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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963, Volume I
Vietnam, 1961Department of State
Washington, DC
211. Memorandum for the Record /1/
Washington, November 6, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-127-69. Top Secret. Prepared by Bagley; the date on the source text is apparently the drafting date rather than the date the conference took place. The subject matter, the participants, and the course of the discussion suggest that the conference took place November 4.
SUBJECT
Meeting to discuss the recommendations of the Taylor Mission to South Viet-NamPRESENT
General Taylor Secretary McNamara Under Secretary Alexis Johnson Lt General Cabell Under Secretary Ball Mr. Hamilton Mr. Rostow Assistant Secretary Bundy Mr. Bissell Mr. Cottrell General Lemnitzer LCdr Bagley Under Secretary Gilpatric 1. General Taylor opened the meeting with a broad assessment of the situation in South Viet-Nam as he saw it during his trip. From the background thus set, he outlined his recommendations to alter the situation favorably. These remarks essentially included-and broadened-the content of messages to the President forwarded from SEA by General Taylor.
2. In answer to specific questions, General Taylor said:
a. The Provincial Survey proposed does not duplicate work done by the Staley Group.
b. Withdrawal of US forces on the basis of completion of a flood relief task would be a matter of months.
3. General Taylor, in reporting the initial reactions of the President/2/ to his recommendations, stated:
/2/Apparently a reference to Taylor's meeting with the President the previous day; see footnote 1, Document 210.
a. The President had many questions. He is instinctively against introduction of US forces.
b. The President, at the high level meeting scheduled for 7 November, would like participants to address themselves to:
(1) Their opinion as to the quality of the proposed program.
(2) Implications and meaning of the program if implemented.
(3) How the program should be implemented.c. The President hoped that Diem would broaden the representation in his government as an earnest to increased US assistance.
4. The comments of those present followed the lines as outlined below:
McNamara: The recommendations in themselves, including the "8000-man force" would not save South Viet-Nam from Communism. It is a US commitment to the ground and other forces would be made ready. It is not a temporary commitment; without the "8000-man force", the recommendations will not save South Viet-Nam; with it, they might.
Small actions without words are not necessarily useful. There should be a commitment with the introduction of a US force, we need a clear objective to plan properly. Tell the world and the US what our commitment really is; the "8000-man force" does not convince anyone of our resolve. In Laos, our objective was never understood. The objective should be in a broad context-secure independence of South Viet-Nam-and resources should be applied against North Viet-Nam.
On Tuesday, the agenda should be restricted to:
a. What is US objective in South Viet-Nam?
b. How far do we want to go?
c. How far do we want to state it publicly?The forces-6 to 8 divisions-required to meet Communist escalation in SEA are available. Put this factor aside and discuss decision on basis of value of area to the US.
Johnson: The Delta is not the place to put US forces; the Plateau is better. Can we save South Viet-Nam with steps short of putting in US forces?
Ball: The placing of the "8000-man force" in South Viet-Nam commits us to unlimited action. Why wait on going at Hanoi? Maybe USSR will be glad to see us engaged in SEA. It is difficult to tell US people we are undertaking a limited series of actions; easier to say we are making a full commitment. If we make such a full commitment-and it is necessary to make the "8000-man force" creditable-we should move fast. A larger force is preferable./3/
/3/For his recollection of the discussion at this meeting, see Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 366.
Rostow: Question really is whether we will accept a guerrilla war supported externally as a legal international process. We should take the limited actions recommended by General Taylor, surface the Jorden paper with necessary follow-up, then look to Hanoi. The Vice President's trip and the Taylor Mission lay on the need for action. There is no soft option. Hanoi and Peking have basic weaknesses which lessen the risk to US action.
Lemnitzer: Employment of "8000-man force" will result in combat forces being thinned out in an area in which it is hard to operate. We must commit the number of troops required for success.
Bissell: Taylor recommendations are useful for they represent action, not talk. Laos is an opposite example.
5. In response, General Taylor stated his recommendations were made in response to the Presidential directive to bolster the GVN to win their own war. The proposals should be tried, the US position kept flexible, and the GVN watched for proper follow-up.
WHB/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, November 4, 1961—6:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-461. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wood, cleared with McConaughy and S/S, initialed by Johnson (G) for the Acting Secretary, and repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd.
545. For Ambassador. Ref: EmbAir A-50, Aug. 17; Embtels 414, Sept. 28; 545, Oct. 25; 549, Oct. 27; 558, Oct. 28./2/ There will be highest level discussion here November 7 on Viet Nam. Effectiveness Diem government will be closely examined. Highest levels request your views prior to meeting on extent to which you believe Diem can be induced to modify and broaden his government if US decides to make substantial additional contribution along lines you discussed with General Taylor.
/2/Airgram A-50 is not printed. Telegram 414, a detailed status report on the political aspects of the counterinsurgency plan, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/9-2861) Telegram 549 is not printed. For telegrams 545 and 558, see Documents 193 and 199.
Feeling is strong that major changes will be required if joint effort is to be successful in that US cannot be asked further engage its prestige and forces while machinery of Diem government remains inadequate and thus full capabilities South Vietnamese forces and population not being realized.
For example, delegation of authority to Vietnamese civil and military authorities commensurate with their responsibilities to overcome present GVN paralysis and sense nonparticipation seems mandatory.
Would appreciate your comments on following possible changes:
1. Creation of National Emergency Council (pursuant to Diem's declaration National emergency) headed by a person of importance and capability (if possible Vice President Tho) through which all GVN business to and from Diem would be transacted. Nhu would coordinate between Diem and NEC. Thuan would be Secretary of NEC. A mature, discreet and hard headed US member would be appointed to participate in all decisions and coordinate with Ambassador. Membership primarily civilian, presumably members present Cabinet.
2. On military side there would be comparable delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility to be achieved placing all services under Joint General Staff and by intelligence unification.
If these basic and difficult changes could be achieved, might then be possible make progress on following:
a) simplify GVN structure and programs.
b) greater role for VP Tho as capable man and constitutional successor.
c) improved contacts between GVN and Vietnamese people, including Sects and labor unions.
d) Other reforms agreed to if CIP but not carried out (refAir).
In addition to foregoing, would appreciate your full comments and suggestions with respect this entire problem.
