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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963, Volume I
Vietnam, 1961Department of State
Washington, DC
242. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/
Washington, November 13, 1961, 2:08 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls. Transcribed by Mildred Asbjornson of the Office of the Secretary.
[Here follows the beginning of the conversation regarding Laos.]
Mr. Johnson asked if the Sec. had gotten the message from the NSC on Vietnam./2/ Johnson said he had tried to discourage General Taylor and according to Taylor the Pres. was receptive. Johnson said he had told Taylor he thought we had our decisions and that there was no necessity for another meeting. Mr. Johnson said that Gen. Taylor was on his way to talk to the Vice President now. The only ones left out were the Vice President and Dillon. Johnson said he had had word that McNamara was agreeable if the Secretary was. He said we could check the paper out with Dillon and Murrow without having a meeting. The Sec. asked if they had indicated they wanted to wait until after NSC mtg., adding he would talk to Taylor by phone./3/
/2/Not further identified, but it apparently pertained to the scheduling of another meeting on Vietnam.
/3/At 2:15 p.m., Rusk called Johnson, who said "we would have to move quickly-Galbraith had been working hard on this." Johnson said he was "a little worried" since he had given Galbraith a copy of the draft instructions to be sent to Nolting. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) For Rusk's subsequent telephone conversation with Taylor, see Document 244.
243. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State/1/
Washington, November 13, 1961, 3:16 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, November 1961. Secret. Drafted by Cross on November 24 and approved in the Office of the Secretary on December 1. The time and location of the meeting are taken from the Rusk Appointment Book in the Johnson Library.
SUBJECT
Laos and Viet-NamPARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
R.T.D. Ledward, Counselor of British Embassy
Charles T. Cross, Officer in Charge, Laos AffairsThe British Ambassador came at our request to talk with the Secretary about Laos and Viet-Nam.
[Here follows discussion of Laos.]
2. Viet-Nam. The Secretary said that we are moving into the next chapter in our efforts to put Diem in position to win his war against the communists. We are planning to give him increased airlift capacity, mostly helicopters, a "Jungle Jim" unit, assistance with photo reconnaissance, some intelligence personnel and advice, additional military advisers so that we may be able to put U.S. advisers down to lower combat echelons, that we will back Diem on his own flood rehabilitation programs with heavy equipment trucks, technical advice, etc. The Secretary pointed out the these moves did not involve sending organized U.S. combat units although it might become necessary to give serious consideration to putting in combat troops depending on the situation some weeks hence.
The moves that we are now planning will bring in U.S. personnel beyond the limits set by the Geneva Accords. We will be prepared to abide by the Accords as soon as the communists do so. The Ambassador asked whether we were intending to make an announcement giving the nature and scope of our assistance. The Secretary replied that we are intending to release the Jorden Report before our moves would come to public attention . . . and we would probably wait until such increases in personnel were being protested openly before making any direct announcement.
The Secretary said that we were also urging Diem to undertake administrative and political reforms designed to improve the efficiency and general acceptability of his government. Diem was still involving himself with too many details and consequently unable to give adequate leadership and direction in major matters.
The Ambassador suggested that the Jorden Report would be a big help to the British in their role as co-chairman, and the Secretary said that we would send pre-publication copies to the British as soon as possible.
244. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, November 13, 1961, 3:37 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau of the Office of the Secretary.
The Sec returned the call and T asked if Johnson had mentioned the proposal to have an NSC meeting Wednesday./2/ The Sec answered in the affirmative and asked is it for making decisions or to ratify a refurbished paper. T said it was two-fold-some advisers were not at the Sat mtg/3/ particularly Treas and there was question as to whether it should not warrant this mtg and the Sec would have the papers ready to go. The Sec asked how T and J are coming on the papers and T said he and Rostow would see J here at 4:30. The Sec asked how far-reaching and T said not much on the cable but literary comments on the letter./4/ The Sec said he was reluctant to see us delay very much but probably they can't go out until tomorrow. T does not want delay either. The Sec suggested sending them over to Dillon to have him look at them. T said McG. Bundy was preparing a memo for the record/5/ and running into difficulty with language and the paper should be checked carefully. His feeling is the Pres does not know what he is approving. Some things are unthought out recommendations and we should tell him this means so and so. The Sec said o.k.--let's do it. He has already told the Br and Fr./6/ NSC will be Wed at 10.
/2/November 15.
/3/See Document 236.
/4/Reference is to instructions to Ambassador Nolting and a letter from President Kennedy to President Diem; see Document 257 and footnote 2 thereto.
/5/See Document 247.
/6/See Document 241 and Document 243.
245. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)/1/
Washington, November 13, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Southeast Asia 1961.
SUBJECT
Command Structure for South VietnamIn accordance with the discussion at the November 11 meeting with the President,/2/ I would appreciate the earliest possible recommendations, together with a draft order, from the Joint Chiefs concerning a command structure for South Vietnam under which a senior US military commander would assume responsibility for all activities, including intelligence operations, related to the counterinsurgency effort./3/ It is understood that such a commander would report directly to the JCS and thence to me for all operational purposes.
/2/See Document 236.
/3/Background information on this question is in an 8-page chronology entitled "Notes on Formation of MACV", which traces the origin of a reorganized command to comments made by McNamara at an August 28 staff meeting that the command under CHMAAG should be used as "a laboratory to develop organization & procedures for the conduct of 'sub-limited war.' " (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 75-062, Misc. Documents 1961)
The following points should be covered, without excluding others that may appear important to you:
1. The status of the command and its designation.
2. The relationship of the command to CINCPAC, and his functions with respect to it.
3. The relationship of the command to the US Ambassador in Saigon, and to the Chief of the USOM.
In addition to the above, please indicate what organization and key personnel you propose within the Joint Staff to monitor the operation on behalf of the Chiefs and myself. Your plans in this regard should envisage that reports to the President will be necessary on a twice-a-week basis until further notice.
For obvious reasons, I hope that the above can be carried out on the narrowest possible basis of participation. (I will handle the necessary discussions with the State Department after I receive your recommendations). Finally, I should like the personal recommendation of the Chiefs themselves for the senior officer to assume the command.
