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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963, Volume I
Vietnam, 1961Department of State
Washington, DC
190. Telegram From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 25, 1961, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-2561. Top Secret; Priority. The Department of State was asked to pass the telegram to the White House for Bundy, Defense for McNamara, JCS for Lemnitzer, and CIA for Dulles. Received in the Department at 9:06 a.m. Telegrams to and from General Taylor in Saigon were numbered in sequence with other telegrams to and from Saigon. The incoming telegrams bear Ambassador Nolting's signature.
536. For Under Sec Johnson.
1. The essential conclusions which we have reached at the end of a week of briefings, consultations, and field trips follow:
A. There is a critical political-military situation in SVN brought on by Western policy in Laos and by the continued build-up of the VC and their recent successful attacks. These circumstances coupled with the major flood disaster in the southwestern provinces have combined to create a deep and pervasive crisis of confidence and a serious loss in national morale.
B. In the field, the military operations against the VC are ineffective because of the absence of reliable intelligence on the enemy, an unclear and unresponsive channel of command responsibility in the armed forces and the tactical immobility of the VN ground forces. This immobility leads to a system of passive, fragmented defense conceding the initiative to the enemy and leaving him free to pick the targets of attack. The harassed population exposed to these attacks turn to the Government for better protection and the latter responds by assigning more static missions to the Army units, thus adding to their immobility. In the end, the Army is allowed neither to train nor to fight but awaits enemy attacks in relative inaction.
C. The situation in Saigon is volatile but, while morale is down and complaints against the Government are rife, there is not hard evidence of a likely coup against Diem. He still has no visible rival or replacement.
2. To cope with the foregoing situation, we are considering recommending a number of possible forms of GVN-US cooperation to reverse the present downward trend, stimulate an offensive spirit and build up morale. In company with Ambassador Nolting, Dr. Rostow and Mr. Mendenhall, I discussed some of these Oct 24 with Diem and Thuan, advancing them as personal ideas to which I was seeking their informal reaction./2/ The following outline, distributed in French translation at the start of the interview, indicates the scope of the discussion.
/2/A more detailed report of this conversation was transmitted in telegram 540 from Saigon, October 25. (Ibid.)
A. Improvement of intelligence on VC: The available intelligence on VC insurgency is inadequate both for tactical requirements and for basis of judgment of situation at governmental levels. A joint GVN-US effort should be able to improve organization, techniques and end product to mutual advantage both parties.
B. Joint survey of security situation at provincial level: The current situation can best be appraised at provincial level where the basic intelligence is found, the incidents occur, and the defenses are tested. The problems vary from province to province and hence require local analysis on the spot. Such a survey should result in better understanding of such important matters as quality of basic intelligence on VC, needs of Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps, command relationships between provincial and Army officials and conditions under which assumption of offensive might be possible.
C. Improvement of army mobility: It appears that size of ARVN cannot be much increased before end 1962. To make it more effective and allow it to cope with increasing number of VC, it must be given greater mobility. Such mobility can come from two sources, (1) freeing army from static missions and (2) making available to it improved means of transport, notably helicopters and light aircraft. Both methods should be considered.
D. Send blocking infiltration into high plateau: Increase in enemy forces in high plateau requires special measures for defense and for counter-guerrilla actions. It is suggested that a carefully tailored "border ranger force" be organized from existing Ranger Units and introduced into the difficult terrain along the Laos/ Vietnam frontier for attack and defense against the Viet Cong. This force should be trained and equipped for extended service on the frontier and for operations against the communications lines of the VC who have infiltrated into the high plateau and adjacent areas./3/
/3/Paragraph D and the heading for paragraph E were omitted from the text as transmitted from Saigon. They were transmitted in telegram 544 from Saigon, October 25, with instructions that they be inserted at the proper places in the text of telegram 536. (Ibid.)
E. Introduction of US Military Forces: GVN is faced with major civil problem arising from flood devastation in western provinces. Its allies should offer help to GVN according to their means. In the case of O.S., two ways of rendering help should be considered. One is of emergency type, such as offer of US military helicopters for reconnaissance of conditions of flooded areas and for emergency delivery medical supplies and like. A more significant contribution might be a flood relief task force, largely military in composition, to work with GVN over an extended period for rehabilitation of area. Such a force might contain engineer, medical, signal, and transportation elements as well as combat troops for the protection of relief operations. Obviously, such a military force would also provide U.S. military presence in Viet Nam and would constitute military reserve in case of heightened military crisis.
F. Actions to emphasize national emergency and beginning of a new phase in the war: We should consider jointly all possible measures to emphasize turning point has been reached in dealing with Communist aggression. Possible actions might include appeal to United Nations, an announcement by GVN of governmental changes to cope with crisis and exchange of letters between the two heads of state expressing their partnership in a common cause.
3. Diem's reaction on all points was favorable. He expressed satisfaction with idea of introducing US forces in connection with flood relief activities, observing that even the opposition elements in his Congress had joined with the majority in supporting need for presence of US forces. In the course of the meeting, nothing was formally proposed or approved but the consensus was that the points considered might form framework for a program of increased GVN-US cooperation offering promise of overcoming many of the current difficulties of GVN. There were no specific figures discussed with regard to such matters as troop strengths, additional equipment, or flood relief.
4. As follow-up on this session with Diem, in consultation with Embassy and MAAG, we will develop specific recommendations for carrying out the concepts discussed with Diem. To assist us, Ambassador Nolting is obtaining further data on the flood from the GVN. We have agreed with Diem to guard against any premature leaks of these matters under consideration.
5. Because of the importance of acting rapidly once we have made up our minds, I will cable my recommendations to Washington enroute home.
191. Telegram From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 25, 1961, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-2561. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. The Department of State was asked to pass the telegram to the White House eyes only for the President, Defense eyes only for McNamara, and JCS eyes only for Lemnitzer. Received in the Department at 8:23 a.m.
537. Eyes only for Rusk and Under Secretary Johnson. Our mission is winding up its business in Saigon; and moving to Bangkok October 25. Results to date are reported in 536./2/
/2/Document 190.
With regard to the critical question of introducing U.S. military forces into VN:
My view is that we should put in a task force consisting largely of logistical troops for the purpose of participating in flood relief and at the same time of providing a U.S. military presence in VN capable of assuring Diem of our readiness to join him in a military showdown with the Viet Cong or Viet Minh. To relate the introduction of these troops to the needs of flood relief seems to me to offer considerable advantages in VC [Vl\] and abroad. It gives a specific humanitarian task as the prime reason for the coming of our troops and avoids any suggestion that we are taking over responsibility for the security of the country. As the task is a specific one, we can extricate our troops when it is done if we so desire. Alternatively, we can phase them into other activities if we wish to remain longer.
The strength of the force I have in mind on the order of 6-8000 troops. Its initial composition should be worked out here after study of the possible requirements and conditions for its use and subsequent modifications made with experience.
