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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963, Volume I
Vietnam, 1961Department of State
Washington, DC
228. Draft Memorandum for the President/1/
Washington, November 8, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T - 2~71. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text except for the date, but the memorandum was apparently drafted in the Department of State. Document 230 refers to what apparently is this draft memorandum as the "State SEA Paper". Moreover, it seems to be an enlarged version of Document 222, which is five pages in manuscript form. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it is the "initial draft" of the November 11 memorandum to the President (see Document 234). Another handwritten notation indicates that the source text was discussed at the meeting with the Secretary of State on November 9, apparently a reference to the meeting described in Document 232.
SUBJECT
South Viet-NamThe Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree:
1. The fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia and in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly in the Orient, would be extremely serious.
2. The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam by any measures short of the introduction of U.S. forces on a substantial scale.
3. It would be desirable if the fall of South Viet-Nam could be prevented without commitment of U.S. combat forces. It is our agreed judgment, as indicated above, that we cannot base a policy on that hope. On the other hand, if we proceed with the energy and confidence based upon a determination to see the matter through, and if this were made evident to both friend and foe, there might be opportunities to accomplish the objective without the actual commitment of the entire effort for which we would be prepared.
4. In a situation where a nation of twenty million people is being intimidated by an active force of fifteen to twenty thousand Viet Cong, it is obvious that the self-help of the Vietnamese and their attitude toward U.S. forces are crucial to success. U.S. and SEATO forces from outside Viet-Nam cannot accomplish our basic national objective without a determined effort by the Vietnamese. This factor constitutes the critical limitation on our own commitment.
Probable Extent of U.S. Commitment
If we commit combat forces to South Viet-Nam, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment in Southeast Asia must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged, and Hanoi and Peiping may overtly intervene. It is the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in the light of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, we can assume that the maximum United States forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia would not exceed six divisions, or about 205,000 men. This would be in addition to local forces and such SEATO forces as may be engaged. It is also the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our military posture is, or, with the addition of more National Guard or regular Army divisions, can be made, adequate to furnish these forces/2/ without serious interference with our present Berlin plans./3/
/2/ A handwritten insertion at this point reads, "and support them in action."
/3/Written above the final four words of this sentence are the words, "the discharge of our obligations", apparently intended as a suggested substitution.
Relation to Laos
It must be understood that the introduction of American combat forces into Viet-Nam prior to a Laotian settlement would run a considerable risk of stimulating a Communist breach of the cease fire and a resumption of hostilities in Laos. This could present us with a choice between the use of combat forces in Laos or an abandonment of that country to full Communist control. At the present time, there is at least a chance that a settlement can be reached in Laos on the basis of a weak and unsatisfactory Souvanna Phouma Government./4/ On the other hand, the introduction of U.S. forces into Viet-Nam after a Laotian settlement could serve to stabilize the position both in Viet-Nam and in Laos by registering our determination to see to it that the Laotian settlement was as far as the U.S. would be willing to see Communist influence in Southeast Asia develop.
/4/When?" is written in the margin alongside this sentence.
Use of ICC and Geneva Conference Procedures
The question naturally arises whether Viet-Nam can be settled through the use of the ICC and a resort to a Geneva-type conference in an effort to find a negotiated settlement. The dangers in this procedure are very high, if our objective is to prevent a serious increase in Communist influence in Southeast Asia. South Viet-Nam resulted from the partition of Viet-Nam and represents that portion which is entitled to be free from Communist penetration or control. To embark upon a course of negotiation with the Sino-Soviet Bloc would acknowledge that the Communists are entitled to negotiate about South Viet-Nam alone and would mean that they would insist upon some sort of settlement comparable to that in Laos. We do not believe this is desirable or necessary, given the scale of Viet Cong action and the stronger position of the GVN and the greater accessibility of Viet-Nam to the United States and SEATO.
Action Short of U.S. Combat Forces
Our only hope of achieving some stabilization of the situation in South Viet-Nam without the commitment of the major/5/ U.S. combat forces would seem to lie in:
/5/The word "substantial" is written above major.
1. The prompt revamping of the administrative and military command structure of the GVN;
2. Sharply increased U.S. military assistance to the GVN in airlift, intelligence, watercraft, and increased U.S. participation in the direction and control of GVN military operations;
3. Large-scale use of U.S. funds to act promptly to support flood relief and rehabilitation, increases in military and civilian pay full supply of a wide range of materials such as food, medical supplies, transportation equipment, communications equipment, and any other items where material help could assist Diem in winning his own war;
4. The maximum political involvement of other nations, including neutrals.
5. A significant diminution in Communist support to the Viet Cong, brought about by a firm/6/ indication to the Communist Bloc that we were prepared to do what was necessary to prevent further support of the Viet Cong.
/6/An illegible word is written above "firm".
It should be pointed out, however, that point 3 above, could not be accomplished unless we ourselves had first taken a clear decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism/7/ including whatever U.S. combat forces may be required to accomplish this objective.
/7/An alternate ending to this sentence is handwritten at this point: "including the introduction of a US military presence at once followed by whatever additional U.S. combat forces may be required to accomplish this objective."
Multilateral Action
From the political point of view, both domestic and international, it would seem crucial to involve at least some combat /8/ forces from other nations alongside of U.S. forces in Viet-Nam. It would be difficult to explain why no effort had been made to invoke SEATO or why the United States would have to carry this burden unilaterally. Our position would be greatly strengthened if the introduction of combat/9/ forces could be taken as a SEATO action, accompanied by units of other SEATO countries, with a full SEATO report to the United Nations of the purposes and limitations of the action itself.
