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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume I Vietnam, 1961 Department of State Washington, DC

265. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Far East (Neilson), to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)/1/

Washington, November 17, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA/TOP Files: FRC 67 A 222, IAF Defoliation 1963. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that copies were sent to Wilson, Sorenson (IOP), and Slaton (IAF). The source text is Sorenson's copy and bears his typewritten name in the margin and the handwritten notation, "TCS. Must reading. BY." "BY" has not been identified.

SUBJECT
Use of Defoliants in Viet-Nam

I am informed that the Department of Defense has drafted a memorandum to the White House seeking the President's decision on the use of defoliants in Viet-Nam./2/ The Secretary of State's concurrence is to be sought before submission to the President.

/2/See footnote 5, Document 264.

A member of my staff saw the memorandum in the Viet-Nam Task Force office yesterday. No copies were available.

The memo, briefly, lists two principal objectives in using defoliants: Deny food to Viet Cong units; establish a denuded area along Viet-Nam borders (with Cambodia, or Laos, or both) to check Viet Cong infiltration. Also listed are negative factors, mainly psychological, which should be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.

The status of this controversial subject thus is: The Government of Viet-Nam, the U.S. Country Team in Saigon and the Department of Defense urge employment of defoliant as an effective tactic to hinder Viet Cong depredations. In proposing the action, consideration was given to so-called public relations or psychological factors. For instance, tests on foliage in or around Saigon would be made publicly to demonstrate that the chemicals employed are not harmful to humans and animals; the GVN itself would mount a publicity campaign explaining the security benefits which would accrue; unmarked aircraft piloted by "civilians" would be employed in spraying flights to guard against charges that "American military adventurists" are involved; etc.

I don't know whether the following factors have been taken into consideration thus far in the decision-making process in Washington:

(1) The use of chemical weaponry in an Asian country could create such a storm of criticism that possible short-range military advantages on the ground in Viet-Nam might be outweighed by a harvest of ill-will deleterious to certain long-ranged goals in Viet-Nam and the region (Southeast Asia).

(2) The communist bloc will, of course, make great propaganda capital of this undertaking by "the U.S. and its stooge Diem." We all recall the propaganda circus created by the communists on alleged U.S. use of "germ warfare" in Korea on the basis of fabricated evidence.

I am no military strategist or tactician, although I did learn a few things about chemical or bacteriological warfare (most of it harrassing) at the Air War College. Perhaps defoliation can be a critical factor in exposing Viet Cong strongholds and destroying Viet Cong food supplies. If it is, and must be used, we can take the psychological bumps which are certain to be dealt to us. But the spectre of charges that "U.S. imperialists are waging germ warfare on Asians" haunts me.

The decision is to be left to the President. I recommend you discuss the subject in its varied ramifications with Walt Rostow.

 

266. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, November 18, 1961, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1861. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated priority to Bangkok and CINCPAC for PolAd.

678. Ref Deptels 618 and 619./2/ I saw President Diem at 5 pm Nov 17 to convey President Kennedy's decisions on Taylor report concerning SVN. President Diem had interrupted inspection trip in central Viet Nam to return to Saigon to receive me. Interview lasted two and one-half hours; was candid, direct, and fundamental.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 257.

I read from, and later expanded on, paper/3/ prepared from instructions reftels. Stressed theme of partnership requiring far-reaching and difficult measures on both sides. Left Diem to do some hard thinking of his own on required GVN actions, and did not at this stage present list of specifics with respect GVN reorganization.

/3/No copy of this paper has been found.

I gave him detailed outline of proposed US actions contained paras 1, 5 and 6 of reftel/4/ and, for precision, left him paper containing full substance sub-paras H through J para 1, less FYI portion sub-para G.

/4/i.e., telegram 619.

I believe I made it unmistakably clear, and repeated the point several times, that US readiness to go ahead with proposed joint effort depends heavily on his coming up with proposed GVN actions in administrative, political and social fields which will be recognized as having real substance and meaning. I urged that he let me know as soon as possible his ideas on this point, as well as on our proposal as a whole.

Diem promised to do so and did not at this stage attempt to give a considered reaction to our proposal. As anticipated, his first question was re introduction US combat troops. I replied along lines para 4 reftel and pointed out that measures set out paras 1A, B and C would involve US uniformed military personnel in roles which could expose them to enemy action. In response to Diem's question he [I?] said that in my personal opinion these personnel would be authorized to defend themselves if attacked. I pointed out that this was one reason why the decisions were very grave from US standpoint and why we needed substantial GVN response on actions it proposed to take.

Diem said that he presumed I realized that our proposals involved the question of the responsibility of the Government of Viet Nam. Viet Nam, he said, did not want to be a protectorate.

I said that this was well understood; we for our part did not wish to make it one. Diem also pointed out that GVN was constantly in process of making reforms but major action could not be taken without thorough consideration and without having always in mind that there was a war to be won. Object was to restore order, not to create disorder. I said I recognized that this was a delicate judgment; in my opinion, as a friend of his country and of him, his greater risk was to stand pat, or act too cautiously. It was my sincere belief that it would be possible for him to streamline his government and delegate authority to a greater extent and, in addition, to take into the government and into his confidence capable people who are now sitting on the sidelines. In past he had told me that he had tried latter without success but I believed that if he tried once again and offered real responsibility to people on sidelines at this critical juncture, it would have great quieting effect on whole country. The President did not respond directly on this point. He did expatiate at length on the difficulty of finding people willing to accept responsibility, on the shortage of trained and able people, on the effects on the people of 80 years of French colonial rule, and on the mentality and habits of the Vietnamese people-a theme on which he has often elaborated in the past.

On the whole, I am not discouraged at Diem's reaction. In fact, he took our proposals rather better than I had expected. He has promised to call me as soon as he has been able to reflect upon our proposals and, until we have heard his considered reaction, I think it would be idle to speculate on outcome. He requested copy of paper from which I read and talked, which I am sending him. He said he would ask his Cabinet for ideas.

I urge that every possible effort be made to avoid leaks on nature of our proposals, particularly the "quid pro quo" aspects, in interest of getting result we desire.

Draft Diem-Kennedy letter not yet shown to Diem and will be modified accordance Deptel 635./5/

/5/Dated November 17, it offered suggested changes in the third and fourth sentences of paragraph 2 and the first sentence of paragraph 11 of the draft letter. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1761)

Nolting

 

267. Editorial Note

On November 20 and 21, 1961, Ambassador Galbraith conveyed his views on Vietnam to President Kennedy in two telegrams which are printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pages 406-409 and 410-418. See also Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, pages 250 ff.

 

268. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, November 21, 1961, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00.11-2161. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, New Delhi, Ottawa, Bangkok, Vientiane, London, Paris, Geneva for FECON, and Phnom Penh.

684. Task Force Vietnam. Department has informed us/2/ current policy approach re Geneva Accords is that we need not confirm to world that we disregarding Accords by increased aid to Vietnam and that GVN should counter charges violation not by admission but by counter-charging DRV violations and insisting on ICC investigations of GVN charges if DRV charges to be investigated.

/2/Reference is to telegram 618; see footnote 2, Document 257.

We agree with this approach as far as it goes, but believe that further development of our Geneva Accords position is necessary in order enable US meet (a) political need of reassuring Vietnamese public and preventing further morale deterioration through provision more information as to what US has been doing in way military assistance to Vietnam during past few months and, as decisions reached in future, what additional steps we are taking, and (b) desirability maintaining with local US correspondents reasonable status of credibility which now seriously stretched by our continued insistence US military personnel still within 685 ceiling. (c) Believe also that if and when US military personnel are given certain operational functions in Vietnam, USG may find it desirable to let American public know what they are doing so that it will be prepared for possible news of casualties.

