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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume I Vietnam, 1961 Department of State Washington, DC

286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, November 27, 1961, 8:28 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11 2261. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and Rostow, cleared with S/S and initialed by Johnson for the Secretary. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd and Bangkok.

693. Embtels 678, 687, 708./2/ As seen from here, there are two immediate and essential requirements in situation:

/2/Documents 266, 270, and 278, respectively.

1. Frontal effort on your part to correct Diem's apparent misinterpretation of intentions of our proposals with respect GVN organization; and

2. Early opportunity for a sustained private conversation and full discussion between you and Diem on concrete measures to accomplish objectives of improving GVN image and making GVN more effective instrument for prosecution of war.

With respect first point, it occurs to us that Diem may have taken point one (i) "administrators and advisors" together with para 5 of Deptel 619/3/ as indicating intention on part USG take over much greater degree of control than in fact our intent. While we satisfied you will be able clarify this when you have opportunity for full discussion with Diem, following amplification our thinking may be of some assistance to you. First, point one (i) specifically provides such action only in agreement between two governments and was included to meet Diem's request to Taylor and Rostow for assistance in meeting shortage trained administrators. We certainly have no intention of packing his administration with Americans against his will or "taking over his government".

/3/See footnote 2, Document 257.

With respect to last sentence para 5 Deptel 619 on "decision-making processes" what we have in mind is that, in operations directly related to the security situation, partnership will be so close that one party will not take decisions or actions affecting the other without full and frank prior consultation. This was spirit in which proposition in para 5 put forward. We think it probably fruitless to argue or engage in recrimination over generalities and that important point is to discuss specifics, drawing from Diem if possible his own suggestions and, to extent necessary, building on that base.

With respect second point, pares 2 a, b, and c and para 5 of Deptel 619 are considered here only as broad guides on which we rely on you and Country Team to translate in your negotiations into such specific measures as you consider effective and practical. Seen from here, crucial elements appear to be:

a. Follow through on intelligence reform and collaboration

b. Prompt conduct day to day security business through Cabinet or Internal Security Council;

c. Clarification of military command channels

d. Prompt follow-through on Thuan's suggestion of security survey in three corps area;

e. Constitution effective frontier ranger force.

In addition we believe it essential for Diem to make moves which would, especially for international and American public opinion, symbolize the fact that bulk of Viet-Namese people-not merely "Diem people"-desire to maintain their independence. How this can best be done is not possible to specify in detail from here but it difficult to overemphasize its importance from Diem's point of view as well as our own. However, might it not be possible for Diem to put a friendly labor leader into some government position, release some political prisoners on selective basis, or to form or give increased substance to public consultative bodies?

We would hope you would be able arrange with Diem for full day or even two at some secluded spot for really full discussion. Diem's dilatoriness in entering into such discussion is giving impression here of lack of sense of urgency on his part.

If your discussion with Diem is clearly not satisfactory it is desired that you promptly return to Washington for full consultation with respect our future course. You authorized in your discretion so inform Diem.

Rusk

 

287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, November 27, 1961, 8:32 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.56311/11-2561. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood; cleared with William Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, McConaughy, and Cottrell; and initialed by McConaughy for the Secretary. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd.

694. Eyes only for Ambassador. Re Embtel 704./2/ Joint State-Defense message.

/2/Document 277.

1. As President's representative you have responsibility for and authority over all U.S. operations in Viet-Nam, over Viet-Nam and originating in Viet-Nam. No public information should be volunteered on ADVON. All questions on this and other matters pertaining to stepped-up U.S. military activity should be referred to you or your authorized representative.

2. CINCPAC has directed Chief MAAG and General Anthis to explain fully to you the status of Chief Air Force Section MAAG./3/ Establishment of a new U.S. military command and headquarters in SEA has not been authorized. Responsibilities and functions of 2nd ADVON, as distinct from Chief, Air Section, MAAG are still under study at CINCPAC, and remain undetermined pending prerequisite high level Washington decisions. Concept generally envisions that 2nd ADVON could provide for an overall commander of scattered PACAF detachments already in place. Advice, training and logistic support to RVNAF heretofore supplied by AF Section, MAAG continues as responsibility Chief, MAAG and General Anthis' assignment as Chief, Air Force Section, MAAG/does not change this.

/3/Felt's instructions to this effect are in telegram 252015Z, November 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.56311/11-2561)

3. Request you advise whether explanation provided by Chief, MAAG and General Anthis satisfactorily resolves your questions./4/

/4/In telegram 722, November 28, Nolting reported that he had just received telegram 694 and that the matter was "satisfactorily resolved." (Ibid., 751K.00/11-2861)

Rusk

 

288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, November 28, 1961, 7:37 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2861. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Tubby; cleared by Tubby with Sylvester (Defense), Wilson (USIA), Salinger (White House), and Heavner; and signed by Tubby for the Secretary.

698. State-Defense-USIA. Supersedes all previous messages.

Do not give other than routine cooperation to correspondents on coverage current military activities in Vietnam. No comment at all on classified activities.

Rusk

 

289. Telegram From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), and the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr)/1/

Washington, November 28, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, South Vietnam 1961-Taylor Recommendations. Top Secret; Priority. Time of transmission is not indicated on the source text. William Bundy's draft of this telegram, which differs only slightly from the final version as sent, is in Department of State, Bundy Files, 1961 Chron.

Def 906345. Personal for Felt and McGarr from McNamara. Situation in Vietnam obviously causing great concern here. I have consulted with JCS on creating continuous personal contact to re view progress and see what more we can do within framework present policy. For this purpose I would like to set up a first meeting at HQ, PACOM with CINCPAC, CH MAAG SVN and the Chiefs of his air and naval sections just after NATO meeting in Paris. I would have with me General Lemnitzer, possibly General Taylor, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bundy/ISA, Brig/Gen Brown, and will arrive Hawaii 1530Z 16 Dec.

Political uncertainty of Diem's position and doubts as to his willingness to take steps to make his government more effective must not prevent us from going ahead full blast (without publicity, until political discussions are completed) on all possible actions short of large scale introduction of US combat forces. Timing of putting these actions visibly into effect in Vietnam will be affected by political development, but we cannot let this slow down our making all necessary preparations and movements. This is philosophy behind series of decisions reached by me yesterday with JCS and being communicated to you separately./2/

/2/This message has not been found.

Fundamentally, we must adjust ourselves to a perennially unclear political framework and to a policy that for overall national reasons sets limits on military action. However, that policy already gives us considerable scope, and I will do my utmost to get authority for any new ideas you may suggest which are not now covered. What we must do is wring the last ounce out of present possibilities and I feel that we have sometimes been slow, both here at DOD and in the field, in devising and carrying out feasible actions. Cost considerations particularly should be secondary in your search for new approaches.

Re Diem's position, President yesterday/3/ emphasized importance all US personnel avoiding criticism his regime outside official channels. Recent adverse publicity making job much more difficult both domestically and in achieving a better partnership. Please stress this within your commands.

/3/See Document 285.

December 16 meeting should be intense one-day session. I have in mind later meetings at about monthly intervals.

 

290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/

Washington, November 28, 1961, 8:41 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11 2861. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood, Heavner, and Horgan; cleared with Anderson (SEA) and Weil (SOA); and initialed by Weil for the Secretary. Repeated to Saigon, Geneva for FECON, and USUN.

1837. For Ambassador. Re Embtel 1501 to Dept, rptd 40 to Saigon, 42 to Geneva./2/ Believe DRV Minister whom Hanoi proposing send New Delhi is DRV Minister Health Pham Ngoc Thach.

/2/Document 282.

Thach now in Djakarta (as personal envoy Ho Chi Minh) to outline DRV view VN situation. Thach's travels plus DRV complaint to UN add up to major DRV effort counter forthcoming Jorden report, brand US assistance GVN as aggression. DRV diplomatic offensive underscores importance keeping Indians informed true situation SVN.

Dept believes any meeting between you and Hanoi envoy would have bad effect Saigon. Diem and many influential Vietnamese seriously concerned US may seek negotiate Viet-Nam settlement which would result ultimate Communist control SVN. Since it is our policy give full support to GVN we must avoid any move that might appear, or which DRV propaganda could cause to appear, as prelude to US reduction its commitments to Viet-Nam.