/8/Handwritten brackets are around the word "combat" and a question mark is written in the margin.
/9/Handwritten brackets are around the word "combat" and "time?" is written in the margin.
Recommendations
In the light of the foregoing, it is recommended that:
1. We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam/10/ to Communism and the willingness to commit whatever United States combat/11/ forces may be necessary to achieve this objective. (At such time as combat forces may be committed, they would at least initially be deployed into the area south of the 17th Parallel with the mission of being prepared to meet any overt North Vietnamese attack across the demilitarized zone and of relieving GVN forces presently deployed in that area for offensive operations./12/
/10/"SEA" is written above "South Viet-Nam" and "when act?" is written in the margin.
/11/Handwritten brackets are around "combat" and the word "military" is written above it.
/12/ Handwritten brackets are around the phrase "for offensive operations" and "how many?" is written in the margin.
2. We immediately undertake consultations initially with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, and subsequently with other SEATO members to inform them of the foregoing decision and to obtain the widest possible SEATO participation. However, our decision to act in South Viet-Nam is not contingent upon SEATO agreement/13/ thereto.
/13/Written in the margin at this point is "any support?"
3. We communicate our decision by suitable diplomatic means at an appropriate time to the Communist Bloc and selected friendly countries other than those in SEATO./14/
/14/Handwritten interpolations reverse the sequence of actions as follows: "We communicate our decision by suitable diplomatic means to selected friendly countries other than those in SEATO and at an appropriate time to the Com. Bloc."
4. We continue our efforts to obtain a settlement in Laos.
5. Ambassador Nolting be instructed to make an immediate approach to President Diem to the effect that the Government of the United States is prepared to join the Government of Viet-Nam in a massive joint effort to cope with the Viet Cong threat, and the ravages of the flood, if, on its part, the Government of Viet-Nam is prepared promptly to carry out an effective total mobilization of its own resources, both material and human, for the same end.
a. Specifically, the United States is prepared on its part to:
(1) Deploy U.S. combat forces to South Viet-Nam in- the area south of the 17th Parallel to meet any overt North Vietnamese attack and to relieve SVN forces presently there for offensive operations against the Viet Cong;
(2) Invite SEATO members to participate in the above deployment, but will not be deterred by any lack of participation;
(3) Provide individual administrators for insertion into the Governmental machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and numbers to be agreed upon by the two governments;
(4) Assist the GVN in effecting surveillance and control over the coastal waters and inland waterways, furnishing such advisers, operating personnel and small craft as may be necessary for quick and effective operations;
(5) Reorganize MAAG-Viet-Nam and increase its size as may be necessary by the implementation of these recommendations;
(6) Review its economic aid program to take account of the needs of flood relief, to give priority to projects in support of the expanded counter insurgency program, and to supply material in support of the security effort;
(7) To support a request by the GVN to FAO or any other appropriate international organization for multilateral assistance in the rehabilitation of the flood area.
b. The United States believes that the following joint enterprises with the GVN are required:
(1) A joint effort to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through the Government and armed forces to the central intelligence organization;
(2) A joint survey of the conditions in the provinces to assess the social, political, intelligence, and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the counter-insurgency in order to reach a common estimate of these factors and a common determination of how to deal with them;
(3) A joint effort to free the army for mobile, offensive operations. This effort will be based upon improving the training and equipping of the civil guard and the self-defense corps, relieving the regular army of static missions, raising the level of the mobility of army forces by the provision of considerably more helicopters and light aviation, and organizing a border ranger force for a long-term campaign on the Laotian border against the Viet Cong infiltrators. The U.S. Government will support this joint effort with equipment and with military units and personnel to do those tasks which the armed forces of Viet-Nam cannot perform in time. Such tasks include air reconnaissance and photography, airlift (beyond the present capacity of SVN forces), special intelligence, and air-ground support techniques.
c. It is the view of the United States Government that the unilateral U.S. actions and the joint US-GVN undertakings listed in a and b above will succeed in defeating the Viet Cong only if:
(1) They are accepted and carried out with the complete and unreserved approval of and cooperation by the GVN
(2) The GVN takes appropriate legislative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilize its entire resources;
(3) Establishes appropriate governmental wartime agencies with adequate authority to perform their functions effectively;
(4) Overhauls its military establishment and creates an effective organization to prosecute the war;
d. Before setting in motion the U.S. proposals listed above, the U.S. Government would appreciate confirmation of their acceptability to the GVN, and an expression from the GVN of the undertakings it is prepared to make to ensure the success of this joint effort.
229. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State/1/
Washington, November 9, 1961, 1:40 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 6s D 366, CF 1990. Secret. Drafted by Horgan and approved in the Office of the Secretary on November 17. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books)
SUBJECT
Viet NamPARTICIPANTS
Mr. M.J. Desai, Foreign Secretary, Government of India
Mr. D.N. Chatterjee, Minister, Embassy of India
The Secretary
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asia
Rogers B. Horgan, Officer-in-Charge, India-Ceylon-NepalThe Secretary requested Mr. Desai's estimate of the Indian influence on Hanoi.
Mr. Desai said it was now very little, mainly because of India's difficulties with China. The primary influence in Hanoi was held by the Soviet Union.