In addition to the logistical component, it will be necessary to include some combat troops for the protection of logistical operations and the defense of the area occupied by U.S. forces. Any troops coming to VN may expect to take casualties.
Needless to say, this kind of task force will exercise little direct influence on the campaign against the V.C. It will, however, give a much needed shot in the arm to national morale, particularly if combined with other actions showing that a more effective working relationship in the common cause has been established between the GVN and the U.S.
192. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 25, 1961, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-2561. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok with instructions to pass to General Taylor, and Geneva for FECON. Received in the Department at 3:06 p.m.
541. Taylor and Rostow, accompanied by Gardiner, McGarr, Mendenhall and me, had final talk with Diem and Thuan October 25. Main points as follows:
1. Diem stressed importance of reinforcement of aviation: particularly helicopters. Taylor and I used this opportunity to make clear to Diem that we envisaged helicopters piloted by Americans and constituting American units under American commanders which would cooperate with Vietnamese military commands. Taylor noted that there is no other immediate solution to helicopter problem other than to introduce American helicopter units.
2. Thuan brought up desire for B-26's AF [and] T-28's in order to place air units at more numerous spots around country so that they can respond quickly to targets. Taylor replied that while there is need for photo reconnaissance airplanes, there is no need at this time for additional bombers as existing ones not being adequately used. He stated that remedy is to improve system of bases, communications and liaison.
3. Taylor told Diem it would be useful if he and I could develop specifics with respect to political-psychological point in paper which Taylor presented to Diem October 24 (our 540/2/). Taylor pointed out this would be very useful to him in Washington because he will be faced with question that, if program he proposes is adopted, what will be chances of early success. In response Thuan's question asking for exact meaning of this point in Taylor's paper, latter said there has been loss of confidence among both Vietnamese and American people about situation in Vietnam and we need to determine together what measures can be taken to restore confidence. Rostow commented that secret of turning point is offensive action. Diem stated complete psychological mobilization required so that everything can be done to raise potential GVN forces and damage enemy's potential. He referred to GVN efforts in past to collaborate more closely with US in military planning and said these efforts had run up against wall of secrecy surrounding US and SEATO military plans.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 190. The paper under reference is outlined in Document 190.
4. Taylor referred to Diem's comments in earlier talk about shortage of capable personnel and suggested US might assist by lending personnel. Diem replied that US could help in this respect in training field. Thuan then brought up dilemma facing GVC [GVN] re instructors at Thui Duc Reserve Officers School. Vietnamese military commanders refuse release their best personnel as instructors but existing instructors, who are not very good, have insufficient moral authority over new officers' training class drawn from best educated persons available in Vietnam. Thuan, backed by President, specifically requested American instructors for this school as soon as possible since course of training already under way.
5. Thuan said that he had dropped earlier request for US instructors for Civil Guard because of language difficulty but is still interested in possibility (which he had raised in Washington)/3/ of Chinese or Korean cadres for Civil Guard and SDC. He said GVN prefers Chinese and asked for Taylor's reaction. Taylor replied question presents difficulty from political point of view. Diem said that [name deleted] talked with Chiang Kai-shek on recent visit to Taipei, who said it would be delicate matter to send troops to Vietnam but said he could send cadres, even for combat. Thuan, in response to questioning, said that while presence Chinese troops in Vietnam could not be kept secret, he thought use of cadres could be, even though they might number thousands.
/3/See Document 68.
6. Diem brought up as pressing question spraying facilities requested from US about month ago for destruction of rice crop being raised in certain areas of high plateau for VC use; he stressed urgency immediate action on this point because harvest will be carried out in November and December.
7. Diem also brought up again need for armored boat assistance in struggle for rice crop in delta area with VC. He underscored that this is great offensive that must be conducted during upcoming months. If this is not won then Saigon itself will be seriously affected.
8. Thuan expressed grave concern over creation of strong VC base at Tchepone in Laos. He said that artillery being brought in there is not for defense of Tchepone but will be used against Vietnam. He wanted to know what could be done about elimination this base.
9. Diem expressed desire for General Lansdale's services here in Vietnam./4/
/4/Written in the margin at this point in an unidentified hand are the words, "No. No. NO!"
10. In conclusion Taylor pointed out that he has discussed overall concept with Diem and that life would have to be breathed into this concept by further detailed discussions and follow-up actions by Diem and me.
Diem asked Taylor to thank President Kennedy for his interest in Vietnam.
Nolting
193. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 25, 1961, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-2561. Secret. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Geneva for FECON, Paris, Tokyo, Bangkok, Manila, CINCPAC for PolAd, and London. Received in the Department at 8:50 p.m.
545. Task Force VN. There has been noticeable rise in Saigon's political temperature during past week. Taylor visit, though reassuring in some respects, has been interpreted by many persons as demonstrating critical stage which VC insurgency has reached. Public funeral of VC-tortured and murdered Col Nam had profound effect on Saigon public. Following deterioration of general security conditions over past two months cancellation October 26 National Day celebrations to devote resources to flood relief and terse, dramatic declaration national emergency caught an unprepared public by surprise and contributed additional unsettling elements to growing atmosphere of uneasiness.
Judging from conversations we have had with such persons as President National Assembly, Vice President, another prominent National Assembly Deputy, lawyer who is regular Governor for Southeast ASIS, former Foreign Minister, etc, net effect most these developments has been negative rather than positive. Flux and uncertainty now beginning develop. As result there has been some scare buying and stocking. Certain commodity prices such as rice and pork have again moved up. (From previous 1961 average price of about 7 piasters per kilo, first quality rice stood at 9.5 at beginning last week, 11.9 October 25.) This in itself most unfortunate development, though flood conditions in southwest probably as much a factor in it as increased insecurity.
This growing public disquietude accompanied by increasing dissatisfaction with Diem's methods of administration on part senior GVN officials. There is considerable Cabinet level criticism and growing though still inchoate determination force organizational reforms on President. Similar attitude seems be developing in ARVN upper levels. Though trend of thinking these groups taking parallel courses, there nothing indicate at this moment that collaboration between them taking place. Beginnings of this would, of course, be serious indicator something brewing.
At same time . . . movement certain platoon to company-size VC units (totalling perhaps 200-500 men) toward Saigon to profit from any disturbances or confusion which may occur. Knowledge these reports within GVN apparently tending deter disaffected officials from developing radical place [plans?] at this moment.
Situation here thus one of insecurity, uneasiness and emergent instability. A genuine and important military victory over VC would do more than anything else to redress balance and allay for moment high-level mutterings of need for change. On other hand, further deterioration of situation over next few weeks or months or new VC success similar Phuoc Hanh incident might well bring situation to head.
Nolting
194. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, October 25, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, 1961 Chron. Secret.
SUBJECT
Conversation with Admiral Felt, October 25, 1961/2//2/Felt was apparently in Washington for consultations.