Bowles
213. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Secretary of State/1/
Washington, November 5, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-561. Top Secret. Drafted and initialed by Johnson and sent through S/S. Rusk returned to Washington on November 5 from his trip to Japan.
SUBJECT
General Taylor's RecommendationsAttached is a copy of General Taylor's recommendations./2/ (This is the only copy in the Department. At the President's direction, they have been held very closely and thus far have been seen only by Mr. Ball, Mr. McConaughy and myself.) The eight specific recommendations begin on page 3. In summary, they are:
/2/Not found as an attachment to the source text, but presumably a reference to the first of the two attachments to Document 210.
(1) Insertion of some U.S. individual administrators into the GVN.
(2) A joint effort to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level.
(3) A joint survey by individual provinces of the social, political, intelligence and military factors.
(4) A joint effort to free the GVN Army for mobile offensive operations by improving the training and equipping of the civil guard and self-defense corps and increasing the helicopter, light aviation and reconnaissance capabilities with U.S. military units to the extent necessary. Also, establishment of a "border ranger force" for use on the Laotian border.
(5) Furnishing U.S. advisers, operating personnel and small craft for control of coastal waters and inland waterways.
(6) Increasing size of MAAG (up to about 2,400) with more clearly defined mission of active direction and indirect control of GVN forces.
(7) Introducing into South Viet-Nam a "military task force" to provide:
(a) U.S. military presence to raise national morale and show seriousness of U.S. intent;
(b) Conduct logistical operations in support of military and flood relief operations
(c) Conduct combat operations as are necessary for self defense and security of area in which such forces stationed;
(d) Provide an emergency reserve to back up the GVN forces; and
(e) Act as an advance party if CINCPAC or SEATO contingency plans are invoked.
(8) Review U.S. economic aid program to take into account flood relief needs and give priority to those projects supporting the counter-insurgency program.
General Taylor and some members of his party met privately with the President on their return Friday afternoon./3/ Saturday morning George Ball and I, with Fowler Hamilton for a part of the time, met with General Taylor, Walt Rostow and Cottrell, with McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Cabell and Dick Bissell also present./4/
/3/See footnote 1, Document 210.
/4/Apparently a reference to the meeting described in Document 211.
The essence of the discussion revolved around whether the United States should make a "Berlin-type commitment" to South Viet-Nam, and it was agreed that discussion with the President should focus on this basic question. McNamara took the position that, if this decision were made, Defense could cope "with the problem of forces". It was also agreed that, if this decision were made, the question of whether, when and how to introduce American forces would much more easily fall into place. There was little enthusiasm for the concept that, by introducing American forces for flood relief purposes, we would thereby retain greater flexibility and be able more readily to withdraw our forces if we decided to go no further. There was also concern over introducing and involving our forces in the delta area, where conditions are most difficult for the effective combat deployment of American forces.
At the President's request we are doing up a paper on what reforms we can and should expect from Diem, and have sent a telegram to Nolting on this./5/
/5/Document 212.
A meeting with the President is tentatively scheduled for 5 p.m. Tuesday./6/
/6/November 7.
214. Draft Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President/1/
Washington, November 5, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, 1961 Chron. Top Secret. Drafted by William P. Bundy on November s and attached to Bundy's memorandum of that date to McNamara, in which he asked whether the draft "at least raises the basic points you wanted" and noted that "one possible omission is the issue of nuclear weapons as part of a punitive action." On the source text are McNamara's handwritten revisions and interpolations, apparently done on November 6 since he wrote November "6" over the "5". McNamara's changes are described in footnotes below.
Bundy recalled that following the Saturday morning meeting described in Document 211, McNamara asked him to draft a memorandum directed toward the question McNamara raised at the meeting, namely whether the United States should make a clear "Berlin-type" commitment to Vietnam. Bundy said that the draft memorandum, which he finished on Sunday, November 8, was sent to the President only after "extensive discussions" with the Joint Chiefs and other Defense Department officials and with "important revisions in the last part." (Unpublished Bundy memoirs, Chapter IV, pp. 24-2S) For text of the memorandum, see Document 227.
The basic issue framed by the Taylor Report is whether the US shall:
a. Commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism, and thus holding the non-Communist areas of Southeast Asia.
b. Support this commitment by necessary immediate military actions and preparations for possible later actions.
My judgment is as follows:/2/
/2/McNamara crossed out this sentence and wrote above it, "The JCS, Mr. G[ilpatric], and I have reached the following conclusions:"
1. The fall of South Vietnam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia right down to Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide would be extremely serious.
2. The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing that fall by any measures short of the introduction of US forces on a substantial scale. I /3/ accept General Taylor's judgment that the various measures proposed by him short of this (what we came to call "the seven points")/4/ are useful but will not in themselves do the job of restoring confidence and setting Diem on the way to winning his fight.
/3/McNamara replaced the word "I" with "We".
/4/McNamara deleted the entire parenthetical phrase.
3. The introduction of a US force of the magnitude of an initial 8-10.000 men--whether in a flood relief context or otherwise--/5/ will be of great help to Diem. However, it will not convince the other side (whether the shots are called from Moscow, Peiping, or Hanoi) that we mean business./6/ The response would be an intensified effort that would probably outrun the successive increments of our own effort as it developed. We would thus be almost certain to get increasingly mired down in an inconclusive struggle.
/5/McNamara changed the first part of this sentence to read, "The introduction of a US force of the magnitude of an initial 8,000 men in a flood relief context".
/6/McNamara inserted the following sentence at this point: "Moreover, it probably will not tip the scales decisively."
4. The other side can be convinced we mean business only if we accompany the initial force introduction by a clear commitment to the full objective stated above, accompanied by a warning through some channel to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet Cong will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnam.
5. If we act in this way, we must proceed at once to increase our military forces available to CINCPAC by about (2) divisions over the next (4) months. The initial force may succeed in turning the situation around; Hanoi, possibly under pressure from Moscow, may decide to cut down its support so that the situation will gradually come under control. However, the chances of this are probably not more than 50-50, and certainly not so good that we can fail to prepare for follow-up action. Above all, we must decide now that we will in fact take that action as and when it is needed./7/
/7/McNamara deleted all of paragraph 5 and accordingly renumbered the subsequent paragraphs.
