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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963, Volume I
Vietnam, 1961Department of State
Washington, DC
X. Implementation of the Taylor Mission Report
November 15-DECEMBER 15, 1961
257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, November 15, 1961, 9:02 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1561. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cottrell and Heavner on November 14 and cleared with McConaughy, U. Alexis Johnson, Rusk, and the President.
620. Following is draft letter from President Diem to President Kennedy which should be handled accordance instructions contained Deptel 619./2/
/2/For text, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 400-405. It instructed Nolting to meet with Diem and inform him of President Kennedy's decision to join the Republic of Vietnam in a joint effort "to contain and eliminate the threat to its independence."
Telegram 618 to Saigon, November 15, summarized for Nolting the results of the U.S. Government's decisions on the Taylor Report; see Declassified Documents, 1976, p. 132C. It stated that the United States did not intend to introduce combat troops into Vietnam now.
"Dear Mr. President:
1. Since its birth, more than six years ago, the Republic of Viet-Nam has enjoyed the close friendship and cooperation of the United States of America. On our mutual concern for the future of the Vietnamese people, on our mutual determination to defend the frontiers of the Free World against Communist aggression, and on our mutual dedication to the ideal of human dignity, we have founded an international partnership which I believe is of great and lasting value not only to our two peoples but to all free men. Together, we have built a bridge of understanding and friendship between an Asian people and a Western people, setting an example for all who believe that great historical and cultural differences need not separate men of goodwill. Together we have laid the material foundations of a new and modern Viet-Nam in which my people can realize their aspirations. Together, we have checked the thrust of Communist tyranny in Southeast Asia. These are great accomplishments and our two peoples can be rightly proud of them.
2. Like the United States, the Republic of Viet-Nam has always been devoted to the preservation of peace. My people know only too well the sorrows of war. We did not sign the 1954 Geneva Agreements because we could never consent to the partition of our country and the enslavement of more than half of our people by Communist tyranny. But we have never considered the reunification of our nation by force. On the contrary, we have publicly pledged that we will not violate the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone set up by the Agreements. We have always been prepared and have on many occasions stated our willingness to reunify Viet-Nam on the basis of democratic and truly free elections.
3. The record of the Communist authorities in the northern part of our country is quite otherwise. They not only consented to the division of Viet-Nam, but were eager for it. They pledged themselves to observe the Geneva Agreements and during the seven years since have never ceased to violate them. They call for free elections but are ignorant of the very meaning of the words. They talk of "peaceful reunification" and wage war against us.
4. From the beginning, the Communists resorted to terror in their efforts to subvert our people, destroy our government, and impose a Communist regime upon us. They have attacked defenseless teachers, closed schools, killed members of our anti-malarial program and looted hospitals. This is coldly calculated to destroy our Government's humanitarian efforts to serve our people.
5. We have long sought to check the Communist attack from the north on our people by appeals to the International Control Commission. Over the years, we have repeatedly published to the world the evidence of the Communist plot to overthrow our Government and seize control of all of Viet-Nam by illegal intrusions from outside our country. The evidence has mounted until now it is hardly necessary to rehearse it. Most recently, the kidnapping and brutal murder of our chief liaison officer to the International Control Commission, Colonel Hoang Thuy Nam, compelled us to speak out once more. In our October 24, 1961, letter to the ICC,/3/ we called attention again to the publicly stated determination of the Communist authorities in Hanoi to "liberate the South" by the overthrow of my Government and the imposition of a Communist regime on our people. We cited the proof of massive infiltration of Communist agents and military elements into our country. We outlined the Communist strategy, which is simply the ruthless use of terror against the whole population, women and children included.
/3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-861)
6. In the course of the last few months, the Communist assault on my people has achieved a new ferocity. In October, they caused more than 1,800 incidents of violence and more than 2,000 casualties. They have struck occasionally in battalion strength, and they are continually augmenting their forces by infiltration from the north. The level of their attacks is already such that our forces are stretched to the utmost. We are forced to defend every village, every hamlet, indeed every home against a foe whose tactic is always to strike at the defenseless.
7. A disastrous flood was recently added to the misfortunes of the Vietnamese people. The greater part of three provinces was inundated, with a great loss of property. We are now engaged in a nation-wide effort to reconstruct and rehabilitate this area. The Communists are, of course, making this task doubly difficult, for they have seized upon the disruption of normal administration and communications as an opportunity to sow more destruction in the stricken areas.
8. In short, the Vietnamese nation now faces what is perhaps the gravest crisis in its long history. For more than 2,000 years, my people have lived and built, fought and died in this land. We have not always been free. Indeed, much of our history and many of its proudest moments have arisen from conquest by foreign powers and our struggle against great odds to regain or defend our precious independence. But it is not only our freedom which is at stake today, it is our national identity. For, if we lose this war, our people will be swallowed by the Communist Bloc, all our proud heritage will be blotted out by the 'socialist society,' and Viet-Nam will leave the pages of history. We will lose our national soul.
9. Mr. President, my people and I are mindful of the great assistance which the United States has given us. Your help has not been lightly received, for the Vietnamese are a proud people, and we are determined to do our part in the defense of the Free World. It is clear to all of us that the defeat of the Viet Cong demands the total mobilization of our Government and our people, and you may be sure that we will devote all of our resources of money, minds, and men to this great task.
10. But Viet-Nam is not a great power, and the forces of International Communism now arrayed against us are more than we can meet with the resources at hand. We must have further assistance from the United States if we are to survive the war now being waged against us.
11. If our request for aid needs any further justification before the court of world opinion, we need only refer to the Charter of the United Nations which recognizes the right of self-defense for all nations. We can certainly assure mankind that our action is purely defensive. Much as we regret the subjugation of more than half our people in North Viet-Nam, we have no intention, and indeed no means, to free them by the use of force.