Robert S. McNamara/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
246. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)/1/
Washington, November 13, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Southeast Asia 1961. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Actions concerning South VietnamIn advance of our receiving the National Security Action Memorandum recording the results of the November 11 meeting with the President, I believe the Joint Chiefs should proceed urgently with the actions stated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the memorandum tabled at the meeting./2/ In this connection:
/2/Reference is to the memorandum discussed in Document 234.
a. Paragraph 2 (b) should be understood to embrace actions within South Vietnam as one possibility, with additional actions against North Vietnam and/or Laos envisaged as separate and supplementary possibilities.
b. The desirability and feasibility of moving troops and/or prepositioning equipment in the forward Pacific area should be specifically considered. If this is militarily useful, and would expedite the carrying out of decisions to go ahead with any of the plans developed under paragraph 2, we should be prepared to work out any political factors with State.
c. The actions listed in paragraph 3 should be carried forward with all possible speed. I should like a full report of the states of these measures, the forces, equipment, and costs involved (estimated as well as is now possible), and the schedule of execution. It is understood, of course, that these measures will not be made public or communicated to officials in South Vietnam, at least until the proposed exchange of letters with Diem has been worked out.
Robert S. McNamara/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
247. Draft National Security Action Memorandum/1/
Washington, November 13, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret. Attached to the source text is a memorandum of November 13 from Bromley Smith to the National Security Council that reported that the draft NSAM was being circulated for discussion in connection with an NSC meeting scheduled for 10 a.m., November 15.
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of DefenseSUBJECT
South Viet-NamThe President today considered a memorandum on the subject of South Viet-Nam,/2/ submitted by the Secretary of State for himself and the Secretary of Defense./3/
/2/See Document 234.
/3/For the memorandum from Wheeler to Lemnitzer on implementation of these proposals, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 368-399.
1. The President approved the recommendation that the Department of Defense be prepared with plans for the use of United States forces in South Viet-Nam under one or more of the following purposes:
(a) Use of a significant number of United States forces to signify United States determination to defend South Viet-Nam and to boost South Viet-Nam morale.
(b) Use of substantial United States forces to assist in suppressing Viet Cong insurgency short of engaging in detailed counter-guerrilla operations but including relevant operations in North Viet-Nam.
(c) Use of United States forces to deal with the situation if there is organized Communist military intervention.
Planning under (b) should embrace initially actions within South Viet-Nam. Actions that might be taken against North Viet-Nam or guerrilla bases in Laos should be considered separately. In connection with all the plans, the Department of Defense should consider the feasibility of moving troops or equipment in the near future to advanced positions in the Pacific, and submit recommendations concerning such action.
2. The following actions in support of the Government of Viet-Nam will be undertaken immediately, subject to the understanding that these actions would not take effect within South Viet-Nam, be communicated to subordinate Vietnamese officials or made public until after the exchange of letters with President Diem contemplated in Paragraph 5 below:
(a) Provide increased air lift to the GVN forces, including helicopters, light aviation, and transport aircraft, manned to the extent necessary by United States uniformed personnel and under United States operational control.
(b) Provide such additional equipment and United States uniformed personnel as may be necessary for air reconnaissance, photography, instruction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for special intelligence.
(c) Provide the GVN with small craft, including such United States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may be necessary for quick and effective operations in effecting surveillance and control over coastal waters and inland waterways.
(d) Provide expedited training and equipping of the civil guard and the self-defense corps with the objective of relieving the regular Army of static missions and freeing it for mobile offensive operations.
(e) Provide such personnel and equipment as may be necessary to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through the Government and the armed forces to the Central Intelligence Organization.
(f) Provide such new terms of reference, reorganization and additional personnel for United States military forces as are required for increased United States participation in the direction and control of GVN military operations and to carry out the other increased responsibilities which accrue to MAAG under these recommendations.
(g) Provide such increased economic aid as may be required to permit the GVN to pursue a vigorous flood relief and rehabilitation program, to supply material in support of the security effort, and to give priority to projects in support of this expanded counter-insurgency program. (This could include increases in military pay, a full supply of a wide range of materials such as food, medical supplies, transportation equipment, communications equipment, and any other items where material help could assist the GVN in winning the war against the Viet Cong.)
(h) Encourage and support (including financial support) a request by the GVN to the FAO or any other appropriate international organization for multilateral assistance in the relief and rehabilitation of the flood area.
(i) Provide individual administrators and advisers for insertion into the Governmental machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and numbers to be agreed upon by the two Governments.
(j) Provide personnel for a joint survey with the GVN of conditions in each of the provinces to assess the social, political, intelligence, and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the counter-insurgency program in order to reach a common estimate of these factors and a common determination of how to deal with them.
3. Ambassador Nolting is to be instructed to make an immediate approach to President Diem to the effect that the Government of the United States is prepared to join the Government of Viet-Nam in a sharply increased joint effort to cope with the Viet Cong threat and the ravages of the flood as set forth under 2., above, if, on its part, the Government of Viet-Nam is prepared to carry out an effective and total mobilization of its own resources, both material and human, for the same end. Before setting in motion the United States proposals listed above, the United States Government would appreciate confirmation of their acceptability to the GVN, and an expression from the GVN of the undertakings it is prepared to make to insure the success of this joint effort. On the part of the United States, it would be expected that these GVN undertakings would include, in accordance with the detailed recommendations of the Taylor Mission and the Country Team:
(a) Prompt and appropriate legislative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilize its entire resources. (This would include a decentralization and broadening of the Government so as to realize the full potential of all non-Communist elements in the country willing to contribute to the common struggle.)
(b) The establishment of appropriate Governmental wartime agencies with adequate authority to perform their functions effectively.
(c) Overhaul of the military establishment and command structure so as to create an effective military organization for the prosecution of the war.
4. An exchange of letters between Diem and the President is to be expedited.
(a) Diem's letter would include: reference to the DRV violations of Geneva Accords as set forth in the October 24 GVN letter to the ICC/4/ and other documents; pertinent references to GVN statements with respect to its intent to observe the Geneva Accords; reference to its need for flood relief and rehabilitation; reference to previous United States aid and the compliance hitherto by both countries with the Geneva Accords; reference to the USG statement at the time the Geneva Accords were signed, the necessity now of exceeding some provisions of the Accords in view of the DRV violations thereof; the lack of aggressive intent with respect to the DRV: GVN intent to return to strict compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV violations ceased; and a request for additional United States assistance in the framework of foregoing policy. The letter should also set forth in appropriate general terms steps Diem has taken and is taking to reform Governmental structure.
/4/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-861)
(b) The President's reply would be responsive to Diem's request for additional assistance and acknowledge and agree to Diem's statements on the intent promptly to return to strict compliance with the (Geneva Accords as soon as DRV violations have ceased.