While Dept believes it unwise for you see Thach, it might be useful for Desai to convey our views to him. You may at discretion remind Desai salient points US position as explained to him in Washington, i.e. sole US role in Viet-Nam is to assist that country defend its independence. You might also point out that expression Indian concern re VC terror tactics (reference to Nam case, attacks malaria teams, schools) could have salutary effect, particularly if Indian officials indicate they well aware of DRV direction VC.

Rusk

 

291. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Secretary of State/1/

Washington, November 28, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Reports & Memos. Secret. Attached to a brief transmittal memorandum of November 29, from Battle to McGeorge Bundy. A handwritten note on the transmittal memorandum from Bromley Smith to Robert Johnson indicates that Taylor also had a copy of Hilsman's memorandum.

Intelligence Note: Coup Plotting in South Vietnam

Two reliable reports indicate that top south Vietnamese military leaders may be plotting a coup against President Diem. These are the first reports of coup plotting since the flurry of reports last month just prior to Gen. Maxwell Taylor's visit to Saigon. Last month's reports, however, were rather vague, of doubtful reliability, and failed to cite names of individuals involved.

Generals Critical. On November 24, Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, Commanding General of the Army Field Command, was unprecedentedly critical of the Diem government in his comments to the US Army Attaché. He referred to Diem's reorganizational moves within the military establishment as being highly inadequate and nothing more than "shams" to fool the Americans and evidenced acute concern over interference by Diem and his family in military operations. Gen. Minh stated that the situation was extremely grave, that the next few months could well be decisive, and urged the US to take a firm stand with Diem. Brig. Gen. Le Van Kim, a deputy under Minh and long outspoken in his criticism of Diem's leadership, was present and obviously agreed with Minh's comments.

The following day, Col. Pham Van Dong, Deputy Commander of the 3rd Army Corps, informed the US Army Attaché that he had discussed "coup possibilities" with Brig. Gen. Le Van Nghiem, Commander of the 3rd Army Corps, and the latter replied that "we will wait and see how things go before we take sides." Dong also told our Attaché that "something must and will be done very soon, possibly by December 1."

Growing Disgust With the Nhus. The activities and influence of Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem's brother and political adviser, and of Madam Nhu continue to be major issues raised by Diem's critics. Gen. Minh, for example, stated that he considers Diem to be a puppet of Nhu, while Col. Dong said that Nhu has his own plans for taking control of the government. Most of Diem critics in government and even some of his supporters, moreover, blame Nhu for the anti-US press campaign.

Heightened Sense of Urgency Within Government. Since last month military and civilian leaders have urgently voiced to Americans their views that Diem must move quickly to reorganize the government, delegate responsibility, and utilize more effectively the existing resources for fighting the Communists. This urgency coincided with the Taylor mission, and a number of officials even recommended that the US pressure Diem to take the necessary steps. A number of Vietnamese abroad, including Vu Van Thai, formerly Director General of the Budget and Foreign Aid, also have been sharply critical of Diem and have urged a firm US position. The recent anti-US statements by the Saigon press may have convinced Diem's critics that Diem will not accept US recommendations and that they should therefore act on their own to alter the situation.

Coup Plotters May See Shift in US Policy. Some military and civilian officials may have also concluded that the Saigon press attacks have weakened US support of Diem, and their comments to the Army Attache may be designed to elicit such information. Their estimate of US intentions could strongly influence a decision to undertake a coup.

 

292. Paper Prepared by Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff/1/

Washington, November 28, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2561. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. A copy of this paper was attached to a memorandum of November 30 from Bagley to Taylor, which reads:

"1. The information which follows, and is attached, refers to the current planning for political contingencies in South Viet-Nam, specifically to coup possibilities.
 
"2. In the past two months, State has forwarded, on a very closely held basis, a letter to Ambassador Nolting outlining possible alternatives to Diem who the US might support. In response to the events of the past two weeks, State is now reviewing the situation. A new letter is being drafted which in present form identifies Tho and Thuan as possible new heads of state, lays down the premise that political exiles not be supported, and develops certain foreseeable coup situations. (This information is secondhand and while accurate may not be complete.)
 
"3. As a related study, and to expand on the more narrow State effort, Bob Johnson prepared a paper on coupe. This is attached; a copy has been sent to Alexis Johnson. It lays out possible situations and develops certain tentative conclusions. In doing so, an argument is made that Amb. Nolting should stay in Saigon immediately following any negative answer from Diem.
 
"I suggest you read the attached paper in its entirety." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-127-69) The letter to Nolting which Bagley referred to is Document 181.

POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES IN VIET NAM

Alternative Situations

I. As a result of Nolting's new efforts, Diem accepts the conditions we have laid down.

II. Diem does not accept the conditions and one of the following occurs:

A. No coup attempt, or, if there is one, it is defeated by Diem.

B. A coup led by experienced ARVN officers which might put Tho or Thuan at the head of the government.

C. A coup led by Nhu which uses Can Lao members of the ARVN officer corps as front men.

D. A coup which fails to put any single individual or group in charge, but results in a continuing struggle for power.

Like all such lists, the above list does not exhaust the possible permutations. In particular, various intermediate situations are possible. Some of these are covered in the discussion below

Discussion

Alternative I: If this occurs, our problems will by no means be solved. It is quite possible that we will get a formal agreement from Diem which he will then fail to carry out. Indeed, he may offer us such formal assurances for the precise purpose of heading off a coup and giving him time to organize to prevent such a coup. This time we cannot give Diem nearly as much time to perform as we have given him in the past. If it is evident within the following month or six weeks that he is not going to perform we will have to consider whether we should make an effort to have him replaced. If it becomes evident that he is buying time in order to build his defenses against a coup, we will have to move even more quickly.

Alternative II-A: If this occurs it will probably be because of one or a combination of three circumstances: (a) the military lacks the will and determination to mount a coup; (b) the U.S. fails to give a clear signal that it will support a coup group; or (c) Diem manages to find sufficient forces loyal to him to prevent coup plans from succeeding. This kind of a situation could be most difficult of all. We would be in a stand-off in our relations. The worst variant (though perhaps an unlikely one) would be one where we had become identified with a coup attempt that had failed. Our relations with Diem would then be at almost dead end. Under other variants, not including U.S. identification with an unsuccessful coup effort, we would have to consider such possibilities as simply withdrawing our offer of additional aid and attempting to revert to the status quo ante or attempting to develop a different kind of package which we would attempt to sell to Diem.

Alternative II-B: This would be the best of the alternative coup possibilities. What should be the U.S. role in bringing about such a state of affairs? The evidence suggests that all we will probably have to do to ensure that a coup takes place is to indicate clearly, but in an indirect fashion, that we will support a coup effort. In giving such indication, we might be well advised to indicate that we would much prefer an arrangement which provided for the constitutional succession of Vice President Tho.

What we do need to do positively in such a situation is to avoid the possibility that either alternative situation II-C or II-D would occur. Our control over troop dispositions which might bring Can Lao-officered units into Saigon to prevent a coup would be very limited. However, we should be able to do something about insuring that Vice President Tho is protected against assassination. Nhu would probably make him the first target of any move since he is the obvious successor. Nhu has already done his utmost to downgrade him.

Another possible danger that must be guarded against is that the Communists will exploit the situation to create confusion. We ought to have prepared now a very full appreciation of just how much trouble the Communists could create. My own belief is that they would not be able to move in and take over militarily. I also believe that it is highly doubtful that they have the capability to insinuate any of their followers into high positions in a coup party. They might exploit a situation of uncertainty (alternative II-D) to produce a period of chaos which would result in an early Communist takeover.

In the light of the above, the U.S. may have relatively little direct role to play. Our most important action will be to make clear that we will go along with a coup.