The Secretary said there was some debate here as to the relative ascendancy of Moscow's and Peiping's influence in Hanoi.
Mr. Desai remarked that Hanoi must pay court these days to Peiping but they try to keep as clear of Peiping influence as possible. In contrast, their relations with Moscow are firm. Washington can talk straight to Moscow and the Soviets will understand us. In turn, Hanoi will accept what Moscow says. If we try to relay messages through India or Yugoslavia, Hanoi will be uncertain how to interpret what Delhi or Belgrade says, and may well go to Moscow for advice on that point.
The Secretary pointed out the U.S. would have some difficulties over going directly to the Soviets on questions involving South Viet Nam. They would seize upon our approach as a negotiating point and try to become involved in the South Viet Nam situation, just as they are now in Laos.
Mr. Desai predicted that in such circumstances the USSR would ask for a discussion of the Viet Nam situation in a conference. He said, however, that he believed we would be able to satisfy them by taking the stand that unification could not possibly be negotiated under present circumstances, and then setting a date, such as 1963, for further talks on unification. (Mr. Desai did not make it clear whether he meant that the USSR would be satisfied with this answer in bilateral talks with us, or whether he envisaged that a conference would be brought to agree on such an arrangement. In earlier conversations, notably his conversation with the Secretary on November 7,/2/ Mr. Desai had reported that he had advised Ambassador Harriman against trying to solve the Viet Nam situation by the conference method. He feels that at a conference there will be a demand for unification by elections as envisaged in the 1954 Geneva accord.)
/2/See Document 221.
The Secretary remarked that in Viet Nam, as in other situations, the U.S. is being asked to negotiate and make concessions in order to get the other side to cease and desist from what amounts to highway robbery by them.
Mr. Desai demurred from this view of the Viet Nam situation, saying that the other side has some justification in its claim that the 1954 agreements have never been carried out. The Secretary dismissed this line of reasoning by pointing out that since 1943 it is hard to find an agreement we have had with the USSR that has not been violated by them. Mr. Desai responded by merely noting that violation of agreements between opponents was not unusual in international affairs, Pakistani agreements with India having often been violated.
The Secretary told Mr. Desai that, looking beyond the present situation in Viet Nam, if it were not possible to bring to a stop the present Communist activity there, and if the solution in Laos were to prove unsatisfactory, there would be a strong possibility that the United States would pull out of Southeast Asia very fast and simply "take the area off our agenda."
Mr. Desai responded by suggesting that we need not take a pessimistic view. In Laos, for example, we can count on the fact that Souvanna Phouma needs our aid, so that we can put much pressure on him.
The Secretary noted that it was Souphanouvong who is dragging his feet on reaching agreement now. Mr. Desai noted that for the past several years Souphanouvong has had to rely on the Viet Minh for everything. It will take a while to rehabilitate him: he cannot be expected to turn his back on his benefactors overnight. Mr. Desai implied, however, that he believed Souphanouvong could be rehabilitated, relying on the fundamental Laotian dislike of the Vietnamese.
The conversation then turned to the consideration of the Joint Communiqué to be issued by the President and the Prime Minister in the afternoon./3/
/3/For text of the joint communiqué issued on November 9, see Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1961, pp. 927-928.
230. Memorandum From Lieutenant Commander Worth H. Bagley to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, November 9, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-127-69. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
State SEA Paper/2//2/See footnote 1, Document 228.
Page 1.
Paragraph 2-Reference to "substantial forces" apparently assumes the lower-tone approach you have recommended is not viable. On one hand, our forces are to boost GVN morale, show our resolve, and provide a boost to Diem's making necessary organizational changes; on the other hand, US forces are to take up the sword and try to win the war.
Page 3.
Ready availability of sea, air, and logistic forces assumed here. This is not consistent with past statements of SecDef. Should be clarified.
Page 4.
If we have warned Bloc of our objectives in SVN before placing troops there, NVN will think twice before supporting Pathet Lao resumption of hostilities in Laos.
What is Harriman view?
If a US force commitment in SVN is urgent (this question is not faced in the State paper), it should not be delayed to complete an "unsatisfactory" settlement in Laos.
As we enter SVN, tell Bloc we intend remain constant to negotiations in Laos as long as fighting is not resumed.
Pages 6-7.
There is every reason to believe that the Taylor Mission eliminated the possibility that significant changes in SVN can be achieved without the encouraging presence of US forces. This fact must be hammered home. If the Vietnamese want us on the ground, the opinion elsewhere is of little account-at least if we truly want SVN to help itself and thereby avoid a large US force commitment later.
Pages 7-8.
If the Task Force envisaged is given an international flavor or strength beyond the initial needs, it is probable that its low-tone application will be lost and it will take on more of the attributes of a combat force deployed for offensive operations. This will then degrade the basic objective of prompting the GVN to organize to win the war essentially without external combat assistance.
Page 8.
If US forces are placed near 17th parallel:
How are flood relief units protected?
Will effect on population be lost since US troops are not visible as they would be in Delta?
If object is to defend line, it can be done better by amphibious force steaming in vicinity of parallel.
Is it not provocative without reason?
Does it not require larger US commitment than would otherwise be needed at outset?
General
Program is blunt. Loses "test" flavor of your recommendations which are more apt to prod Diem to action. As written, State paper emphasizes too much a large, inflexible US commitment for all to see.