6. The ultimate possible extent of our military commitment must be faced./8/ The struggle may be prolonged and Hanoi and Peiping may intervene overtly. In view of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, I believe we can assume that the maximum US forces required on the ground will not exceed (6-8) divisions, or about (220,000) men, and that our military posture is, or can be made, adequate to furnish these forces. For the immediate purpose of raising the needed (2) additional divisions we (will/will not) need additional legal authority from the Congress. However, we can do the job without serious interference with our present Berlin plans./9/
/8/McNamara revised the first sentence to read, "5. If we act in this way, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment must be faced."
/9/McNamara revised the last three sentences as follows: "In view of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, we believe we can assume that the maximum US forces required on the ground in SEA will not exceed (6-8) divisions, or about (220,000) men. Our military posture is, or, with the addition of more N[ational] G[uard] divisions, can be made, adequate to furnish these forces without serious interference with our present Berlin plans."
7. I return to my central view, that clarity of objective is crucial./10/ To accept the stated objective is of course a most serious decision. Military force is not the only element of what must be a most carefully coordinated set of actions. Success will depend on factors many of which are not within our control-notably the conduct of Diem himself and other leaders in the area. Laos will remain a major problem. The domestic political implications of accepting the objective are also grave, although it is my own feeling that the country will respond better to a firm initial position than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually, and that in the meantime are sure to involve casualties. The over-all effect on Moscow and Peiping will need careful weighing and may well be mixed; however, permitting South Vietnam to fall can only strengthen and encourage them greatly.
/10/McNamara deleted the entire first sentence and renumbered the paragraph "6."
8. In sum, I/11/ recommend an affirmative decision on the issue stated at the start of this memorandum.
/11/McNamara renumbered the paragraph "7" and replaced "I" with "we".
Robert S. McNamara
215. Editorial Note
On November 5, 1961, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and a party including his daughter Indira Gandhi and Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai arrived in the United States for a 10-day visit. Briefing papers for the visit, including an undated position paper on Vietnam, NIN D-14, prepared by the Department of State, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1990. Also in this folder is a memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Chester Bowles to the President, November 3, offering suggestions on the talks with Nehru. The Acting Secretary made the following comments regarding Southeast Asia, which he said was possibly "the most important single question" the President would discuss with Nehru:
"You might consider broadening the discussion by pointing out the grave decision you personally might be called upon to make in the coming months with the weakening situation in Vietnam, the great uncertainties in Laos, and potential instability in Thailand.
"Naturally, you hesitate to think of committing major troops to this area, and you would give everything in the world to avoid it if possible in this era of nuclear weapons when a local war can quickly spread and intensify.
"Yet if the Chinese should move into this region, the whole of Southeast Asia would be opened up from Australia to the east and India to the west. and this would be hard for us to accept.
"Can the Prime Minister think of any way to achieve a new power balance in the area that would relieve us of our present direct confrontation with the Communists which we did not seek and do not want?
"With that opening, it is conceivable that the possibility of a neutral and independent Southeast Asia, guaranteed by India together with the Soviet Union and the United States, and for the record, at least, by China, might emerge naturally out of the discussion.
"If not, it might be worthwhile to consider opening this subject yourself. In my opinion, a settlement in Laos is very nearly meaningless unless we can find some way to create stability in Vietnam. If the latter situation deteriorates much further, Thailand is almost certain at some point to make her own adjustments with Peking, and this could turn our present position into a shambles and present us with an ugly and dangerous choice."
After appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press" in New York on the evening of November 5, Nehru, along with some members of his party, went the following day to Hammersmith Farm, Newport, Rhode Island, the home of Jacqueline Kennedy's mother and stepfather. Already at the farm were the President, members of his family and the Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith. In his journal, Galbraith described the luncheon discussion that day as follows:
"At the residence, we had a long lunch, mostly on South Vietnam. The President and I pressed Nehru hard on what we should do to put down Communist terror. Could Ho Chi Minh do anything? The U.N.? What about a U.N. observer corps? What could the I.C.C. do? Nehru was rather negative on all of these matters and most interested in making clear that we should not send in soldiers. I agree heartily but we need an alternative with a plausible chance of success." (Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, page 246)
On the evening of November 6, the Nehru party and the President flew to Andrews Air Force Base in Washington, where they were greeted by Vice President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, other United States officials and members of the diplomatic corps. From the airport, Galbraith rode to the Department of State with Rusk to whom he described the luncheon discussion that day together with his own arguments against the introduction of United States troops into Vietnam. (Ibid., page 247)
216. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 6, 1961, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-661. Top Secret; Niact.
598. Eyes only for the Secretary. Reurtel 388 October 5 and my reply 445 October 6./2/ A great deal has occurred here in interval of one month since exchange reftels. In first place, security situation has markedly deteriorated in terms of increased incidents and lack of noteworthy government victories and, above all, in effects of these retrograde developments on public and official morale. In this situation, special mission of General Taylor has tended bring situation here to a head more rapidly than anticipated. Government and people of Viet-Nam, and especially military forces, now expect major underwriting by US. Public expectation has developed, on basis largely of hope, to such extent that failure on part US to make major new commitments here would, I fear, cause rapid deterioration present unsatisfactory situation and collapse of morale.
/2/See Document 147 and footnote 2 thereto.
I heartily endorse the six recommendations which General Taylor sent from here (Embtels 536 and 544/3/). Nevertheless, I am sure that neither he nor you will be under any illusions as to formidable obstacles to implementing some of them. You will note that several of the six points are procedural, involving better utilization existing GVN resources and development better techniques, with our help. These recommendations hit the principal spots where improvements should and can be made, but I caution against assumption that miracles can be worked here in field of GVN organization for two reasons: severe shortage of capable, trained, cooperative-minded people with a will to national unity, and the personality of President Diem. Nevertheless, we have made some, and can make further improvements in GVN organization, and under the pressure of present emergency Diem speaks as if he is willing to allow us to become more intimately involved in GVN plans and their execution. We should certainly make best use this opportunity.
/3/Telegram 536 is printed as Document 190. Telegram 544 is not printed.
Main new substantive US contributions recommended in Taylor's six points are: (1) three helicopter squadrons (63 helicopters) to give much-needed mobility to GVN forces especially in vicinity of Laotian border, and (2) US military task force to do job of rehabilitation flooded provinces of Mekong Delta. With respect to (1), it is clear that if these helicopters are to be useful in time, American pilots and maintenance crews are required.