If this analysis is correct, we would not be well advised to pull our ambassador out and put Lansdale in Saigon if Diem refuses to sign on the dotted line. If we can get the kind of coup we want without evidence of overt U.S. involvement, we shall be better off than if we are clearly identified with a coup group. No matter how unpopular Diem may be and no matter how popular his successors, our identification with the change would be a definite drawback in Viet Nam and in the world at large. No government in a situation like that in Viet Nam is going to remain tremendously popular for very long. Moreover, in the larger arena of our relations with the rest of the world such identification could convert the situation in Viet Nam into one like that in Laos making it appear to be a straight U.S.-Bloc struggle for power with the Vietnamese as mere pawns. Our identification with the change may be an immediate bonus, but a long-term disadvantage. It would also involve a heavy additional commitment of U.S. prestige which may or may not be advantageous. If we send Lansdale when Nolting leaves, the coup will inevitably be viewed as another CIA effort since he is so clearly identifiable in the area.

Nolting himself should stay in Viet Nam long enough to "pass the word". It is most important that it be passed in a way that gives it an authoritative coloration.

I am not altogether convinced that Nolting needs to leave in order to dramatize the breakdown in our relations and the need for change. The situation will be known quickly enough within the GVN without such action. There would be a real advantage in having him there to direct our responses in the event a coup occurs. Unfortunately the DCM is so new to that part of the world that he would be in great difficulty. If we want to indicate our displeasure we should be able to find other ways to communicate it. Nolting's absence could conceivably deter a coup by the military. To sum up, I believe that, even if we go through with plans to withdraw Nolting, such withdrawal might better be deferred for a time to permit him to have some influence on developments that occur subsequent to his withdrawal.

Because of the disadvantages of U.S. identification, any military moves should be relatively unostentatious. We might, at some crucial stage, let coup leaders know privately that we were prepared to fly in forces, without putting such forces in a publicly visible position off the coast.

Alternative II-C: This alternative would create a worse situation than we have now. Nhu is much less popular than Diem. He would probably run a very repressive regime and would probably be most difficult to deal with. Moreover, if he were in control, the political situation might become even more unstable. There would probably be extensive purges and counter-coup plotting. The likelihood of a coup by Nhu succeeding is probably fairly low because he is so universally disliked. However, the potential role of the Can Lao is difficult to assess. What is more likely is a temporary Nhu success followed by a counter-coup by the experienced military officers. Such a development could produce the situation envisaged in Alternative Il-D.

Alternative II-D: A struggle for power could involve any or all of five elements-Diem, the regular ARVN officers, Nhu and the Can Lao, the Communists and the sects (which might be armed by any of the other three). Such a struggle could create a situation most favorable to the Communists. If we should support a coup effort by the officers, it would be most important to assure that it succeeded quickly and cleanly. One of the first objectives would therefore have to be the effective neutralization of Nhu. He would be the most immediate threat.

If there is any serious hitch indicating the possibility of success by the opposition, we may have to move quickly with military force. But couldn't the necessary forces (which would not have to be very large) be kept in the Philippines or some considerable distance offshore and flown into Saigon?

Recommendations

1. We should obtain an intelligence appreciation of possible alternative developments. In order to keep distribution limited, it may be necessary to ask for a CIA appreciation rather than a coordinated estimate. The appreciation should deal with the probable role of the four principal power groupings (army, Nhu and the Can Lao, the Communists and the sects), and of Diem himself.

2. A high-level limited attendance meeting should discuss U.S. policy in various possible situations at a very early date. We should not wait for the outcome of our latest démarche to have such a discussion. The arguments above are intended to be provocative rather than dogmatic. They are based upon judgments that need to be examined.

Robert H. Johnson/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

293. Letter From the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to General Samuel T. Williams/1/

Washington, November 28, 1961.

/1/Source: Hoover Institution Archives, Williams Papers, 1961 Letters. Handwritten by Lansdale.

Mon General--Warm thanks for your letter./2/

/2/Not further identified.

Upon return here, the boss had another crash project for me to work on, /3/ so I've been quite apart from most of the follow-through of the Taylor group's reports and activities. I've had to keep one eye cocked on it, but it hasn't been enough-as perhaps you've seen in the press.

/3/Lansdale was asked by Attorney General Robert Kennedy to work on a project relating to Cuba.

One of the conclusions drawn in town, and both Taylor & Rostow say it isn't one of theirs (although I'm suspicious) is that we cannot help the VN win against the VC as long as a dictator (Diem) holds power. So, one of the thoughts being ginned up is that I go over as his personal advisor and, presumably, clobber him from up close. I pointed out that this was a duty without honor and I'd be dammed if I'd do that./4/ Now I'm being asked about you, whether you're free to become involved in VN affairs. I'm not certain if there's a connection between these two things, so this is just a little personal alert.

/4/In a memorandum to the President of November 23, the President's Naval Aide, Tazewell T. Shepard, wrote, "You wished to be reminded to discuss with Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer: (1) Why is Brigadier General Lansdale the only man available?" (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bromley Smith Drawer, Memos to the President)

In a memorandum of November 25 to McNamara, William Bundy wrote, among other things, that McGarr sent two messages through special channels reporting Diem's disappointment that no decision had been reached regarding Lansdale's return. Bundy had gathered from these messages and other indications that McGarr favored Lansdale's return. Bundy himself concluded, "In spite of the importance of Ed's assignment, I think he belongs in Vietnam, where he is of unique value." (Department of State, Bundy Files, 1961 Chron; also printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-l967 Book 11, p. 422)

In a telephone call to Taylor at 12:11 p.m. on November 27, Rusk "suggested getting Lansdale out right away . . . not in lieu of the amb but to brief him and Diem." The conversation continued, "We did have in mind bringing Nolting back if we did not see better response from Diem. T is getting uneasy and hopes the response from Diem would so indicate this. The Sec said but it might be well for L to get out before we get too wrong a response. T is concerned it would be viewed as his being a second amb. The Sec thinks that can be explained. T mentioned getting L from the AG for this and the Sec said it would not be for too long." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

Between midday November 27 and 30, a decision was made not to send Lansdale, for in a memorandum of November 30 to McNamara, McGeorge Bundy wrote that the President's question of why Lansdale was the only man available for Vietnam was "probably moot at the moment." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bromley Smith Drawer, Memos to the President)

I do hope there is some sound way of getting you into the act on VN, because the situation there needs the best we have.

Diem has been getting worn out by all the vicious attacks on him. The first evening I was there, he looked really down in the dumps-so I told him to go to bed instead of talking to me. During the next several days, I went to work to keep him up, and he started becoming the fighter we knew of yore. However, these latest attacks on him-seemingly stemming from the Taylor group-apparently really got him down. Also, the wording of some of the U.S. proposals made it look as though the U.S. was going to act the same way the French have. I jumped back into the act long enough last night to try to straighten out this aspect.

The VC war is getting real rough. Your successor seems to be fighting it with memos, with the result that he has lost much of his influence with Diem, Thuan, etc. I urged Thuan to work with him more closely and Thuan pointed to a big stack of papers and said: that's what I got the last time I asked for some help.

A number of our VN army friends have told me that Thuan is a jerk and no good. He and Diem have said much the same about some of their generals. I tried to explain to all that they had to work together in a team and that suffering casualties always creates emotional stress-which is the real basis for any falling out in a situation like theirs.

I'm afraid that another coup might get ginned up, despite present U.S. attitudes locally against it. If so, it could lead to real disaster.

Incidentally, Diem, Thuan, and the others think highly of Fritz Nolting. Too bad you didn't have someone like him as ambassador while you were there.

We probably will be boosting our help by a lot more men, money, & material. However, what's really lacking is something of the spirit, something of leadership qualities on our part, which would give meaning to our aid. It's pure hell to be on the sidelines and seeing so conventional and unimaginative an approach being tried. About all I can do is continue putting in my two-bits worth every chance I get to add a bit of spark to the concepts. I'm afraid that these aren't always welcome.

Rather than end this on a gloomy downbeat, let's noodle out how to lick the crowd. One of the main problems is here at home, with Washington being only one phase. Do you feel up to entering the fray again--against folks of Durbrow's ilk--but much subtler? I'll see what I can noodle out for a sound place and way to do battle, if you feel up to it.

Warmest and best wishes, as always,

Ed

 

294. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report/1/

Washington, November 28, 1961.

/1/Source: USAMHI, Kraemer Papers, VN 61-63. Confidential; Noforn/Continued Control.

. . . Subject: Views of Ngo Dinh Nhu on Vietnamese American relations.