1. Viet-Nam. Mr. Williams and I asked Admiral Felt what he thought the major items were on which we could move at once without awaiting the Taylor report. He singled out the following:
a. Helicopters in a strength adequate to provide a force for each of the province governments and for the central government, i.e., 4 in all. He supposed that 2 Army aviation companies would be necessary to man these, and said he had no judgment whether these should be in uniform or sheep-dipped. He thought this item was vital in Diem's mind and as a basic military necessity to provide mobility.
Comment. FE should get status on this. It may be a political question, but in this connection Admiral Felt suggested using the flood situation as an immediate cover. This idea should certainly be followed up strongly.
b. An Army engineer and a Navy Seabee unit. These could build a pipeline for POL from the off-loading point near Saigon to the Saigon airport (we asked about sabotage possibility and he admitted that this would be a problem), and also to build a road east from Attopeu in Laos. For the latter purpose, combat troops would be needed to protect the engineers.
Comment. This undoubtedly has serious political hurdles, but again the flood situation might provide a cover for immediate activity that would lay a foundation.
c. T-28 Aircraft. Admiral Pirie had just informed him that the Navy had a going production line and could add seal-proof tanks and armor at once (making the Navy version similar to the Air Force version) and deliver thereafter in 6 weeks.
Comment. This is contrary to previous information, and should certainly be followed up at once. I believe it is agreed in principle that these additional aircraft should be supplied.
. . . . . . .
Apart from these urgent needs, the Admiral had the following comments:
e. In general, he thought that the Taylor report would probably recommend all possible assistance short of the introduction of combat forces. (Apparently this would not exclude the helicopters and engineer operations suggested above.)
f. The Caribou aircraft need was very much downgraded by Admiral Felt. He thought C-47's could do the job and that the Caribou had simply appealed to Diem when introduced by the Godel group.
g. Admiral Felt did see a legitimate need for T-33 aircraft, with 2 as a starter. The military purpose would be to build up a Vietnamese air defense capability, leading eventually to the introduction of F-86F aircraft as in Thailand. He wants an immediate start in training Vietnamese pilots in the United States.
Comment. This seems much more dubious to me from a military standpoint. If the North Vietnamese or ChiCom air forces become involved now or later, surely we would deal with them by US carrier aircraft. In any event, any useful Vietnamese capability is at least 1-2 years away, and this might be a poor time to divert effort for such long lead-time projects.
h. ChiNats. Admiral Felt reported Diem's view that some ChiNat forces could be introduced, naturalized as Vietnamese, and used profitably in the Delta area, where there is already a large number of ethnic Chinese. He understood that State had turned this down, and asked us to see what could be done.
Comment. FE should review the bidding on this one and see if we can make additional arguments.
[Here follows discussion of military assistance to Korea and Pakistani forces in SEATO.]
William P. Bundy
Acting
195. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Wood) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/
Washington, October 25, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/10-2561. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Also addressed to McConaughy. Drafted and initialed by Wood and sent through S/S. A copy was sent to Anderson (SEA).
SUBJECT
Diplomatic and Political Preparations for Sending U.S. Troops to Viet NamThe following suggested guidelines for diplomatic and other preparation prior to sending U.S. troops to Viet-Nam are set forth in outline form. They were requested today by Secretary Johnson.
I. Recommendation
That 6-8,000 U.S. logistical troops plus combat troops for their protection be sent to Viet-Nam to participate in flood relief and to provide a military presence which will assure President Diem that we will join him in a military showdown. These troops would have a specific humanitarian task in a specified area. They could be taken out after the flood, or phased into other activities.
II. Diplomatic and Political Factors Which Cannot Be Ignored
1. For the U.S.
A. Troops. A prior decision that if necessary we will send in enough troops to finish the job or alternatively a prior decision that we will fix a ceiling (say 100,000) on the number of U.S. troops which we would commit to Southeast Asia no matter what circumstances might arise. (Presidential decision prior to November 6, date of submission of Note to ICC-see below).
B. Command. A prior decision to simplify the U.S. chain of command, e.g. a U.S. Commander for Southeast Asia whose plans would require a) the general prior approval of the U.S. Ambassador as the President's representative, and b) the subsequent approval and cooperation of the local Government.
If the U.S. effort is to succeed, the U.S. Command structure must be simplified so that our actions may be flexible, resolute, and rapid. Our Commander should be the best available for guerilla war, perhaps a Marine General. (Presidential decision prior to November 11, date on which first contingents of U.S. troops would arrive.)
2. For Viet-Nam.
Before committing ourselves so fully to Viet-Nam and to the Vietnamese Government we should require, as a minimum, the following pledges from Diem:
A. Military. Simplified chain of command. Intelligence coordination.
B. Administrative. Increased salaries for provincial officials; reduced salaries for Saigon officials. Rotate officials between Saigon and provinces.
C. Political. Create, under Diem, an Internal Security Council through which Diem would conduct all business.
D. Concurrence in proposed U.S. Command structure (see above).
E. An assurance that we would have full GVN support for all movements of troops and equipment in Viet-Nam as necessary. (Exchange of letters between President Kennedy and President Diem prior to November 11. Assigned to: Ambassador Nolting and Mr. Cottrell.)
3. Allied Cooperation.
This should be limited to gifts for flood relief. We cannot hope to defeat the fast moving Viet Cong if we are required to seek multilateral consultation and concurrence prior to every move. It is difficult enough to obtain fast action within the U.S. Government and in cooperation with the Vietnamese Government. We should seek the general assent and approval of our allies. As leaders of the Free World, we must retain responsibility for our actions in a war situation. This applies to SEATO and the UN as well as to individual nations. We must show great respect for, but not be entangled by or ask decisions of any international Organization.
4. Timing.
First contingent U.S. troops to arrive November 11 while there is flood work to do. This allows time to inform world opinion, but not time enough for international objections to coalesce. It gives 16 days for military preparations.
III. Steps
1. Continue and increase publicity on DRV threat and importance of Viet-Nam's independence. (Timing: continuous; Responsibility: Jorden; Heavner of TF/VN; P, USIA.)
2. Parallel U.S. and Vietnamese diplomatic conversations with the British, Canadians and Indians to inform them that the Vietnamese Government considers that the Geneva Cease Fire has been flagrantly violated and this situation plus the flood disaster has created a situation in which the GVN has decided to ask increased U.S. assistance in the flooded area. We should not indicate what form our assistance may take. It would be unconvincing to cite only the flood as a reason for bringing in U.S. troops. The purpose is to give the ICC powers some private, advance notice of our views and intentions. (Timing: November 1; Drafting responsibility: C.B. Wood.)