5. The "Jorden Report" is to be printed as a United States "white paper" and distributed to the Governments of all countries with which we have diplomatic relations, including the Communist states, to coincide as nearly as possible with the release of the exchange of letters between the President and Diem and shortly before the arrival in South Viet-Nam of the first increments of U.S. military personnel and equipment described in Paragraph 2, above, which would exceed the Geneva Accord ceilings.
6. The President directed that the following actions be considered for carrying out at the appropriate time in relation to the exchange of letters and other developments:
(a) A private approach to the Soviet Union that would include: our determination to prevent the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism by whatever means is necessary; our concern over dangers to peace presented by the aggressive DRV policy with respect to South Viet-Nam, our intent to return to full compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV does so; the distinction we draw between Laos and South Viet-Nam, and our expectation that the Soviet Union will exercise its influence on the Chicoms and the DRV.
(b) A special diplomatic approach to the United Kingdom in its role as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference requesting that the United Kingdom seek the support of the Soviet co-Chairman for a cessation of DRV aggression against South Viet-Nam.
(c) A special diplomatic approach to India, both in its role as Chairman of the ICC and as a power having relations with Peiping and Hanoi. This approach should be made immediately prior to public release of the "Jorden Report" and the exchange of letters between Diem and the President.
(d) Special diplomatic approaches to Canada, as well as Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, Ceylon, the UAR, and Yugoslavia. SEATO, NATO, and OAS members should be informed through those organizations, with selected members also informed individually. The possibility of some special approach to Poland as a member of the ICC should also be considered.
7. The President directed the Departments of State and Defense to develop detailed recommendations for a US command structure in South Viet-Nam that would have a senior US commander assuming responsibility for all phases of US activity, including economic aid, related to the counter-insurgency effort. Such a commander should report directly to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense for operational purposes.
8. The President directed General Taylor and Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, in consultation with the Attorney General, to prepare statements to be used for background purposes pending release of the exchange of letters with Diem and other fuller disclosures of US policy.
248. Letter From Prime Minister Nu to President Kennedy/1/
Rangoon, November 13, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1861. Attached to the source text is a copy of a brief memorandum of transmittal from Battle to Bundy, November 18, indicating that it was the signed original of the Prime Minister's letter. settle already apparently sent Bundy a copy of telegram 380 from Rangoon, November 14, containing the text of the letter. (Ibid., 751K.00/11-1461) A note on the Department of state s copy of telegram 380 indicates that it was passed to the White House at 1121 a.m. on November 15.
My Dear Mr. President: I am aware that the situation in South Vietnam has been causing you much concern. Needless to say, I share this concern, not only because a threat to the peace is a bad thing wherever it occurs, but because this particular threat happens to be close to my country.
To begin with, let me say that I fully understand the reasons for the concern of the United States with regard to the situation in South Vietnam. Like you, we in Burma desire to see a unified, independent and democratic Vietnam, and until that can be achieved, we wish to see South Vietnam develop as a truly democratic and nationalist entity. Only then can there be any hope of the eventual emergence of a unified, independent and democratic Vietnam.
Recent press reports connected with General Taylor's visit to South Vietnam have referred to the possible despatch of United States forces to South Vietnam. This is probably no more than speculation, but even so, it opens up such dangerous possibilities that I feel it my duty, both as a lover of peace and as a friend of the United States, to say that I would regard such a step as a very grave mistake. In my view, South Vietnamese problems cannot be solved by military means. It can only be solved through measures which will help to bring the Vietnamese masses solidly behind the Diem Government. Besides, introduction of foreign troops into South Vietnam would only worsen the situation, because it would certainly produce similar measures in North Vietnam, leading to a military confrontation between East and West whose consequences no one can foretell. These steps certainly would not conduce to the eventual emergence of a united, independent and democratic Vietnam.
Mr. President, in sharing these thoughts with you, I would like you to know that I have made known to the Government of North Vietnam my grave concern at the persistent reports of North Vietnamese subversive activities in South Vietnam, and have warned them that such activities, if not ended, can only endanger the peace by inviting new steps by the South Vietnamese Government and its close friends.
I trust that you will not regard this letter as an unwarranted intrusion on my part. As I have said earlier, my sole purpose is to help maintain the peace of the world and promote the future well-being of South-East Asia.
With my warm regards and good wishes,
Yours sincerely,
Maung Nu
249. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Wood) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Steeves)/1/
Washington, November 14, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Task Force Files: Lot 66 D 193, 1-A2-Briefing Papers GVN 1961. Secret. Drafted by Heavner and sent to Steeves through Anderson.
SUBJECT
Viet Cong Infiltration: Nature and Extent1. Infiltration and Viet Cong Strength. We do not have good intelligence on VC strength or on the numerical importance of infiltration. It is abundantly clear, however, that infiltration is taking place, that it has been accelerated in recent months, and that the VC war could not be long continued without it.
The evidence of VC infiltration available to us has been summarized in the Jorden report. Some of this evidence was placed before the ICC in the recent GVN letter of October 24 regarding the kidnap-murder of Colonel Nam./2/ This evidence includes the statements of interrogated prisoners as well as captured documents and diaries. It reveals that whole units as well as individuals have been infiltrated, and that the infiltration routes include southern Laos, the 17th parallel, and the sea.
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 751K.00/11-861)
Hard core VC strength is now estimated at about 20,000. These are armed and trained forces, about half of which are believed to operate in regular units. This summer, when hard core VC were believed to number 12,000, between five and thirty per cent were thought to have been infiltrated from the north. In early October, MAAG Saigon reported that 25 to 40 per cent of VC strength is probably composed of infiltrees. Thus, while it is clear that most VC have not been infiltrated from the north, it is also apparent that both the rate of infiltration and the percentage of infiltrees in the VC forces have increased.
Regardless of the relative number of VC infiltrated from the north, it has always been true that this element provides the leadership and the backbone of VC forces. This means of course that infiltration has always been essential to the prosecution of the VC war. It also means that continued acceleration of the VC drive will require increased infiltration as well as increased local recruitment.
Infiltration is relatively more significant in terms of total VC strength in the Plateau area than in the delta. While overall VC forces may now include as little as 25 per cent infiltrees, the VC operating on the plateau adjoining the Lao border are believed to be largely composed of men infiltrated from the north. The most conservative estimate now places the number of VC in that area at 4,000.