12. I have said that Viet-Nam is at war. War means many things, but most of all it means the death of brave people for a cause they believe in. Viet-Nam has suffered many wars, and through the centuries, we have always had patriots and heroes who were willing to shed their blood for Viet-Nam. We will keep faith with them. When Communism has long ebbed away into the past, my people will still be here, a free united nation growing from the deep roots of our Vietnamese heritage. They will remember your help in our time of need. This struggle will then be a part of our common history. And your help, your friendship, and the strong bonds between our two peoples will be a part of Viet-Nam, then as now."Rusk
258. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 16, 1961, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1661. Secret. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Geneva for FECON, Bangkok, Paris, London, CINCPAC for PolAd, Manila, Tokyo, and Hue.
661. Task Force VN. Embtel 545/2/ reported decline: in public morale which occurred late October with attendant increased dissatisfaction with GVN on part civil and military officials.
/2/Document 193.
Since then situation seems to have stabilized somewhat in that morale has not noticeably deteriorated further. Prices Saigon remain high (no. 1 rice was 11 plasters per kilo Nov 14), but slight decline certain commodities has taken place. There remains, however, much jitteriness, and population could easily be thrown into state of near panic by VC terrorism in or military [garble] near Saigon.
We believe present situation is anticipatory lull pending hoped-for dramatic results of Taylor Mission. In past few days there have been press stories inquiring when evidence of increased US support can be expected and continuing express hope either directly or indirectly US forces in some form will be sent to Viet-Nam. Conversations with Assembly Deputies, Government officials and private citizens also indicate some uneasiness at absence to date of visible aftermath Taylor visit. In this atmosphere it evident dramatic moves by US would give immediate boost to morale, whereas absence such moves would further depress spirits.
On political front criticism of government and Diem is growing, especially by people in or close to GVN. Vice President and Can Lao financial advisor most recent and most striking examples we can cite in this connection. Criticism also appears more open in that there less attempt than before to conceal personal views and even usually strictly controlled newspapers carry occasional barbs against government methods. Perhaps this reason two papers had articles censored Nov 10.
At same time, pattern of possible reformist action beginning to develop openly. Principal goal of extremely moderate group behind this action seems to be creation some sort of supreme war council which, though under President, would exercise much of his present authority and take over many fields of activity he now personally directs. Idea has now been publicly floated in press, has received favorable cross-play and is very much alive.
While advocacy of reforms continues, CAS reports indicate coup plotting per se in abeyance pending results of Taylor Mission and GVN response to them.
Thus while situation here momentarily stable psychologically, it still highly volatile pending hoped-for US-inspired new phase in anti-VC war.
Nolting
259. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Secretary of State/1/
Washington, November 16, 1961./2/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Presidential Status Reports. Top Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which is attached to a brief covering memorandum from Hilsman to McGeorge Bundy, dated November 16, which reads:
"Alex has passed the attached to Max Taylor and Walt Rostow. The main study and a summary of lessons and findings should be ready by Monday [November 20]."
/2/This is the date of transmittal to McGeorge Bundy. Although there is no date on the source text, statements in the second paragraph suggest that the paper was drafted before November 15 when a decision was reached on Taylor's recommendations.
SUBJECT
General Taylor's Recommendations on South VietnamIn the next week or ten days INR will complete a four-month study of the political and foreign policy implications of the new Communist tactics of guerilla warfare and subversion./3/ Done with the help of an outside consultant/4/ who spent three months working full time with people in INR, this study is a comprehensive one and it has produced some significant findings.
/3/The completed study has not been found.
/4/Not identified.
Unfortunately the completed INR study will not be available in time for these findings to be considered in the decision on General Taylor's recommendations, which I understand will be made this coming week. In this memorandum, however, I have tried to select from the study those considerations that seem most immediately relevant to the Vietnam decision.
In general, the INR study indicates that the most effective way of meeting a guerilla threat like that of the Viet Cong is not with regular troops, but rather by a sophisticated combination of civic action, intelligence, police work, and constabulary-like counter-guerilla forces that use a tactical doctrine quite different from the traditional doctrine of regular forces.
The findings of the INR study would support the recommendations you have just made to the President in your memorandum of November 11th./5/ These findings would, however, indicate the desirability of certain additional measures as well. A hasty and incomplete catalogue of these additional measures follows.
/5/Reference is to the memorandum discussed in Document 234.
1. Police. There is a great need for, and potential use of, police forces in South Vietnam. A rapid buildup of these security forces would supplement, not duplicate, the work of MAAG and ARVN. In certain situations such a buildup would facilitate the military preparedness program.
Police training can immediately be augmented in two vital categories-communications and specialized constabulary-enforcement efforts. The communications field has already benefited from efforts to establish village alarm systems and joint security communication systems. This channel of training and operations should be preserved and broadened.
Vietnam sorely needs a rural police service-with local personnel stationed in their own provinces, a highway patrol, stronger urban and prefectural police networks than presently exist, and additional river and harbor companies. At present surete municipal, and prefectural police total 22,000. These forces need further training in police intelligence work and in matters related to detection of subversion. Their numbers must be augmented by at least 10,000 if they are to perform all the necessary functions noted above. This increment can come from the Civil Guard which numbers 64,000, but only 32,000 are to be trained by MAAG within the next year or
so.
In certain matters MAAG is moving ahead-as in the 17 Boat Platoon program. But it is likely that the required ICA estimate of ten river and harbor companies is not only essential but can still be considered a valid program in light of the difficulties in patrol encountered by the VNN. In any event if AID personnel are available, for training purposes at the very least, they could be added to the MAAG group to expedite and broaden the program.
Police can play a vital role in rural and highway work. By remaining in their own provinces, they can keep up good contacts with the local inhabitants, build confidence, and so serve as a vital source of intelligence regarding guerilla LOC and locations. This type of approach has proved particularly effective in Burma and Indonesia.
Moreover such an effort could also have useful effects on the South Vietnam political scene. It would give a rational and valid base to Diem's policy of bolstering his Provincial Chiefs. Since this policy is based in part on a fear of the military and the concentration of power in its hands, the development of a separate security force with a legitimate purpose, spread over the countryside and under the control of his political allies, might diminish Diem's hostility to the military and make him more amenable to accepting our reform recommendations in that sphere of activity. The fact that the Provincial Chiefs will not now permit the Civil Guard to be transferred out of their provinces illustrates the current tension between the government and the army. So does the Chiefs' reluctance to permit ARVN inspection of the Civil Guard. An expansion of essential police functions, including the transfer of untrained Civil Guard personnel to the police field, might improve the training program as well as facilitate the integration of the rest of the force into the major military effort.