Depending on how implemented, State paper may require dictating changes to Diem which will put joint effort on poor basis. A better alternative is your program which envisages a softer approach with no less hard end-objective.
Timing throughout State paper is vague. This should be clarified.
WHB/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
231. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of Defense (Bundy) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
Washington. November 9, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SE Asia 1961. Top Secret. The time of receipt in the Office of the Secretary of Defense is stamped on the source text as 2:20 p.m., November 9.
SUBJECT
Comments on South Vietnam ThreatBasic
1. The paper/2/ does not say whether we will in fact send combat forces and if so when. Does it mean "take the seven steps and then test," or what? If it means "make the commitment and take only the seven steps," then I would agree with George Ball that this is the worst of both worlds.
/2/See footnote 1, Document 228.
2. The combat forces scheme is most undesirable militarily, and was so pointed out three weeks ago by JCS./3/ The border area is not an area of major Viet Cong activity, it is unhealthy and difficult to operate in, and easy to bypass for the Viet Cong. Either the Kontum plateau or the Delta "flood relief" force make much more sense, and I for one see no compensating political edge to the idea in the draft. The Kontum area has a good border-holding explanation.
/3/Presumably a reference to Document 150.
3. The timing of action is not covered. In particular, the relation to Laos is left hanging. Does the draft mean wait at all costs till Laos is buttoned up? If so, it may be indefinite and futile, and in itself condemn us to the "seven points" only. On the other hand, it is true that if we rely on sea lift the time of transit from the US (35 days) or Hawaii (25-30 days since shipping has to come from the US) would itself mean that, even if we decided now, we could hold the impact of arrival of the major force off till a month from now. If the movement leaked, we could argue a maneuver with at least faint plausibility. By airlift or use of Okinawa forces we can of course get some forces in quicker-a week by sea from Okinawa, 7-10 days to get a brigade from the US by air . . . ./4/ However, on this whole question of relation to Laos, the tough question is whether the cat won't be out of the bag the moment we say to Diem that we will send forces. To me, the draft judgment that there is "considerable risk" of the other side moving in Laos is a bit over-stated. There is a risk, all right, but the right noises would help keep it down-and it doesn't wholly go away even with a settlement. This again argues against too fixed calculation on the timing of a settlement.
/4/Ellipsis in the source text.
4. The paper does not mention the issue of honoring the Laos border. This does hinge on a settlement. If there is one, or about to be one, my own judgment is that we would be wiser, net, to honor the border. However, we might have to change later if the flow kept up-and the odds are that it would.
Lesser
5. On SEATO help, seek it by all means, but let's not wait long on this. Accord on not accepting any veto.
6. On when to tell the Soviets (page 9), to tell them right away would run the risk of appeals for a conference, and our having to reject this before we even move men in. One answer might be to move some few men in and tell the Soviets coincidentally. Enough to show we mean business, not so large it makes the whole thing clearly unnegotiable.
William P. Bundy
232. Notes of a Meeting, Department of State/1/
Washington, November 9, 1961, 4:36 p.m.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, L-216-71. Secret. Handwritten by Lemnitzer. According to the source text, the following people were present at the meeting: Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Nitze, Lemnitzer, William Bundy, Harriman, Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, Taylor, and Rostow. According to Rusk's Appointment Book, he met at 4:36 p.m. on November 9 to discuss Vietnam with Ball, McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Rostow, Nitze, Taylor, William Bundy, and U. Alexis Johnson. Harriman joined the meeting at 5:06 p.m. The next appointment shown was a 6:41 p.m. meeting with McNamara alone. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books)
Sec. State read p. 1/2/ aloud. Argument on "extremely." Rusk questioned "sharply against," par. 3 & 4.
/2/Reference is apparently to the draft paper described in footnote 1, Document 228.
I raised question of what is the obj.
Secy. Def. would put his first par. 1st p. 8.
I objected to parenthetical remarks. I stated that we must have a clear statement of the milt objective before we rec[ommend] a force to accomplish it.
Sec. State insisted on discussing troop deployment rather than face real issue of troops.
Rostow believes it would be easier to get SEATO into the 17th area rather than in the plateau area.
Rusk leans strongly toward introducing administrators, MAAG, etc.--it does not commit US as does combat forces. Reluctant to put in US forces until Diem makes a 100% effort in his area. Cited US pulling out students, etc., while VN students stay in school. What domestic case can be made for such a step?
Harriman--pare 5 line 8--suggests we have a conference before we put forces in-would confront . . ./3/
/3/Ellipsis in the source text.
Rostow--Desai says that if you try to deal with ICC before troops you have no bargaining power.
Harriman believes we should have a showdown with plan ready. If you put in troops there is no real negotiation possible with Russians.
Nitze believes introduction of US forces will result in stepping up infiltration.
Sec. State-to Harriman: Will putting US forces in VN blow open Laotian situation?
Harriman--Yes. World does not consider that VC are supported from North-they believe it is Diem's fault. Time schedule-release Jorden report. Talks with USSR within a few days.
Rusk-national interest obj. What we should do. Scenario-diplomatic moves.
233. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President/1/
Washington, November 11, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-628-71. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "Gen. Taylor only-no further distribution." Neither the original nor any other copy of this memorandum has been found at the Kennedy Library.
Mr. Rusk will table this morning a proposal for action in Viet Nam/2/ that stops short of installing U.S. forces now, but commits us-in our minds-to a full scale U.S. effort to save that country.