3. ICC. Prepare with the GVN a Note which they would submit privately in Saigon to the ICC and to the British Co-chairman (through the British Embassy) stating that due to the flood disaster and the continued violation of the Geneva Cease Fire Agreement by the DRV, the GVN has decided that it will request the assistance of U.S. troops to assist in the flood relief program thus freeing Vietnamese troops to. defend their country. In extending this invitation, the GVN does not criticize the ICC. It considers the situation has gone beyond minor infractions of the cease fire which the ICC was designed to control. Regretfully, it can no longer voluntarily observe Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Accords controlling the importation of men and equipment. It is prepared to resume observance as soon as the DRV ceases to violate them. This Note to be supported by a White Paper based on the Jorden Report. (Timing: November 6; Drafting responsibility: Jorden and Wood).
4. Presidential Discussion of Step 3 with Prime Minister Nehru on November 7./2/
/2/Nehru was scheduled to visit the United States in early November.
5. Public circulation of GVN Note and White Paper and of U.S. reply at SEATO and the UN.
With the greatest respect we should inform these bodies that in response to the GVN's request we are sending a limited number of U.S. troops to help in the flood relief and that we consider their presence an important symbol of our determination to assist Viet-Nam in maintaining its independence. We will welcome contributions to the relief work, and will be prepared to consider withdrawing our troops as soon as the UN and/or SEATO is prepared to send to Viet-Nam an international force which can successfully assume these responsibilities. We will be prepared, with the GVN, to enter international negotiations on Viet-Nam as soon as the DRV adheres to the Geneva Accords by removing all its troops and cadres from Viet-Nam, but not before. (Timing: November 9; Responsibility: Mr. McConaughy and Mr. Johnson.)
6. Geneva Conference (if it has survived the above). A full statement that we still support the concept of an effective ICC in Laos as a means of enforcing the existing cease fire. However no ICC, whether in Laos or Viet-Nam, can be expected to control a war situation. It would need a body of international troops under its control. We should make it clear that we will only discuss Laos at Geneva. (Timing: November 10; Responsibility: Ambassador Harriman.)
7. Ambassador Trimble explains our purpose generally to Sihanouk. (Timing: November 10.)
8. Arrival of first contingents of U.S. troops by air at the flood area at dawn on November 11 coupled with a U.S.-GVN public request that all fighting in Viet-Nam cease for 24 hours in observance of Armistice Day-and a pledge that no GVN or U.S. soldier will fire a shot until a Viet Cong soldier attacks.
IV. Concurrent Actions-October 25-November 11.
1. Appoint George Tanham/3/ as a temporary Special Assistant to Ambassador Nolting to study the flood area with a MAAG and a USOM representative and submit recommendations to the Ambassador on how the flood relief and rehabilitation work can best be carried out. They should, if possible, work with Vietnamese opposite numbers. They should suggest clear-cut roles for U.S. troops, MAAG, USOM and IVS volunteers and for representatives of private, charitable organizations willing to work in the flood area. They should consult with the Thompson mission and formulate recommendations for a simple, effective rehabilitation program designed to give maximum credit to GVN officials. (Warren Silver of TF/VN to draft message to Saigon).
/3/Tanham was an employee of the Rand Corporation.
2. DOD to have full and unimpeded responsibility for getting the troops to the flood area.
196. Telegram From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Bangkok, October 27, 1961, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1551K/10-2761. Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to the Department for U. Alexis Johnson as telegram 625, which is the source text. Telegrams to and from General Taylor in Bangkok were numbered in sequence with other telegrams to and from Bangkok. The incoming telegrams bear Ambassador Young's signature.
146. Eyes only for Amb Nolting. The fol outlines actions agreed upon during Gen Taylor's visit in Saigon. Memo for record/2/ is being pouched this date.
/2/Dated October 25, signed by Taylor, and transmitted as an attachment to Bagley's memorandum of October 27 to Nolting. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Vietnam-Taylor)
In order to reduce reaction time fol approval of some or all of the recommendations growing out of the visit of the Taylor Mission, Emb Saigon and the Taylor Mission will undertake the fol actions without delay:
A. Improvement of intelligence on the V.C.
(1) The anticipated form of the mission recommendation will be to urge a joint GVN-US effort to improve the organization, techniques and end product of the intelligence bearing on the V.C. insurgency. . . .
(2) The Emb Saigon will develop a specific proposal along these lines for discussion with the GVN, repeating to Washington such reinforcements in personnel and equipment as may be necessary to support the plan.
B. A joint survey of the security situation at the provincial level.
(1) The Mission will recommend that such a survey be encouraged for the purpose of improving US knowledge of what takes place at the grass roots of the insurgency and for acquiring a greater ability to influence the GVN to take appropriate measures.
(2) The Emb Saigon will propose to the GVN the composition of the survey parties and a procedure for their operation.
C. Improvement of army mobility.
(1) The Mission will recommend, upon return to Washington, the prompt provision of US mil helicopters up to about 3 companies.
(2) The Emb-MAAG will report to Washington the command and control procedures recommended for the operation of these helicopters and the plan for their location and administration. At the same time the MAAG will recommend the amount and kind of light aviation necessary to improve the over all mobility of the army and, in particular, to support the proposed border ranger force.
D. Blocking infiltration in the high plateau.
(1) The mission will recommend US Govt support for the creation of the "carefully tailored border ranger force" in terms of US advisors, authorized VN personnel ceiling and special equipment.
(2) The Emb-MAAG will press upon the GVN the prompt organization of such a force, utilizing existing ranger units and will report to Washington the requirements in US personnel and equipment.
E. Introduction of US military forces.
(1) The mission will recommend the prompt introduction of a flood relief task force of a composition to be recommended by the Emb, Saigon. It is felt that such a force could arrive piece-meal if the arrival as a package will substantially delay the initial contingent.
(2) The Emb-MAAG will recommend promptly to Washington the composition of mission, and schedule of arrival of such a force and tentative thinking on where it will be located and how administered.
F. Actions to emphasize the national emergency and a new phase in the war.
(1) The mission will discuss in Washington the actions which can be taken there to focus attention upon the new phase which we are entering in conjunction with the GVN. Among the actions considered would be a letter from President Kennedy indicating to President Diem the new forms of support which the US Govt offers.
(2) The Emb, Saigon will urge upon Pres Diem the need to announce governmental changes calculated to raise confidence in Saigon and Washington in the probability of success of the new program. It will give specific consideration to the desirability of a letter from President Diem appealing for US aid to cope with the double disaster of the Viet Cong aggression and the flood in the southwestern provinces.
The Emb, Saigon will keep Gen Taylor informed during his return trip to Washington of new developments arising from the foregoing follow-up actions.
197. Telegram From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the Department of State/1/
Bangkok, October 27, 1961-9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-2761. Top Secret. Repeated to Saigon for Nolting. The Department of State was asked also to pass for action to the White House personal for Bundy and Ewell.
626. Sec State for Under Sec Johnson. Reference: Saigon 536./2/ By way of Ewell's daily summary/3/ I get impression that there may be a tendency to regard the concept of a flood relief task force as essentially a cover plan for the introduction of US troops into VN. Such is not my view. The flood in VN is a real emergency program, capable of giving real assistance to the VN authorities charged with relief measures as well as a military reinforcement to assist in safeguarding the area from a return of the Viet Cong who have fled before the high waters.