Believe that we could meet above objectives to substantial degree if we could find means consistent with Geneva Accords of being more direct and forthright about increased US military personnel in Vietnam. We think this could be done by use rotation argument under Article 16/3/ to effect that American military personnel are replacing withdrawn French personnel. This was basis our argument to ICC in early 1960 when we increased MAAG to 685. At that time we said we had right to go up to 888, since French had at least that number training personnel in Vietnam when Geneva Accords concluded. Subsequently we learned from French military attaché Saigon that French training cadres in 1954 actually amounted to about 3,500.

/3/Article 16 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, signed at Geneva on July 20, 1954, stipulated seven conditions under which the "rotation of units and groups of personnel, the arrival in Viet-Nam of individual personnel on a temporary duty basis and the return to Viet-Nam of individual personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam" would be permitted. (Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1505-1520)

Believe we should inform Canadians and Indians bilaterally (not through formal ICC channel except in answer to eventual ICC letter requesting explanation) that we now intend take advantage this fact for further augmentation MAAG in light growing DRV threat. Department will recall this is essentially line we intended to take some months ago but Canadians in Saigon objected and said Indians would not go along. However, in light Washington discussions with Nehru, we would hope Indians would now be more forthcoming. (Have discussed here with Ambassador Galbraith.)

Seems desirable at present time avoid any reference to our "right" to replace French combat troops (who amounted to about 150,000 in 1954), because this would probably make it tactically harder to sell Indians and therefore Canadians on immediate case about increase in MAAG. We should however, keep this point in reserve for future use if needed.

In eventual publicity which we might undertake after establishing 3,500 justifications with Indians and Canadians, we do not think we would need to be rigidly careful to state publicly that all American military personnel in Vietnam are trainers and advisers only, but neither should be strident in stating that they are not. We believe that case by case decision as to what to state publicly would be best method, and that Embassy Saigon should be consulted in each case prior public announcements anywhere. Since it is likely we shall want to show that some American personnel are "operational" (such as projected helicopter crews), we should be prepared meet possible argument by DRV and Poles that this shows de facto military alliance in violation Article 19 Geneva Accords./4/ Believe our best way of meeting this if it arises would be to point out that as far as US is legally concerned only written treaty signed and ratified by two-thirds of Senate constitutes military alliance and that does not exist in case Vietnam.

/4/Article 19 reads: "With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the re-grouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy." (Ibid.)

Would appreciate Department's early reaction to above. If Department concurs suggest New Delhi and Ottawa be asked make prompt approaches to governments to which accredited, and that these approaches be pitched more in terms of informing those governments what we propose to do rather than asking for their concurrence. Meanwhile we would compile with view toward bolstering Vietnamese morale what we believe could be released locally with respect build-up US military assistance during recent months.

Nolting

 

269. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President/1/

Washington, November 21, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Memos and Reports. Secret. Initialed by Rostow.

SUBJECT
Viet-Nam Status Report

There is attached the first status report on recent decisions with respect to Viet-Nam./2/ This memorandum is designed to supplement that status report by providing additional clarifying information, covering subjects not covered in the report and bringing it up to date where additional information has been received.

/2/Dated November 20, not printed.

The Military Situation. There has been continuing deterioration, but no major change, in the military situation. The crisis described in the Taylor Mission Report has not been reversed. There has been a recent step-up of Viet Cong activity in the Delta and GVN analysis suggests that the VC plans to broaden the area of Zone D north of Saigon. Though the Government has taken some military initiatives, its military operations have produced no significant results. There is one bit of evidence indicating that the Cambodians may have tightened their border somewhat and that the VC are raiding Cambodian border villages in retaliation.

Casualty rates remain at the higher level inaugurated in September, when the VC stepped up their offensive.

The Flood Situation. Each new report on the flood emphasizes the fact that its effects will not be so severe as had been feared initially. However, estimates of rice requirements which have fluctuated up and down have now been firmly estimated at the relatively high figure of 220,000 tons. Action to deal with this problem is reported in the status report. Meanwhile, Diem has established his own flood relief and reconstruction organization under an official who is well regarded by the American Embassy.

U.S. Economic Aid. AID in mid-October approved a level of $140 million for non-project aid (commercial imports) for FY 1962. Because of the floods and General Taylor's visit, this figure was never given to the Vietnamese. The Ambassador on November 16 requested that this level be increased to $160 million on the basis of new requirements created by the flood, particularly the need for rice./3/ Today he has sent a new message to the personal attention of Fowler Hamilton/4/ requesting expedited action on this request on the grounds that it would be of great help in his current negotiations with Diem and is crucial to Vietnamese action to carry out exchange reform and other measures which were agreed in connection with the Staley Report. The request is receiving urgent consideration in State and AID.

/3/Toaid 69 from Saigon, November 16, not found.

/4/Telegram 680 from Saigon, November 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2061)

The Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. The item on this subject at the bottom of page 2 of the status report actually deals only with the Civil Guard. We have not yet reached agreement with the Vietnamese Government on a plan for the training of the Self Defense Corps. The Government rejected a MAAG proposal that members of the Corps be trained in the Civil Guard training centers on the grounds that such action would leave a security vacuum in the provinces. The GVN proposed instead to bring 3 to 5 thousand Nationalist Chinese military to Viet-Nam to provide "on-the-spot" training./5/ We are planning to make a counter-proposal for training of the Corps at thirty provincial training centers.

/5/On November 17, the Department of State's Executive Secretariat transmitted to McGeorge Bundy a memorandum of the same date drafted by Warren A. Silver of the Vietnam Task Force regarding Vietnamese requests for Chinese Nationalist assistance as well as tables prepared by Silver on U.S. economic and military assistance to South Vietnam during the period October 18-November 17, 1961. In a brief covering memorandum, Deputy Executive Secretary Melvin L. Manfull told Bundy that the attached memorandum and tables contained "the information you requested last night by phone for the President's use." (Ibid., 75lK.00/11-1761)

The Geneva Accords. As anticipated, we are already having some difficulties dealing with questions from newsmen and others on the relationship between our actions and the Geneva Accords. The problem has been contained for the moment, but can be expected to become more difficult as additional large items of military equipment are delivered.

New Management of the Surete. The Embassy is seizing upon the opportunities provided by change in leadership of the Surete. It is planning to propose development of a "National Communist Party Penetration Service" . . . down to the provincial level and an improved police program with the support of the USOM.

Organizational Questions. General Taylor has been consulting with General Lemnitzer on the question of organization of U.S. military activities in Viet-Nam. The question of Washington organization for implementation of the action program is under consideration between State and Defense in consultation with General Taylor.

Weed Killer. You will be receiving papers from Defense and State soon raising the question of whether we should support the use of a weed killer to attack crops in the plateau area on which the VC feed and to clear jungle paths, notably for an attack on Zone D. Your decision is required because this is a kind of chemical warfare.

 

270. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, November 22, 1961, noon.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, 350 GVN. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok and to CINCPAC for PolAd.

687. Re Deptels 618, 619 and Embtel 678./2/ Saw Thuan November 20 on several matters, and in course conversation asked him what he could tell me re schedule of follow-up discussions with President Diem on recent démarche. This led to long, wide-ranging, and pessimistic account by Thuan of how things stand here. I do not take his pessimism too seriously-indeed it may be only bargaining tactic-and conversation gave me opportunity to clarify and put in proportion proposed "new partnership" envisaged in our position, and reasons for it.

/2/Telegrams 618 and 619 are not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 257. Telegram 678 is printed as Document 266.