2. Parallel U.S. Organization. The Taylor Report/6/ places great stress on U.S. participation at the working levels of the Vietnamese armed forces, not only in plans, operations, intelligence, and communications, but also in the areas of logistics, supply, and morale. An effort to increase morale and effectiveness through an immediate improvement in the general welfare of the enlisted man (diet, pay, promotion, leaves, awards) requires close and continual attention. For this effort to succeed, the entire apparatus of the Vietnamese forces, and not simply the combat arm, must have American participation that will be both acceptable and effective.
/6/Document 210.
A possible solution which should be considered is the creation of a parallel U.S. chain of command running alongside the indigenous forces and ranging from corps level down to the smallest administrative units. Their purview could include supervision of training exercises as well as the items noted above.
Such supervision would be of particular importance in the rapid enlargement of company grade and non-commissioned officer cadres. It is essential that the U.S. officers not exercise command in these activities, but that they and their Vietnamese counterparts do have the authority to make reports and appeal matters through their own chains of command to the next highest echelon in both national organizations. In this way, an American official could report to his own and to Vietnamese superiors any failure to follow what he considers to be reasonable and sound advice. At the minimum, such a liaison system would serve as an instrument of intelligence and surveillance on the quality of work done by the armed forces in effecting reform programs, the level of morale of the enlisted personnel, and the degree of efficiency obtained as a consequence of the training program.
The possibility of providing sanctions through such a system might also be investigated. That is, Vietnamese officers who failed to carry out their tasks could lose their posts or promotions, and if necessary, U.S. supplies could be made conditional on the maintenance of proper personnel policy.
3. Counter-guerilla Operations and Leadership. The Taylor Report notes that each additional guerilla requires fifteen more government soldiers to engage in this kind of warfare. Hence as the Viet Cong force reaches a critical size, it outstrips the GVN's ability to match forces at the 15:1 ratio. With the regulars at 170,000, the Civil Guard at 64,000 and the self defense force at 53,000, the total reaches 282,000 (or 317,000 if the regulars are augmented.) But the Viet Cong is growing rapidly, and is now estimated at 16,000. Should it continue to increase at the present rate, it will easily rise above the accepted ratio, especially if we take into account the number of ineffectives in the military forces that already swell the government-force totals.
As a consequence, the burden on the quality of the government's combat forces is enormous. An all-out effort in training, tactical conception, leadership and morale are vital if the situation is to be kept under control. In numerical terms, it is essential to bring the effective combat ratio down as close to 10:1 as possible.
Radical innovation in the organization, doctrine, equipment and tactical deployment of counter-guerilla forces is a primary requirement in Vietnam. The Taylor Report notes this major issue and is quick to analyze the political difficulties involved in the proper deployment even of those troops that have had special training.
These difficulties must be overcome or the entire project will remain out of control. Therefore we need to stress the separation of the Vietnamese equivalent of Special Forces from the regular army. Since Diem is bound to resist the overall military reorganization which the Taylor Report advocates, it may be wise to start with this category and try to wring from him this specific concession. In this way, the vital issue of losing control over his whole army will not be at stake, and the comfort he draws from this might make him more amenable.
In such circumstances, it is essential that we determine what percentage of the armed forces of GVN we wish to treat in this category. Under present conditions, we should be influenced by considerations of Diem's position, the size of such forces trained and immediately trainable, and the short and medium range military requirements. The nature and structure of this command, and its relationship to the rest of the regular army and to the chain of command, must also be worked out carefully.
Though experts differ in several important details, there is a considerable body of agreement on what constitutes a proper counter-guerilla effort. The basic unit is a small formation roughly around 50/7/ men in size. This force must be able to fan out into the countryside, be self-reliant, and be able to operate autonomously. It must live in the jungle and be prepared to employ guerilla techniques against guerillas. In the interest of mobility, its arms must be light, its transport facilities rudimentary yet efficient, and its communications equipment both simple and open. Though it must operate apart from other units and at times deploy itself in decentralized patrols, it must be able to regroup into large formations when needed. The ability to disperse and regroup rapidly, much as guerillas themselves do, is absolutely essential.
/7/The number "15" is crossed out in the source text and "50" is written in the margin.
Leadership is a vital component for these units require brave determined professionals. The leader must be able to study the terrain, maintain good relations with the indigenous farming population, keep up the morale of his men while behind enemy lines or in a no-man's jungle, and at the same time be able to plan ahead and extemporize as a situation develops.
Vietnam may be unable to supply leaders of this type immediately, in the number and quality required. Consequently, the use of U.S. or SEATO personnel for the critical jobs of forming and leading such groups and training indigenous leaders in Vietnam or abroad may afford results beyond the proportion first apparent from the numbers and costs involved. American experts, Philippine veterans of the Huk campaign, and successful field officers from Malaya are all specially qualified for such a role.
4. Military Tactics and Political Support. In conjunction with any investigation at the "provincial grass roots" of the social, political and other factors bearing on the counter-insurgency problem, we must repeatedly stress to the GVN the importance of minimizing damage to the civilian community in the course of military operations. Indeed a prime objective of special-force operations should be to recognize that the struggle goes on within friendly, or potentially friendly, territory, even though the enemy is at hand and may have voluntary or involuntary assistance from the inhabitants of a particular region.
A primary requirement is a force disciplined to respect civilian rights and property. Soldiers must not seize food. They must take as little as possible and pay for all requisitions. They must avoid undue damage to property (especially crops and livestock). They must treat the local inhabitants with respect. Often how common courtesies are extended is as significant as the intent. A friendly attitude establishes proper rapport with the citizenry, maintains the government's prestige, and often induces the people to talk to the soldiers and give them valuable information. Discipline and proper behavior are especially important when units engage in autonomous operations free from central control, such as wide-ranging patrols. A combination of an ineffective sweep and harsh behavior during its operation ruins a regime's prestige and diminishes its intelligence contacts with the people, without which the patrols themselves are of no value.
