.S. units. I will follow through.

 

188. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Commander in Chief. Pacific (Felt)/1/

Saigon, October 23, 1961, 10:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 851H.49/10-2361. Secret; Priority. Repeated to JCS (J-3), DOD, and the Department of State for attention CTR and Task Force Vietnam. The source text is the copy sent to the Department of State. Received in the Department at 6:01 a.m. on October 25.

MAGCHKNDP 1943. Serious flood in Mekong Delta area upstream from Can Tho and Sa Dec (worst since 1937) raises possibility that flood relief could be justification for moving in US military personnel for humanitarian purposes with subsequent retention if desirable. Gen Taylor and Ambassador Nolting evaluating feasibility and desirability. State Dept informed of possibility by Embassy-520, 21 [20] Oct, and CINCPAC by Embassy-54 [194?]./2/ Following data furnished for your information.

/2/Not printed.

Brig Gen Eggleston this hqs made air and ground reconnaissance of delta area 22 Oct and talked with western delegate in charge of all flood relief on the ground and with one province chief. Flooding is widespread and up to 500,000 personnel, mostly civilians, involved. At many towns and agrovilles there is no dry land and water up to eaves of buildings. Current is swift making it impossible for people to live on boats or rafts adjacent to their homes which have not been washed away. Water starting to recede slowly and no upstream indication of a higher crest to follow. Hydrologists predict that waters will recede very slowly.

Greatest future needs appear to be food, seed and other crop assistance, medical personnel and supplies, construction supplies for buildings, water purification and reconstruction of roads and bridges. Strong indication on part of GVN officials that they have the personnel skills for relief work and only need supplies and funds. USOM providing these.

Senior US personnel of opinion that flood relief work is not effectively organized, that officials do not realize magnitude or seriousness of required relief work and that personnel assistance is required. In the event GVN request US assistance in the form of personnel as well as equipment for flood relief, an excellent opportunity immediately is presented for introduction of US military forces for humanitarian purposes. Such action must however come as result of political evaluation and decision.

Types of units which could feasibly be used are:

A. Helicopter squadrons. A minimum of one H-34 squadron possible carrier based for immediate capability.

B. Medical teams including preventive medicine control teams (Team LA), medical teams (OA) and medical supply teams (Team

C. Water supply and water purification units.

D. Engineer construction battalions. Actual need not too urgent in flood area; however, they could be used to improve counterinsurgency and contingency posture after minimal repairs to roads and bridges in delta area.

E. Supply maintenance and administrative units to support operation forces.

By utilizing US forces in areas controlled by ARVN, security would not be a serious problem; however it must be recognized that any US troops introduced must be prepared to protect themselves and terms of reference and status of forces agreements agreeable to US and Vietnamese Governments completely spelled out. If as result of Taylor visit and recommendations decision is made to support Diem with US troops, this is an excellent opportunity to minimize adverse publicity.

 

189. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)/1/

Saigon, October 24, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, 1961 Eyes Only Messages. Secret; Eyes Only. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text.

SGN 747. At a meeting with Taylor and the Ambassador at 0845, 24 October preparatory to an-0900 meeting with President Diem, I was handed a paper/2/ on possible additional forms of cooperation between U.S. and GVN in view of Viet Cong activities and the recent Mekong Delta flood as basis for discussions. These were not in nature of formal recommendations but as time was very short, I commented on only two of the six points covered. Others such as additional helicopters to improve combat mobility, better intelligence by Joint Governmental action, preventing cross border infiltration, and emphasizing the nature of the threat here and to the world have all been covered in my correspondence with you over the past 14 months.

/2/Not found, but the paper's main points are outlined in Taylor's telegram, Document 190.

The first point was the introduction of military forces in the nature of a flood relief task force for relief and rehabilitation. This would have the advantage of withdrawal if desirable policy-wise after reconstruction period and would contain logistic, transportation, medical and combat troops. It was thought that the combat element considered would be approximately a Battle Group. I stated that with the known Viet Cong strength in III corps, the recent significant increase in incidents and the additional Viet Cong capability for further Viet Cong increase, I felt this strength inadequate especially as the non-combat units will probably be scattered in approximately thirty locations. When it was indicated that possibly some combat units might be used in the high plateau, I stated this would further fragment U.S. forces and render them vulnerable to successful attack by Viet Cong who have capability with strength in-country. I said I felt adequate forces must be provided to prevent this particularly since it appeared from his remarks that while most of the service forces were to be deployed in III CO UAAREA, possibly certain of combat forces might be used in the high plateau of II corps. He said it was my job to prevent fragmentation and that he would be disappointed in U.S. troops who were unable to protect themselves. I reminded him that careful arrangements would have to be worked out at governmental level to ensure that I had the requisite control and authority over the use of U.S. forces.

The above was followed by a brief discussion on the paragraph concerning a Joint-GVN team which would survey each province to make an overall determination on what was needed to put the whole house in order. This to include command arrangements counterinsurgency planning, supply and equipment for all Military and Para-military forces and the like. This is an extension of my previous recommendation to GVN following the significant Viet Cong success at Vinh Binh for Joint Group to inspect all static defenses countrywide. I said this was sound concept however that MAAG should not be responsible for "B" boards on RVNAF officers. I brought this up because Diem and Thaun have, particularly following a Viet Cong success, repeatedly downgraded their generals to me and this would afford them the opportunity to put the onus of getting rid of certain of them on MAAG. This would put MAAG in an intolerable position vis-a-vis the RVNAF Officer Corps. General Taylor did not answer but Ambassador Nolting agreed this was valid reasoning.

At this point, discussion was terminated in order to depart for meeting with Diem. When I said I would see them at palace, the Ambassador said in effect they had decided to keep meeting small and only "The Four of Them" would attend. I said that as American Military Advisor I recommended strongly that I go as most of the discussion would be about the military. General Taylor said I do not agree that you should go.

I then said to General Taylor, as Representative of the JCS in Vietnam, I recommend that I attend. General Taylor said this was a personal meeting with Diem and I was not to go. I answered it is your decision General.

Mainly, I am particularly concerned regarding local loss of prestige in eyes of GVN which as you know is most important here. This is meant only as background for your personal information.

[Continue with the next documents]

Volume I, Vietnam, 1961 Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State