Thuan said that Diem had not yet discussed fully with him U.S. proposals presented last Friday;/3/ but had given him impression of being "very sad and very disappointed". Thuan said Diem had said he now hesitates to put proposals before even his Cabinet Ministers, fearing that they would be disappointed and lose heart. He had intended to discuss US proposals with both Cabinet and selected members of Assembly who had been consulted re advisability of US forces at time of Taylor Mission, but now thought contrast between his earlier question and US proposals too striking. Thuan conveyed impression that Diem is brooding over US proposals and has made no move yet to develop specific ideas on actions GVN expected to take. Thuan said President's attitude seemed to be that US asking great concessions of GVN in realm its sovereignty, in exchange for little additional help; that this is great disappointment after discussions with General Taylor involving, in particular, concept of Delta Task Force; that Diem seemed to wonder whether US was getting ready to back out on Viet-Nam as, he suggested, we had done in Laos.

/3/November 17.

I told Thuan that if in fact President Diem had reacted in this manner after consideration our proposals, I wished to talk with him directly and soon. These are very serious matters to us as well as to GVN, and we cannot afford to have any misunderstandings, lack of clarity, or to deal at arms' length. What I had proposed on President Kennedy's instructions was a serious, difficult, and far-reaching set of proposals designed to reverse the trend and eventually to win the struggle in Viet-Nam. I said I was sure he knew this, and he confirmed it. I told him that we on our side had to have a structure for improved performance on the part of GVN in several areas, in order to make far-reaching political decision involving substantial additional US effort, manpower, resources, and prestige. Furthermore, the United States had no idea whatsoever of wanting to make South Viet-Nam a US "protectorate" (Diem's word); on contrary, if SVN could protect itself, nothing would please us more. The fact is that we are trying in a most difficult situation to develop means to help SVN protect itself, and measures we propose are very far-reaching indeed. I explained reasons why we considered introduction US combat forces, either in anti-guerrilla war or as garrison troops, unwise; and how we had searched for, and found, substantial measures to bolster GVN's own effort in anti-subversion war, which would be effective if GVN reorganized itself to make them so. I also emphasized the seriousness of our proposal to bring international pressure, and effective pressure, on Communist bloc to discontinue infiltrations. I elaborated on benefits to SVN from multi-national participation in civilian effort re rehabilitation flooded provinces.

Thuan seemed to be torn between appreciation of soundness and significance of our proposals and the difficulties, political, psychological and administrative, which Diem faces. He said frankly that given the structure of Vietnamese society, the paucity of people willing to assume responsibility, the tendency to analyze and criticize rather than to act, he shared President's fear that public acceptance of our proposals would disastrously weaken strong Diem leadership which he considers indispensable at this time. "Without his determined and active leadership, we would collapse." On other hand, he recognized our needs in terms US and world opinion. He inquired most earnestly whether our proposals could not be done "in a practical manner", meaning step-by-step, without publicity, and without requiring any over-all GVN acceptance. He pointed to present reorganization and strengthening GVN intelligence service as a case in point. He said Diem would do these things one by one on a practical basis if right men could be found, but he would not accept anything that looked to public as a sweeping reorganization under US pressure. I told him that essentially it is results, not appearances, that we are seeking; that if GVN would come up with specific suggestions for improvements we would try to meet them on the means; but that our experience to date had led us to conclusion that real measures of decentralization and delegation of authority, strengthening of personnel in administrative positions, and broadening popular appeal are urgently required.

Turning to military, Thuan asked what sort of "new terms of reference" for MAAG are envisaged. I said that as minimum Chief MAAG would have to have command authority for any US operational forces introduced, in addition to present advisory authority as maximum, and depending on GVN needs and wishes, he might have a role like that General Van Fleet in Greece. I described how Greece, nearly submerged by Communism, had been able to reserve the trend and win, making full use of US operational advice as well as material aid; and that Greece is now a fully independent member of world community. Thuan said that in military command structure, as in so many others, there is grave lack of competent people willing to discharge responsibility. I said we could help in this. He said he knew we could, but trouble was that none of their people, especially military, liked to have their incompetence exposed. I asked him whether he was telling me that introduction of US advisors for operations would bring about such resentment on part ARVN officer corps as to cause military coup d'etat. He said that was what he had in mind. I said I thought we could find a way; it would depend on how the matter was handled and the quality of the men we might contribute. I again urged Thuan to urge President Diem to come up with specific proposals. I said we are not inflexible, but determined this time to work out a new partnership which would give real results and win the struggle, now going badly. We do not wish to take over, but we had to be assured that additional US commitments, plus present large-scale aid, was going to have real results. Otherwise, I saw no way of winning.

I think my best tactic is to wait a few days for Diem's response, I do not want to seem to be pressing him to buy our proposals, and I think Thuan will help.

Meanwhile I would appreciate prompt as possible clarification and elaboration on following (letters are keyed to sub-paragraphs numbered paragraph 1, Deptel 619):

(a) (b) (c). Would uniformed personnel referred to be armed and authorized at least to defend themselves? Any limitation on types of missions in which they could participate?

(a). What is composition in terms numbers aircraft and personnel of "increased airlift"? How soon could they reach Viet-Nam?

(b). Does this pare refer to Jungle Jim unit already here, or is additional effort this area contemplated?

(c). What types and numbers of small craft are contemplated and when could they arrive? Would such craft, manned partly or wholly by US uniformed personnel, carry out patrols in coastal and inland waterways?

(f). What sort of "new terms of reference" are envisaged? It would plainly be necessary to broaden MAAG responsibility to include operational direction of US forces. Would this be accomplished by classified directive to Chief MAAG, or by openly establishing theater command?

(g). Is it possible to be more specific regarding "increased economic aid as may be required"?

(i). What are the areas other than military in which we would contemplate putting US administrators? Can we do this without publicity, insofar as possible?

Nolting

 

271. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/

JCSM-812-61

Washington, November 22, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-185-69. Top Secret. Attached to a brief covering memorandum of November 28 from Lemnitzer's staff assistant, Richard R. Day, to Taylor, indicating that Lemnitzer had asked that the memorandum be sent to Taylor for his information. For William Bundy's comments, in a memorandum to McNamara, November 25, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, p. 449.

SUBJECT
South Vietnam

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 13 November 1961, subject as above./2/

/2/Document 245.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the problem of establishing a new command structure for South Vietnam and believe that certain criteria should be established before initiating major changes in the present command organization. Such changes should be preceded by:

a. A firm agreement with President Diem on the program of joint effort that the United States is proposing.

b. Clearly defined United States objectives that will be pursued in South Vietnam

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff examined three possible command structures for South Vietnam; i.e., a unified command under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a joint task force under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a subordinate unified command under CINCPAC. Subject to establishment of the agreement and objectives cited in paragraph 2, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend a subordinate unified command under CINCPAC at this time for the following reasons: Current guidance as to the nature of the mission and the magnitude of US forces to be assigned to the new command does not warrant the establishment of a theater of operations type command directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. South Vietnam cannot be isolated militarily from the rest of Southeast Asia which is in CINCPAC's area of responsibility. All US and SEATO contingency plans for South Vietnam are inextricably tied, both operationally and geographically, to CINCPAC strategic plans. All resources in the Pacific Area are allocated to CINCPAC.

4. If it is decided to change the command structure in Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor utilizing the existing unified command structure by requiring CINCPAC to organize a subordinate unified command for South Vietnam similar to those already established in Korea, Taiwan and Japan. This command would have Service component commanders and would be over the existing MAAG.