/2/See Document 234.
I appreciate, of course, the difficulty of the decision and the reasons for reserving this move; but I should like to set out as clearly as I can the reasons for placing some minimal U.S. ground force in Viet Nam as part of the initial package.
This problem has been bedevilled by confusion about the various things a U.S. force could initially accomplish: from fighting in the paddies and jungles (which no one proposes), to guarding engineer units. To simplify the matter, I shall make the case for placing immediately a U.S. (or SEATO) force of (say) 5,000 men on the 17th Parallel./3/
/3/Neither the place nor the figure are essential to the argument. As an initial point of disposition, I like the Parallel because it fits the diplomatic situation described in paragraph 3, below. I say 5,000 men because I understood from the MAAG adviser to the 1st ARVN division that static duty on the parallel was now being done by 3,500 men (half the division); and U.S. forces could relieve them. On the other hand, 5,000 seemed a rough minimum U.S. unit that could protect itself. [Footnote in the source text.]
1. From the point of view of Southeast Asia, this is the gut issue and gut decision they are awaiting. Our case for asking a great deal from Diem would be strengthened if this threshold in U.S. action were passed.
2. Without the troop commitment, the Communists (who have been reading of our fears of white men in Asia and of Nehru's line on Ho Chi Minh) will believe they still have plenty of room for maneuver and to continue infiltration. An ambiguous signal to them is dangerous; and, whatever the rhetoric, they will interpret our policy by deeds, not words. The deeds proposed are, indeed, ambiguous.
3. When we publish the Jorden Report and enlarge the MAAG we shall be declaring the 1954 Accords are being violated and we propose to deal with the consequences of that violation, until the Accords are re-established. We cannot carry out the agreed seven steps without grossly exceeding the 1954 advisory ceiling. Under these circumstances, the question arises: What is there to protect South Viet Nam from the North Viet Nam divisions if the 1954 Accord is in temporary abeyance? A U.S. (or SEATO) force on the Parallel would provide an unambiguous answer.
4. If we go into a negotiation on Viet Nam with U.S. forces in place on the 17th Parallel, we have a bargaining counter for a return to the Geneva Accords namely, the withdrawal of our troops. Otherwise, as Desai pointed out, a negotiation about Viet Nam might be turned simply into a negotiation about South Viet Nam. In short, the presence of the U.S. force would give us the element which we badly lacked in the Laos negotiation, which led many of us, including Harriman, to urge the installation of SEATO Plan 5 in May.
Aside from these four specific points, there is a general attitude in the State Department paper which I regard as dangerous. It would inhibit U.S. action on our side of the truce lines of the Cold War for fear of enemy escalation. The lesson of the post-war, it seems to me, is that we must be prepared on our side of the line to do whatever we believe necessary to protect our own and the Free World's interest. No one is proposing that we liberate North Viet Nam. No one is proposing at this stage-although the issue may have to be faced-selective action in North Viet Nam if Communist infiltration does not stop. General Taylor's proposals are, in my view, conservative proposals for action on our side of the Cold War truce lines, to buy time and permit negotiation to take over for an interval, under reasonably favorable circumstances. I think it unwise to inhibit ourselves in these regions for fear of what the enemy may do by way of reaction.
The steps proposed-including those which are now agreed-should, of course, not be taken unless we are deeply prepared for all the possible consequences. But, if the enemy goes to war-in Laos, South Viet Nam, or both-because of our actions on our side of the line, it means he has already decided to take Southeast Asia by whatever means are necessary; and that his actions up to this point simply meant that he was prepared to take South Viet Nam by cheap means and Laos by slow means, if possible. If he goes to war because of what we do on our side of the line, it does not mean that he went to war because of what we did. It means he had already determined to face war rather than forego victory in South Viet Nam, and that only our surrender of South Viet Nam could prevent war.
Because of this assessment, I question the State Department's judgment on the relation between the introduction of U.S. troops and a Laos settlement. The Communist problem is to decide whether or not they are prepared to fight the U.S. (or SEATO) in Southeast Asia.
A final thought. With respect to both Cuba and Laos our legal and moral case was ambiguous. It was impossible in our kind of society to rally the full weight of American authority behind the military enterprises in those areas. The case of South Viet Nam is clean. We know it; the enemy knows it; and, in their hearts, the knowledgeable neutrals know it; e.g., Desai. The Jorden Report will, I believe, be widely persuasive. If we move without ambiguity-without the sickly pallor of our positions on Cuba and Laos-I believe we can unite the country and the Free World; and there is a better than even chance that the Communists will back down and bide their time. This we should cheerfully accept; because the underlying forces in Asia are with us, if we do not surrender and vigorously exploit them.
234. Editorial Note
On November 11, 1961, the Departments of State and Defense prepared a memorandum for the President which, according to a covering memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, was intended for the discussion with the President at noon that day (see Document 236). Copies were sent to Taylor and Rostow. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series) The text of the memorandum for the President is in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pages 359-367.
235. List of Questions Prepared by the President/1/
Washington, November 11, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-642D-71. Secret. Also printed in Declassified Documents, 1976, p. 210F.
Questions for the Meeting on South Vietnam, 12:00, November 11, 1961
1. Will this program be effective without including the introduction of a U.S. troop task force?
2. What reasons shall we give Diem for not acceding to his request for U.S. troops?
3. Under what circumstances would we reconsider our decision on troops? How are we relating their possible introduction to the Laotian negotiations?