As valuable and necessary as I consider these two additional US contributions to be, and without them I think there is likely to be a collapse of morale and/or a military coup d'etat here, I am not sure that these commitments, coupled with other actions undertaken and planned, will be sufficient for the long run. I would expect the Communists to react by increasing the tempo and strength of their campaign within SVN, by heavier infiltrations into central Viet-Nam and perhaps also in the delta, thus attempting to discredit US military presence here. In final analysis, in order to win we may have to force Communist side to conclude that further attempt to take this country by introduction of force from outside will be met direct US action against North Viet-Nam. I think the steps recommended by General Taylor are necessary now, but I wanted you to have my private and personal assessment as you consider them.
Nolting
217. Notes by the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
Washington, November 6, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SE Asia 1961. Handwritten by McNamara. The source text does not indicate whether the views of the Joint Chiefs were communicated orally or in writing, but they may have been given to McNamara by Lemnitzer at a luncheon meeting which, according to Lemnitzer's journal, took place in the Secretary of Defense's dining room at 1 p.m. on November 6. (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, L-419-71)
Prior to the meeting between McNamara and the Joint Chiefs, the following telephone conversation took place between McNamara and Rusk at 10:53 a.m.:
"M said he understands tomorrow at 5 they are to meet with the Pres on the Taylor report. The Sec said he is seeing T at 2:45 today. M wants a meeting between the two appoints with the Sec and Lemnitzer. They have doubts about the approach recommended and he hopes to thrash this out with the JCS today. The Sec said he would stop by there about 6." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)
Views of Chiefs-11/6/61
1. 8000 should be considered part of a larger increment to come later if that proves necessary.
2. The 8000 men will probably not be sufficient to preserve independence of SVN.
3. Action in SVN should be considered part of action SE Asia.
4. Further milt aid to SVN should be accompanied by agreement with Diem of action he will take.
5. Further US milt aid to SE Asia will not lead to use of nuclear weapons by USSR.
6. Further US aid to SVN should be accompanied by notice to NVN that action will be taken against it unless stop support of Viet Cong.
7. If further US aid is not provided to SVN it will fall & following it: SE Asia.
8. It is not necessary now to call tact . . . additional res. or gd. force . . . ./2/
/2/The last sentence is illegible. The ellipses are the editor's.
218. Memorandum of a Conversation, The White House/1/
Washington, November 7, 1961, 10-10:32 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1990. Secret. Drafted by Talbot and approved in the Office of the Secretary on November 26 and in the White House on December 4. (Kennedy Library, JFK Appointment Books) For Galbraith's account of the conversation, see Ambassador's Journal, p. 248.
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Secretary of State
Ambassador J.K. Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador to India
Mr. Walt Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
Assistant Secretary of State Phillips TalbotPrime Minister Nehru
Foreign Secretary Desai
Ambassador B.K. Nehru, Indian Ambassador to U.S.[Here follows discussion of the Berlin situation and Soviet foreign policy.]
Turning to another subject, the President acknowledged the importance India places in its geographic situation in relation to its foreign policy. He also recalled that the United States had been neutralist for a long time. Nevertheless he wanted to say that we would like India to oppose us on issues when we were wrong and to support us on those occasions when we might be right. The Prime Minister welcomed the opportunity afforded by this comment to explain the Indian approach to international issues. Indians naturally seek to act on the merit of each matter, the Prime Minister said, but he attaches importance to the manner of approach as well. He wants to create the feeling that India wants to be friendly and wants to cooperate with other nations even though it does not necessarily agree with each of them on a particular point. It is not a question of finding a midway position between the United States and the Soviet Union; that would have no meaning, really. The worst of the cold war is that it makes everyone rigid in mind and in spirit and so it becomes difficult for either side to deal with the other side. If the way to war is obstructed, then a feeling will come that matters can be dealt with in other ways, and the approach becomes easier.
The President described the foreign policy of the United States as, of course, to support countries with democratic systems, but even more basically to support national sovereignty. Sometimes this means, unhappily, that we support governments not fully supported by their own people. Yet it is not always easy to withdraw. In some places we believe that if we should withdraw communism might take over by subversion. This is the problem that faces us; we don't object when communists take over by electoral means as Jagan did in British Guiana.
The Prime Minister asked why communism has an appeal to many people. Mainly, he felt, it develops in poor and underdeveloped countries. The President pointed out that in many areas communism takes over by force and subversion. The Prime Minister agreed that no one would view with approval terroristic tactics, adding, however, that military actions bring unfortunate results. The very act of meeting a situation militarily may make it worse. For example, with the help of United States forces a situation may be cleared but it is very likely that the position of the leaders then becomes weaker because of their dependence on an outside power. Thus the problem is not settled.
President Kennedy explained that we are faced with a situation in which we are making efforts to settle the Laos problem but at the same time there are serious attacks on South Vietnam, some of them via Laos. If these should succeed, it would look as if by our willingness to negotiate on Laos we had lost both Laos and Vietnam. That would discredit our efforts and make it impossible for us to negotiate on other issues, including Berlin.
Ambassador Galbraith interjected that several members of this Administration have had the view that truly neutral countries offer opportunities for us to help economically to build them up. If in Laos or in any other country neutralism becomes merely a stage which precedes a communist takeover then the whole concept of neutralism will become a stench in the nostrils. The question is what India and other countries can do about this.
Agreeing that there is a question of what to do, Prime Minister Nehru observed that the whole idea in the Geneva Conference of 1954 was to create international commissions to meet this situation. To some extent it has been the failure to live up to these commitments that has led to later difficulties. If the commissions had not been there he was convinced that trouble would have come much sooner in Vietnam. In Laos, indeed, trouble did come after the commission was closed down. These things don't always happen according to plans or our decision. We can affect them sometimes but not always. The Prime Minister said he realized the position of the United States is difficult because the United States is tied up in many matters from which it is difficult to come out.
On Laos the President said that the United States will try to persuade the three Princes to come together promptly, in this month of November. But, he added, we don't want our efforts in Laos to end in a collapse in South Vietnam.
[Here follows discussion of nuclear testing, the Kashmir question, Indo-Pakistani relations, Ghana, and Yugoslavia.]
219. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 7, 1961--1 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-761. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; Eyes Only. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd. Received in the Department of State at 3:30 p.m.
608. Reference: Deptels 545 and 550./2/I think Diem can be induced to modify his govt, but not to extent set forth pares 1 and 2 reftels, which would in his view amount to divesting himself of key instruments of power.
/2/Telegram 545 is printed as Document 212. In telegram 550 to Saigon, November 6, the Department asked the Embassy to comment, with regard to paragraph 2 D of telegram 545, on the possibility of the introduction of "new local faces" into the Government of Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-661)
I believe Diem can be persuaded to create and use a National Emergency Council (or some similar executive organ), but probably only if chaired by his brother Nhu. Vice President Tho would in all probability be a member of this council and Thuan would probably be its Secretary. I do not think Diem could be persuaded to place a US member on the Council "to participate in all decisions". This step would, I think, be interpreted by him and by most Vietnamese as handing over Govt of SVN to US.
On military side, I do not believe Diem can be persuaded to delegate complete authority to anyone, but I do think he can be induced to take a less direct part in military operational matters. Re intelligence unification, I think this can be achieved, and we are on way towards it as reported Embtel 558./3/
/3/Document 199.
Re para 2 A, B, C, D and Deptel 550, believe we can make progress in these areas if President Diem accepts the type National Emergency Council indicated above.
In my judgment, our best bet is to continue to press for improvements in GVN governmental efficiency and popular appeal by backing Pres Diem, using the confidence we have gained to persuade him in the directions we want, utilizing his own Vietnamese advisors to this end, but never giving him grounds to believe that we are trying to undercut his constitutional position or to reduce his overall prestige and authority.
My views as to broad limits of what we can and cannot accomplish on that basis are set out in my telegram to Secretary of Nov 6 (Embtel 598/4/).
/4/Document 216.
Nolting
220. Editorial Note
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs George W. Ball met with President Kennedy on November 7, 1961, to discuss a subject not related to Vietnam. At the end of that meeting, according to Ball, they discussed Vietnam:
"I told him that I strongly opposed the recommendations of the Rostow mission. To commit American forces to South Vietnam would, in my view, be a tragic error. Once that process started, I said, there would be no end to it. 'Within five years we'll have three hundred thousand men in the paddies and jungles and never find them again. That was the French experience. Vietnam is the worst possible terrain both from a physical and political point of view.' To my surprise, the President seemed quite unwilling to discuss the matter, responding with an overtone of asperity: 'George, you're just crazier than hell. That just isn't going to happen.' . . . " (Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, pages 366-367)
No other record of this conversation between Ball and the President has been found. Ball's only meeting with the President on November 7 apparently was with Clarence Randall, 4-4:23 p.m., off the record. (Kennedy Library, Kennedy Log Book)
221. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State/1/
Washington, November 7, 1961, 5:13 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1990. Confidential. Drafted by Horgan, approved in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs on November 17, and in the Office of the Secretary on November 26. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books)
SUBJECT
Viet NamPARTICIPANTS
Mr. M.J. Desai, Foreign Secretary, Government of India
The Secretary
Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, Near East and South Asia
Rogers B. Horgan, Officer-in-Charge, India-Ceylon-NepalThe Secretary asked Mr. Desai for his thoughts on how it might be possible to reverse the trend in Viet Nam from its present slippery downward slope. Mr. Desai said, after some thought, the basic thing was to have in South Viet Nam a regime-the present one or another-that would be non-Communist, though not necessarily anti-Communist; the regime should be interested in economic development; and it should be willing to agree to a continued separation of North and South Viet Nam. At present each regime in Viet Nam is threatening to absorb the other.
Mr. Desai professed to be too out of touch with South Viet Nam, which he had left in 1955, to have any thoughts on any possible alternative to Diem. He characterized Diem as sincere, courageous, self-centered, stubborn. He told a number of anecdotes of his own contacts with Diem, not just from his position on the ICC. but as a disinterested advisor to Diem. These stories illustrated Mr. Desai's failure to convince Diem that he should subordinate everything to Diem's big problem, which was and is the enmity of the North Viet Nam regime. For example, he had tried to persuade Diem to make his peace with Prince Sihanouk but Diem told him he could not deal with such a madman. Mr. Desai expressed his belief that Diem must be persuaded to broaden the base of his government and evoke the assistance of other South Vietnamese rather than merely to run the government for the benefit of his own family.
Mr. Desai said he felt it was important for us to take into account the objectives of the North Vietnamese in considering steps we might take in Viet Nam. He gave his analysis of North Vietnamese objectives, starting in 1954. He said at that time Hanoi was willing that Laos and Cambodia be neutral because Hanoi believed it would get South Viet Nam through political means, especially by exploiting differences between ourselves and the French and British.
During the period 1955 to 1958, Hanoi toyed with the Laotian situation and used Laos as a bargaining point with regard to a settlement of its relations with South Viet Nam. In 1958 he believed that Hanoi was somewhat worried about Laos but nevertheless allowed a settlement between Souvanna and the Pathet Lao. More recently our activities and the succession of governments in Laos caused Hanoi to intervene actively again.
Mr. Desai then moved to a consideration of the effect of various moves that could be made with regard to the Vietnamese situation. If a conference were to be held, the immediate result would be a call for elections. He said he had advised Ambassador Harriman against the United States using the conference approach to a settlement of the Viet Nam situation. If a small number of U.S. troops were to be moved in, he did not believe they would materially help the South Vietnamese. If a large number of troops were to move in, it would upset the Laotian situation and fighting would be renewed. Even if the U.S. ended up in military occupation of South Viet Nam and Laos, where would we be?
Mr. Johnson stressed the point that the fighting in South Viet Nam was very severe and very dirty, and that some immediate action appeared to us to be called for. Mr. Desai dismissed the dirtiness of the fighting as an old Vietnamese custom. He stressed that there was no immediate solution available in Viet Nam, and that the problem was to work on Diem and gradually to convince him of the necessity of changing his methods.
Mr. Desai also was asked for his suggestions for immediate action. He said first to get the Laotian settlement out of the way.