5. As and when the actions in paragraph 2 are complete, and subject to your approval of the proposals contained herein, CINCPAC should be directed to establish without delay a subordinate unified command for South Vietnam in accordance with guidance contained in the Appendix hereto.

6. The monitoring of the activities of the command in Vietnam should be carried out in the normal manner by the Joint Chiefs of Staff utilizing the Director for Operations Joint Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. Lemnitzer/3/

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

Appendix/4/

/4/Top Secret.

CONCEPT FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUBORDINATE
UNIFIED COMMAND UNITED STATES FORCES, VIETNAM

General

1. Subject to agreement with the Government of Vietnam (GVN), as represented by letters which will be exchanged by President Kennedy and President Diem (copies of which will be made available), the United States will establish a subordinate unified command with Headquarters in Saigon.

2. The objective of this establishment will be to increase US military and economic assistance to the GVN, short of introduction of combat forces, and to increase US participation in the direction and control of Armed Forces of Vietnam (RVNAF) counter-insurgency operations, in order to assist the GVN to contain and eventually to eliminate the Viet Cong. To this end the command will draw together, under single command and control, all those US activities in Vietnam, including intelligence operations, MAAG South Vietnam, and economic aid, which are related to the counter-insurgency effort.

3. The command title will be "United States Forces, Vietnam" (USFV); the commander's short title will be "COMUS Vietnam."

Mission and Functional Responsibilities

4. The mission of COMUS Vietnam will be to assist and support the Government of Vietnam in its efforts to prevent the fall of Vietnam to communism, to defeat communist insurgency, and to destroy the Viet Cong.

5. The commander's responsibilities, in discharging the above mission under CINCPAC, will include but not be limited to the following:

a. Exercise operational command over all US military forces in Vietnam, including MAAG South Vietnam.

b. Plan and conduct all US ground, sea and air operations in Vietnam, including US efforts undertaken in support of RVNAF combat operations against the Viet Cong.

c. Exercise full control of all US joint intelligence efforts in Vietnam.

d. Participate with the RVNAF at all appropriate levels in intelligence activities, the development of plans, and the conduct of operations, to the extent necessary to insure the effective employment of RVNAF forces.

e. Supervise and direct, through the Chief of US Operations Mission, and other appropriate members of the US Diplomatic Mission, all US economic aid related to the counter-insurgency effort in Vietnam.

f. Function, on a direct and personal basis, as principal US military advisor to the Commander in Chief of the RVNAF.

g. Conduct planning, in coordination with PACOM agencies and other appropriate agencies, for the effective application and employment of US and GVN resources in execution of his mission. Such plans will be subject to approval by CINCPAC.

Command Arrangements and Relationships

5. USFV will be a subordinate unified command with a joint staff; COMUS Vietnam will report directly to CINCPAC; USFV will be comprised of US forces organized into Army, Naval, and Air Force Service components and assigned for the accomplishment of the mission.

6. Relationship with CINCPAC:

a. COMUS Vietnam will coordinate all relevant activities with CINCPAC, who has over-all responsibility for the Pacific area, including Southeast Asia. As directed by CINCPAC, COMUS Vietnam will communicate and coordinate directly with subordinate agencies of PACOM in areas adjacent to Vietnam.

b. CINCPAC will be responsible to provide, from within PACOM resources, logistic and communications support to meet USFV approved requirements. In addition, and when directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC will make available necessary staff and forces, including air and naval forces operating in direct support, for the execution of the COMUS Vietnam mission

7. Relationship with the US Ambassador, Vietnam:

The status of COMUS Vietnam will be co-equal with that of the US Ambassador. In this connection reference is made to a letter from the President to all Ambassadors, dated 29 May 1961, which is pertinent to this relationship (copy attached as Annex hereto)./5/

/5/Not printed. On the copy of this letter attached to the source text, the following paragraph has a line drawn next to it in the margin:

"Now one word about your relations to the military. As you know, the United States Diplomatic Mission includes Service Attaches, Military Assistance Advisory Groups and other Military components attached to the Mission. It does not, however, include United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander. The line of authority to these forces runs from me to the Secretary of Defense; to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and to the area commander in the field."

 

272. National Security Action Memorandum No. 111/1/

Washington, November 22, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs. A note on the source text indicates that information copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and General Taylor. Printed also in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 419-421, and in Declassified Documents, 1979, p. 107A.

TO
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT
First Phase of Viet-Nam Program

The President has authorized the Secretary of State to instruct our Ambassador to Viet-Nam to inform President Diem as follows:

1. The U.S. Government is prepared to join the Viet-Nam Government in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in South Viet-Nam.

2. This joint effort requires undertakings by both Governments as outlined below:

a. On its part the U.S. would immediately undertake the following actions in support of the GVN:

(1) Provide increased air lift to the GVN forces, including helicopters, light aviation, and transport aircraft, manned to the extent necessary by United States uniformed personnel and under United States operational control.

(2) Provide such additional equipment and United States uniformed personnel as may be necessary for air reconnaissance, photography, instruction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for special intelligence.

(3) Provide the GVN with small craft, including such United States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may be necessary for operations in effecting surveillance and control over coastal waters and inland waterways.

(4) Provide expedited training and equipping of the civil guard and the self-defense corps with the objective of relieving the regular Army of static missions and freeing it for mobile offensive operations.

(5) Provide such personnel and equipment as may be necessary to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through the Government and the armed forces to the Central Intelligence Organization.

(6) Provide such new terms of reference, reorganization and additional personnel for United States military forces as are required for increased United States military assistance in the operational collaboration with the GVN and operational direction of U.S. forces and to carry out the other increased responsibilities which accrue to the U.S. military authorities under these recommendations.

(7) Provide such increased economic aid as may be required to permit the GVN to pursue a vigorous flood relief and rehabilitation program, to supply material in support of the security efforts, and to give priority to projects in support of this expanded counter-insurgency program. (This could include increases in military pay, a full supply of a wide range of materials such as food, medical supplies, transportation equipment, communications equipment, and any other items where material help could assist the GVN in winning the war against the Viet Cong.)

(8) Encourage and support (including financial support) a request by the GVN to the FAO or any other appropriate international organization for multilateral assistance in the relief and rehabilitation of the flood area.

(9) Provide individual administrators and advisers for the Governmental machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and numbers to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

(10) Provide personnel for a joint survey with the GVN of conditions in each of the provinces to assess the social, political, intelligence, and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the counter-insurgency program in order to reach a common estimate of these factors and a common determination of how to deal with them.

b. On its part, the GVN would initiate the following actions:

(1) Prompt and appropriate legislative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilize its entire resources. (This would include a decentralization and broadening of the Government so as to realize the full potential of all non-Communist elements in the country willing to contribute to the common struggle.)

(2) The vitalization of appropriate Governmental wartime agencies with adequate authority to perform their functions effectively.

(3) Overhaul of the military establishment and command structure so as to create an effective military organization for the prosecution of the war and assure a mobile offensive capability for the Army.

McGeorge Bundy

 

273. Memorandum From the Counselor of Embassy in Vietnam (Mendenhall) to the Public Affairs Officer in Vietnam (Anspacher)/1/

Saigon, November 22, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 335, GVN-Government of Vietnam 1961. Secret. Initialed by Mendenhall; also addressed to McGarr, Gardiner, and Colby.

SUBJECT
Proposals for Improving the Organization and Broadening the Base of Support of the GVN

Attached is a paper prepared at the Ambassador's request containing certain specific proposals aimed at improving the organization of the GVN and broadening the base of its support among both the educated classes and the masses. Your comments and suggestions on an urgent basis would be appreciated. It would be particularly helpful if MAAG could briefly spell out for inclusion in this paper the specifics of fleshing out the authority of the Field Command over military counterinsurgency operations./2/

/2/No response by MAAG to the paper has been found.