/2/Document 190.
/3/Not further identified. Ewell, a member of Taylor's staff, was presumably providing, through White House channels, a summary of daily international developments to the Taylor Mission.
This concept does not amount to a cover as it undertakes to conceal nothing. It does give our forces a good reason for coming and the termination of flood relief, a matter at least of months, would give our forces a good reason for going. In the meantime they would have satisfied Diem's request for troops with a commitment far smaller than that required to make a military or psychological impression if the announced purpose was merely to render aid to suppress the VC insurgency. If we come in for this latter purpose, we will have to talk in terms of the three divisions . . . .
I hope that thinking on the whole subject of aid for VN will not harden before my return. Behind each item contained in Saigon 536 is a number of considerations of considerable complexity which I would like to present personally before any decision is taken. I will complete my recommendations in Baguio and forward them about Nov 1. In the meantime I would urge immediate action to do the following:
(1) Get best estimate of the flood problem and determine a line of possible US actions to assist. It may be desirable to send a team of experts from US for survey.
(2) Determine availability of Army and Marine helicopter companies for prompt movement to VN. MAAG estimated requirement is about 64 cargo helicopters.
(3) Ask Emb Saigon for report on status of follow-up actions being taken on subjects reported in Saigon 536 as outlined in Bangkok's 146 to Saigon./4/
/4/Document 196.
198. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor), at Bangkok/1/
Washington, October 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Trips and Conference Series Taylor Trip. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text bears the notation, "Cable for dispatch via State Department." No other copy of this message has been found.
The President requests that your conclusions on Vietnam, especially those relating to U.S. forces, not be discussed outside your immediate party in terms which would indicate your own final judgment. He is most concerned that you and he should have firm common ground when decisions are taken, and rumors of your conclusions could obviously be damaging.
Your Bangkok 626/2/ just received and will be passed to the President in the morning. Concur in your three proposals for interim action and will follow up on them.
/2/Document 197.
199. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 28, 1961, noon.
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-2861. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok, Hong Kong (for General Taylor who was stopping there en route from Bangkok to Manila), Manila for General Taylor, Paris, London, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Geneva for FECON, and CINCPAC for PolAd.
558. Task Force VN. Thuan gave me following information today (October 27) on actions pursuant recent discussions between GVN, Taylor mission, and ourselves:
1. Flood relief and rehabilitation. GVN cabinet meeting today had decided set up organization for a broad nationwide contribution to flood relief and rehabilitation in delta, composing following elements;
(A) A steering committee in which diverse elements of SVN population and political opinion would be invited to participate, anti-Communist oppositionists, fence-sitters, businessmen, lawyers, trade unionists, etc., to be presided by National Assembly President Truong Van Le. Steering Committee would be charged with fundraising, recruitment of volunteer workers from other provinces, including youth movement, boy scouts, women's organizations, and others. Steering committee would also furnish ideas for relief and rehabilitation, which would be screened by:
(B) Executive head of flood relief and rehabilitation Huynh Van Diem, an engineer who is now GVN Planning Commissioner. Huynh Van Diem would be man through whom US contribution would be tied in. He described by Thuan as able and tough-minded;
(C) Committee of control, headed by Nguyen Thanh Lap, well known banker. This committee would control expenditure of funds. I commended this broadly-based organization, and asked Thuan when the specific requirements paper would be ready. He promised it for Monday next./2/ (Will forward to Manila and Washington.)
/2/October 30.
2. Intelligence. Thuan said he had proposed to President Diem, who had accepted, reorganization of GVN intelligence services, combining present Surete (NBI) with CIO, with Colonel Yankee in charge.... Said that General La, present head Surete, would go out. GVN intends keep J-2 of ARVN separate but bring about closer coordination with reorganized CIO. I said this welcome decision, and felt sure we could help with US experts. (Comment: I particularly stressed need of best possible people from our side if this is to work. Specific requirements will follow./3/)
/3/No subsequent communication on intelligence requirements was found.
3. Survey teams. I said we are studying how best to organize these. Our tentative thought is about three people from each side, and possibly three teams, to begin in most critical provinces. Thuan said his ideas corresponded with ours; that GVN seeking best men possible, but would find it difficult to find nine people of really high calibre, who could be spared. I suggested 2, or even 1, good teams preferable to three poor ones. Value of survey teams depends on quality of men on them.
4. Montagnard problem. In response to earlier suggestion from me, Thuan said President had agreed to appoint commissioner for Montagnards at high level in GVN. They are looking for best possible man to fill this position.
5. Border force. Thuan inquired whether request for 3,000-man augmentation for special forces was in addition to idea for ranger border force, and whether augmented special force would be under separate or same command nearer border force. He added that augmentation of special forces by 3,000 should not be done from existing military units, but if agreed should be recruited separately. I said that I would have to discuss this further; tentatively I thought that a special force for special operations should be continued under separate organization and command, but that I was not sure special force of 3 to 4,000 in addition to and separate from ranger border force was desirable. Thuan said he hoped special forces could be financed under separate budget not DOD budget. On ranger border force, Thuan thought up to 4 to 5,000 rangers could be organized and deployed as suggested by General Taylor. We discussed in some detail suggested arrangements for giving them airborne mobility. Thuan understands thoroughly that suggestion re US helicopter squadrons involves MAAG command of these transports on which effectiveness ranger force would depend, and fact that this would involve closest operational coordination and agreement between GVN commanders and MAAG. He feels this can be made to work provided best men selected on both sides under General Minh and General McGarr. Suggested General Lansdale as ideal choice to help organize ranger border force and to command US transport units assigned to help it.
6. Top-level GVN organization. Thuan reverted to this suggestion previously made to me privately/4/ re possibility persuading President Diem to delegate full authority and responsibility, subject to Diem's policy directives, to executive board composed of Ngo Dinh Nhu, chairman, and 3 or 4 other members of present cabinet, including Thuan to carry out more efficiently and promptly GVN policy decisions. Said his present thought is that Nhu should be given a specific cabinet responsibility with, namely, coordinating secretary for national security. Said, as previously, that only person to whom President would delegate so much authority, and leave it delegated, was his brother Nhu. Said he felt such a board would materially improve GVN performance. Asked my reaction. I told him that I did not wish to meddle officially in questions involving personnel of Government of Vietnam, but that I say officially that any organization under President Diem's policy guidance which would give government greater efficiency and cut down on reaction time would be a welcome development, and is in fact an urgent necessity. I added that I did not know personally Mr. Nhu's ability as an executive, I had known him rather as a planning and philosophical type; but if Thuan and others felt that this would improve top-level organization and efficiency of GVN I personally would be inclined to try it. Thuan said he and others felt that this would make a definite improvement; that they could guarantee faster and better executive performance; and that in any [case] it was only feasible way to bring about a delegation of authority by the President and have it stick. (Comment: It is highly necessary to protect Thuan re this matter. He said he would talk to President and Nhu about it).