1. On 27 November 1961, Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother and political advisor to President Diem, said that he had called Director General of Information Tran Van Tho that morning and advised him that he thought it improper that the Vietnamese press criticize the American Government. He said he fully understood their annoyance at American press stories of conditions being imposed upon the Vietnamese Government, unfair criticisms, etc. Nhu said that he had told Tho that Vietnamese criticisms of such statements were fair if addressed to the authors of the statements but not at a friendly government. He stated that this was a matter of simple justice and should not be interpreted as a decision by the Vietnamese Government not to insult the American Government for political reasons. He then added that it is most important that neither the Americans nor the Government of Vietnam (GV) be isolated by Communist propaganda whose primary objective is to isolate the Vietnamese Government from its people and the Americans from their companions in the Free World. . . .

2. Nhu stated that the difficulties between Vietnamese and Americans can be laid at the door of the Free World's lack of any coherent concept of the development of an underdeveloped country toward democracy. He contrasted this with the definite stages by which the Communists view their political program. The Communists view an independent country as moving along a clear path to include the following four states: (a) neutrality, (b) anti Free World, (c) pro Soviet bloc, (d) popular democracy. It is this concept of stages which enables the Communist world to accept with no criticism, conditions or other harassment a country such as Cambodia in the neutral stage, the efforts to create a neutral Laos, and the situation of other underdeveloped countries in Africa and Asia. While the Free World looks toward Laotian neutrality, for instance, as an objective, the Communists are content to consider it as one step toward the eventual goal. This concept of progression toward Communist control also explains the discipline of a Communist party in a country such as Cambodia when instructed to support the government in power.

3. In contrast, the Free World has only one step it expects any underdeveloped country to make. It expects it to move from the stage of underdevelopment to full-blooming democracy in one jump. The impossibility of such an abrupt change, the chaos which ensues when it is attempted and lack of understanding of this fact between the country itself and outside observers all lead to considerable lack of confidence and criticism between the Free World and the underdeveloped country. The greatest need in the Free World today is a clear concept of stages through which underdeveloped countries are expected to progress so that premature expectations of democracy will not destroy confidence between free nations. While this problem applies to Vietnam, it applies with equal force to other underdeveloped countries in Africa and Asia.

4. Nhu stated that one of the first requirements of this progression is a step toward land reform and land resettlement, to give each citizen a plot of land of his own and a feeling of economic security. At the same time, like the tribes of Israel moving through the desert toward the promised land, the flame of future ideal, the Ark of the Covenant, must be kept in full view at all times. This eventual goal will give cohesion and force to the progress of the underdeveloped country through its necessary stages. In Vietnam this cohesive force is provided by the philosophical underpinnings of the Can Lao party, i.e. personalism, community life and collective improvement. A similar philosophical base must be found in every underdeveloped country moving through its necessary stages.

5. Nhu said that the problem of bringing about [garble] precision of these stages is one which calls for priority effort by the political theorists and thinkers of the best American institutions. Only if such a planned progression is achieved will we be able to avoid in the long term the misunderstandings and criticisms which have marked the press of Vietnam and the United States with regard to each other in recent times.

6. Nhu stated that the Taylor visit and its results reminded him of an incident which brought the delay of the arming and training of the Civil Guard. This occurred in 1956 [?] when Ho Thong Minh, then Minister of Defense, advised General Lawton Collins that President Diem had no support within the army. As a result, he said, the President planned to create a private army in the Civil Guard, which would give him control of the situation. General Collins understandably accepted this statement of a minister of the government and as a result assistance to the Civil Guard was passed to United States Operations Mission (USOM) and Michigan State University (MSU) which did not prepare it to become a paramilitary force for local defense. As a result of this comment by a minister, therefore, the training of the most important arm for anti-guerrilla operations was delayed a number of years. Nhu said that it was quite clear that General Taylor had been exposed to similar comments from very high officials in the government and from outsiders. The results of their criticisms are now being imposed on the President despite their errors. Nhu also said he had the impression that General Taylor's mind was made up before he came to Vietnam, as his investigations were quite limited.

. . . . . . .

 

295. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report/1/

Washington, November 29, 1961.

/1/Source: USAMHI, Kraemer Papers, VN 61 63. Confidential, Noforn/Continued Control.

. . . Subject: Views of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

1. On 27 November 1961, President Ngo Dinh Diem said that the mission of General Maxwell D. Taylor to South Vietnam was somewhat similar to the mission of General Marshall to China. In the latter case, General Marshall insisted that Chiang Kai-shek divide his power with the Liberal Party, which had no authority and represented nothing but a few intellectuals. The American position after the Taylor Mission was completed bears similarities, as it apparently wishes to impose some sort of liberalization or change upon the Government of Vietnam (GVN) which is not suited to the present situation or the Government's structure. Diem said that he had been trying for a long time to build the infra-structure of a democratic system in South Vietnam but that he was faced with two major obstacles, the war being waged by the Vietnamese Communists, and the difficulty of finding loyal and efficient cadres for the GVN.

2. President Diem stated that he was conscious of the demand that "emergency" action be taken and this he had tried to accomplish. When discussing the specifics of "emergency" actions with such political figures as Pham Huy Quat, leader of the Front for National Unity, however, the President found nothing but vague and irrelevant ideas about giving greater freedom propounded. He found that such figures as Dr. Quat actively refused to accept the real "emergency" actions necessary, such as immediate and severe punishment of treason and cowardice in the face of the enemy. He planned in the next few days to establish provincial councils, but these would not be elected in the beginning but would be appointed from non-party people in the area. A similar technique was used in forming the National Economic Council which was nominated by various interest groups. It was delayed by the difficulties of finding labor representatives who were anything but Communist. Meanwhile oppositionists such as Pham Huy Quat were currying favor with potential foreign sponsors instead of helping the country to fight during this period.

3. Another drawback to the Taylor Report recommendations was the experience of the GVN with the Staley Report, which was delivered with great fanfare and indicated that all sorts of additional assistance would be forthcoming. The promised increase in American support had not materialized to date. Diem stated that he had taken steps to devaluate the recommendations.

4. The Vietnamese newspapers were commenting on the conditions stated in the Taylor Report, according to Diem, and the press revealed the depth of the antagonism of thinking Vietnamese to any conditions which they believed limited GVN sovereignty. Diem knew that his advisers and cabinet members would feel so strongly on this subject that he had not exposed the specifics of the Taylor recommendations to more than one or two individuals. (Field comment. Assistant Secretary of National Defense and Secretary of State at the Presidency Nguyen Dinh Thuan stated on 27 November that President Diem's attitude was appropriately described as "frustrated" by the convergence of problems upon him, including what he deemed the unreality of the Taylor conditions; the extreme difficulty in locating appropriate individuals to whom power could be delegated and who would accept it; the pressures of the war; and, the fact that he had carefully consulted his Cabinet, National Assembly members, and other advisers on the desirability of receiving American troops, and now faced a difficult problem in re-orienting them.)

5. President Diem also expressed considerable fury and bafflement at how to handle American press representatives. He realized the importance of the American press influence, but insisted that it should assume responsibility commensurate with its power, and should also realize that the backdrop to the Vietnamese scene being reported is the Vietnamese Communist attack. He complained that if he did not give an interview to a foreign newsman, the latter criticized him for ignoring foreign newsmen, but that if he did give the interview, the reporter used almost nothing told to him and criticized the length of the interview. . . .

6. President Diem said that he intended to go ahead with extra financial expenditures and has instructed Thuan to find the necessary 600 million plasters, of which 40 million would be for Self Defense Corps equipment, 60 million would be to pay village notables, etc.

. . . . . . .

 

296. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, November 29, 1961, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2961. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Repeated to Bangkok and CINCPAC for PolAd.

729. Reference: Deptel 693./2/ In somewhat improved atmosphere here, believe cool and unhurried approach is our best bet for success. Diem habitually takes quite a while to react; he likes to take other people's ideas and make them his own, sometimes. I have indications that he is trying to come up with something along lines we suggested, and I think it would be a mistake to rush him.

/2/Document 286.

Definitely think better arrangements to benefit of common cause can be made if we do not become impatient and if I use latitude between my original instructions and reference telegram prudently and in response to his ideas.

Since dictating above, learn from Thuan that Diem wants to see me tomorrow (November 30), after his return from field trip.