The Ambassador has made no decision about the use of this paper, but he wishes to have it available for possible use during the current negotiations with the GVN in case he is asked by the GVN for specifics in the fields covered by the paper.

 

[Attachment]/3/

/3/No drafting information is given on the source text, which includes several handwritten interpolations, apparently by Anspacher. Attached to the source text is a memorandum of November 25 from Anspacher to Mendenhall, in which Anspacher said he had no basic disagreement with the paper, but suggested certain textual changes.

I. Organizational steps

1. Make the national-level Internal Security Council into a fully functioning body meeting at least twice weekly and making all policy decisions relating to the conduct of counterinsurgency planning and operations.

2. Have the national-level Internal Security Council presided over regularly by the Vice President or, in his absence, by the Coordinating Secretary of State for Security.

3. Retain Mr. Nguyen dinh Thuan as Coordinating Secretary of State for Security and appoint him as Secretary of State for National Defense, but at same time remove him from all other positions since each position he now holds needs a full-time official.

4. Appoint three Assistant Secretaries of State for National Defense in order to spread the growing burden of work in this mammoth department and broaden the base of the government.

5. Appoint as Secretary of State for the Presidency an official who is a capable administrator who can serve as the implementing executive of the national-level Internal Security Council.

6. Give the Vice President as Coordinating Secretary of State for Economic Development full power and authority over all the economic ministries, requiring them to report to him and leaving to his decision the further questions to be taken up with the Internal Security Council and with the President.

7. Give similar power and authority to the Coordinating Secretary of State for Social and Cultural Affairs.

8. Raise the Direction [Director] General of Information to ministry level and replace the incumbent by an official who is experienced in the use of information techniques and who can work with the Minister of Civic Action and the ARVN Psywar Director.

9. Establish internal security councils at the regional, provincial and district levels.

II. Steps to rally support of educated class

1. Appoint to the Cabinet various representatives of a really independent spirit and assure them of a full voice in policy determination and of freedom within broad policy bounds of running their departments. (Names can be supplied on request.) Aim should be to establish a "Cabinet of All the Talents".

2. Find a means of removing Mme Ngo dinh Nhu completely from the public eye in view of the adverse affects (unintentional, to be sure, but, nevertheless, true) of her activities on the political standing of the Government.

3. Release non-Communist political prisoners, and place certain of them in high position as a political gesture to establish national unity in the face of the Communists.

4. Permit all non-Communist political parties to operate and to put up candidates for the 1962 National Assembly elections.

5. Liberalize press censorship permitting criticism of both the government and the personalities therein, but excluding pro-Communist propaganda.

6. Set up a public tribune for the free expression of ideas and criticism within the same limitations as those applied to the press.

7. Establish an independent judiciary with the Ministry of Justice in the hands of a real independent.

8. Give the National Assembly freedom to debate on the measures placed before it. As an example, send back for thorough open debate measures recently adopted at Madame Nhu's instigation re taxi girls and establishment of a women's paramilitary force.

9. To insure that deputies actually represent their constituents, establish requirement applicable to 1962 elections that all candidates must be bona fide residents of the districts in which they present their candidacies.

III. Steps to rally support of masses

1. Appointments to the Cabinet proposed under II, 1, above, can also serve this objective provided representatives of the Cao Dai or Hoa Hao are selected.

2. Increase Diem's personal contact with people through more informal trips to countryside, by making himself available at palace to ordinary people, either in groups or individually, by occasionally hearing mass in small church or visiting Buddhist Pagoda, et cetera.

3. Frequent, frank, and down-to-earth talks over radio (at least once a month).

4. Stop emphasizing "sacrifice and discipline" theme in talking to the people and tell them what they are anxious to hear-that better times are coming and that soon they will not be afraid to sleep at night.

5. In Saigon and other cities institute, visit, and dramatize labor-consuming projects for unemployed who have increased considerably as result influx into cities because of insecure conditions in countryside.

6. Initiate and publicize economic and social programs aimed at improving conditions in every village.

7. Proceed to set up provincial councils which President Diem has already promised publicly.

 

274. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President/1/

Washington, November 24, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret. The source text is neither signed nor initialed by Rostow and bears no indication that the President saw the memorandum. Under cover of a brief letter of November 25, Rostow sent to Galbraith a copy of his memorandum to the President and of a memorandum from McGhee to McGeorge Bundy on "Counter-Guerrilla Campaigns in Greece, Malaya and the Philippines." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense) In the letter to Galbraith, Rostow wrote: "Whatever we achieve or fail to achieve with respect to Vietnamese administration and politics, we should not kid ourselves that we are up against a serious and major offensive mounted from Hanoi; and it will take hard and purposeful labor on many fronts, both inside and outside South Viet-Nam, to save that area without a war." (Ibid., Meetings and Memos Series, Staff Memos-Rostow-Guerrilla and Unconventional Warfare)

Herewith a comment on Ken Galbraith's letter on Viet-Nam./2/

/2/See Document 267.

On his major point I have no objection; namely, that if Diem does not perform we be prepared to indicate in the proper way to the proper people that we would prefer a successor. The management of that crisis will take great skill to avoid exploitation by the Communists; but I think it not impossible. Contingency planning might quietly begin.

The letter does not grip the problem of infiltration. In 1959 there were 2,000 guerrillas; by a pre-announced and purposeful policy they have been built up to 16,000 (aside from the Communist civil guards) while taking heavy casualties. We know from one transit station, on one route that the infiltration rate was over 400 per month for over six months early in 1961. Virtually the whole of the threat in the plateau is the consequence of recent infiltration; and the build up of the cadres in the south in the last year has been an infiltration job. The proportions have been as we described in our report: about 70% locally recruited; 25% South Vietnamese trained in the north and re-infiltrated; 5% North Vietnamese regulars. But the opening of the second front on the plateau via Laos has probably increased the proportion of infiltrators. The infiltrators have all been trained political cadres and soldiers, the hard core of the Viet Cong effort.

The proportion of guerrillas to regular troops in the war in South Viet-Nam is not abnormal by the experience of previous guerrilla wars. Moreover, none of the recent guerrilla wars has been won with an open frontier; the Greek war was won when the Stalin-Tito fight closed the Yugoslav frontier and fractured the Greek Communist Party; there was no Communist frontier in Malaya or in the Philippines.

In short, I cannot help conclude that in order to heighten his political argument Ken has grossly underestimated the military significance of the infiltration process; he has ignored Diem's record down to 1959; and he has misinterpreted the brutal basic arithmetic of guerrilla war. (I should like to remind Ken that Desai told Alex J. and me that there is an Indian province on the Burma frontier where they require 35,000 policemen to control 2,500 guerrillas.)/3/

/3/This conversation has not been further identified.

As for Diem. While by the normal standards of an underdeveloped area, his weaknesses would be tolerable-and he did well down to 1959-he has four major weaknesses in terms of the crisis he confronts. First, he cannot protect his peasants. Second, the intellectuals are affronted by his dictatorial political style. Third, the army, the civil servants, and even his ministers are frustrated by his administrative style. Fourth, he lacks the ability to communicate and to identify with the mass of the people-a gift which even Sarit and Sihanouk command. Right now the critical problem from our point of view is his administrative weakness. If this can be conquered by a combination of U.S. partnership and pressure, we shall get a lift of confidence which would, among other things, make it more safe to help induce a coup. If he will not perform, I think it proper that we conceive of an alternative.