The GVN is all too prone to take repressive measures. Tactically, the operating units on patrol tend to gain the impression that they are in enemy territory and they act accordingly. Or, on occasion, the government has bombed inhabited areas in the central mountains because the ethnic minorities there have helped sustain Viet Cong forces. Yet this does not stop those who volunteer such help and seriously antagonizes others. Saturation of Viet Cong areas with anti-personnel chemicals is also politically hazardous, since few entire areas are actually pro Viet Cong.
The techniques of operating in guerilla saturated territory, of establishing contacts with friendly inhabitants, and of gradually building up a clandestine espionage and political network, require great skill and training on the part of experienced counter-guerilla special forces. Experiences in Vietnam's Northwest Frontier Region is a good illustration of the application of unconventional efforts to this problem, although it would be overly hopeful to expect the Frontier Force to clear and pacify so difficult a region. The location of the area close to zones of Viet Cong concentrations and additional forces from without signify that a much stronger effort will be needed.
5. SEATO. In certain carefully delimited spheres, a combined effort by as many SEATO members as are willing to participate might enhance the overall result sought in the Taylor Report. If the commitment remained at approximately the same level as under the anticipated American involvement, the organization, its Asian members and South Vietnam might all draw benefits.
We have already noted that SEATO members can contribute specialist training forces and perhaps unit leaders for specific types of combat. In addition, Thailand and the Philippines might be able to set up training centers, so that our long-projected concept of a SEATO counter-guerilla school might finally be realized as a byproduct of this endeavor. SEATO naval patrols could aid the hard-pressed VNN in both operations and training. Experts from SEATO countries could participate in the multiple intelligence efforts (training and operations) stressed in the Report.
It might also be possible to send special SEATO detachments, of very small size, to frontier regions as observers, or perhaps to establish intricate communications and surveillance networks again for operational and training assistance to the ARVN. SEATO officers might man the parallel control organization noted in No. 2 above if an American presence of such intensity appears inadvisable. Thai Border Guards, trained by our own Special Forces, might in turn be able to assist in the training and operations problems of the GVN Frontier Force.
A primary objection to the employment of the SEATO label stems from the intense Vietnamese distrust of the French, whom they blame for Kong Le's defection and a good deal of the trouble in Laos. On the other hand, France and, to a lesser extent, Britain are the two powers most likely to oppose any SEATO action. To the extent that it is possible, the rest of the SEATO allies could decide on a joint ad hoc program, along the level of intensity suggested in the Report, and proceed without their European allies. In a sense, this would be a cautious de facto follow-up of the trial balloon floated by the Thais last summer when they proposed that SEATO's European members quietly dissociate themselves from SEATO actions if they so desired.
A partial SEATO participation, however moderate at first, could set the stage for the implementation of its more ambitious efforts, plans 5 or 7/8/ as noted in the Report. It would set a precedent for the participation of regional organizations in a defense against indirect aggression. It would help demonstrate that a besieged land has more of a choice than capitulation or dependence solely and publicly on the United States. Since we must bear the brunt of the burden in any event, the successful invocation of SEATO participation even on a partial basis, would enhance our diplomatic and moral position as well as hopefully relieve some of our direct military responsibilities.
/8/Neither found.
6. U.S. Non-Combat Forces as an Entering Wedge. The Taylor Report made considerable use of the current flood disaster, as an occasion for the introduction of American military personnel into Vietnam. The circumstances are admittedly favorable, for the humanitarian aspects and evident need for sizeable aid point to a rare juncture of strategic and social welfare considerations.
This proposal could in effect become the first stage application of the U.S. Army's recently developed concept of Foreign Liaison Assistance Group (FLAG). Under this concept, we would introduce American forces into a troubled zone in three waves-humanitarian and civic action, followed by Special Forces as needed, and regular troops in force should the situation get out of hand. Thus the first group is literally an entering wedge, available to facilitate the arrival of the other two, in case of need. The Report itself notes with approval CINCPAC's estimate of that in the event of any of three contingencies (the seizure of the Kontum area, an assault on Saigon, a major Vietminh overt assault) we would have to respond quickly with force already earmarked and deployed for action. This recommendation fits into the FLAG concept which requires that the second and third waves and their logistical support be in position in advance.
This leads to the crux of the issue. A force of 8,000 engineers is of limited value unless it augurs more to come-unless it is a token of a US commitment that will be honored as needed. The entering move will evoke protests from disaffected groups in Saigon as well as from neighboring neutrals. The legality of an intervention based on the appeal of a sovereign state does not end our political difficulties, as the Lebanon episode demonstrated.
An engineering force is of little value once its immediate job is done. Its continued presence after the original task is completed will bring more political costs. There would be new political consequences from its withdrawal. Yet of itself, it has not assured or facilitated, except in a marginal way, the possible further commitment of US combat troops. We must, at the outset contemplate the possible need to follow through with this further effort, should the need arise. Otherwise we might finish in a worse diplomatic and strategic posture than if we had not sent any units in to begin with.
There is a further danger that our initial move may be considered out of context, as one of a series of possible measures we could take, graded in intensity and separate from one another. Some recent American contingency studies have already placed the engineer commitment in that category. The idea that such a move of itself will automatically boost GVN morale-although admittedly the move is of little use against the Viet Cong-is difficult to support. It will be even more difficult to support should the situation worsen. We should recognize that a major indication of this sort makes it very difficult for us to withdraw. It should be undertaken only as part of a more fundamental decision to follow through with a Korean-scale action if need be, and to begin recruiting and deploying troops accordingly.
Since the flood repair operation is essential in its own right, we could devise alternate methods of approach. A mixed U.S. army-civilian force could perform the basic tasks, with the military aspects played down. A SEATO operation along the "economic help" line devised in recent years could be mounted, while still pointing up the diplomatic-military overtones to the Communist Bloc. Finally, we could call upon various interested agencies for technical and expert help-ECAFE for broad-based UN-oriented economic surveys, WHO for health control, as well as FAO for food stocks.