Recent intelligence indicates that infiltration directly across the 17th parallel is considerable. While it is probably easier to enter South Viet-Nam via Laos, there is no guarantee that friendly control of the Lao panhandle would seriously handicap the VC unless it was coupled with effective denial of the routes leading directly across the parallel.
2. VC Potential. The DRV is known to have more than 300,000 men in its armed forces. Probably the majority are veterans of the long guerrilla war against the French. Many are southerners who came north during the regroupment period following the Geneva Agreements in 1954. These forces obviously provide a very large reservoir of trained guerrilla forces which could be dispatched to South Viet-Nam very quickly. The VC could probably double or even triple their present strength, by infiltration alone, in a very short time. Since it requires about 15 GVN regulars to deal with one guerrilla, it seems clear that the VC can more than meet any increase in GVN forces.
To the VC infiltration potential must be added potential local support. Maximum voluntary supporters are now estimated by the GVN at 200,000; our people are inclined to cut this figure in half. However, much if not most local VC recruitment is accomplished by at least a measure of force or threat. To estimates of voluntary supporters a considerable number of involuntary supporters should probably be added.
250. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/
Washington, November 14, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that a copy was also sent to McGeorge Bundy.
SUBJECT
The Draft National Security Action Memo for South Viet Nam dated November 13, 1961/2//2/Document 247.
I have only a fairly general understanding of the discussion on which the draft action memo is based, but there are certain aspects of the memo which give me some trouble.
I. General
Military Intervention. I fear that we are losing a strategic moment for the introduction of U.S. troop units. The world has been made aware of the crisis in Viet Nam as a result of the Taylor mission. Both the Bloc and the Free World are going to look upon the actions we take now as the key to our future actions no matter what we may say. A plate glass window on the 17th parallel or a flood relief task force could make a great political difference not only in Viet Nam, but in the whole area. Such intervention later might have much less political effect and may have to be on a much larger scale to have military effect. In any event, in the interim uncertainty as to our intentions will grow.
I am concerned about the relationship between our actions and the diplomatic noises we propose to make. Have we really decided to "prevent the fall of South Viet Nam by whatever means are necessary"? (par. 6 (a)) If not, should we say so to the USSR? I understand that endorsement of a general statement to this effect was explicitly avoided at the meeting on Saturday./3/ I myself think that we ought to decide now the key question of whether we are prepared to introduce combat troops if necessary even if we are not going to introduce them now. That is obviously the ultimate test of whether we are prepared to prevent the fall of Viet Nam. Until we have decided it in our own minds, I do not think that we ought to make statements to the USSR that may reflect only hypothetical intentions. Past employment of such statements has depreciated their effect.
/3/Apparently a reference to the meeting described in Document 236.
Finally, if we are really prepared to use troops eventually, shouldn't there be some hint of this in our conversations with Diem (par. 3)? You would have a much better feel for this than I do, but I don't think that some such indication would cause Diem to sit back and turn over responsibility for the ultimate fate of SVN to the U.S. The situation is not analogous to that in Laos where we have had to be very careful about the way we committed ourselves to Phoumi for fear that he would not take negotiations seriously.
What is needed, if we are not going to provide troops, is some equivalent of the bilateral agreement requested by the GVN. Perhaps it could take the form of pointing to our SEATO commitment and stating that we consider this commitment binding without regard to how other SEATO members may vote on intervention. (This was the formula developed for talks with Thanat but never, to my knowledge, used in those talks.)
The Command Concept. The proposal that a senior military commander be put in charge of all U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Viet Nam is going to create all kinds of problems and I fail to see that it has compensating advantages. Counterinsurgency efforts clearly embrace all activities of any importance. The change would reflect the changed character of our military relationship under the proposed recommendations-our greater operational involvementbut it will downgrade a capable ambassador who has a very good relationship with Diem to the role of a political adviser. It will create new, difficult problems of relationship between the USOM, embassy, USIA and the military. It will also tend to give the effort a wholly military cast which will be undesirable both intrinsically and because of its effect on the attitude of the rest of the world toward the Diem regime.
Why not reorganize the MAAG, give it a new name to reflect its new duties (including operational control of U.S. units) and put a senior general in charge, but leave ultimate responsibility with the ambassador? Or, if some change is absolutely necessary, it might possibly be better to make the ambassador and the military commander co-equal heads of our activities.
If we need to create a theater commander as a dramatic move, would it be better to give him all of SEA as his theater and leave the ambassador in charge in SVN? (Incidentally, if this change does go through as proposed, I assume that a Defense representative will become director of the Washington Task Force.)
II. Other Comments
Par. 1: These three cases seem somewhat vaguely stated, perhaps deliberately so for security reasons. Are we clear as to what is intended by each?
Par. 2 (a) and (c): Who is going to decide how many helicopters, hello-couriers, small craft, etc., are to be provided? There will be a real argument about such specifics unless there is already a clear understanding as to the requirements.
Par. 2 (d): Do we know clearly how we are going to expedite Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps training? The Taylor Report was not specific on this. We have long been aware of the problem; "expediting" isn't going to solve it unless we have a plan.
Pars. 2 (e), (f) and (i): One of the very difficult problems involved in implementing the encadrement concept is going to be to find the necessary intelligence, military and administrative personnel. We will need a special study and crash effort on this problem. Should we rob U.S. activities around the world of French-speaking personnel? Is special incentive pay required to get people into this war area? Would active and reserve military personnel trained in military government be a good source of candidates for administrative cadres?
Par. 2 (g): What is the relationship between existing economic aid and these proposals? For example, are flood requirements going to be covered within the existing commercial import program? Gardiner a week or so ago suggested such an approach to the Vietnamese/4/ pointing out that we are committed to make up any trade deficits under the agreed import criteria and that, therefore, if the flood increased total needs we would increase our total aid as that became necessary. The Vietnamese can be depended upon, however, to ask that such aid be clearly additional to the level we have set for the commercial import program. What is the significance of the material in parentheses? Does the President's approval of the action memo constitute approval of our financing of an increase in military pay, etc.?
/4/Not further identified.
Par. 2 (h): Are we clear that the FAO can undertake such a relief job? I understand that the organization has never run one. I would think we would want an organization that had considerable past experience-perhaps the International Red Cross though its scope may be too narrow for the job here. If an international approach should not prove feasible, how is the relief job to be organized?