Nolting

 

297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Burma/1/

Washington, November 29, 1961, 9:12 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1461. Confidential. Repeated to Saigon. Previous drafts of the enclosed letter, one of which bears the handwritten notation "changed by White House 11/27/61," are ibid., 751K.00/11-2261.

301. Following is text, for delivery Prime Minister, of President's reply to U Nu's November 13 letter re Vietnam./2/ Signed original being airpouched:

/2/Document 248.

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am happy to have your letter of November thirteenth expressing your concern over the situation in South Viet-Nam. It is in no sense an intrusion, and I want you to know that I will always welcome your thoughts and counsel. We share the same objective of maintaining the peace and promoting the well-being of Southeast Asia. I am sure that I need not tell you that the United States has no ambitions for itself in the area; our only desire is that independent countries of the area should be able to maintain their independence, free from threats of force and from externally supported subversion and infiltration. Unhappily, this is not now the case in South Viet-Nam.

"It is good to know that you have expressed to the Government in North Viet-Nam your concern on this point; a continuation of its present course cannot but endanger the peace. Although we are satisfied that the Government of South Viet-Nam is prepared to live peacefully within the Geneva Accords, the authorities in North Viet-Nam have done little to conceal their disregard of those Accords and have openly and systematically fomented efforts aimed at the violent overthrow of the Government in South Viet-Nam. This policy was openly proclaimed in the declaration of the Third Lao Dong Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960, which called upon its members to 'liberate South Viet-Nam from the ruling yoke of the United States imperialists.' Three months later Hanoi announced the creation of a 'front for liberation of the South.'

"There have been many other public statements in the same vein from Hanoi, and it is clear that there has been established in the South an elaborate guerrilla organization supported, directed and supplied from the North. The October 24, 1961, letter of the Government of Viet-Nam to the International Control Commission/3/ set forth in what I am satisfied to be an objective and factual manner detailed information and evidence with respect to the massive infiltration from the North.

/3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-861)

"While there may be varying assessments and points of view with respect to the domestic policies of the Government of Viet-Nam, it is the legitimate government of an independent country and the freedom of the people it represents is endangered, I am sure that you would agree that it would be extremely difficult for any government, unaided, to cope with externally supported attacks of the intensity of those now being mounted with increasing crescendo against the Government of South Viet-Nam. I know that your own experience enables you, especially, to appreciate the dangers which are now threatening the Government and people of South Viet-Nam.

"We are gravely concerned not only by the danger they face, but also by the threat which Communist domination imposed from the outside would present to the nations of Southeast Asia. I am sure you will agree that this is a question in which our common interests are deeply involved.

"The intention of my Government is to help South Viet-Nam by continuing and considerably increasing the military assistance program which we have been providing. At the same time we will step up economic aid in connection with damage caused by the recent flood.

"In reply to the point raised in your letter, I would like to assure you that we are not sending U.S. combat forces to Viet-Nam. We are profoundly aware of the grave questions which would be involved in such a decision and I earnestly hope that we will not be faced by such an eventuality.

"As to the nature of the crisis in Viet-Nam, we are convinced by extensive and detailed evidence that the increase in internal disorder and the expansion of military operations against the Government are caused by a massive campaign of infiltration, subversion, and terror directed and reinforced from the outside. While this form of aggression is indirect, it is very real.

"I am gratified that you have undertaken to let me have your views on this grave matter and I believe that on most points our views coincide. Certainly as events unfold and as this Government considers future actions to help the people and Government of South Viet-Nam stop the forces which threaten their independence, I shall have in mind your thoughts and welcome counsel.

"Sincerely, John F. Kennedy."

White House and Dept do not plan release text. Suggest you confirm with Burmese our assumption they will not release.

Rusk

 

298. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/

Saigon, November 30, 1961.

/1/Source. Department of State, Johnson Files, Official and Classified Letters. Confidential; Official-Informal.

Dear Alex: For your information, Senator Ellender paid us a one-day visit on November 29th. He saw all members of Task Force Saigon and received answers to his questionnaire,/2/ sent in advance of his arrival. His general attitude towards our policy, plans, and efforts here was totally negative.

/2/Not further identified.

During a long discussion at my home on the evening of his arrival, I tried to give Senator Ellender as candid a picture as I could of what we are trying to do here. Starting from completely different premises, he naturally did not agree with our policy. His premises, as the Department doubtless knows, are:

(1) that the Viet-Cong insurgency here is nothing but a manifestation of discontent with a corrupt regime;

(2) that Communist expansionism from North Viet-Nam, China and Russia has nothing to do with it;

(3) that corruption in the regime is bred by US assistance, and that contention among factions for control of US assistance further corrupts and paralyzes the Government.

I was unable to sway him from these extraordinary views.

On the evening of his arrival, Senator Ellender requested an appointment with President Diem for the next day. After hearing Senator Ellender's views, which he said he intended to give to Diem (whom he said he had seen on every previous visit to Viet-Nam), I decided it would be most unwise in the present circumstances to promote the meeting. I told Senator Ellender that I thought it would be impossible on such short notice to arrange a meeting with President Diem. I further told him that if President Diem had any time, I myself wished to see him on urgent and important business, and that it would be very awkward for me at this juncture to ask Diem to see Senator Ellender. The Senator would not, however, withdraw his request to me to arrange an appointment.

The next day I got in touch with Thuan, telling him that Senator Ellender was in town and wanted to see President Diem, but that in view of the shortness of time and the President's many preoccupations, I would tell Senator Ellender that President Diem was unfortunately unable to see him on such short notice. Thuan agreed and I did so. Senator Ellender was markedly displeased at not being able to see Diem, and said that he was going to write a letter expressing his regret to President Diem, after his departure. I will take care of this angle through Thuan.

I would appreciate it if you would see that the proper persons in the Department are informed of the above, in the event that the matter comes up after Senator Ellender's return to Washington./3/

/3/In his reply of December 8, Johnson wrote that Ellender's "views with regard to Viet-Nam are hardly surprising in the light of his well-known views on other areas." Johnson expressed approval of the way Nolting had handled the incident and promised to bring Nolting's letter to the attention of the Bureaus of Congressional Affairs and Far Eastern Affairs. Johnson concluded:

"I want you to know that everyone here is most pleased with the very able way that you have succeeded in handling things, in spite of the handicaps of most unhelpful leaks from here. On the latter point, I have made extraordinary efforts to run them down but, as is all too often the case, thus far without positive result." (Ibid.)

Best personal regards.

Sincerely,

Frederick E. Nolting, Jr./4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

299. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, November 30, 1961, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-3061. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and CINCPAC for PolAd.

737. Task Force VN. Regret report that Thompson Mission is badly off rails from standpoint US-UK coordination and that Thompson recommendations to GVN, whatever may be their intrinsic merit, are bound to complicate our task of bringing about essential reforms in GVN military and administrative structure. Position may be retrievable (and we are working at it). But as of now British initiative has introduced knotty problem in our discussions with GVN.

Difficulties with Thompson Mission have been procedural and substantive. Procedurally, problem has been that Thompson has submitted his recommendations to President Diem without prior consultation with US and without real effort to ascertain thrust of our plans or programs for counterinsurgency. This has occurred despite what I considered most precise prior understanding with Ambassador Hohler that advance consultation was essential if two pitfalls were to be avoided: (1) That we should present alternative recommendations to Diem between which he could vacillate without acting on either; and (2) That British would present recommendations which we for one reason or another could not or would not support and which would therefore be sterile (given fact that UK not contributing substantially to anti-VC effort beyond Thompson recommendations). Second procedural point fully agreed with Hohler was that Thompson would strictly limit himself to intelligence and civil aspects of counterinsurgency effort.

Although Hohler does not deny that there was clear understanding on above points-and I have had occasion to remind him of them several times recently-fact is that Thompson has disregarded them. Only defense offered is that General Taylor specifically requested Thompson's views without limitation as to subject matter (I have this only from Hohler)/2/ and that as Thompson Mission is accredited to Diem he must respond to latter's requests.