/4/The date that this suggestion was made has not been determined.
For General Taylor's and task force Washington information, we are developing here detailed recommendations on matters discussed by General Taylor with President Diem. These will be forwarded as soon as possible.
Nolting
200. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
Saigon, October 30, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6439, Viet 091. Top Secret. The source text is stamped: "SecDef has seen."
Dear Mr. Secretary: Due to the increasing seriousness of the situation in Vietnam as well as General Taylor's suggestion that you might find my sensing of events useful, I shall follow this initial round up with pertinent recurring reports. Upon the completion of my first twelve months as Chief MAAG, Vietnam, this September, I forwarded to CINCPAC a brief but fairly comprehensive situation report./2/ This report, together with MAAG concepts for "Border Control," an outline of our proposed "Geographically Phased National Pacification Plan," the critical need for an overall National Plan with recommendations for improving the "Present GVN System of Control and Coordination of Counter-Insurgency,"/3/ and MAAG's doctrinal treatise titled "Tactics and Techniques for Counter-Insurgent Operations"/4/ is being hand carried to you by Brigadier General Ed Lansdale.
/2/A copy of this 29-page report, dated September 1, is part of a packet of documents entitled "South Vietnam Information Folder," dated October 25. (Ibid., RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Internal Security 1961)
/3/These three papers, all undated, are also part of the "South Vietnam Information Folder" cited in footnote 2 above.
/4/A copy of this 426-page treatise, originally published November 10 and 15, 1960, and subsequently published in four revisions-on January 18, 1961; May 1, 1961; October 1, 1961; and February 10, 1962, was given by General McGarr to the Department of State in 1984 and deposited in the Saigon Embassy Files cited in footnote 2 above. On the inside front cover is the following undated inscription signed by McGarr's successor as MAAG Chief, Charles J. Timmes: "Copy Number 2 presented to Lionel C. McGarr, Lt. Gen., USA (Ret.), who was the originator and driving force behind the production of this treatise and one of its principal authors."
To very briefly summarize the past year, I feel that considerable progress has been made but that developing conditions leave much yet to be done with time of the essence. Due to Viet Cong actions, "finding time" for even marginal troop training has been a major problem since 1959. Therefore, training programs have been integrated and appropriately reoriented to improve overall ARVN, Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps training, while at the same time placing heavy emphasis on conducting counter-guerrilla operations. Induction of the additional 20,000 force ceiling recommended by MAAG in October 1960, approved in May 1961 and further retarded due to a question of U.S. fund support, will be completed by January 1962. This 20,000 which was primarily justified as a "rotational training base" and to strengthen the RVNAF logistical support is, of course, not yet adequately trained or ready for employment except in case of critical emergency and then on a partially trained basis. The induction of the additionally approved 30,000 will begin January 1962 with a completion date of January 1963. To increase ARVN combat capabilities, a Combat Development Test Center has been organized and MAAG has developed and furnished the RVNAF a specially tailored tactical counter-guerrilla treatise titled "Tactics and Techniques for Counter-Insurgent Operations," which has been used extensively since last November by MAAG advisors and RVNAF and which is under continuing joint MAAG-GVN refinement. Following MAAG insistence, the Civil Guard was finally transferred from the Department of Interior to the Department of Defense allowing MAP and MAAG advisory support. Likewise, certain U.S. military support and MAAG advice for the Self Defense Corps has also been authorized. During the year, heartening improvement was made in Navy, Marine and Air Force operations as well as in logistical capabilities throughout all three services. Also, although significant problem areas in implementation still remain, many of the military recommendations in the U.S. Counter-Insurgency Plan have been approved by GVN edict such as a single chain of command and the establishment of Field Command with its three subordinate tactical corps. Of course, as mentioned previously, much of importance remains to be done, not only with respect to new innovations, but also in the all important areas of urgency, implementation and follow through. As MAAG has no command authority, this is quite difficult. For example, the single chain of command has been too much downgraded by continuing Presidential insistence on retaining the Province Chief in the military chain of command and supporting him against higher military commanders in purely military matters. This problem will be further discussed in a later paragraph.
Since my September year end report, significant and revealing trends which were beginning to emerge have since further materialized. The most indicative is the recently accelerated infiltration and build up of Viet Cong strength, particularly in the northern and central sections of South Vietnam. The sparsely settled and rugged jungle terrain along the VN-Lao border make it exceedingly difficult to stop or materially slow down Communist infiltration from North Vietnam through Laos. Positive hard intelligence on infiltration of personnel from North Vietnam, especially accurate numbers, has been difficult to obtain as our intelligence is necessarily based on GVN reports with whatever verification can be gotten from our MAAG advisors with tactical and intelligence units. Although as you know, MAAG under its present staffing and current terms of reference cannot function as an intelligence evaluating or producing agency, reports from American intelligence agencies, plus circumstantial evidence when correlated with known events reasonably establishes a high degree of infiltration as a fact. The current fairly firm estimate of regular, numerically designated Viet Cong units in Vietnam is approximately 17,000 as compared with an estimated 7,500 upon my arrival fourteen months ago. This force in itself, not considering the additional Communist capability due to their build up in Laos, is capable of selective large scale operations in South Vietnam. This capability is significantly increased by Communist control of the terrain along the Lao-SVN border and intelligence indications that the Viet Cong are "regularizing" and reorganizing territorial units within South Vietnam.
The Viet Cong initiative in September in both the north and central areas-I and II Corps Zones-gave further testimony of this infiltration capability. In marked contrast to the previous comparatively low level of Viet Cong activities in these areas, the September attacks were larger and more numerous. October has been deceptively quiet in both I and II Corps as far as large scale attacks are concerned but political and subversive incidents have risen sharply. In September, Viet Cong activities included at least a dozen attacks by units reported by ARVN in strengths of from 300 to 500 each. The attacks in Kontum Province on 1 September were made by a force estimated by ARVN and our advisor on the ground as three "battalions" totalling 1,000 personnel (Viet Cong battalions vary from 100 to 600). These troops were reportedly much better trained and equipped than any previously encountered and the attacks were executed with considerable professional skill. Although they overran small isolated Civil Guard posts, relieving ARVN troops, in most cases, inflicted comparable casualties in return for casualties suffered. During this same period, Viet Cong armed activity in the southern or Delta region continued at a normal high level with, however, a significant increase in political and subversive activity. Furthermore, the major portion of the Viet Cong forces, about 10,000, are located in this region and they are considered the best trained and best equipped of the Viet Cong regular forces.