Par. 3: The proposed undertakings by the GVN seem exceedingly general. Wouldn't they need to be spelled out in any communication? For just one example, the need to reduce static deployments of the ARVN ought to be covered. (Perhaps the mention of the detailed recommendations of the Taylor Mission and the Country Team is, however, intended to incorporate their proposals by reference.) I am puzzled by the reference in 3 (b) to wartime government agencies. I was not aware that we wanted the GVN to establish any number of new wartime agencies. It is difficult to say in the abstract whether this would be a good idea. It could provide the basis for some decentralization of power and for bringing new people into the government or new people to the top within the government. However, if it is like the last reorganization, it will be mostly facade. Reorganization could also lead to some loss of governmental effectiveness.
RHJ
251. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President/1/
Washington, November 14, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Initialed by Rostow.
SUBJECT
Negotiation about Viet-Nam1. It is universally agreed that the objective of the proposed exercise in Viet-Nam is to induce the Communists to cease infiltration, return to the Geneva Accord, while assisting South Viet-Nam in reducing the force of some 16,000 guerrillas now operating in the country. This track unquestionably will require extensive talk with the Bloc countries and, at some stage, probably formal negotiations.
2. One crucial question is this: should we enter formal negotiation with the Bloc on this matter before we have taken steps to stabilize and strengthen the military, political, and psychological position on the ground?
3. I submit that it would be unwise and contrary to the lessons of past and current experience to negotiate with the Communists before we have moved to buy time in Viet-Nam and indicated by deeds that the U.S. is serious about saving South Viet-Nam.
A. As in Laos last Spring, we face a deteriorating situation. If we postpone action to talk, the Communists will do two things: they will extend that talk while continuing to dismantle South Viet-Nam and (as the British and Desai have indicated) will focus the negotiation on elections. Only a de facto stabilization plus the bargaining position which the potential withdrawal of U.S. forces above the MAAG ceiling would offer appears to make conceivable the notion that they would call off the infiltration guided from Hanoi. It may even require a credible threat to impose military action against North Viet-Nam.
B. If we postpone action in Viet-Nam in order to engage in talk with the Communists, we can count surely on a major crisis of nerve in Viet-Nam and throughout Southeast Asia. The image of U.S. unwillingness to confront Communism-induced by the Laos performance-will be regarded as definitively confirmed. There will be real panic and disarray.
4. In the wake of the Taylor Mission, the moves we now make will be examined on both sides of the Iron Curtain with the greatest care as a measure of this Administration's intentions and determination. It will be very difficult to undo first impressions. If we negotiate now-while infiltration continues-we shall in fact be judged weaker than in Laos; for in that case we at least first insisted on a cease-fire.
5. In advocating this position I have, of course, been mindful of the danger of escalation and war. The question is: does a show of U.S. strength and determination on our side of the post-war truce lines tend to induce war?
6. The Korean War arose from the withdrawal of U.S. force from South Korea and the opening it appeared to offer the Communists.
In other cases where we have acted strongly on our side of the line we have come home free: Northern Iran; Greece; the Berlin blockade; Lebanon-Jordan; Quemoy-Matsu. In Laos, the alerting and loading of the Seventh Fleet induced a cease-fire.
7. In Viet-Nam the gut issue is not whether Diem is or is not a good ruler. That is important in a variety of ways; but he was doing fine from 1956 to 1959, by the standards we apply to other underdeveloped countries. The gut issue is whether we shall continue to accept the systematic infiltration of men from outside and the operation from outside of a guerrilla war against him which has built up from 2,000 to 16,000 effectives in two years. The whole world is asking a simple question: what will the U.S. do about it? If our policy and action is focused sharply on this question, I believe there is a fair chance of avoiding a war. If we act indecisively now, I fear we shall produce excessive fears on our side and excessive hopes on the other side; and then we shall have to over-react to correct a disintegrating situation worse than the present. In those circumstances there would, indeed, be a danger of war. As in Korea we would have first tempted the enemy by our apparent weakness and then double-crossed him. It is that circumstance I would wish to see us avoid.
Therefore, I suggest that we make the moves we believe required to stabilize the situation and to buy time in South Viet-Nam; and then by imaginative communication and diplomacy-addressed to all elements in the Bloc as well as the Free World-we bring maximum pressure on Hanoi to call off the invasion of South Viet-Nam now under way. Such communication should begin the day we publish the Jorden Report-or the day before.
252. Memorandum From the President to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
Washington, November 14, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. The source text bears the following handwritten notation by Bundy: "used by President as talking paper Nov. 14 P M-before NSC. MGB"
I think we should get our ducks in a row for tomorrow morning's meeting. I believe we should make more precise our requests for action. In the papers which I have seen our requests have been of a general nature.
1. I would like to have you consider the proposals made by Governor Harriman./2/ I am wondering if he should return, perhaps on Friday/3/ to discuss the matter further with Pushkin.
/2/Apparently a reference to Harriman's draft memorandum which he transmitted to the President under cover of a letter of November 12, Document 239.
/3/ November 17.
2. In the meantime what action should be taken toward South Viet Nam pending the arrival of Harriman.
3. I would like a letter to be written to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference to call a meeting of the conference to consider immediately South Viet Nam as a breach of the accord. As we will be breaching the Geneva accords ourselves it is important that we lay the groundwork. The Jorden report will do some of this. Has anyone examined the political implications in their efforts.
4. Should I address a statement today to Khrushchev concerning South Viet Nam stating how dangerous we thought the situation was.
5. If we are going to send a military man as a Commanding Officer at the four star level for South Viet Nam, perhaps we could name a younger general and give him a star or do you know someone who already has the stars who can handle the situation.
6. I gather you felt that we should have a general military command set up. We want to make sure that someone like George McGhee, heads it, in fact, it might be well to send McGhee.
7. I would like to have someone look into what we did in Greece. How much money and men were involved. How much money was used for guerrilla warfare? Should we have not done it at the company level rather than at the battalion level? It is proposed by the military that we should operate from the battalion level or even before this.
Are we prepared to send in hundreds and hundreds of men and dozens and dozens of ships? If we would just show up with 4 or 5 ships this will not do much good. Or am I misinformed?