/2/In telegram 717 to Saigon, December 1, Taylor told Nolting that he had informally discussed with Thompson the situation in Vietnam and had expressed "interest in Thompson's views." Taylor said he had been "greatly surprised" to receive from the British Embassy a copy of Thompson's October 27 paper, "Appreciation of Vietnam, November 1961 to April 1962" (not printed). Taylor said that if it seemed useful to Nolting, he might mention to the British Ambassador that Taylor thought Thompson had misunderstood his request and suggested it be forgotten. (Ibid., 751K.00/12-161) In a covering memorandum of December 1 to U. Alexis Johnson with the text of this message, Taylor stated that he was "somewhat disturbed" that "Thompson was using me as a kind of screen for his out-of-channel operations in Saigon." (Ibid.)

Although British performance is procedurally incorrect, substantively it is far more serious. Thompson has submitted to Diem so-called "outline plan" for clearing delta (Embdes 205, Nov. 20)./3/ This paper deals with whole range of anti-guerrilla measures, including all aspects of military. It is an admirable paper from standpoint of presentation and as a statement of concepts of anti-guerrilla operations. We can easily agree with ninety per cent of it and have in fact been pressing same or similar concepts on GVN for many months.

/3/See Document 237.

Problem arises in unexpected way. We have been pressing Diem to set up a proper military command structure headed by field command and to delegate authority to it. Diem accepted this most reluctantly six months ago, but has never fully carried through on it, and recently there have been several instances of direct orders from palace to ARVN units without field commands knowledge. Thompson proposal for delta provides that control of operations in that area bypass field command (since chain of command would be from NISC to Combined Third Corps HQ) and operational control would thus in effect be exercised by Diem. This point has obviously not escaped President. Thuan has already informed McGarr that Diem has "accepted" Thompson plan and inquired whether MAAG has any comments on it. Diem has also asked Thompson to submit plan for clearing area north of Saigon.

I do not wish to suggest by above that I consider Diem's reaction to Thompson plan is motivated solely by desire avoid delegation of authority which we have been pressing on him, although this is without doubt a major factor. Another is very likely a reaction to our approach in current negotiations. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are being doctrinaire in our reaction, which I think is not the case. Fundamentally, problem is that we are convinced that unless we can bring Diem to delegate authority we shall never get effective counterinsurgency effort in this country, no matter what sort of paper plans we may have. Thompson proposal, particularly coming at this juncture, strikes a hard blow at this effort.

A second major substantive difficulty with Thompson plan is proposal that clearance of delta provinces have first priority. In MAAG view first priority is area to north of Saigon-which Thompson had not surveyed at time he submitted his delta plan to Diem.

At meeting with Hohler and Thompson November 29, at which McGarr and Trueheart present, I spoke along above lines very frankly and even bluntly, emphasizing that I feared Thompson plan would be distinct handicap in discussions which I am now carrying on with GVN. I also warned them that if, as I expected, Diem raised Thompson plan in these discussions, I would have to tell him that we did not agree with command arrangements proposed.

Hohler and Thompson ostensibly accepted all this with good grace and reiterated their desire to cooperate closely with US and by implication to play role of junior partner in this enterprise. I sense nevertheless that Thompson is thoroughly annoyed.

Another meeting is scheduled for next week at which we plan to go through Thompson Plan in detail with object of identifying points on which US and UK approaches diverge.

Nolting

 

300. Editorial Note

On November 30, 1961, Chester Bowles drafted a memorandum to the President reporting on his recent 2-week visit to East and Southeast Asia, which included visits to Japan, Indonesia, and Malaya. As a result of the trip Bowles offered several conclusions regarding Vietnam:

"1. I believe General Taylor's estimate of the immediate danger in South Vietnam is valid. The government in Saigon is not only weak but confused. In its present form I seriously question whether it can create stability within its own borders regardless of our assistance.
 
"2. I assume that CIA and other related agencies have surveyed the possibilities of an alternative Vietnamese leadership; if not, I believe they should do so. Under present circumstances I can see little hope for internal stability except through the emergence of a vigorous new leader such as General Park in South Korea who might rally the indigenous anti-Communist forces behind a more effective military policy and intelligence effort solidly based on long overdue economic, political, and social reforms.
 
"3. In the meantime, I believe we are correct in delivering essential military equipment to the present government as long as it shows some willingness to face up to the need for improved performance.
 
"However, in my opinion, it would be a serious mistake to send in organized units of U.S. troops which like the French before Dien Bien Phu would almost certainly be bogged down in a frustrating and costly struggle of white outsiders against 'anti-colonial' guerillas.
 
"4. If the over-all situation in Southeast Asia as a whole absolutely requires direct military action, I believe that our pressure should be directed against the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi. Such pressure could be accompanied by an offer through the U.S.S.R. or India to cooperate in establishing a 'neutral and independent' Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos with free elections in Vietnam within five to ten years provided the present Communist pressure against Vietnam is ended.
 
"Although such a development runs counter to our present stance, I believe it would be wholly in our long-range interest. It is no more possible over the long haul for the United States to maintain a military power position on a peninsula of Asia against the growing pressure of Communist China than it would have been for the Spanish to hold a military position in Florida in the face of the developing power of the U.S.A. A neutral belt supported by non-Communist Asians is our one best hope of containing China within her present borders.
 
"5. In the meantime I feel the CIA, the Pentagon, and State should be asked to prepare a fall back position to which we could withdraw if the situation in Vietnam should collapse before these or other moves become possible."

In the margin of the first page, Bowles wrote, "Decided to delay and expand." (Yale University, Bowles Papers, Box 297, Folder 0496 Kennedy) The expanded version of this paper is apparently a long memorandum Bowles sent to the President on April 4, 1962. (Ibid.)

 

301. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/

I-19406/61

Washington, December 1, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Vietnam 1961-2 Dec. Top Secret. Copies sent to Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and Wheeler.

SUBJECT
Vietnam Command Arrangements

I have reviewed the JCS proposal, /2/ approved in principle by you, during the week with Alexis Johnson, and with representatives of AID and CIA. Concurrently, Admiral Felt's 290301Z/3/ has laid out his ideas on the charter. This memorandum sets forth the views and issues, with my recommendations.

/2/Document 271.

/3/A copy of this telegram was attached to Bagley's memorandum of December 1 to Taylor, in which Bagley characterized ClNCPAC's view of how the command should be set up in Vietnam as "your 'normal model' with an on-the-spot CINCPAC representative superimposed, but without the 'Korea model' responsibilities." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-185-69)

1. State View. Alexis Johnson reported yesterday that Secretary Rusk accepted his, Alex's views, as follows:

a. That there should be no new title for the present, although the powers of Chief, MAAG, might well be extended in the economic and intelligence areas as needed, and to cover clearly the command of forces introduced on the existing policy basis.

b. That it was not essential that the officer selected have a 4-star rank.

c. That the co-equal status of the officer with the Ambassador was acceptable, but would need minor clarification for protocol purposes.

I said that you would surely disagree on a. and b. His argument was that appointment of a US "Commander" would amount to an irrevocable and 100% US commitment to saving South Vietnam. I disputed this, and said it would be no more than a slight addition in a situation where, in the eyes of the world, we were already overwhelmingly committed. I also said you regarded the 4-star rank as crucial to the positive impact of the change.

. . . . . . .

3. AID View. The preliminary view (Frank Coffin) is that the key issue is control of the allocation of local currency generated by the commodity import program. This is now in the Ambassador, who also retains the final refereeing of any disputes between USOM and the military. These two do have a working agreement, under which all military-related projects (roads, telecommunications, village communications, police support) are subject to full coordination; disputes are said to have been minor in recent months (I have heard the contrary about earlier periods).

Coffin's view is that the present system should be maintained (which could be accomplished by substituting the word "Coordinate" for the words 'Supervise and direct . . ./4/ Diplomatic Mission" in paragraph 5 e. of the JCS draft) or that the whole direction of USOM should pass to the military commander-that there was no happy middle ground. I think there is a strong case for the second action as we go along, but would be much influenced by Felt and McGarr's views. Again, Felt has not included the point in his draft of proposed powers.

/4/Ellipsis in the source text.