7. Stress on Provinces for Political Effort Since Diem has fostered the influence of the Provincial Chiefs in order to reduce the centralized authority of the military-at great cost in military efficiency (in planning, command, field communications, and coordination)-he is not likely to suffer loss of direct political influence "at the bottom" lightly. Under such circumstances, the establishment of the provinces as sources of power apart from Diem will be a most difficult undertaking. Such a loss would not only deprive Diem of direct authority, but would lead him to feel that his main bulwark against the military in Saigon was disintegrating.
Since the provincial approach has the advantage of reform at the source as well as possibilities for immediate impact, it must be preserved. However to the fullest extent possible, it must be couched in terms that eliminate the possibility that Diem is conspicuously losing his authority-an outcome which few rulers have proved willing to countenance even in the national interest. Hence the approach can succeed only if it is couched in terms of building up the channel of power Diem himself favored originally and of strengthening it as a counterweight to the military. The establishment of a more adequate provincial administration, the development of a police force, and the emergence of a provincial government sympathetic and responsive to peasant needs will indeed strengthen the civilian branch of the government. (The military status of the Provincial Chiefs is, as noted in the report, a device to control the armed forces and prevent the evolution of their autonomous power.)
This touches on a fundamental problem we face in all underdeveloped lands, especially those with high military threats or advanced military posture. The military area of the government, thanks to outside help, is usually educated, trained and equipped for [far?] beyond the state's ability to sustain such an effort. The military leaders, especially if indoctrinated in the civic action concept, possess some technical competence in the area of civilian action. They soon arrogate to themselves the moral and political right to judge the honesty, adequacy and modernity of a government. From here to a coup, as was tried in Vietnam, is a small, logical step.
We have an obligation in Vietnam and elsewhere to bolster the civilian components of the government. An enhancement of civilian power and prestige in Saigon and in the provinces will do much to offset the fear of the military so prevalent in Diem's thinking. If our efforts improve provincial rule (especially in keeping the government on good terms with peasants who have to be resettled for strategic reasons like the Meo, or because of the flood) and loosen Diem's control over the provinces at the same time, the results will be a three-fold bonus. In light of the dangerous situation in Saigon, the move to broaden the base of political power should be coupled with a strengthening of the civilian bureaucracy. These are vital preconditions for the struggle ahead, and they would probably insure the loyalty and subordination of the military leadership. The latter could then be given the coordinating and command authority so desperately needed.
260. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/
Washington, November 16. 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, R. Johnson Chron. Secret.
SUBJECT
India and the Viet Nam ICCI have been thinking about the President's remark that you reported to me on India's role in the Viet Nam ICC./2/ Although I am not sure of the precise context in which it was made, I have been disturbed by its possible implications.
/2/Apparently a reference to the President's remarks at the National Security Council meeting on November 15; see Document 254.
As I understand it, we and the Vietnamese will announce that we are no longer bound by certain provisions of the Geneva Accords. (This subject is not covered in yesterday's messages to Saigon;/3/ I don't know why.) We believe that it will then be up to the ICC to establish that North Viet Nam as well as we are violating the Accords. . . .
/3/See Document 257 and footnote 2 thereto.
In my opinion, when we announce that we are no longer bound by the Accords the ICC will be pretty well washed up in Viet Nam. To hope that following such an event it will become a much more effective instrument for the sole purpose of establishing North Viet Nam as an aggressor seems to me quite optimistic. Perhaps the Indians . . . have indicated that they will take the ICC more seriously, but did he commit himself to such action in the context of a decision by the U.S. to state that it is no longer bound by the Accords?
. . . How much of value can we hope to get out of the ICC? At best, we might get a judgment by the Indian and Canadian members substantiating some of the Vietnamese charges against North Viet Nam. It would be an important advance which would help us establish the basis for current and future U.S. actions, . . . .
Robert H. Johnson/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
261. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to the Secretary of State/1/
Washington, November 16, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1661. Top Secret. Drafted by Chayes and sent to the Secretary through S/S and Johnson (U). Initialed by both Chayes and Johnson. Attached to the source text is the following note of November 16 from Chayes to the Secretary: "This preparation of this memorandum and its attachments was undertaken before yesterday's NSC decisions. I believe that the analysis and observations given below will continue to be relevant, both in the carrying out of those decisions and in deliberations on further steps in the future."
SUBJECT
Report of Taylor Mission on Viet-Nam/2//2/Document 210.
I have reviewed General Taylor's report on Viet-Nam and the proposed action documents stemming from it (draft instructions to Embassy Saigon and draft letter from President Diem to President Kennedy)./3/ Attached is a memorandum (Tab A) which examines the proposed actions from the legal point of view. This memorandum concludes that, apart from any measures involving military operations deep into North Viet-Nam, the proposed actions do not present legal problems incapable of being dealt with and surmounted. The memorandum suggests some changes that ought to be made in the planning for these actions if it is decided to proceed with the general course plotted out by the Taylor Mission. These changes would be designed to improve the defensibility of our actions and to avoid consequences that would be prejudicial to the interests of South Viet-Nam and the United States. There is also (Tab B)/4/ a suggested revision of certain paragraphs of the draft letter from President Diem.
/3/Drafts of telegram 619 to Saigon (see footnote 2, Document 257) and the letter quoted in Document 257.
/4/Not printed.
Thus, apart from the possibility of long-range attacks into North Viet-Nam, the issues in deciding on our future course of action are essentially political. But we must remember that the extent to which resort to direct self-help, rather than to the procedures and institutions for peaceful settlement of international problems, has an important bearing on the prospects and effectiveness of the rule of law in the world. Because of my deep concern with these matters, I should like to give you my thoughts on the less technically legal issues in relation to Viet-Nam.
General Taylor's analysis of the situation in South Viet-Nam shows that the basic causes of deterioration and threatened collapse of non-Communist authority are not military but political. But the remedies proposed would undertake to cope with the situation principally by military and semi-military means. The central feature of the course would be the initial introduction of substantial numbers of United States troops to help in pacifying the country. It is said that to embark on this course we must be prepared to escalate, if necessary, to the dimensions of a Korea-type conflict. In assessing the prospects for this course the long history of attempts to prop up unpopular governments through the use of foreign military forces is powerfully discouraging. The French experience in this very area, as well as our own efforts since 1955, reveal the essential inadequacy of the sort of program now proposed. The drawbacks of such intervention in Viet-Nam now would be compounded, not relieved, by the United States penetration and assumption of co-responsibility at all levels of the Vietnamese Government suggested in the Taylor Report.