I think there should be a group specially trained for guerrilla warfare. I understand that the guns that have been used have been too heavy. Would carbines be better? Wonder if someone could make sure we are moving ahead to improve this./4/
/4/In a memorandum of December 14 to Lemnitzer, the White House Defense Liaison Officer, Major General C.V. Clifton, wrote that he briefed the President regarding the Armalite rifle using a briefing paper prepared by the Department of the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics dated December 5, which was attached. Clifton also reported that the President wanted to be informed of the Joint Chiefs' decision in response to ClNCPAC's recommendation that additional Armalite rifles be sent to Vietnam. Clifton informed Lemnitzer:
"I also had the Army bring an M-1 rifle, an M-14 rifle, an Armalite rifle and a carbine to the President. In response to his question, the Army is trying to find out how many of the 1,327,310 unserviceable carbines can be made serviceable. Also the President expressed the opinion that we should be sending as many carbines to South Viet-Nam as they can use because this seems to be a good weapon." (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Eyes Only Messages In)
Perhaps we should issue some sort of a statement on what we propose to do. Our actions should be positive rather than negative. As I said on Saturday/5/ concerning Laos-we took actions which made no difference at all. Our actions should be substantial otherwise we will give the wrong impression.
/5/Apparently a reference to the meeting described in Document 236.
8. We should watch Laos very carefully for any fighting that might break out again even though we decide not to intervene.
253. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/
Washington, November 15, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Vietnam. Top Secret.
So many people have offered their opinions on South Vietnam that more may not be helpful. But the other day at the swimming pool you asked me what I thought and here it is.
A. We should now agree to send about one division when needed for military action inside South Vietnam.
1. I believe we should commit limited U.S. combat units, if necessary for military purposes (not for morale), to help save South Vietnam. A victory here would produce great effects all over the world. A defeat would hurt, but not much more than a loss of South Vietnam with the levels of U.S. help now committed or planned.
2. I believe our willingness to make this commitment, if necessary, should be clearly understood, by us and by Diem, before we begin the actions now planned. I think without that decision the whole program will be half-hearted. With this decision I believe the odds are almost even that the commitment will not have to be carried out. This conclusion is, I believe, the inner conviction of your Vice President, your Secretaries of State and Defense, and the two heads of your special mission, and that is why I am troubled by your most natural desire to act on other items now, without taking the troop decision. Whatever the reason, this has now become a sort of touchstone of our will.
3. I believe the actions now planned, plus the basic decision to put in limited combat troops if necessary, are all that is currently wanted. I would not put in a division for morale purposes. I'd put it in later, to fight if need be. After all, Admiral Felt himself recommended, on balance, against combat troops less than a month ago./2/ It will be time enough to put them in when our new Commander says what he would do with them.
/2/Reference is to telegram 200401Z from Felt to the JCS, October 20. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series)
4. The use of force up to a total of 20-25,000, inside Vietnam, is not on the same footing as the larger forces that might become necessary if the Vietminh move to direct invasion. I would not make the larger decision on a war against North Vietnam today.
B. We can manage fee political consequences of this line of action.
5. I believe South Vietnam stands, internally and externally, on a footing wholly different from Laos. Laos was never really ours after 1954. South Vietnam is and wants to be. Laotians have fought very little. South Vietnam troops are not U.S. Marines, but they are usable. This makes the opinion problem different at home and abroad.
6. I believe the Jorden Report, the exchange of letters, and Stevenson and Rusk, can coolly justify this basic line of action, not to all the world, but to an effective fraction. I do not expect that these actions will lead to rapid escalation of the conflict, since they remain essentially on our side of the line, and since the Communists do not want that kind of test.
7. I think this solution will put a serious strain on our position in Laos, but that has always been a bad bargain. My advice would be to give the game promptly to Souvanna and hope for the best, meanwhile holding hard to our new course in South Vietnam. Souvanna may make noises against that action, but I don't think he'll fight or be overthrown by the PL for a while.
C. The role of your senior advisers to Diem is crucial.
8. Next only to the basic decision, I put the role of the men to act for you in South Vietnam. I now accept, after some doubts, the Rusk-McNamara view that the man in charge of the war must be a military man. His quality thus becomes decisive, and Nolting should be judged as his complement, not as your head man in South Vietnam. McGarr has been inadequate. All the pressures will be in favor of a solid, virtuous, not quite first-rate senior officer. You need a man chosen with inspiration by you and McNamara personally; his rank can be arranged.
9. In addition to his personal qualities, this senior man will need the full confidence and support of Diem. No one action can guarantee this relation, but our present efforts with Diem should be directed toward strengthening the role of the U.S. military commander in every possible way. How this should be done is a matter of tactics-but it should not be left to faith, hope and charity.
D. In Summary: two changes are needed in the cable to Nolting./3/
/3/Apparently a reference to a draft version of telegram 619 to Saigon, November 15; see footnote 2, Document 257.
10. If you accept this argument, the cable to Nolting should include:
(1) a statement that U.S. combat troops will be put into South Vietnam when and if the U.S. military recommend it on persuasive military grounds for internal action.
(2) a much clearer statement that Diem must take U.S. military counsel on a wholly new basis.
MGB
254. Notes on the National Security Council Meeting/1/
Washington, November 15, 1961, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, National Security Council (11). Top Secret. The drafter is not indicated, but it was probably Howard L. Burris, the Vice President's military aide. According to the President's log, the following people, in addition to the President, attended the meeting: Byron R. White, Acting Attorney General; David E. Bell; Allen W. Dulles; John A. McCone; Robert S. McNamara; Roswell L. Gilpatric; Paul Nitze; William P. Bundy; Lyman L. Lemnitzer; Edward A. McDermott; Dean Rusk; Fowler Hamilton, U. Alexis Johnson, George C. McGhee; Walter P. McConaughy; Henry H. Fowler; Edward R. Murrow, McGeorge Bundy; Walt R. Rostow; Maxwell Taylor; Chester V. Clifton; Theodore C. Sorensen; Howard L. Burris; and Bromley Smith. (Kennedy Library; JFK Log, Book 11) From the notes themselves it is evident that Robert Amory was also present.
[Here follows a brief discussion of other matters.] A brief outline of the size and disposition of Chinese armed forces was given. The President then asked what routes of movement are available for these troops from China to North Viet Nam. Mr. Amory pointed out and described the condition of railway and roads of access and cited the generally inadequate aspects of these avenues. Mr. Dulles cautioned that it should not be assumed that the Chinese setbacks as well as the ideological rift were such that the Soviets and Chinese would not be able nor willing to engage jointly any nation which threatened Communist interests.