4. Summary. The CIA and AID issues seem resolvable, although there should certainly be a high-level meeting of minds and fully coordinated instructions both giving the text and glossing it. However, the State view strikes at the heart of the whole proposal, and is not acceptable in my judgment. I recommend that you:

a. Take up the matter with Secretary Rusk (perhaps with a name in hand) to urge that the title "Commander" be used and that a 4-star appointment be made.

b. If State continues adamant, that a charter be dreamed up embodying the JCS text, modified to meet the CIA points and to the less forceful position vis-a-vis AID (a senior military officer still called a Chief, MAAG, could hardly take over more economic power), together with the more specific points of Admiral Felt's cable, as the best possible solution now obtainable.

WP Bundy

 

302. Memorandum for the Record by the Public Affairs Officer in the Embassy in Vietnam (Anspacher)/1/

Saigon, December 1, 1961.

/1/Source Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 335, Press July-December 1961. Confidential. Attached to a memorandum of December 1 to Nolting, in which Anspacher wrote that the recent press campaign was the first one in his experience that had taken on such proportions.

SUBJECT
Anti-U.S. Press Campaign, November 25-30, 1961

Pending a fuller study of this subject, it is worth noting here the more or less accepted version of how the campaign began, what form it took and the "official" reaction to it expressed by the Director General of Information to the PAO.

During a call on the PAO by Dang Duc Khoi presumably for this purpose,/2/ Khoi explained the source of the press campaign as he had determined it: a fit of temper in the Nhu family arising from reports of NBC correspondent Jim Robinson's reaction to an interview with Madame Nhu. According to Khoi, Nhu issued direct orders to Tran Van Tho (DGI) to let loose a campaign against the U.S. press. This was reportedly executed without President Diem's knowledge; it was only after it was brought to his attention by Thuan and Tuyen that Nhu's role was revealed. Meanwhile, Dr. Tho had issued a directive to the Vietnamese press which went far beyond Nhu's instructions. Certainly there were references throughout the week's campaign to American reportage on Vietnam-particularly in the New York Times-but this appeared quite patently a "hook" on which to hang a much broader critique of U.S. policies and practices. Little bits of pieces of information gleaned from statements made here and in Washington about US/Vietnamese "negotiations" were interpreted with a heavy dollop of imagination as a means of leveling charges of "interference" and "conditional aid" against the United States.

/2/This conversation, which took place on November 27, was described in Anspacher's memorandum of November 28 to Nolting attached to the source text, but not printed.

Although as many as half a dozen newspapers joined in the fracas in the first few days, they all seemed to run out of steam early in the week beginning Monday, November 27 and their comments became either ridiculous and/or considerably less vitriolic. Part of this may have been due to a conversation between Dr. Tho and the PAO on Monday (which Khoi had accurately predicted almost to the minute during his call).

In a two-hour conversation, Dr. Tho said that he had discussed the Thoi Bao articles with the publisher whom he described as a "sincere man who accepts full responsibility" for the articles which were inspired by "tendentious" reportage and commentary in the American press in recent weeks. These articles have reportedly not only more than doubled the newspapers' sales but had inspired tracts by persons unknown, saying "Ami Go Home" which the GVN has picked up in Gia Dinh. Dr. Tho reminded us of his stand against freedom of the press and stated that here was proof of the correctness of this stand. If other newspapers continue to follow Thoi Bao's lead, elements of the population would be inflamed to continued anti-American actions, Tho predicted.

There followed further discussion in which we pointed out that the newspapers here had a right to criticize American reporting from Vietnam, but this should really not be a springboard for a massive condemnation of the American Government and people as "Capitalist-Imperialists." Dr. Tho then proposed that if the American Government could prevail upon the American press to "report correctly" about Vietnam that the GVN, through his office, would be able to "persuade" the Vietnamese press to desist in their present anti-American effort.

We made a thorough explanation of how U.S. press relations are conducted, pointing out the difficulties in preventing speculative stories. Tho noted that the State Department should be asked to call "erroneous reporting" to the attention of U.S. editors. We stated that wherever possible, this was done but that our government was not in a position to dictate what the press should print. I said, further, that because of the nature of the situation, we could not offer alternative true copy, in this case as in others.

One of the questions Tho asked was whether the legal principle "the right of response" was accepted in the U.S. so far as press reporting and commentary are concerned. This was a reference to the requirement by law in many countries that a newspaper most [must] provide equal space and equal prominence to counter-charges or at least to a defense against charges against an individual or a government-completely apart from the laws of libel. Of course, my response was in the negative, although I did point out that in this particular instance as in others, any newspaper which had published information thought to be "damaging" against the GVN, for example, would be happy to respond to an offer from the GVN Ambassador in Washington to grant an interview to the newspaper in which the GVN's position could be re-stated. However, there is no U.S. Government regulation of the press in America except for the law of libel and certain postal regulations. Dr. Tho smiled benignly at this and echoed his predecessor's sentiments that eventually the U.S. would realize that complete press freedom without some form of government regulation simply gives free run to irresponsibility and in these times may lead to real danger in the national interests. I smiled benignly, too.

I don't think we got anywhere, really, except to "recognize" each other's problems. We could make no promises about the American press of course; we are walking on eggs as it is. However, we left the Director General with the assurances we would do what we could; but we were impressed also with his concern over what he had done in response to Brother Nhu's directive.

Under the circumstances, the only possible thing we could do in reaction to the press campaign itself is to consider it-apart from its source and the way in which it was conducted-a favorable sign of intellectual muscle-flexing on the part of newspaper editors which fundamentally is encouraging.

 

303. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, December 1, 1961, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-161. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok and CINCPAC for PolAd. Another copy of this telegram, which had been sent to the White House, was marked with the handwritten notation, "P[resident] has seen. Dec. 2." (Kennedy Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series) Printed also in Declassified Documents, 1976, p. 211A.

748. Marathon discussion with Diem this evening (Dec. 1) started on negative note, but improved over course of four hours to a point from which I think we may find meeting of our essential interests. Thuan was present throughout, and he and I will work together tomorrow on GVN paper responding to our démarche of November 15. This will be subject, of course, to Diem's approval, but will be forwarded as soon as possible. We need a GVN paper for sake of clarity and precision.

Diem did not retreat much from his basic conviction that Vietnamese conflict must be won by non-Communist Vietnamese nationalists and that American influence in his government, if publicly known, would be disadvantageous. On other hand he expressed gratitude for President Kennedy's willingness to help, he realizes the reasons for our conditions, and I think we may find way to work out practical steps which will make increasing aid effective. However, pending further report recommend nothing be made public other than that talks continuing. Atmosphere was good throughout, but Diem evidently smarting under what he regards as unjustified criticism of him, his family, and his regime in certain sections US press.

Nolting

 

304. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, December 2, 1961, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-261. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, Paris, and London.

749. Task Force VN. Reference: Deptel 704./2/ Following is evaluation short-range coup possibilities prepared by Mission Intelligence Committee:

/2/In telegram 704, November 28, the Department of State noted recent reports from Vietnam regarding coup rumors and asked the Embassy for its evaluation of the possibility of a coup "at any time you note a set of conditions or reports which are particularly significant." (Ibid., 751K.00/11-2861)

Rumblings of discontent and expression of need for changes which had increasingly pervaded local political scene given additional fillip by Nhu's anti-American gambit in Vietnamese press. At present, however, no firm indications pointing to any group (categorized below) actively preparing as dynamic element in overthrow GVN.

Civilian opposition groups, within Viet-Nam and also including those active abroad, can be expected step up their activities to remind any group contemplating coup of their availability for participation in future government. They are not believed have capability acting as dynamic element to overthrow government, and there no indications their plotting or forming firm alliances with more vigorous elements at this time.

Reformist group within government (including such figures as V.P. Tho, Thuan, Tuyen, Chau) can be expected maintain its pressure for greater efficiency, but to do so for time being at least within context of Diem's continuation in power.

The generals and senior military officers are clearly frustrated by combination of stepped-up enemy capabilities and presidential meddling in military affairs. To carry off coup, however, they would have to establish united front and insure that subordinate commanders would follow their lead. Both would require considerable conspiring of which we have no active indications at this time and would face major dilemma between desire for change and still strong personal prestige and authority of Diem.

Major area of our uncertainty is among field grade officers particularly of elite groups who as unit commanders could force senior officers' hand by mounting coup similar to November 1960. Our coverage political attitudes and possible plotting these groups is still inadequate but it known that their officer corps purged after November 60 and they particularly aware serious nature VC threat today. (We remaining alert to any information bearing on this subject but believe it would be highly dangerous mount special program of collection these attitudes which might provoke either action on their part or serious GVN reaction.)