4. Is the U.S. commitment to prevent the fall of South Vietnam to Communism to be a public act or an internal policy decision of the U.S. Government?
5. To what extent is our offer of help to Diem contingent upon his prior implementation of the reform measures which we are proposing to him?
6. I note the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in paragraph 5, page 3./2/ Does our ability to support forces in action include those of our Allies as well as U.S. forces?
/2/Reference is to the memorandum discussed in Document 234.
7. How will we organize the execution of this program (a) in Washington, (b) in Saigon?
8. How do you propose to proceed now in bringing this matter to me as a coordinated recommendation?
236. Notes of a Meeting, The White House/1/
Washington, November 11, 1961, 12:10 p.m
/1/Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, L-214-71. Top Secret. Handwritten by Lemnitzer. According to the notes, the meeting was attended by the President, Rusk, U. Alexis Johnson, McConaughy, Robert Kennedy, Cabell, Taylor, Rostow, McGeorge Bundy, Nitze, Lemnitzer, and McNamara. According to the President's log book, he met on November 11 from 11:50 a.m. to noon with Taylor and Rostow and from noon to 1:55 p.m. with Rusk, McNamara, Lemnitzer, and Taylor. (Kennedy Library, JFK Log Books) No other record of this meeting has been found.
Rusk: Reviewed situation--U.S. interests, situation now, relationship with Laos. Discussed disproportionate ratio of U.S. forces (except ROK) in Korea during Korean War, SEATO possibilities, neutral possibilities. Helicopters--discussion of each step under 3./2/
/2/Reference is to the memorandum discussed in Document 234.
P: Par. 3 items sound like Laos. Question of international character a la Phils, Thais, Aussies, etc.
Taylor: Could be useful in flood relief.
P: How can we make Diem govt more palatable?
Rostow: Flood.
P: We have a congressional prob. Sen. Russell & others are opposed.
Rusk: Line with ICC would be that enemy has broken agreement--we will return to adherence when enemy does.
P: Troops are a last resort. Should be SEATO forces. Will create a tough domestic problem. Would like to avoid statements like Laos & Berlin.
Atty Gen: Statement from P. is required in connection with Taylor mission. We are not sending combat troops. [We are] not committing ourselves to combat troops. Make it much SEATO as possible.
Secy McNamara & I made it clear that JCS and Sec Def conclude that proposed actions will not by themselves solve this problem and that further action will be required.
P: Will draft letter to Diem.
Secy State: Rec[ommended] general approval of approach.
P: Will not decide now re point 1 of the rec[ommendations]. Will it mean a war with China? Will not go that far as to approve. Approve 2, 3 & 4.
Sec Def: We will work on 2, 3, 4, & 6 without taking actions.
Taylor: Under 3 which is irrevocable we should move now.
P: I am ready to approve 3. Will not accept 1. Will go for 3. Want it to be as multilateral as possible.
Johnson: Line clearly drawn in VN-it was not in Laos.
237. Editorial Note
On November 11, 1961, Robert G.K. Thompson of the British Advisory Mission in Saigon sent a letter to President Diem to which was attached a memorandum outlining a plan for clearing the Viet Cong from the delta area. Also attached to the letter was a note dealing with various intelligence matters. Copies of the letter and the memorandum were also given to the United States Embassy in Saigon and were transmitted to the Department of State as attachments to despatch 205, November 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2061) The note on intelligence was apparently not given to the United States Embassy. Thompson's letter and the attached memorandum are printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pages 345-358.
238. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President/1/
Washington, November 12, 1961.
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret. Initialed by Rostow.
At your request I have read again SNIE 10-4-61, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain U.S. Actions in South Vietnam."/2/
/2/Not printed. A note on the source text indicates that a copy of SNIE 10-4-61 was attached to the source text, but this copy, which Rostow marked for the President, has not been found.
1. By and large-with one major exception-I agree with the estimate. The sentence which I would question is on page 6: "Nevertheless these developments are not likely to substantially alter (sic) Communist China's attitudes towards military commitments in Southeast Asia." I do not see how a country which is depending on Australia and Canada for a critical margin for feeding its cities, which is probing to see if it can get PL 480 grain, and whose agriculture and industry are disorganized in a crisis which will take several years at best to surmount, would go to war except as a suicidal act. The present Communist leaders have a long view of history and a great faith in the future of China. There is no evidence that they are in a suicidal mood. Mao's basic precept has always been: "If the enemy attacks, I disappear; if he defends, I harass; and if he retreats, I attack." Under present circumstances I believe that Communist China would be in a mood to postpone its advance into Southeast Asia even at the expense of what they would regard as a temporary stabilization of the Free World's position in South Viet-Nam so long as we did not cross the 17th parallel with forces on the ground and threaten to liberate North Viet-Nam. Then-but only then-do I believe they would go to war with us.
2. Fundamentally the assessment in the SNIE is in accord with this judgment. It suggests that the actions taken by the U.S. would lead to essentially defensive responses./3/ See, for example, the marked passages on pages 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15 and 16.
/3/Even selective air attack on North Vietnam. [Handwritten footnote in the source text.]