Considering the currently identified regular Viet Cong forces in the country, they have the capability of increasing both the frequency and magnitude of their attacks. These attacks may well be coordinated to a greater degree, but will more probably follow the present pattern of hit and run, with the limited objective of further weakening government control. If, however, infiltration continues to accelerate significantly, it may well indicate that the Communists have stepped up their timetable and plan to move into a larger scale, more conventional campaign designed to conquer a portion or all of South Vietnam. The "National Front Liberation of South Vietnam" has announced its intent of seizing and holding an enclave in South Vietnam, declaring it a liberated area and establishing a government which would then be quickly recognized as "legal" by the Soviet bloc. That they have not yet been able to accomplish this indicates the "Front" has not yet gained adequate political or military strength to overcome the GVN military capability here.
As the Viet Cong offensive is multi-pronged, I believe it very important that our officials at all policy and decision making levels be fully current on the inter play and effect of the application of all elements of national power by both sides on the overall pacification effort here. Currently, the main emphasis is in the military field because of the advanced development of the insurgency. However, as MAAG has spelled out in the military section of the Counter-Insurgency Plan and in its Tactics and Techniques of Counter-Insurgent Operations treatise, military action alone, even though successful, is not the answer and can even be counterproductive if not preceded and followed by coordinated interlocking political, psychological and economic action in consonance with an overall National Plan. Without the development and employment of a politico-military-paramilitary infrastructure to secure militarily cleared areas for the GVN, the Viet Cong will move back as ARVN forces, of necessity, go to new missions. Of course, this has an adverse psychological impact on the population. Military successes of June-July-August have been dissipated by GVN failure to follow through and truly reassert and maintain government control. This control and reconstruction phase can only be accomplished by the civil authorities with the help of the paramilitary forces. I am convinced that a concerted effort at US-GVN level is absolutely necessary if President Diem and the GVN are to develop the required National Plan together with an adequate Intelligence Organization and a working control and coordination framework in which all governmental elements including the military can operate in a meaningful and effective manner. The GVN excuse that they do not have sufficient trained leadership must not be allowed to postpone the implementation of these required actions. Otherwise, the military will continue to be held responsible, both in Vietnam and in our country, for failure to obtain and capitalize on desired and timely results which, acting alone it cannot hope to achieve.
Although increasing emphasis on military planning and combat operations is certainly in order, additional measures other than military are required to motivate the people to resist Viet Cong blandishments and terrorist methods to the point of actively assisting the government's counter-insurgency efforts. The inability of the GVN to protect the lives of the people in far flung villages is, of course, an important factor. Also, the population must be induced through political, economic and psychological measures to support the GVN with greater patriotic ardor than now appears evident. For example, General "Big" Minh, Commanding General of Field Command, reported to General Taylor that the RVNAF is receiving progressively less cooperation from the villagers in the matter of information on Viet Cong presence and activities. This could be the result of governmental relations with the people. Also, it could be the result of the impact of Viet Cong initiative in the north following so closely upon the ARVN initiative and successes in the Delta. Whatever the cause, it again emphasizes the need for an adequate overall GVN organization which will operate from the top levels to the villages and hamlets to properly counter the insurgency.
Until this is accomplished, military operations can, at best, result in a series of isolated and temporary victories. I have repeatedly and forcefully urged in my letters and in conversations with both President Diem and Secretary of Defense Thuan the necessity for the development of a National Level Operations Plan into which a Military Operations Plan can be integrated. Such a plan must include at all appropriate levels an adequate Command/Control Structure such as agencies subordinate to the National Internal Security Council designed to dynamically apply all elements of national power in proper combination-economic, political and psychological, as well as military. In this respect, although the National Internal Security Council has been established by Presidential Decree, it is not yet functioning in its intended role.
At MAAG's urging, "Big" Minh's Field Command, the headquarters charged with planning and executing the military phase of the counter-insurgency effort, is now developing the military portion of such a plan. While the plan needs to be coordinated on a geographically phased "amoeba principle" starting with the clearance of various key areas and expanding these areas until the entire country is covered, MAAG does not feel this plan should or could be prepared on a rigid or mechanical time schedule basis. Because of the advanced state of the insurgency and because of the limited forces available to counter it, I feel that an inflexible timetable approach would be unrealistic. As indicated in the paper Lansdale will furnish you, MAAG has prepared an outline for a National Geographically Phased Operations Plan which it is hoped will assist in furthering the military effort and could serve as a point of departure for GVN planning in this area. In addition, MAAG currently has representation on a Saigon Task Force committee which is now writing such an overall National Plan for presentation to the GVN.
Military morale continues to be a problem stemming from GVN failure to properly plan and organize their counter-insurgency effort. Slow promotion, low pay in the lower grades, charges of political favoritism, unavoidable long separation from families due to necessarily extended operational troop commitment, poor family housing and the like no doubt have an adverse affect on soldier and officer morale. Although some of these are normal soldier "gripes" which in most cases can and are being remedied, the import of this situation is not discounted here. However, I feel a more serious morale problem lies in a deep sense of frustration caused primarily by too often seeing hard won victories watered down by inadequate civil-military follow through measures which allow the Viet Cong to regain control in areas after clearance by military action.
As noted previously, another critical problem hampering the GVN in its pacification effort is the serious lack of hard and timely intelligence. This results from the uncoordinated condition of the presently established GVN intelligence community. Although, of course, MAAG is primarily concerned with instructional advice and assistance in the military intelligence field, we have repeatedly pointed out to the GVN that the present fragmentation of the overall countrywide intelligence effort into several unrelated and uncoordinated civil and military agencies will not answer the requirement in a situation where the value of information is measured in minutes and hours. In response to MAAG and Country Team urging for central intelligence control and direction in the Counter-Insurgency Plan, President Diem created the Central Intelligence Organization. However, at present this organization has neither the personnel nor the charter to do the job and there now appears to be some doubt that Diem actually intends that centralized control and direction of intelligence be vested in one organization. Apparently, he does not feel he has a suitable man or that he can trust any one official to this degree. However, despite the problems facing the GVN, some method of obtaining adequate, timely, grass roots level intelligence must be developed if the Viet Cong is to be defeated.
With respect to MAAG's all important mission of guiding RVNAF training, a Master Training Plan designed to overcome the long standing situation of units being inadequately trained due to continuing operational commitments has been developed jointly with RVNAF. This plan is a sound and logical extension of the improvements in the training effort here which has, during the past year, been fully reoriented on counter-guerrilla operations and ranger type training as well. In addition to regular ARVN units including the 20,000 and 30,000 increases, this plan is also designed to train the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. As previously mentioned, the Civil Guard was formerly under the Department of Interior where they received limited police type instruction and the Self Defense Corps, for all practical purposes, received no military training. As you know, over two years ago this insurgency had developed far beyond the capability of normal police type law enforcement. Since the transfer of the Civil Guard to DOD, ARVN, with MAAG guidance has trained these units to the full extent possible considering operational commitment, time and facilities which, of course, leaves much to be desired. Their training schedules have been most carefully worked out and repeatedly reviewed to ensure at least adequate training in the shortest possible time. I feel that the Civil Guard is currently receiving a minimum amount of training consistent with developing an acceptable capability to perform their mission and that to further reduce training time could well result in a "paper trained" force not capable of success against the Viet Cong. Provided MAAG's Master Training Program is not further cut by directive and can be followed, all ARVN units, including the 20,000 and 30,000 force increases, plus the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps will be developed into a trained force within the shortest possible time consistent with local conditions, facilities and necessary heavy operational commitments.