Second, we should get Diem to cooperate with the ICC and to expose through the ICC to the world what was happening. He said that he had received the Government of Viet Nam letter of October 24/2/ from Ambassador Harriman in Geneva and that it was the first really well-documented case South Viet Nam had made. He said that when he had learned in Delhi last month of the protest from South Viet Nam on Col. Nam's assassination, he had told the Indian ICC representative to ask for facts and that the ICC now had something to work with. He said that with ICC exposure it would be possible for the U.K. to press the U.S.S.R. to stop what was going on.
/2/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-861)
Third, he suggested that there should be no settlement of the reunification question while the war was going on. Mr. Johnson asked him whether he thought the Viet Minh would listen to the Soviet Union. Mr. Desai replied indirectly by saying that the Vietnamese hate the Chinese and always have. He predicted Hanoi would be Peiping's Yugoslavia in ten years. He suggested that it would be useful for Diem to announce publicly three policies: (1) cooperation with the ICC, (2) his determination to work for the economic development of the country in peace and freedom, and (3) his renunciation of force for the unification of the country. In short, Mr. Desai said he should carry the political offensive to the enemy's camp.
At the close of the conversation, Mr. Desai made the suggestion that South Viet Nam try to get economic help from its fellow Asians in the Colombo Plan.
222. Draft Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President/1/
Washington, November 7, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 150, Taylor Report on VN. Top Secret. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson. The similarity between certain sections of the source text and Document 214 suggests that Johnson consulted with William Bundy in the preparation of this draft.
SUBJECT
South Viet-NamThe Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree:
1. The fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia and in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly in the Orient, would be extremely serious.
2. The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam by any measures short of the introduction of U.S. forces on a substantial scale.
If we commit combat forces to South Viet-Nam, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment in Southeast Asia must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged, and Hanoi and Peiping may overtly intervene. It is the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in the light of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, we can assume that the maximum United States forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia would not exceed six divisions, or about 205,000 men. It is also the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our military posture is, or, with the addition of more National Guard or regular Army divisions, can be made, adequate to furnish these forces without serious interference with our present Berlin plans.
While it is clear that, from the standpoint of South Viet-Nam alone, the introduction of American combat forces into that country is most desirable, it is not clear what effect this action might have on Laos if this action is taken prior to a settlement with respect to that country. It could have the effect of causing the Communists to break off negotiations and renew their offensive in that country, thus requiring us also to commit forces in Laos or to abandon that country to full Communist control. While a fully satisfactory settlement with respect to Laos does not now appear probable, it may be possible in the near future to reach a settlement on the basis of a very weak and unsatisfactory Souvanna Phouma government.
Our only hope of achieving some stabilization of the situation in South Viet-Nam without the commitment of major United States combat forces may lie in:
1. Our prompt revamping of the administrative and military command structure of the GVN;
2. Sharply increased U.S. military assistance to the GVN in air lift, intelligence, water craft, and increased MAAG participation in the direction and control of GVN military operations; and
3. A sharp diminution in Communist support to the Viet Cong.
It might perhaps be possible to achieve point 3 above if we were able to communicate to the Communist bloc our firm and clear intention to intervene with United States combat forces in South Viet-Nam unless they took prompt steps to halt their support of the Viet Cong. However, this intention could not be communicated with conviction unless we ourselves had first taken a clear decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism and the willingness to commit whatever United States combat forces may be required to accomplish this objective.
In the light of the foregoing, it is recommended:
1. We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism and the willingness to commit whatever United States combat forces may be necessary to achieve this objective.
2. We communicate this decision by suitable diplomatic means to the Communist bloc and selected friendly countries.
3. We continue our efforts to obtain a settlement in Laos.
4. We immediately undertake the first seven points of General Taylor's recommendations, deferring the decision on the timing of the introduction of combat forces into South Viet-Nam.
DeanRusk/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
223. Note From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
Washington, November 7, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SE Asia 1961. Secret.
At the risk of blitzing you with paper, I attach some think-pieces on the Vietnam problem, by myself and Harry Rowen's staff../2/ The key paper, however, is the first one on possible outcomes. It is a first cut. Paul Nitze agrees with it.
/2/The second attachment, "Effects Upon Laos of U.S. Actions to Defend South Viet Nam," is not printed.
Yesterday's discussion/3/ did not bite deep on Laos. My own strong feeling is that we must let that one come to us-i.e., wait and see what the 8000 produces as reaction, but be ready to move fast on the off chance that Hanoi decides to take over before we can react. We cannot politically move into Laos right away, and we should try not to let our intervention in South Vietnam kill the chances of the Souvanna "solution" in Laos. In other words, one at a time.
/3/Perhaps a reference to the meeting between McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff described in Document 217.
WP Bundy
[Attachment 1]
Draft Paper Prepared by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)/4/
Washington, November 7, 1961.
/4/Top Secret. The following typewritten notation is at the top of the source text: "2nd Draft. W.P. Bundy. 7 Nov. 1961."
Reflections on the Possible Outcomes of US Intervention in South Vietnam
The range of possible outcomes:
"Good" Scenarios
Scenario A: Diem takes heart and also takes the measures needed to improve efficiency, with only the 8000 man force and US specialist help. Hanoi heeds our warning and lays low, so that control is reasserted in South Vietnam. (Laos is a big question mark here and in other Scenarios.)
Scenario B: The struggle continues to go against Diem, and his own efforts at improvement are feeble. Thus, the US moves into the driver's seat and eventually brings the situation under control, using forces on the scale of 25,000-75,000. Hanoi and Peiping do not intervene directly, and we do not attack Hanoi.
Scenario C: As the struggle becomes prolonged, the US strikes at Hanoi (or Hanoi and Peiping intervene overtly). The US wins the resulting conflict, i.e., obtains at least a restoration of the status quo, after inflicting such punishment on Hanoi and/or Peiping that further aggressive moves are forestalled for a long time to come.
"Bad" Scenarios
Scenario X: The US decides not to put in the 8000 men, or later forces, and Diem is gradually overcome.
Scenario Y: The US puts in the 8000 men, but when Diem fails to improve his performance pulls out and lets him be overcome.
Scenario Z: Moscow comes to the aid of Hanoi and Peiping, supplying all necessary equipment (including a limited supply of air-deliverable nuclear weapons to retaliate in kind against US use) so that the outcome is a stalemate in which great destruction is wreaked on the whole area.