3. I have marked one passage on page 13 with an "X". This passage suggests the possibility that if it looked as though South Viet-Nam were winning out over the Communists in South Viet-Nam, the Communists would consider sending North Vietnamese regular units into South Viet-Nam, although they would recognize this action would raise the risks of broadening the war. As I said to you in my memorandum of yesterday,/4/ whether they would go to war in Southeast Asia depends on their assessment of U.S. strength and determination. Thus far their whole operation has been designed to bypass U.S. military strength, both nuclear and conventional. I do not believe that they would go to war in Southeast Asia merely to save a Communist foothold in South Viet-Nam; and the whole argument of SNIE 10-4-61 tends to bear this out.
/4/Document 233.
239. Letter From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to the President/1/
Washington, November 12, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Personal. Handwritten by Harriman.
Mr. President: I have given a copy of this draft memorandum to Dean Rusk. He asked me to tell you his comment. "It is a matter of timing" bearing in mind "other communications" on the same subject.
Averell
[Attachment]
Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)
Washington, November 11, 1961.
This memorandum outlines a diplomatic-political course of action in Viet-Nam. It is put forward as offering the possibility of avoiding heavy United States military commitments with attendant risk and at the same time preventing the loss of South Viet-Nam to the Communists. The chance of its success cannot be estimated but it does not preclude other actions should it fail. Moreover, there are some indications that the Soviet Union would be interested in the establishment of a peaceful and stable situation in Southeast Asia, at least for a time.
Every effort should be made to bring the present Laos negotiations to a rapid conclusion-at Geneva and in Laos. Then certain commitments, already agreed to, would become operative, namely not to use Lao territory against any country with the undertaking by the U.S.S.R. as a co-chairman to police Communist-bloc observance. Compliance or noncompliance with this provision could be promptly ascertained.
The course here suggested involves a direct approach to the U.S.S.R., through our present relationship at the Geneva Conference on Laos. Thus there is hope for a fairly quick reading on the prospect for success.
1. Tactical: Concurrently with the publication of the "Jorden Report", Harriman would be authorized to approach Pushkin at Geneva. He would recall that Pushkin has often said the Soviet Union is interested in a stable and peaceful situation in Southeast Asia. The progress made toward the settlement of the Laos question is meaningless if hostilities continue in neighboring Viet-Nam. The United States believes that an effort should be made to resolve that situation peacefully and end the aggression against SVN. The violation of the 1954 Accords by NVN has caused the United States to support SVN. A peaceful settlement should be built on the foundation of the 1954 Accords. The U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom, as co-chairmen, should bring together a small group of the powers directly concerned to review the Accords to see how compliance can be secured and how they can be strengthened to meet today's needs. If this small group of powers could agree on measures to this end, the co-chairmen could present the results of their work to the Geneva Conference as a whole for ratification. The powers which would be engaged in this review would be the U.K., U.S.S.R., United States, Communist China, France, North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, and India (perhaps). Although France is not as directly concerned as the others we cannot afford the resentment which would be caused by excluding her. As chairman of the ICC and the largest free country in the general region, India could make an important contribution if it so desired. This group of seven or eight powers, comprising those most directly interested, would be broadly representative enough to ensure that its conclusions would be adopted by the Conference as a whole and it would be small enough to be workable.
If the initial talks with Pushkin seemed promising, it might be necessary for final arrangements to be made at Moscow by Thompson, possibly with Harriman.
2. The General Character of the Settlement We Are Prepared to Contemplate:
(a) Cessation of hostilities, if possible before discussion of other points is begun.
(b) Acceptance for the time being of the division of Viet-Nam with non-interference of any kind by one side in the other's affairs.
(c) Mutual renunciation of the use of force against each other by North and South Viet-Nam and agreement that eventual reunification be sought only through peaceful means. (We should not preclude a restudy of the possibility of elections as a matter of strategy.)
(d) Mutually advantageous trade and economic relations between North and South Viet-Nam. (This appears of greater importance to NVN).
(e) Strengthened and modernized ICC, or possibly some substitute mechanism for observation and enforcement.
(f) Under these conditions we might be prepared to adhere to the Accords as revised.
Harriman would be authorized to put forward these points with Pushkin as a basis of negotiations. (Supporting staff studies on each of them should begin at once.) In the course of his discussions, Harriman could point out that the level of our military assistance and the size of MAAG in South Viet-Nam are obviously related to the seriousness of the military situation there. As hostilities are brought under control and as the situation demonstrates stability, the natural consequence would be a concomitant reduction in U.S. military aid and advice.
3. The Internal Situation in South Viet-Nam: The best any international settlement can do is to buy time. If the Government of South Viet-Nam continues a repressive, dictatorial and unpopular regime, the country will not long retain its independence. Nor can the United States afford to stake its prestige there. We must make it clear to Diem that we mean business about internal reform. This will require a strong ambassador who can control all U.S. activities (political, military, economic, etc.), and who is known by Diem to have the personal intimacy and confidence of the President and the Secretary. Additional military aid and increased U.S. participation with SEATO support should be promptly provided as necessary to hold the line, and to improve the present dangerous situation, both in gaining ground militarily as well as in building public morale.
4. The International Situation: Based on the "Jorden Report" world public opinion should be developed to understand the true nature of NVN aggression. Our actions with SEATO support must be clearly but firmly presented as necessary to permit the people of SVN to retain their freedom, but are limited in duration to the emergency. We cannot afford to face again the situation we have in Laos where most of world opinion, including some of our close allies, believe we have acted unwisely, to put it mildly, in attempting to dominate that country.