Despite this current appraisal, it must be expected that discussions and rumors will continue and may well sharpen in minds of above groups and be translated into more precise plans.

Nolting

 

305. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, December 3, 1961, 9 p.m.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Box 309. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok and CINCPAC for PolAd.

754. With further reference Embtel 748,/2/ no progress Saturday,/3/ because Thuan sick (flu) and said could not meet until Monday. I nevertheless had full talk with him at his home Sunday morning, which served clarify to some extent Diem's position as stated to me on Friday. On basis these two talks, I am putting on paper my understanding GVN position re our démarche. Thuan has agreed go over this paper with me Monday morning and seek get Diem's approval of it during course of day. Have strongly emphasized time factor and hope to telegraph this paper soonest./4/ Believe it desirable I then fly to Washington to consult on next moves. If this approved think I should tell press here that I am returning at my own suggestion in order to give my government a full account of discussions which have taken place and, hopefully, to conclude arrangements on which we have been working with GVN.

/2/Document 303.

/3/December 2.

/4/In telegram 756 from Saigon, December 4, Nolting transmitted to the Department of State the text of a memorandum of understanding cleared with Diem that morning for submission ad referendum to the U.S. Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-461)

As indication substance of Diem's position, based on discussions Friday, following is pertinent. When we got down to brass tacks, I asked Diem to say what he could and would do under two broad headings: measures to improve GVN efficiency (in all fields, including military) and measures to improve GVN public image at home and abroad (to gain more active and widespread public support).

On efficiency, Diem noted what he has done and what he plans to do, at same time stressing shortage of competent people and need to develop administrative skills. He agreed to reactivate National Internal Security Council, to have it meet regularly as "war cabinet", to create a secretariat for it, and to conduct government security business through it. Thuan said today that this step, in his judgment, is best way to organize national effort at top, to accomplish delegation of authority, and to bring about more efficient governmental action. Thuan said President expects to have NISC meet regularly twice a week. Diem also said that next week he would issue decree setting up Provincial Councils in all provinces which would have advisory and real powers vis-a-vis the province chiefs. These councils would be appointed in first instance, from people who had shown themselves to be "most active anti-communist patriots" regardless of party or occupation; idea was to have them eventually elected. Diem was at first very cool to offer of selected Americans to help in administrative organs, taking position that this would not work out in practice, that nationalistic Vietnamese would resent it and Viet Cong would capitalize on it, and especially that he could not afford to admit publicly that he had to call on Americans to help administer his national revolution. He was blunt here in stating, citing cases in which Americans got frustrated when things were not done "their way", causing resentment among Vietnamese. He said he would not wish to build up situation like that which resulted in anti-American blow-out in Taiwan some time ago. I made clear that we did not want to force any American advisors upon him, but that we needed assurance of strengthened GVN administration. What did he propose? He said he recognized that certain Americans, on selective basis and on request, could help strengthen his government. Thuan confirmed this. I said this was exactly our idea. (This is something that can be worked out, I think, on an ad hoc and ad hominem basis, but not in any overall sense and not publicly.) On military command, especially on full and unimpeded authority to Field Command to plan and conduct field operations, Diem stated flatly and repeated several times that he had given his military command full authority, had made it clear over many months that he counted on Field Command to plan and conduct military operations with full authority and control of ARVN forces, that he had not interfered either in plans or in troop dispositions, but that he had been sadly disappointed in results. "They tell you", he said, "that I interfere to hide their own incompetence and lack of initiative." This was a blunt and apparently sincere statement of a most serious situation. It conflicts, of course, with many allegations from GVN military about Palace interference. In any case I asked Diem how I could recommend that the US invest more heavily in a military machine that was admittedly not effective in overall organization and operation, although, as he had said, individual units fight well. I said we had to have systematic planning and strong, competent overall military direction if we were to support effectively. Could an American, or Americans, help here? Diem would not answer directly, but said he recognized that GVN military establishment had to be "reorganized." When I came back to the point, Diem said he hoped General McGarr would help General Minh to fullest extent in his planning and would urge him to take the offensive, specifically a major offensive against Zone D. (General McGarr has, as reported, been doing just that for many months.) Thuan said later that part of difficulty in this regard is personal friction between General Minh and General Thanh, JGS Chief of Staff. On our requirement for coordination in planning and operations between ARVN commanders and US command of any US operational units (e.g., helicopter squadrons), Diem was clear and affirmative. In such cases, he recognized that there must be full cooperation in planning and operations and neither party would take an action or decision affecting the other without prior frank consultation. Summing up the discussion on the point of improving GVN efficiency, I said President Diem had stated certain things that held some promise of improvement, but that frankly I was still not in position satisfactorily to answer root question on mind of my government when it considering sending reenforcements to Viet-Nam-i.e., why is it that with forces now available, and with resources built up over seven years, GVN has not been able to mount a systematic and effective effort against an enemy estimated at 20,000 armed men? I thought inadequate governmental organization was part of the answer, and I did not think sufficient remedial measures for this had yet been suggested by President Diem.

On improvement of public image, President's attitude was one of sincere regret, at times edging on anger, that he had been misunderstood and misrepresented, especially abroad. He spoke earnestly along familiar lines of the need to build in Viet-Nam the "infrastructure of democracy" (education, sense of civic responsibility, administrative skills, political toleration); that infrastructure comes before "superstructure" of democracy, which can only come at a later stage, though as rapidly as possible. Over and over, Diem stressed his view that key to wider public support for GVN and himself is ability of government to provide protection to its people, this to be followed by the steady building of "infrastructure of democracy." No amount of window dressing, he argued, could substitute for the hard measures of self-sacrifice required to win against the Viet-Cong. This is a battle for the "hearts and minds" of the people; their basic sentiments are anti-communist; they must be given protection from terror in order to demonstrate their true allegiance. On specific measures discussed, he agreed that he should "get to the people more", by more visits (he already travels frequently and widely) and by more frequent radio talks. Thuan said later that Diem had agreed to talk over the radio at least once a month. On broadening the base of his government, he was generally negative; said that taking in dissidents or fence sitters in any broad government reorganization would not do any good and miss the point. Specifically on taking in a labor leader, Diem said that Buu was at cross purposes with the other principal trade unionists, and that to take any one or all of them in would not be practical or feasible. On release of political prisoners, Diem said that there are two kinds: communists, most of whom have committed crimes, who are in "rehabilitation camps", and are released periodically; about 30 who were active in November Coup, for whom public trials are being prepared. In summary, on this subject, Diem stuck to his guns; took little interest in any suggestions about measures to improve his public image; gave every impression that, so far as his own country is concerned, he felt confident in his judgment as a political leader and did not evidence concern about opinion outside.

I stressed throughout our requirement for a closer and more effective partnership. His reply in essence was that he cannot share the responsibility of governing South Viet-Nam with the United States; but that within that principle he too wanted to establish a closer and more effective partnership. In probing for specifics, I found some willingness to have US advisors on a selective and agreed basis in intelligence (both civilian and military), in military planning and operations, in joint provincial surveys (where however he insisted that these should be focused on intelligence and military aspects, not on political and social). Thuan said today that GVN prepared to organize surveys this month and that political and social matters could be inquired into, but this could not be advertised. Thuan also confirmed that the Border Ranger Force suggested by General Taylor could be organized and that sufficient ranger companies could be pried loose from static guard duty to form a force of from four to five thousand men.

I realize the above is not a clear picture. It is sent only as a raw report. I will attempt set down the essentials in a paper to be approved by Diem, with Thuan's assistance. I hope no decisions will be reached in Washington prior to this subsequent report. My own thinking, with full regard to the gravity of contemplated US moves, is that we can develop a base sufficiently solid to give positive results and to turn the tide here in our favor. While I think we can, on a case by case basis, work out arrangements for mutual cooperation and execution of a stepped-up effort, I do not think that the "public image" can be substantially improved unless and until the GVN begins to win the war against the Viet-Cong. I believe that the tide can be turned with the limited concessions which Diem is prepared to make now and others that we can obtain on piece meal basis. In sum, I believe that we should proceed with confidence.

Nolting

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