Of these, only A is truly a good outcome from all long-term standpoints-it stiffens us generally vis-à-vis the Bloc, holds the area (save perhaps Laos), does not discomfit us unduly in the neutral world, excellent for domestic US will and drive. Only trouble is-it's unlikely! However, it is still so much better than any other that it is worth accepting some added degree of difficulty in achieving B and C to give A every chance to happen.
The choice between B and C is a hard one. Despite all our warnings and Jorden Report, our case of aggression against Hanoi will not convince neutrals of its accuracy and justice, or major allies of its wisdom and practicality. On the other hand, B is a road that has almost no end in sight. The US is poorly cast as a permanent protecting power, but the local capabilities would be so low at the end of such a struggle that we would almost have to assume that role. There is a very considerable chance that under continuing US protection, South Vietnam and the area as a whole would become a wasting asset and an eyesore that would greatly hamper all our relations worldwide. On the whole, the short-term onus attached to C may be preferable. However, as we play the hand toward C (especially if we use Moscow as the channel to Hanoi) we may well raise the chances of Moscow acting to bring on Z.
On the "bad" side, X and Z are clearly nightmares. Though X means loss of the area for a long time to come, it is probably better in the long run than Z. The chances of the Soviets acting to bring about Z do not appear great in the short run, but we must certainly try to keep those chances low (e.g., by making our dealings with Moscow private).
Y is also a nightmare. It loses the area. Moreover, vis-a-vis the Bloc it would be worse than X, since they would take it as an almost final proof that we would not stand up. It might have some compensating gains in the neutral world, at least in the short run. But on the whole it seems the worst possible outcome.
The basic strategic issues are:
a. How long to give A a chance?
b. Whether B is preferable to the weighted odds of C vs. Z?Note on the Scale of US Intervention in South Vietnam
In deciding on the appropriate level of a possible US Intervention in Vietnam, it is important to consider the objective of preserving Vietnamese prestige. The preferred US outcome is for the Vietnamese, and Diem, to get credit for the defeat of the Communists with the help of the US. The next best outcome, a defeat of the Communists as a consequence of large scale intervention on the part of the US is a distinctly inferior outcome to the former. Diem would very probably be discredited and progress toward the formation of a cohesive nation slowed.
The problem of a US take-over of the conflict hardly arises at the 6-8000 US troop level-especially if these troops are mostly engineers. It would seem to arise only if the scale of intervention is of the order of several divisions. (Even then the outcome of the war would be very largely dependent on the Vietnamese effort.) The introduction of a large US force may turn out to be necessary in any case. This would be so if Hanoi and Peiping intervened openly or if sizeable forces are needed in Laos. Short of such clear and urgent demands for a large US force on the scene we should restrict our effort to a level that leaves the burden primarily on the Vietnamese. The US role would be (1) to assist South Vietnam more actively in a variety of ways, and (2) to bail out the Vietnamese if things go badly.
224. Memorandum From Lieutenant Commander Worth H. Bagley to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, November 7, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-127-69. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Secretary McNamara's Memorandum for the President on the subject of South Viet-Nam/2//2/Bagley was apparently referring to the draft memorandum described in footnote 2, Document 227, which was a later draft of Document 214.
1. My comments on Secretary McNamara's memorandum are as set forth below:
a. The basic issue framed by your report is not the decision for commitment to prevent the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism. Rather, your report responds to a lesser scale objective, which can be altered up or down by later choice. There is advantage, however, in exploring the President's view now on an ultimate objective toward SEA as long as it can be done without detriment to the subtle actions you have recommended, which in fact permit a delayed decision.
2. The following comments are numbered the same as related paragraphs in the basic paper:
(1) A statement regarding Communist control of Southeast Asia should be expanded for the benefit of the President to include a clear statement as to the strategic implications of a neutral SEA as it will affect the US position worldwide.
(2) The suggestion that US forces be employed on a substantial scale indicates the purposes of your recommendations, as an entity, are not understood. The basic reason for introduction of US forces at this time is to remove all doubt as to the extent the US is committed to the defense of SVN and, further, to offset sagging morale in that area. It is not intended to accomplish any positive military task other than that of self-defense.
The US military presence will provide sustenance to encourage Diem to respond to the other measures you have recommended. The combination of these military and non-military measures, which in the context of the report are inseparable, if fully realized will increase confidence and Diem will in fact be set on the way to winning his own fight. The prospect is that US assistance will then diminish rather than increase. In this context, Secretary McNamara's interpretation of your judgment as to the potential of your recommendations is erroneous.
(3) In order to implement your recommendations, it is necessary to violate the 1954 Geneva Accords, and to acknowledge such violation. Present thinking as to the use of the Jorden report envisages publication of a White paper, tabled at the United Nations, which will be publicly used as the excuse for such violation. We are thus announcing to the world a radical increase in our assistance to SVN including placement there of a small American force. This will be a dramatic indication of our recognition of the vital interest SVN represents to our own national security, and should be just as convincing to the "other side" whether we commit 8,000 men or 80,000 men.
It should be noted, however, that renunciation of the Accords (though we do so on the basis of the US reservation attached thereto) is a double-edged sword. The Communists are then free to invade. It is here that our commitment must be clear as a defense for SVN.
We do not envisage US units having a positive military objective, so it is difficult to see how our forces can become mired down in an inconclusive struggle. If their presence, in conjunction with other measures, increases SVN capabilities to fight, the Viet-Cong will become less able to engage them. If this anticipated result does not occur, a new US decision will be required.
(4) A public commitment to a maximum objective in SVN seems unnecessary for the same basic reasoning as outlined above. If such an announcement were made it would decrease our flexibility and initiative. It is ironic that we continue to point with envy to the flexible and fluid tactics which Mao adherents follow and at the same time eliminate any possibility that we can retain similar advantages. The lack of such public announcement of our objectives does not, however, prevent the possibility of transmitting an appropriate diplomatic warning to Hanoi that their continued support of the Viet-Cong will lead to expanded action on our part.
(5) Recognition now that an expanded US participation in SVN could conceivably result in an enlarged conflict will add to the flexibility of the Taylor Program. If we recognize the requirements and provide for them, but do not publicly announce such an appreciation, our flexibility is enhanced because there is then no limit to the scale of action to which we can resort.
(6) When we publicly announce our violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords, and the reasons therefore based on the Jorden paper, it will be appropriate to advise the American people of our increased commitments in SVN. For the same reasoning as in subparagraph 3 above, this should be sufficient to explain any action that may subsequently be required even though our initial commitment of forces may be limited.