5. Other Alternatives: Major military commitment as well as possible UN initiative should be held in reserve as long as direct negotiations seemed to be making progress.
240. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, November 12, 1961, 7:31 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1361. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by McConaughy, cleared in draft with Johnson (G) and the Secretary, and signed for the Secretary by McConaughy.
587. Eyes only for Ambassador. Embtel 635./2/ While I recognize cogency of arguments you have advanced for immediate brief period consultation Washington, believe that we cannot afford inevitable delay in implementation action program based on Taylor Report (forthcoming Deptel) which would result from your absence from your post at this time. I feel that you should personally and immediately conduct complex and delicate negotiations with Diem which are condition precedent for launching of this ambitious program on which so much hinges. We estimate that trip you suggest would result in delay of two weeks in getting this effort under way. Such a delay unacceptable when time crucial factor.
/2/In telegram 635, November 13 (received in the Department on November 12 at 6:08 a.m.), and sent eyes only for the Secretary, Nolting asked for permission to return to Washington for a brief period of consultation regarding Vietnam. He gave the following as the main reasons for his request:
"1. I believe I can help mold plan which will fit here; in any event I should see and discuss details of what's being developed before it is finalized;
"2. It would be most valuable-from standpoint of correct understanding of Washington intentions and of Embassy and Task Force authority in executing U.S. plans-if I could personally bring back President's decision. (Standing of those on spot here was inevitably diminished-to the benefit, I hope and believe, of the cause-by Mission sent from Washington under its expressed terms of reference and attendant publicity.)" (Ibid.)
We regret now that you were not instructed to come to Washington for consultation when General Taylor returned. Since this was not done, we have no choice but to postpone any Washington consultation for present.
Rusk
241. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State/1/
Washington, November 13, 1961, 10:33 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1361. Secret. Drafted by Brown and approved in the Office of the Secretary of State on November 26. The time of the meeting is from the Secretary of State's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books)
SUBJECT
Viet-NamPARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Embassy
Mr. Marcel Barthelemy, First Secretary, French Embassy
Mr. L. Dean Brown, WE
Mr. Chalmers B. Wood, SEAThe Ambassador came in to discuss Viet-Nam in light of General Taylor's mission.
The Secretary said he would not try to give a run-down of General Taylor's report but would outline what we intend to do. We plan to take the necessary measures which will make it possible for Viet-Nam to win its own war. We will put in additional economic and ordinary military assistance and supply some types of support the Vietnamese cannot supply themselves. The latter will include American-manned photo reconnaissance and airlift capability. We will supply personnel and certain equipment to assist reorganizing parts of the government and its intelligence functions. More military instructors will be made available at lower levels within the Vietnamese forces so as to overcome immobility. Food will be supplied in connection with flood relief. We will provide assistance so as to enable the Vietnamese to block Viet-Minh movement by sea.
The Secretary continued by saying Diem must reorganize to give authority to civilian and military parts of his government so that these can operate effectively without his direct supervision. National mobilization of Viet-Nam is the goal. We do not, however, visualize sending U.S. forces of the battle-group type, although this may become necessary later.
The Ambassador said that the French Government fears that the U.S. will send fighting forces, perhaps starting with engineers.
The Secretary replied that the idea of sending engineers had been dropped as the flood is now receding. We will, instead, backstop Vietnamese flood relief efforts with supplies.
The Ambassador expanded on French opposition to U.S. troops. First, no pretext should be given the Soviets to make trouble at Geneva. Second, the Soviets should not be given a pretext to intervene in mass in Viet-Nam.
The Secretary said we share the concern. So far as the second point is concerned, intervention is already on a large scale and is increasing. It is now company-sized forces with Western weapons. Three Viet-Minh regiments may be involved.
The Ambassador continued by stating the West is in a bad position to fight in Viet-Nam as the French know by experience. It would be disastrous to lose Viet-Nam but France does not want to see the involvement of forces escalated by the introduction of American troops.
The Secretary replied that we cannot see the story of Laos repeated in Viet-Nam. Friendly and United States public opinion would not accept this; isolationism would increase. NATO allies have questioned our resolve on Laos. Laos is a bad precedent. We press Phoumi to negotiate while the other side concedes nothing. If the result of Geneva does not lead to a genuine coalition and true neutrality but rather to a disguised surrender, then it is difficult to see how the United States can sign the Geneva accords or convince the American people that a neutral Laos has been established. In Viet-Nam, meantime, the Soviets blandly aid the Viet-Minh and say that all that is taking place is a popular revolt against Diem. They see no need to compromise if they can pick-up Southeast Asia without it. We are seeking to build up Vietnamese morale through our assistance, realizing that it is up to the Vietnamese government to do the main job.
The Ambassador asked if the United States position is that it will not now send forces but will not discard the possibility.
The Secretary replied affirmatively. We realize that sending troops would represent a risk. It might be a greater risk not to send them. If Southeast Asia is lost, our alliances throughout the world will be affected. The United States must look across the Pacific as well as the Atlantic. This attitude is different than that of Western European countries.
The Ambassador said he wished to sum up his government's views which he believed were shared by the British: it favors U.S. support of Vietnamese forces but believes the introduction of American forces would have a bad result.
The Secretary replied that the loss of Southeast Asia would be more important to the U.S. than to Europe. We hope that we can work together, but if the issue comes to be one of the possible loss of Southeast Asia and our European friends do not agree with our policies to prevent this, then our paths may have to diverge.
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