Mr. Rusk explained the Draft of Memorandum on South Viet Nam./2/ He added the hope that, in spite of the magnitude of the proposal, any U.S. actions would not be hampered by lack of funds nor failure to pursue the program vigorously. The President expressed the fear of becoming involved simultaneously on two fronts on opposite sides of the world. He questioned the wisdom of involvement in Viet Nam since the basis thereof is not completely clear. By comparison he noted that Korea was a case of clear aggression which was opposed by the United States and other members of the U.N. The conflict in Viet Nam is more obscure and less flagrant. The President then expressed his strong feeling that in such a situation the United States needs even more the support of allies in such an endeavor as Viet Nam in order to avoid sharp domestic partisan criticism as well as strong objections from other nations of the world. The President said that he could even make a rather strong case against intervening in an area 10,000 miles away against 16,000 guerrillas with a native army of 200,000, where millions have been spent for years with no success. The President repeated his apprehension concerning support, adding that none could be expected from the French, and Mr. Rusk interrupted to say that the British were tending more and more to take the French point of view. The President compared the obscurity of the issues in Viet Nam to the clarity of the positions in Berlin, the contrast of which could even make leading Democrats wary of proposed activities in the Far East.
/2/Document 247.
Mr. Rusk suggested that firmness in Viet Nam in the manner and form of that in Berlin might achieve desired results in Viet Nam without resort to combat. The President disagreed with the suggestion on the basis that the issue was clearly defined in Berlin and opposing forces identified whereas in Viet Nam the issue is vague and action is by guerrillas, sometimes in a phantom-like fashion. Mr. McNamara expressed an opinion that action would become clear if U.S. forces were involved since this power would be applied against sources of Viet Cong power including those in North Viet Nam. The President observed that it was not clear to him just where these U.S. forces would base their operations other than from aircraft carriers which seemed to him to be quite vulnerable. General Lemnitzer confirmed that carriers would be involved to a considerable degree and stated that Taiwan and the Philippines would also become principal bases of action.
With regard to sources of power in North Viet Nam, Mr. Rusk cited Hanoi as the most important center in North Viet Nam and it would be hit. However, he considered it more a political target than a military one and under these circumstances such an attack would "raise serious questions." He expressed the hope that any plan of action in North Viet Nam would strike first of all any Viet Cong airlift into South Viet Nam in order to avoid the establishment of a procedure of supply similar to that which the Soviets have conducted for so long with impunity in Laos.
Mr. Bundy raised the question as to whether or not U.S. action in Viet Nam would not render the Laotian settlement more difficult. Mr. Rusk said that it would to a certain degree but qualified his statement with the caveat that the difficulties could be controlled somewhat by the manner in which actions in Viet Nam are initiated.
The President returned the discussion to the point of what will be done next in Viet Nam rather than whether or not the U.S. would become involved. He cautioned that the technique of U.S. actions should not have the effect of unilaterally violating Geneva accords. He felt that a technique and timing must be devised which will place the onus of breaking the accords on the other side and require them to defend their actions. Even so, he realized that it would take some time to achieve this condition and even more to build up world opinion against Viet Cong. He felt that the Jorden Report might be utilized in this effort.
The President discussed tactics in dealing with the International Control Commission. He delineated a clever plan to charge North Viet Nam with the onus for breaking accords. Following this he envisioned the initiation of certain U.S. actions. He realized that these actions would be criticized and subject to justification in world opinion but felt that it would be much less difficult if this particular U.S. action were secondary rather than primary. He directed State to study possible courses of action with consideration for his views relating to timing and to the Geneva Accords. He asked State also to consider the position of the individual members of the ICC and further suggested that the time was appropriate to induce India to agree to follow U.S. suggestion.
Mr. Murrow reported that parts of the Jorden Report are already in the hands of the ICC. He questioned the value of utilizing the report in the suggested manner since to do so would simply be to place a U.S. stamp on the report. Such action might not reap the desired effects.
The President asked what nations would possibly support the U.S. intervention in Viet Nam, listing Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand (?). Mr. Rusk replied that they all would but the President implied doubts because of the pitfalls of the particular type of war in Viet Nam. He described it as being more a political issue, of different magnitude and (again) less defined than the Korean War.
Mr. Fowler said that the studies suggested to him that the job to be done has been magnified, thereby leading to pessimistic conclusions as to outcome. Taylor responded that although the discussion and even some of the draft memoranda were somewhat pessimistic, he returned from Viet Nam with optimism over what could be done if certain clearcut actions were taken. He envisioned two phases: (1) the revival of Viet Nam morale and (2) the initiation of the guerrilla suppression program. Mr. McNamara cautioned that the program was in fact complex and that in all probability U.S. troops, planes and resources would have to be supplied in additional quantities at a later date.
The President asked the Secretary of Defense if he would take action if SEATO did not exist and McNamara replied in the affirmative. The President asked for justification and Lemnitzer replied that the world would be divided in the area of Southeast Asia on the sea, in the air and in communications. He said that Communist conquest would deal a severe blow to freedom and extend Communism to a great portion of the world. The President asked how he could justify the proposed courses of action in Viet Nam while at the same time ignoring Cuba. General Lemnitzer hastened to add that the JCS feel that even at this point the United States should go into Cuba.
The President stated the time had come for neutral nations as well as others to be in support of U.S. policy publicly. He felt that we should aggressively determine which nations are in support of U.S. policy and that these nations should identify themselves. The President again expressed apprehension on support of the proposed action by the Congress as well as by the American people. He felt that the next two or three weeks should be utilized in making the determination as to whether or not the proposed program for Viet Nam could be supported. His impression was that even the Democratic side of Congress was not fully convinced. The President stated that he would like to have the Vice President's views in this regard and at that point asked if there was information on the Vice President's arrival./3/ The President then stated that no action would be taken during the meeting on the proposed memorandum and that he would discuss these subjects with the Vice President. He asked State to report to him when the directed studies had been completed.
/3/In a memorandum of November 15 to the Vice President, Colonel Burris described the hasty manner in which the November 15 meeting had been scheduled and how he had been unable to notify the Vice President prior to his departure from Washington on November 14 for Detroit. Just before the opening of the meeting, Burris told McGeorge Bundy that the only flight Johnson could get back from Detroit did not arrive until just after 11 a.m. but that he was not aware of the Vice President's plans. Burris then described the course of the meeting:
"The meeting proceeded in the normal fashion with the first hour being consumed by the presentation of reports. Discussion continued until about 11:30, at which time the President asked me if I had further information on your arrival and, when I replied in the negative, he asked if I would check. I went outside the meeting and called Walter [Jenkins] and discovered that you had informed him around midnight of your difficulty in returning to Washington last night by private plane because of weather and of the possibility that you might not return to Washington as scheduled but might proceed to Seattle. I returned to the meeting and informed the President that I could not ascertain the details of your flight and arrival at the moment. The President then suggested that the meeting be adjourned and that he would discuss the subject with you later." (Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, National Security Council (II))
No record was found of a subsequent meeting between the President and Vice President regarding Vietnam.
255. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 15, 1961, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1561. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Received in the Department of State at 10:29 a.m.
656. During course Trueheart's courtesy call today, British Ambassador Hohler read to him November 14 message from British Embassy Washington, summarizing decisions on Taylor recommendations as received from Department. Telegram gave much more detailed rundown on decisions than apparently communicated to Alphand (Deptel 600),/2/ and indicates that all points which were under consideration by General Taylor when he was here have been adopted with the very major exception of flood relief task force. British also informed that Jungle Jim units are part of Taylor package.
/2/Telegram 600, November 13 (ibid., 751K.00/11-1361), summarized the conversation between Rusk and Alphand described in Document 241.
You can imagine that Vietnamese and Task Force Saigon have been awaiting results of President's decision anxiously and impatiently. It is naturally embarrassing and discouraging to have these results conveyed to us first by British. But what is more serious is that there is little or no doubt that British and French here will find a way to let Vietnamese know that they are ahead of us and I would not at all rule out that they will pass along immediately to Vietnamese what they know of contents of decisions./3/
/3/At a meeting at the Department of State between 3 and 4 p.m., November 15, at which Vietnam was one of a number of subjects raised, Rusk told Ambassador Alphand and Lord Hood of the British Embassy that the Department of State had not yet sent any instructions to the Embassy in Saigon, although British and French representatives in Saigon had given Nolting the impression that decisions had already been reached in Washington. Rusk said that he wanted to make clear that previous discussions with British and French representatives in Washington "had been an exchange of thoughts but we had not given specific instructions." Alphand expressed his certainty that "nothing had been said to the press or to the Vietnamese authorities." (Memorandum of a conversation at the Department of State, November 15; Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1561)
Nolting
256. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/
Washington, November 15, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret.
NOTES FOR TALK WITH SECRETARY RUSK-NOV. 15/2/
/2/In a memorandum of November 15, entitled "Points for discussion with Secretary Rusk, November 15, 2:30 p.m.," McGeorge Bundy listed the following areas in which he understood "the President has concern about our South Vietnam operations: (1) command and control in Washington, (2) command and control in South Vietnam, (3) coordination with the Allies, and (4) the prospects of limiting the other side's activity." He also listed the following specific questions raised by the President:
"1. Should we not float the Jorden report at once?
"2. Why did Diem put his brother in charge of the flood relief task force, and is this not a bad sign?
"3. Do we really think the ICC can do very much in South Vietnam?
"4. Why was he told that U Nu wants to see us act when U Nu has just warned him privately against sending troops?" (Ibid.)
Bundy met with the Secretary of State at 2:38 p.m. that day. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books) Although the memorandum printed here is entitled "Notes for Talk with Secretary Rusk," it apparently is a record of what was actually said at that meeting.
Bundy had called Rusk at 1:05 p.m. that day; the following conversation was held:
"Mr. B. said the Pres. is still thinking hard and has spoken to Harriman and Taylor and now thinks it would be a great help if he and the Secretary could have a talk on the next steps to be taken. Mr. B. will come over at 2:30 to fill the Sec. in on a few things and Sec. will come to WH at 4:15 p.m." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)
A. Vietnam
1. The problem of management in Washington
I've told the Secretary frankly that you feel the need to have someone on this job that is wholly responsive to your policy, and that you really do not get that sense from most of us. I suggested Averell. He said Averell was needed in Geneva and that Alexis would loyally carry out any policy you directed. I don't think this is the same as having your own man-Alexis isn't that dispassionate-or that much of an executive. Averell is your man, as Assistant Secretary.
2. The problem of management in Saigon
The Secretary thinks Nolting is good and has Diem's confidence. He wants to keep him there. I expressed my uncertainty. He persists. On military leadership he agrees strongly that no routine four-star general will do. I would still consider McGhee (for one thing, if he thinks it won't work after a good look, he'll tell you, and he has the authority of the victor of Greece).
3. The problem of allied support
You want to get as much backing as possible from Allies. I think this means a strong line with British, an appeal for Australian help, and pressure via Galbraith on Indians. (Galbraith assured me he would put all the heat you wanted on Indians and thought he could do anything in reason, short of bringing Indian troops into Saigon for combat.) I think Secretary will respond well on this, subject to point 5 below.
4. The problem of enemy reactions
I asked Secretary if he thought action now recommended would be enough if enemy stepped up infiltration. He thought more might be needed, but within SVN. He is against bombing Hanoi as a response to guerrilla infiltration. He believes we should do enough to put the result up to Diem.
5. The problem of U.S. clarity of purpose
Secretary thinks the good of our actions depends on belief we mean to hold in Southeast Asia. He knows we may lose, and he knows we want no Korea, but he thinks we must try to hold and must show determination to all concerned. He suggests you should let this be a Rusk-McNamara Plan and fire all concerned if it doesn't work. He thinks we must meet Khrushchev in Vietnam or take a terrible defeat. I attach cables showing what Mr. Rusk told Alphand & Ormsby Gore./3/ This shows the tone he thinks we must take, and it is obviously important that you either approve or disapprove.
/3/Neither found attached, but reference is to the conversations described in Documents 241 and 243.
6. Specific questions
I have alerted the Secretary and Alexis Johnson to your questions on several specific points and he hopes to have comments:
1. What does U Nu really think and want, in light of his cable?/4/
/4/Document 248.
2. Is it a good sign that Diem put his brother in charge of flood relief?
3. Shouldn't we float the Jorden report as soon as possible? (Alexis says it will take ten days, at least, to print-I wonder).
4. What can ICC really be expected to do?
B. Department Organization
If Averell, or any other strong man, is to take McConaughy's place, it should be in the context of a general game of musical chairs, something like this:
Ball for Bowles
Bowles for Harriman
Harriman for McConaughv
McConaughy for the Philippines
McGhee for Nolting(?)
Rostow for McGhee(?)
Goodwin for Coerr
Achilles or Coerr for Morrison (OAS)
Morrison for a Commission
Dutton for Hays
Hays for a quiet Embassy
Hamilton for BallSecretary won't do this till you tell him to./5/
/5/Regarding the organizational changes that took place within the Department of State later in the month, see Document 281.
McG.B./6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
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