With respect to American troops, I know of no one who has recommended that American troops take part in sweeps through Vietnamese territory. There are, nevertheless, concrete functions for U.S. forces which might be envisaged if the battle goes badly or if we feel, for other reasons, American troops are necessary: to provide a plate-glass presence at the 17th parallel and to relieve Vietnamese forces for combat; to take over the protection of towns in the open country (either in the plateau or along the coast), and to relieve Vietnamese troops for combat; to provide assistance in road building and in other engineering and logistic tasks; to help cope with the Viet Cong if they move from their present hit-and-run tactics to open and sustained battle.

The Viet-Nam situation confronts us with the question of whether we shall or shall not accept the mounting of a guerrilla war across a frontier as legitimate. I wish it were not so; but the New Frontier will be measured in history in part on how that challenge was met. No amount of political jiu-jitsu is going to get us off that hook; but-certainly-our stance in dealing with that issue will be affected significantly by the administrative and political effectiveness of the government in Saigon./4/

/4/Written at the end of this sentence, apparently in Rostow's hand, is the following: "An issue on which the Taylor Report was by no means silent."

 

275. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President/1/

Washington, November 24, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Reports & Memos. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the "original" was given to Rostow and the "enclosure" to McGeorge Bundy. A draft of the memorandum, prepared by U. Alexis Johnson, was submitted to the Secretary of State for his signature under cover of a memorandum of November 22, in which Johnson wrote:

"The key is not making this an operation in itself but carefully coordinating it with and making it an incidental part of larger operations for resettlement of the Montagnards, the setting up of an effective border control force, and the ability to mount an effective military operation in Zone D. We must also stay away from the term 'chemical warfare' and any connection with the Chemical Corps, and rather talk about 'weed killers'. Defense and the Chemical Corps entirely agree on this." (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs)

SUBJECT
Defoliant Operations in Viet-Nam

I concur with the attached memorandum from Mr. Gilpatric on the foregoing subject./2/ The use of defoliant does not violate any rule of international law concerning the conduct of chemical warfare and is an accepted tactic of war. Precedent has been established by the British during the emergency in Malaya in their use of helicopters for destroying crops by chemical spraying.

/2/For text, see Declassified Documents, 1978, p. 50B.

We will, of course, be the object of an intense Communist "germ warfare" campaign which may be picked up by some neutrals. You will recall that this was the case during the Korean war although the Communist charges had no factual basis whatever.

On the other hand, I am satisfied that successful plant-killing operations in Viet-Nam, carefully coordinated with and incidental to larger operations, can be of substantial assistance in the control and defeat of the Viet Cong.

Carrying out of the operation will be carefully planned and coordinated between State, Defense, USIA, CINCPAC, the Country Team, and the GVN. Detailed plans in this regard have been formulated.

Therefore, I recommend that you approve the undertaking of such operations in accordance with Paragraph 8 (b) of Mr. Gilpatric's memorandum; that is, "to go ahead with a selective and carefully controlled program starting with the clearance of key routes, proceeding thereafter to food denial only if the most careful basis of resettlement and alternative food supply has been created, and holding Zone D and the border areas until we have realistic possibilities of immediate military exploitation."

I also concur in Mr. Gilpatric's recommendation that this should be done only after careful prior consideration and authorization from Washington of the plans developed by CINCPAC and the Country Team./3/

/3/For the President's approval of the State-Defense proposal on Defoliant Operations, see NSAM No. 115 in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, p. 425.

Dean Rusk/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

 

276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, November 24, 1961, 8:22 p. m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2461. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson, cleared with McConaughy, and initialed by Johnson for the Secretary. Repeated information to CINCPAC for PolAd.

678. We are naturally concerned over Nhu's distortions your negotiations with Diem over increased assistance reported Embtel 702./2/ Unfortunately, today's Washington Evening Star carries story by Earl Voss that USG has urged Diem "to broaden participation in his Government and has offered him every aid short of combat troops if he does" and "until Diem takes into his Government qualified administrators instead of relying almost exclusively on members of his own family and circle of close friends, US officials say they cannot be sure increased US aid would be effective in stopping Communist advances". However, story closes with statement that American officials recognize will be difficult for Diem to broaden administration because of shortage of well-trained civil servants.

/2/Dated November 24, telegram 702 reported that an editorial in the Saigon newspaper Thoi Bao, apparently reflecting the views of Ngo Dinh Nhu, had castigated Nolting's démarche to Diem as an infringement of Vietnamese sovereignty. (Ibid., 611.51K/11-2461)

We realize foregoing story, as well as Washington Post interview this morning with Vu Van Thai critical of Diem, will complicate your negotiations. If you feel it necessary, you can assure Diem that no one in USG inspired these stories and we regret their appearance. We certainly have no desire to humiliate Diem. Hope you will be able impress on Diem that we are simply seeking to arrive at broad understanding with him which will permit establishment of effective partnership between us. As you well stated to Thuan, we are interested in substance rather than form and hope Diem will be able quickly to get down to discussion with you of practical details.

Rusk

 

277. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, November 25, 1961--noon.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.56311/11-2561. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok and to CINCPAC for PolAd.

704. I learned yesterday of the establishment in Saigon of 2nd ADVON. As explained to me by its commander, Brigadier General Anthis USAF, this headquarters will have operational control over all USAF operational (i.e., non-training) units in Vietnam, including Jungle Jim, AC&W unit, planes due to arrive for spraying operations, etc. It will also have operational control over certain USAF units in Thailand. It is my further understanding that, while General Anthis will concurrently be head of Air Force section of MAAG, as Commander 2nd ADVON he will have separate staff and will report directly to 13 Air Force and thence through PACAF to CINCPAC. Finally, General Anthis tells me that he expects 2nd ADVON has begun operations with skeleton staff established at GVN's Tan-Son-Nhu Air Base.

I have high regard for General Anthis and in what follows I am not expressing a view regarding military command relationships, and specifically not objecting to establishing this headquarters.

I nevertheless find it incomprehensible that new US military headquarters would be established in this country without consultation with me or with Government of Vietnam. As new headquarters will immediately become known to Vietnamese Government and probably very quickly to press, I have asked General Anthis not to expand activation 2nd ADVON in Vietnam until following has been accomplished:

1. I have been informed that the Department has concurred in establishment of USAF operational headquarters in Vietnam with jurisdiction also over USAF units in Thailand (and possibly eventually elsewhere in SEA).

2. I have received instructions as to relationship of this headquarters to myself, Chief MAAG, and GVN, and as to what may be said publicly about its functions and command relationships. With regard to relationship 2nd ADVON to me, I would in particular wish precise understanding that any combat or quasi-combat operations in Vietnam carried out by elements of this command will be cleared in advance with me.

3. GVN has been consulted and has concurred in establishment of headquarters in Vietnam.

Please instruct urgently.

Nolting

 

278. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, November 25, 1961, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/11-2561. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Geneva for FECON, and CINCPAC for PolAd.

708. Embtel 702./2/ I saw President Diem this morning on question of Vietnamese newspaper article reported reftel, and subsequent article along same line in this morning's issue of same paper (Thoi Bao). I told him that I had not come to push him on response to our proposals of November 17, although I hoped he would soon be in position to give me his views. I wished specifically to bring to his attention two articles appearing in one Vietnamese newspaper which were untrue in their implication and obviously damaging to our joint enterprise. Our one hour's conversation was inconclusive, but rather revealing.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 276.