Considering the language barrier and personnel requirements, I am convinced that the worldwide MAAG concept of teaching indigenous personnel to act as instructors rather than "face to face" training by U.S. personnel is certainly the soundest way to build a strong, viable, self sufficient Armed Force in the host countries. For this reason, MAAG has resisted sporadic pressures here beamed at Americans running all training centers and schools. In this respect, the shortage of ARVN officers to act as instructors could be somewhat alleviated by calling back the large number of officers now on non-military assignments. To speed training, additional MAAG advisors have been requisitioned. This will also allow us to do a better job of teaching the RVNAF to stand on its own feet as the Army of a sovereign nation should do.
As you know, General Taylor and his group have proposed a series of actions designed to further assist the GVN in countering the insurgency while concurrently coping with the floods in the Delta area./5/ MAAG, in association with the other U.S. agencies here is now working out coordinated positions and recommendations for implementation of these proposals.
/5/See Document 190.
One of the actions under study is the matter of blocking infiltration from Laos into the high plateau area. Currently MAAG has finally induced ARVN to combine small, inefficient static border posts into larger mobile patrol bases and to build light plane strips in some areas along the border. Presently, ARVN does operate clandestine cross border patrols from five blocking units astride main penetration routes. . . . Also, over a year ago, when I found that the borders could not be sealed by political action, I proposed to President Diem that a "cordon sanitaire" be established along the entire land border of South Vietnam. General Taylor's proposal for a Border Force to be organized from existing ranger units trained and equipped for prolonged service along the border zone is similar in many respects to the MAAG concept which Lansdale will furnish you. The major difference is that the MAAG plan did not envision GVN forces operating regularly or deeply on the Lao side of the border. Also, the Taylor group proposals envision that all elements of this force be completely under military control. As no purely military action can completely seal the border, I feel our planners and policy makers should understand that presently contemplated action can do no more than reduce the present rate of infiltration. Therefore, I believe that intensified action at our highest diplomatic levels should be continued toward a workable border control arrangement not only with Laos, but with Cambodia as well.
A most significant proposal by the Taylor group is the introduction of U.S. military forces-to be accomplished, at least initially-under a cover plan centered around the present flood conditions in the Delta./6/ This plan envisions service type troops as part of a Flood Relief Task Force which, over an extended period of time would assist the GVN in rehabilitation of the area. For the protection of these units, U.S. combat troops would also be committed here. I fully recognize the advantages, for psychological as well as military reasons, of establishing a U.S. military presence in Vietnam. As you know, as recently as last spring, MAAG recommended a brigade task force of at least two Battle Groups be committed here as "school troops" to assist in speeding up ARVN training. At that time, considering the level of Viet Cong activity in the I and II Corps areas where it was planned to station them, it was felt that these two battle groups, provided they were not fragmented into small isolated packages, could perform their mission without becoming heavily involved in fighting the Viet Cong. Later, due to increased Viet Cong activity, MAAG recommended that if U.S. combat troops were to be introduced for the primary purpose of freeing ARVN fighting units, which would then result in their becoming involved in counter-guerrilla warfare, a strength of two divisions, suitably reinforced with combat, logistic and air support would be required initially. Provided U.S. combat troops are to be used solely to protect U.S. logistic units in the flood area, three battle groups are considered adequate. However, I am now convinced that unless deployed in sufficient strength the Viet Cong, both for military and propaganda reasons, will eventually consider U.S. troops a prime target. Of course, I have no doubt that American troops will fully live up to their traditions if forced to fight. However, it is important that combat troops sent here be specially trained and equipped for counter-guerrilla warfare, that they come expecting to fight and that they be prepared for extended commitment. Most important of all, it is essential that these forces be totally under U.S. command and that command and control relationships, support and other arrangements such as a status of forces agreement and the like be fully agreed between the two governments prior to and not after their arrival.
/6/See Document 191.
A joint survey of the security situation at the Provincial level has been proposed by the Taylor group and accepted by the GVN. This is a logical and forward looking extension of a recently obtained joint MAAG-GVN agreement to inspect Province Chiefs' security arrangements at all installations employing ARVN units. The proposed joint survey is of particular interest to MAAG because of the previously mentioned "dual position" of Province Chiefs with respect to the military and political chain of command and because of the importance of working out improved civil-military cooperation at Province level.
One of the basic conclusions reached during my initial assessment of the military situation in September 1960, was the absolute necessity for a single, inviolate chain of command. In addition to previous recommendations, the necessity for the reorganization of the command structure of the RVNAF and for the establishment of a single chain of command was spelled out in the Counter-Insurgency Plan. A significant degree of success was achieved when a Presidential Decree, and the subsequent implementing directive, enacted most of the MAAG recommendations. While this decree did not remove the Province Chief from the military chain of command, it is the most workable solution obtainable at this time. This is because Diem, who personally selects his Province Chiefs and holds them in high regard, desires that these officials retain a high degree of control. Of the thirty-eight Province Chiefs in Vietnam, all but six are military officers and are supposedly under tactical zone (divisional) commanders for military operations involving any significant number of ARVN troops. For this reason, although their military qualifications vary greatly, Diem feels that for all practical purposes, the military chain of command is now satisfied. However, in actual fact, this is not entirely true.
It is hoped that the proposed joint survey can be used as a vehicle to remedy this situation as it cannot be rectified by the military alone. Because of the dual role of the Province Chief and his "direct line" to the highest civil levels of the government, it will be necessary for the political member of the survey group to insist on corrective action.
Other Taylor group proposals which are primarily in the nature of measures to improve intelligence and further improve RVNAF mobility are now being staffed as priority matters. These actions present no particular problem except that with respect to intelligence a change in MAAG terms of reference may be required.
In conclusion, this report has been frank and objective with emphasis on what remains to be done rather than the very significant improvements which we have made over the past year. Naturally, our progress is due in large part to the fine cooperation and support of CINCPAC and all agencies throughout the Department of Defense. Again, our position here is complicated primarily by lack of authority to direct the GVN to take proper politico-military measures which will adequately coordinate the overall counter-insurgency effort from the viewpoint of required political-military-economic-psychological actions. For the above reasons, I feel that these interlocking military-political actions need heavy pressure from our political side if they are to be accomplished adequately and in time.
Sincerely,
Lionel C. McGarr
Lieutenant General, USA[Continue with the next documents]
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