In my view, a more promising course of action would be to seek to internationalize the problem with a view to a negotiated settlement or a United Nations solution. I believe we should take advantage of Ambassador Harriman's presence at Geneva and his working relations with Pushkin to sound out the Soviets on the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Viet-Nam. Mr. Harriman has discussed this problem with me and has shown me the memorandum which he has given you on this subject./5/ I concur generally in his proposals.
/5/Apparently a reference to Document 239.
If Ambassador Harriman's efforts should produce no affirmative result we should also consider the advisability of taking the Viet-Nam problem to the United Nations. We would particularly seek to establish in the United Nations the facts of foreign intervention in Viet-Nam, and to enlist the United Nations' assistance in protecting the independence and integrity of Viet-Nam. Attached at Tab C/6/ is a memorandum outlining a course of action in the United Nations.
/6/Not printed.
You have often said with reference to the Berlin question that, in view of the magnitude of the stakes, we owe it to ourselves, to the American people and to our allies and associates in the free world, to exhaust the possibilities of a negotiated or peaceful settlement which will be consistent with our interests and responsibilities. The alternative to such a settlement is no less grave in Southeast Asia.
[Tab A]
Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Legal Adviser/7/
/7/Top Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.
General Taylor's Report on Viet-Nam recommends among other things that additional United States military personnel and equipment be introduced into South Viet-Nam to provide increased airlift, for expanded intelligence operations, for naval surveillance activities, and to expedite training and equipping of South Vietnamese military and civil guard elements. The question of whether additional United States forces should be introduced even to the extent of a Korea-type operation and whether we may eventually have to attack the source of guerilla aggression in North Viet-Nam is also discussed.
It has been suggested in connection with the Taylor Report that because South Viet-Nam did not sign the Geneva Accords, it is not bound by them. In any case, it is said, North Vietnamese violations of the Accords have made them inoperative, and the Accords can be ignored by South Viet-Nam in taking actions to meet the present danger. In addition, it has been suggested that the right of self-defense under the United Nations Charter can be invoked to justify actions now contemplated by the United States in South Viet-Nam.
The legal implications of these proposed actions and suggested rationale are discussed below. As with all legal principles, the application of the particular principles of law discussed herein depends upon the facts of the case. One of the steps necessary to the successful development and projection of our case in the international forum is a much fuller development than presently exists of the facts concerning external interference in Viet-Nam, such as those disclosed in the Jorden Report. We must remain continuously alert to ways in which facts that bring the legal principles into operation-such as the facts of external interference-can be gathered from reliable sources and persuasively presented.
1954 Geneva Accords
This office has never accepted the argument that South Viet-Nam is not bound by the Geneva Accords of 1954 because it did not sign them. While the representative of South Viet-Nam did not sign the agreement and in fact protested against certain provisions in it, it was signed by the French on behalf of the French Union Forces, and since the State of Viet-Nam was part of the French Union it would seem to be bound by the French signature. The agreement relating to Laos was similarly signed on behalf of the French Union Forces without a Laotian signature, yet we have always considered the Kingdom of Laos bound by the Accords. South Viet-Nam can also be considered bound by the Accords as a successor state to France. In any event the argument to the contrary leads to very undesirable consequences, for if the South Vietnamese are not parties to the Accords and not bound by them, they would seem to have no legal basis for demanding compliance by the Viet Minh with obligations under the Accords such as respect for the demarcation line and the cease-fire.
Unlike Viet-Nam, the United States did not become a party to the Accords. It issued a unilateral declaration stating that it would refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb them and that it would view any renewal of aggression in violation of the Accords with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.
The Geneva Accords prohibit the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troop reinforcements, additional military personnel and increased amounts of war material. In the absence of adequate legal justification, introduction of United States military personnel and equipment as envisaged in the Taylor Report would therefore, in our view, be a violation of the Accords by South Viet-Nam. Such action would not be inconsistent with the unilateral declaration of the United States, since it would not constitute the threat or use of force to upset the Accords. Nevertheless, again in the absence of adequate legal justification, the United States would be aiding and abetting violations by South Viet-Nam.
Justifications for the actions presently contemplated may be found in general principles of international law governing treaties. Under these principles, a material breach of a treaty by one party entitles the other either to suspend the operation of the entire agreement or at least to withhold compliance with an equivalent, corresponding or related provision until resumption of observance by the other party. The Viet Minh have violated the Geneva Accords by directing, assisting and engaging in active hostilities in South Viet-Nam and presumably by illegal introduction into North Viet-Nam of military personnel and war materials.
Justification of suspension of certain parts of the Geneva Accords would gain force in the present context from the fact that actions contemplated by the Government of Viet-Nam which might be said to contravene the Accords can be related to the requirements of legitimate self-defense necessitated by the breaches of the other party.
Thus, under the applicable principles, we would have the option of suspending the agreement in toto or of withholding compliance with appropriate provisions. In our judgment, the United States and South Viet-Nam should choose the latter course, since we will wish to assert the continuing force of a number of obligations which the Viet-Minh have undertaken under the Accords. The demarcation line itself between North and South Viet-Nam is established by the Accords, as is the requirement for the general cessation of hostilities. It should be recognized, however, that the adoption of this course imposes upon us some obligation to keep our response appropriately related to the infractions of the other side.
Though we believe that the introduction of additional military forces and equipment into South Viet-Nam for the purposes described at the beginning of this memorandum would be justified at law, there is no doubt that the Communists will claim, and with a certain plausibility, that South Viet-Nam has violated the Accords, aided and abetted by the United States. To the extent that the contemplated measures can be cast in the form of assistance and training to police and constabulary forces rather than the introduction and training of regular troops, the persuasive force of these complaints will be lessened.