Diem said he had just read the articles in question. They did reflect, in his opinion, the latent feelings of most Vietnamese (and, he added most Asians) concerning fancied or real conditions attached to Western aid. He went on to say that, because of this fact, he had not told anyone except Thuan, Ngo Dinh Nhu and Vu Van Mau the content of our proposals of last week. He said he feared the reaction even among his own Cabinet members. I said I thought he misjudged their sentiments. Diem went on to say that newspaper articles in question were not inspired by government and could not have been based on knowledge of US proposals (except that obtained from US press), but that they expressed a point of view which he felt would be widespread if our proposals were known. He speculated that articles in part reaction to US press (mentioned in particular Rose's story in Time and Elegant's story in Newsweek), which he said indicated that US would have to "take charge" if Vietnam were to be saved. He mentioned in this connection, and read from, an article in Hong Kong Observer of November 8. I said I would not argue the point of whether or not Vietnamese articles in question were [garble], but that I wished to point out frankly that line taken in them had certain clear resemblances to what I had understood to be Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu's views expressed in recent conversation with correspondent of Christian Science Monitor. Beyond that, I wanted to make point that our difficult and complex problem of establishing a more effective joint partnership to win the war here could only be complicated, and perhaps be made impossible, by a continuation of emotional, incorrect, and damaging line in newspapers. Diem concurred in this, but insisted that misrepresentations of his government in our own press could not but provoke nationalistic rejoinders from newspapers in Vietnam. He did not offer, nor did I press him, to issue any countervailing release; but I believe our conversation may help dampen down this foolish and dangerous business.

Throughout this discussion, Diem continued to make references to the quid pro quo aspects of our proposals, claiming that they played right into the hands of the Communists. He argued that we are pressing him to give a monopoly on nationalism to the Communists. I told him that this was the exact opposite of our aim; that we were not seeking quid pro quo as such, but were definitely seeking a structure of government in Vietnam, under his leadership, which could bear the weight of increased US assistance and could channel that assistance effectively; and that we were definitely seeking a basis in US and world opinion to enable US to support his government even more heavily. He promised next week to sit down and systematically go over our proposals point by point and to give his considered reaction. I said it would be helpful if he could give his response in due course in written form for clarity and precision. Throughout, Diem stressed that any attempt to "broaden the government" and to "make it more popular" was putting the cart before the horse. Giving security to the people, he said, is the first essential of regaining popular support; it is Communist terror and propaganda which is destroying Vietnamese support of their government; the will exists but can only be demonstrated when the people are free to express it; no additions of "dissidents" to his government would alter this fact. Moreover, he had many independents in the government already, and had had for many years. He cited educators, doctors, and others in this regard.

Without prejudging outcome these negotiations, [I?] think we should be [doing?] some [garble] thinking whether we should not put major stress on efficiency in GVN rather than on more nebulous concept of "political reform". [I?] think we can get a certain measure of improvement in GVN efficiency, which may open up possibility of political liberalization and broadening of political base, with all deliberate speed.

Nolting

 

279. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the British Ambassador (Ormsby Gore)/1/

Washington, November 25, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Correspondence with UK Officials-Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy and C. Chapman of the Vietnam Task Force.

Dear David: I have considered carefully the points you raised in your note of November 17/2/ referring to our assistance to the Government of Viet-Nam.

/2/Not printed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series)

I agree with you that we should try to see to it that our efforts to assist the Vietnamese Government do not reduce the chances for a negotiated settlement of the Laotian problem at Geneva. I also agree that we want to avoid any publicity which would be needlessly provocative.

At the same time it seems to me that we cannot fail to take immediate action needed to lay a foundation for the prospective program of expanded assistance to Viet-Nam. The contemplated publication of the "Jorden Report" exposing and documenting the North Vietnamese part in the Viet Cong guerrilla war is an essential prelude to the program.

I believe you will concur that the forthcoming publication is factual, objective and probably understated.

With appreciation as always for your comments,

Sincerely,

Dean/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

 

 

280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, November 25, 1961, 7:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2561. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wood; cleared with Cottrell, McConaughy, U. Alexis Johnson, and the Office of the Secretary; initialed by Pezzullo of the Executive Secretariat for the Secretary. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd.

684. Ambassador Chuong called on Secretary 22nd and again 25th/2/ in order clear up certain points raised by Chuong, who spoke under instructions.

/2/Memoranda of these two conversations are ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, November 1961.

Following principal points emerged from Chuong's somewhat opaque presentation:

US should not rely on neutrals, particularly GOI and RLG. Greatest threat to free world is in SEA, not Berlin. Last year Communists waged war without danger to themselves to take over Laos. This year it is Viet-Nam. American military assistance is best direct counter to Communists. It should not be spread too thin; should be used not only as foreign aid, but as arm in a war.

Secretary replied we not satisfied with attitude neutrals, but noted we have explained situation to Indians and others. They increasingly concerned. GOI may be helpful through ICC and by its diplomatic efforts, but we should not expect too much. Our total per capita aid to India for 12-year period has been $2.00. Our total per capita aid to Viet-Nam for six years has been $100.

Secretary agreed on dangers in SEA and emphasized necessity joint effort. He asked repeatedly, "How do we win the battle?" Ambassador did not reply directly, but several times in his presentation made point US should be tougher with friends and foes alike.

Secretary asked to what extent Thoi Bao editorial represented public expression of GVN's real attitude; said it appeared to be most unhelpful prelude to Diem-Nolting talks. Emphasized US had no desire "run" GVN. Our only aim to help GVN with its own war.

Chuong said GVN concerned lest impression be gained there was to be "condominium" in Viet-Nam, but, speaking personally, did not believe editorial represented GVN opinion.

Secretary said editorial (picked up in Washington Post today) could create serious public opinion problem in US. Emphasized that in Greece and Korea when the question was that of winning battle, problem of sovereignty did not arise.

Ambassador asked if US had suggested specific steps which might have caused editorial and mentioned Diem sensitive on question bringing exiled political elements into GVN. Secretary replied that we had simply asked for GVN views on how it could get broader support; perhaps there were elements in Viet-Nam, now on sidelines, who might throw themselves behind GVN in its struggle.

FYI. Ambassador Nolting may cite Secretary's remarks as needed in conversations with GVN. End FYI.

Rusk

 

281. Editorial Note

On Sunday, November 26, 1961, the White House announced a major reorganization of the Department of State. Among the changes were the appointment of George Ball as Under Secretary of State to replace Chester Bowles; W. Averell Harriman as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to replace Walter McConaughy; George McGhee as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to replace Ball; Brooks Hays as the President's Special Assistant; and Frederick Dutton as Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations to replace Hays. The President subsequently named Bowles as his Specia1 Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs and Walt W. Rostow as Counselor and Chairman of the Department of State's Policy Planning Council to replace McGhee. Regarding the background of Department of State reorganization, see Bowles, Promises to Keep, pages 352-367; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pages 437-447; and Sorensen, Kennedy, pages 287-290. See also the transcripts of interviews with Chester Bowles, February 2, 1965, pages 38-46, and Walt W. Rostow, April 11, 1964, pages 113-114, at the Kennedy Library.

 

282. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/

New Delhi, November 26, 1961, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2661. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Saigon and to Geneva for Harriman.

1501. Embtel 1500./2/ . . . Hanoi had asked GOI if they could send Education Minister Tacha (phonetic spelling) to New Delhi for confidential talks with GOI on VN situation and threat to peace there. . .

/2/In telegram 1500, November 26, Galbraith summarized his discussion that day regarding the question of Vietnam and particularly the ICC investigation of the Nam assassination. Galbraith observed that comments added little to the picture that the Department of State already had of the Indian Government's views. (Ibid.)

. . . . . . .