WHB/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
225. Editorial Note
The meeting to discuss Vietnam with the President, scheduled for November 7, 1961, was apparently postponed. No record has been found of such a meeting on that date, and the Kennedy Log Book, as well as the Taylor and Lemnitzer Appointment Books, show no record of such a meeting. The reason for the apparent postponement has not been determined, but may have been due to the President's heavy schedule of activities during the visit of Prime Minister Nehru.
The meeting was rescheduled for November 8, 1961, but that too was postponed. According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation between Rusk and McGeorge Bundy at 10:50 a.m. on November 8:
"B returned the call and the Sec said he spoke to the Pres about postponing the meeting today at 5 until later. He would like to shoot for the same time tomorrow. The Sec thinks those working on it have too simplified a view. B said McNamara said that. The Pres would rather wait until the Sec is ready. The Sec will stay with it and will alert B.
"Re the press conf-if asked about Taylor B thinks the Pres should say the report is still being studied and resist questions. The Sec said right and mentioned he would be over for lunch." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)
Later that afternoon, at 3:40 p.m., Rusk called U. Alexis Johnson and asked him to inform McNamara and Taylor that there would be no meeting that afternoon. Thirty minutes later McNamara called Rusk and the following conversation took place:
"M asked when the Sec thinks we will have the meeting on South Vietnam. The Sec said it is a question of getting thoughts here and recommendations-it is more complicated than he supposed. He hopes tomorrow-will be in touch-we are trying to weave some political factors in but it is complicated." (Ibid.)
226. Draft Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)/1/
Washington, November 8, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Vietnam 092 Nov. 1961. Top Secret. Drafted by William Bundy on November 8. A handwritten note in the margin reads: "Not used. All other copies destroyed."
SUBJECT
Timing and Visibility of Action to Assist South VietnamIn the light of our discussion last night,/2/ it is clear that there is great concern that the actions we take in the immediate future in South Vietnam will disrupt the possibility of a Souvanna settlement, including signature of Geneva agreements, which might otherwise be expected to take place within about a month. I think we must recognize that even the installation of a Souvanna government will not by any means eliminate the possibility of our having to take early action in Laos; the hope, however, is that such action would be in response to some breach of the situation by the other side. Otherwise, our political difficulties would be greatly multiplied-as they would be if our introduction of added elements into the Vietnam situation were blamed for upsetting the possibilities of a settlement.
/2/Lemnitzer's journal shows that he left the Pentagon at 5:40 p.m. with McNamara to attend a meeting at the Department of State. (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, L-419-71) No record of this meeting was found.
Some of our discussion last night tended to assume that introduction of an 8000-man force (or some such number) would be a decisive event in determining reactions in Laos. I doubt if it is as black-and-white as this, and of course we must reckon that anything we say to Diem may lead in some way to reactions. What we need, however, is a very careful look at the successive military actions that we might take under the Taylor Report recommendations, the timing of these, their degree of visibility, and whether there is any way to frame plausible cover stories that would enable us to move forces into position without upsetting the apple cart. For example, the 8000-man force might be labelled as a reinforcement for Honolulu, or engaged in an exercise in the Philippines. In this connection, the use of an existing divisional staff organization, while surely much more efficient, may raise serious problems of publicity.
Could you look into these matters in a preliminary fashion and give me your best reading before the White House meeting this afternoon at 5:00? /3/
/3/See Document 225.
227. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President/1/
Washington, November 8, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SE Asia 1961. Top Secret. Also printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 343-344.
SUBJECT
South VietnamThe basic issue framed by the Taylor Report is whether the U.S. shall
a. Commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism,/2/ and
/2/On a November 7 draft of this memorandum, the following words were crossed out at this point: "thus holding the non-Communist areas of Southeast Asia,". (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51K/11-761) This is the only difference between the November 7 draft and the source text.
b. Support this commitment by necessary immediate military actions and preparations for possible later actions.
The Joint Chiefs, Mr. Gilpatric, and I have reached the following conclusions:
1. The fall of South Vietnam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia and in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly in the Orient, would be extremely serious.
2. The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing that fall by any measures short of the introduction of U.S. forces on a substantial scale. We accept General Taylor's judgment that the various measures proposed by him short of this are useful but will not in themselves do the job of restoring confidence and setting Diem on the way to winning his fight.
3. The introduction of a U.S. force of the magnitude of an initial 8,000 men in a flood relief context will be of great help to Diem. However, it will not convince the other side (whether the shots are called from Moscow, Peiping, or Hanoi) that we mean business. Moreover, it probably will not tip the scales decisively. We would be almost certain to get increasingly mired down in an inconclusive struggle.
4. The other side can be convinced we mean business only if we accompany the initial force introduction by a clear commitment to the full objective stated above, accompanied by a warning through some channel to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet Cong will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnam.
5. If we act in this way, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged and Hanoi and Peiping may intervene overtly. In view of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, I believe we can assume that the maximum U.S. forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia will not exceed 6 divisions, or about 205,000 men (CINCPAC Plan 32-59,/3/ Phase IV). Our military posture is, or, with the addition of more National Guard or regular Army divisions, can be made, adequate to furnish these forces without serious interference with our present Berlin plans.
/3/Not found.
6. To accept the stated objective is of course a most serious decision. Military force is not the only element of what must be a most carefully coordinated set of actions. Success will depend on factors many of which are not within our control-notably the conduct of Diem himself and other leaders in the area. Laos will remain a major problem. The domestic political implications of accepting the objective are also grave, although it is our feeling that the country will respond better to a firm initial position than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually, and that in the meantime are sure to involve casualties. The over-all effect on Moscow and Peiping will need careful weighing and may well be mixed; however, permitting South Vietnam to fall can only strengthen and encourage them greatly.
7. In sum:
a. We do not believe major units of U.S. forces should be introduced into South Vietnam unless we are willing to make an affirmative decision on the issue stated at the start of this memorandum.
b. We are inclined to recommend that we do commit the U.S. to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism and that we support this commitment by the necessary military actions.
c. If such a commitment is agreed upon, we support the recommendations of General Taylor as the first steps toward its fulfillment.
Robert S. McNamara
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