General Intervention
Assuming that the Geneva Accords are not a barrier to actions contemplated in the Taylor Report, the question arises as to whether there are any other legal obstacles to such actions under general international law or the United Nations Charter.
International law permits the United States to introduce its forces into South Viet-Nam at the invitation of the Government of Viet-Nam to assist that Government in quelling insurgent activities having substantial external support, inspiration or direction. There is nothing in the United Nations Charter that prohibits such action.
In 1958, at the invitation of the President of Lebanon, and in circumstances of alleged indirect aggression against the Government of Lebanon by outside forces or governments, United States troops were sent to Lebanon. President Eisenhower explained that this action was taken in part "to encourage the Lebanese Government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity."
As in the Lebanese situation, however, we should be prepared to defend United States action in Viet-Nam in an international forum such as the United Nations, whether the question is brought there at our own or someone else's initiative.
Retaliatory Attacks
As to the problem of attacking the source of guerilla aggression in North Viet-Nam there are two currently relevant categories of fact situations:
1) The first category relates to operations undertaken against bases near the border in North Viet-Nam and Laos which are being used as a sanctuary and for supply purposes by the Viet Cong. It would seem justifiable under international law principles relating to hot pursuit to follow the enemy across the border and attempt to destroy his bases of operations adjacent to the border. Such operations would have to be appropriately related to the act provoking them, proportionate in their effects and limited to action necessary to obtain relief.
2) The second category consists of direct attacks against Hanoi and similar strategic centers deep inside North Viet-Nam. In the absence of overt aggression by means of armed attack against South Viet-Nam, such action would go beyond permissible self-defense under general international law and would be contrary to the United Nations Charter.
The right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter can be invoked only in the event of an armed attack. The term "armed attack" as used in the Charter is generally understood as a direct external attack upon one country by the armed forces of another such as the German invasion of Poland in 1939 or the North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950. Armed attack is a form of aggression. "Aggression" is a broader concept, covering a range of actions by which one state may threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of another. This difference is recognized in international law generally, in the United Nations Charter and in our mutual defense treaties. In the latter the term "armed attack" has been expressly or implicitly limited to exclude indirect aggression.
An essential element in determining whether an action constitutes an "armed attack" is the factor of time. An armed attack is an action which occurs swiftly, requiring immediate measures to ward it off. The "armed attack" envisaged under Article 51 of the Charter is an attack which requires immediate measures of self-defense, measures which cannot await the action of the United Nations but which must be undertaken at once. By the same token "armed attack" under such agreements as the North Atlantic Treaty, the Southeast Asia Treaty, and the Rio Treaty implies a situation in which a response is required before the normal consultative procedures can be availed of.
Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits any use of force by a United Nations member in its international relations which is inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Article 51 of the Charter recognizes the right of individual or collective use of force in self-defense against armed attack without waiting for steps to be taken by any United Nations organ. In cases of aggression that fall short of armed attack, however, it would not be consistent with the purposes of the United Nations for the United States as a UN member to proceed to the use of armed force to defeat acts which it considers aggressive. In such cases, it would be incumbent upon a UN member to bring the matter first to the attention of the United Nations organization for its consideration and judgment.
262. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev/1/
Washington, November 16, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, JFK-Khrushchev 1961-62. Top Secret.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I have now had a chance to study your most recent two letters on the German problem and on Laos and Vietnam. I shall be writing you again about Germany and Berlin,/2/ but I do wish to give you my thoughts about Laos and Vietnam as soon as possible.
/2/For texts, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VI, Documents 23 and 24, and 26.
In writing to you, I am conscious of the difficulties you and I face in establishing full communication between our two minds. This is not a question of translation but a question of the context in which we hear and respond to what each other has to say. You and I have already recognized that neither of us will convince the other about our respective social systems and general philosophies of life. These differences create a great gulf in communication because language cannot mean the same thing on both sides unless it is related to some underlying common purpose. I cannot believe that there are not such common interests between the Soviet and the American people. Therefore, I am trying to penetrate our ideological differences in order to find some bridge across the gulf on which we could bring our minds together and find some way in which to protect the peace of the world.
[Here follow three paragraphs on the situation in Laos; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VI, Document 25.]
As to the situation in Vietnam, I must tell you frankly that your analysis of the situation there and the cause of the military action which has occurred in Southern Viet-Nam is not accurate. Precisely because of the visit of such Americans as Vice President Johnson and General Taylor we are, as you yourself recognize, well informed as to the situation in that country. I do not wish to argue with you concerning the government structure and policies of President Ngo Dinh Diem, but I would like to cite for your consideration the evidence of external interference or incitement which you dismiss in a phrase.
I would draw your attention to a letter sent by the Government of Vietnam to the International Control Commission concerning the North Vietnam subversion and aggression against Vietnam, dated October 24, 1961./3/ I would urge that you should read this document very carefully since it contains evidence of a planned and consistent effort on the part of the DRV to overthrow by violence the legitimate government of South Vietnam. I would like to add that the evidence contained in this document is known to the United States to be accurate and sober. Many more incidents of the type outlined in this document could be deduced from our own experience and our own direct knowledge. I might point out here that in effect from 1954, the signature of the Geneva Accords, until 1959, the situation in Vietnam was relatively tranquil. The country was effecting a limited recovery from the ravages of the civil war from which it had just emerged. The Government enjoyed the support of the people and the prospects for the future appeared reasonably bright. However, in 1959, the DRV having failed in the elections which had been held in Vietnam and in the attempt to arouse the people against their legitimate government, turned to a calculated plan of open infiltration, subversion, and aggression. During the Third Party Congress of the Lao Dong Party the Secretary General Le Duan stated: "There does not exist any other way outside of that which consists in the overthrow of the dictatorial and Fascist regime of the American-Diemist clique in order to liberate totally South Vietnam, with a view to realizing national unity." As indicated in the document to which I have referred, you will find this statement in the Nhan Dan, Hanoi Daily Number 2362 of September 6, 1960.
/3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-861)
It is the firm opinion of the United States Government that Southern Vietnam is now undergoing a determined attempt from without to overthrow the existing government using for this purpose infiltration, supply of arms, propaganda, terrorization, and all the customary instrumentalities of communist activities in such circumstances, all mounted and developed from North Vietnam.