Unless there is penetrating and non-routine reason to contrary, I think I might see Hanoi representative if and when he comes to New Delhi, and with appropriate discretion hear what he has to say and indicate that while US and GVN are not menacing and do not intend menace DRV we are serious in determination maintain independence SVN. Indians doubtless willing put forward idea of meeting as their suggestion.

Galbraith

 

283. Memorandum From the Under Secretary-Designate for Political Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State/1/

Washington, November 27, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, HO Chron. Secret.

SUBJECT
Vietnam

I have read Mr. Chayes' memorandum to you of November 16 on this subject./2/

/2/Document 261.

There is one consideration bearing on the introduction of substantial US combat forces into Vietnam which is not mentioned in that memorandum and which seems to me worth noting.

Domestic US dissatisfaction with what would surely be the prolonged involvement of American soldiers in these indecisive anti-guerrilla operations would mount and give rise to growing demands that we attack the source of the aggression in North Vietnam.

If we resisted these pressures, they would build up and eventually spill over into across-the-board criticism of our foreign policy, which would make it increasingly difficult to conduct that policy with moderation and good sense. We would be back in the atmosphere of Korea 1950-53-only more so.

If we gave in to these pressures and attacked North Vietnam, we would be propelled into a widening conflict which might be hard to terminate short of all-out struggle with Peiping.

In short, once we committed combat troops to Vietnam we would tend to lose control of subsequent events-either in that theater or more generally-by reason of the popular reactions that our continued involvement would likely trigger.

George C. McGhee/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

284. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the President/1/

Washington, November 27, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-185-69. Secret. An attached note indicates that copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, U. Alexis Johnson, Lemnitzer, Bundy (apparently McGeorge), and Rostow.

SUBJECT
Possible Command Relationships in South Vietnam

1. Considerable discussion is taking place over the kind of organization required in South Vietnam to administer the accelerated U.S. program there. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have had several meetings on the subject and State is also studying the matter. The following are a few observations on the problem advanced before you receive final recommendations from your advisors, based upon the kinds of government activities which will take place in South Vietnam.

2. Kinds of Business. Under the pending program the United States will have business of the following types to accommodate within the State/Defense organization in South Vietnam: a. Embassy business; b. USOM business; c. MAAG business; d. Military headquarters business to include the command of U.S. operational units and military planning with the forces of South Vietnam with U.S. contingency forces, and with SEATO forces; e. Intelligence production and evaluation for U.S. purposes.

3. Channels of Responsibility. The Embassy and USOM types of business are clearly the prerogative of the State Department under the direction of the senior State representative in South Vietnam. The responsibility for the MAAG can be channeled as at present through the Ambassador with a technical channel of communication open to Defense. This channel may or may not pass through CINCPAC. The military headquarters type of business should not pass through the Ambassador, but should go directly to Defense, either through or bypassing CINCPAC. Military intelligence should be immediately available to the senior military representative, whereas the Ambassador should receive integrated intelligence from all sources.

4. Possible Command Relationships. There are three general models which may be considered for Vietnam. The present (normal) model, the Berlin model, or the Korean model.

a. Normal model. The present relationship could be retained with rather simple modification. The Chief of the MAAG could be made concurrently the Commander of the U.S. military units assigned to South Vietnam. The charter of the MAAG could be expanded to cover the additional functions beyond those presently assigned. For military matters pertaining to the conduct of the anti-Viet Cong operations, the Chief, MAAG could be authorized direct communication to the Department of Defense, either through CINCPAC or direct. A joint U.S. intelligence organization should report to the Ambassador, while a joint U.S.-JCS military intelligence should be directly available to MAAG.

b. Berlin model. Following the original Berlin USCOB (U.S. Commander Berlin) model there could be a senior U.S. officer in South Vietnam, presumably of 4-star rank, who would represent concurrently the Department of State and the Department of Defense. His principal subordinates would be a charge d'affaires for embassy business and a military commander to look after the MAAG and Military Headquarters business. The intelligence system would report to him.

c. Korean model. This would be the pattern of relationships appropriate to an active or potential theater of war. Embassy/USOM business would be conducted by the Ambassador reporting directly to the Secretary of State. Military business to include MAAG affairs would be the responsibility of a senior Military Commander reporting to the Department of Defense, either through or bypassing CINCPAC. The relationship between the Ambassador and the Military Commander would be one of liaison. Intelligence would be handled as under the normal model (subparagraph a above).

5. The simplest way to proceed in Vietnam for the present would be to stay with the normal model as outlined above. The adoption of either the Berlin or the Korean model proclaims a significant change in the U.S. attitude which should be confirmed by the program which we adopt for South Vietnam. As long as that program is essentially an intensification of past actions, it would be at a minimum inconsistent to set up a command structure such as the Berlin or Korean model which suggests that we are clearing the boards for a show-down-until that is indeed the case.

6. For the time being I would stay with the normal model until our program changes or the model proves inadequate. Meantime, there is work to be done in Washington to tighten up the steering apparatus and to delineate responsibilities here. State, Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are all working on this matter.

Maxwell D. Taylor/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

285. Notes of a Meeting, The White House/1/

Washington, November 27, 1961, 5:30 p.m.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, L-217-71. Top Secret. Handwritten by Lemnitzer. According to the source text, the following people were present: Rusk, Johnson, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Taylor, William Bundy, Rostow, McGeorge Bundy, Hamilton, and Lansdale. Neither Lemnitzer's nor Taylor's Appointment Books at the National Defense University lists the participants at the meeting. Rusk's Appointment Book lists as participants the President, Rusk, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Taylor, Johnson, Bell, Rostow, Hamilton, and Bundy (without specifying William or McGeorge). (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books) The President's log indicates that the meeting was off the record and was attended by the President, Rusk, U. Alexis Johnson, McNamara, William Bundy, Lemnitzer, Lansdale, Hamilton, Dulles, Taylor, Rostow, and McGeorge Bundy. (Kennedy Library, JFK Logs) The source text seems to indicate that the President joined the meeting in progress.

Rusk: prob. of American impatience is involved in VN. Gen. Choi [Chau?] commented that many in VN who revere Ho Chi Minh & hate French and all Westerners. Diem is having great trouble staying in power. We are trying to find out if a job can be done-Diem fears we are trying to take over VN. Controlled VN press is pushing this line.

Johnson summarized where we are now. Talks began on 17 Nov. Diem worried over comment in message to Diem/2/ "we expect to share in decision making in security milt pol. & ec. field." Thuan felt Diem could not accept it publicly. Diem could not accept sweeping reorg. of govt. Diem felt security came before reorg. of govt.

/2/Apparently a reference to telegram 319, see footnote 2, Document 257.

SecState-VN Amb. conversation-expressed concern over press items etc. re-and rebutted US failures./3/

/3/See Document 280.

Lansdale-Diem fears we are trying to do what French did by putting key officials in VN conferences. State proposal is to send Lansdale out as an "explainer" of US position.

SecDef suggested that Nolting come back & report if next talks are negative.

Jorden report is being printed-will be finished by 6 Dec. Question is-should we release it if next round of talks is negative.

Rostow considers joint survey of Corps Areas is extremely important.

Hamilton explained ec. aid proposals-Diem not yet informed Nolting is armed.

Meeting with Pres.

Rusk reviewed previous comments.

Pres. asked Lansdale if our program made sense.

Lansdale-Yes, but there is an opportunity for misunderstanding which should be cleared up.

P-what about Jorden report?

SecState-being printed but no dist. until new talk with Diem.

P-when policy is decided people on spot must support it or get out. There must be whole-hearted support.

Johnson & Rostow will redraft instr. to.

P-who will head it up in Defense?

Sec-myself & L.

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