It is hardly necessary for me to draw your attention to the Geneva Accords of July 20-21, 1954. The issue, therefore, is not that of some opinion or other in regard to the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem, but rather that of a nation whose integrity and security is threatened by military actions, completely at variance with the obligations of the Geneva Accords.
Insofar as the United States is concerned, we view the situation in which the Republic of Vietnam finds itself with the utmost gravity and, in conformity with our pledge made at the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954,/4/ as one seriously endangering international peace and security. Our support for the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem we regard as a serious obligation, and we will undertake such measures as the circumstances appear to warrant. Since there is no semblance of any threat to the DRV by the Government of Vietnam, it is clear that if the DRV were honorably to discharge the obligations it undertook in the Geneva Accords, the prospects for peace would be improved. I would, therefore, venture to suggest that you, as the head of a government which was a signatory to the Geneva Accords, should use all the influence that you possess and endeavor to bring the DRV to the strict observance of these Accords. This would be a great act in the cause of peace which you refer to as the essence of the policies of the Twenty-second Party Congress. If the DRV were to abide by its obligations under the Geneva Accords, there would be no need for the United States to consider, as we must at the present, how best to support the Government of Vietnam in its struggle for independence and national integrity.
/4/For Under Secretary Smith's statement at Geneva on July 21, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, p. 1500.
I have written you frankly about Laos and Vietnam for a very simple reason. Both these countries are at a distance from our own countries and can be considered areas in which we ought to be able to find agreement. I am suggesting to you that you use every means at your disposal to insure a genuinely neutral and independent Laos, as those words are commonly understood throughout the world, and to insure that those closely associated with you leave South Vietnam alone. On our part, we shall work toward a neutral and independent Laos and will insure that North Vietnam not be the object of any direct or indirect aggression. This would be a step toward peace; I am reluctant to believe that there is any necessary alternative to be imposed upon my country by the actions of others.
I am leaving for a few days for a visit to the western part of our country and will be in touch with you on other matters when I return.
Sincerely,/5/
/5/The source text is not signed.
263. Editorial Note
At a press conference on November 17, 1961, Secretary Rusk made an introductory statement about several issues, including Vietnam. He said that the accelerated North Vietnamese campaign to overthrow the South Vietnamese Government was "a threat to the peace" and was "of major and serious concern not only to the people of Viet-Nam and their immediate neighbors but also to all other free nations." The Secretary noted that there had also been "an acceleration of deliveries under our mutual defense assistance program" to South Vietnam and that some changes could be expected "in the nature of our training under the military advisory and training program . . . ." For the complete text of the Secretary's statement, as well as his replies to questions asked about Vietnam, see Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1961, pages 918-922.
264. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/
Washington, November 17, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Sept.-Dec. 1961. Secret.
SUBJECT
Use of Defoliants in Viet NamIt seems to me that if we are going to cope successfully with charges that we are engaged in germ or poison gas warfare, we must make the general character of the operations as open and above board as possible. Would it be possible to get the ICC to examine every drum of the defoliant mixture to determine that it is what we say it is? If we are going to pursue the policy of letting the ICC find out itself whether we are violating the Geneva Accords, this may be impossible. It may be difficult, in any event, to get the ICC to agree to any such action. An alternative approach would be to bring in some other international group or perhaps a group of private scientists. Publicity ought to emphasize the fact (I believe it is a fact) that the chemical agents involved are the same kind that are used by farmers against weeds.
I think that the adverse political consequences of the operation would also be less if this is not the first concrete move that is announced in connection with our stepped-up effort in Viet Nam. If it could be put in the context of a comprehensive story of what we plan to do and why we plan to do it, we shall be much better off. There is some danger that North Viet Nam, which has already got hold of our general plans and begun a propaganda operation, can exploit this operation to the point where its propaganda would be a quite effective backfire against our subsequent charges of DRV involvement in the South.
It seems to me important that this question be got to the President on an urgent basis, possibly this weekend, no later than Monday./2/ If we are not going ahead we ought to stop our preparatory efforts quickly. Otherwise we may pay many of the political costs while reaping no military advantages.
/2/November 20.
The cost estimates on this program seem to have gone upward continuously. Whereas earlier this week I understood that the total cost was on the order of $4 million ($1 million for chemicals and $3 million for air transport), I now understand that it may be on the order of $10-15 million. This estimate is for just the initial phase operation-the attack on the food supplies. Other estimates have put total possible cost of the three-phase program at $70 million or more. I think that these figures raise serious questions with respect to the comparative value of this as opposed to other measures we might take in Viet Nam.
As you probably know, subsequent phases would involve selective defoliation in Zone D and of the communications routes between Saigon and other key cities and defoliation along the Cambodian border. If I understand a recent Department telegram/3/ correctly, we have in mind defoliating an area near, but not on, the border, but at a constant distance from it. Will this accomplish the purpose?
/3/Telegram 582 to Saigon, November 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-961)
I am not certain whether the President is being asked to approve all three phases. Politically, the defoliation of areas around Zone D and along the roads to the principal cities would seem to present least difficulties. If we should decide against the operation directed at VC crops, we might still decide to go ahead with Zone D and roadside operation. The principal political danger in it may be to turn non-Communist villagers whose crops are accidentally destroyed against the government. That is, of course, one of the political drawbacks of all three proposed phases.
I would recommend that, since State and Defense are now to discuss the subject this afternoon,/4/ they might consider preparing a joint paper for the President. The Defense draft ought clearly to state the technical military case for case. (A bootleg copy of a draft/5/ which I have seen did not.) The State draft ought to discuss the political problems in the area and worldwide.
/4/This discussion took place at the Department of State at 2 p.m. on November 17 and included U. Alexis Johnson, William Bundy, and Rostow, among others. (Memorandum from Bagley to Taylor, November 18; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-127-69)
/5/Not found, but apparently a reference to a draft of a memorandum of November 21 from Gilpatric to the President. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Vietnam 1962-370.64)
Relevant recent cable traffic is attached./6/
/6/Not found attached to the source text.
Robert H. Johnson/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
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